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 FOIA ID: F97-106 - Wills
 Date: 11/27/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Marshall to Ikle re Options-1p R 4/7/06 NLS897-106/2 #145	10/6/82	P1/B1
2. paper	re Options 17p R " " #146	n.d.	P1/B1
3. memo	Kemp/Teicher to Clark-1p R " " #147	10/7/82	P1/B1
4. memo	Clark to Shultz re Policy Planning-1p R " " #148	n.d.	P1/B1
5. minutes	Interagency Group No. 31-3p R " " #149	10/7/82	P1/B1
6. cable	081632Z Oct 82 3p P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #150 R 11/25/08 M2008-098/15 #52971	10/8/82	P1/B1
7. cable	081745Z Oct 82 6p R 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #151	10/8/82	P1/B1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/25/2007

File Folder ISRAEL/LEBANON (PHASE II) 1982 (4)

FOIA

F97-106/1

Box Number 90493

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	MEMO	MARSHALL TO IKLE RE OPTIONS	1	10/6/1982
			<i>mvH 3/11/08</i>	
2	PAPER	OPTIONS	17	ND
			<i>mvH 3/11/08</i>	

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F97-106/z

#146

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C11

NARA, DATE

4/7/06

Considering Different Options for Lebanon

(S) At this point, there is much we do not know about the status of Ambassador Habib's discussions with the Syrians. Even if he has achieved Assad's agreement in principle to withdraw from Lebanon, many unanswered questions remain. Moreover, as we saw in the tortuous negotiations over Beirut, agreements in principle may or may not reach fruition; whether this one does will depend heavily upon what we do, the evolving political and security situation within Lebanon, and on maintaining the Syrian incentives to withdraw -- something that is largely a function of the Syrian fear of the continuing Israeli military presence in the Bekaa and the threat it poses to Syrian security.

(S) Our role and profile in Lebanon, the evolving internal situation, and Syrian (and also PLO and Israeli) incentives to withdraw may well be determined by the kind of MNF that we settle on and the role we envision it playing. The choices we have in this regard range from a very small MNF, that stays principally in Beirut and withdraws as soon as the Syrians and Israelis withdraw; a somewhat larger MNF that grows as it supports the expansion of the Lebanese government and military authority to areas outside of Beirut and into the rest of the country; and a significantly larger MNF that basically guards Lebanon's borders and polices the buffer zones along the Lebanese-Israeli and Lebanese-Syrian frontiers.

(S) In making a choice among these alternatives (and variants of these alternatives), we must be very sensitive to the critical assumptions that underpin each. For example, if we select a mid-size MNF that grows as the

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authority of the Lebanese government and military expands outside of Beirut, we are basically assuming that a new and stable Lebanon can emerge. We are, in effect, betting that things can be worked out domestically between the various sects and militias and that the MNF has an important role to play in backing up the government, "steeling its nerve," and giving potentially dissident militias a reason or an excuse to accept governmental authority and control. Playing such a role would almost certainly require a continuing MNF presence in Lebanon for some time; it would also mean that the MNF would play at least an indirect role in Lebanese domestic politics. Thus, in choosing such a path we would also be making some important assumptions about US interests in Lebanon -- essentially assuming that our stakes in Lebanon justify an open-ended presence and the risks of getting involved in what all too often has been the quagmire of Lebanese politics.

~~(S)~~ But do our interests and stakes in Lebanon justify playing such a role and running the risks related to it? The answer to this question is not clear, but the question itself highlights the importance of thinking through our interests in Lebanon before choosing one of the MNF options. With this in mind, we will address the question of why Lebanon is important to us before turning to an analysis of the different MNF options.

Why is Lebanon Important to Us?

~~(S)~~ Historically, Lebanon on its own merits has never been particularly important to the US. Its importance to us has always been a function of our interests or fears elsewhere in the region. Even in 1958 when we intervened in Lebanon, we did so not in response to specific developments

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in Lebanon but rather in response to the coup that unseated Nuri es-Said and the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy in Iraq.* We feared that Nasser was behind the Iraqi coup, that he might now be able to exploit the turmoil in Lebanon, and that basically the whole Middle East might go Naṣser's way unless we intervened immediately to prevent it. Since we had been invited in by the Lebanese President and since we suddenly saw events in Lebanon in a new light, we intervened there.

~~(S)~~ Over the last several years our interests in Lebanon have continued to be shaped less by the intrinsic importance of Lebanon and much more by our concerns that turmoil in and over Lebanon not trigger Syrian-Israeli conflict and a wider Arab-Israeli war. Though we paid lip-service to the concept of an independent, unified Lebanon and publicly declared that this was our goal, we did little actively to bring this about. On the contrary, we seemed to accept the principle that the Syrian presence was a stabilizing factor and we showed little interest in even neutralizing Syrian or PLO power in Lebanon. To the extent that we were involved, we focussed our main efforts on trying to prevent an escalation of PLO-Israeli tensions in Southern Lebanon.

* Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that Camille Chamoun was the only leader in the area to embrace the Eisenhower doctrine and had been seeking US intervention since March under this rubric, we showed no signs of responding to him until after the July 14 coup in Baghdad. Then we reacted immediately; interestingly enough, however, we presided over a resolution of the crisis -- one that had been triggered by Chamoun's desire to break precedent and succeed himself -- by supporting Chehab (the commander of the LAF) and not Chamoun as the new President.

~~(S)~~ If our real interest in Lebanon up to now has been in keeping the lid on and preventing an explosion, the recent war both marked the defeat of that objective and raised the possibility of a more ambitious definition of our interest in Lebanon. Our old interest remains: controlling the threat to Israeli tranquillity from southern Lebanon, both for its own sake and so as to avoid Israeli responses which spur Arab anger at the US and/or lead to a broader war.

~~(S)~~ But in the new circumstances, our interest in Arab-Israeli peace might be advanced more positively in Lebanon, in several different (and not necessarily compatible) ways. First, a solution to Lebanon could provide essential new impetus to the President's peace initiative. Aside from the obvious impact on Egypt of such a solution, the fact is that a tangible US success in Lebanon -- most likely meaning the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces -- could provide King Hussein with the necessary pretext to embrace the President's initiative and could put greater pressure on the Saudis to offer him some support in doing so. Second, Lebanon makes necessary some kind of arrangement between Syria and Israel -- a necessity which creates an opportunity for them to conclude a much broader agreement. A Syrian-Israeli deal on Lebanon might be linked to arrangements concerning the Golan Heights and permit a treaty of peace or (more likely) non-belligerency. While consistent with US interests in Arab-Israeli peace, this might involve continuing foreign involvement in Lebanon contrary to declared US principles.

(S) Indeed, recent events have made it more difficult for the US to regard events in Lebanon simply for their effects outside of Lebanon. With the redeployment of the MNF to Beirut, we have assumed an important responsibility for the safety and security of Lebanon's capital city. The Habib-Draper missions have given us a higher profile than before and established certain specific objectives that could be costly to disown. As we are called on to explain the purposes of our presence in a way that justifies our possibly taking casualties, it could become even more difficult for us to move away from our declaratory principles and objectives.

(S) What this means is that it may be difficult for us to accept certain options that might make sense from the standpoint of our real interests in the region -- for example a Syrian-Israeli deal which severely compromised or dispensed with the idea of an independent Lebanon. A partition of Lebanon into Syrian and Israeli spheres of influence -- formal or informal -- might serve the most pressing US interest in stabilizing conditions in Lebanon and promoting Arab-Israeli peace, as well as permitting an early withdrawal of the MNF. What is for Israel the "Syrian option" -- making a deal with Syria, rather than with a Lebanese government of questionable power -- would mean less involvement, burden, and risk for the US. Our view of this option depends first of all on how we assess the prospects for reconstruction of a Lebanese government which can police Lebanon on its own; and also on whether we think Syria and Israel could indeed work out stable spheres of influence.

~~(S)~~ A continuation or expansion of the MNF's role would be intended to help police some or all of Lebanon without a Syrian and Israeli presence. Before discussing possible MNF roles, it is useful to consider ~~the~~ how a "Syrian option" for continued Syrian and Israeli presence might appeal to the parties involved -- both because that is revealing about their motivations, and because the possibility of the situation in Lebanon rapidly deteriorating might push this option to the fore.

~~(S)~~ The Syrian Option. In its essence, the Syrian option depends upon the Syrians regarding their stake in legitimizing their presence and influence in Lebanon as important enough to justify their cutting a broader deal with Israel over Lebanon, its security arrangements, and the Golan. In effect, the Syrians would be given those Lebanese territories -- largely Moslem in population -- that were taken away from Syria in the 1920s and joined to Lebanon.* They would also recover at least part of the Golan Heights. In return, they would either agree to a peace treaty with Israel, or barring that, a treaty of non-belligerency. The Israelis would gain an important modus vivendi with Syria -- without having to surrender all of the Heights -- as well as a buffer in Southern Lebanon, and a Syrian commitment to control threats against Israel from Lebanese territory.

~~(S)~~ A variant of the Syrian option might be a more or less formal understanding between Syria, Israel, the US, and the Lebanese government that would divide Lebanon into spheres of influence. The Syrian sphere would be

* ~~(S)~~ Something that Lebanese Christians objected to at the time and something that the Syrians still refuse to recognize and accept.

in the eastern and northern part of the country -- the traditional areas of Syrian interest; the Israeli sphere would be in the South. Syrian and Israeli surrogates would effectively control these areas.

~~(C)~~ What specific reasons would the Syrians and Israelis have for accepting the Syrian option now?

~~(S)~~ The Syrians might have several:

- The areas that the Syrians would gain direct or indirect control over -- especially in the Bekaa Valley -- are areas of enduring security concern to Syria.
- Recognition of the legitimacy of Syrian control in these areas would respond to historical claims and greatly bolster the nationalist credentials of any Syrian regime.
- Recovery of even part of the Golan would count for much in Syria and would also offset the Assad regime's humiliation at being unable to respond to the earlier Israeli annexation of the Heights.
- This approach would preempt President Reagan's peace initiative, which did not include Syria; it would end Syria's exclusion and project the Syrians to the forefront on Arab-Israeli peace issues.

~~(S)~~ The Israelis, too, would have several reasons for looking favorably on the Syrian option:

- Given their uncertainties about Amin Gemayel and their fears about what may emerge in Lebanon, the Israelis may see some virtue in Syria having responsibility for part of Lebanon -- and Israel having responsibility for a southern buffer.

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- The Begin government needs some bold political initiative to defuse domestic turmoil and opposition in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila massacres.
- Begin wants to preempt the President's initiative, and a deal that encompasses the Golan could take the pressure off of him to make a deal on the West Bank. Additionally, under these circumstances, Begin might reason that Hussein would be the odd man out and might be willing to deal on terms more favorable to Israel.

~~(S)~~ While the Syrians and Israelis have reasons to favor the Syrian option, one should be careful about predicting their adherence to it soon. The Syrians may find it costly to formalize a deal with the Israelis now; and, in any event, the Syrians most want to get the Israelis out of the Bekaa and may believe that their own withdrawal, the prerequisite for Israel's, will not prevent their establishing Syrian political dominance in Lebanon afterward. The Israelis, for their part, may want to see whether Amin, the LAF, and a Shia-Christian entente in the South may be sufficient to protect their interests in Lebanon without any Syrian presence. Though the prospects of the Syrian option may be dim now, we shouldn't lose sight of the logic of this approach, particularly if things begin to fall apart in Lebanon and we need a way out.

The Role of a Multi-National Force

~~(S)~~ Most uses of the MNF would attempt to support an independent Lebanon, something proponents of the Syrian option would claim is unlikely ever to emerge or endure. The MNF's present assignment is to back up the LAF's

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attempt to regain control of Beirut. The MNF could be withdrawn altogether, continued or modified in its present limited role, or given a much more extensive assignment: backing up a nationwide restoration of control by the Lebanese government. It could focus on either or both of the following tasks:

- maintaining internal security in areas relinquished by Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces; and/or
- securing Lebanon's border regions, preventing infiltrations across the border and deterring attacks.

While these problems of internal security and border security are of course related, it is useful to consider separately the advantages and difficulties associated with addressing each of them. An MNF which attempted to solve both problems is conceivable, but would have to be very large.

~~(S)~~ Internal Security. The PLO's use of Lebanon as a base of operations against Israel depended on Lebanon's inability to control military activities on its own territory. To prevent a recurrence of that problem (and of its consequences) a thoroughgoing reconstitution of Lebanese national authority under the auspices of moderate elements has been a US goal. Israel appears to have hoped that Bashir Gemayel could achieve such a united Lebanon in the circumstances which Israeli military success would create. The war weariness of the Lebanese population, the removal of the PLO from southern Lebanon and from Beirut, and the disarming of the largest Sunni Moslem militia Murabitun, may make this reconstitution possible -- assuming Syrian and Israeli withdrawal. An MNF which supplemented and

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backed the Lebanese Armed Forces would presumably provide additional incentives for the Phalange and Haddad militias, and the Shiite Amal Militia, to accomodate themselves to the Lebanese government, perhaps by their integration into the LAF as "home guard" units.

~~(S)~~ This option is most attractive if the MNF forces can remain in a supporting role, and if the LAF is able to absorb rather than required to defeat most competing factions. The MNF's role in backing up the LAF, offering confidence to it and deterrence to others, already exists in Beirut, and could be extended to whatever territories were relinquished by foreign forces. But the more territory Lebanon regains, the more ambitious the project of internal security becomes; in this respect, the task would be less daunting if a complete withdrawal by Israel and Syria were delayed for a time. A "west-to-east" withdrawal pattern could focus the MNF on protection against infiltration by sea, and spare the LAF the task, to begin with, of patrolling against infiltration from Syria.

~~(S)~~ The biggest problem with an MNF dedicated to Lebanon's internal security is that there is no clear stopping point either in time or in degree of involvement; and there is inevitable awkwardness in "backing up" the efforts of a central government whose acts one cannot completely control, whose severities will be unattractive to Western opinion, and whose simply vengeful cruelty cannot be ruled out. We should be aware that the Phalange relied on by Israel to clean up West Beirut are not entirely distinct from the forces whom we would be helping clean up Lebanon. It is also true that our close presence, and our implicit or explicit threat to

depart, could encourage them to moderate their approach. But the possibility of a renewed civil war which we could control only by a more massive commitment, or in the midst of which we would need to withdraw, suggests the danger of an open-ended commitment to aid Lebanon's internal security.

~~(S)~~ Border Area Security. A different approach to the MNF would avoid entanglement with Lebanon's internal situation insofar as possible. The MNF could simply be assigned to patrol border areas of Lebanon, so as to assure Israel against a renewed threat from PLO infiltration to southern Lebanon, and to assure Syria against a return of Israeli forces to strategically threatening positions in the Bekaa valley. The MNF would keep its distance from internal Lebanese politics, and simply guard the border areas.

~~(S)~~ However, avoiding responsibility for internal events may mean neglecting an opportunity to help improve the situation; moreover, it may also not be a sustainable role if civil war should occur. Indeed, could the MNF stand aside along the borders while a new Lebanese tragedy unfolded in Beirut or elsewhere?

~~(S)~~ Even should the MNF not be faced with this problem, its main tasks (e.g., guarding against PLO infiltration) are not likely to be simple. Similarly, there are not likely to be feasible "high technology"-only solutions to the problems of securing the borders, and large forces will probably be required to fulfill this role.

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~~(S)~~ The promise of a "border area" MNF might increase the willingness of Israel and/or Syria to withdraw their forces from Lebanon. However, the possibility that an MNF could be unnecessary or in certain circumstances counterproductive in securing Israeli and Syrian-PLO withdrawals should be considered. Indeed, an MNF which patrolled a "buffer" area between Israeli and Syrian-PLO forces may be a mistake. While there are no tidy cease fire lines now, and while US interests would not be served by a renewal of fighting, we should be careful not to buff the two sides in a way which reduces their incentives to withdraw completely from Lebanon.

~~(S)~~ This is the danger of a "step-by-step" pullback which would introduce the MNF between the two sides in the course of the steps. Even if there is advance agreement on all of the steps leading to a total withdrawal, the introduction of an MNF could frustrate its consummation. The Syrian incentive to leave is their great vulnerability where they are to Israeli military power. While an Israeli pullback would not fully remedy Syria's vulnerability, an MNF which seemed to guarantee against an Israeli return or a further Israeli advance could do so. Either the threat to withdraw the MNF if Syrian and Israeli withdrawals do not proceed on schedule, or the use of UNIFIL forces known to be ineffectual, would reduce this problem; but a total withdrawal either before or without an MNF would avoid it.

~~(S)~~ The MNF and Israeli and Syrian Withdrawals. Could Israeli and Syrian withdrawals be secured without the promise of an MNF? Israel's need to withdraw its own forces from Lebanon stems from the economic and political

cost of keeping them there, though no Israeli government will find it possible to withdraw totally from Lebanon and leave a vacuum that could be filled by the PLO. Nevertheless, Israel's feelings about an MNF are surely mixed. A military force with major American participation which would patrol southern Lebanon could both relieve them of a major security burden and constitute a significant American political commitment to Israeli security. The danger is that the force might be ineffectual (given the nature of the PLO threat); that Israeli and American standards of efficacy might differ; and that the PLO might specifically try to provoke US-Israeli confrontation, particularly as they might justifiably expect the MNF to restrain or even prevent Israeli responses. In addition, in a future Israeli-Syrian war on the Golan, the kind of flanking maneuver through Lebanon which Israel might find essential to avoid a prolonged war of attrition would be inhibited by an MNF which stood in the path through the Bekaa valley.

~~(S)~~ The key consideration is what kind of Lebanese situation the Israelis expect to emerge without an MNF. Israel's strategy seems to have assumed that a Bashir Gemayel-led government would gain control of Lebanon and would, if handed a situation in which Israel had defeated and expelled PLO forces, prevent a recurrence of the threat to Israeli security from southern Lebanon. If, after Bashir's death, that expectation appears to have been too optimistic, there is still the possibility that elements in southern Lebanon interested in preserving the peace and willing to cooperate with Israel could act as Israeli surrogates in keeping the PLO out. Israel

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might calculate that either of these scenarios -- a friendly united Lebanon, or a pliant sphere of Israeli influence in southern Lebanon -- is encouraged as much or more by the continuing threat of an Israeli military return as by an MNF which would prevent such a return. (Indeed, Shamir's recent public statements seem to support this.)

~~(S)~~ Syria may have a clearer interest in an MNF presence, given its military vulnerability in the present circumstance; but that very vulnerability may reduce their bargaining leverage in obtaining an MNF. If an MNF is unavailable, Syria's military vulnerability after a mutual withdrawal is still less than it is before a mutual withdrawal. An American deployment to reassure Soviet client Syria against a security threat from Israel would be an ironic reversal which might embarrass the Soviets, but is perhaps a benefit in return for which we could extract more from Syria than a withdrawal from Lebanon which seems necessary for them in any case.

~~(S)~~ Less clear is whether Syria can or will take the PLO forces with them when they leave. While the PLO is unlikely to agree to withdraw -- particularly since their interest is in remaining and recreating a fractionated Lebanon in which they can operate -- the departure of Syrian forces would leave them without any protection and vulnerable to an almost certain onslaught by LAF and/or Phalange forces, or to an Israeli return which Syria would feel unable to challenge. This danger could provide a strong incentive for most of the remaining PLO to leave along with the Syrians; but in any case an MNF would probably not increase the PLO's willingness to leave (unless

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they thought an MNF would help protect Palestinian civilians, or would make it easier to reinfiltrate Lebanon without an Israeli response).

(S) In short, a mutual Israeli-Syrian withdrawal is conceivable without a multinational force. The US could simply press for this in negotiations, and monitor its implementation without forces on the ground. In principle the LAF would take control of the territory from which the foreign forces leave; in practice, local factions might remain somewhat autonomous. But Syria and Israel both have incentives to withdraw even if no MNF is put in their place.

~~(S)~~ No MNF, a "Beirut-Only" MNF, or a training mission. Given the limits on the ability of an MNF to strengthen the Lebanese Government, and given the difficulty of an MNF undertaking to secure Lebanese border areas, we should consider dispensing with the MNF entirely. Without an MNF, it is possible that Syrian and Israeli forces would be withdrawn anyway; it is possible that the Lebanese government will successfully extend its authority without MNF assistance. Another outcome would be the kind of partition already mentioned, in which Israeli and Syrian forces remain as occupants of their respective spheres in Lebanon. Or Israel and Syria might withdraw most or all of their forces on the assumption that they could maintain spheres of influence which could serve their major purposes. Thus Israeli surrogates in southern Lebanon might be trusted to prevent a return by the PLO even if a strong central government does not emerge. Syria might think it could use Lebanese and PLO factions to prevent the emergence of a strong pro-Israeli Lebanese government.

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If these outcomes are not too damaging to US interests, avoiding the risks of a large MNF involvement is attractive. US declarations linking the timing of the Beirut MNF's departure to both the withdrawal of foreign troops and the wishes of the Lebanese government mean that either our getting out or our staying or expanding our role will need to be delicately managed and explained. If Israel and Syria will withdraw their forces without the introduction of a border-area MNF, we can gracefully withdraw our Beirut MNF and vindicate President Reagan's publicly stated expectation. It will be more awkward to extricate ourselves if Syrian and/or Israeli troops remain. In that case we could either maintain the Beirut MNF for its symbolic and limited practical contribution to the strength of the Lebanese government; or -- what might be most useful (and worth considering even if foreign forces are all withdrawn) -- convert, supplement, or replace the MNF with a Military Assistance and Training Mission, either our own or one from, say, France. This would emphasize our commitment to a genuine rebuilding of the Lebanese Government and Army's capability to control the country -- rather than undertaking to substitute for the lack of that capability. We could continue to call for foreign troops to be withdrawn, and could reasonably think that whatever success the Lebanese internal reconstruction has would encourage Israeli withdrawals (and therefore also Syrian withdrawals). An emphasis on training rather than peacekeeping would assist the government's efforts to extend its authority, but limit our direct involvement and make more practical an option to depart if we find the government unworthy of even symbolic support.

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All of these more limited options -- a training mission, a continuation of the present size and mission of the MNF in Beirut, or a fairly hasty departure from Beirut -- presuppose a US willingness to live with various possible untidy outcomes. A more ambitious MNF would attempt to provide the internal and border security which the Lebanese government has in the past been incapable of providing, on the grounds that Israel and Syria would otherwise attempt to do so for themselves in ways dangerous or embarrassing to the US if they think Lebanon's incapacity continues. But an MNF could create dangers and embarrassments of its own. A lower profile for the US would mean accepting whatever degree of restored Lebanese sovereignty the Lebanese Government can gain over diverse factions by its own blandishments and threats; and whatever degree of Syrian and Israeli intrusion in Lebanese affairs that those countries find necessary and possible in the present circumstances. Optimism on both these counts is possible, but even a less favorable outcome for Lebanon might be sufficiently tolerable to US interests to make a very limited US role seem most prudent.

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Teicher
SYSTEM 11
90809

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 7, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *JK* HOWARD TEICHER

SUBJECT: Need for More Coordinated Policy Planning on
the Middle East

Attached at Tab A is a memo from you to George Shultz recommending that we set up a closely held interagency group to examine some of the political choices the President will have to make in the coming weeks and months concerning the Middle East. This memo was prepared based on instructions from Bud and John Poindexter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab A to George Shultz.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Will do it verbally

① 16

② NODS

10/8
Also informed.
JK

*(we mentioned
to Sen. S. on
phone.)*

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CW NARA, DATE 4/7/06

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90809

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Near Term Mid-East Crisis and Policy Planning

As you know, the President will have to make some very difficult decisions concerning our overall Middle East policy during the next few weeks and months. It is important that our various efforts, i.e., withdrawal of forces from Lebanon, the peace initiative, and the Iran-Iraq war, be integrated in a coherent manner. For example, how might particular approaches to encourage Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon affect our strategy toward Israel in the peace process? (Security arrangements in southern Lebanon immediately come to mind.)

Moreover, this planning must bear in mind the President's forthcoming meetings with Amin Gemayel, the deputation of Arab League representatives headed by King Hassan, and, possibly, Prime Minister Begin. The President has made clear his desire for early progress. This will lead to intense speculation both at home and abroad as to the likely course of action we will take if the parties in the region prove uncooperative with our plans.

While we all hope for a breakthrough in the withdrawal from Lebanon and the peace process, we must work to prevent, but if need be overcome, running up against a brick wall. This applies to Israel and the Arabs. With regard to Israeli withdrawal and the peace process, the question of pressures and inducements on Begin are bound to be raised. The sensitivity of this issue needs no elaboration, but it must be considered and options must be given to the President. Similarly, possible pressures on the Arab leaders need to be considered. It is increasingly clear that we cannot hope for Saudis to generate enough pressure.

I would like to recommend that we set up a small, tightly held, interagency working group to look at these interrelated questions and, in particular, some of the sensitive political questions the President will have to face. I would like your views on what procedures and timing you think we should follow in order to carry out these tasks.

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CU NARA, DATE 4/7/06

William P. Clark

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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October 8, 1982


UNCLASSIFIED
(With SECRET Attachment)

Interagency Group No. 31

TO : OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg
 NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
 AID - Mr. Gerald Pagano
 CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
 Defense - COL John Stanford
 JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley
 OMB - Mr. Alton Keel
 Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
 UNA - Amb. Harvey Feldman

SUBJECT: Interagency Steering Group on Lebanon: Summary of
 Conclusions

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the Meeting of
 the Interagency Steering Group on Lebanon held on October 7, 1982.


 L. Paul Bremer, III
 Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Summary of Conclusions
2. List of Participants

UNCLASSIFIED
(With SECRET Attachment)

6951



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 7, 1982

SECRET

Interagency Group No. 31

PARTICIPANTS: See List Attached

DATE AND TIME: October 7, 1982, 1:40 p.m.

PLACE: Deputy Secretary's Conference Room 7219, State Department

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Interagency Steering Group on Lebanon,
October 7

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Acting Secretary Dam opened the meeting by citing the need for rapid action on the Lebanese problem. The results of the Steering Group's work should be available to the President early the week of October 11 so that decisions on U.S. policy toward the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon can be taken. To accelerate the work of the Steering Group, the chairman announced the formation of two subgroups, one to handle diplomatic and military aspects of the problem under the leadership of Ambassador Veliotes, the second to work on assistance and reconstruction under the leadership of Peter McPherson.

Ambassador Philip Habib briefed the meeting on the basic requirements for peace in Lebanon. He cited first the problem of the Lebanese government in relation to sectarian, political, and economic factors. Without security and internal consensus, a central government could neither take shape nor be effective. Second was the problem of foreign forces, the withdrawal of which he considered essential. Withdrawal was a negotiable proposition, and ought to be addressed in two phases: disengagement, and final withdrawal. While neither the terms nor the mechanics of withdrawal had yet been agreed upon, the physical process per se need not require months to accomplish. A discussion ensued on various details of the problem.

AID Director McPherson noted the progress to date toward establishing a consortium of donors to Lebanon's reconstruction. Amin Gemayel's October visit to New York and Washington would provide an opportunity for the Lebanese President to meet with representatives of the IBRD and donor organizations.

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7. 111 NARA DATE 4/7/06

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ACTION ASSIGNMENTS

1. Chairman Dam called into being the two subgroups referred to in paragraph one above. These are tasked with carrying forward the work of the Steering Group in their respective areas.

2. DOD undertook to refine its present draft paper on peace-keeping modes in cooperation with JCS and the Politico-Military Affairs Bureau of the State Department. To be effective, this paper will be needed by COB Friday, October 8.

3. State undertook to complete the basic paper to the President setting forth options for U.S. diplomacy toward withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

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INTERAGENCY STEERING GROUP ON LEBANON

October 7, 1982, 1:30 p.m.

Deputy Secretary's Conference Room 7219, State Department

PARTICIPANTS

<u>State</u>	Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam, Chairing Mr. Nicholas Veliotos, NEA Amb. Philip Habib Adm. Jonathan Howe, PM Mr. Tain Tompkins, S/S-S (Notetaker)
<u>OVP</u>	Mr. Donald Gregg
<u>NSC</u>	Mr. Howard Teicher
<u>AID</u>	Mr. Peter McPherson Mr. Alfred White
<u>CIA</u>	Mr. Charles Waterman Mr. Robert Gates
<u>Defense</u>	Mr. Francis West Maj. Gen. Richard Secord
<u>JCS</u>	Lt. Gen. Paul Gorman Vice Adm. Thomas Bigley
<u>OMB</u>	Mr. Alton Keel Mr. Phil DeSault
<u>Treasury</u>	Mr. Beryl Sprinkel Mr. William McFadden
<u>UNA</u>	Amb. Harvey Feldman

RECEIVED 08 OCT 82 14

TO CLARK

FROM MCPHERSON, M

DOCDATE 07 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

AID

RUPPE; L

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO CLARK 4 OCT MEMO RE PEACE CORPS PARTICIPATION IN LEBANON RECONSTRUCTION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON D C 20523

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THE ADMINISTRATOR

October 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. CLARK
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Peace Corps Participation in Lebanon
Reconstruction

While I too appreciate Ms. Ruppe's offer to have Peace Corps Volunteers participate in our Lebanon reconstruction efforts, I come out exactly where you and State did. The Lebanon disaster differs quite significantly from those natural disasters cited by Ms. Ruppe, where the Peace Corps was able to contribute. Neither Lebanon's politics, its level of development, nor its security situation will allow volunteers to work there effectively in the foreseeable future.


M. Peter McPherson

cc: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane

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FOR THE SECRETARY, DEPUTY SECRETARY, EAGLEBURGER, AND
VELIOTES
SECSTATE PLS PASS INFO TO THE WHITEHOUSE AS IMMEDIATE
FROM LEWIS
BEIRUT FOR DRAPER
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, LE
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH ISRAEL ABOUT U. S. ACTION PLAN
- FOR LEBANON
REF: STATE 283703

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. I WANT TO URGE STRONGLY THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF FURTHER, HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATION WITH ISRAEL BEFORE RPT BEFORE WE LAUNCH OUR GAME PLAN FOR ACHIEVING WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. SHAMIR IS SCHEDULED TO SEE YOU NEXT THURSDAY, OCTOBER 14, AND THAT MEETING PROVIDES AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY. LOSS OF A FEW DAYS MOMENTUM IN THIS CASE IS A MANAGEABLE PRICE FOR AVOIDING MUCH GREATER AND UNNECESSARY COMPLICATIONS. IF WE GO AHEAD ON THE EVE OF SHAMIR'S ARRIVAL WITH A GAME PLAN EMBODYING APPROACHES DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THOSE BEGIN AND SHARON DISCUSSED WITH DRAPER IN JERUSALEM THIS WEEK, REACTION HERE WILL BE DOUBLY NEGATIVE.
3. AREA OF GREATEST CONFLICT WILL CENTER AROUND THE FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTH LEBANON. AS ISRAELI DCM NETANYAHU STRESSED TO VELIOTES (REFTEL), THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COMPLETELY REJECTS UNIFIL AS A SOLUTION AND IS DETERMINED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO WORK OUT DIRECTLY WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT A PACKAGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FORTY-FIVE KILOMETER ZONE. IF WE SUPPORT AND INDEED ENCOURAGE AN EFFORT AT DIRECT NEGOTIATION WHICH THEN FAILS, WE MAY THEN BE ABLE TO RETURN TO EITHER A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE OR POSSIBLY TO A STRENGTHENED UNIFIL OPTION AND FIND THE ISRAELIS RELUCTANTLY PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE, ABSENT ANY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. THIS SEQUENCE HAS SOME PROMISE BECAUSE NOT ONLY THE ISRAELI PUBLIC BUT A LARGE MAJORITY IN THE CABINET ARE GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO WITHDRAW THE IDF FROM LEBANON IN A REASONABLE PERIOD, IF THEY CAN BE ASSURED ABOUT THE FORTY-FIVE KILOMETER SECURITY ZONE.

BY *AWJ* NWRA DATE *11/28/08*
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BUT TO START WITH UNIFIL AND THEREBY PREEMPT ANY POSSIBILITY THAT ISRAEL MIGHT ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS DIRECTLY WITH THE LEBANESE IS A PRESCRIPTION FOR ANGRY CONFRONTATION--AND A LONG DELAY IN ACHIEVING OUR GOALS OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. BEGIN RETAINS AMPLE POLITICAL STRENGTH TO REJECT U.S. PRESSURE FOR WITHDRAWAL UNDER TERMS HE CAN DEPICT AS A U.S. ULTIMATUM.

4. THERE ALSO WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE A SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEM ABOUT GETTING THE PLO COMBATANTS OUT OF NORTH AND EAST LEBANON. PRESS REPORTS THIS MORNING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SOFTENED THE POSITION GIVEN TO DRAPER AND ME DURING THE MEETINGS HERE ON OCTOBER 5 WERE INCORRECT. AFTER READING THEM, BEGIN QUICKLY INSTRUCTED DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YEHUDA BEN MEIR TO TELEPHONE ME TODAY TO DENY THESE REPORTS. BEGIN'S MESSAGE WAS THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION REMAINED EXACTLY AS HE HAD STATED IT TO DRAPER: GETTING THE PLO OUT IS THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS. (FROM PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS NOT AN IRONCLAD PRECONDITION THAT ALL THE PLO MUST BE OUT BEFORE THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW. RATHER WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO INTERPRET IT MORE ELASTICALLY AND TO NEGOTIATE SOME SIMULTANEOUS PHASING; THE CENTRAL POINT FOR THE ISRAELIS IS TO GET THE PLO ISSUE MOVING AND NOT TO LEAVE IT WHILE CONCENTRATING ON SYRIAN AND ISRAELI MOVEMENTS. SHAMIR PERSONALLY SEEMS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN BEGIN ON THE TIMING FOR PLO DEPARTURE.)

5. AS YOU KNOW, THE REACTION OF BEGIN AND HIS CABINET TO THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE WAS PARTLY, THOUGH BY NO MEANS ENTIRELY, INFLUENCED BY A DEEP SENSE OF AFFRONT THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT CONSULTED IN ADVANCE BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS WERE PUT TO THE ARABS AND TO THE PUBLIC. WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO PRODUCE A SIMILAR AND UNNECESSARILY SHARP REACTION TO OUR LEBANESE GAME PLAN. YOU SHOULD TALK IT OUT WITH SHAMIR NEXT WEEK BEFORE DOING ANYTHING FURTHER WITH THE OTHER PARTIES. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IF, AS I UNDERSTAND IS LIKELY TO BE THE CASE, OUR APPROACH DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE ONE THE ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE TO PURSUE.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 14485

6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/25/02

EXDIS
FROM DRAPER FOR NEA VELIOTES OR CHARLES HILL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PINS, SY, MOPS, MILI, LE, US, IS
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: GEMAYEL IS READY FOR US GAME PLAN

1. (8- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT
VELIOTES OR HILL GET IN TOUCH WITH ME BY SECURE PHONE
(BRAVO CHANNEL) TOMORROW MORNING, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 9,
AT ABOUT 0900 WASHINGTON TIME. THERE ARE NEW NUANCES

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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AND NEW WRINKLES IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS WASHINGTON MOVES TOWARDS AN AGREED PLAN FOR NEXT STEPS. FOLLOWING ARE SOME THOUGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS, BASED IN PART ON SOME SO-FAR UNREPORTED EXCHANGES WITH KIMCHE AND LAF CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL KHOURY, AS WELL AS A TALK I HAD TODAY, OCTOBER 8, WITH PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL: A. PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANT, GEMAYEL NEEDS A SPECIFIC GAME PLAN FROM US. HE HAS TAKEN TO HEART PHIL HABIB'S SUGGESTION THAT WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY ON A COMBINED SYRIAN-ISRAELI-PLO WITHDRAWAL. HE DOES NOT REALLY BELIEVE THIS CAN BE DONE WITHIN, SAY, A MONTH BUT HE HOPES FOR A FINAL AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL BY THE END OF THE YEAR. IN PRINCIPLE, HE IS READY TO MOVE FORWARD IN TALS WITH THE PLO (PERHAPS THROUGH THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE HERE IN BEIRUT. SHAFIQ AL-HUT), WITH THE SYRIANS, AND WITH ARAB STATES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA WHO COULD BE HELPFUL BUT HE WANTS OUR ADVICE ON TACTICS AND TIMING AT EVERY STEP ALONG THE WAY. HE ALSO WANTS EVERYTHING THAT LEBANON DOES TO FIT WITHIN A US-DESIGNED PACKAGE PLAN.

EXDIS

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--B. THERE ARE TRICKY SHOALS AHEAD, HOWEVER. WITH HIS BLESSING. A TWO-MAN COMMITTEE FROM THE PHALANGE-DOMINATED "LEBANESE FORCES," BUSTANI AND ABU KHALIL, ARE REMAINING IN TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELIS TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP. THE ISRAELI SIDE, ACCORDING TO GEMAYEL, IS LED BY KIMCHE, AND MEETINGS ARE BEING HELD AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK.

EXDIS

-- C. AT THE SAME TIME, HE NOW HAS A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, ELIE SALEM. HE WANTS ME TO STAY IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TOUCH WITH SALEM ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS, BUT HE ALSO WANTS ME TO BE DISCREET AS REGARDS THE PARALLEL TALKS BEING CARRIED OFF BY THE "LEBANESE FORCES COMMITTEE." "ELIE SALEM WILL KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT THAT CHANNEL,"

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HE INDICATED, "BUT NOT ALL." ASIDE FROM THIS, IN A MORE PUBLIC GATHERING TODAY, HE DROPPED A TRULY BROAD HINT THAT EVEN THICK WESTERNERS UNVERSED IN LEBANESE PLIITICS COULD UNDERSTAND, TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HAD PICKED ELIE SALEM AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BECAUSE HE WAS WITH AUB AND IS KNOWN TO BE VERY CLOSE TO THE AMERICANS.

EXDIS

-- D. GEMAYEL WANTS UNIFIL'S MANDATE EXTENDED FOR AT LEAST TWO MONTHS, SO THAT IT IS NOT ELIMINATED AS A POSSIBLE INSTUMENT FOR CONTROLLING A 40 KM. - PLUS SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE DOES NOT HOLD UNIFIL IN HIGH REGARD, BUT HE INSISTS HE MUST HAVE UNIFIL PRESENT OR PERHAPS AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S "PRESENCE" IN THE SOUTH THROUGH THE 1500 LAF TROOPS NOW ATTACHED TO UNIFIL. IN THE ABSENCE OF UNIFIL OR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE COMPELLED TO LEAVE SOUTHERN LEBANON TO HADDAD.

EXDIS

-- E. GEMAYEL DOES NOT RULE OUT ANOTHER POSSIBLE "ARRANGEMENT" FOR THE SOUTH, AND HE WOULD WANT TO USE THE TIME GIVEN THROUGH A TWO-MONTH EXTENSION OF UNIFIL TO EXPLORE ALL POSSIBILITIES.

EXDIS

--F WHILE GEMAYEL IS READY TO OFFER A "LEBANESE SOLUTION" -- PROBABLY AN AMNESTY FOR HADDAD AND CERTAINLY ALL THE FORMER LAF OFFICERS AND MAN NOW IN HADDAD'S MILITIA -- HE WILL NOT ACCEPT HADDAD

AS GOVERNOR OF SOUTH LEBANON OR AS LAF COMMANDER.

-- G. KHOURY CONSIDERS AMIN GEMAYEL AS MUCH MORE DARING AND AGGRESSIVE THAN HIS BROTHER, BASHIR.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 7040

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FROM DRAPER FOR NEA VEILOTES OR CHARLES HILL
HE DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE LAF--
WITH SOME OF HADDAD'S MILITIA INCORPORATED INTO IT--
MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE BUFFER ZONE. HE AND
I ARE GOING TO TALK ABOUT THIS TOMORROW.
--H. AMIN GEMAYEL DOES NOT APPEAR TO ME TO BE
OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO AN ARRANGEMENT WITH THE
ISRAELIS FORMALLY TERMINATING THE STATE OF BELLI-
GERENCY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT MAY BE, HOWEVER,
THAT HE SIMPLY HAS NOT THOUGHT THE CONCEPT THROUGH TO
ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION. AGAIN, HE WANTS OUR ADVICE,

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AND I WOULD JUDGE PARTICULARLY ON WHETHER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE LEBANON'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD.

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--I. GEMAYEL REMAINS CONVINCED THAT A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE BEKA'A AND PERHAPS IN NORTHERN LEBANON WHEN THE SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES THERE ARE WITHDRAWN. I HAVE SOUNDED OUT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON FHE CONCEPT OF AN MNF FOR THOSE AREAS AND HIS OPINION IS THAT FRANCE MIGHT WELL BE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATION, ALTHOUGH PARIS IS NOW RUEFULLY RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EXPENSES OF THE PRESENT MNF OPERATION. MY VIEW IS THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD REMAIN OPENMINDED, EVEN POSITIVE, TO THE CONCEPT OF AN MNF FOR A PERIOD OF SIX TO 12 MONTHS IN THAT REGION.

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--J. THERE IS AN INTERESTING ELEMENT IN AMIN GEMAYEL'S ATTITUDES WHICH IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE APPARENT. HE HARBORS INTENSE FEELINGS ABOUT NON-LEBANESE "OUTSIDERS" WHO, IN SOME CASES INNOCENTLY AND IN SOME CASES DELIBERATELY, HAVE ADDED TO THE PROBLEMS OF HIS COUNTRY. THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH HE ENDORSES THE "LEBANESE FORCES" DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELIS AS NECESSARY TO RETAIN ISRAELI CONFIDENCE AND TO SHOW CONTINUED APPRECIATION FOR THE MANY HELPFUL THINGS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE DONE OVER THE YEARS, HE STILL RESENTS VERY DEEPLY ANYTHING THAT SMACKS OF A DICTAT FROM THE ISRAELIS OR THE ATTITUDE OF A CONQUEROR. WHILE HE REALIZES HE CANNOT DO MUCH ABOUT IT NOW, HIS OWN PERSONAL PRIORITIES ARE REMOVING THE REMAINING ISRAELI PRESENCE OUT OF THE CAPITAL COMPLETELY (MEANING TRANSIT OF VEHILCES THROUGH THE GREATER BEIRUT AREA, ETC) ALONG WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF FROM ALAYH, ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY. IN THE LATTER CASE. HE IS FRUSTRATED THAT THE IDF PRESENCE THERE WILL NOT ALLOW HIM TO SEND IN THE LAF TO STOP THE INTERNECINE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE DRUZE AND THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES".

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--K. ALTHOUGH I GAVE HIM ONLY A NON-COMMITTAL GRUNT, KIMCHE INSISTS THAT WE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SQUARING A DEAL IN SOUTHERN LEBANON THROUGH WHICH THE LAF COULD HONESTLY TAKE CONTROL OF THE BUFFER ZONE. IN THAT CASE, HE SAID, WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THE UNIFIL AREA OF OPERATIONS COULD BE SHIFTED TO EASTERN LEBANON, IN THE BEKA'A WHERE ITS PRESENCE COULD NOT CAUSE IRRITATIONS FOR THE ISRAELIS. DILLON
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