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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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Archivist: smf/smf  
 FOIA ID: F97-106 - Wills  
 Date: 11/27/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Clark to Peter McPherson, Admin. of the Agency for Int'l Development 1p <i>R 4/7/06 NLSF 97-106/2 #138</i>	10/4/82	P1/B1
2. memo	Teicher to Clark re Peace Corps Participation 1p <i>R " " #139</i>	9/20/82	P1/B1
3. memo	Kemp to Clark re Peace Corps Participation 1p <i>R " " #140</i>	8/30/82	P1/B1
4. cable	041803Z Oct 82 15p <i>D 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #141</i> <i>D 11/28/08 MAC08-098/15 #56972</i>	10/4/82	P1/B1
5. cable	052309Z Oct 82 8p <i>P 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #142</i> <i>R 11/28/08 MAC08-098/15 #56973</i>	<del>10/5/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
6. cable	052357Z Oct 82 1p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #143</i>	10/5/82	P1/B1
7. handwritten notes	re Lebanon 3p <i>R 4/7/06 " #144</i>	n.d.	P1/B1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
 B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
 B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
 B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

*Reamy*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE M. PETER MCPHERSON  
Administrator, Agency for International  
Development

SUBJECT: Peace Corps Participation in Lebanese  
Reconstruction

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from Loret Miller Ruppe, Director of the Peace Corps. Ms. Miller has generously offered Peace Corps Volunteers to participate in the U.S. efforts to reconstruct Lebanon. She makes several references to their previous participation in a number of disasters throughout the world.

While very appreciative of her offer, I feel, as State does, that sending Peace Corps Volunteers, whose specialization is teaching and training, into this politically delicate area would be risky. Lebanon needs money and equipment more than developmental training and education.

My deputy, Bud McFarlane, would welcome a telephone call from you on this issue.

*Bue*

William P. Clark

Attachment:

Tab A - Incoming from Loret Miller Ruppe

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 597-106/2 #13827 CS NARA, DATE 4/7/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 4, 1982

Dear Loret:

Your proposal for Peace Corps participation in the reconstruction of war torn Lebanon is innovative and much appreciated. The spirit of willingness expressed by the Corps Volunteers and yourself is a sincerity that will not go unnoticed.

I have referred your memorandum to Mr. Peter McPherson, the President's Special Representative for Lebanese Reconstruction. You can be assured that he will give your proposal every consideration as he plans and administers the U.S. efforts to reconstruct Lebanon.

Once again, thank you for your generous offer.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

Ms. Loret Miller Ruppe  
Director  
Peace Corps  
Washington, D. C. 20525

# Peace Corps

Washington, D.C. 20525


Office of the Director

August 17, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Judge William P. Clark  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

FROM: Loret M.  Ruppe  
Director, Peace Corps

SUBJECT: Peace Corps Participation in Lebanon Reconstruction

Peace Corps has been in discussion with AID personnel on the possible participation of Peace Corps Volunteers in the reconstruction of war torn Lebanon which will be carried out by USAID with \$40 million currently appropriated by Congress.

Peace Corps has responded to disaster relief calls in past years on such projects as:

1. 1972 Peru earthquake
2. 1976 Guatemala hurricane
3. 1977 Fiji hurricane
4. 1979 Dominican Republic hurricane
5. 1982 Tonga hurricane

In all of these instances Peace Corps was able to move Volunteers quickly and effectively to meet health, sanitation and reconstruction needs. In addition, Peace Corps was able to collaborate swiftly with government and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO's) already operating in the country where the disaster had occurred.

The Lebanon situation provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate to the citizens of Lebanon and the rest of the world the Peace motives and human concerns of President Reagan and the American people.

The Peace Corps is ready to assist the President to seize this initiative.

A Peace Corps task force could be operational in 15 days in Lebanon. A Peace Force of 200 Volunteers serving for three months would cost less than \$1 million.

## Peace Corps

Dear Judge Clark,

Enclosed is a copy of letter to Dear  
Stoehman - we are working closely with O. H. B..  
The President's commitment to peace through  
development is so important. We are ready to move  
forward on Haiti, Jamaica, Morocco, (Lebanon?) etc.  
The instant budget relief is granted. Mr. Sergio Bush

# Peace Corps

Washington, D.C. 20525

Office of the Director

August 17, 1982

Honorable David Stockman  
Director, Office of Management  
and Budget  
Executive Office of the President  
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Dave:

President Reagan recently renewed his commitment to the Peace Corps, as it exemplifies many of this Administration's major policy initiatives: volunteerism, self-sufficiency, grass roots economic development and efficiency in government development assistance. More importantly, however, the Peace Corps can provide an immediate tangible and visible indication of the President's commitment to world peace; to his foreign assistance policy as stated at Cancun and Philadelphia; and, most particularly, to the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

The Peace Corps' ability to support the President in these areas is largely constrained by the FY 1983 budget limitations. Despite concerted planning on our part to target available resources to areas which most directly support the Administration's initiatives, the proposed budget level of \$97.5 million precludes the needed flexibility to implement the President's initiatives and may well represent the loss of an opportunity to clearly demonstrate his commitment to peace and development in a very inexpensive manner.

Taking these things into account, I find myself compelled to raise before you a proposal that the Peace Corps' FY 1983 budget request be amended such that the program is funded in 1983 at the 1982 current level of \$105 million. This would represent a \$7.5 million increase from current FY 1983 assumptions.

## Program Requirements

Overseas Program Requests: \$5.9 million

The Peace Corps finds itself daily rejecting both Host Country requests for assistance and qualified U.S. citizens who are applying to serve overseas. An additional \$5.9 million would provide for the placement of nearly 400 more Americans overseas, working directly with some of the poorest peoples of the world, in programs designed to help them to help themselves. Significantly, almost 50 of these volunteers -- 12% -- are slated for Caribbean Basin countries in programs designed to be income generating for the poorest levels of society. The remaining 350 would be placed around the world, in countries such as Morocco, the Phillipines, Jamaica, Kenya, Yemen, and Zaire. These countries have a desperate need

for our assistance, and have submitted actual requests in areas which meet our programming capabilities.

Moreover, we have recently completed negotiations on new country agreements with Haiti and Burundi. At the \$97.5 million level we will be unable to program volunteers in these countries and negotiations with Egypt, Panama, Korea, Peru and Bolivia will have to be suspended.

Program Quality Initiatives: \$1.6 million

The Peace Corps this year was legislatively separated from the ACTION agency. Shortly after that, an ACTION Inspector General report was issued summarizing long standing deficiencies in Peace Corps administration. The report served to verify assessments I had already made and strengthened my commitment to make the agency an efficient and effective business-like operation. This year we have made great strides toward that goal. We have a strong management team in place. We have developed a comprehensive 3 year program plan, and we have numerous tasks in progress which are designed to professionalize administrative staff, streamline management systems and procedures (e.g. enhanced audit capability and improved accounting and management information systems), and generally better enable us to run the program effectively. Also, within this amount we will continue to replace dangerous and unsafe vehicles in the Peace Corps vehicle fleet on a regular basis. Improvements will be made in volunteer selection and training in certain countries. Most, if not all, of these initiatives will have to be tabled or severely curtailed at the \$97.5 million level.

The Peace Corps is a high visibility, immediate impact, cost effective development tool. It should be used and targeted by this Administration. It represents a unique opportunity and ready vehicle for the Reagan Administration to demonstrate its commitment to peace through development, for a very small additional amount of money. The Congress may make this determination for us, as they did last year in reversing the Administration's budget decisions with regard to the Peace Corps. However, this year, I would rather it be the President's initiative. I know you share my feeling in this area.

Sincerely,



Loret Miller Ruppe  
Director

Attachment



SUMMARY OF BUDGET AMENDMENT

	<u>Appropriation</u>	<u>FTE</u>	<u>Trainee/ Input</u>	<u>Volunteer Years</u>	<u>EOY T's &amp; V's</u>
FY 1982	\$105,000,000	884	2,800	4,509	5,395
FY 1983- Current	97,500,000	981	2,453	4,643	5,050
FY 1983- Proposed	<u>105,000,000</u>	<u>1,007</u>	<u>2,835</u>	<u>4,750</u>	<u>5,400</u>
Amount of Difference	<u>+ 7,500,000</u>	<u>+ 26</u>	<u>+ 382</u>	<u>+ 107</u>	<u>+350</u>
 Program increases	 \$ 5,900,000				
Management and Quality Improvements	<u>\$ 1,600,000</u>				
 Total	 \$ 7,500,000				

# National Security Council The White House

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further Action

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cc:    VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

### COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

September 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *HJT*  
SUBJECT: Peace Corps Participation  
in Lebanon Reconstruction

Attached at Tab I is a letter to Loret Miller Ruppe, Peace Corps Director, for your signature.

Ms. Ruppe has proposed that Peace Corps Volunteers participate in the reconstruction efforts taking place in Lebanon (Tab A).

We have referred her proposal to Peter McPherson, Special Presidential Representative for Lebanese Reconstruction, in a memo, also for your signature, at Tab II. We've conveyed our feelings that employing Peace Corps Volunteers in Lebanon would be risky and inappropriate to the current needs of the people of Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION:

- 1. That you sign the letter at Tab I to Loret M. Ruppe, Peace Corps Director.

APPROVE ✓ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

- 2. That you sign the memo at Tab II to Peter McPherson.

APPROVE ✓ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I - Letter to Loret Miller Ruppe
- Tab II - Memo to Peter McPherson  
A - Incoming from Loret Miller Ruppe

Prepared By:  
Liz Attardo

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-106/2 #139  
CIS NARA, DATE 4/7/06

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Geoff Kemp/Howard Teicher

Subject: Letter from Loret Ruppe


The attached package contains a number of things. The only one you need focus upon is the memo from Ruppe to the Judge on possible involvement of the Peace Corps in Lebanon Reconstruction. The Judge is basically bearish on this but is willing to refer it to Peter McPherson for his consideration.

Please prepare two things: 1. A note back to Ruppe from the Judge saying he appreciated her memo and spirit of willingness to assist in the vital resotation of Lebanon (blah, blah, blah). Add that he has referred it to Peter, the President's Special Representative for Lebanese Reconstruction

2. A memo from the Judge to Peter simply forwarding the Ruppe incoming note and asking that Peter call me (Bud) on this matter.

Many thanks

Bud



L12 for action

Jacques 8/21  
 Type note from

Judge to Bud. Attach  
 to memo and  
 PACOM to Bud.

*J*

**Internal Security Council  
 The White House**

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
_____	<u>1</u>	<u>/</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>/</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>/</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS:**

*Think this is too risky  
 not beneficial - too  
 sending amateurs into search of  
 a zone - can we turn to  
 now or should it be  
 tasked?*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1982

TO: NSC - Mr. McFarlane

FR: Bill Clark

Bud,

Think this is not beneficial -- too risky sending amateurs into such a zone -- can we turn off now or should it be tasked?

8/30

RCM:

You rec'd attached pkg via DACOM -- has action been completed?

Can you tell us status?

Wilma

*Handwritten:*  
#15  
DAC # 15

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Brian,

Per request, please  
send back to Kemp.

Thanks,

kathy, 9/2





## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

August 30, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*

SUBJECT: Peace Corps Participation in  
Lebanon Reconstruction

Peace Corps has been discussing the idea of possible participation of Peace Corps Volunteers in the reconstruction efforts to take place in Lebanon. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Peace Corps Director Loret Miller Ruppe, outlining their proposal. They have suggested that their volunteers participate in the USAID programs, which will be funded by Congress' \$40 million Lebanese reconstruction appropriation.

State feels that the Peace Corps programs emphasize training and teaching. Lebanon needs financing for their reconstruction effort not manpower or training. For this reason, they feel that Peace Corps Volunteers in Lebanon would be inappropriate.

We appreciate their offer, but, in concurrence with State, feel that the type of developmental assistance the Peace Corps provides is not needed in these very special Lebanese reconstruction circumstances. Aid in the form of equipment and finances would be more appropriate than the training and manpower Peace Corps could offer.

Attachment:

Tab I - Memorandum from Ruppe

Prepared By:  
Liz Attardo

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NLS 197-106/2 #140  
CN NARA, DATE 4/7/06

# Peace Corps

Washington, D.C. 20525

Office of the Director

August 17, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Judge William P. Clark  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

FROM: Loret ~~M. Miller~~ <sup>JWM</sup> Ruppe  
Director, Peace Corps

SUBJECT: Peace Corps Participation in Lebanon Reconstruction

Peace Corps has been in discussion with AID personnel on the possible participation of Peace Corps Volunteers in the reconstruction of war torn Lebanon which will be carried out by USAID with \$40 million currently appropriated by Congress.

Peace Corps has responded to disaster relief calls in past years on such projects as:

1. 1972 Peru earthquake
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4. 1979 Dominican Republic hurricane
5. 1982 Tonga hurricane

In all of these instances Peace Corps was able to move Volunteers quickly and effectively to meet health, sanitation and reconstruction needs. In addition, Peace Corps was able to collaborate swiftly with government and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO's) already operating in the country where the disaster had occurred.

The Lebanon situation provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate to the citizens of Lebanon and the rest of the world the Peace motives and human concerns of President Reagan and the American people.

The Peace Corps is ready to assist the President to seize this initiative.

A Peace Corps task force could be operational in 15 days in Lebanon. A Peace Force of 200 Volunteers serving for three months would cost less than \$1 million.

bcc: Craig Fuller  
Richard Darman

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 24, 1982

TO: KEMP

I understand from the West Wing that the Judge (?) has taken this to California with him. (perhaps Morris's material).

The Peace Corps is calling this office to find out the status.

1. Is it urgent enough to address while they are in California?
2. Do you want to have this logged and action assigned to you and you will informally inform Clark's office that you are handling?
3. Do you want me to try and talk to someone in California about it?
4. Other recoms?

Thanks  
Donna Moore

← 8/24/82  
Relayed to...

# Peace Corps

Washington, D.C. 20525

Office of the Director

August 17, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Judge William P. Clark  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

FROM: Loret M. <sup>WPA</sup>Ruppe  
Director, Peace Corps

SUBJECT: Peace Corps Participation in Lebanon Reconstruction

Peace Corps has been in discussion with AID personnel on the possible participation of Peace Corps Volunteers in the reconstruction of war torn Lebanon which will be carried out by USAID with \$40 million currently appropriated by Congress.

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bcc: Craig Fuller  
Richard Darman

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03040

NODIS  
FROM DRAPER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, MOPS, PLO, XF, LE, SY, IS  
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: INFORMAL ISRAELI IDEAS ON  
- NEXT STEPS IN LEBANON

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN A FREE-FLOWING DISCUSSION WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON, WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED SHOULD BE CONSIDERED STRICTLY INFORMAL. A GOOD OVERALL PICTURE OF THE ISRAELI POSITION WITH RESPECT TO NEXT STEPS IN LEBANON EMERGED. I DISCUSSED AT LENGTH THE TALKS HABIB HAD HAD WITH THE SYRIANS ON THE ISSUE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, DESCRIBING THE SYRIAN OPENING POSITION AS STIFF. KIMCHE DESCRIBED THE SYRIAN POSITION OF PRIOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS A "NO-GO," ADDING THAT IF THE SYRIANS INSISTED ON THAT POSITION ISRAEL MIGHT AS WELL PREPARE FOR A WINTER BIVOUAC. I REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SYRIANS TO MODIFY THEIR POSITION, AND NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD BARGAINED IN A TOUGH WAY EARLIER, SAYING THAT THEY WOULD NOT TAKE ANY PLO EVACUEES FROM BEIRUT. I DID NOT SEE MUCH LIKELIHOOD THAT THE BULK OF THE PLO WOULD LEAVE LEBANON BEFORE THE SYRIANS. I SAID THE SYRIANS WERE MORE THAN ORDINARILY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAEL, BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD VIOLATED ITS COMMITMENTS TO US REGARDING NOT GOING INTO WEST BEIRUT. KIMCHE SAID THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE WORKED OUT DIRECTLY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, ADDING THAT IF THE ISSUE COULDN'T BE DISCUSSED IN THIS WAY, IT WOULD DELAY A WITHDRAWAL OF "ALL" FOREIGN FORCES. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE DIALOGUE GOING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE ISRAELI FOCUS IS ON AN AGREEMENT FOR AN END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, NO RETURN TO CLOSED BORDERS, FORMAL (SIGNED) SECURITY ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, NO FOREIGN FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE. KIMCHE SAID THAT ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT, WITH THE ADDITION OF HADDAD'S FORCES, THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD DO THE JOB IN THE SOUTH. IF INFILTRATION OCCURRED OR

*LIA*

*GK*

*Ph. II*

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 12008-078/15 # 56973

BY *[Signature]* NARA DATE *11/28/08*

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3040 DTG: 052309Z OCT 82 PSN: 004268

IF ARRANGEMENTS BROKE DOWN, HOWEVER, ISRAEL WOULD WANT SOME KIND OF IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT LEBANESE APPROVAL TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. SAM AND I SAID THIS COULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE LEBANESE TO ACCEPT OR, FOR THAT MATTER, FOR THE U. S. TO ACCEPT, PARTICULARLY IF THE ISRAELI RIGHT TO INTERVENE EXTENDED TO PLO OR SYRIAN INFILTRATION IN AREAS REMOVED FROM THE SOUTHERN LEBANESE SECURITY ZONE. KIMCHE SAID ISRAEL WANTS UNIFIL TO GO. I SAID THAT THE U. S. ROLE WILL NOT BE A ROADBLOCK TO A DIRECT ISRAELI-LEBANESE DIALOGUE. I NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U. S. COULD BE IN A DILEMMA OF SORTS FROM TIME TO TIME. WE LIKED THE IDEA OF DIRECT ISRAELI-LEBANESE UNDERSTANDINGS BUT WE MIGHT HAVE PROBLEMS IF THE ISRAELIS PRESSED THE LEBANESE TOO HARD. END SUMMARY.

3. DRAPER MET FOR FOUR HOURS AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 5 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL HANAN BAR-ON, IF LUNCH COUNTS. DRAPER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM FLATEN, ROSS, AND SCOTT. AMBASSADOR LEWIS LATER JOINED THE DISCUSSION. DURING THE DISCUSSION, WHICH WAS FREE FLOWING, INFORMAL, AND SPRINKLED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO NOTETAKERS "NOT TO TAKE THIS DOWN," A GOOD OVERALL PICTURE OF THE ISRAELI POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE NEXT STEPS IN LEBANON EMERGED.

4. DRAPER OPENED THE DISCUSSIONS WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE SYRIAN OPENING POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AS "STIFF AND VERY HARD," IN FACT A STIFFER POSITION THAN WE HAD EXPECTED. HE STRESSED THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REQUEST. HOWEVER, THEY SAY THAT THEY WILL NOT WITHDRAW UNTIL THE IDF HAS LEFT LEBANON. MOREOVER, THEY WILL NOT EVEN NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEBANESE THE TIMING AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS OF WITHDRAWAL UNTIL THE IDF HAS WITHDRAWN. WHILE THE TIMEFRAME BETWEEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL COULD BE VERY SHORT, THEY SIMPLY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL AT THIS TIME. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THE SYRIAN POSITION WAS "A NO-GO," ADDING THAT IF  
BT

NONDIS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8841

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03040

NODIS

THE SYRIANS CONTINUED TO INSIST ON THAT POSITION,  
ISRAEL MIGHT AS WELL PREPARE FOR A LONG WINTER BIVOUAC.  
--

5. DRAPER SAID THAT HABIB HAD SPOKEN OF A TWO-PHASE WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD BEEN LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT THEIR FORMULA WAS A FORMULA FOR THE CONTINUED (ISRAELI-SYRIAN) OCCUPATION OF LEBANON FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. ASSAD HAD TOLD HABIB THAT HE HAD BEEN READY TO ACCEPT AT THE FEZ SUMMIT VARIOUS FORMULAS FOR RAPID SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE WERE INSISTENT THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN IN CONJUNCTION WITH THOSE OF SYRIA. SYRIA COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. THEREFORE, THE TERM "IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL" HAD BEEN USED IN THE COMMUNIQUE, MEANING THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST GO FIRST. DRAPER STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL AND WOULD PRESS THE SYRIANS TO MODIFY THEIR POSITION. HE OBSERVED THAT, BEFORE THE EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT, THE SYRIANS HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY PLO EVACUEES, BUT THEY HAD CHANGED THEIR MINDS. THIS COULD HAPPEN AGAIN.  
--

6. KIMCHE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY PROSPECT THAT THE PLO WOULD LEAVE LEBANON BEFORE THE SYRIANS EVACUATED. DRAPER REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT SCENARIO WAS WORKABLE. HE OBSERVED THAT MANY PLO MEMBERS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LEAVE WHEN THE SYRIANS LEFT LEBANON, SINCE THIS WOULD REMOVE AN ELEMENT OF PROTECTION FOR THE PLO.  
--

7. DRAPER SAID THAT THE SYRIANS REMAIN VERY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI MOTIVES, INCLUDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 40 KM. SECURITY ZONE. KIMCHE STRESSED THAT IT MUST BE OBVIOUS TO THE SYRIANS THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT SETTLE FOR ANYTHING LESS THAN THEY HAD ON JUNE 6, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LEBANESE OPERATION. "WE NEED TO MEET ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS IN THE NORTH." DRAPER REPLIED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT IS A BOTTOM LINE REQUIREMENT FOR THE ISRAELIS. HE NOTED THAT WE HAD

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3040 DTG: 052309Z OCT 82 PSN: 004269

TOLD THE SYRIANS CLEARLY THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.  
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8. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE SECURITY ZONE ISSUE WAS ONE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE AT THE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT LEVEL DIRECTLY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. DRAPER REPLIED THAT THAT WAS FINE IF THE LEBANESE WERE WILLING TO GO ALONG. HE NOTED THAT THE "OVERT" MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNEL MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS REGARD, AND THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD ASSURED HABIB AND HIM -- AT THEIR REQUEST -- THAT THIS CHANNEL COULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. KIMCHE STRESSED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET A DIALOGUE GOING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE LEBANESE, HOPEFULLY BEFORE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL GOES TO THE UNITED NATIONS LATER THIS MONTH. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.  
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9. KIMCHE DESCRIBED ISRAELI GOALS IN THIS CONNECTION. THESE INCLUDED THE NECESSITY OF KEEPING THE TERRORIST THREAT AWAY FROM ISRAEL'S BORDERS, NO RETURN TO CLOSED BORDERS, A FORMAL (SIGNED) SECURITY ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, NO FOREIGN FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE, AND AN END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. DRAPER NOTED THAT THE CONCEPT OF AN END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WAS ATTRACTIVE TO HIM, ALTHOUGH HE STRESSED THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT. PICKING UP ON THE GOAL OF NO FOREIGN FORCES IN THE ZONE, DRAPER ASKED WHAT ISRAEL WOULD SUGGEST IF IT TURNED OUT THE LEBANESE FORCES WEREN'T ADEQUATE TO DO THE JOB.  
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10. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT IT WAS ISRAEL'S BELIEF THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD DO THE JOB, IF HADDAD'S FORCES COULD PARTICIPATE. PREFERABLY THROUGH INTEGRATION INTO THE LAF. DRAPER NOTED THAT IT MIGHT BE EASY TO INCLUDE THOSE ELEMENTS OF HADDAD'S FORCES WHO HAD BEEN MEMBERS OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, BUT DRAWING ON THE OTHER ELEMENTS MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY MIGHT WELCOME THE NEW RECRUITS.  
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11. DRAPER ASKED IF KIMCHE WOULD ENVISAGE THE NEED FOR AN ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE. SOMEWHAT  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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O 052309Z OCT 82  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3373

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0118  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 5230  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8842

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03040

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HESITANTLY, KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN CLOSE COOPERATION. HE CONTINUED THAT, IF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BROKE DOWN, ISRAEL WOULD "PROBABLY" WANT TO MAINTAIN THE OPTION TO GO INTO LEBANON MILITARILY. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT "THE ODD TERRORIST" COULD BE HANDLED BY THE LEBANESE, AND WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE CAUSE FOR ISRAEL TO GO INTO LEBANON.  
--

12. DRAPER NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE WISHED TO DEAL WITH HADDAD IN THE LEBANESE WAY, BUT THIS COULD BE A PROBLEM WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SEES THE PROPOSED LEBANESE TREATMENT OF HADDAD AS WRONG: HADDAD IS A PATRIOT. NOT A TRAITOR. TO EXTEND AMNESTY TO HIM WOULD IMPLY THAT HE HAD COMMITTED A CRIME. DRAPER SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE PM COULD BE GREETED WITH A LEBANESE FORMULA WHICH HADDAD WOULD HAVE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE.

13. ONE OF THE RESULTS OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, KIMCHE CONTINUED, WOULD BE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ILMAC FROM THE SCENE AND THE CREATION OF A NEW ORGANIZATION TO REPLACE IT. AS FAR AS UNIFIL WAS CONCERNED, ISRAEL WOULD PREFER TO SEE IT GO. DRAPER REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO SEE UNIFIL CONTINUED FOR A WHILE. AMB LEWIS NOTED THAT, WITH THE RIGHT CONTINGENTS, A MODIFIED MANDATE AND STRENGTHENED FORCE, UNIFIL MIGHT BE A PROMISING WAY TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF A FORCE IN LEBANON UNTIL THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCE GETS BACK ON ITS FEET. KIMCHE ASKED HOW THE LEBANESE VIEWED THE SITUATION, AS WELL AS WHAT THE U. S. POSITION WOULD BE IF THE LEBANESE ASKED FOR AN EXPANDED MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE TO SERVE OUTSIDE THE BEIRUT AREA. DRAPER REPLIED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO EXAMINE SUCH A REQUEST IMAGINATIVELY, NOTING THAT THERE WOULD BE INSTITUTIONAL RESISTANCE IN WASHINGTON TO ANY U. S. INVOLVEMENT. HE CONTINUED THAT MANY LEBANESE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN THE BEKA'A AND NORTHERN LEBANON TO KEEP THE SYRIANS AND PLO FROM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 02 OF 02 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3040 DTG: 052309Z OCT 82 PSN: 004272

COMING BACK IN. HE ASKED KIMCHE IF ISRAEL WOULD WANT THE FREEDOM TO INTERVENE IF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES COULDN'T HANDLE SUCH INFILTRATION. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT, AS A DETERRENT FACTOR, ISRAEL WOULD WISH TO MAINTAIN SUCH FREEDOM. DRAPER SAID THIS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO FORCE UPON THE LEBANESE.

--

14. DRAPER SAID THAT THE LEBANESE ARE DETERMINED, AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL PRIDE, TO RESIST ANY SYRIAN RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS. THIS COULD APPLY TO ISRAEL ALSO. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THIS COULD LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD INTERVENE IF THE PLO COMES BACK IN. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT THERE WAS DISTINCTION BETWEEN NORTH LEBANON, WHERE A PLO PRESENCE DOES NOT POSE A SECURITY THREAT TO ISRAEL AND THE SECURITY ZONE IN THE SOUTH. NEITHER THE U.S. NOR ISRAEL COULD HOPE TO UNDERWRITE AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE PLO OUT OF ALL OF LEBANON. WE WOULD JUST HAVE TO HOPE THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD DEVELOP A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF DOING SO.

--

15. THE U.S. ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH. DRAPER NOTED THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME ISRAELIS DO NOT WANT THE U.S. IN THE MIDDLE. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT IF ISRAEL CANNOT GET A PEACE TREATY WITH LEBANON, IT AT LEAST WANTS MAXIMUM NORMALIZATION. THE UNITED STATES ROLE AS AN INTERLOCUTOR SHOULD NOT PREVENT DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. INSTEAD, THE U.S. SHOULD SUPPORT DIRECT ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONTACTS AS LEADING TO NORMALIZATION. BAR-ON ADDED, AS AN EXAMPLE, THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE U.S. TO EXERCISE ITS ROLE TO ENCOURAGE DIRECT ISRAELI CONTACTS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY FOR THE U.S. TO BE INVOLVED IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS. KIMCHE CONTINUED THAT THE ISRAELIS HOPED THE U.S. WOULD BACK THEIR DESIRE TO KEEP A "POLITICAL MISSION" -- WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE TEHRAN FORMULA -- IN BEIRUT. HE ASKED DRAPER HOW HE FELT ABOUT SUCH A MISSION. DRAPER REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY PERSONAL PROBLEM WITH SUCH A MISSION, BUT THE PRESENT MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE MISSION LOCATED IN BAABDA CREATED REAL DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING A SECURITY THREAT. THE OFFICE THERE WAS AN INVITATION TO TERRORISTS. KIMCHE INFORMED DRAPER THAT THE MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD BE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3374

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0119  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 5231  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0843

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03040

NODIS  
WITHDRAWN "SHORTLY" AND THAT THE MFA OFFICE WOULD  
BE MOVED PROBABLY TO ASHRAFIYYA (EAST BEIRUT).  
DRAPER ENDORSED THOSE STEPS AS WISE.

16. HE CONTINUED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT SOMETIMES  
THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT BE SUPPORTIVE OF AN  
ISRAELI POSITION FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS. HE  
CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE QUESTION OF MAKING HADDAD  
A MILITARY COMMANDER OR GOVERNOR IN SOUTH LEBANON,  
AFTER HE WAS RE-INTEGRATED INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY.  
REINSTATING HADDAD WAS FEASIBLE; GIVING HIM A ROLE IN  
SOUTH LEBANON WAS PROBABLY MORE THAN THE MARKET  
WOULD BEAR. KIMCHE OBSERVED THAT IT WAS A LEBANESE  
AND NOT AN ISRAELI IDEA TO MAKE HADDAD "MUHAFEZ" IN  
SOUTHERN LEBANON. "YOU WOULDN'T OPPOSE THAT, WOULD  
YOU?" DRAPER SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE TOO MUCH AT  
THIS TIME.

17. DRAPER STRESSED AGAIN. HOWEVER, THAT HABIB AND  
HE HAD GOTTEN AMIN GEMAYEL'S COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE  
THE MILITARY COMMISSION INTO THE FUTURE, WITH THE  
POLITICAL ELEMENT. THIS WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE SUP-  
PORTIVE ROLE THE UNITED STATES WANTED TO PLAY. KIMCHE  
OBSERVED THAT THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE COMMISSION  
MUST BE "AT A SERIOUS LEVEL." THE POLITICAL REPRESENTA-  
TIVE MUST BE ABLE TO SPEAK AND MAKE DECISIONS ON  
BEHALF OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

18. KIMCHE OBSERVED THAT IN VIEW OF THE ISSUES ALREADY  
DISCUSSED AND IDENTIFIED: 1) DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN  
ISRAEL-LEBANON, 2) THE NEED FOR THE PLO TO LEAVE  
LEBANON, 3) SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND  
SYRIAN FORCES, AND 4) ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SECURITY  
ZONE IN SOUTH LEBANON -- THE PROCESS COULD BE A  
LENGTHY ONE. DRAPER OBSERVED THAT DIRECT CONTACTS  
IN THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COMMISSION COULD START UP  
AT ANYTIME. THEY ALREADY HAD OCCURRED. AS FAR AS  
SIMULTANEOUS SYRIAN-IDF WITHDRAWAL AND THE WITHDRAWAL  
OF THE PLO WERE CONCERNED, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK  
ON THE SYRIANS.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3040 DTG: 052309Z OCT 82 PSN: 004275

19. KIMCHE ASKED DRAPER IF HABIB HAD RAISED THE PRISONER ISSUE WHILE HE WAS IN DAMASCUS. DRAPER REPLIED THAT HE HAD AND REVIEWED WHAT THE SYRIANS HAD TOLD US SO FAR. DRAPER CONTINUED THAT HE WAS WORRIED THAT CONTINUED DIRECT US EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS COULD COMPLICATE THE POW ISSUE. THE ICRC SHOULD HANDLE THE ISSUE. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THE POWS WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF ANY WITHDRAWAL DEAL. HE CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL WOULD ALSO HAVE TO DISCUSS THE ROUGHLY 8,000 PALESTINIAN PRISONERS STILL IN ITS HANDS. THE CHOICE SEEMED TO BE EITHER TO HAND THEM OVER TO THE LEBANESE (WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A VERY DICEY DECISION) OR TO MAKE THIS ISSUE PART OF THE PLO EVACUATION DEAL WITH THE SYRIANS. DRAPER OBSERVED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF HABIB AND HE HAD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO RAISE THIS ISSUE AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. COMMENT: KIMCHE ENCOURAGED DRAPER TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH BEGIN (WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE UNPRODUCTIVE.) END COMMENT. GROVE  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2748 DTG: 052357Z OCT 82 PSN: 004242  
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 13063

EXDIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR DRAPER, FOR AMBASSADORS FROM A/S VELIOTES  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P), UNGA, XF  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S OCT. 5 UNGA BILATERAL WITH MOROCCAN  
FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA: FEZ SUMMIT AND SYRIAN WITH-  
DRAWAL FROM LEBANON

1. ~~18~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. FYI: FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OCCURRED DURING THE SEC-  
RETARY'S BILATERAL ON OCT. 5, 1982 WITH MOROCCAN FONMIN  
M'HAMED BOUCETTA.  
BEGIN TEXT:  
THE SECRETARY, IN CLOSING, ASKED THIS QUESTION: "I HOPE  
WE CAN ASSUME CORRECTLY THAT THE FEZ SUMMIT STATEMENT ON  
LEBANON MEANS THAT INSOFAR AS THE ARAB LEAGUE IS  
CONCERNED SYRIA IS TO LEAVE LEBANON AS ISRAEL LEAVES IT."  
BOUCETTA RESPONDED "IT IS MORE NUANCE." PUBLICLY, HE  
SAID, FEZ DECLARES THE SUMMIT'S APPROVAL OF THE REQUEST  
OF THE LEGITIMATE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO SYRIA TO  
WITHDRAW THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE DEPLOYED IN LEBANON  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN EARLIER LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REQUEST  
AND ARAB SUMMIT APPROVAL OF THAT REQUEST. PRIVATELY,  
WE APPROVED WITHDRAWAL, BOUCETTA CONTINUED (REFERRING  
SECRET  
TO THE FEZ SUMMIT), BUT THE SYRIANS ASKED AND WE AGREED  
THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL OCCUR CONCURRENTLY WITH OR FOLLOWING  
ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL.  
THE SECRETARY THEN SAID I HOPE THE EMPHASIS CAN BE ON THE  
CONCURRENTLY, RATHER THAN THE FOLLOWING. BOUCETTA  
REPLIED, "IT CAN BE." END TEXT. END FYI.  
SHULTZ  
BT

*OK*  
*File*  
*Phase II*

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106/2 # 143

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

~~SECRET~~

File Lebanon  
Phase II

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Nov 6 10-6

- 99.9% achieved IDF w/d  
Baida

- Leb. gov't

excellent from our standpoint  
wants our advice - now we  
can work with

we must protect him from  
Israel's. Am. cannot include  
any agreement w/Israel's

w/o cabinet approval. Smother  
AG wants us to run inter-  
ference for him

\* - people have a clear idea we support  
Arab support too

- Saudi. month, no money yet

- Syrian ok

- Egypt wants closer relations

- Jordan supp

DECLASSIFIED/RE/ASED

NLS F97-106/z #144

z. CW NARA, DATE 4/7/06

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- w/d of external forces. No PLO first then second stage is all external forces. PLO won't leave before Syrians, nor will they stay
- Drooper to help initiate (GOS - PLO, Wazzan, (Abu Mubarak killed) could be Hamid al-Hassan) Where to go? Distribute to same places.
- key: Timing + phasing (monthly)
  - push rapid on 2 phases
  - Disengagement
  - Total w/d
- simultaneous GOS/GOI will be very difficult. Fee: contingent on IDF w/d first (according to exp)
- Principles
  - Total w/d
  - No right of re-entry
  - Buffer zone + I/MNF



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- what do ~~you~~ we think ought to happen?

- Provide Summary for Pres.
- Don't think he's aware
- Wait for Shultz to review ideas on instructions

Mechanist  
substance

- what do we want to happen  
- principles/objectives  
- issues

- simul w/d process to max extent possible. some fallback.
- Disengagement by IDF to 40 km / Syrians off ridges
- incanta - Rd / Summit Ridge for Syria

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- Possibility of pre-cooked plan
- what type of interposition force?
- Arrangements for buffer zone
  - Lebak
  - UNIFIL
  - expanded mandate
- Palestinian refugees
- Haddad - Amin has a formula to declare amnesty for all Haddad + Khalil

Draft for NY by 4 pm

- Reconstruct draft
- Who has to talk to whom
  - X Saudis
  - X Israelis right away

Teicher!

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1982

Dear Nick:


Phil Habib and I agree that the success of Beirut could not have been achieved without both careful policy guidance and determined and effective support from Washington. I write to commend you and your colleagues for the superb performance which made this dramatic and important success possible.

The challenge of Beirut was a test of judgment and stamina. Your ability to make balanced and reasonable decisions and carry them out with determination even at the limits of physical endurance testifies to the skill and dedication with which you have approached your task.

One of the great satisfactions of the office I occupy has been the observation and recognition of gifted Americans of your caliber as they serve their country with such distinction.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



The Honorable  
Nicholas A. Veliotos  
Assistant Secretary for  
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Department of State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1982

Dear Morrie:


You and Phil have done the impossible. Your unique success at saving the city of Beirut will be long remembered, not only for its humanitarian purpose, but also for opening the way to what I hope may be the path to peace in the Middle East.

I know how essential you were to the success of the Habib mission. Your ability to make sound decisions and carry them out with determination even when pressed to the limits of physical endurance was essential to this success. Added to this was the courage with which you fulfilled your duties in a city under fire.

One of the great satisfactions of the office I occupy has been the observation and recognition of distinguished Americans of your caliber as they serve their country with such dedication and effectiveness. Please accept my congratulations and very great appreciation for your service to all America.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "Ronald Reagan".

The Honorable  
Morris Draper  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Department of State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1982

Dear Jon:


Phil Habib and I agree that the success of Beirut could not have been achieved without both careful policy guidance and determined and effective support from Washington. I write to commend you and your colleagues for the superb performance which made this dramatic and important success possible.

The challenge of Beirut was a test of judgment and stamina. Your ability to make balanced and reasonable decisions and carry them out with determination even at the limits of physical endurance testifies to the skill and dedication with which you have approached your task.

One of the great satisfactions of the office I occupy has been the observation and recognition of gifted Americans of your caliber as they serve their country with such distinction.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



The Honorable  
Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe  
Director  
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs  
Department of State

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 6, 1982

Dear Larry:


Foreign policy successes are the result of initiative, careful thought and hard work. We all look to Phil Habib as the author of the success in Beirut. Phil and I agree, however, that without your driving, dedicated direction of the Washington effort success might have been denied.

I write, therefore, to commend you for your initiative, for the balanced judgment which characterized your guidance, and for the determination and stamina which kept you at the job until it was complete.

It is performance such as yours which contributes greatly to the successful implementation of our foreign policy.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "Ronald Reagan".

The Honorable  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Department of State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 5, 1982

**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*  
SUBJECT: Congratulatory Letters

Congratulatory letters from you to Larry Eagleburger, Morris Draper, Nick Veliotos and Jon Howe for their contribution to the success of the Habib mission are at Tab A.

Recommendation

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

APPROVE *WPC* DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

MW

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 29, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *HJT*  
SUBJECT: Congratulatory Letters

Attached are congratulatory letters from the President to Larry Eagleburger, Morris Draper, Nick Veliotes and Jon Howe for their contribution to the success of the Habib mission.

The Speechwriters have cleared these letters.

Recommendation

That you sign the memo at Tab I for the President transmitting the letters at Tab A.

APPROVE   /  

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Memo for the President
- A - Congratulatory Letters





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8227182

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Congratulatory Letters

Attached are congratulatory notes from the President to Larry Eagleburger, Morrie Draper, Nick Veliotos and Jon Howe for their contribution to the success of the Habib mission.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As Stated.

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Nick:

Phil Habib and I agree that the success of Beirut could not have been achieved without both careful policy guidance and determined and effective support from Washington. I write to commend you and your colleagues for the superb performance which made this dramatic and important success possible.

The challenge of Beirut was a test of judgment and stamina. Your ability to make balanced and reasonable decisions and carry them out with determination even at the limits of physical endurance testifies to the skill and dedication with which you have approached your task.

It is one of the great satisfactions of the office I occupy to be able to observe gifted Americans of your caliber as they serve their country with such distinction.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable

Nicholas A. Veliotis,

Assistant Secretary for

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,

Department of State.

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Morrie:

You and Phil have done the impossible. Your unique success at saving the city of Beirut will be long remembered, not only for its humanitarian purpose, but also for opening the way to what I hope may be the path to peace in the Middle East.

I know how essential you were to the success of the Habib mission. Your ability to make sound decisions and carry them out with determination even when pressed to the limits of physical endurance was essential to this success. Added to this was the courage with which you fulfilled your duties in a city under fire.

One of the great satisfactions of the office I occupy is to observe distinguished Americans of your caliber as they serve their country with such dedication and effectiveness. Please accept my congratulations and very great appreciation for your service to all America.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mr. Morris Draper,

Deputy Assistant Secretary,

Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,

Department of State.

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Larry:

Foreign policy successes are the result of initiative, careful thought and hard work. We all look to Phil Habib as the author of the success in Beirut. Phil and I agree, however, that without your driving, dedicated direction of the Washington effort success might have been denied.

I write therefore to commend you for your initiative, for the balanced judgment which characterized your guidance, and for the determination and stamina which kept you at the job until it was complete.

It is performance such as yours which contributes greatly to the successful implementation of our foreign policy.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable

Lawrence S. Eagleburger,

Under Secretary for Political Affairs,

Department of State.

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Jon,

Phil Habib and I agree that the success of Beirut could not have been achieved without both careful policy guidance and determined and effective support from Washington. I write to commend you and your colleagues for the superb performance which made this dramatic and important success possible.

The challenge of Beirut was a test of judgment and stamina. Your ability to make balanced and reasonable decisions and carry them out with determination even at the limits of physical endurance testifies to the skill and dedication with which you have approached your task.

It is one of the great satisfactions of the office I occupy to be able to observe gifted Americans of your caliber as they serve their country with such distinction.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable

Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe

Director,

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,

Department of State.