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**Collection:** Kemp, Geoffrey: Files  
**Folder Title:** Israel/Lebanon (Phase II) 1982 (1)  
**Box:** 90493

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY: Files  
 OA/Box: Box 904923  
 File Folder: Israel/Lebanon (Phase II) 1982 (1)

Archivist: smf/smf  
 FOIA ID: F97-106 - Wills  
 Date: 11/27/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	271801Z Aug 82 2p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #116</i>	8/27/82	<del>P1/B1</del>
2. cable	291322Z Aug 82 8p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #117</i>	8/29/82	P1/B1
3. cable	071836Z Sep 82 9p <i>P 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #118 - R 11/24/02 M2004-098/15 W 56967</i>	<del>9/7/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
4. cable	120645Z Sep 82 3p <i>A 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #119</i>	9/12/82	P1/B1
5. cable	161319Z Sep 82 13p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #120</i>	9/16/82	P1/B1
6. cable	McFarlane to Crisis Pre-Planning Group 1p <i>R 1/22/03 F97-106/2 #121</i>	n.d.	<del>P1/B1</del>
7. letter	RR to Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia 2p <i>K 4/7/06 " #122</i>	n.d.	<del>P1/B1</del>
8. letter	Malcolm Fraser to RR 2p <i>R " " #123</i>	n.d.	<del>P1/B1</del>
9. letter	Malcolm Fraser to RR 1p <i>R " " #124</i>	n.d.	<del>P1/B1</del>
10. draft letter	RR to Fraser 2p <i>R " " #125</i>	n.d.	<del>P1/B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
 B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
 B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
 B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 4/25/2007

**File Folder** ISRAEL/LEBANON (PHASE II) 1982 (1)

**FOIA**

F97-106/1

**Box Number** 90493

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
<del>2</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>291322Z AUG 82</del>	<del>8</del>	<del>8/29/1982</del>
		<del>mvh 3/11/08</del>		
<del>3</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>071836Z SEP 82</del>	<del>9</del>	<del>9/7/1982</del>
		<del>mvh 3/11/08</del>		

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 3093  
SIT894

DTG: 271801Z AUG 82 PSN: 007580  
TOR: 239/1823Z

EXDIS

DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF VP SIT EOB KEMP /009  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

EXDIS

PRIORITY  
STU3214  
DE RUEHTV #3093 2391814  
P 271801Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7869

*Handwritten:* ~~HT~~ Saw  
~~OK~~

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0345  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0780  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3514  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 7411  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5976  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 6016

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 13093

EXDIS

EXDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PLO, LE, IS, US, SY, XF  
SUBJECT: "PHASE TWO" WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN  
FORCES FROM LEBANON--NEED FOR U.S. POLICY  
REF: DAMASCUS 6166

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.  
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2. IN PREPARING FOR "PHASE TWO" NEGOTIATIONS, THE  
REAL PROBLEM WILL NOT BE HOW TO "EQUATE" THE  
BASES OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106/2 #116

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/23/02

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DTG: 271801Z AUG 82 PSN: 007580

EXDIS

(REFTEL). WHILE WE UNDERSTAND SYRIA'S SENSITIVITY ON THAT ISSUE, THE FACT REMAINS THAT U.S. POLICY, STATED BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY IN OUR TALKS HERE, HAS CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. REALISTICALLY, BUT ALSO WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR SYRIAN PERCEPTIONS, THE ONLY WAY TO REALIZE THIS OBJECTIVE WILL BE IN DEVisING SOME FORMULA WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR THE MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

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3. THE IMPORT OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR'S STATEMENT (CITED REFTTEL) AND BEGIN'S POSITION CONVEYED TO US PRIVATELY IS THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON. THE CHALLENGE FOR U.S. POLICY, THEREFORE, IS TO DEVELOP THE TACTICAL MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

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4. MINIMIZE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.

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PAGE 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 5815  
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TOR: 241/1447Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST  
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PRIORITY  
DE RUQMBE #5815/01 2411355  
P 291322Z AUG 82 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8326

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0599  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0588  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0701  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0752  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0590  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0825  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 5815

EXDIS  
FROM HABIB  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MILI, PEPR, PINT, LE  
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: WHAT AFTER BEIRUT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106/2 + 117

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

1. (~~8~~-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO LOOK FORWARD BEYOND THE PLO EVACUATION OF BEIRUT AND TO SET FORTH BRIEFLY THE PROBLEMS AND TASKS WE SHALL FACE. WE WILL NEED A CLEAR AND CONCISE COURSE OF ACTION LAID OUT FOR THE NEXT STAGE IN LEBANON. I KNOW THAT THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN UNDER

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ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IN THE DEPARTMENT, AND I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A FEW THOUGHTS.

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3. IF THE PLO WITHDRAWAL FINISHES AS PLANNED; IF THE LEBANESE POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE WAKE OF BASHIR GEMAYEL'S ELECTION BEGIN TO BE RESOLVED IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS; AND IF THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS DO NOT RESUME MAJOR MILITARY CLASHES ON THE EASTERN FRONT; WE WILL BE ABLE TO PURSUE THE REMAINING LEBANESE ISSUES IN A RELATIVELY PEACEFUL ATMOSPHERE. AT THE SAME TIME, I KNOW AND APPLAUD THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS FULLY SEIZED OF THE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE OVERALL ISSUES THAT IMPINGE ON OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT TOUGH TASK WILL BE MADE EASIER TO THE EXTENT THAT THE CRISIS IN LEBANON IS DEFUSED.

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4. THE LONGER TERM PROBLEMS IN LEBANON, BEYOND THE LIFTING OF BEIRUT SEIGE, THAT WILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED CENTER ON RE-ESTABLISHING LEBANESE AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WHOLE OF LEBANON. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, WE WILL HAVE TO ASSUME THAT BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER THERE WILL BE A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON ABLE TO FUNCTION WITH ACCEPTED LEGITIMACY. WE WILL NEED TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO BRING THAT ABOUT. THE MAJOR REMAINING PROBLEM WILL BE TO GET ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT LEBANON--ISRAELI, SYRIAN, AND THE REMAINING PLO COMBATANTS WHO ARE IN NORTH AND EAST LEBANON. TO DO THIS WILL REQUIRE ACTIVE US MEDIATION.

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5. IN ADDITION, AS SOON AS THE PLO LEAVE BEIRUT WE SHOULD SEEK SOME DISENGAGEMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM AROUND BEIRUT AND ITS IMMEDIATE SUBURBS, TO INCLUDE B'ABDA AND THE AIRPORT. THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WILL NEED THIS TO FUNCTION PROPERLY. WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF THE LAST PLO DEPARTURE THERE SHOULD BE NO ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST AND WEST BEIRUT AND THE ISRAELI LINES SHOULD BE

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DRAWN FROM THE COAST SOUTH OF KHALDAH TO POINT EAST OF BA' BDA UP TO ALAYH AND EAST TO SOFAR. ISRAELI FORCES IN THE MATN (NORTH OF THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY) WOULD REMAIN FOR THE TIME BEING AND A SUPPLY LINE TO THEM WOULD BE ARRANGED WITH THE LEBANESE WHO RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY AND ARE ALREADY THINKING ABOUT THE PROBLEM. THIS ADJUSTMENT OF ISRAELI LINES SHOULD BE MADE WITHOUT RELATION TO OVERALL WITHDRAWAL, BUT BE THE RESULT OF A DECISION TO LIFT FULLY THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT, REDUCE POSSIBILITIES OF CLASHES IN THE BEIRUT AREA AND BEGIN THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THEIR OWN COUNTRY.. THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAVE SET THIS AS A HIGH PRIORITY, RECOGNIZING THAT THE PERVASIVE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE BEIRUT AREA DETRACTS VISIBLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY FROM THEIR AUTHORITY. IT IS ALSO RECOGNIZED AS A LATENT FORM OF PRESSURE ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO DO WHAT ISRAEL WISHES.

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6. RIDDING LEBANON OF FOREIGN FORCES CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STRETCH OUT OVER MONTHS. THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON ACHIEVING SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES, WITH PLO COMBATANTS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE THROWN IN. IF EITHER THE ISRAELIS OR THE SYRIANS INSIST ON PRIOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE OTHER, IT WILL NOT WORK.

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7. WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL AS PRESIDENT AND A LEBANON PREPARED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, IT WILL BE

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MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE ISRAELI PRESENCE TO BE USED AS A LEVER TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT. DEALING WITH THE PLO WILL BE EASIER WITH THE SYRIANS OUT OF THE WAY AND A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MORE SURE OF ITSELF. GETTING THE SYRIANS TO AGREE TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES IS TECHNICALLY SIMPLE BUT POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE. AN OFFICIAL LEBANESE DEMAND SUPPORTED BY ARAB LEAGUE CONCURRENCE, PLUS THE LINKAGE TO ISRAELI SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL,



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 5815  
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DTG: 291322Z AUG 82 PSN: 009769  
TOR: 241/1504Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST  
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PRIORITY

DE RUQMBE #5815/02 2411415

P 291322Z AUG 82 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8327

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0600

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0589

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0702

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0753

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0591

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0826

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 5815

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

SHOULD PROVIDE THE IMPETUS FOR ENDING THE SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE WHICH IS IN LEBANON UNDER THE COVER OF THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE. SYRIAN INFLUENCE AND INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON WILL CONTINUE THROUGH VARIOUS MEANS, BUT NOT WITH A MILITARY PRESENCE. THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE BASED ON THE EXPECTATION THAT SYRIA WILL NOT SUPPORT A PARTITION OF LEBANON IN THE AFTERMATH OF GEMAYEL'S ELECTION.

8. THERE WOULD REMAIN THE PROBLEM OF GETTING THE PLO COMBATANTS OUT OF THEIR REMAINING POSITIONS IN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NORTH AND EAST LEBANON. THERE ARE PROBABLY FROM 10-12 THOUSAND OF THESE PLO WHOSE EVACUTAION TO OTHER COUNTRIES WILL MAKE THE BEIRUT WITHDRAWAL LOOK SIMPLE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS SOME QUESTION WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THIS PLO WITHDRAWAL AT A SEPARATE TIME FROM THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DEPARTURE. THE ISRAELIS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THEY DO NOT INTEND TO LEAVE LEBANON UNTIL ALL PLO MILITARY PRESENCE IS ENDED. THUS, WHILE IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO LEAVE PLO WITHDRAWAL TO A TIME IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT ISRAEL WILL INSIST ON SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF PLO COMBATANTS. THIS WILL COMPLICATE THE TASK GREATLY AND WOULD HOLD UP BOTH SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. LEAVING LEBANON OCCUPIED IN THIS MANNER IS ASURE FORMULA FOR MILITARY CLASHES AND FOR PREVENTING THE LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY FROM EXTENDING ITS WRIT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

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9. THUS, IT MAY BE PREFERABLE TO LET THE PLO WITHDRAWAL BE DEALT WITH IN A DIFFERENT TIME FRAME, BUILDING UPON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THE WIDE DISPERSAL OF PLO FORCES WHICH HAS BEEN A RESULT OF THE WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT. THIS PRESUPPOSES ALSO THAT STRENUOUS LEBANESE EFFORTS WILL BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT THOSE PLO WHO HAVE LEFT FROM COMING BACK AND RE-ESTABLISHING PLO POWER IN LEBANON. THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE THIS AS A MAJOR ORDER OF BUSINESS.

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10. TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OUTLINED ABOVE I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:

A. MORRIS DRAPER BE DESIGNATED AS THE PERSON TO CARRY ON AS THE US INTERMEDIARY WHEN NECESSARY. I DO NOT BELIEVE HE WILL NEED TO BE RESIDENT IN THE AREA CONSTANTLY BUT HE WILL NEED TO SPEND A GREAT DEAL OF TIME HERE. FOR REASONS OF MY HEALTH I MUST HAVE A GOOD REST. I WILL REMAIN AVAILABLE TO LEND A HAND FROM TIME TO TIME

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AND IF NEEDED AND UNDERSTAND THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM WILL ALSO BE INVOLVED. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH DRAPER AND HE IS WILLING.

B. WE MOVE WITHOUT DELAY TO ARRANGE FOR ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT IN AND AROUND BEIRUT. FOR THIS PURPOSE, I SUGGEST DRAPER STOP OFF IN ISRAEL AND SEEK ISRAELI UNDERSTANDING BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 8 FOR BRIEF CONSULTATIONS.

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C. UPON THE INAUGURATION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL AS PRESIDENT ON SEPTEMBER 23, WE BEGIN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AS THE OPENING STEP FOR PRODUCING AN AGREED PROCESS FOR SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD NEED TO BE MADE TO SATISFY ISRAELI SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE SOUTH (FOR EXAMPLE, THE 40 KILOMETER ZONE), AND THE ASSURANCES TO SYRIA FOR ITS SECURITY (ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BIQA') WILL NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO TALK PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL, SO BE IT, BUT I DOUBT THIS IS A NEAR-TERM PROSPECT AND IT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME A PRECONDITION FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

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D. IN ADDITION TO MARSHALLING OUR OWN AND INTERNATIONAL AID FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEBANON, WE SHOULD BEGIN A PROGRAM OF EFFECTIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE LEBANESE ARMY WHICH IS GOING TO BE COMPLETELY OVERHAULED. THIS WILL NOT BE EXPENSIVE, RELATIVELY SPEAKING, AND WILL REQUIRE BOTH TRAINING AND MATERIAL. THE FRENCH AND OTHERS WILL BE WILLING TO ASSIST, BUT WE SHOULD BE IN THE KEY POSITION.

EXDIS

E. TO KICK OFF THE POST-BEIRUT SITUATION, I SUGGEST WE SEND A SMALL BUT CAREFULLY CHOSEN DELEGATION (SIX PEOPLE AT MOST) TO REPRESENT THE US AT GEMAYEL'S INAUGURATION ON SEPTEMBER 23. WE ARE IN THE FRON RANK OF FRIENDS OF THE NEW PRESIDENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IT WILL SERVE OUR INTERESTS TO REMAIN THERE.

*Committee  
or  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 3464  
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TOR: 250/2242Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

EXDIS

OP IMMED  
STU3655  
DE RUEHTV #3464/01 2501843  
O 071836Z SEP 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8069

*[Handwritten signatures and notes]*  
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*[scribble]*

EXDIS

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0426  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0875  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3605  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7486  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 6094  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6084

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 13464

EXDIS

EXDIS  
FOR S/S, NEA, AND AMBASSADOR HABIB ONLY  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, SY PLO, US, XF  
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN LEBANON -- THE ISRAELI DIMENSION  
REF: A) STATE 243186, B) BEIRUT 5815, C) STATE 243164,  
D) TEL AVIV 13201

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. WE AGREE COMPLETELY WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT (REF A) THAT WE MUST WORK TOWARD ALL OF OUR GOALS IN LEBANON TOGETHER TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. AS DEPARTMENT

DECLASSIFIED

NLR M2008-098/15 # 5296

BY AMF NARA DATE 11/26/08

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EXDIS

HAS NOTED, SUCCESS IN ONE AREA WILL TEND TO BE MUTUALLY REINFORCING IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL; THE REVERSE IS ALSO TRUE. WE ALSO AGREE WITH THE NEED TO INTERNATIONALIZE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEBANON TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT IN THE END IT WILL BE THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH MUST DEAL WITH THE PLIGHT OF LEBANON. THEREFORE, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT IN OUR EFFORTS TO GET MORE INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON, WE NOT UNDERCUT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN AREAS WHERE IT CAN HELP ITSELF. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO SOME OF THE COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE STATE MESSAGE, OUTLINING NEXT STEPS.

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R E D E P L O Y M E N T F R O M I M M E D I A T E  
A R E A O F B E I R U T  
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3. AS RECENTLY AS EARLY LAST WEEK THE ISRAELIS WERE TELLING US THAT THEY INTENDED TO "REDEPLOY" THE FORCES THEY NOW HAVE AROUND WEST BEIRUT. MINISTER OF DEFENSE SHARON MENTIONED THIS TO SECRETARY SHULTZ, AND SHARON'S CHIEF NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, MAJOR GENERAL ABRASHA TMIR, TOLD OUR DATT THAT ISRAEL PLANNED TO REDEPLOY ITS FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA AFTER THE EVACUATION OF PLO FORCES FROM BEIRUT IS COMPLETED. AND, IN FACT, SOME LIMITED REDEPLOYMENTS AND THINNING OUT OF FORCES HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE DAYS SINCE THE EVACUATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

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4. NEVERTHELESS, RECENT ISRAELI COMMENT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT ANY SUBSTANTIAL REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM BEIRUT IS NOT IMMINENT. SHARON HAS AUTHORIZED GENERAL DRORY TO MEET WITH THE LAF AND TO BE HELPFUL ON SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR READJUSTMENT OF IDF LINES. HOWEVER, BOTH SHARON

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AND SHAMIR TOLD DRAPER ON SEPTEMBER 5 THAT ISSUES SUCH AS OVERALL REDEPLOYMENT OR COMPLETE IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT AIRPORT, WHICH HAVE LARGE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, COULD AND SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WAS INSTALLED. SHARON PUT AN EVEN MORE RESTRICTIVE CONDITION ON REDEPLOYMENT, SAYING ISRAELI TROOPS WOULD NOT BE MOVED UNTIL BEIRUT WAS "AN OPEN CITY." IN LIGHT OF SHARON'S "OPEN CITY" CONDITION, WHICH HE DEFINED AS AN ABILITY

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FOR ALL (ISRAELIS INCLUDED) TO TRAVEL FREELY THROUGHOUT BEIRUT, INCLUDING IN FORMERLY PLO-DOMINATED AREAS, IT WILL BE EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT TO MEET THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S PACIFICATION CRITERIA. WHILE SHARON MAY LOOSEN HIS DEFINITION OF AN "OPEN CITY" AS THE LAF CAN DEMONSTRATE ITS CONTROL OVER REMAINING LEFTIST MILITIAS IN WEST BEIRUT, THIS COULD BE A LONG DRAWN OUT PROCESS, NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO QUICK SOLUTIONS AND THEREFORE EARLY ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. THE ISRAELIS MAY ALSO CALCULATE THAT THEIR PRESENCE IN AND AROUND BEIRUT HAS A USEFUL INFLUENCE ON BASHIR.

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M U T U A L D I S E N G A G E M E N T

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5. THE CONTINUED CONFRONTATION OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES ALONG THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY AND IN THE BEKA'A VALLEY REMAINS A MATTER OF CONCERN.

SO LONG

AS THE TWO FORCES FACE EACH OTHER AT CLOSE QUARTERS, THE CHANCES OF A MISCALCULATION ON EITHER SIDE ARE GREAT AS WAS DRAMATICALLY SHOWN IN THE CAPTURE OF EIGHT ISRAELI SOLDIERS OVER THE WEEKEND. WE BELIEVE SOME VERY LIMITED MUTUAL DISENGAGEMENTS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE SYRIANS  
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PAGE 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 3464  
SIT278

DTG: 071836Z SEP 82 PSN: 022202  
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STU3664  
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O 071836Z SEP 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8070

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0427  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0876  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 13464

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MAY BE POSSIBLE IN CERTAIN AREAS, THOUGH SEVERAL FACTORS  
WILL IMPACT APPRECIABLY ON THE DEGREE OF DISENGAGEMENT WHICH  
CAN BE OBTAINED.  
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6. FIRST, THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT CHANGE THE DEPLOYMENT OF  
THEIR FORCES IN ANY WAY WHICH ADVERSELY IMPACTS UPON THEIR  
CONTROL OF THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY. THE ISRAELIS HAVE  
STRESSED THIS POINT REPEATEDLY, MOST RECENTLY DURING THE  
SEPTEMBER 5 SHARON/DRAPER MEETING, WHEN SHARON SAID ISRAEL  
WILL NOT RELINQUISH CONTROL OF THE HIGHWAY UNTIL ALL FOR-  
EIGN FORCES HAVE LEFT LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS WILL ALSO BE  
INFLUENCED BY SYRIAN PERSONNEL REINFORCEMENTS IN THE BEKA'A

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 071836Z SEP 82 PSN: 022202

EXDIS

VALLEY, AND PLO CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAELI FORCES FROM BEHIND SYRIAN LINES. IN OUR JUDGMENT, SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE IN AVOIDING A BUILD UP OF PERSONNEL IN THE BEKA'A AND SYRIAN CONTROL OVER THE PLO FORCES IN ITS AREA ARE PREREQUISITES TO ANY MUTUAL DISENGAGEMENT, HOWEVER LIMITED IN SCALE. FURTHER, THE ISRAELIS WILL ADAMANTLY OPPOSE ANY U.N. (OR OTHER) INVOLVEMENT IN ANY MUTUAL DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, SINCE THEY WILL NOT WANT THE SYRIANS (AND THE PLO) PROTECTED BY SUCH A BUFFER FORCE. IN THIS RESPECT, THE ISRAELIS WILL BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE, AS THEY WERE DURING THE SIEGE OF WEST BEIRUT, THAT ISRAELI PRESSURE WILL BE REQUIRED TO GET THE SYRIANS AND PLO ENTIRELY OUT OF LEBANON DURING THE SECOND PHASE.

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D E P L O Y M E N T O F L A F T O S O U T H E R N  
L E B A N O N  
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7. WHILE IT MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN AN IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND THE RESTORATION OF FULL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AUTHORITY IN THE SOUTH, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISER TO PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INCORPORATION OF HADDAD'S MILITIA FORCES INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY AS A FIRST STEP. WE HAVE ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE SEPARATE (IN TEL AVIV 13201 - REF D) IN RESPONSE TO REF C.

EXDIS

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P H A S E T W O -- SYRIAN AND PLO W I T H D R A W A L

8. THE ISRAELIS HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY THAT THEY WANT TO GET OUT OF LEBANON, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF DOING SO UNTIL AND UNLESS ALL OTHER FOREIGN FORCES (I.E., THE SYRIANS, THE PLO AND OTHER NON-LEBANESE ARMED ELEMENTS) ALSO LEAVE LEBANON. WE AGREE THAT THE PHASE TWO EVACUATION OF FOREIGN

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EXDIS

FORCES FROM LEBANON WOULD BE GREATLY SIMPLIFIED IF WE COULD DEAL WITH THE REMOVAL OF IDF AND SYRIAN FORCES FIRST, AND ADDRESS THE PLO FORCES IN NORTHERN LEBANON AT A LATER STAGE. AS NOTED IN AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MESSAGE (REF B), HOWEVER, THERE IS A BIG QUESTION WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE PLO SEPARATELY FROM THE ISRAELI/SYRIAN DEPARTURE SCHEDULE. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL WANT TO SEE PLO COMBATANTS WITHDRAWN SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES. SHAMIR, FOR EXAMPLE, SPOKE OF THE SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL AS THE PRECONDITION FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WHEN HE MET SECRETARY WEINBERGER SEPTEMBER 3. WHILE THIS WILL COMPLICATE THE TASK GREATLY, AND COULD HOLD UP BOTH SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL AGREE TO AN EVACUATION WHICH LEAVES ARMED PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS ANYWHERE IN LEBANON.

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 P E A C E T R E A T Y

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9. BEGIN AND SHARON ARE FIRMLY WEDDED TO THE IDEA OF AN EARLY PEACE TREATY WITH LEBANON, AND BEGIN IN PARTICULAR WILL NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM THIS GOAL. A PEACE TREATY IS, IN FACT, ONE OF ISRAEL'S BASIC OBJECTIVES REGARDING LEBANON (AS IT WAS IN THE ISRAEL-EGYPT NEGOTIATIONS), AND HAS BEEN STATED AS SUCH TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC. WE

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SURELY MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THIS GOAL THOUGH TACTICALLY WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE THE POINT THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF A TREATY ONLY WEAKENS BASHIR'S POSITION AND THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD BE BETTER PURSUED IN MORE DISCREET AND NUANCED WAYS. UNFORTUNATELY, ALTHOUGH OUR CONCERN HAS WIDE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AMONG MFA, MOSSAD, AND IDF PROFESSIONALS, BEGIN PERSONALLY TOTALLY REJECTS IT, AND SHARON ECHOES HIM. STOPPING PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE

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DTG: 071836Z SEP 82 PSN: 022202

TREATY ISSUE HERE IS THEREFORE NOW IMPOSSIBLE.

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10. WE SHOULD TRY TO DELINK THE TREATY ISSUE FROM  
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0428  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0877  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3607  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7488  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 6096  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6086

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 13464

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AND STRESS TO THE ISRAELIS THAT AN ATTEMPT TO  
INSIST ON SUCH A LINKAGE WOULD BE DISASTEROUS TO  
THE WORKING OUT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE  
WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. UNFORTUNATELY, SHARON HAS  
NOW PUBLICLY STATED WHAT HE AND OTHER DEFENSE OFFICIALS  
HAVE BEEN SAYING PRIVATELY, NAMELY THAT IF THE  
GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON REFUSES TO SIGN A PEACE  
TREATY WITH ISRAEL, ISRAEL WILL INSIST THAT A 40-50  
KILOMETER SECURITY BELT BE SECURED BY SPECIAL SECURITY  
ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON TO PROTECT  
ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDERS. WHILE THIS CONCEPT  
DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY THE STATIONING OF  
ISRAELI TROOPS IN THE SECURITY BELT, IT IS SAFE

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DTG: 071836Z SEP 82 PSN: 022206

EXDIS

TO ASSUME THAT SHARON ENVISAGES AT A MINIMUM AN EXPANDED HADDAD ENCLAVE TO FILL THE BUFFER ZONE OR SOME VERY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH BASHIR'S GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS INVOLVING SOMETHING AKIN TO A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY.

11. MINIMIZE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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*Important*  
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*Phase II*

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8593

EXDIS

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 694  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 677  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 804  
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NLS F97-106/2 #119

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

EXDIS

EXDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, LE, IS  
SUBJECT: PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL: A PHALANGE PERSPECTIVE

*HT. Make sure  
Rosen & Co  
understand  
I had long talk  
with him on Friday*

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. IN A SEPTEMBER 11 CONVERSATION WITH KARIM PAKRADUNI, PHALANGE POLITBURO MEMBER AND CLOSE ADVISOR TO BASHIR GEMAYEL, HE ELABORATED ON ISRAELI PRESSURES FOR A PEACH TREATY AND THE DANGER THIS POSED FOR BOTH LEBANESE AND U.S. INTERESTS. WHILE GENERALLY OPTIMISITC OVER THE PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL UNITY (SEPTEL), PAKRADUNI SAID THAT A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL WOULD DESTROY THIS PROCESS

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AND MAKE IMPOSSIBLE ANY EFFORT TO REBUILD LEBANON. PAKRADUNI STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SPEAKING AS ANY ENEMY OF ISRAEL: IT IS ISRAEL THAT IS BEHAVING AS THOUGH IT WERE LEBANON'S ENEMY.

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3. PAKRADUNI SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE MAKING IT CLEAR THEY WANT A PEACE TREATY AND THEY WANT IT NOW. THEY ARE ALREADY PRESSING FOR SOME FORM OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS EVEN BEFORE BASHIR TAKES OFFICE. AT THIS STAGE, SAID PAKRADUNI, IT IS A VERY SIMPLE CHOICE -- EITHER THE UNITY OF LEBANON OR A PEACE TREATY. PAKRADUNI BELIEVES THAT THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IS ON ITS WAY TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH BASHIR. HOWEVER, THEY SIMPLY WILL NOT ACCEPT A TREATY WITH ISRAEL. A TREATY MAY BE POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE, BUT AS BASHIR HAS SAID PUBLICLY, IT CAN ONLY COME ABOUT THROUGH A NATIONAL CONSENSUS. IF BEGIN AND SHARON MANAGE TO IMPOSE A TREATY, BASHIR WILL WIND UP FACING PARTIION.

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4. PAKRADUNI ASSERTED THAT THE U. S. POSITION WILL BE CRITICAL. IF WE DO NOT QUICKLY AND ACTIVELY OPPOSE EFFORTS BY THE ISRAELIS TO OBTAIN A TREATY, THEY WILL SUCCEED: NEITHER BASHIR NOR ANY OTHER LEBANESE IS STRONG ENOUGH TO STAND AGAINST THEM ALONE. PAKRADUNI ALSO ARGUED THAT THE U. S. WOULD LOSE AS MUCH IN THE REGION AS BASHIR WOULD IN LEBANON IF THE ISRAELIS WERE SUCCESSFUL. WITH THE GROWING CHRISTIAN-SUNNI RAPPROCHEMENT, BASHIR WAS ON HIS WAY TO BUILDING A REUNIFIED, STRENGTHENED LEBANON THAT WOULD BE CLOSE TO THE U. S. AND AN IMPORTANT BRIDGE TO THE REST OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE MAINTAINED, A PEACE TREATY SOUNDED ALMOST LIKE A SOVIET PLOT. IT WOULD MAKE BASHIR, WHO IS ALREADY IDENTIFIED AS A FRIEND OF THE U. S., COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER ARABS. HE WOULD BE LABELED AN AMERICAN-ISRAELI AGENT, AND U. S. INTERESTS WOULD SUFFER THROUGH IDENTIFICATION WITH HIM. THE SYRIANS

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WOULD HAVE A PERFECT EXCUSE TO REJECT ANY EFFORTS TOWARD A WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM THE BIQA' AND NORTH LEBANON. FINALLY, THE U. S. WOULD FIND ITSELF WITH A MAJOR ECONOMIC BURDEN. THE ARABS WOULD BOYCOTT LEBANON WHICH WOULD THEN BE DEPENDENT ON MASSIVE INFUSIONS OF FOREIGN AIDE. INSTEAD OF HAVING A BRIDGE TO THE ARAB WORLD, AMERICA WOULD BE IDENTIFIED WITH AND OBLIGATED TO SUPPORT A "SECOND ISRAEL", THE REMAINS OF A PARTITIONED LEBANON THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY BE A SATELLITE OF TEL AVIV.

EXD  
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5. PAKRADUNI CONCLUDED THAT DEVELOPMENTS WERE MAKING IT INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT ISRAELI INTERESTS IN LEBANON RUN COUNTER BOTH TO THOSE OF LEBANON ITSELF AND THOSE OF THE U. S. IN THE REGION. WE SHOULD NOT LET ISRAEL DICTATE ITS DESIRES ON THE QUESTION OF A PEACE TREATY: "PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO THE ISRAELIS."

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6. COMMENT: THIS IS THE STRONGEST REACTION WE HAVE HEARD FROM BASHIR'S CIRCLE ON THE SUBJECT OF A PEACE TREATY. PAKRADUNI IS ONE OF THE MORE INTELLIGENT AND THOUGHTFUL OF HIS ADVISORS, AND THE INTENSITY OF HIS PRESENTATION APPEARS TO REFLECT BOTH HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A TREATY AND A FEAR OF HOW HARD THE ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO PRESS. IT IS ALSO AN

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ILLUSTRATION OF A GROWING REALIZATION IN THE PHALANGE THAT WHILE ISRAEL AND THE PHALANGE MAY HAVE HAD THE SAME OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS THE PLO, THE RELATIONSHIP IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO MANAGE.

BARRETT

BT

WHSR  
ROUTE SLIP

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Clark	
McFarlane	C
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NSC S/S	C

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**B**

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S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 156 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages 2  
 FROM: LPBremer S/S 22540 7224  
 (Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Draft UN Resolution

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Mr. McFarlane	456-2257	

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: PLEASE DELIVER URGENTLY TO WILMA HALL.

S/S Officer: *LPB #*

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General  
(document S/-----),

Having listened to the statement by the Permanent  
Representative of Lebanon,

Taking note of Lebanon's determination to ensure the  
withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,

Calling again for the strict respect for Lebanon's  
sovereignty, territorial integrity, untiy, and political  
independence,

\*Condemning the murder of Lebanon's elected President  
and the effort thus to disrupt by violence the restoration  
of a strong, stable government in Lebanon,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),  
and, in particular, its call upon all the parties to the  
conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all  
military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-  
Israel border, demands the withdrawal of all foreign forces  
to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon, as  
well as its demand that Israel withdraw all its military  
forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally  
recognized boundaries of Lebanon.]

2. Condemns the recent Israeli incursions into Beirut  
in violation of the ceasefire agreements and of Security  
Council resolutions.

3. Demands an immediate return to the positions occupied  
by Israel before 15 September 1982, pending the full imple-  
mentation of Security Council resolutions.

4. Calls upon all governments who are in a position to  
do so to continue to deploy their best efforts to ensure the  
implementation of the present resolution and other pertinent  
resolutions of the Council.

5. Decides to remain seized of the question and asks  
the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on  
developments.

File  
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Phase II

② + FINAL 5/16/82

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DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (document S/-----),

Having listened to the statement by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon,

Taking note of Lebanon's determination to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,

Calling again for the strict respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), and in particular, its call upon all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border, as well as its demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon.

2. Condemns the recent Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the ceasefire agreements and of Security Council resolutions.

3. Demands an immediate return to the positions occupied by Israel before 15 September 1982, pending the full implementation of Security Council resolutions.

4. Calls upon all governments who are in a position to do so to continue to deploy their best efforts to ensure the implementation of the present resolution and other pertinent resolutions of the Council.

5. Decides to remain seized of the question and asks the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on developments.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 3925  
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DTG: 161319Z SEP 82 PSN: 034371  
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O 161319Z SEP 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8282

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0515  
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 1725  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0970  
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AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8919  
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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LEWIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR EG. IS. US. XF

SUBJECT: U.S. MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE AFTER TWO WEEKS:  
THE BATTLE LINES ARE DRAWN

REF: TEL AVIV 13405

EXDIS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

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EXDIS

2. SUMMARY: IN THE TWO WEEKS SINCE THE REAGAN  
INITIATIVE WAS UNVEILED, THE DEBATE IN ISRAEL  
OVER THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS HAS  
INTENSIFIED AND WILL ESCALATE FURTHER AFTER  
THE ISRAELI HOLIDAYS AND AFTER ARAB REACTION--  
PARTICULARLY KING HUSSEIN'S--AND AMERICAN  
INTENTIONS BECOME CLEARER. THE U.S. PROPOSALS  
HAVE BROUGHT INTO SHARP AND DRAMATIC FOCUS  
WHAT HAS BEEN BOTHERING ISRAELIS FOR A

EXDIS

GENERATION AND PARTICULARLY SINCE 1967: WHAT  
WILL ISRAEL'S FINAL BORDERS BE AND HOW CAN  
ISRAEL CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY WITH 1.3 MILLION  
PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA> IN  
HIS SKILLFUL MANAGEMENT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS,  
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IS TRYING TO PRE-EMPT THE  
SUBSTANTIVE DEBATE BY DANGLING THE PROSPECT OF  
EARLY ELECTIONS AND BY APPEALING TO THE SENSE  
OF PATRIOTISM AND SEIGE MENTALITY SHARED BY ALL  
ISRAELIS. TRY AS HE MAY, HOWEVER, PRIME MINISTER  
BEGIN HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO DOMINATE THE DEBATE OR  
YET RALLY ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION SOLIDLY BEHIND  
THE GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S  
PROPOSALS. AS LONG AS ISRAELIS

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DTG: 161319Z SEP 82 PSN: 034371

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DO NOT PERCEIVE BLATANT AMERICAN PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO AGREE WITH THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS OR FORCE ISRAEL TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN CONSIDERABLE SOUL-SEARCHING. IT SEEMS CLEAR. THEREFORE. THAT BEGIN WILL HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONVINCING THE OUTSIDE WORLD THAT THE ISRAELI PUBLIC SOLIDLY REJECTS THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. HOWEVER. BECAUSE OF POWERFUL DOMESTIC AND PERSONAL ASSETS WHICH BEGIN CAN MUSTER, HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO DRAW DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE INITIATIVE AND MORE ENDURING U.S. - ISRAELI TIES AND HIS GOVERNMENT WILL EXERT EVEN TIGHTER CONTROL OVER THE TERRITORIES AND STEP UP SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. COUNTING ON A WEAK AND DIVIDED OPPOSITION AND ARAB INABILITY TO TAKE STEPS TO ENTER THE PEACE PROCESS. BEGIN BELIEVES OUR POSITION WILL ERODE OVER TIME. CALM. STEADY DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE ACTIVE PURSUIT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND OF ARAB (I.E. HUSSEIN'S) WILLINGNESS TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS OPENLY ARE THE BEST U.S. RESPONSES TO BEGIN'S CHALLENGE. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE GREAT DEBATE IN ISRAEL HAS INDEED BEGUN, AND. MORE THAN IN ANY PERIOD SINCE JUST AFTER SADAT'S VISIT IN 1977. ISRAELIS

ARE SEIZED BY THE FUTURE PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF PEACE. IN PART BECAUSE OF THE WAY BEGIN HAS DRAWN THE LINES OF DEBATE, AND IN PART BECAUSE THE NUANCES OF TRANSITIONAL AUTONOMY ISSUES ELUDE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING, THE DOMESTIC DEBATE HAS CONCENTRATED ON FINAL STATUS ISSUES: THE BORDERS OF ERETZ ISRAEL. THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORIES. THE ROLE OF JORDAN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 3925  
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0516  
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 1726  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0971  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3458  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1218  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3711  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 0482  
DIA WASHINGTON DC// IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7565  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 7115  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6156  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 3008  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8920  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1462  
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0630  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4143  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2716  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 1598  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1529  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN IMMEDIATE

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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4. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, IN HIS SKILLFUL MANAGEMENT OF ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICS, IS TRYING TO PRE-EMPT THE SUBSTANTIVE DEBATE BY OPENING UP THE PROSPECT OF EARLY ELECTIONS AND BY APPEALING TO THE SENSE OF PATRIOTISM AND SEIGE MENTALITY SHARED BY ALL ISRAELIS, WHEN CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES LOOMS. HIS SEPTEMBER 8 SPEECH TO THE KNESSET WAS VINTAGE BEGIN--HE SOUGHT TO CHALLENGE THE OPPOSITION LABOR PARTY TO EARLY ELECTIONS FIRST OF ALL TO ACHIEVE AN ENLARGED ELECTORAL MANDATE FOR HIS VISION OF PERMANENT ISRAELI CONTROL OVER THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AND, SECONDLY, TO FORESTALL ANY POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE REAGAN INITIATIVE FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT NINE MONTHS. HE WANTS TO HOLD EARLY ELECTIONS DESPITE OPPOSITION WITHIN HIS OWN COALITION AND HE MAY WELL SUCCEED IN DRAGGING HIS RELUCTANT COALITION PARTNERS TO THE POLLS, THOUGH PROBABLY NO EARLIER THAN OCTOBER, 1983. BEGIN'S VIVID ASSERTION THAT ISRAEL IS NOT A "BANANA REPUBLIC" SUBJECT TO THE POLITICAL WHIMS OF WASHINGTON STRIKES VERY RESPONSIVE CHORDS HERE. THE PRIME MINISTER IS EXTREMELY ASTUTE IN JUDGING ISRAEL'S PUBLIC MOOD AND THE COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS OF PRE-ELECTORAL POLITICKING WILL SURELY REVEAL AGAIN HIS CONSIDERABLE RHETORICAL TALENTS AND AN UNCEASING DRIVE TO RALLY MORE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS.

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5. AS LONG AS ISRAELIS DO NOT PERCEIVE OR ANTICIPATE BLATANT AMERICAN PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO AGREE WITH OUR PROPOSALS, OR TO BRING THEM

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FORCEABLY TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN CONSIDERABLE SOUL SEARCHING. THE REVERSE ALSO APPLIES, NAMELY A PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN THREATS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL WILL STRENGTHEN BEGIN'S POLITICAL POSITION. PUBLIC OPINION IS DEEPLY DIVIDED OVER WHETHER ISRAEL SHOULD ABSORB THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (PUBLIC OPINION POLLS IN RECENT MONTHS INDICATE THAT ROUGHLY A THIRD OF ISRAELIS SUPPORT THIS OPTION) OR YIELD SOME PARTS OF IT UP FOR PEACE. THE MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LABOR AND LIKUD BLOCS.

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7. REACTION HERE TO THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE AT FEZ IS INDICATIVE OF HOW THE DEBATE CUTS ACROSS THE BODY POLITIC. THE GOVERNMENT CHARACTERIZED THE SUMMIT AS ANOTHER ROUND OF ARAB REJECTIONISM AND MANY BELIEVE THE FEZ PROPOSAL PLAYS INTO BEGIN'S HANDS. BUT FOR SOME ISRAELIS, THE SUMMIT WAS THE FIRST UNIFIED EXPRESSION OF ARAB WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PEACE AND NOT TO CONFRONT ISRAEL BY WAR. THE ULTIMATE QUESTION FOR THE ISRAELIS IS WHETHER FEZ II WILL PREVENT HUSSEIN FROM BECOMING THE PRIMARY ARAB INTERLOCUTOR AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. KING HUSSEIN'S COMMENTS IN A SEPTEMBER 13 BBC INTERVIEW HAVE ALSO PRODUCED MIXED REACTIONS. FOR LABOR, THE KING'S COMMENTS THAT IT HAS BEEN "ABSURD NOT TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL FOR 34 YEARS" AND HIS FAVORABLE REMARKS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN ARE SEEN AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS. OPENING UP THE DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT HUSSEIN IS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. CONVERSELY, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE DELIBERATELY DISMISSED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KING'S COMMENTS, ARGUING THAT THE KING DID NOT IN ANY WAY INDICATE A SERIOUS INTENT TO ENTER INTO

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DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. WE CAN EXPECT  
THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO ISSUE THIS CHALLENGE  
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TO JORDAN AND TO OURSELVES. SAYING IF JORDAN IS PREPARED TO APPEAR AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. ISRAEL WILL BE A PARTNER IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

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8. THE OPPOSITION LABOR PARTY IS ATTEMPTING TO STAKE OUT ITS OWN POSITION IN THE PUBLIC EYE. ALTHOUGH LABOR DISAGREES WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, SUCH AS THOSE RELATING TO JERUSALEM AND CONTINUING SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN SECURITY ZONES. MOST LABOR PARTY LEADERS REMAIN ENTHUSIASTIC AND SEE THIS ISSUE AS LABOR'S FIRST CHANCE TO DELINEATE CLEARLY A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S GOVERNMENT. THE LABOR PARTY IS SEIZING ON EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO REMIND THE PUBLIC THAT LABOR FORESEES REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR THE OPENING OF MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS. FOR INSTANCE, A LABOR PARTY SPOKESMAN DESCRIBED SEPTEMBER 14 THE GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO HUSSEIN'S REMARKS AS "A TRAGIC OVERSIGHT IN THE FACE OF A HISTORICAL CHANCE FOR PEACE." ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANTLY TROUBLED BY INTERNAL DIVISIONS, THE LABOR PARTY WILL SEEK TO CAPITALIZE ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S REJECTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS AND WILL CONTINUE TO FUEL THE DEBATE AS LONG AS THE JORDANIAN REACTION IS POSITIVE AND THERE IS NOT A PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN PRESSURE TO FORCE ISRAEL TO ACCEPT AN IMPOSED SOLUTION. NO ONE HERE, HOWEVER, BELIEVES LABOR IS PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF RALLYING ENOUGH SUPPORT TO CHALLENGE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S EFFECTIVE MASTERY OF ISRAEL'S POLITICAL SYSTEM. FORMER PRIME MINISTER RABIN'S LUKEWARM REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATES

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THE LEADERSHIP DILEMMA IN THE PARTY.

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9. TO CONCLUDE. THE DEBATE HAS BEEN OPENED AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. IT SEEMS CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN PRESENTING A CASE TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD THAT THE ISRAELI PUBLIC SOLIDLY REJECTS THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, BEGIN HAS RECOVERED HIS BALANCE AFTER THE INITIAL SHOCK AND HAS MANAGED TO GAIN CONTROL WITHIN THE CABINET AND MORE BROADLY, AS DEMONSTRATED IN LAST WEEK'S KNESSET DEBATE AND VOTE. HE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND THE BASIC FACT AND REALITY OF THE ENDURING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. ESPECIALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT, BELIEVING ONCE AGAIN THIS STORM CLOUD WILL ULTIMATELY PASS. HE WILL COUNT AMONG HIS ASSETS HIS UNPARALLELED POLITICAL POSITION WITHIN ISRAEL, STANDING IN STARK CONTRAST TO A WEAK AND DIVIDED OPPOSITION, AND THE INABILITY OF THE ARABS, AND ESPECIALLY KING HUSSEIN, TO ENTER UNEQUIVOCALLY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS AS MAPPED OUT AT CAMP DAVID. AND WITHOUT A DRAMATIC ARAB GESTURE, HE BELIEVES OUR POSITION WILL ALSO ERODE OVER TIME. IN THE MEANTIME, HIS

GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO EXERT EVEN TIGHTER CONTROL OVER THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND INTENSIFY SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ISRAEL IS THE PRINCIPAL ACTOR IN THIS DRAMA AND IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO START AGAIN, ITS POSITIONS MUST BE MORE FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. IN CONTRAST, THE LABOR OPPOSITION WILL HOPE BEGIN'S STRATEGY WILL CRUMBLE IN THE FACE OF OUR STEADY DETERMINATION TO

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ACTIVELY PURSUE THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND  
ON ARAB WILLINGNESS, ESPECIALLY BY HUSSEIN, TO  
TAKE A DECISIVE STEP FORWARD ON THE PATH TO PEACE.  
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10. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED.

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TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 3182

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 260877  
E. O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: SOPN. IS. LE. US  
SUBJECT: SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT ON LEBANON

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1. (LOU) FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS MADE SEPTEMBER 16 BY  
DEPARTMENT'S SPOKESMAN. POSTS SHOULD BRING STATEMENT  
TO ATTENTION OF APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

2. (U) "IT APPEARS FROM PRESS REPORTS AND EYEWITNESS  
ACCOUNTS. THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOW MOVED INTO STRATEGIC  
POSITIONS THROUGHOUT WEST BEIRUT AND CONTROL MUCH OF  
THAT SECTOR OF THE CITY. THIS IS CONTRARY TO ASSURANCES  
GIVEN TO US BY THE ISRAELIS BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND IN  
ISRAEL.

WE FULLY SUPPORT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S CALL FOR THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. WHICH ARE IN CLEAR VIOLATION  
OF THE CEASE-FIRE UNDERSTANDING TO WHICH ISRAEL IS PARTY.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

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By smf NARA, Date 11/21/00

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THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION IN OUR VIEW, FOR ISRAEL'S  
CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE IN WEST BEIRUT AND WE CALL  
FOR AN IMMEDIATE PULLBACK." SHULTZ

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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
MEMORANDUM FOR CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Secure Conference Call: Lebanon Coordination

At 10:00 a.m., September 24, 1982, I would like to convene a secure conference call among those of us involved in the various aspects of the U.S. contingent to the Beirut Multi-National Force (MNF). The purpose of the call is to ensure that we have effected all requisite coordination in the final hours before our units go in. I propose that we cover the issues as follows:

- o Intel Update . . . . . Bob Gates
  - Armed Lebanese Elements
  - Locations of Israeli forces
  - Soviet Reaction?
  
- o Status of Diplomatic Efforts . . . . Jon Howe
  - Congressional Notification
  - French, Italian, Lebanese concerns?
  
- o U.S. Military Preparations/Plans/Issues . . Paul Gorman  
Bing West
  
- o Public Affairs/Press Guidance . . . Bud McFarlane
  
- o Next Steps

If there are any additional items that you wish to have covered, or if anyone cannot be available for the call, please so inform. The NSC POC for confirmation is Oliver North, 395-3345/2000.

*for*   
 Robert C. McFarlane  
 Deputy Assistant to the President  
 for National Security Affairs

DISTRIBUTION:

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BY CAW, NARA, DATE 1/22/13

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S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 581 CLASSIFICATION Unclassified No. Pages 2109

FROM: Alan Romberg PA/PRESS 22492 2109  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Background Briefing On President's Statement,  
September 20 at the Department of State

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>WH</u>	<u>MORT ALLIN</u>	<u>456-2947</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: URGENT REQUEST - PLEASE SEND ASAP

S/S Officer: 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
ON  
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH REGARDING LEBANON  
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1982, 4:30 P. M.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The statement the President will make at 5:00 o'clock is designed to solve problems.

First, the problem of bloodshed and potential further bloodshed in Beirut.

Second, the problem of creating conditions whereby the duly constituted Government of Lebanon can assert itself and take control of its capital city.

Third, the problem of clearing Lebanon of all foreign forces so that the country of Lebanon can take charge of its destiny and govern itself.

And, finally, and of overriding importance, to emphasize once more the importance of the basic peace process and of finding that resolution of the legitimate needs and desires of the Palestinian people in a manner consistent with the security interests of Israel.

Those are the things to which the President's speech is addressed.

The immediate action is the expression on the part of the President of a willingness to once again take part in a multinational force that would establish a presence in Beirut and perform a function somewhat like the function of the multinational force that was there before. Obviously, it's not an identical function. It's not a function to provide for evacuation; it's a function to provide a presence that will help the armed forces of the Government of Lebanon to take charge of their central city.

Through the evening we have had intensive consultations with the Government of Lebanon, with the French, the Italians and the Israelis. The French and the Italians have agreed to join with us in this multinational force.

I might note that the Italians suggested it, I think, on September 18, or, at any rate, several days ago positively, so they were very easy to persuade, as were the French.



The Government of Lebanon, in consultation with various factions in Lebanon, has urgently requested that the multinational force return. The Government of Israel has been asked to withdraw its forces. As you know, this has been a request on the books: Withdraw its forces from Beirut and to cooperate fully with a multinational force.

We have been assured that the Cabinet will meet tomorrow morning, Israeli time, and consider this request.

Again, I want to emphasize the primary thrust of this statement as being directed towards solving problems and looking toward the longer-term problems as well as the immediate problem of Beirut, although the immediate problem in Beirut is, of course, one that must capture our hearts and our minds and attention.

I recognize that it's very hard for you to ask questions about a speech that you haven't seen, but it may be that you have enough sense of it to ask some questions; and, when it comes in, we can pause for a minute while you quickly leaf through it, then we can come back to questions.

The President will go on the air at 5:00.

Q One, how many Marines will go? Will there be any time limitation, and does this have to be cleared with Congress?

A The U.S. forces will be deployed in accordance with the War Powers Act. The precise dispositions are being reviewed now by the military, and the military representatives from the Governments are in the process of doing that.

We envisage a force on the order of the force that was there before.

Q Could I just follow that up? In accordance with the War Powers Act means that there will be a limit of X number of days, whether it's 30 or 60.

A It depends upon the section of the War Powers Act under which the notification to Congress takes place, or whether, indeed, there is a particular section that is singled out.

The President, according to law, must decide on that within 48 hours of the introduction of any American forces, and he will do so; and he will make that decision when the time comes.

I would say that we have no intention whatever of introducing American forces into a basically conflict situation, and as before this will be a case, if they go in, where they will go in at the request of the Government of Lebanon which has itself secured the cooperation of the various principal groups in Lebanon. We expect to hear from the Israeli Government what their attitude will be. Obviously, if they say they will oppose the coming of a multinational force, we won't deploy under those circumstances, but we don't think that that will be the case.

Q Sir, can you tell us what you expect the Israeli response to be? You've obviously been, as you said, in consultation with them all this time. And I know the Cabinet will meet tomorrow, but at this point, since the President is speaking, what is your expectation? What do you hope the Israelis will say, and how will they respond?

A Of course, it is for the Israeli Government to speak for itself, and I don't know that it's worthwhile for me to speculate too much.

We haven't received any big negative, and in exchanges that I've had with Foreign Minister Shamir, he has gone out of his way to point out that there is underway a process of turning over positions in Beirut to the armed forces of the Government of Lebanon, and that is underway.

So I take that as a signal that the idea of a withdrawal is something that they are contemplating, but I don't want to get myself in the position of seeming to speak on their behalf.

-- MORE --

Q Will the Americans go into the camps?

A The actual deployments are in the process of being worked out. They will probably be along the lines of the deployments that we had before, possibly extending further south but I don't want to comment further on that because that is something that is now being worked out.

The function of the force is not to be an internal security or police force. We expect the Government of Lebanon Armed Forces to perform that function. So I wouldn't expect that these forces would go into the camps.

Q Given the facts you now know about what happened in Lebanon following the death of Bashir Gemayel, was it a mistake to withdraw the Multinational Force as early as it was withdrawn?

A I think it is important to point out that when the Multinational Force was withdrawn before, the basic mission, that is, the evacuation of the PLO and the establishment of stable conditions under the control of the Government of Lebanon existed. There was a new president who had been elected by a constitutional process, and all of the indications were that a process of reconciliation was underway and there was calm, and I think every reason to believe that the situation was as contemplated.

I think it was appropriate to withdraw. Now, of course -- I'll just speak for myself -- when you have a tragedy like what we have seen, and you have been in any way connected with the things that have gone on there, you have to ask yourself, or I ask myself, while feeling that what we did was right and proper and would be done again, you can't help but say to yourself, is there anything that could have been done that could have possibly avoided this horrible massacre.

I don't know what it could have been. I don't think that under the circumstances the Multinational Force was withdrawn too soon; no, I don't.

Q A couple of questions: One, what happened to the idea of sending some of the UNIFIL Forces into Beirut? Was that idea not acceptable to the Israelis?

And, secondly, to clear up any confusion, if the Israeli Government says no, you said we wouldn't go in; if the Israeli Government says okay, when would you contemplate the forces would be able to arrive -- after the Israelis have left Beirut or as they are leaving or what?

A They are in the process of turning over posts right now. I think our expectation is that that process will continue and so a process of withdrawal will continue. I think the further it goes, by the time the Multinational Force arrives, the better.

As far as when could they arrive, I think, in a kind of physical sense, considering where people are and how they can be transported and so on, that probably contingents can arrive in approximately 72 hours. But, at any rate, this is something that is being worked out.

Q And the UNIFIL Force?

A Let me read to you, reminding you of the U.N. Resolution. It says "Requests the Secretary General as a matter of urgency to initiate appropriate consultations and, in particular, consultations with the Government of Lebanon on additional steps which the Council might take, including the possible deployment of United Nations Forces to assist that government," and so on.

The consultations with the Government of Lebanon, including those that took place before this vote occurred, were such as to find the Government of Lebanon definitely preferring a Multinational Force, and the Government of Lebanon has expressed itself as wanting this Multinational Force to come in. It's a very clear expression of their intent.

Q You said that the overriding importance of what the President had to say, or the third point was the forward progress on the peace plan itself, and you implied the events in Lebanon have distracted, to some extent, the attention from that.

A Let me correct that, if that's the impression I gave. Obviously, they have distracted attention from everything. But I think they serve only to underscore the importance of all parties coming together, sitting down and trying to resolve these differences. And, again, we see it is the Palestinian issue that seems to be at the heart of this.

Without trying to go into the detail of it, I think it only underscores the point that if we are to see any fundamental stability and peace in the region, we must address the Palestinian issues.

Q What I wanted to ask you, sir, was if any new impetus is being planned in order to advance that process?

A We are in very strong and constant diplomatic

communications with the various governments concerned. Clearly, the flow of effort has been diverted, for the moment, to the problem in Beirut, and naturally so, but we are determined to push hard on the basic peace process.

The President is determined to do so, and in his address he emphasizes this point.

Q Before the United States demanded that the Government of Israel withdraw its troops from West Beirut immediately, and now it's asking them to withdraw.

A Our demand for withdrawal stands as stated and it's there. We demand that they withdraw. They are in the process of some turnover, so we regard that as progress. But we feel very strongly that they must leave.

Q How long do you think the troops may remain in Beirut?

A It's hard to say. I think it's a mistake to name some number of days or something like that. We will introduce, of course, our portion of the troops under the War Powers Act and the War Powers Act does treat, depending on what section is involved, the question of duration and how duration is determined.

The answer is that the War Powers Act sets out certain conditions under which troops are introduced, and the President does it under one of the two conditions or it leaves that question open. And depending on which of those three routes is chosen, the Act specifies the conditions under which they stay.

Q So the answer is, you don't know at this point how long they're expected to stay?

A The answer is that we haven't determined, and at this point I think it is impossible to determine the number of days it will take for the Government of Lebanon to be judged and to judge itself as now in control and confident that it can do the job and the Multinational Force should leave. So we will have to see how that situation develops, and my basic answer was that I think it's a mistake to say now what we think the situation might be like ten days from now, twenty days from now, thirty days from now, forty days from now. I think it's a mistake to get yourself in that frame of mind.

--MORE--

Q Sir, when you met with the President this morning, was he at all interested in calling for some sort of investigation as to what happened in the Beirut massacre?

A We are, of course, trying to find out all the facts we can. We have our own sources; there are authoritative news accounts being produced; the Government of Israel has called for an investigation. I don't think we are going to lack for investigations, but clearly, we want to determine how this horrible event took place.

The President's speech emphasizes that this is not the time to dwell and spend all of our time on that question, on the recriminations and whatnot, but really to look to the future, to see the problem as it exists, to try to contribute, take hold of the problem as it exists, then focusing on the underlying causes, and trying to do something about them. It is, I think, as always with the President, constructive, forward-looking, and designed to solve these problems.

Q Mr. Secretary, you did not quite answer a question I asked before. The statement the State Department made yesterday was that the United States had asked Israel's cooperation in having UNIFIL forces go into Beirut, and you were waiting for a reply. Did the Israelis not reply or did they --

A They replied. Actually, what happened was, the Secretary-General, after the U.N. vote, wrote a letter to me and asked me to ask the Israelis if they would cooperate with the movement of the UNIFIL force to Beirut. I did write to Foreign Minister Shamir and suggested that the Secretary General also be in touch directly with Foreign Minister Shamir. The Foreign Minister has written me back, and the gist of his reply is that the matter was discussed in the Israeli Cabinet and they find it troublesome. It did not decline; it did not say yes. It said that it found that issue troublesome. I think there is a sense in which the request of the Government of Lebanon overtook the subject.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your talks with Foreign Minister Shamir, did he indicate any greater willingness on the part of Israel now to consider our other demand that they withdraw from all of Lebanon, as a result of the massacre?

A What I said was that in response to the Secretary-General's request, I wrote Foreign Minister Shamir about this specific matter of the UNIFIL force, and I had a response from him which covered that, as I mentioned, and also went out of its way to point out to me the turnovers that are

taking place. That's the direct communication I had with Foreign Minister Shamir. We have had many discussions -- I don't have them tabulated here -- with Ambassador Arens who, in turn, has talked back and forth with his government although it has been difficult because of the time of holidays.

Q Are you saying, then, that there has been no communication between the two governments since Friday about the subject of the Israeli withdrawal from all of Lebanon, not just the limited withdrawal from Beirut, but from all of Lebanon?

A This subject has been constantly in our minds and always present, but clearly, when we had the event of the murder of Bashir Gemayel and the unfolding of things that happened subsequently to that, the focus of our attention was, of course, on Beirut and what was going to happen there. That was the principal focal point of our discussions.

Q Can I nail down one more thing? I'm not that clear what the purpose of the multinational force is because both you and the President have gone out of your way to say that it is not there to be an internal security force or police force, but to make it possible for the lawful authorities of Lebanon to do so for themselves.

My question is, is the main purpose of the force a political one to hasten the withdrawal of the Israelis from Beirut, or somehow make the Lebanese feel better? What will the force actually be doing?

A It will take up positions that are of importance because they mark a line between two population groups that have historically had a certain amount of antagonism toward each other. I think that in itself provides a certain measure of stability. And you remember, this was the line along which the deployments took place before. Secondly, the very presence of these forces I think can be expected -- and the Government of Lebanon clearly expects them -- to provide a kind of measure of stability and international attention.

I think, undoubtedly, it will be a factor in the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. Those are the types of things I think it can do. Its presence, in other words, is a significant fact in itself in helping the Government of Lebanon to take control. But it is the Government of Lebanon and its armed forces that have the basic task of taking charge of their internal security.

Q Along that same line, when the earlier forces were sent, it was specifically stated that it was to be in a non-combatant role, as I recall. Is that also the intention with these Marines?

A Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, you can't say how long the Marines will stay. Can you say how long it should take the Israelis to withdraw from the City of West Beirut?

A I think they can withdraw very rapidly. The Government of Lebanon and the generals in charge of the army have assured us through Morris Draper that they feel that they can take up those positions, so our demand of two days ago, I guess it was, that you referred to, was based on that. We referred to that, and that was the basis for saying, "Withdraw immediately." So we have reason to believe that there is capability there.

The Government of Lebanon at the same time has requested the multinational force; they think it will be helpful in this process. And we feel that under all the circumstances, the United States, and I believe the Governments of France and Italy feel likewise have a responsibility to return and help. That is what is being done.

At the same time, I think we must not let our attention get riveted exclusively to this particular problem, but also bear in mind that there are broader problems; and while these tragic events capture our attention, the broader problems are the significant ones that must be solved if we are going to avoid a continuation of this.

I don't know about you people, but I want to catch the President's speech.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:55 p.m.)

- - -



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 20, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD CHILDRESS 

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Fraser Correspondence to the President

On August 26, Prime Minister Fraser wrote to the President congratulating him on Ambassador Habib's successful negotiations in Beirut (Tab B).

On September 8 at the Credentials Ceremony, the new Australian Ambassador passed a letter from Prime Minister Fraser introducing Bob Cotton as an old friend and further praising the President's "courageous and forthright" initiative on the Middle East. In addition, he indicated that he and his Cabinet were seeking to mobilize support for free trade as discussed with the President in May.

Gaston Sigur and Howard Teicher concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President transmitting a reply to both letters.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments

Tab I      Memorandum for Signature to the President  
           A      Letter for Presidential Signature  
           B      Fraser Letters dated 8/26/82 and 9/8/82  
 Tab II     State Memo dated 9/7/82

cc: ~~Gaston Sigur~~  
 ✓ Howard Teicher

TAB  
I

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Fraser Correspondence

Issue

Reply to letters from Prime Minister Fraser.

Facts

Prime Minister Fraser has written two letters to you. The first at Tab B congratulates you on the successful conclusion of Ambassador Habib's negotiations in Beirut. The second at Tab B which was handed to you at the Credentials Ceremony by Sir Robert Cotton introduces him as an old friend, praises your recent Middle East initiative and reaffirms he and his Cabinet's active pursuit of free trade as discussed in your May meeting.

Discussion

Prime Minister Fraser is one of your strongest supporters on a broad range of initiatives. The proposed reply at Tab A thanks him for his support and amplifies on our Middle East initiatives.

RecommendationOK      No

\_\_\_\_\_ That you sign the letter at Tab A.

## Attachments

Tab A      Letter for Your Signature  
Tab B      Fraser Letters of 8/26/82 and 9/8/82Prepared By:  
Richard Childress



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Malcolm:

Thank you very much for your letters of August 26 and September 8. Your very kind words on the successful resolution of the West Beirut crisis, and our recent initiative on the Middle East are most welcome. I, too, am extremely pleased and proud that Ambassador Habib's skill and patience have resulted in the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut.

With the completion of the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut, we will turn our attention to negotiating arrangements for the withdrawal of PLO, Syrian, Israeli and remaining forces from Lebanon. We will continue to work closely on such issues with the Lebanese government, as we encourage it to exert maximum effort to strengthen its institutions, expand its authority throughout its sovereign territory and promote a genuine reconciliation among Lebanon's many communities.

It is generally agreed that certain international peacekeeping arrangements in an extensive area of southern Lebanon will have to become part of a general solution. In this context there can be no return to the situation in which southern Lebanon can be used as a staging area for military attacks against Israel. Again, we will be working closely with the Lebanese government on issues such as these, particularly as they relate to the restoration of the government's control over all of its sovereign territory.

Australia's contribution to the reconstruction of Lebanon is welcome, indeed. The United States continues to be determined to exert every possible effort to alleviate the enormous human and material

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BT CS NARA, DATE 4/7/06

losses which the Lebanese people and other innocent inhabitants of Lebanon have sustained. We hope the World Bank will take the lead in coordinating international reconstruction efforts for Lebanon.

In addition, I wanted to tell you how much I appreciate your recent statement of support on our Middle East initiative. I firmly believe that the Arab states and Israel have a unique opportunity at this moment to further the cause of peace, an opportunity in which the United States can play a major role, in seeking to expand the negotiations to include the Palestinians and Arab states prepared to pursue the cause of peace through negotiations. Most significantly, I concluded that the United States could no longer remain silent on the critical issues involved, if we are to inject a fresh start in the peace process. It is my fervent hope that we will succeed in resurrecting the spirit of peace and hope for a just solution for the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects. I welcome your support and counsel as we pursue these goals.

In closing, let me say I am most pleased that Bob Cotton is here as your new Ambassador. He is an obviously able representative and more importantly an old friend of yours.

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable  
John Malcolm Fraser, C.H., M.P.  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra





PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

With the withdrawal of the PLO fighters from West Beirut now going on, I am writing to express to you the Australian Government's warm congratulations on the achievement for United States foreign policy which this represents.

Along with other members of the international community, we have admired very much your steadfastness of purpose through this most trying period, as well as the skillful and tireless contribution of your special emissary, Philip Habib. This successful outcome has shown the immense value of determined United States leadership.

I am sure that we share the hope that this traumatic and distressing episode will lead to a new stage in the affairs of the Middle East, when it will prove possible to address the underlying causes of conflict in a constructive and sustained way. The defiant shouts of the PLO fighters as they left Beirut showed that the new opportunity that may exist will be anything but easy to grasp, but I can assure you of firm Australian support for efforts to that end.

More immediately, of course, we hope that it will shortly prove possible for the process of rebuilding and reconstruction in Lebanon to commence.

We have noted the generous assistance for the relief and rehabilitation of Lebanon which the United States has promptly announced. Earlier this month I announced on behalf of the Australian Government that we would be providing a special initial sum of \$10 million for the reconstruction of Lebanon. I am commending this decision personally to Heads of Government of potential donor countries, and of some other leading countries, in the hope that our action will contribute to a broadly-based and effective co-operative effort to rebuild Lebanon after the devastation it has experienced.

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2\* CU NARA, DATE 4/7/06

...2/



2.

I repeat how much we in Australia have admired your sustained efforts to bring about a peaceful end to the seige of Beirut, and your country's characteristic generosity in addressing the human and economic problems of Lebanon.

The Honourable Ronald Reagan,  
President of the United States,  
WASHINGTON D.C.  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

Bob Cotton is an old and trusted political colleague of mine and I know he will do much in Washington to strengthen the uniquely close bonds between our two countries. Following a distinguished Ministerial career in Australia, Bob subsequently served with distinction as Australia's Consul-General in New York where much of his work lay in strengthening our commercial links. Accordingly he brings an unusual depth of perspective to our mutual interests and concerns, and I commend his acquaintance highly to you.

May I also say how much we in Australia have admired your courageous and forthright recent initiative on the Middle East. You will know that immediately after your statement, I declared firm Australian support for your efforts in search of a just and lasting settlement. Clearly, forbearance as well as strength will be required in winning over an initially suspicious and even defiant Israel. But I am sure that the effort will be worthwhile, in the long-term interests of all the countries and peoples concerned. We both know that, ultimately, the solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute must be a peaceful political one.

I take this opportunity to say that my Cabinet colleagues and I have maintained the concern about trends in world trade which I set out to you when we met in Washington in May. Since then, we have been active in seeking to mobilise support for the free trade case, looking particularly to the forthcoming GATT Ministerial Meeting in November. I know that we will continue to work together on this vitally important issue.

The Honourable Ronald Reagan,  
President of the United States,  
WASHINGTON D.C.,  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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NLS F97-106/2 #124

87 91 NARA, DATE 4/7/06



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 7, 1982



P10: 17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Response to Letter to the President from the  
Australian Prime Minister

Australian Prime Minister John Malcolm Fraser wrote to the President on August 26 congratulating him on the successful conclusion of Ambassador Habib's negotiations in Beirut (Tab B). A draft response is attached at Tab A.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive SecretaryAttachments:

- Tab A - Draft response
- Tab B - Letter from Australian Prime Minister

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 11/22/00~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

PROPOSED REPLY

Dear Malcolm:

*and September 8.*

Thank you very much for your letter<sup>s</sup> of August 26, ~~with~~ your very kind words on the successful resolution of the West Beirut crisis. *and our recent initiative on the Middle East was most welcome.* I, too, am extremely pleased and proud that Ambassador Habib's skill and patience have resulted in [a plan for] the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut, [and am heartened by the overall success of the plan's implementation.]

With the completion of the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut, we will turn our attention to negotiating arrangements for the withdrawal of Syrian, Israeli and remaining PLO forces from Lebanon. We will continue to work closely on such issues with the Lebanese government, as we encourage it to exert maximum effort to strengthen its institutions, expand its authority throughout its sovereign territory and promote a genuine reconciliation among Lebanon's many communities.

It is generally agreed that certain international peacekeeping arrangements in an extensive area of southern Lebanon will have to become part of a general solution. In this context there can be no return to the situation in which southern Lebanon can be used as a staging area for military attacks against Israel. Again, we will be working closely with

The Right Honorable  
John Malcolm Fraser, C.H., M.P.,  
Prime Minister of Australia,  
Canberra.

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NLS 197-106/2 #175  
BY: CU NARA, DATE 4/7/16

the Lebanese government on issues such as these, particularly as they relate to the restoration of the government's control over all of its sovereign territory.

Australia's contribution to the reconstruction of Lebanon is welcome, indeed. The United States continues to be determined to exert every possible effort to alleviate the enormous human and material losses which the Lebanese people and other innocent inhabitants of Lebanon have sustained. We hope the World Bank will take the lead in coordinating international reconstruction efforts for Lebanon.

In closing, I wanted to tell you how much I appreciate your recent statement of support on our Middle East initiative. I firmly believe that the Arab states and Israel have a unique opportunity at this moment to further the cause of peace, an opportunity in which the U.S. can play a major role, in seeking to expand the negotiations to include the Palestinians and Arab states prepared to pursue the cause of peace through negotiations. Most significantly, I concluded that the United States could no longer remain silent on the critical issues involved, if we are to <sup>inject a peace spirit into</sup> restore credibility to the peace process. It is my fervent hope that we will succeed in resurrecting the spirit of peace and hope for a just solution for the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects. I welcome your support and counsel as we pursue these goals.

Sincerely,

Ron

*In closing let me say  
I am most pleased that  
Bob Cotton is here as your new  
Ambassador. <sup>He is an</sup> Obviously able  
representative and signatory an old  
friend of yours.*

RECEIVED 29 SEP 82 18

TO PRESIDENT

FROM ROTH, WILLIAM V

DOCDATE 21 SEP 82

DOBERSTEIN, K

27 SEP 82

*Kemp*

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

MIDDLE EAST

WAR POWERS

CO

SUBJECT: RESERVATIONS RE SENDING US TROOPS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: ANY ACTION REQUIRED

DUE: 01 OCT 82 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

KIMMITT

SOMMER

NORTH

BOVERIE

COMMENTS

REF# 100439

LOG

NSCIFID

( J / J )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

<i>State</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>10/4</i>	<i>Prepared per Kemp + Scowles</i>		
	<i>C</i>	<i>10/4</i>	<i>Direct Reply / Furnish Info. by</i>	<i>10/2</i>	<i>GK, RK, PS.</i>

DISPATCH

*SG 10/4*

W/ATTCH

FILE *WA*

*(C)*

October 4, 1982

TO: NSC/S

FROM: GEOFF KEMP

RE-OPEN AND SEND TO STATE FOR  
DIRECT REPLY.



# 6787

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO Geoffrey Kemp,

Recommend you send a note to NSC/S telling them to assign 6787 to State for direct reply. This would be consistent with ~~our~~ our approach to other Compensation letters on US troops in Lebanon.

~~Noted~~ Liz

Prema  
Walter - General  
in keeping with  
above suggestion  
Peter Sorensen

REFERRAL

DATE: 04 OCT 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: ROTH, WILLIAM V

DATE: 21 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

MIDDLE EAST

WAR POWERS


CO

SUBJ: RESERVATIONS RE SENDING US TROOPS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

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REQUIRED ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY

DUE DATE: 12 OCT 82

COMMENTS:



FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER  
STAFF SECRETARY

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

100439

September 21, 1982

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As I wrote to you last July, I have very grave reservations about sending American troops to the Middle East. Although I can appreciate your determination that the explosive situation in Lebanon requires extraordinary measures, I strongly urge you to withdraw our forces at the earliest possible date. In my view, only when all foreign troops withdraw completely will the Lebanese government have a decent chance to reassert its legitimate authority.

Sincerely,



William V. Roth, Jr.  
U. S. Senate

WVR/bcg

September 27, 1982

Dear Senator Roth:

This is to let you know that your September 21 letter has been received and brought to the President's direct attention. We appreciate being apprised of your serious reservations about sending troops to the Middle East; and be assured that the concerns you have raised are receiving close attention. Your letter is also being shared with the appropriate national security advisers for their careful review and consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: NSC Secretariat w/copy of inc., for  
appropriate action

cc: Pam Turner w/copy of inc., FYI

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT WILL RETAIN ORIGINAL INCOMING

KMD:CMF:vml--

ND007

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 82109122

Name of Correspondent: Bill Roth

MI Mail Report      User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: "Although I can appreciate your determination that the explosive situation in Lebanon requires extraordinary measures, I strongly urge you to withdraw our forces at the earliest possible time... Only when all foreign troops withdraw completely will the Lebanese Government have a decent chance to reassert its legitimate authority"

ROUTE TO:      ACTION      DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>LA DUBE</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>820922</u>	<u>KD</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>82109127</u>
<u>✓ NS Sec</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>820929</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
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		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
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		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
  - C - Comment/Recommendation
  - D - Draft Response
  - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
  - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
  - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
  - S - For Signature
  - X - Interim Reply

- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
  - B - Non-Special Referral
  - C - Completed
  - S - Suspended

**FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**  
 Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
 Code = "A"  
 Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOP).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.