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File Folder GRENADA - URGENT FURY (03/03/1983-10/21/1983)

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2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
37092	PAPER	RE POTENTIAL THREAT (ANNOTATED) <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	4	ND	B1
37093	MEMO	JONATHAN HOWE TO UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER RE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SECURITY <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	4	ND	B1
37094	MEMO	CHARLE HILL TO DONALD GREGG, ET AL RE INTER-AGENCY GROUP ON EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY <i>PAR 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	1	6/11/1983	B1
37095	PAPER	ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IG CONSIDERATION <i>PAR 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	7	ND	B1
37096	CABLE	KINGSTON 05734 (201944Z JUN 83) <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	1	6/20/1983	B1
37097	CABLE	BRIDGETOWN 03512 (211728Z JUN 83) <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	2	6/21/1983	B1
37098	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO WILLIAM CLARK RE GRENADA <i>R 3/6/2012 M260/1</i>	1	6/21/1983	B1

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37099	TALKING POINTS	FOR AMBASSADOR MIDDENDORF <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	2	ND	B1
37100	MEMO	JAMES MICHEL TO MR. EAGLEBURGER RE GRENADA <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	1	6/21/1983	B1
37101	PAPER	RE CENTRAL AMERICA <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	2	7/1/1983	B1
37102	CABLE	BRIDGETOWN 04213 (221336Z JUL 83) <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	2	7/22/1983	B1
37103	CABLE	211700Z OCT 83 <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	2	10/21/1983	B1
37104	CABLE	211732Z OCT 83 <i>R 9/20/2010 M260/1</i>	4	10/21/1983	B1
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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~*Grenada
Suriname*

II. Potential Threat

The security environment in the Eastern Caribbean is deteriorating markedly. Superimposed on domestic sources of instability that have generated four violent actions against democratic regimes in the last four years, growing Soviet and Cuban involvement in Grenada and the leftward lurch of the Suriname government provide further cause for concern.

The most dramatic setback occurred in Suriname, where the assassination of the democratic political, trade union and civic leaders decapitated the internal opposition to the Bouterse regime. While Cuba's direct role has been submerged, Bouterse's violent actions followed secret visits to Cuba by Suriname leaders and by Cuban officials to Suriname, Cuban training of Surinamese security officers, and the appointment of an intelligence operative, the former head of the Caribbean section of the Americas Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, as Cuban Ambassador to Suriname. The Cubans clearly support Bouterse's elimination of opposition -- whether or not they counseled their execution. This Cuban support for the use of violence against democratic elements,

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NLRR M260/1 # 37092

BY KML NARA DATE 9/21/10

plus the use of Cuban allies -- such as Nicaragua and Grenada -- as bases for the propagation of subversion, cannot but preoccupy the weak democratic states of the Eastern Caribbean.

Grenada has been moving into the Soviet orbit at an accelerated pace since PM Bishop's visit to the Soviet Union last summer. Recent intelligence indicates that the Soviets and Cubans are in the process of deepening their presence. Soviet experts are expected to arrive in Grenada shortly to begin a feasibility study of the Grenville deep water port. Naval access was reportedly requested during Bishop's Moscow visit. A major military base at Calivigny has been completed, but not yet occupied. The battalion-sized facility could be used as a staging base for Cuban or other foreign forces. A road between Calivigny and the airport in construction at Point Salines is also being improved for use by heavy equipment. Construction at Point Salines appears to be proceeding at a substantial pace. A ^{10,500} 9800-foot runway will probably be completed early next year. March '84 (5th Anniversary of the Rev) The air-field will then be able to accommodate Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft and IL-62 aircraft used to support the Cuban forces in Africa. (The IL-62 cannot fly directly to Angola from Cuba, but could do so from Grenada, which is 900 miles closer to Africa.)

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Angol Cabanon
Head of CIA
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- 3 -

The work of internal consolidation is well advanced. The People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) has established a military and security apparatus out of proportion to the island's population of 110,000. In August 1982, a Cuban vessel offloaded what was probably a substantial delivery of military equipment. Three Soviet-built BRDM-2 amphibious armored vehicles were subsequently identified on the island.

In parallel, the Soviet Union has provided Cuba for the first time with air and naval equipment which allows Havana to project force beyond the periphery of the island. During the past year, Cuba has received its first two amphibious landing ships (Polnocny-class) that would each allow the transport of 180 troops and six tanks to anywhere in the Caribbean. In addition to this over-the-beach assault capacity (and the naval protection provided by Cuba's new Soviet-built ocean-going surface combatants and attack submarines), Havana has a formidable capacity to land or airdrop troops in the Caribbean Basin, using its AN-26 military transports. (1500-3000 troops could be moved anywhere in the Caribbean in twenty-four hours.) These capabilities could be used to reinforce the Grenadan or Surinamese regimes, or to transport troops from these countries or Cuba, or Caribbean subversives, to back up a minority group seizing power in other Eastern Caribbean states.

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DECL. 3/3/89

Cuba currently maintains contact with radical leaders in the Eastern Caribbean through intelligence links and overt devices such as scholarships and propaganda. Grenada increasingly has become a focal point for training and direction of Caribbean revolutionaries. PM Bishop has acknowledged publicly that Grenada is training members of "progressive" organizations from Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent in "basic security work." Libyan money is funnelled to radical groups by a "People's Bureau" operating in Grenada.

Because of their small size and limited potential for resistance, political takeovers in the islands can be accomplished without the need to engage in prolonged Central America-style insurgencies or extended consolidation processes such as in Nicaragua. Power was seized in Grenada by less than 50 men in one-half day. In suriname, Bouterse eliminated most serious opposition in two twenty-four hour sessions of arrests and executions. (See description of recent crises in Annex B.)

Potential instability in the area has increased in recent years as a result of the fall in prices of the region's leading export commodities and the depressed state of tourism. External forces (particularly Cuba and Libya) have played on this troubled situation.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

TO: P - Under Secretary Eagleburger
 FROM: PM - Jonathan T. Howe
 SUBJECT: Eastern Caribbean Security

The security environment in the eastern Caribbean has deteriorated markedly in recent months as the result of the deepening Soviet and Cuban presence in Grenada and the radicalization of the Bouterse regime in Suriname.

In Grenada, direct Soviet involvement has expanded since PM Bishop's visit to the Soviet Union last summer. The Soviets opened a resident embassy, agreed to train Grenadans in intelligence techniques in the Soviet Union, and are expected to begin shortly a feasibility study of the Greenville deep water port, which could be used as a station for the Soviet Navy in the Caribbean. Joint Grenadan-Cuban military maneuvers reportedly will be held later this year. A major military base at Calivigny has been completed, but not yet occupied. There is reason to believe that the battalion-sized facility may be intended as a staging base for Cuban or other foreign forces. A road between Calivigny and the airport in construction at Point Salines is also being improved for use by heavy equipment. Construction at the airfield is proceeding at a substantial pace; when completed, probably early next year, it will be able to accommodate TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft and the IL-62 aircraft used to support the Cuban forces in Africa (IL-62s cannot fly directly to Angola from Cuba, but could do so from Grenada, which is 900 miles closer to Africa).

In Suriname, the assassination of democratic leaders decapitated potential opposition to the regime. While the Cubans have been keeping a low profile, the violence in Suriname was preceded by a series of events that suggest a pattern of Cuban covert activities. We anticipate a period of consolidation and growing ties with Cuba, following which Suriname could become a base for subversion against Guyana and the islands on the rim of northern South America. Suriname is, of course, close to the South Atlantic narrows through which 66% of Europe's oil flows.

Cuba. Access to eastern Caribbean facilities, together with its conventional military build-up, has enhanced Cuba's ability to project force beyond the periphery of the island. In the past year, Cuba took delivery of its first Mi-24 HIND attack helicopter squadron and of two Polnocny-B amphibious landing ships, which have given Cuba its first over-the-beach landing capability, in addition to its substantial existing capacity to airlift forces in the Caribbean with its AN-26 transport aircraft.

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/21/10

The emergence of a Cuba/Grenada/Suriname axis is of major geopolitical import, particularly in view of the relative absence of countervailing forces. The eastern Caribbean island-states are for the most part small and vulnerable to takeovers. Potential instability has increased in recent years because of deteriorating economic conditions, labor unrest, the activities of criminal elements associated with the drug traffic and rising dissidence in some of the islands.

Recognizing their individual vulnerability, Barbados, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Lucia and Antigua signed a Memorandum of Understanding last fall establishing the eastern Caribbean Regional Security System. The arrangement provides that a state whose security is threatened could request assistance from the other states. The Barbados Defense Forces have identified fifty personnel who would be ready to move to a threatened island within two hours of a call for assistance. Selected rapid response personnel have also been identified on other islands.

We are working closely with S/P in an effort it is coordinating with input from ARA and DOD to develop a security strategy for the region, centering on U.S. support of the Regional Security System. The strategy will include the following elements:

-- Provision of U.S. transportation support. Emergency transport is a key requirement of the Regional Security System. However, there is only a limited fixed wing transport capability in the Regional Security System states. Over the long run, development of indigenous vertical lift would be the most satisfactory solution to the transportation problem, but neither Barbados nor the other states currently have the financial or technical resources to acquire and maintain helicopters. In the short run, therefore, the system will have to rely on outside sources for vertical lift. We have asked JCS to develop a contingency plan or amplification of existing plan to provide U.S. airlift to the Regional Security System in an emergency. This would include, at Embassy Bridgetown's request, an assessment of the feasibility of prepositioning U.S. military helicopters in the eastern Caribbean.

-- Training and equipment support of Regional Security System. We are seeking to design our security assistance program to meet the immediate requirements of the system's rapid reaction force, and to make possible eventually an autonomous response by the system to potential threats.

-- Level of U.S. military presence. Since maintaining an adequate U.S. presence is necessary in order to demonstrate our commitment to the security of the region, we are recommending that an appropriate exercise schedule be considered

for the region. We also propose to ask DOD to search for alternative missions for the U.S. naval facility at Antigua, which it plans to close by July 1984. A separate memorandum with a suggested letter from you to Deputy Secretary of Defense Thayer on this subject is being prepared.

What will emerge from this process will be basically a containment strategy, which does not attempt to address the fundamental problem of Cuban and Soviet involvement in the eastern Caribbean, but it may harden the targets of Cuban subversion and slow down the deterioration of our security position in the area.

Drafted: PM/RSA:ARabasa *AR*
3/09/83

Clearances: PM:ARaphel
S/P:JGlassman *J*



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(U) GRENADA: SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

Summary

Since the March 1979 revolution which brought the New Jewel Movement to power in Grenada, five well-known international front organizations have established local affiliates on the island. All five--the World Peace Council (WPC), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the International Union of Students (IUS), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)--have solid historical records of affiliation with and explicit support for Soviet foreign political positions and objectives. The latter four maintain well-established ties with the WPC leadership.

How active and effective these organizations have been on the island is uncertain--virtually the only source of such information is the official publications of the fronts themselves. In recent years the fronts have staged at least three gatherings in St. Georges--sponsored by the IUS (April 1980), the WPC (November 1981), and the IOJ (April 1982). Little else is known of their activities.

Nevertheless, the steady evolution of the front affiliates since 1979 suggests that Moscow hopes to use its Grenada foothold for future front activities in the Caribbean. The island's proximity to Cuba no doubt enhances its attractiveness to the Soviets.

In the meantime, the five fronts give the Bishop regime "international" standing while they promote a favorable Soviet image in the Caribbean and influence public opinion against the US. At the same time, Grenada's association with the fronts tends to undermine Bishop's claim to an independent, nonaligned foreign policy.

* * * * *

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Report 581-AR
March 21, 1983

World Peace Council

The Grenada Peace Council (GPC) was established as a WPC affiliate on May 20, 1982. According to press reports, its executive body is composed of approximately 12 members with the Grenada Electric Company manager as the president. Four standing subcommittees are: National Liberation and International Solidarity; Social Progress and Human Rights; Education, Research, and Culture; and Fund Raising.

The WPC, currently headquartered in Helsinki, claims to have at least 135 affiliates worldwide. Most of these "peace committees" are controlled by local communist parties but may include in their ranks prominent noncommunist philosophers, academics, physicians, lawyers, and other political and humanitarian figures sympathetic to WPC goals. Soviet officials in the mid-1970s reportedly considered that the WPC had a total of more than 400 million supporters.

The aims of the WPC, as adopted at its triennial World Assembly in Sofia in 1980 (and expected to be readopted this June in Prague), are:

- prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction and ending of the arms race;
- abolition of foreign military bases;
- general, simultaneous, and controlled disarmament;
- elimination of all forms of colonialism and racial discrimination;
- respect for the right of peoples to sovereignty and independence, essential for the establishment of peace;
- respect for the territorial integrity of states;
- noninterference in the internal affairs of nations;
- establishment of mutually beneficial trade and cultural relations based on friendship and mutual respect;
- peaceful coexistence between states with different political systems; and

--replacement of the policy of force with that of negotiation for settlement of differences between nations.^{1/}

GPC membership is open to all Grenadian citizens as well as all organizations in Grenada that subscribe to world peace movement principles and the GPC's objectives. According to General Secretary Victor Husbands, GPC objectives in essence are to cooperate with and uphold the principles and programs of the WPC.

Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, speaking at the May 20 ceremony, said that the GPC's main task was to "explain why the quest of peace is so important to Grenada." Observing that 20 million Soviet citizens were killed during World War II, Bishop declared that Grenadian "work over the next few years is to try to get our people on the side of peace and against war."

Earlier, in November 1981, an International Solidarity Conference, organized by the USSR and Cuba and attended by a WPC delegation, was held in St. Georges. The conference attacked US policies around the globe, and praised the USSR's. According to the USSR's international weekly New Times (No. 49, 1981), Bishop proposed that the Caribbean be made a zone of peace "without colonialism and neo-colonialism in any form, without foreign military bases and nuclear weapons." He called for a ban on "any aggressive military exercises" there and asserted that Grenada would never renounce the principles of its revolution or its friendship with Cuba and other socialist countries in order to "curry favor" with Washington.

On January 19, 1983, the GPC unexpectedly issued a statement condemning the imprisonment of 160 members of the Turkish Peace Committee, another WPC affiliate. The GPC called their incarceration a "serious threat" to the peace movement, described the actions of the Turkish authorities as "malicious, wicked and unjustifiable," and alleged that the activists were subjected to "all forms of inhumane treatment."

Significantly, neither the WPC nor its Soviet affiliate, the Committee for the Defense of Peace, has publicly raised this issue since the Turkish activists were arrested in February 1982. The Soviets clearly have given priority to their relationship with Ankara and are using such obscure fronts as the GPC to do hatchet jobs for them.

^{1/} For additional information on the WPC, see INR Report 157-AR, "World Peace Council Reenters the Lists" (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), June 11, 1981.

International Organization of Journalists

The IOJ, a Prague-based front with worldwide affiliates and 150,000 members, held its Ninth Congress October 19-22, 1981, in Moscow. There it admitted to membership the Media Workers Association of Free Grenada (MWAFFG), believed to be the IOJ's Grenadian affiliate.

IOJ goals are similar to those of the WPC. According to Pravda (October 23, 1981), the IOJ's chief aim is to "bring truth to the masses and promote in every possible way united action by supporters of peace and broader cooperation and strengthening friendship among peoples." It mainly concerns itself with cultivating journalists in the developing world by providing equipment or financing courses at schools of journalism in communist countries.

The IOJ actively opposes the "hegemony" of the United States and other capitalist countries over the international information flow and demands an end to the arms race and the elimination of imperialist domination of developing countries.

A First Conference of Journalists from the Caribbean Area was held April 17-20, 1982, in St. Georges, according to the May 1982 issue of the IOJ Newsletter. Fifty-six journalists attended from 20 Latin American countries. Bishop, speaking at the opening, stressed the need to circulate truthful information throughout the world and to resist the "imperialist mass communications mafia." He castigated the "aggressive" campaign against Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua "unleashed by the imperialist communications media" and the flood of "war-like" information disseminated by the US.

The plenary agenda covered such topics as the information flow to the Caribbean and Latin America; the social, economic, and political situation affecting journalists in the Caribbean; and the building of national organizations of journalists throughout the region. General Secretary Jiri Kubka spoke on the "Role of Journalists in the Defense of Peace" and criticized imperialism's journalistic practices. The conference's final declaration condemned alleged imperialist distortions of facts about Grenada's revolution and attacked what it termed a systematic campaign of lies and misinformation against all progressive forces in the Caribbean.

The IOJ Newsletter in August 1982 carried an interview with Don Rojas, MWAFFG vice-president and press secretary for Bishop. Earlier that month Rojas had traveled to IOJ headquarters in Prague, as well as to the USSR, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Rojas stated that the purpose of the trip was to solicit IOJ support for establishment of a regional office in St. Georges; he expressed

hope that "this office [would] soon become a reality." Rojas said he had discussed IOJ training of young Grenadian journalist cadres; and he had proposed a "Truth in Grenada" project that would bring several influential West European journalists to the island to "report truthfully" about events there.

Rojas also revealed that he had concluded an agreement in the Soviet Union for the establishment in Grenada, "very soon," of an Intersputnik earth ground station. (Such a station would provide Grenada with direct telecommunications with the USSR and all of Eastern Europe.) Other agreements signed, according to Rojas, would enable Grenada to receive Soviet films, documentaries, and TASS news service on a daily basis.

On January 25, 1983, Radio Free Grenada reported that four local media outlets on the island soon would be receiving TASS English-language news service. The report stated that equipment to relay TASS news was being installed at the Ministry of Information, presumably by Soviet technicians.

International Union of Students

By the time of the 13th IUS Congress, November 18-24, 1980, in East Berlin, the National Student Council of Grenada had been admitted as an IUS member.

The IUS, headquartered in Prague, claims to have 117 affiliates; the bulk of its membership, claimed to be more than 10 million, comes from communist countries. The IUS works particularly closely with the WFDY (below); the IUS president is also a member of the WPC's Presidential Committee (as is the IOJ General Secretary).

IUS activities and public statements consistently promote Soviet foreign policy objectives. The IUS has condemned Western, but not Soviet, nuclear testing; it campaigns against NATO, but not against the Warsaw Pact; it protests alleged violations of students' rights in noncommunist countries, but ignores similar allegations in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.

In Latin America the IUS, like other international fronts, concentrates on strengthening "anti-imperialist" forces. Since the fall of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, the IUS has organized or participated in a variety of activities directed against the Pinochet regime. The IUS has a permanent campaign titled: "Every University a Center of Solidarity With Chile." Together with the British National Union of Students, the IUS in 1975 organized a World Student Seminar of Solidarity with Chile to launch the program from London.

IUS interest in the Caribbean and Latin America has increased in recent years, with special focus on the "anti-imperialist struggles" of Puerto Rico, Panama, and El Salvador. In that context it helped to organize various student meetings in Costa Rica and Panama in 1976, in Jamaica in 1978, and in Grenada in 1980.

IUS General Secretary Srinivasan Kunalan in 1981 summed up the main tasks facing the IUS in the 1980s: it must pay "great attention to the struggle for peace, detente and disarmament"; this struggle cannot be separated from that being waged "for national independence, democracy and social progress, particularly that waged by youth and students in Third World countries."

Kunalan also specified four main areas of cooperation between the IUS and the WFDY: peace, detente, and disarmament; international solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa, Palestine, and El Salvador and solidarity with all peoples "suffering from imperialist plots and maneuvers"; wider cooperation with other youth and student organizations "of different orientations and convictions"; and activities related to establishment of a new international economic order.

World Federation of Democratic Youth

The Youth of the New Jewel Movement (YNJM) apparently was admitted as a WFDY affiliate in February 1980. At the WFDY's 11th World Youth Assembly in Prague in June 1982, the YNJM was placed on the WFDY's Executive Committee.

The WFDY, headquartered in Budapest, maintains strong links with the WPC (both its President and General Secretary sit on the WPC Presidential Committee). It claims more than 150 million members from 123 countries. Most WFDY members are from communist countries; affiliated groups from noncommunist countries generally are connected with local communist parties.

WFDY activities in Latin America traditionally have sought to support and lend credibility to opposition forces. Following Allende's 1973 overthrow, Chile for a time dominated the WFDY's agenda; since then, the organization has campaigned vigorously against the "crimes" of the Chilean junta and for the release of political prisoners. The WFDY also has organized meetings and seminars in Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Jamaica, and Nicaragua on such subjects as US multinational firms, the struggle against fascist regimes and violations of human rights, the new international economic order, and anti-imperialism.

Almost 800 delegates from more than 130 countries attended last year's WFDY 11th General Assembly in Prague. Final documents called for stepping up the struggle for peace, disarmament, and

social progress and against imperialism. One resolution called on all youth organizations to unite against the threat of nuclear war. Another, titled "The 1980s - A Time for Action," enshrined the Federation's political action program for the decade. Other resolutions condemned Britain's action in the Falkland Islands and the support extended by the US to British "colonial" policy.

The British Young Communist League (a WFDY affiliate) expressed concern over some of the assembly's conclusions. Pointing out that it was opposed to martial law in Poland and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the League criticized the manner in which the Executive Committee's report dealt with "peace." It did not accept the thesis that the US and its allies were the exclusive source of world tension. It expressed its wish that the WFDY take into account different points of view on particular issues.

Women's International Democratic Federation

The National Women's Organization of the New Jewel Movement was admitted to the WIDF at the latter's Eighth Congress, October 14-15, 1981, in Prague.

The WIDF, with headquarters in East Berlin, now claims a membership of more than 200 million in 131 affiliated organizations in 116 countries; no noncommunist women's organizations are members. WIDF goals are to:

"...unite women regardless of race, nationality, religion and political opinion, so that they may win and defend their rights as citizens, mothers, and workers, protect children and ensure peace, democracy and national independence, establish friendship and solidarity."

WIDF activities invariably are meshed with campaigns inspired by the Soviet Union and by other front organizations. Opposition to Soviet domination led the Italian affiliate, the Union of Italian Women, to withdraw from full membership in 1964.

Throughout the 1970s, the WIDF organized meetings in support of Soviet peace and disarmament policies in Lima, Havana, Sofia, Panama, Conakry, New Delhi, Luanda, Vienna, Budapest, Helsinki, Warsaw, Nicosia, Aden, and New York. The WIDF's 1976-80 action program included a series of international meetings on women's role in the struggle against Zionism, apartheid, and fascism as well as regional meetings on such topics as the struggle for peace and independence in Asia, the role of women and their organizations in defending rights and opposing pillage by the multinational companies in Latin America, and "ideological penetration by imperialism" with the aid of mass media in Europe.

Signs of dissension within the WIDF were evident at the WIDF's World Congress of Women, October 8-14, 1981, in Prague. According to the Belgrade weekly NIN, representatives of women's organizations who were likely to blame the Warsaw Pact as well as NATO for strained international relations were prevented from addressing the congress. WIDF president Freda Brown (currently a WPC vice-president) denounced such views at the start of the gathering, asserting that the notion of equal guilt and responsibility was "the falsehood of the century."

According to NIN, the Japanese delegate was forcibly ejected from the hall after she stated she did not agree with the WIDF's condemnation of China or its official view on Afghanistan and Cambodia. Other dissident representatives (from Algeria, France, Iraq, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Romania, and Yugoslavia) then attempted to take the floor, but the microphones were switched off and the congress adjourned.

Prepared by David Hertzberg
632-9120

Approved by Martha Mautner
632-9536

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 11, 1983

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Interagency Group No. 38

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

TO	:	OVP	- Mr. Donald P. Gregg
		NSC	- Mr. Robert Kimmitt
		CIA	- [REDACTED]
		Defense	- COL John Stanford
		JCS	- LTC Dennis Stanley
		DOT (Coast Guard)	- Mr. Logan H. Sallada

SUBJECT : Inter-Agency Group on Eastern Caribbean Regional Security

During the past several months considerable attention has been focussed on the serious economic problems plaguing the Eastern Caribbean. The CBI and its special aid programs were designed to respond to these specific needs. But the security problems facing the small and vulnerable island states remain a central concern.

On April 14, 1983, a pre-IG at the working level was convened for purposes of determining the range of issues affecting Eastern Caribbean regional security and focussing recommendations for Inter-Agency Group consideration. The pre-IG, with representatives of State, DOD, CIA, NSC and Coast Guard, was able to reach agreement on a number of key issues. Nevertheless several remain to be resolved, and all recommended courses of action require review and confirmation through the IG forum.

We invite you to participate in the IG scheduled for Wednesday, June 15, at 4:00 p.m. in Room Room 3242 at the Department of State. Attached for consideration by the IG is a list and brief synopsis of the issues together with a summary of views expressed at the pre-IG.

Please telephone the name of your agency's representative to Mr. Peter F. O'Meara at 632-4194.

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NLRR M260/1#37094

BY KML NARA DATE 9/21/10

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Issues and Recommendations for IG Consideration

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DECL: OADR

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EASTERN CARIBBEAN SECURITY

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IG CONSIDERATION

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES

I. U.S. Commitment to the Protection of the Eastern Caribbean

In an effort to offset the growing projection of Cuban and Soviet power in the sub-region, it is essential that the U.S. signal its support for the Democratic Eastern Caribbean states. A public statement underscoring our commitment to the security of the Eastern Caribbean would carry significant psychological impact.

II. Emergency Transportation for the Regional Defense Forces

The five Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) signatories are located at distances of 25 to 300 miles from one another. A regional security request for one state to assist another will require indigenous or externally-provided transportation, for example: either (a) ship transportation requiring access to port facilities; (b) fixed-wing transport which normally would require access to airfield facilities (although a short takeoff and landing type of fixed-wing aircraft such as the Caribou might be landed on a flattened strip approximately 1000 feet in length or used for airborne personnel); or (c) vertical lift capability which would require only a small clearing of land for setting down or could disembark troops while hovering over rocky or forested land.

III. Relationship with the Regional Security System

We are at a critical juncture in our relationship with the five Eastern Caribbean states which have formed a common security assistance arrangement. In addition to providing for mutual assistance in coping with natural disasters, drug smuggling, environmental protection, etc., the arrangement enables any signatory state suffering or fearing external or internal attempts to overthrow its government by armed extra-constitutional means to request assistance from the other signatories. The signatories could help or not help, depending upon their individual evaluations of the situation. Essential to the establishment of the mutual security arrangement is the availability of arms and supplies for each state to use in its response. What types of equipment and training should be provided by the U.S. and/or others?

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/2/10

IV. U.S. Military Presence

The United States should maintain sufficient military presence in, and sense of commitment to, the Eastern Caribbean to deter external aggression and to respond to any such aggression, as needed. A U.S. military peacetime presence in the region should be maintained at least at present levels if not increased.

SPECIFIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

I. The United States should signal its support for efforts of the democratic Eastern Caribbean states to enhance their collective security against external aggression and extra-constitutional armed seizures of power. Accordingly, the following steps should be taken:

- a. The President should respond positively, through a private letter, to a communication from Eastern Caribbean heads-of-government or the Council of Ministers of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System requesting U.S. support for regional security efforts. The Presidential letter should indicate our intention, in the event of an armed attack or other threats to the security of the democratic states of the region, to consult with a view toward providing appropriate contributions to the collective defense of the United States and the Caribbean nations, for example, emergency transport or assistance for states of the region.

(PRE-IG VIEWS: While it would be worthwhile to establish a written record of our commitment to the common defense of the United States and the Eastern Caribbean states, we should be careful not to heighten the EC governments' perceptions of what the U.S. can and is prepared and able to do in terms of providing U.S. military troops, transport and security funding for the sub-region. Any Presidential letter would have to be carefully drafted to avoid creating expectations beyond our ability and willingness to respond in time of crisis. Such a "security commitment" also raises difficulties in terms of congressional sensitivities and our legal practice and is related to consideration of the role of the Rio Treaty.

- b. The President and Secretary of State should reaffirm, in the context of speeches and public declarations, our continuing commitment to prevent export of Communist subversion in the Hemisphere and, in particular, in Central America and the Caribbean. They should underline our support, through the

Caribbean Basin Initiative and our bilateral security assistance, for the maintenance of stability and prosperity of the Central American/Caribbean democracies. In this context, we should express our support of, and willingness to assist, regional self-help efforts.

(PRE-IG VIEWS: An effort to raise public consciousness of the strategic importance of the Eastern Caribbean to the U.S. is worthwhile and should be undertaken. Such public declarations should be embodied preferably within speeches or addresses on broader topics so as to avoid giving the impression that the RSS is a USG creation and to avoid exposing the Eastern Caribbean leaders to criticism by domestic leftists.)

II. Until Eastern Caribbean states are able to do so themselves, the United States should provide funding and emergency air and sealoift, if necessary and consistent with applicable legal requirements, to allow one or several of the members of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System to respond to emergencies on another island. Accordingly, the following steps should be taken:

- a. The JCS should prepare contingency plans for the provision of emergency air and sea transport using DOD or Coast Guard assets. DOD, the Department of State, and the NSC staff should prepare and preposition, to the extent possible, paperwork needed to execute a U.S. response. Contingency planning should assume either funding by security assistance or Department of Defense funding, if the national interest so warrants.

(NOTE: Existing contingency plans provide for assistance to local governments, cooperation with regional and indigenous forces, and restoration of peace and order. Execution of an approved plan is implemented by JCS upon direction of the National Command Authority.)

- b. For eventualities appropriate to security assistance funding, \$50,000 of MAP resources should be set aside to be used for troop airlift or other logistical support in time of emergency.
- c. The Department of State should study the desirability of encouraging Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St Lucia, and St. Vincent to sign the Rio Treaty.

(NOTE: Agreement was not reached in the Pre-IG regarding whether the U.S. should encourage the independent states of the EC to accede to the Rio Treaty or whether instead the U.S. should remain essentially passive. The U.S., for over thirty years, has had a well-known policy of encouraging dual adherence by American states to the OAS Charter and Rio Treaty as fundamental and complimentary hemispheric commitments. It was noted that, in time of emergency it might prove easier to deflect criticism of U.S. emergency provision of assistance to an EC government by being able to invoke Rio Treaty commitments to that government. An added advantage is that Rio Treaty membership might heighten deterrence of aggression. An opposing view was expressed that the U.S. should not be perceived by the Latins as packing the Rio Treaty with English-speaking countries. An increase in Rio Treaty membership might also complicate the problem of obtaining the required two-thirds majority for action on a number of potential issues, particularly when a leftist Latin regime is involved. Moreover, adherence to the Treaty by Caribbean states could provide other donor nations, such as the U.K., with a rationale to pull back on their own security assistance efforts. Evidence for this is found in the U.K.'s present interest in having Belize sign the Rio Treaty.)

- d. The Department of State, working with regional governments, should design a coordinated approach to France, the Netherlands, the U.K., Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic on possible contingency air and naval transport assistance.
- e. DOD should conduct a study comparing the feasibility and costs of: (A) long-term use of charter or CONUS-based DOD/Coast Guard assets for emergency transport, (b) provision to Eastern Caribbean governments of, and maintenance, through security assistance funding, for indigenous helicopter, STOL or seaplane lift, and appropriate airborne or heliborne training; or (c) permanent or rotating deployment of DOD or Coast Guard air/sea transport assets in the Eastern Caribbean. (Permanent or rotating deployment in Barbados or Antigua of 2-3 helicopters for search and rescue, drug interdiction, humanitarian/civic action, and contingency emergency transport purposes, as recommended by Embassy Bridgetown, should be specifically considered.)

III. The United States should provide security assistance that will provide for eventual autonomous response by the Eastern Caribbean nations to any threat short of overt aggression by an outside power. To this end, the following steps should be taken:

- a. The immediate equipment requirements of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System should be met out of available FY 82/83 MAP resources.
- b. Should the DOD study (II.e. above) recommend acquisition of indigenous lift, the Department of State and DOD should raise the priority of the Eastern Caribbean in allocating MAP and IMET resources for FY 85 and the out-years.
- c. Equipment for the Regional Security System ground forces and, depending on the outcome of the DOD study (and the Ambassador's and Embassy's views) (II.e. above), air transport equipment should receive priority funding out of FY 83/84 MAP resources. Remaining FY 83/84 resources, if any, should be allocated in response to explicit requests toward beginning purchases of deep-water-capable patrol boats for the coast guards of Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts. Further funding for the coast guards should be requested for FY 85 and the out-years.
- d. Specialized training should be provided, as appropriate, to Eastern Caribbean personnel in inter-island communications, airborne operations, and heliborne transport and assault operations out of available FY 83/84 IMET.
- e. Anti-terrorism training should be given highest priority after approval of the Department of State's anti-terrorism training program.
- f. The intelligence community should reassess the priority of intelligence collection and analysis on the region with a view toward possible increased emphasis. Foreign intelligence-sharing with regional governments should be increased as local intelligence and organizational infrastructure improve.
- g. The Department of State should work with regional states to approach the U.K., France, Canada, the Netherlands, Venezuela, and Jamaica for possible additional contributions of training, equipment, and advice for participants in the Regional Security System.

IV. The United States should maintain sufficient military presence in, and sense of commitment to, the Eastern Caribbean to deter external aggression and to respond to any such aggression, as needed. To this end, the following actions should be taken:

- a. DOD should undertake a study of anticipated mid-to-long-term changes in the Eastern Caribbean threat environment and consequent requirements for enhanced U.S. military presence (military facilities, ship and air deployments). The study, which may incorporate the emergency transport analysis requirement (II.e. above) if desirable, should recommend alternatives for varying or upgrading the U.S. presence. Alternative military uses of U.S. facilities scheduled to be closed should be considered in the study.
- b. The Department of State should approach the U.K., Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Venezuela to encourage increased Western military assistance in the region.
- c. DOD should review the possibility of additional "show-the-flag" demonstrations in the Eastern Caribbean (e.g. Blue Angels, Thunderbirds, flagship visits).
- d. JSC and CINCLANT should reassess the adequacy of the CINCLANT contingency plan for providing timely response in the Eastern Caribbean in light of possible new Cuban, Soviet, and Grenadian threats and force presence.

(NOTE: The contingency plan is produced annually through a process initiated by CINCLANT and submitted for review and approval by JCS. Approval is based on perceived threat and military requirements in the area.)

- e. JCS and CINCLANT should hold a command post (CPX) and force training (FTX) exercise in the Eastern Caribbean in CY 1983 to test emergency Regional Security System response in conjunction with U.S. forces. Similar exercises should be programmed annually in JCS Exercise Planning Guidance (EPG). CINCLANT should include Eastern Caribbean participation in JCS and service exercises in the region.

Drafted: S/P:JGlassman/ARA/CAR:JLBaker:gg
6/8/83 632-8451

W-2714E
Cleared:

- ARA/CAR - Richard Morefield/Richard Brown
- ARA/ECP - Jay Dehmlow
- ARA/PPC - Michael Skol
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- INR/IAA - Robert Dubose/Howard Davis
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- P - Robert Perry
- PM/RSA - Angel Rabasa
- CIA - [REDACTED]
- Coast Guard - Dave Simcox
- DOD/ISA - Joseph Becelia
- OJCS/J-3 JOD - Cdrs. Mike McQuiston/Paul Hansel/Jarrett Crowley
- OSD/PA&E - Wade Hinkle
- NSC - Alphonso Sapia-Bosch
- Ambassador Bish

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

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Department of State

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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EXDIS

FOR DEPT PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK: USFORCARIB KEY WEST FL;
COMANTDEFCON ROOSEVELT ROADS P, AND CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: JM, XL, PINS, UR, CU
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER SEAGA ASSESSES SECURITY
SITUATION IN CARIBBEAN: GROWING CONCERN OVER SOVIET/
CUBAN THREAT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: DURING A STATE/INR BRIEFING ON THE REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION, PRIME MINISTER SEAGA INDICATED GROWING CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET/CUBAN EFFORTS TO SUBVERT THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA. SEAGA NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL EXPLOIT THE REGION'S DEEPENING ECONOMIC CRISIS. CARICOM COUNTRIES ARE TOO INVOLVED IN THEIR DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND ARE NOT DEVOTING SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THIS GROWING SECURITY THREAT; IN FACT, MANY SEEM TOTALLY UNAWARE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE THREAT. SEAGA PREDICTS OVER THE NEXT DECADE COMMON US/CARICOM INTERESTS WILL BE UNDERCUT AND THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE SERIOUS INROADS IN THE AREA. HE URGES THAT USG OFFICIALS ENGAGE THE REGION'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SECURITY THREAT AND ON WAYS TO RESPOND TO IT. WHILE HIS OWN ECONOMIC CRISIS HAS PERHAPS EXAGGERATED HIS IMMEDIATE CONCERNS, SEAGA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES WITH US INTERESTS AND WANTS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. END SUMMARY.

3. STATE/INR OFFICER DUBOSE BRIEFED PRIME MINISTER SEAGA, MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPAULDING AND MFA MINISTER OF STATE GALLIMORE ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION AT JAMAICA HOUSE ON JUNE 16. THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM ALSO ATTENDED. SEAGA RESPONDED BY OUTLINING HIS VIEWS ON THE INCREASING SOVIET/CUBAN THREAT TO THE DEMOCRATIC, PRO-WESTERN CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. SEAGA BELIEVES GRENADA WAS SELECTED AS THEIR SURROGATE BECAUSE IT WAS AN AVAILABLE, VULNERABLE AND COOPERATIVE PARTNER THAT WOULD NOT REQUIRE MAJOR SOVIET/CUBAN RESOURCES. HE PREDICTED THAT SURINAME WILL LIKELY FOLLOW THE SAME PATTERN. SIMILARLY, THE RAPID EAST EUROPEAN BUILD-UP IN

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NICARAGUA AND SUBVERSION OF THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR AIM TO TOPPLE NEIGHBORING DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. SEAGA UNDERLINED THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE DETERIORATING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE REGION WHICH MADE MANY OF THE DEMOCRACIES VULNERABLE TO THIS THREAT. HE NOTED THAT LEFTIST MILITANTS ARE READY TO EXPLOIT THE POTENTIAL SOCIAL UNREST AND DISSATISFACTION CREATED BY UNEMPLOYMENT AND DASHED EXPECTATIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED, DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS MUST MOBILIZE POPULAR SUPPORT AND RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO SOCIAL NEEDS. AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS, HOWEVER, DO NOT HAVE SIMILAR PRESSURES AND THEREBY CAN EXPLOIT THE WEAKNESSES OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. HE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVES THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS WERE PREPARING TO USE GRENADA AND SURINAME AS THE BASES FOR MAJOR SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGNS MUCH AS THEY WERE ALREADY DOING IN NICARAGUA.

4. SEAGA ILLUSTRATED THIS POINT BY INDICATING THAT THE JAMAICAN OPPOSITION PNP PARTY HAD USED SIMILAR TACTICS IN THE 1970S. THE OPPOSITION RESORTED TO VIOLENCE, SOCIAL UNREST AND AUTHORITARIAN TACTICS TO SEEK TO RETAIN CONTROL. HOWEVER, THE JAMAICAN PUBLIC WAS UNWILLING TO GIVE UP ITS STRONGLY HELD DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS. OPPOSITION LEADER MANLEY IS CONTINUING TO PURSUE THIS STRATEGY, ACCORDING TO SEAGA, AND IS PURSUING THREE OPTIONS. FIRST, THE PNP IS BIDDING ITS TIME TO SEE IF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS WILL UNDERCUT SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND THEREBY ENABLE IT TO REGAIN POWER THROUGH POPULAR MEANS. SECONDLY, SHOULD THIS TACTIC FAIL, THE PNP WILL USE "TERRORISM AND ARMED FORCE" TO GAIN CONTROL. SEAGA BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT THE PUBLIC WOULD OPPOSE SUCH MEASURES AND WOULD ONLY ACCEPT THEM SHOULD A MAJOR SOCIAL CRISIS OCCUR. SEAGA ADDED THAT BOTH THE PNP AND THE COMMUNIST WPJ PARTIES ARE ORGANIZING FOR SUCH ACTION. AS ITS THIRD OPTION, THE PNP MAY SEEK TO SABOTAGE THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY BY EXPLOITING PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION, THROUGH SUCH MEASURES AS STRIKES,

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO NSC.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BRIDGETOWN 03512

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, GJ
SUBJECT: GRENADA: FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEE DETAILS
TORTURE CHARGES AGAINST THE PRG

1. (C) SUMMARY/COMMENT: A FORMER GRENADIAN POLITICAL DETAINEE, ANTHONY MITCHELL, HAS CHARGED THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) OF GRENADA WITH TORTURE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE ALLEGATIONS APPEARED IN AN INTERVIEW MITCHELL GAVE RECENTLY TO THE TRINIDAD EXPRESS AND WHICH WAS ALSO REPRINTED IN PART IN THE BARBADOS NATION. BECAUSE OF THE SPECIFICITY OF MITCHELL'S CHARGES, HIS STORY COMES ACROSS AS PARTICULARLY CREDIBLE. IT IS ALSO NOTEWORTHY THAT PROMINENT INDEPENDENT GRENADIAN JOURNALIST ALISTER HUGHES, PREVIOUSLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT TORTURE CHARGES AGAINST THE PRG, TOLD EMBOFFS IN RECENT CONVERSATION THAT HE NOW THINKS TORTURE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS HAS IN FACT OCCURRED. HUGHES HAS COMPILED NEW UPDATED LIST OF POLITICAL DETAINEES WHICH EMBASSY WILL FORWARD TO DEPARTMENT SEPTEL. END SUMMARY/COMMENT.

2. (U) FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MITCHELL INTERVIEW: BEGIN QUOTE. PORT-OF-SPAIN, TRINIDAD, JUNE 14, CANA -- A FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEE OF GRENADA'S PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) HAS ALLEGED IN A NEWSPAPER (#) PUBLISHED HECA THAT PRISONERS WERE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS FORMS OF TORTURE IN THE SPICE ISLE.

- BUSINESSMAN ANTHONY MITCHELL, HELD FROM OCTOBER 15, 1979 TO NOVEMBER 16, 1982, ACCUSED THE GRENADA AUTHORITIES OF SHOOTING PRISONERS, ADMINISTERING ELECTRICAL SHOCKS TO SENSITIVE PARTS OF THEIR BODIES, AND PEELING OFF THEIR SKIN WITH PLIERS.

- MITCHELL, NOW A TEMPORARY RESIDENT OF BARBADOS UNTIL HE GETS PERMISSION TO SETTLE IN THE UNITED STATES, TOLD THE EXPRESS NEWSPAPER IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE HIS MOTHER WAS CLOSE TO THE RULING NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT (NJM) THAT HE DID NOT GET ROUGHER TREATMENT.

- "I HAVE TO SAY THAT I WAS LUCKY I WAS NOT BRUTALISED ANYMORE THAN I WAS AND THIS WAS BECAUSE OF MY MOTHER WHO HAS BEEN CLOSE TO THE MOVEMENT," HE SAID, ADDING:

- "THERE WERE OTHER THINGS THEY DID TO SOME OF THE PRISONERS. THEY SHOCKED PEOPLE IN THEIR BOTTOMS, THEY SHOCKED THEM IN THEIR TESTICLES, THEY BROKE PEOPLE'S FINGERS AND ALLOWED THE BONES TO SET WITHOUT ANY MEDICAL ATTENTION.

- "MOST OF THIS TYPE OF TORTURE WAS CARRIED OUT AT MOUNT ROYAL, WHICH HAD BEEN GAIRY'S HOUSE."

- MITCHELL, WHO SAID HE USED TO BELONG TO THE NJM SAID PRISONERS COULD SOMETIMES COMMUNICATE IN PRISON, OR FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WERE ALLOWED TO GO TO CHURCH TOGETHER ABOUT ONCE A MONTH.

- "OR WE MIGHT MEET IN THE LIBRARY WHERE THEY WOULD SHOW ME THEIR FINGERS STILL SWOLLEN BIG. RUSSELL BUDHALL, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD HIS FINGERS BROKEN LIKE THIS," MITCHELL TOLD THE "EXPRESS."


- HE SAID HE SAW MARKS ON CERTAIN PRISONERS WHICH SHOWED THEY HAD BEEN TORTURED BY THE BISHOP REGIME.

- ASKED BY THE "EXPRESS" IF ELECTRICAL SHOCKS WERE USED, MITCHELL REPLIED: "YES, ELECTRIC SHOCKS. KEITH ST. BERNARD, ANOTHER PRISONER, HAS SCARS ON HIS CHEST WHERE THEY TOOK OFF THE SKIN WITH A PLIERS. ROLAND BUDHLALL WAS TRIED FOR MURDER, FOUND NOT GUILTY, BUT IS STILL IN DETENTION. HIS HANDS ARE COVERED WITH SCARS FROM ELECTRIC SHOCKS. THE SHOCKS LEAVE WHITE MARKS, AND THOSE PLACES NEVER GET BACK THEIR NATURAL COLOUR.

- "I WAS IN CONTACT WITH ALL THESE PEOPLE IN PRISON. IF YOU WERE ALLOWED TO GO AND VISIT THESE PEOPLE IN PRISON YOU WOULD SEE THE MARKS YOURSELF."

- ASKED BY THE "EXPRESS" IF THERE WERE ANY OTHER FORMS

NOTE BY OC/T: (#): OMISSION PARA 2 LINE 5. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.



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OF TORTURE WHILE HE WAS DETAINED, MITCHELL SAID:

- "SOMETIMES THEY WOULD HANDCUFF YOU WHILE YOU WERE STANDING WITH YOUR HANDS STRETCHED ABOVE YOUR HEAD. SO YOU WOULD ACTUALLY ALMOST BE HANGING. YOU WOULD BE LEFT LIKE THIS FOR DAYS. THEY MIGHT LOOSEN ONE HAND TO ALLOW YOU TO EAT, THAT WAS ALL. I SAW PEOPLE LIKE THAT, BUT I WAS ONLY LIKE THAT FOR A SHORT WHILE UNTIL THE THING I WAS HANGING ON BROKE."

- HE ADDED: "I HAVE ALSO SEEN PEOPLE SHOT IN THE CELLS. WINSTON "NANAN" CROW, FOR EXAMPLE. HE IS A RASTA. WE WERE TAKING EXERCISES IN THE YARD. USUALLY WE WERE ALLOWED ABOUT ONE HOUR A DAY. THE OTHER 23 HOURS WE WERE LOCKED UP. ONE DAY WE WERE TAKING SOME EXERCISE IN THE YARD WHEN AFTER ONLY 30 MINUTES A GUARD TOLD US TO GO BACK INSIDE.

- "ONE OF MY FRIENDS HAD WARNED ME TO COOPERATE WITH THE GUARDS, BUT ALL OF A SUDDEN THE GUARD JUST SHOT WINSTON CROW. THE SHOT PASSED THROUGH HIS LEG AND TOOK OFF PART OF HIS GROIN. HE DIDN'T DIE.

- "DENNIS CHARLES WAS SHOT IN HIS HAND WHILE HE WAS IN HIS CELL. HIS THUMB WAS BADLY DAMAGED."

- MITCHELL TOLD THE "EXPRESS" THAT THE GROUNDS FOR HIS BEING DETAINED WERE THAT HE WAS "REASONABLY SUSPECTED OF COUNSELLING AND CONSPIRING WITH OTHER PERSONS TO TAKE ACTION OF SUCH A NATURE THAT WAS LIKELY TO ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC ORDER OR THE DEFENCE OF GRENADA OR TO SUBVERT OR SABOTAGE THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT." END QUOTE. BISH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Grenada

June 21, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Grenada: Response to Bishop's Remarks

In response to Prime Minister Bishop's critical remarks at a New York press conference on June 9, the Department endorses an interagency recommendation that we express our displeasure and spell out more precisely our expectations in the areas of human rights and relations with the Soviets and Cubans. We have determined that the message should be delivered by Ambassador Middendorf through the Grenadian Ambassador to the OAS. The points of the interagency cleared demarche are attached.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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DECL: OADR

Drafted: ARA/CAR:RCBrown *ReB*
6/20/83 x23210 W3503E

Cleared: DOD/ISA: Cdr. Castro
DOD/JCS: Com. Darby
NSC: ONorth
CIA/NIO/LA: Mr. Horton
CIA/ADC/LAD: DClarridge
ARA: JMichel
ARA: CAGillespie *ReB*

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NLRR M260 #37098

BY KAL NARA DATE 3/16/12

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Talking Points for Ambassador Middendorf

- We were surprised and disappointed by remarks reportedly made by Prime Minister Bishop to a press conference in New York on June 9 and recent attacks against the U.S. by Deputy Prime Minister Coard and Foreign Minister Whiteman in Grenada. These statements appear to contravene the June 7 understanding to mutually curb critical rhetoric.
- We made clear during the Washington conversation that we will judge the sincerity of Prime Minister Bishop's proposal for a dialogue by the actions of the Grenadian Government in several important areas: civil liberties, foreign policy orientation and public rhetoric.
- With respect to public statements, the constant barrage of anti-American propaganda generated by the Government of Grenada, whether inside or outside the country, creates misimpressions and an atmosphere of hostility. Curbing this hostile rhetoric is essential before any rational exchange can begin.
- In the area of human rights, we will look to the Grenadian Government:
 - a) to release from jail the large number of political prisoners who have been held without trial for several years,
 - b) to restore Grenada to a constitutional state of law, reestablishing guarantees for such basic human liberties as free speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and due process.
 - c) to establish a timetable to return Grenada to a democratically elected government in the near future through secret ballot elections overseen by international observers, and
 - d) to restore an independent judiciary to deal with the full range of civil and criminal matters.
- In the field of foreign affairs, we are concerned about Grenada's non-independent foreign policy. The votes cast by Grenada in international fora are almost identical to those cast by the Soviet Union and Cuba. We would like to see evidence that Grenada is following a truly non-aligned policy.

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/21/10

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- The presence in Grenada of an increasing number of Soviets and a large number of Cuban personnel -- some with military responsibilities -- creates the impression that Grenada is becoming an outpost for interests alien to the security of this hemisphere. Consistent with a truly non-aligned foreign policy, we would like to see a reduction of these personnel eventually to a level of no more than the requirements of a normal diplomatic mission.

- We hope that the Government of Grenada will take the necessary steps to demonstrate its good faith in following through on the concerns expressed during the June 7 meeting in Washington.

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Under Secretary has seen.

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Department of State DATE: JUN 21 1983
8319070 J

ACTION MEMORANDUM
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8319071

JUN 21 1983

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TO: P - Mr. Eagleburger
FROM: ARA - James H. Michel *g 6/21*
SUBJECT: Grenada: Response to Bishop's Remarks

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to express our displeasure at the Grenadian Prime Minister's anti-U.S. statements.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

After reviewing a number of options, the restricted interagency meeting I chaired last Friday concluded that we should express our displeasure to Bishop for his anti-U.S. remarks as well as similar statements made recently by his chief ministers. We also believe it important to spell out in more detail our expectations in the other important areas of human rights and relations with the Cubans and Soviets. The best means for transmitting our demarche is through the already established channel between Ambassador Middendorf and Grenadian OAS Ambassador Dessima Williams.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached Hill-Clark memorandum transmitting the decision to express our displeasure at Bishop's remarks through Ambassador Middendorf.

Approve *[Signature]* JUN 21 1983 Disapprove _____

Attachment:
As stated

Drafted: ARA/CAR:RCBrown
6/21/83 632-3210
W-3505 Clearance:ARA:CAGillespie *mlj*

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Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Current Analysis Series

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NLRR M260/1 #37101

BY KML NARA DATE 9/21/10

G1 37101

July 1, 1983

CENTRAL AMERICAN HIGHLIGHTS

Caribbean: CARICOM Summit

The July 4 summit of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is expected to further the process of dissolution of Caribbean regional cooperation. Political solidarity has already been splintered by the issue of Grenada's pro-Eastern Bloc orientation and now economic cooperation is seriously threatened. While we expect that the differences will be papered over, the long-range future and utility of the institution is in doubt. Two positive factors which may slow the dissolution process are the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security Treaty and the hoped-for Congressional approval of US trade liberalizations included in the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

The splintering of regional political solidarity was evident last fall in Ocho Rios, Jamaica, when an effort to exclude Grenada from CARICOM or insist that it hold elections aborted. This time, despite the continued militarization of Grenada and the disturbing events in nearby Suriname, the issues of Grenada and Soviet and Cuban adventurism in the the region are unlikely to be raised. Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica told us that Grenadian Prime Minister Bishop has shown such good behavior of late that his critics in CARICOM lack an issue on which to focus.

Regional economic cooperation is seriously threatened by deteriorating economic conditions and a new wave of protectionism stemming from and manifested in, inter alia:

- the trade impasse from Jamaica's recently expanded two-tiered foreign exchange system;
- deceptive labeling of goods to unfairly exploit intraregional tariff advantages;
- Trinidad's return to licensing of imports;
- the collapse of the multilateral clearing facility due to Guyana's default;
- Trinidad's failure to renew the oil facility because of its own economic troubles; and
- failure to agree on a regional air carrier.

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A slight decline in real GDP per capita, 25-40 percent unemployment and 8-20 percent inflation in most of the CARICOM countries has caused them to concentrate on protecting their tiny economies rather than taking a broader view of regional cooperation.

The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security Treaty signed last fall offers some hope that the highly vulnerable islands of the Eastern Caribbean can band together with strong Barbados to defend themselves against internal and external violence. It remains to be seen whether the Treaty signers will have the political will or the rapid military deployment capability to fulfill its assigned mission. The Treaty's implementation will depend almost entirely on US aid.

Another positive factor on the horizon is the hoped for passage of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Political and economic cooperation may revive somewhat if economic conditions improve and the United States increases its imports of Caribbean products. Thus, much will depend on the conditions for access the Caribbean has to US markets.

A final factor which may affect US-Caribbean relations as well as Caribbean regionalism is the Antiguan initiative to interest CARICOM in a proposal for a deep-seabed-type of regime for Antarctica. We understand that the Antiguan proposal asks for United Nations General Assembly involvement in the Antarctica issue and is similar to the proposal Malaysia presented at the Non-Aligned Movement summit in New Delhi.

Drafted by INR/IAA:IBiswas/WLofstrom
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Approved by INR:NBellocci

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Department of State

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PLANNED FOR THE NORTH-EASTERN TOWN OF GREENVILLE.

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3. (U).

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Grenada

GRENADA ASSUMES MORE PROMINENT ROLE IN WPC. ACCORDING TO RECENT GOVERNMENT REPORTS FROM GRENADA, THE GRENADA PEACE COUNCIL (GPC) HAS BEEN ELECTED TO THE BUREAU OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC) AND VICTOR HUSBANDS, THE GPC GENERAL SECRETARY, HAS BEEN ELECTED A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE OF THE WPC. THE ELECTIONS REPORTEDLY TOOK PLACE AT THE "WORLD ASSEMBLY FOR PEACE AND LIFE AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR" WHICH WAS HELD IN PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM JUNE 21-26. HUSBANDS LED A THREE-MEMBER DELEGATION TO THE ASSEMBLY WHICH INCLUDED WILBERFORCE NYACK, VICE-PRESIDENT, AND PATSY ROAIM OF THE NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION. HUSBANDS IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID GRENADA WAS ELECTED TO SERVE ON THE WPC BECAUSE OF THE SOLIDARITY IT EXTENDED INTERNATIONALLY WHEN COUNTRIES ARE THREATENED BY WAR. EIGHT ACCUSED TERRORISTS FREED ON LEGAL TECHNICALITIES ARE REINCARCERATED BY THE PRG. IN LATE JUNE EIGHT INDIVIDUALS CHARGED WITH THE MURDER OF FIVE GRENADIANS IN 1980 WERE FREED ON LEGAL TECHNICALITIES IN A DRAMATIC HIGH COURT DECISION, BUT WERE IMMEDIATELY TAKEN BACK INTO CUSTODY BY POLICE, ACCORDING TO (CANA) REPORTS FROM GRENADA. GUYANA-BORN JUDGE JAMES PATTERSON DISCHARGED THE ACCUSED AFTER RULING THAT THERE HAD BEEN "BRUTAL BREACHES" OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES ACT DURING THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WHICH PRECEDED THE TRIAL. JUDGE PATTERSON SAID THE ACCUSED WERE NOT INFORMED OF THEIR RIGHTS TO CALL WITNESSES AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCUSED, AS REQUIRED, WERE PROVIDED WITH COPIES OF THE WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION TWO DAYS BEFORE THEIR

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ROME FOR THE VATICAN OFFICE

E.O. 12356: DECL 07/21/86
TAGS: GJ, SHUM, PGOV, PREL
SUBJECT: GRENADA NOTES

1. (U).

SUMMARY: THIS GRENADA NOTES CABLE CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

- GRENADA/USSR SIGN FOUR NEW AGREEMENTS
 - GRENADA ASSUMES MORE PROMINENT ROLE IN WORLD PEACE COUNCIL
 - EIGHT ACCUSED TERRORISTS ARE FREED ON LEGAL TECHNICALITIES BUT REARRESTED
 - CATHOLIC CENTER IN GRENADA SPONSORS SOCIALIST CONFERENCE
 - AMNESTY OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON GRENADA
- END SUMMARY.

2. (U).

GRENADA/SOVIET UNION SIGN FOUR NEW CONTRACTS. IN EARLY JULY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) OF GRENADA AND THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED FOUR NEW CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS IN THE AREAS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, WATER-SUPPLY AND A SEAPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. ACCORDING TO BORIS NIKOLAEV, THE ECONOMIC COUNSELOR IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN ST. GEORGE'S, MOSCOW WILL BE SENDING 15 TEACHERS TO GRENADA BY SEPTEMBER TO TEACH SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS AT THE SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL. THE SOVIET UNION WILL FINANCE A FEASIBILITY STUDY AND IDENTIFY THE SITE FOR A PROPOSED SATELLITE EARTH STATION WHICH IT HAS PROMISED THE PRG, NIKOLAEV STATED. ACCORDING TO THE PRG, THE SATELLITE EARTH STATION, WHICH IS TO BE FINANCED UNDER A US \$7.5 MILLION LINE OF CREDIT, WILL ENABLE THE COUNTRY TO RECEIVE RADIO, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION FROM SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL ANNOUNCED THAT A GROUP OF SOVIET EXPERTS WOULD BE ARRIVING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS TO WORK WITH OFFICIALS OF THE CENTRAL WATER COMMISSION (CWC) ON A THREE-MONTH FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THE WATERSUPPLY SYSTEM IN THE AREAS OF CONCORD AND SPRING GARDENS. FINALLY, NIKOLAEV SAID, MOSCOW WOULD ALSO SEND A TEAM TO GRENADA SHORTLY TO CONDUCT A FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THE SEAPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT WHICH IS

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APPEARANCE IN COURT. OTHER BREACHES INCLUDED THE FAILURE OF THE MAGISTRATE TO TAKE NOTES AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARINGS AND TO SHOW THAT ALL OF THE ACCUSED WERE REPRESENTED BY DEFENSE LAWYERS. THE JUDGE ALSO RULED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS DISCHARGE OF THE CASE DID NOT PRECLUDE THE PROSECUTION FROM INSTITUTING FRESH PROCEEDINGS FOR ANOTHER PRELIMINARY INQUIRY. FOLLOWING ARE NAMES OF THE ACCUSED IN THE MURDER CASE: JIMMY JULIEN, ISAAC JAMES, DENZIL RICHARDSON, RICHARD, MATTHEW, CATHERINE AND ANNAS PASCALL. HUGHES HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE BACKGROUNDS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS. THE EIGHTH PERSON ACCUSED, FORMER POLICE CORPORAL WILTON DE RAVENIERE, WAS CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES IN NOVEMBER 1979.

5. (C).

(EMBASSY COMMENT: IN THE OPINION OF PROMINENT INDEPENDENT GRENADIAN JOURNALIST ALISTER HUGHES, THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE AGAINST THE EIGHT ACCUSED IS QUESTIONABLE AT BEST. ACCORDING TO HUGHES, A MAN WAS SHOT UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IN A PRG MILITIA CAMP IN 1980. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, HUGHES SAID, A MINIBUS RIDDLED WITH BULLETS AND FOUR DEAD PASSENGERS WAS FOUND IN THE VICINITY OF THE CAMP. SPECULATION IS, ACCORDING TO HUGHES, THAT MEMBERS OF THE MILITIA HAD INTERCEPTED THE MINIBUS AND ACCIDENTALLY SHOT ONE OF THE PASSENGERS. HAVING DONE SO, THEY DECIDED TO REMOVE ANY WITNESSES BY KILLING THE OTHER THREE. HUGHES BELIEVES THE PERSONS NOW CHARGED WITH THE MURDERS ARE INNOCENT SCAPEGOATS ROUNDED UP IN ORDER TO SAVE THE MILITIA FROM EMBARRASSMENT. END COMMENT.)

6. (U).

CATHOLIC CENTER IN GRENADA SPONSORS SOCIALIST CONFERENCE. A REGIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE SPONSORED RECENTLY BY THE POPE JOHN PAUL ECUMENICAL CENTRE IN GRENADA HAS CALLED ON CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT GRENADA'S "RIGHT TO BUILD THEIR OWN POLITICAL PROCESS." THE CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY YOUTH FROM CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS, LEFTIST POLITICAL PARTIES, TRADE UNIONS AND PEACE COUNCILS FROM CUBA, DOMINICA, EL SALVADOR, GRENADA, JAMAICA, NICARAGUA, PUERTO RICO, ST. CROIX, ST. LUCIA, AND ST. VINCENT, ALSO EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA AND THE GROUPS WANTING "TO OVERTHROW THE U.S.-BACKED MILITARY ADMINISTRATION" IN EL SALVADOR. STATEMENT ALSO URGED THE U.S. TO REMOVE ITS MILITARY BASE FROM CUBA, AND WHAT WAS

CALLED U.S. BUILD-UP OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PUERTO RICO.

7. (C).

(COMMENT FOR ROME-OFFICE OF THE VATICAN: WE WONDER TO WHAT EXTENT VATICAN AUTHORITIES FOLLOW THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN WHICH HAVE TENDED TO ADOPT TENDENTIOUS ANTI-U.S. AND RADICAL LEFTIST POSITIONS ON MANY ISSUES. TO WHAT EXTENT IS EMBASSY ROME-OFFICE OF THE VATICAN INTERESTED IN BEING KEPT INFORMED BY THIS EMBASSY? WE NOTE THAT GRENADA GOVERNOR GENERAL PAUL SCOON IS TO HAVE AN AUDIENCE WITH THE POPE SOMETIME BEFORE AUGUST 13. END COMMENT.)

8. (U).

AMNESTY OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON GRENADA. DURING RECENT VISIT TO BARBADOS, JACK RENDLER, DESCRIBED IN LOCAL PRESS AS AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR THE WESTERN REGION, SAID THE CARIBBEAN GENERALLY DOES NOT PRESENT THE KIND OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM OR ABUSES THAT CONCERN AMNESTY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. RENDLER NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ARBITRARY DETENTION AND FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF HAITIAN REFUGEES BY THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND THE ARBITRARY ARREST OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS IN GUYANA, SURINAME AND GRENADA, ARE OF CONCERN TO AMNESTY. RENDLER CALLED ON BARBADOS TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN SPEAKING OUT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE REGION AND BEYOND. (EMBASSY COMMENT: BY THE TIME REPORT OF RENDLER'S VISIT APPEARED IN LOCAL PRESS HE HAD ALREADY LEFT ISLAND. WE ARE STILL AWAITING DEFINITIVE WORD ON THE LONG PROMISED VISIT TO GRENADA OF AMNESTY AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS. END COMMENT)9:71BISH

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 6579

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CU, GJ
SUBJ: CUBA BREAKS SILENCE ON GRENADA: MOURNS BISHOP; CLAIMS NO INVOLVEMENT IN EVENTS

REF. HAVANA 0652 (WOTAL)

1. (S) SUMMARY: BREAKING A WEEK-LONG SILENCE, THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND GOVERNMENT RELEASED A FORMAL DECLARATION EVENING OF OCTOBER 20, CLAIMING THAT CUBA HAD NO ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT AND DENYING THAT CUBA HAD PLAYED ANY ROLE IN THE EVENTS IN GRENADA. STATEMENT ADMITS, HOWEVER, THAT CASTRO COMMUNICATED WITH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT OCTOBER 15, OUTLINING CUBA'S POSITION AND PROMISING CONTINUED CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE, REGARDLESS OF ANY CHANGES IN THE PARTY, WHICH CUBA CONSIDERED PURELY AN "INTERNAL MATTER". THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED THREE DAYS OF MOURNING OVER BISHOP'S DEATH, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHICH IT SAID MUST BE "CLARIFIED" AND IF IT TURNS OUT TO HAVE BEEN A COLD BLOODED EXECUTION, THE GUILTY SHOULD BE GIVEN EXEMPLARY PUNISHMENTS. STATEMENT PREDICTABLY WARNS THAT IMPERIALISM WILL TRY TO USE THE GRENADIAN TRAGEDY AND THE "ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE GRENADIAN REVOLUTIONARIES" TO REVERSE THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN GRENADA. COMMENT: IT SOUNDS AS THOUGH CASTRO, AFTER HAVING GIVEN A CLEAR SIGNAL OF CUBAN ACQUIESCENCE IN BISHOP'S OUSTER, WAS STUNG BY UNEXPECTED KILLINGS AND IS CONCERNED THAT THE AFTERMATH MAY BE A SET-BACK FOR CUBAN-INSPIRED REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) IN A LENGTHY STATEMENT READ ON NATIONWIDE TELEVISION AT 8:00 P.M. OCTOBER 20 (PRESUME FBIS HAS TEXT) AND PUBLISHED THE FOLLOWING MORNING IN THE OFFICIAL DAILY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC), THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT FINALLY BROKE ITS WEEK-LONG SILENCE ON THE EVENTS IN GRENADA (REFTEL). STATEMENT CLAIMS THAT WHEN BISHOP AND A GRENADIAN DELEGATION SPENT 36 HOURS IN CUBA OCTOBER 6-8 (FOLLOWING THEIR TRIP TO HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA), BISHOP NEVER TOLD CASTRO ABOUT THE "SERIOUS ARGUMENTS AND DIFFERENCES" WHICH WERE TAKING PLACE

WITHIN THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT (NJM). (THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT CASTRO ACCOMPANIED BISHOP ON A TOUR THROUGH THE CIENFUEGOS AREA, WHERE THEY VISITED PLANTS AND TALKED WITH WORKERS, SO THE TWO MEN APPARENTLY SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TOGETHER. PREVIOUSLY, THE CUBANS HAD ONLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE GRENADIAN DELEGATION TOURED THE AREA, WITH NO INDICATION THAT CASTRO AND BISHOP HAD SPENT MUCH TIME TOGETHER).

3. (C) ON OCTOBER 12, ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT, CUBA FIRST HEARD FROM ITS EMBASSY IN GRENADA THE "SURPRISING AND DISAGREEABLE NEWS" THAT THERE WERE PROFOUND DIVISIONS WITHIN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT. SAYING THAT THIS WAS A "PURELY INTERNAL MATTER." STATEMENT CLAIMS THAT THE PCC, "DESPITE OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH BISHOP AND OUR CONFIDENCE IN HIS INTEGRITY AND GOVERNING CAPACITY," GAVE STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CUBAN REPRESENTATIVES IN GRENADA NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN AN INTERNAL PARTY MATTER. ON OCTOBER 15, FIDEL CASTRO SENT THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE A MESSAGE OUTLINING CUBA'S POSITION IN TERMS OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL PARTY MATTERS. FIDEL WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT CUBA WAS CONCERNED THAT DIVISIONS WITHIN THE NJM COULD DAMAGE THE "IMAGE OF THE GRENADIAN REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS." AND RECALLING THE HIGH ESTEEM IN WHICH CUBA HELD BISHOP--HE WARNED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN THESE EVENTS TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE. MOREOVER, FIDEL'S MESSAGE POINTEDLY SAID THAT CUBA'S COLLABORATION WITH GRENADA "WOULD BE MAINTAINED AS A COMMITMENT TO THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE" REGARDLESS OF HOW THE INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLE TURNED OUT.

4. (U) AFTER RECOUNTING THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE KILLINGS OF BISHOP AND HIS AIDES, THE CUBAN STATEMENT SAYS THAT IT HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE ACTUAL MANNER OF THEIR DEATH. STATING THAT NO REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE OR PRINCIPLE, NOR ANY INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITH THE NJM CAN JUSTIFY "ATROCIOUS PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS THE PHYSICAL ELIMINATION OF BISHOP AND THE GROUP OF WELL-REGARDED, HONEST AND WORTHY LEADERS" KILLED, THE STATEMENT CALLS FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AROUND THE KILLINGS. IF IT INVOLVED COLD-BLOODED EXECUTIONS, THE CUBANS SAY, THOSE GUILTY SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO "EXEMPLARY PUNISHMENTS".

5. (U) CUBAN STATEMENT CLOSES BY SAYING THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GRENADA IS "EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX, AND THAT "ONLY A MIRACLE OF COMMON SENSE, EQUANIMITY AND REVOLUTIONARY WISDOM" CAN SAVE THE GRENADIAN

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REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS. WARNING THAT "NO STEP MUST BE TAKEN WHICH COULD HELP IMPERIALISM'S PLANS", STATEMENT PLEDGES CONTINUED CUBAN COOPERATION WITH GRENADA, BUT SAYS THAT "OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THOSE NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RULING GRENADA MUST UNDERGO A SERIOUS AND PROFOUND ANALYSIS."

6. (S) COMMENT: CASTRO'S OCTOBER 15 MESSAGE TO THE NJM CLEARLY GAVE A GREEN LIGHT FOR COARD AND HIS SUPPORTERS TO OUST BISHOP, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE CUBANS DID NOT EXPECT THE RESULT TO BE THE MURDER OF BISHOP AND HIS SUPPORTERS. INDEED, IN A CONVERSATION OCTOBER 20 WITH A MID-LEVEL FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL, HE TOLD ME THAT A CUBAN STATEMENT ON GRENADA WOULD SOON BE RELEASED, AND THAT IT WOULD EMPHASIZE CUBA'S VIEW THAT THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE NJM WERE A "FAMILY MATTER". THE MINREX OFFICIAL ALSO CLAIMED THAT CUBA HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT BISHOP AND HIS CLOSE SUPPORTERS MIGHT BE EXILED TO CUBA. HE STATED OUTRIGHT THAT BISHOP HAD BEEN "MURDERED" BECAUSE "NO SOLDIER WOULD SHOOT A LEADER WITHOUT ORDERS", AND THEN TRIED TO DRAW A PARALLEL WITH CHE GUEVARA'S DEATH. MUCH OF THE CUBAN STATEMENT IS WINDOW-DRESSING, OF COURSE, FOR THE CUBANS SURELY WERE AWARE OF DIVISIONS WITHIN THE NJM, AND NO REFERENCE WAS MADE IN THE STATEMENT TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE GRENADIAN AMBASSADOR TO CUBA. FOR A CUBAN GOVERNMENT PRONOUNCEMENT ON AN INTERNATIONAL EVENT, HOWEVER, IT IS REMARKABLE THAT NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO BLAME THE U. S. OR OTHER "IMPERIALISTS" FOR THE EVENTS IN GRENADA, AND THE WARNINGS THAT THE FREE WORLD MAY TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION ARE RATHER MUTED. THE IMPLIED REBUKE IN THE ADMISSION THAT THE NEW LEADERS OF THE NJM MADE "SERIOUS ERRORS" AND THAT CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH THEM WILL BE REVIEWED MAY INDICATE CASTRO'S CONCERN THAT THE KILLINGS IN GRENADA WILL UNTIMATELY PROVE A SET-BACK TO CUBAN-INSPIRED REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND ELSEWHERE. FINALLY, AS AN EXAMPLE OF PURE GALL, DECLARING THREE DAYS' OFFICIAL MOURNING IS HARD TO BEAT.
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INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02
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O 211732Z OCT 83
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5918
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANTIGUA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
USFORCARIB KEY WEST FL PRIORITY
NAVFORCARIB ROOSEVELT RDS P PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 KINGSTON 10366

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, GJ, JM
SUBJECT: GRENADA: PNP SEVERS TIES WITH NEW JEWEL
MOVEMENT; WILL RECOMMEND ITS EXPULSION FROM THE
SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

REF: (A) KINGSTON 10281, (B) KINGSTON 10313

1. (U) SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY (PNP), PARTY
LEADER MICHAEL MANLEY ISSUED A STATEMENT ON GRENADA
OCTOBER 20. THE PNP ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO:
REPUDIATE AND NOT RECOGNIZE THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL;
FORMALLY SEVER ALL RELATIONS WITH THE NEW JEWEL
MOVEMENT (NJM) "IN ITS PRESENT GUISE;" RECOMMEND
THE EXPULSION OF THE NJM FROM THE SOCIALIST INTER-
NATIONAL; APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
"TO ISOLATE THE RULING CLIQUE IN GRENADA;" AND DEMAND
THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW, CESSATION OF EXECUTIONS
AND RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF FREE MOVEMENT AND INDI-
VIDUAL LIBERTY. STATEMENT CONCLUDED WITH A WARNING
"AGAINST ANY EXTERNAL EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT A DEPLORABLE
SITUATION AND ... ANY ATTEMPT AT FOREIGN INTER-
VENTION FROM ANY SOURCE WHATEVER."

2. (U) FULL TEXT READS:

BEGIN TEXT:
THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY HAS HAD A CLOSE RELATION-
SHIP WITH THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT WHICH GOES BACK TO
ITS EARLIEST DAYS MORE THAN TEN YEARS AGO.

THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT AND ITS LEADERS FACED TERRIBLE
YEARS OF REPRESSION INVOLVING MURDERS, BEATINGS AND
FREQUENT IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE BRUTAL AND CORRUPT
GOVERNMENT OF ERIC GAIRY. IN THE END THE RIGGED
ELECTION SYSTEM AND PLANS TO ELIMINATE CERTAIN LEADERS
OF THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT LEFT THEM LITTLE CHOICE BUT
TO RESORT TO REVOLUTION TO SAVE GRENADA FROM THE
TYRANNY OF GAIRY'S RULE.

THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY GAVE BIRTH TO THE EXISTENCE
OF A PLURAL DEMOCRACY IN JAMAICA AND HAS AT ALL TIMES
REMAINED FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE HAVE NEVERTHELESS CONSIS-
TENTLY AND RESOLUTELY DEFENDED THE GRENADIAN REVOLU-

TION UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT.
WE HAVE GIVEN THAT SUPPORT BECAUSE OF OUR CONVICTION
THAT THE NJM, AS A PARTY, WAS GENUINELY COMMITTED
TO DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND WAS ITSELF ORGANISED ON
STRICTLY DEMOCRATIC LINES.

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT GAIRY WAS OVERTHROWN BY
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA ENJOYED POPULAR SUPPORT AT ALL
TIMES DURING THE 4 1/2 YEARS OF ITS EXISTENCE.

AT EVERY STAGE THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY ENCOURAGED
THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN GRENADA. WE RECEIVED
THE SOLEMN ASSURANCES THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERN-
MENT OF THE NJM INTENDED TO MOVE TO CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT AND THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN DUE COURSE.
THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE
WHICH WAS TO PREPARE A DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR DIS-
CUSSION IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE, WAS EVIDENCE OF AN
EFFORT TO MEET WITH THAT SOLEMN COMMITMENT. WE
WERE PREPARED TO PERMIT THEM A REASONABLE TIME IN
WHICH TO FULFILL IT.

WE HAVE OBSERVED THE CAREFUL WORK CARRIED OUT IN THE
NAME OF THE REVOLUTION IN ENCOURAGING THE EMERGENCE
OF GENUINE DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS REPRESENTING
FARMERS, WORKING GROUPS, PROFESSIONAL GROUPS AND
OTHER OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS. PARTICIPATION WAS NOT
CONFINED TO PARTY CADRES BUT EXTENDED TO INVOLVE
ALL GRENADIAN CITIZENS. WE ALSO OBSERVED THE GROWING
VOICE THAT WAS ACCORDED TO THESE DEMOCRATIC ORGANI-
SATIONS IN THE RUNNING OF THE COUNTRY AND, IN PARTI-
CULAR, IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/21/10

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INCOMING
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ACTION ARA-00

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIG-02
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O 211732Z OCT 83
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5919
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANTIGUA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
USFORCARIB KEY WEST FL PRIORITY
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WHILE COMPLAINTS WERE RAISED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DETEN-
TIONS AND PRESS FREEDOM, WE NOTED THE CONTINUANCE OF
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THAT NO EXECUTIONS WERE ORDERED
BY THE REGIME.

THE EVENTS WHICH BEGAN IN GRENADA SEVERAL DAYS AGO
AND WHICH ENDED IN THE BRUTAL KILLING OF PRIME MINISTER
MAURICE BISHOP ALONG WITH CABINET COLLEAGUES AND TRADE
UNION LEADERS WERE MARKED BY ONE CRITICAL AND DECISIVE
FACT. THERE HAD CLEARLY BEEN DIFFERENCES OF OPINION
WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP ON THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT
ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN PARTY DECISIONS.
THE PARTY DECISIONS THEMSELVES AND ANY ARGUMENT ABOUT
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION ARE NOT OUR BUSINESS NOR THE
BUSINESS OF ANYONE ELSE ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD.
HOWEVER, IN THE MIDST OF THE ARGUMENT A CLIQUE USED THE
ARMY TO DETAIN THE LEADER OF THE COUNTRY AND TO KEEP
HIM UNDER HOUSE ARREST. THERE HE WAS SILENCED SO
THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO PRESENT HIS SIDE OF THE ARGU-
MENT TO HIS PARTY OR TO HIS COUNTRY. BY THE ACT OF
INTRODUCING THE ARMY TO SILENCE ONE PARTY TO AN IN-
TERNAL DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENT, THOSE RESPONSIBLE ABRO-
GATED ABSOLUTELY AND IRREVOCABLY THE VERY DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS TO WHICH THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT HAD BEEN
COMMITTED THROUGHOUT ITS EXISTENCE.

BY THAT ACT, THE CLIQUE AMONG THE LEADERSHIP OF
THE PARTY AND AMONG THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMY HAD
REMOVED THEMSELVES FROM ANY SEMBLANCE OF THE DEMO-
CRATIC PROCESS. THEY HAVE, THEREFORE, DISQUALIFIED
THEMSELVES AS MEMBERS OF THE GREAT FAMILY OF PRO-
GRESSIVE MOVEMENTS AND PARTIES IN THE WORLD WHO ARE
COMMITTED TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY DEPLORES THE IMPOSITION OF
ARMY RULE ON THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA AND DENOUNCES THE
INTRODUCTION OF ANY TOTALITARIAN REGIME WHETHER IN THE
CARICOM REGION OR ELSEWHERE.

WE DEEPLY REGRET THE LOSS OF A GREAT YOUNG LEADER AND
HIS COMRADES IN THESE BRUTAL CIRCUMSTANCES. FURTHER-
MORE, WE STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT THOSE WHO BREACHED
THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS BY DETAINING PRIME MINISTER
BISHOP INSTEAD OF ALLOWING THE MATTER TO BE HANDLED
BY DEMOCRATIC DISCUSSIONS AND DECISION-MAKING IN THE
PARTY, SET IN TRAIN A SERIES OF EVENTS THAT MADE VIR-

TUALLY INEVITABLE THE BRUTAL UNACCEPTABLE EVENTS WHICH
TRANSPIRED ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19. WE HOLD THE
CLIQUE WHICH ORIGINALLY SENT THE ARMY TO DETAIN BISHOP
ABSOLUTELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FINAL OUTCOME.

DURING HIS TENURE, MAURICE BISHOP EARNED INTERNATIONAL
RECOGNITION AND RESPECT FOR HIS EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT
BASIC REFORMS AND BENEFICIAL PROGRAMMES FOR THE AD-
VANCEMENT OF HIS PEOPLE. TO THE VERY END HE CONTINUED
TO ENJOY THEIR LOVE AND ADMIRATION.

THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY HAS CONSIDERED THE QUESTION
OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CLIQUE WHICH NOW FORMS
THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND WITH THE NEW JEWEL
MOVEMENT AS IT NOW STANDS AFTER THE EVENTS OF THE
LAST WEEK.

TAKING NOTE OF THE ARBITRARY SEIZURE OF POLITICAL
POWER BY THE MILITARY AND A CLIQUE; BEING SATISFIED
THAT PRIME MINISTER BISHOP ENJOYED OVERWHELMING POPULAR
SUPPORT AND THAT THE CLIQUE OF PERSONS WHO HAD HIM
DETAINED AND WHO BEAR THE CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS
DEATH AND THE DEATH OF THE OTHER LEADERS OF THE
REVOLUTION WERE ACTING CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF
THE PEOPLE; THE PNP HAS UNANIMOUSLY TAKEN
THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

- 1. WE REPUDIATE THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND AS
- A PARTY WE DO NOT RECOGNISE ITS RIGHT TO SPEAK
- FOR THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE.

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
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D 211732Z OCT 83

FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5920

AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANTIGUA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE

CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY

USFORCARIB KEY WEST FL PRIORITY

NAVFORCARIB ROOSEVELT RDS P PRIORITY

DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

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- 2. WE FORMALLY SEVER ALL RELATIONS WITH THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT IN ITS PRESENT GUISE.
- 3. WE WILL BE RECOMMENDING TO THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL THE EXPULSION OF THE NJM AS IT IS NOW COMPOSED AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE EVENTS OF THE LAST WEEK.
- 4. WE APPEAL TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES TO ISOLATE THE RULING CLIQUE IN GRENADA AND THEREBY ENCOURAGE THE RETURN OF A GOVERNMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE WISHES OF THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE.
- 5. WE DEMAND THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW, THAT THE EXECUTIONS CEASE AND THE RIGHT OF FREE MOVEMENT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY BE FULLY RESPECTED.

AT THIS TIME, WE SHARE A FEELING OF PROFOUND GRIEF WITH THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA AND WE HOPE AND PRAY FOR THEIR EARLY RELEASE FROM THE MILITARY OPPRESSION WHICH HAS BEEN SO BRUTALLY IMPOSED UPON THEM. WE GRIEVE WITH THE RELATIVES OF ALL THOSE WHO HAVE DIED.

FINALLY, THE FUTURE PATH OF GRENADA MUST BE SETTLED BY ITS OWN PEOPLE. ONLY THEY HAVE THE COMPETENCE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN POLITICAL PROCESS.

WE WARN AGAINST ANY EXTERNAL EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT A DEPLORABLE SITUATION AND DENOUNCE ANY ATTEMPT AT FOREIGN INTERVENTION FROM ANY SOURCE WHATSOEVER.
END TEXT.

3. (C) COMMENT: IN DISCUSSING MANLEY'S STATEMENT WITH THE DCM, PRIME MINISTER SEAGA INTERPRETED ITS THRUST AS A WARNING TO ANY INTERNAL CLIQUE NOT TO INVOLVE THE MILITARY IN SETTling POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. THE PM ALSO SAW IT AS AN ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY EVENTS IN GRENADA AS A PURELY DOMESTIC AFFAIR AND THUS "KEEP THE HEAT OFF CUBA." ACCORDING TO SEAGA, MANLEY BELIEVES GRENADA IS ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY SOCIALIZED TO "REMAIN A COMMUNIST BASTION," BUT FEARS THAT SOMEONE MIGHT INTERVENE.

4. (C) SEAGA'S INTERPRETATION POINTS UP WHAT THE EMBASSY HAS ALREADY REPORTED, THAT HE AND THE JAMAICA LABOR PARTY (JLP) INTEND TO USE THE GRENADA SITUATION TO THE FULLEST TO DISCOMFIT THE PNP AND REVIVE PUBLIC FEARS ABOUT MANLEY'S TIES WITH CUBA. THE REFERENCES IN SEAGA'S OCTOBER 20 SPEECH (SEPTEL) TO THE "MISTAKEN, NAIVE AND VIRGINAL VIEW OF MANY PEOPLE...WHO BELIEVE SUCH THINGS CANNOT HAPPEN HERE," FOLLOW THIS TACK. SO TOO DOES THE STATEMENT THAT "MODERATE LEADERS ARE ONLY USED... TO WIN THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT IN THE BEGINNING, WHILE MILITARY COMMANDS ARE PUT IN PLACE TO KEEP THE PEOPLE UNDER OPPRESSIVE CONTROL WHEN THE TIME COMES TO REMOVE THE SHEEPSKIN OF MODERATE LEADERSHIP AND MAKE WAY FOR THE WOLF UNDERNEATH." NINE REFERENCES TO CUBA (AND ONE TO RUSSIA) CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE WOLF; THE IDENTITY OF THE NAIVE, MODERATE SHEEP IS LEFT TO THE AUDIENCE TO DETERMINE.

5. (C) BY PNP STANDARDS, THE STATEMENT ON GRENADA IS TOUGH. DESPITE THE FULSOME PRAISE FOR BISHOP, THERE IS NO ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN AWAY RECENT EVENTS AS A RADICALIZED RESPONSE RESULTING FROM OUTSIDE PRESSURES (A LINE FREQUENTLY TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO THE SANDINISTAS). THE PNP HAS ADOPTED A NON-RECOGNITION POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE NEW GRENADIAN AUTHORITIES AND IS MOVING TO ISOLATE AND OSTRACIZE THE NJM UNTIL IT CLEANS UP ITS ACT. THE WARNING AGAINST INTERVENTION IS TO ALL.
END COMMENT. (DRAFTED/APPROVED: POL: AKSLEIGHT)

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O 211732Z OCT 83
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5921
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANTIGUA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
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FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7016
INFO THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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CINCLANT NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
COMUSFOR CARIB KEY WEST IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
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THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC

USIA FOR OPS CENTER, C, AND AR
E.O. 12356: DECL 20 OCT 88
TAGS: CASC, PINS, PGOV, GJ
SUBJECT: MORE ON AM CITIZEN WELFARE IN GRENADA
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REPORTS FROM RADIO FREE GRENADA EVERY 15-30 MINUTES
RESTATE THAT NO AMERICAN CITIZENS NOR FOREIGN NATIONALS
HAVE BEEN HARMED AS A RESULT OF THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS
TAKEN PLACE IN GRENADA. THE SECOND PORTION OF THE NEWS
RELEASE STATES THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL
ADVISES THAT IT WILL NOT ALLOW "LIES" ABOUT U.S. CITIZENS
BEING IN DANGER TO BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR FOREIGN
INTERVENTION IN GRENADA AND THAT THE PRA AND PEOPLES
MILITIA WILL BE USED TO RESIST ANY FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

3. STATEMENTS BY THE LEFTIST UNITED PEOPLES MOVEMENT IN
ST. VINCENT, THE LEFTIST PEOPLES PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT
IN GUYANA AND THE LEFTIST WORKERS PARTY IN JAMAICA HAVE
ALL STATED CONCERN THAT FOREIGN FORCES MIGHT USE THE
CURRENT SITUATION TO LAND FORCES IN GRENADA.

4. OBVIOUSLY MISSING FROM THE RFG ANNOUNCEMENTS IS ANY
REFERENCE TO AMCITS HAVING SUFFERED NO HARM AT ALL AS A
RESULT OF THE UNCERTAIN SITUATION IN GRENADA. EMBASSY
HAS HAD CONVERSATION WITH THE PERSONAL SECRETARY OF
P.M. ADAMS OF BARBADOS MAKING INQUIRY AS TO THE POSSIBLE
NEED FOR MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN GRANADA. SPECIFICALLY
MENTIONED HAVE BEEN AMPACILLIN, INSULIN AND MEDICINE FOR
HEART DISEASE PATIENTS. SPECIFICS OF NEED, HOW THE U.S.
MIGHT ASSIST AND OTHER DETAILS ARE BEING SOUGHT FROM

THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO MAKING
ANY DECISIONS.

5. RFG IS APPARENTLY BEING USED TO PASS MESSAGES TO
INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS GENERAL INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC
AT LARGE. HEARD HAVE BEEN REQUESTS FOR THE MANAGER OF
A LOCAL COMPANY (BELIEVED TO BE THE GRENADIAN TRANSPORT
COMPANY) TO CONTACT "OFFICIALS AT FORT RUPERT; REQUESTS
FOR "ANYONE KNOWING THE WHEREABOUTS OF MR. PAUL OR JOHN
BROWN PLEASE TELL THEM TO CALL 3177"; "WILL THE SON OF
MRS. PHYLLIS WILLIAMS PLEASE CALL HIS MOTHERS HOUSE";
AND "THE MATRON OF THE HOSPITAL HAS ASKED THAT ALL
AFTERNOON STAFF BE ALERTED THAT TRANSPORTATION WILL BE
SENT BY THEIR HOMES TO PICK THEM UP TO TAKE THEM TO WORK
AT THE HOSPITAL".

6. THERE HAS BEEN A REPORT OF ONE AMCIT BEING TAKEN INTO
CUSTODY BY THE PRA. THIS HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY CONFIRMED.
THERE HAS BEEN A SECOND REPORT OF A DIABETIC WHO WAS UNABLE
TO SECURE INSULIN SUPPLIES WHO FLED GRENADA OVERNIGHT AND
REACHED SAFETY AND SUPPLIES. ANOTHER REPORT STATES A LACK
OF TETANUS TOXIN IN GRENADA AND A LACK OF NURSES AT THE
HOSPITAL BECAUSE THE NURSES "WERE AFRAID".

7. COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED THAT STATEMENTS FROM THE
GRENADIAN RMC MUST BE TAKEN WITH A LARGE GRAIN OF SALT. IT
IS OBVIOUS THAT THE CARIBBEAN LEFTIST CAMP IS TALKING A
VERY WELL DEFINED PARTY LINE OF PSYOPS IN AN ATTEMPT TO
OBIVIATE THE NEED FOR A FOREIGN INTERVENTION. IT IS ALSO
VERY EVIDENT THAT THERE ARE IN FACT LIFE-THREATENING
SITUATIONS IN GRENADA. THE EARLIER REPORTS OF A LACK OF
ELECTRICAL POWER ON THE ISLAND COULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE
LOSS OF REFRIGERATION AND ATTENDANT LOSS OF REFRIGERATED
MEDICAL SUPPLIES. THERE HAVE BEEN NO OFFICIAL REQUESTS

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/21/10

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O 212113Z OCT 83
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7017
INFO THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USLO CARIBBEAN IMMEDIATE
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
COMUSFOR CARIB KEY WEST IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANTIGUA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE
COMNAVFOR CARIB ROOSEVELT IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC//JSA/DC-IA/CCF/DC-4// IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1314
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
FBIS KEY WEST IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BRIDGETOWN 06492

THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC

USIA FOR OPS CENTER, C, AND AR
E. O. 12356: DECL 20 OCT 88
TAGS: CASC, PINS, PGOV, GJ
SUBJECT: MORE ON AM CITIZEN WELFARE IN GRENADA

FOR ASSISTANCE MADE BY THE GRENADIAN RMC OF WHICH THIS
EMBASSY IS AWARE. THE OBVIOUS REALIZATION THAT ANY LANDING
BY OUTSIDE FORCES WOULD RESULT IN A FREE LOOK AT THE EVENTS
OF THE PAST WEEK IN GRENADA BY THE WORLD CAN BE ASSUMED TO
COLOR ANY STATEMENT OR LACK OF STATEMENT BY THE RMC. BISH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~