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**Collection:** Kemp, Geoffrey: Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** KEMP, GEOFFREY: Files  
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**File Folder:** Israel/Lebanon (Phase II) 1982 (2)

**Archivist:** smf/smf  
**FOIA ID:** F97-106 - Wills  
**Date:** 11/27/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Howe to Mayhew, et al 1p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #126</i>	9/21/82	P1/B1
2. draft diplomatic note	from Fouad Boutros, Dep. Prime Minister of Foreign Minister 4p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #127</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
3. draft diplomatic note	MNF Countries and Lebanese Gov't 1p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #128</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
4. memo	Shultz to RR 2p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #129</i>	9/21/82	P1/B1
5. memo	For Shultz re Lebanon and the Peace Process 1p <i>R 4/7/06 NLSF97-106/2 #130</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
6. cable	012050Z Oct 82 6p P <i>upheld P 11/24/08 M2008-098/15 #56970</i> <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #131</i>	10/1/82	P1/B1
7. cable	022121Z Oct 82 4p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #132</i>	10/2/82	P1/B1
8. cable	031537Z Oct 82 (Section 1 of 2) 2p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #133</i>	10/3/82	P1/B1
9. cable	031608Z Oct 82 (Section 2 of 2) 2p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #134</i>	10/3/82	P1/B1
10. cable	031914Z Oct 82 (Section 1 of 3) 2p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #135</i>	10/3/82	P1/B1
11. cable	031917Z Oct 82 (Section 2 of 3) 2p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #136</i>	10/3/82	P1/B1
12. cable	031943Z Oct 82 (Section 3 of 3) 2p <i>R 11/22/02 F97-106/2 #137</i>	10/3/82	P1/B1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PHINCO III

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Time Stamp

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02 SEP 21 P 1: 29

LA

FILE  
MNF

or  
Race Plan

C : Copy

O : Original

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1982 SEP 21 PM 1 02

B

S/S #

URGENT  
1:27  
WHSR

599

MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 6  
FROM: RADM Jonathan T. Howe PM 29022 7327  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Modified Text for Exchange of Notes between  
MNF Countries

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>OSD/ISA</u>	<u>Mayhew, Phil</u>	<u>695-3890</u>	<u>4D765</u>
<u>JCS/J-3</u>	<u>RADM J.S. Donnell</u>	<u>697-2608</u>	<u>2C867</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Howard Teicher</u>	<u>395-5650</u>	<u>351 OE0B</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: URGENT

S/S Officer: [Signature]

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 11/22/00



United States Department of State

Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

URGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 21, 1982

TO: OSD/ISA - Mr. Phil Mayhew  
JCS/J-3 - RADM J. S. Donnell, III  
NSC - Mr. Howard Teicher

FROM: PM - Jonathan T. Howe *JTH*

The following modified text for the exchange of notes between MNF countries and the Lebanese Government is attached. These changes will be subject to ratification by the Italian and French Governments. If we agree to something along the lines of the attached, there will be no need for a mandate paper which was the fallback we discussed last evening.

Please review on an urgent basis and obtain a clearance of your Principals. I will keep you advised of additional suggested changes.

Attachment:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106/2 #126

BY DM, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the urgent discussions between representatives of our two Governments concerning the recent tragic events which have occurred in the Beirut area, and to consultations between my Government and the Secretary General of the United Nations pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 521. On behalf of the Republic of Lebanon, I wish to inform Your Excellency's Government of the determination of the Government of Lebanon to restore its sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area and thereby to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring an end to violence that has recurred. To this end, Israeli forces shall withdraw from positions they now occupy in the Beirut area.

In its consultations with the Secretary General, the Government of Lebanon has noted that the urgency of the situation requires immediate action, and the Government of Lebanon, therefore, is, in conformity with the objectives in Security Council Resolution 521, proposing to several nations that they contribute forces to serve as a temporary Multinational Force (MNF) in the Beirut area. The mandate of the MNF will be to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLS F97-106/2 #127

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in the Beirut area in their efforts to restore their sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area and thereby to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring an end to violence that has recurred. The MNF may undertake other functions only by mutual agreement.

In the foregoing context, I have the honor to propose that the United States of America deploy a force of approximately 1200 personnel to Beirut, subject to the following terms and conditions:

-- The American military force shall carry out appropriate activities consistent with the mandate of the MNF.

-- Command authority over the American force will be exercised exclusively by the United States Government through existing American military channels.

-- The LAF and MNF will form a Liaison and Coordination Committee, composed of representatives of the MNF participating governments and the LAF. The Liaison and Coordination Committee will have two essential components: (A) Supervisory liaison; and (B) Military and technical liaison and coordination.

-- The American force will operate in close coordination with the LAF. To assure effective coordination with the LAF, the American force will assign liaison officers to the LAF and the Government of Lebanon will assign liaison

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

officers to the American force. The LAF liaison officers to the American force will, inter alia, perform liaison with the civilian population and with the UN observers and manifest the authority of the Lebanese Government in all appropriate situations.

-- In carrying out its mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense.

-- It is understood that the presence of the American force will be needed only for a limited period to meet the urgent requirements posed by the current situation. The MNF contributors and the Government of Lebanon will consult concerning the duration of the MNF presence and arrangements for the departure of the MNF. The American force will depart Lebanon at the request of the President of Lebanon or at the direction of the United States Government.

-- The Government of Lebanon and the LAF will take all measures necessary to ensure the protection of the American force's personnel, to include securing assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will refrain from hostilities and not interfere with any activities of the MNF.

-- The American force will enjoy both the degree of freedom of movement and the right to undertake those activities deemed necessary for the performance of its mission or

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

for the support of its personnel. Accordingly, it shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded the administrative and technical staff of the American Embassy in Beirut, and shall be exempt from immigration and customs requirements, and restrictions on entering or departing Lebanon. Personnel, property and equipment of the American force introduced into Lebanon shall be exempt from any form of tax, duty, charge or levy.

I have the further honor to propose, if the foregoing is acceptable to your Excellency's government, that your Excellency's reply to that effect, together with this note, shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments, to enter into force on the date of your Excellency's reply.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Fouad Boutros]

Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of  
Foreign Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note of September, 1982 requesting the deployment of an American force to the Beirut area. I am pleased to inform you on behalf of my Government that the United States is prepared to deploy temporarily a force of approximately 1200 personnel as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. It is understood that the presence of such an American force will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, an objective which is fully shared by my Government, and thereby further efforts of the Government of Lebanon to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.

I have the further honor to inform you that my Government accepts the terms and conditions concerning the presence of the American force in the Beirut area as set forth in your note, and that Your Excellency's note and this reply accordingly constitute an agreement between our two Governments.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106/2 #128

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

NLS F97-106/2 #129

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: George P. Shultz *AS/12*  
Subject: Reaction to Your Lebanon Initiative *FL*

Arab spokesmen have welcomed your decision to join with France and Italy in sending a multinational force to Beirut. While there has been no official PLO response, the fact that Arafat had earlier called for a return of the MNF favorably conditioned the other Arabs. When our Ambassador in Jordan informed King Hussein, he replied, "Thank God. It is the right step at this time." The Foreign Minister said it would be "extremely helpful" at today's Arab League Foreign Ministers conference in Tunis.

The massacres in Beirut cost the U.S. heavily in terms of goodwill among Arab countries. Notwithstanding that, most of them will find positive aspects in the evidence of U.S. commitment to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and a continuation of the peace process.

We have not yet received an official response to your proposal from Israel although the Cabinet issued a communique approving the MNF without conditions. However the communique is disappointing in two respects: it makes no mention of an IDF withdrawal; and it proposes a coordinating committee of the MNF countries Lebanon, and Israel to prevent incidents. This would clearly not be appropriate since Israel is the country which is supposed to be withdrawing from Beirut (though we will have to work out some informal mechanism for liaison between the MNF and the IDF).

Generally favorable European reaction contrasted with initial negative view from Soviets. Tass reported that your speech shows the U.S. responsibility "for having armed Israel and inspired it to commit bloody crimes." Tass also accused the U.S. of using the bloodbath in Beirut as a pretext to send the Marines back in.

Members of Congress from both houses were publicly very supportive, but some have expressed concern about committing troops because of possible danger to them (Glenn and Jackson, in particular, although Nunn and Warner were also concerned). Members were also worried about securing an Israeli withdrawal, privately expressing surprise that Israel had not already taken this step.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

**Drafted:** NEA/ARN:DL<sup>M</sup>Mack:pdw  
9/21/82, x 22670, #1484C

**Cleared:** S/NM:Ambassador Fairbanks  
NEA:CHIL<sup>R</sup>DM  
H:PAMoore<sup>M</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1982

Dear Mr. President-elect:

The American people join me in congratulating you upon your election as President of Lebanon. We are proud to stand beside your courageous nation as our friends in Lebanon again overcome adversity in exercising the democratic and constitutional tradition that our nations share.

In my September 20 address to the American people, I restated the basic objectives of the U.S. relationship with Lebanon. "First and foremost," I said, "we seek the restoration of a strong and stable central government" in Lebanon, "brought into being by orderly constitutional processes." Your election as President sets Lebanon firmly on the path to national reconciliation behind a strong government with a broad mandate from the people of Lebanon.

You have our pledge that the United States will remain a staunch partner and friend to Lebanon as you set out upon the difficult and challenging tasks ahead. The American nation and I extend to you and all Lebanese our very best wishes for the future.

Sincerely,

*Ronald Reagan*

His Excellency  
Amin Gemayel  
President-elect of the Republic  
of Lebanon  
Beirut

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1982


Dear Mr. President:

I would like to take this historic occasion to offer my personal gratitude for your strength and dedication throughout these difficult times. Your commitment to the maintenance of Lebanon's national institutions has been unsurpassed, encouraging all friends of Lebanon to persevere in the shared task of restoring peace and security to your people.

As Lebanon completes the democratic process of transition and greets its new president, and upon your return to private life, please accept my respect and admiration for all your efforts.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Elias Sarkis  
President of the Republic  
of Lebanon  
Beirut

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1982

Your Majesty:

I deeply appreciated your letter of September 19 on the tragic events which took place in Lebanon this past week. I share with you feelings of outrage and revulsion over the murders of innocent Palestinian civilians. There can be no justification for this heinous crime which has only deepened the suffering in Lebanon and made more difficult the goal of achieving national reconciliation, an imperative objective shared by all men of good will.

As I told the American people on September 20, we must and will act with all friends of Lebanon to bring to an end this nightmare of suffering. To this end, we have once again agreed with our French and Italian allies to constitute a multinational force and dispatch it urgently to Beirut. If all goes well, this force will arrive in Lebanon within the next few days. It will have as its task assisting the Government of Lebanon to assume full responsibility over its capital, an essential precondition for extending its control over the entire country. It is only by beginning this process that we can stop the cycle of violence which has swept Lebanon for the past seven years and move forward the search for peace and a solution to the plight of the Palestinians.

I am convinced the Lebanese people deeply yearn for peace and a restoration of stability in their troubled country. Given the opportunity and proper conditions, I believe they will bend every effort to return to constitutional government. This has been most lately evidenced by the election September 21 of Amin Gemayal as President of Lebanon. An absolute precondition for the return of normality to Lebanon, however, is the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that troubled land. I can assure you, Your Majesty, that my government will spare no effort towards this end.

It is essential in the period ahead that the friends of Lebanon work together towards our common objectives. We must all bring our influence to bear in constructive ways to restore stability in Lebanon and create the conditions which allow the process of national reconciliation to go forward. I am sure that Your Majesty will do everything possible in achieving this goal. As always, I value highly your views and wise counsel.

Please be assured, Your Majesty, of my friendship and high esteem.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "R".

His Majesty  
Hassan II  
King of Morocco  
Rabat



**URGENT**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8206520

REFERRAL

DATE: 22 SEP 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: L PAUL BREMER

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: HASSAN II

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 22 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

MOROCCO

GEMAYEL, AMIN

HS

SARKIS, ELIAS

SUBJ:

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REQUIRED ACTION: FOR IMMEDIATE DISPATCH VIA CABLE

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DUE DATE: 22 SEP 82

COMMENTS:

**URGENT**

  
FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER

STAFF SECRETARY

RECEIVED 22 SEP 82 12

TO BREMER

FROM POINDEXTER

DOCDATE 22 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

MOROCCO

GEMAYEL, AMIN

HS

SARKIS, ELIAS

HASSAN II

SUBJECT: PRES LTRS RE ELECTION IN LEBANON

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR

DUE:

STATUS C

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
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FOR CONCURRENCE

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COMMENTS

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3 PRESIDENTIAL GREEN LETTERS RE LEBANON

Subject:

CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED  
(check one)

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DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: MERCHANDISE

**URGENT**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8206520

REFERRAL

DATE: 22 SEP 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: L PAUL BREMER

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: GEMAYEL & SARKIS

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 22 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

MOROCCO

GEMAYEL, AMIN

HS

SARKIS, ELIAS

SUBJ:

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REQUIRED ACTION: FOR IMMEDIATE DISPATCH VIA CABLE

HARD COPY TO FOLLOW FOR POUCH

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DUEDATE: 22 SEP 82

COMMENTS:

**URGENT**



FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER

STAFF SECRETARY

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Lebanon and the Peace Process (U)

Before I leave for Latin America, I would like to share with you some of my hopes and frustrations concerning our Middle East peace initiative and our efforts to secure an early withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. (U)

I know you share my hope that we can achieve a withdrawal by the end of the year. The longer we delay a resolution to the military problem in Lebanon, the greater the chances that we will lose this unique opportunity for a solution to the broader, more fundamental problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Similarly, as your recent letter to Mr. Begin indicates, we both share the same frustrations concerning the progress made to date on Lebanon. (S)

I believe we need to inject still more urgency into the Lebanese negotiations, while at the same time pressing ahead with our efforts to increase the participants in the peace process. I am not at all confident that the government of Israel will be able or willing to compromise on Lebanon and the peace process at this time unless Mr. Begin and his colleagues fully understand our determination not to allow this opportunity for peace to slip by us. I have to admit, though, that I am not sure what our most effective tactics for achieving this should be. (S)

For this reason I would like you to prepare by my return from Latin America a list of policy options for us to consider which would be focused on specific, near-time actions the United States could take to put greater pressure on all the parties to move events forward. This review should include discussion of all the practical means of persuasion available to us including further positive or, in extremis, negative incentives that we may have to consider, bearing in mind that our ultimate goal continues to be a resolution of the Palestinian problem, an independent Lebanon, and assured security guarantees for Israel. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-106/2 #130

e: CW NARA DATE 4/7/06

TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO BE MADE

I am pleased tonight to be able to tell you that the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force will enter Beirut, and the Israeli defense forces will complete its withdrawal from the city and the airport tomorrow. Our Marines will be deployed at the Beirut International Airport.

The deployment of 1200 U.S. Marines, along with the contingents from Italy and France is, in my view, essential to a brighter future for Lebanon under its newly-elected president. Indeed, President Amin Gemayel faces a difficult task as he strives to draw his country together and overcome the strife and turmoil of recent years. I wish him well.

The hearts of the American people go out to the people of Lebanon at this important period in their nation's history. As Americans, we can be proud of the role our country has played.

The Marines, supported by the Navy, can be proud of the important role they are playing to ensure that the Lebanese authorities can successfully undertake responsibility for security and stability in Beirut, particularly after the painful tragedies of recent weeks.

To the people of Lebanon, let me assure you that we are behind you and will do what we can to assist you through this difficult period. With the deployment of the Multinational Force, we shall press ahead to negotiate the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

September 28, 1982  
1500 hours

UNCLASSIFIED

Leb/Isr  
Phase II

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

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UNCLAS STATE 276309

PASS TO DOD FDR OGC - J. ALLEN

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TAGS: PORG, EG, IS

SUBJECT: MFO PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES AGREEMENT

1. BELOW ARE TEXT OF LETTER WHICH EMBASSY WILL RECEIVE FROM GOI, AND TEXT OF LETTER TO BE GIVEN TO GOI BY EMBASSY; AS REFERRED TO IN STATE 276243.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF GOI LETTER: EXCELLENCY: I HAVE THE HONOR TO REFER TO THE PROTOCOL OF 3RD AUGUST 1981, RELATED TO THE TREATY OF PEACE OF 26TH MARCH 1979 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, AND TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MFO CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF A UNITED STATES CONTINGENT IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) ESTABLISHED BY THE SAID PROTOCOL. I PROPOSE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 11 (D) OF THE APPENDIX TO THE PROTOCOL, THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPECTING THOSE UNITED STATES MILITARY MEMBERS AND CIVILIAN OBSERVERS OF THE MFO (OTHER THAN

ACCORDANCE WITH ARRANGEMENTS TO BE MADE WITH THE MFO, WHO WILL BE REGARDED AS ON DUTY DURING THEIR ASSIGNMENT TO SUCH OFFICE) WHO ENTER ISRAEL, AS THE RECEIVING STATE WITHIN THE MEANING OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE APPENDIX TO THE PROTOCOL (HEREINAFTER "ISRAEL"), ON LEAVE OR WHO ARE TAKING LEAVE IN ISRAEL AFTER HAVING ENTERED ISRAEL ON OFFICIAL DUTY AND OVER WHOM YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD OTHERWISE EXERCISE JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 11 (A) OF THAT APPENDIX (HEREINAFTER CALLED VACATIONING UNITED STATES MEMBERS OF THE MFO. THIS ARRANGEMENT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO REQUEST A WAIVER OF IMMUNITY IN INDIVIDUAL CASES PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 11 (C) OF THE APPENDIX.

(A) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WAIVES THE IMMUNITY OF VACATIONING UNITED STATES MEMBERS OF THE MFO WHO ARE REASONABLY SUSPECTED OF HAVING COMMITTED WHILE ON LEAVE IN ISRAEL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT OF MORE THAN 3 YEARS OR

DEATH OR OF POSSESSING FOR PERSONAL USE DANGEROUS DRUGS AS DEFINED IN THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ORDINANCE (NEW VERSION, AS AMENDED) 5733-1973, TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO PERMIT THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO DETAIN SUCH SUSPECTED PERSONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LEGAL PROCEDURES. AS PROVIDED BY APPLICABLE LAW, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES MAY DETAIN SUCH SUSPECTED PERSONS MAY NOT EXCEED 48 HOURS, EXCEPT WHEN DETENTION IS AUTHORIZED BY AN ORDER OF A COMPETENT COURT ISSUED FOLLOWING A HEARING AT WHICH THE SUSPECTED PERSON MAY BE REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER. THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES MAY SEEK A COURT ORDER PERMITTING DETENTION FOR MORE THAN SEVEN DAYS ONLY IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND WITH THE PERSONAL APPROVAL OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ISRAEL. THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES SHALL NOTIFY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MFO AND THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTENTION TO REQUEST SUCH A COURT ORDER AT LEAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS PRIOR TO HIS DOING SO. ANY VIEWS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MAY EXPRESS SHALL BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN ORDER THAT HE MAY TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT.

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AFTER DETENTION UNDER THIS SECTION AND EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION (B) BELOW, THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES

SHALL TRANSFER THE CUSTODY OF SUCH SUSPECTED PERSONS TO THE MFO AUTHORITIES FOR INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATIONAL LAW AS PROVIDED IN THE PROTOCOL. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL INFORM THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES AS TO THE RESULTS OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO SUCH SUSPECTED

PERSONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE APPENDIX TO THE PROTOCOL FOLLOWING THEIR TRANSFER TO CUSTODY OF THE MFO.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED STATES LAW, AN ALLEGED VICTIM OF A CRIME, HIS FAMILY AND/OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE MAY BE PRESENT AT ANY TRIAL FOR THAT CRIME OF A MEMBER OF THE MFO TRANSFERRED TO THE MFO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION.

A MEMBER OF THE MFO WHO IS OBTAINED BY THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION SHALL BE AFFORDED ALL PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES ESTABLISHED BY APPLICABLE LAW, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING GUARANTEES:

- (I) TO CONSULT WITH A LAWYER WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME;
- (II) TO HAVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF HIS OWN CHOICE FOR HIS DEFENSE IN DETENTION PROCEEDINGS, OR, IF HE INDICATES HE LACKS FUNDS FOR HIS DEFENSE, TO PETITION THE COURT FOR FREE LEGAL REPRESENTATION;
- (III) TO HAVE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SOUGHT ON HIS BEHALF;

HE SHALL ALSO BE ENTITLED:

- (I) TO HAVE THE SERVICES OF A COMPETENT INTERPRETER, IF HE CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY.
- (II) NOT TO BE SUBJECT TO THE APPLICATION OF MARTIAL LAW.

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(III) IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSULAR PRACTICE, TO COMMUNICATE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MFO AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TO HAVE SUCH REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT AT DETENTION PROCEEDINGS.

(IV) IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE PRISON REGULATIONS, TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE VISITED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MFO AND OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND

BY MEMBERS OF HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND TO RECEIVE DURING SUCH VISITS MATERIAL AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

(B) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WAIVES THE IMMUNITY OF VACATIONING UNITED STATES MEMBERS OF THE MFO WHOM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL INTENDS

TO BRING TO TRIAL FOR WEAPONS OFFENSES COMMITTED WHILE ON LEAVE IN ISRAEL IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 144 OF THE PENAL LAW, OR FOR FELONIES COMMITTED WHILE ON LEAVE IN ISRAEL IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 7 AND 13-20 OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ORDINANCE (NEW VERSION, AS AMENDED (ATTACHED HERETO)) 5733-1973, INCLUDING PROCUREMENT, CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT SUCH OFFENSES, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT NONE OF THE OFFENSES DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION IS PUNISHABLE BY DEATH. THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES SHALL NOTIFY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MFO AND THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTENTION TO BRING SUCH MFO MEMBERS TO TRIAL AT LEAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS PRIOR TO PRESENTING CHARGES AGAINST SUCH MEMBERS. ANY VIEWS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MAY EXPRESS SHALL BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN ORDER THAT HE MAY TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT.

(C) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS ARRANGEMENT, A MEMBER OF THE MFO PRESENT IN ISRAEL SHALL BE CONSIDERED ON LEAVE UNLESS THAT MEMBER'S NAME HAS BEEN FORWARDED IN ADVANCE TO THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES AS BEING IN ISRAEL ON OFFICIAL DUTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULAR MUTUALLY ACCEPTED PROCEDURES PREVAILING IN THIS REGARD. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MFO SHALL DETERMINE ANY QUESTION ARISING AS TO WHETHER A MEMBER OF THE MFO WHOSE NAME HAS BEEN FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE PROCEDURES WAS ON OFFICIAL DUTY AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED.

(D) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROTOCOL AND CONSULAR PRACTICE, THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES SHALL NOTIFY IMMEDIATELY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MFO AND THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE DETENTION OF A VACATIONING UNITED STATES MEMBER OF THE MFO, AND OF ANY FURTHER ACTION TAKEN.

(E) A MEMBER OF THE MFO WHO IS TO BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS SHALL BE AFFORDED ALL PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES ESTABLISHED BY

APPLICABLE LAW, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING GUARANTEES:

(I) TO A PROMPT AND SPEEDY TRIAL.

(II) TO BE INFORMED, IN ADVANCE OF TRIAL, OF THE SPECIFIC CHARGE OR CHARGES MADE AGAINST HIM.

(III) TO BE CONFRONTED WITH THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

(IV) TO HAVE COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR OBTAINING EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR, IF THEY ARE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

(V) TO HAVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF HIS OWN CHOICE FOR HIS DEFENSE, OR, IF HE INDICATES HE LACKS FUNDS FOR HIS DEFENSE, TO PETITION THE COURT FOR FREE LEGAL REPRESENTATION.

HE SHALL ALSO BE ENTITLED:

(I) TO HAVE THE SERVICES OF A COMPETENT INTERPRETER, IF HE CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY.

(II) IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSULAR PRACTICE, TO COMMUNICATE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MFO AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO HAVE SUCH REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT AT HIS TRIAL.

(III) NOT TO BE SUBJECT TO THE APPLICATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR TRIAL BY MILITARY COURTS OR SPECIAL TRIBUNALS.

(IV) IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE PRISON REGULATIONS, TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE VISITED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MFO AND OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND BY MEMBERS OF HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND TO RECEIVE DURING SUCH VISITS MATERIAL AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

(F) AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER GOVERNMENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL REVIEW THIS ARRANGEMENT.

I HAVE THE HONOR TO PROPOSE, IF THE FOREGOING IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU, THAT THIS LETTER AND YOUR REPLY THERETO SHALL TOGETHER CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DATE OF YOUR REPLY. SINCERELY, YITZHAK SHAMIR, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS END TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF USG LETTER: EXCELLENCY: I HAVE THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER OF (DATE OF LETTER) PROPOSING A SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 11 (D) OF THE APPENDIX TO THE PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) OF 3 AUGUST 1981.

I HAVE THE FURTHER HONOR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE PROPOSAL MADE THEREIN IS ACCEPTABLE TO MY GOVERNMENT, WHICH THEREFORE AGREES THAT YOUR LETTER AND THE PRESENT REPLY SHALL CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHICH SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DATE OF THIS REPLY.

COMPLIMENTARY CLOSING. SINCERELY, SAMUEL LEWIS, U.S. AMBASSADOR END TEXT. DAM  
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DOCDATE 30 SEP 82

*Lebanon  
Phase II*

TO AGENCIES FROM CLARK

KEYWORDS: LEBANON ISRAEL  
SYRIA MILITARY OPERATIONS  
MEDIA

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON US TROOPS IN LEBANON

ACTION: CLARK SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8205656 NSCIFID ( H / H )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Press Guidance on U.S. Troops in Lebanon

We can all expect to receive numerous inquiries in the coming days and weeks regarding the duration and conditions of the Marine deployment in Lebanon. Given the significance of this issue, it is very important that all of our remarks on this subject are consistent, if not identical. Based on the inputs of your staffs, we have prepared the attached press guidance. It will serve as the interagency statement on this issue. Please ensure that this guidance is widely disseminated.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

Attachment:

-- Press Guidance

September 30, 1982

Q: How long and under what conditions will our forces stay in Lebanon:

A: The U.S. government has emphasized many times that the Marines will stay in Lebanon for only a limited duration.

Within that limited period of time, the President expects the Israelis and Syrians to follow through on their announced intentions and withdraw from Lebanon. The very presence of the MNF and the Lebanese government's increased control over its territory should encourage early agreement on these withdrawals and those of all foreign forces, including remaining armed elements of the PLO. The President expects all of these events to occur promptly.

The U.S. Marines will leave, as the President said, after consultations with other MNF participants and the Lebanese government, which requested the MNF to assist in the first place. The President pointed out withdrawals of foreign forces could occur prior to the Lebanese government's establishment of full control throughout the country. Similarly, that government and the MNF participants could determine that the MNF could depart before all foreign forces have completed their withdrawals.

Q: What if there are snags and the foreign forces don't withdraw?

A: He expects them to withdraw promptly. Period.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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
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MESSAGE NO. 394 CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS PAGES two  
 FROM WILLIAM P. CLARK 456-2255 WHSR  
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)  
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRESS GUIDANCE

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>SECRETARY SHULTZ</u>		
<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>SECRETARY WEINBERGER</u>		
<u>STATE</u>	<u>USUN REPRESENTATIVE</u>		
<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CHAIRMAN, JCS</u>		

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 233  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1209  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1084  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 312

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 6769

EXDIS  
FROM HABIB/DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINT, MOPS, XF, IS, SY, LE  
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH GAMEYEL  
ON PHASE II

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR 142008-098/15  
# 56970  
BY smf NARA DATE 11/26/08

- 1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)
- 2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HABIB OUTLINED HIS PRELIMINARY IDEAS

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 012050Z OCT 82 PSN: 055973

ON PHASE II OF LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL  
OCTOBER 1. HE PROPOSED TWO-STEP PROCESS: SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT

(TARGET DATE

OCTOBER 15), WITH SYRIANS WITHDRAWING TO BEKAA AND ISRAELIS  
WITHDRAWING TO WITHIN 40 KMS OF BORDER, AND COMPLETE  
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES (TARGET DATE NOVEMBER 1).

GEMAYEL BLESSED THIS TWO-STEP APPROACH AS "ONLY WAY" TO  
PROCEED. IN DISCUSSION OF DISENGAGEMENT, GEMAYEL TOLD

HABIB THAT LEBANESE ARMY COULD NOT BE GIVEN MISSION OF  
TAKING OVER ZONE FROM WHICH SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS HAD  
WITHDRAWN; THIS WOULD GREAT STRAINS THAT WOULD IMPEDE  
EFFORTS TO REBUILD IT. GEMAYEL PROPOSED INSTEAD EITHER

THAT MNF BE GIVEN THIS MISSION (PREFERRED OPTION FROM  
HIS POINT OF VIEW) OR THAT PRESENCE GREATER THAN

OBSERVERS AND LESS THAN ARMY BE INTRODUCED. IN  
DISCUSSION OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, GEMAYEL  
SAID HE THOUGHT MANY PLO FIGHTERS NOW IN NORTH WOULD  
LEAVE WITH SYRIANS. THOSE REMAINING COULD BE DISARMED  
BY LEBANESE ARMY, EVEN IF SOME FIGHTING TOOK PLACE.

HABIB SAID IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO AVOID FIGHTING

END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DILLON AND DRAPER AND BY  
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AMBASSADOR HABIB CALLED ON PRESIDENT  
GEMAYEL OCTOBER 1 AT 11 TO REPORT ON HIS VISITS TO  
JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND EGYPT AND ENGAGE IN EXPLORATORY  
TALKS ON PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. THE DETAILS OF THESE  
EXCHANGES ARE REPORTED BELOW. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED,  
INTER ALIA GEMAYEL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SO-CALLED  
"LEBANESE FORCES", RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, ISRAEL'S  
"OFFICE" IN BAABDA, THE FUTURE OF SA'D HADDAD, EMERGING  
SECURITY PROBLEMS, AND GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO THE U.S., WILL  
BE THE SUBJECTS FOR SEPTELS. THE MEETING LASTED ONE AND  
ONE-HALF HOURS.

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4. HABIB OPENED THE MEETING WITH A BRIEF REPORT ON HIS TRIP TO JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND EGYPT. THE MODERATE LEADERSHIP IN EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES, HE SAID, WELCOMED THE ELECTION OF GEMAYEL, AND EACH COULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN DIFFERENT WAYS. JORDAN AND EGYPT, BOTH NOW CONCENTRATING ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, HAD LITTLE THEY COULD BRING TO BEAR IN THE PHASE II LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE SYMPATHETIC TO GEMAYEL'S PROBLEMS.

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5. SAUDI ARABIA WAS, HABIB EMPHASIZED, A DIFFERENT CASE.



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6. HABIB TOLD GEMAYEL IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO KNOW [REDACTED] THAT MORE COULD HAVE BEEN DONE FOR LEBANON AT THE FEZ CONFERENCE ON THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, BUT CERTAIN LEBANESE DEMANDS HAD PREVENTED THIS. [REDACTED]

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7. TURNING TO THE PHASE II LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, HABIB

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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STRESSED THE NEED FOR A SCENARIO FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY, BEARING IN MIND THAT SYTH SYRIAND DID NOT WANT TO BE EQUATED WITH THE ISRAELIS. NE NOTED HE HAD REARD ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR BOTH OF A ONE-STATE WITHDRAWAL AND OF A STEP-BY-STEP WITHDRAWAL. HIS OWN FEELING WAS THAT A MIDDLE PATH WAS A BETTER ANSWER: A TWO-STEP PROCESS LEADING FORST TO A SUBSTANTIAL DISENGAGEMENT AND THEN TO A FULL WITHDRAWAL. GEMAYEL CONCURRED FULLY WITH THESE IDEAS, CALLING THEM "THE ONLY WAY" TO PROCEED. HABIB SAID IT WAS INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT THAT GEMAYEL FELT THIS TO BE SO. A STEP-BY-STEP WITHDRAWAL WAS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER, SINCE THE SMALLEST INCISENT COULD RISRUPT THE PROCESS. THERE WAS A CLEAR NEED FOR FULL DISENGAGEMENT.

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8. TOUCHING ON SPECIFICS, HABIB SAID A FIRST-STEP DISENGAGEMENT MIGHT BEST CONSIST OF A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL INTO THE BEKAS FROM THE RIDGE OVERLOOKING BEIRUT AND AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO WITHIN 40 KMS OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. AS TAgET DATES, HE PROPOSED OCTOBER 15 FOR THE FIRST-STEP DISENGAGEMENT AND NOVEMBER 1 FOR THE SECOND-STEP WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

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GEMAYEL SAID HE FEARED THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW WITHOUT OBTAINING CERTAIN GUARANTEES. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, NEITHER THE SYRIANS NOR THE ISRAELIS COULD BE COUNTED ON TO RESPECT THEIR PROMISES, SINCE THEIR ARMIES WERE TO SOME EXTENT PRISONERS OF "UNOFFICIAL FORCES" -- THE (SO-CALLED) "LEBANESE FORCES" IN THE CASE OF THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS AND LEFTISTS IN THE CASE OF THE SYRIANS.

9. FOR THIS REASON, GEMAYEL SAID, THE STABILIZATION OF THE ZONE FROM WHICH THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS WITHDRAW IN STEP ONE MIGHT REQUIREM GIVING THE MNF A NEW MISSION OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, DEPLOYING NUMEROUS OBSERVERS. HABIB ASKED WHETHER THE LEBANESE ARMY MIGHT BE CAPABLE OF PLAYING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THIS ROLE. GEMAYEL RESPONDED THAT, IF THE LEBANESE ARMY WERE PUT INTO THE "NO-MAN'S LAND") STRAINS WOULD BE CREATED AND EFFORTS TO REBUILD IT WOULD BE IMPEDED. WHILE HE PREFERRED THE MNF FOR THIS ROLE, IF IT COULD NOT BE SENT IN, THEN SOME KIND OF PRESENCE GREATER THAN OBSERVERS AND LESS THAN AN ARMY WOULD HAVE TO BE INTRODUCED. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT WHAT FORM SUCH A PRESENCE MIGHT TAKE.

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10. LOOKING AHEAD TO THE SECOND STEP -- FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, -- HABIB ASKED GEMAYEL ABOUT THE PLO PRESENCE IN THE NORTHERN REGIONS OF LEBANON. GEMAYEL SAID IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT AS THE SYRIANS WITHDREW MANY OF THE PLO FIGHTERS WOULD LEAVE WITH THEM. HE WOULD THEN WORK WITH THE INHABITANTS OF THE REGIONS TO SEND IN THE LEBANESE ARMY TO ENSURE THAT THOSE WHO REMAINED BEHIND WERE DISARMED, EVEN IF THIS MEANT SOME FIGHTING. HABIB REPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE WITHOUT FIGHTING

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IT WAS BETTER, HABIB EMPHASIZED, TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE BY NEGOTIATION, NOT FIGHTING.

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1. HABIB CLOSED THE DISCUSSION OF PHASE II BY INFORMING GEMAYEL THAT HE AND DRAPER WERE GOING ON TO SYRIAN LATER IN THE DAY AND THAT DRAPER WOULD RETURN TO

LEBANON AND THEN GO ON TO ISRAEL TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS.

12. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED AFTER HABIB AND DRAPER LEFT FOR DAMASCUS. THEY MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON THE MEETING VIA SEPTTEL.

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 8535  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

*File*

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 07135

EXDIS  
FROM HABIB  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MOPS, PINT, PEPR, MILI, LE, SY, XF, IS  
SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: SYRIANS MAKE CLEAR THEIR  
- POSITION ON STAGE TWO

1. ~~1.~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. JOINED BY DRAPER AND PAGANELLI, DCM RUGH AND POLOFF HUME, I HAD SOME THREE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF MEETINGS TODAY, OCTOBER 2, WITH SYRIAN ACTING FONMIN FAROUK SHAR'A, IN TWO SESSIONS. SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN QADDOUR AND MFA AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR QABBANI WERE WITH SHAR'A. I ALSO HAD A CANDID EXCHANGE AT LUNCH WITH QADDOUR. THIS WILL BE A SUMMARY REPORT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS AND THE SYRIAN POSITION: DETAILS BY SEPTELS.
3. IN ESSENCE, I REVIEWED WITH THE SYRIANS WHAT HAD OCCURRED IN THE LEBANESE SITUATION OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, ACNOWLEDGED OUR DEEP CONCERN AND UNHAPPINESS OVER SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS THE MASSACRES IN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND THE ISRAELI INVASION OF WEST BEIRUT, BUT WENT ON TO STRESS THAT WE NOW HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY TO PUT LEBANON AND ITS NEW GOVERNMENT ON A NEW FOOTING. THIS COULD WORK TO THE ADVANTAGE OF ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE SYRIANS. OUR UNDERLYING OBJECTIVE WAS TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN A WAY THAT WOULD ENHANCE NATIONAL UNITY AND ALLOW IT TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY UP TO ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS. THE RECENT IDF DIS-ENGAGEMENT FROM THE BEIRUT AREA, THE OPENING OF THE BEIRUT AIRPORT, AND THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT TO SUCCEED THE ASSASSINATED BASHIR GEMAYEL ALL CONSTITUTED EVIDENCE THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. THE CITY OF BEIRUT IS OPEN FOR MOVEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS.

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NLS F97-106/2 #132

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

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DAMASCUS 7135

DTG: 022121Z OCT 82 PSN: 000158

4. I PROCEEDED TO SUGGEST THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD, GIVEN A READINESS BY ALL PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE CARRYING OUT OF A SCENARIO--A "PLAN"--WHICH WOULD HAVE BUILT-IN SAFEGUARDS. SUCH WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS--WHICH IN MY VIEW MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN TWO STAGES--WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE FEZ SUMMIT DECISIONS AND WITH THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF SYRIA, FOR EXAMPLE. I REMINDED MY LISTENERS THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD HIMSELF HAD SAID THAT SYRIA DID NOT HAVE TO KEEP ITS TROOPS IN LEBANON IN ORDER TO ASSERT INFLUENCE THERE. THE UNITED STATES, I STRESSED, HAD A UNIQUE CAPABILITY, BECAUSE OF ITS INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL AND THE NEW LEBANESE LEADERSHIP, TO PLAY A USEFUL FACILITATIVE AND MEDIATORY ROLE. AS FOR ISRAEL, I SAID THAT WE COULD PLAY ON THE PERSISTENT THEME THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD PROJECTED: THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO STAY IN LEBANON ANY LONGER THAN WAS NECESSARY.

5. WE GOT INTO A LIVELY LGIVE-AND-TAKE WITH SHAR' A AND QAQDOUR. SHAR' A REGISTERED THE FOLLOWING MAIN THEMES, AMONG OTHERS, TO DESCRIBE THE PRESENT SYRIAN POSITION (I WILL COMMENT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE ON HOW WE MIGHT DEAL FURTHER WITH THEM AS THE PROCESS GOES FORWARD):

- A. THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON MUST NOT BE EQUATED WITH THAT OF ISRAEL. THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IS LEGAL, HAVING BEEN ENDORSED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE AND BY LEBANON. THE ISRAELI POSTION WAS THAT OF AN INVADER.
  - B. SYRIA--WHEN IT WITHDRAWS FROM LEBANON --MUST NOT BE SEEN AS HAVING DONE SO IN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI PRESSURE.
  - C. BY THE SAME TOKEN, ISRAEL LMUST NOT BE SEEN AS HAVING "GAINED" THROUGH ITS INVASION OF LEBANON. ANY FORMULA BRINGING ABOUT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES MUST NOT ALLOW ISRAELIS TO SAY THAT THEY WENT INTO LEBANON TO ELIMINATE THE PLO AND SYRIAN PRESENCES THERE AND SUCCEEDED.
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PAGE 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 7135 DTG: 022149Z OCT 82 PSN: 000150  
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NLS F97-106/2 #130

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 07135

EXDIS  
FROM HABIB

D. THE SYRIANS, HOWEVER, ARE IN PRINCIPLE READY TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOL AND CONSISTENT WITH THE FEZ SUMMIT DECISION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF) MIGHT BE WITHDRAWN "IN THE LIGHT OF" (OR IN THE CONTEXT OF) THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

E. TRANSLATED, THIS MEANS THAT ALL EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON MUST GIVE PRIORITY TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF. THIS WAS THE SENSE OF THE FEZ SUMMIT DECISION; OTHERWISE, THE SUMMIT WOULD HAVE APPROVED THE LEBANESE WORKING PAPER WHICH EQUATED IDF WITHDRAWAL WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER FORCES.

F. MOVING TO DETAILS, THE SYRIANS WOULD BE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO LEAVE LEBANON ONE DAY AFTER FINAL AND COMPLETE IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. HOWEVER, EVEN HERE, THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT BE READY TO DISCUSS IN ADVANCE WITH THE LEBANESE THE CONDITIONS AND TIMING OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL; THEY WOULD ONLY DO SO AFTER IDF WITHDRAWAL, ALTHOUGH SHAR' A ASSURED ME THAT THIS WOULD BE NO PROBLEM AND COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, ASSUMING THAT THE GOL DOES NOT WANT SYRIA TO STAY.

G. THE SYRIANS ARE NOT ATTRACTED TO THE CONCEPT OF A TWO-STAGE WITHDRAWAL ON DISENGAGEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY SPOKE CRITICALLY OF THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWING THE IDF INITIALLY TO THE 40 KILOMETER ZONE--WITH UNIFIL OR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE CONTROLLING THAT ZONE--WOULD BE A CONCESSION AND GIFT TO ISRAEL.

6. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I PUT FORWARD NUMEROUS LCOUNTER-ARGUMENTS AND STRESSED PARTICULARLY MY CONCLUSION THAT AN ELEMENT OF "SIMULTANEITY" WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY SUCCESSFUL WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCES, INCLUDING THE IDF. I SAID I THOUGHT IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE IDF WOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON WITHOUT SOME UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SYRIANS ALSO WOULD WITHDRAW MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUSLY. I

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DTG: 022149Z OCT 82 PSN: 000150

SAID THAT IF WE DID NOT SOMEHOW OVERCOME THIS IMPASSE, THE REAL LOSERS WOULD BE THE LEBANESE AND PERHAPS ALSO THE SYRIANS, SINCE A CONTINUED NEAR CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON COULD PRODUCE ESCALATION, MILITARY INCIDENTS, A HIGH RISK OF WIDER WAR, AND A LONG-TERM OCCUPATION OF LEBANON.

7. WHEN THE SYRIANS REITERATED THAT THEIR POSITION WAS BASED ON "LEGALITY" AND THEIR OWN FORM OF "LOGIC," I REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT WE HAD TO BE PRACTICAL AND PRAGMATIC AND DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AS IT WAS. WE HAD TO DEVISE A PRACTICAL PLAN WHOSE MEASURES WOULD BE SELF-ENFORCING AND REINFORCING. WHEN THE SYRIANS ARGUED THAT, GIVEN THE EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI REFUSALS TO ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENTS, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BUILD IN STRONGER SAFEGUARDS, I AGREED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO SEEK STRONGER ARRANGEMENTS. THE SYRIANS PERSISTENTLY ARGUED THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WERE OPERATING, AND THE FACTS OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE ASSOCIATION. I JUST AS CONSISTENTLY SAID I UNDERSTOOD THEIR POSITION AND THEIR STRESS ON LEGALITIES. BUT THAT DID NOT MEAN THAT I BELIEVED THEY COULD BE A BASIS FOR A SENSIBLE OUTCOME. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING, HOWEVER, THAT THE SYRIAN FORCES WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW WITH THEIR HONOR INTACT.

8. FOR THE RECORD, I EXPLORED IN DETAIL A SCENARIO UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD SEEK AND OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM THE ISRAELIS FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL ON A DATE CERTAIN; I PROPOSED IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE GOL AND THE SYRIANS ALSO NEGOTIATE BEFOREHAND THE TERMS AND TIMING OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, SO THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THE RESPECTIVE FORCES OF SYRIA AND ISRAEL COULD OCCUR "WITHIN THE SAME TIME FRAME." SHAR'A IN THE END REJECTED EVEN THIS PRACTICAL PROPOSAL, AT LEAST FOR NOW.

9. I ENDED OUR NIGHT SESSION BY SAYING THAT WE (MEANING AMBASSADOR DRAPER AND MYSELF) WOULD, OF COURSE, COMMUNICATE THE SYRIAN POSITION TO THE LEBANESE AND TO THE ISRAELIS, BUT THAT IT DID NOT SEEM TO BE A GOOD BASIS FOR MAKING PROGRESS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I WAS DISAPPOINTED. IT WAS LEFT CLEAR--ALTHOUGH IMPLICITLY-- THAT AFTER THIS INITIAL STAKING OUT OF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, WE WILL HAVE TO RETURN WITH SOME ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS.

10. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI  
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EOB308

DAMASCUS 7153  
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NLS F97-106/2 #139

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/22/02

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 07153

EXDIS  
FROM HABIB/DRAPER  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, SY, US  
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ROUND TWO WITH THE  
- SYRIANS, OCTOBER 2  
REF: (A) DAMASCUS 7135; (B) DAMASCUS 7136

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND PAGANELLI, DCM RUGH AND POLOFF HUME, MET FOR 90 MINUTES AT 1900 HOURS, OCTOBER 2-- SECOND TIME IN ONE DAY--WITH SYRIAN ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER FAROUK SHAR'A, SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN QADDOUR AND MFA AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR QABBANI. SUBSTANTIVE SUMMARY REFTEL A. END SUMMARY.

3. SHAR'A BEGAN THE MEETING BY READING VERBATIM A PREPARED TEXT, WHICH HE SAID WAS THE SYRIAN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE LEBANESE PROBLEM, AS PUT FORWARD IN THE MORNING MEETING (REF B). THE SIX SPECIFIC POINTS WERE:  
--THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS LEAGAL FROM THE ARAB AND LEBANESE POINTS OF VIEW; SYRIA AND LEBANON ARE BOTH MEMBERS IN THE ARAB LEAGUE AND HAVE SIGNED THE LEAGUE'S DEFENSE TREATY;  
--THE JUNE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AT THE 40 KM LINE WAS YET TO BE FULFILLED AS AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD ACKNOWLEDGED;  
--THE HABIB PROPOSALS FOR SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL EQUATE THE ISRAELI/SYRIAN PRESENCE. HABIB IS NOT ONLY NOT A MEDIATOR BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, BUT IS GIVING AN ADVANTAGE TO ISRAEL THROUGH HIS PROPOSED IDF INTERIM WITHDRAWAL TO THE 40 KM LINE, WHICH IS PROPOSED FOR NEGOTIATION BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL "WHILE WE (SYRIA) REMAIN MERE SPECTATORS."  
--AMBASSADOR HABIB DOES NOT SEEM THROUGH HIS PROPOSALS TO BE TAKING THE ROLE OF AN IMPARTIAL MEDIATOR.  
--THE PHRASE "IN LIGHT OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL" USED

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AT FEZ CLEARLY MEANS THE ISRAELIS MUST WITHDRAW FIRST; OTHERWISE THE ARAB DELEGATES WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED THE LEBANESE WORKING PAPER STIPULATING SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES, THE IDF AND ADF, WHICH THEY IN FACT REJECTED.

--SYRIA IS PREPARED NOT TO STAY IN LEBANON MORE THAN ONE DAY AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT SYRIA TO STAY.

4. AMBASSADOR HABIB RESPONDED BY FIRST POINTING OUT THAT THE JUNE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL WAS OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THAT NOW WE MUST DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AS WE FIND IT. HE THEN ARGUED THAT THE PHRASE "IN LIGHT OF" COULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWALS, AND EMPHASIZED THAT SYRIAN INSISTENCE ON PRIOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEFORE AGREEING TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WITH LEBANON MEANS NO CHANCE OF PROGRESS IN THE IMMEDIATE OR

FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AMBASSADOR HABIB SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIANS CONSIDRE A SCENARIO IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW BY A DATE CERTAIN AND THEN THE SYRIANS WOULD AGREE WITH THE LEBANESE ON WITHDRAWAL, WITH THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS THEN TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE SAME ROUGH TIME FRAME. ALTHOUGH THIS POSSIBILITY WAS EXPLORED IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT WAYS THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION, SHAR'A NEVER ACCEPTED IT AND INSISTED THAT SYRIAN-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS ON WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE ONLY AFTER COMPLETE IDF WITHDRAWAL.

5. AMBASSADOR HABIB POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH SYRIA'S MAIN OBJECTIVE--THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID HE WOULD TRY ANY FORMULA AS LONG AS THE SAME FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI TROOPS TOOK PLACE AT THE SAME TIME. WHEN HABIB TRIED OUT THE IDEA THAT SYRIA WOULD AGREE IN ADVIACE TO WITHDRAW ON A DATE ONE DAY

AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SHAR'A ON THIS OCCASION ONLY SHOWED A LITTLE FLEXIBILITY; HE SAID THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED, BUT HE COULD NOT RESPOND TO IT OFFICIALLY WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS (HE LATER HARDENED EVEN ON THIS POSITION).

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BY [Signature], NARA, DATE 11/22/02

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 07153

EXDIS  
FROM HABIB/DRAPER

6. SHAR'A REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT SYRIAN WATHDRAWAL MUST NOT APPEAR TO OCCUR UNDER ISRAELI PRESSURE. THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCES IN LEBANON CANNOT BE EQUATED; PROPOSALS FOR SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE SEEN BY OBSERVERS TO EQUATE THE TWO. HE SAID THAT SYTIA WOULD BE UNWILLING EVEN TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOL TO DEPART. THEREFORE, UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI FORCES ACTUALLY HAD DEPARTED LEBANON, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT AGREEMENT WITH THE GOL COULD BE REACHED IN ONE DAY.

7. AMBASSADOR HABIB SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF A GOL REQUEST ELIMINATED THE APPEARANCE OF AN EQUATION WITH THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. SHAR'A DEMURRED. HABIB REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT THE SYRIAN FORMULA WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS CAN CITE LEGALITY; HOWEVER, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO STAND ON FORM BUT TO GET RESULTS. THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL FORMULA IS WORKABLE; THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES BEARS THE DANGER OF MILITARY INCIDENTS, ESCALATION, AND CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF LEBANON. IN ADDITION, DELAYED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR LEBANESE INTERNAL POLITICS. SHAR'A SUGGESTED HABIB TURN HIS PROPOSAL AROUND AND TELL THE ISRAELIS THAT IF THEY WANT SYRIA OUT OF LEBANON, ISRAEL SHOULD GET OUT FIRST.

8. WHEN SHAR'A RAISED THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS IN LEBANON, AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID THAT THIS ISSUE MUST BE RESOLVER BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE PALESTINIANS IN THE SAME TIME FRAME AS THE DEPARTURE OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES.

9. HABIB BROUGHT UP THE DANGEROUS SITUATION CAUSED BY REINFILTRATION INTO LEBANON OF PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS

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DTG: 031608Z OCT 82 PSN: 000825

FROM SYRIA, SOME OF WHOM TRANSITED DAMASCUS AIRPORT. REINFILTRATION IS A VIOLATION OF THE EVACUATION AGREEMENT, AND THE UNITED STATES IS AN INTERESTED PARTY BECAUSE OF ITS PARTICIPATION IN THAT AGREEMENT AND ITS DESIRE NOT TO HAVE EVENTS IN LEBANON GET OUT OF HAND. SHAR'A DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF REINFILTRATION, BUT HABIB PRESSED SHAR'A TO GET THE SYRIANS, IN THEIR OWN INTEREST, TO CONTROL THESE MOVEMENTS. QADDOUR SAID THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION FOR THE UNITED STATES TO RAISE WITH LEBANON, NOT WITH SYRIA, HABIB SAID FIRMLY THAT THE SYRIAN HAD THE CAPACITY TO CONTROL THES PEOPLE AND SHOULD DO SO.

10. HABIB BROUGHT THE DISCUSSION BACK TO THE SEARCH FOR A FORMULA FOR SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS SHOULD DROP THEIR DEMAND FOR A POLITICAL SPECTACLE GLORIFYING THEIR ROLE AND AGREE TO A MECHANICAL PLAN FOR SIMULTANEOUS DEPARTURE. IT SHOULD BE A TRANSPORT PROBLEM. SPEAKING TO THE FEAR REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED BY SHAR'A THAT ISRAEL WOULD RENEGE ON ANY PROMISE TO WITHDRAW, HABIB SAID THE PARTIES HAD TO PRESUME COMPLIANCE BUT COULD MAKE SELF-ENFORCING ARRANGEMENTS AS A SAFEGUARD. IF THE ISRAELIS DID NOT CARRY OUT THEIR COMMITMENT TO DEPART UNDER THE PLAN, SYRIA WOULD NOT BE COMMITTED TO DEAPRT. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SYRIAN RATIONALE AND POSITION, INCLUDING THE HISTORIC LEBANESE-SYRIAN ASSOCIATION, BUT HE DID NOT ACCEPT IT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A PRACTICAL SOLUTION THAT COULD GET THE NECESSARY RESULTS. THE LEBANESE CRISIS HAS GONE ON TOO LONG, AND A QUICK, EARLY SOLUTION IS NEEDED.

11. SHAR'A STUCK TO HIS POSITION. HE ASKED HABIB TO CONSIDER THE SARG APPROACH AND PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FIRST. SHAR'A EXPLAINED THAT SARG INSISTED ON ITS POSITION BECAUSE IF ISRAEL DID NOT WITHDRAW FIRST,

THE IDF COULD GO RIGHT BACK INTO LEBANON IN 24 HOURS, WHILE SYRIA, BEING WEAKER, COULD NOT DO THAT. SHAR'A SAID ISRAEL HAD THE UPPER HAND IN LEBANON, BUT SYRIA COULD ONLY LEAVE WITH HONOR. HABIB REJOINED THAT AN HONORABLE SOLUTION IS ONE THAT GIVES NO PARTY AN ADVANTAGE. HE PROMISED TO REPORT THE SARG POSITION FAITHFULLY TO THE CONCERNED PARTIES, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT BELEIVE THE SARG APPROACH WAS WORKABLE.

12. HABIB SAID HE PLANNED TO LEAVE DAMASCUS AT 7 A. M. OCTOBER 3 UNLESS HE WERE GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. (NOTE: EARLY A. M. OCTOBER 3 THE MFA INFORMED US THAT ASSAD WOULD SEE HABIB ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 3.)

13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 07155

EXDIS  
ROME FOR HABIB  
FROM HABIB/DRAPER  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, SY, US  
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH SYRIAN  
- PRESIDENT ASSAD

1.  - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HABIB ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND PAGANELLI, DCM RUGH AND POLOFF HUME MET WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHAR'A AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QADDOUR FOR 1-1/2 HOURS BEGINNING 1245 OCTOBER 3. HABIB REVIEWED FOR ASSAD U. S. HOPE FOR QUICK, SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF A QUICK, TIME-PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AS THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY TO REACH THIS OBJECTIVE AND ARGUED THAT THE SYRIAN POSITION CALLING FOR PRIOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT PRACTICAL AND WOULD POSTPONE ANY REAL PROGRESS. HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RESOLVE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM NOW IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE. ASSAD REVIEWED THE BASES OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONS AND THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IN FAMILIAR TERMS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS MADE BY HABIB ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ASSAD IN JUNE SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED NOW. ASSAD STUCK FIRMLY TO SYRIAN POSITION THAT FEZ PHRASE "IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL" REQUIRES TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEFORE SYRIANS DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TROOPS WITH LEBANESE. ASSAD SAID THE ISRAELI PRESENCE PREVENTED THE LEBANESE FROM EXERCISING THEIR FREE WILL, BUT ONCE THE ISRAELIS WERE GONE, SYRIAN DEPARTURE COULD BE ARRANGED QUICKLY IF THE LEBANESE WANTED IT. HABIB SAID THAT HE WAS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE. DRAPER WOULD RETURN TO LEBANON AND SHORTLY PROCEED TO ISRAEL TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS

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ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT ALL OF THE RECENT BAD EVENTS DID NOT CHANGE THE BASIC FACTS. OUR OBJECTIVE IS STILL THE SAME--AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN LEBANON WITH AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT ITS OWN TERRITORY. ASSAD AND HABIB HAVE AGREED ON THIS FOR MORE THAN A YEAR. WHATEVER HAS HAPPENED IN RECENT WEEKS, IT IS NECESSARY TO RETURN TO THIS BASIC OBJECTIVE AND SEEK ITS ACHIEVEMENT. WHEN HABIB LEFT WASHINGTON AFTER SEEING THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE, U. S. PRIORITIES WERE:

-- TO MOVE ISRAELI FORCES OUT OF BEIRUT AND THE BEIRUT AREA.

-- TO SEEK TO INCREASE THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON.

-- TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES SO THAT WE CAN CONCENTRATE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE PROCESS; PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS PUT FORWARD A U. S. MIDEAST PEACE INITIATIVE, THE FEZ SUMMIT HAS TAKEN DECISIONS, AND THE PRESIDENT NOW WANTS TO ACCELERATE THE PEACE PROCESS.

4. HABIB REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER TALKS WITH MINISTER SHAR' A, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS EFFICIENT AND BUSINESS-LIKE ALTHOUGH IN THE END AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD COME TO DAMASCUS TO CONCENTRATE ON A PRACTICAL PLAN TO WITHDRAW ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE STATED THAT PRESENCE OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON CANNOT BE EQUATED, FOR THEIR PRESENCE IS BASED ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS, BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER ALL EXTERNAL FORCES SHOULD DEPART AT THE SAME TIME. THE PREVIOUS DAY HE HAD PRESENTED (TO SHAR' A) THE IDEA OF A VERY QUICK TIME-PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES, AND HE HAD HEARD THAT SYRIA INSISTED ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FIRST AND THEN WITHOUT DELAY SYRIA AND LEBANON COULD NEGOTIATE FOR THE DEPARTURE OF SYRIAN FORCES. ASSAD INDICATED THAT THIS WAS AN ACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE SYRIAN POSITION.  
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ROME FOR HABIB  
FROM HABIB/DRAPER

5. HABIB SAID HE BELIEVED THIS SYRIAN POSITION MAKES THE PROBLEM OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT NEEDS TO BE. IT IMPOSES A BURDEN ON THE LEBANESE BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ISRAELI FORCES. HE UNDERSTOOD THE SYRIAN POSITION, BUT HE WAS HOPING TO FIND A WAY TO OVERCOME IT AND REACH A SOLUTION IN "A TECHNICAL MANNER." HE WAS HOPING NOT TO BE LEFT WITH A PROCESS WHICH WOULD BE LONGER, HARDER, AND PERHAPS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON. HABIB SAID HE REMEMBERED THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD HAD SAID PREVIOUSLY THAT SYRIA DID NOT REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF ITS FORCES IN LEBANON TO PRESERVE ITS INFLUENCE AND THAT SYRIA WAS READY TO LEAVE LEBANON AT LEBANESE REQUEST. IN ADDITION, HE TOOK THE WORDS OF THE FEZ DECISION "IN LIGHT OF" TO BE A DELIBERATE AMBIGUITY ALLOWING FOR SIMULTANEOUS BUT UNLINKED ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE DAMASCUS WITHOUT EXCHANGING A FEW WORDS WITH THE PRESIDENT SO THAT WHEN HE RETURNED TO REPORT IN WASHINGTON, AND WHEN AMBASSADOR DRAPER CONSULTED IN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, THEY WOULD BE SURE OF HAVING A CLEAR VIEW OF SYRIAN POLICY FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

6. IN CONCLUDING HIS PRESENTATION, HABIB SAID THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS UNLESS THE EXTERNAL FORCES DEPART. HE SAID THE LEBANESE PROBLEM INTERFERES WITH THE LARGER PROBLEM OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. THEREFORE, ONE MUST WORK TO ACCELERATE THE SOLUTION OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD DEMONSTRATED HIS INTENT TO ACCELERATE THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; WHETHER ONE AGREED WITH HIS PEACE PROPOSAL OR NOT, MOST PEOPLE REALIZE IT WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES. HABIB CONCLUDED THAT WE

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NOW FACED AN IMPASSE AS TO HOW TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES, AND ASKED ASSAD WHETHER THERE WASN'T A FASTER, BETTER, TOTAL WAY OF DOING THIS THAN THAT SUGGESTED BY ASSAD'S COLLEAGUES IN THE PREVIOUS DAY'S DISCUSSIONS. HE ASKED ASSAD TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE IN HIS RESPONSE, RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO FIND AN EARLY SOLUTION WITH SYRIAN COOPERATION.

7. ASSAD BEGAN HIS RESPONSE BY REAFFIRMING SYRIA'S DESIRE FOR THE UNITY, INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON. THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE ARE ONE PEOPLE WITH THE SAME PAST AND THE SAME FUTURE, EVEN IF THEY HAVE BECOME TWO INDEPENDENT STATES. SYRIA AND LEBANON ARE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND JOINED BY COMMON DEFENSE TREATY AGAINST ANY AGGRESSION AGAINSTEITHER. ON THIS BASIS, SYRIA ACTED TO HELP PUT AN END TO THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS REINFORCED BY THE PLEA OF MANY LEBANESE CITIZENS ASKING FOR SYRIAN HELP. THEREFORE, THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES TO THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITIES AND THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. SYRIA, AS A MATTER OF FRATERNITY WITH THE LEBANESE, HAD MADE THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY SACRIFICES THAT NO ONE ELSE HAD BEEN WILLING TO MAKE. (ASSAD NOTED, IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT FORMER LEBANESE PRESIDENT SULEIMAN FRANJIEH HAD TOLD ASSAD THAT U. S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO LEBANON DEAN BROWN HAD SAID TO FRANJIEH THAT ALL UNITED STATES COULD OFFERE WAS TO SEND SHIPS TO CARRY THE LEBANESE TO CANADA. HABIB INTERJECTED THAT HE REMEMBERED HEARING THIS STORY FROM ASSAD BEFORE, BUT IT WAS NOTEWORTHY THAT NOW U. S. SHIPS WERE CARRYING AMERICAN MARINES IN THIS DIRECTION TO BEIRUT.)

8. CONTINUING, ASSAD SAID THAT THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND UNITY OF LEBANON REQUIRES CONDITIONS OF STABILITY FOR LEBANESE CITIZENS. LONG EXPERIENCE

SHOWS THAT AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF LEBANESE STABILITY IS TO CONTINUATION OF GOOD, FRIENDLY, COOPERATIVE. AND FRATERNAL TIES BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON. IF THE UNITED STATES REALLY WANTS TO HELP LEBANON, IT SHOULD NOT WEAKEN THESE TIES. SYRIA HAS NO UNILATERAL AMBITIONS IN LEBANON. AMBASSADOR HABIB INTERJECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO DESIRE TO WEAKEN SYRIAN-LEBANESE TIES AND BELIEVES THAT HEALTHY RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON ARE ESSENTIAL FOR LEBANON'S STABILITY. HE SAID WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY SIGNS OF IMPROVED LEBANESE-SYRIAN RELATIONS AFTER AMIN GEMAYEL'S ELECTION. ASSAD ACKNOWLEDGED SYRIA HAD SUPPORTED AMIN GEMAYEL.

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

9. ASSAD THEN WENT BACK TO THE JUNE 10 CEASE-FIRE DISCUSSIONS, SAYING THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD AT THAT TIME READ ASSAD A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHICH CONTAINED A THREE-POINT AGREEMENT: A CEASE-FIRE; AN EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON; AND AN IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO A CERTAIN LINE. NOTHING WAS ASKED OF SYRIA OR SYRIAN FORCES. IT IS IMPORTANT, SAID ASSAD, THAT WHEN THE PRESIDENT OF ONE STATE AGREES WITH THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF ANOTHER STATE, WHICH IS A GREAT POWER AND A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THAT BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO THE AGREEMENT.

10. HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE DOES NOT JUSTIFY WHAT HAPPENED, AND WOULD OFFER NO EXCUSES, BUT STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOT THE U. S. DESIRE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT ACTED IN BAD FAITH. HABIB WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS A PRACTICAL MAN WHO HAD TRIED TO PURSUE BASIC OBJECTIVES AND TO BE PATIENT. DESPITE WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PAST, WE ARE NOW FACED WITH AN IMMEDIATE SITUATION. THE TIME HAS NOW COME TO THINK OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. HABIB SAID THAT HE HAD GOTTEN THE SARG VIEW THE DAY BEFORE, BUT IT WAS NOT PRACTICAL OR COGNIZANT OF THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY. IN HIS OPINION, IT WAS NECESSARY TO MOVE QUICKLY AND DEAL WITH WHAT COULD BE CONSIDERED A PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION ANT TO AVOID POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS. HABIB THEN POSED A QUESTION TO ASSAD: WHEN MINISTER SHAR'A SPEAKS OF NEGOTIATING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IMMEDIATELY AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHAT DOES "IMMEDIATE" MEAN? WOULD THERE BE A PRIOR ARRANGEMENT SO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL COULD BE CONCURRENT WITH, AT SOME STAGE OF, OR AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL?

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11. ASSAD EXPLAINED THE LEBANESE ARE NOT NOW IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE THEIR FREE POLITICAL WILL BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI PRESENCE. THE LEBANESE CANNOT EXERCISE THEIR FREE WILL WITH ISRAELI BAYONETS POINTED AT THEIR HEADS. ONCE THE ISRAELIS DEPART, THE SYRIANS WILL BE WILLING IMMEDIATELY TO SIT WITH THE LEBANESE AND WILL CAUSE NO DIFFICULTY OVER REACHING AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL, IF THE LEBANESE WANT IT. BUT THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT THAT GOL ACTIONS ARE THE FREE WILL OF THE LEBANESE.

12. TURNING TO THE FEZ CONFERENCE, ASSAD SAID IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO REVIEW ALL OF THE DISCUSSIONS THERE BUT HE WANTED TO CITE ONE EXAMPLE WHICH SHOWED THAT WHAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS DOING IS NOT OF ITS OWN FREE WILL. DURING THE FEZ CONFERENCE, ASSAD SAID, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION RECEIVED A CABLE FROM BEIRUT SAYING THAT OUR BROTHERS IN SYRIA KNOW THAT WE ARE NOT TAKING DECISIONS NOW ON OUR OWN. ASSAD SAID HE TOLD THE HEAD OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION THAT SYRIA WOULD LISTEN TO THE OPINION OF THE GOL WHEN IT WAS TRULY FREE. AFTER SEEING THIS CABLE FROM BEIRUT, ASSAD SAID, HE PROPOSED A (NEW) FORMULA FOR THE FEZ DECLARATION WHICH MEANT THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT FOR THE SYRIANS AND ELBANESE TO DISCUSS SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON ONLY AFTER THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAD TAKEN PLACE. AS FOR THE PHRASE "IN LIGHT OF," ASSAD SAID HE THOUGHT HE KNEW ARABIC BETTER THAN HABIB, AND HE COULD EXPLAIN THAT IT MEANT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW BEFORE SYRIA COULD WITHDRAW. ASSAD SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO FACE THE SAME PROBLEM OF AMBIGUITY THAT HAD ARISEN WITH RESOLUTION 242, AND HE WANTED TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR WHAT THIS LANGUAGE IN THE FEZ DECLARATION MEANT.

13. AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SYRIAN POSITION FULLY, BUT THAT WHETHER HE AGREED WITH IT WAS ANOTHER MATTER. HE SAID HE WOULD RETURN TO WASHINGTON

FOR CONSULTATIONS AND THAT AMBASSADOR DRAPER WOULD PROCEED TO LEBANON AND ISRAEL TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL. IN HIS OPINION, IT WILL BE NECESSARY NOW TO PAUSE AND TO DO SOME THINKING. HABIB WOULD BE SURE THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD WOULD BE KEPT INFORMED BY EITHER AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI, AMBASSADOR DRAPER OR HIMSELF.

14. THIS MESSAGE NOT REPEAT NOT SEEN BY HABIB AND DRAPER.

15. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI  
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