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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** DEGRAFFENREID, KENNETH: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SJW 2/26/2016

**File Folder** HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT: TERRORISM 8/23/81-12/31/81

**FOIA**

F02-0083/01

**Box Number** RAC BOX 9

PRADOS

600

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
173371	FOLDER	PAPER, CABLE	1	12/18/1981	

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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173371 FOLDER

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SSW 2/26/16

KD

Terrorism

TERRORISM IN THE 1980s

Key Judgments

The likely scope and shape of international terrorism and ways of countering it in the coming decade were the subject of a recent State Department-sponsored conference of academic and government experts.<sup>1/</sup> There was:

- General agreement that terrorists will have no particular problem in gaining access to an already huge and rapidly growing number of different types of weapons of mass destruction. Detailed procedures for producing, storing, and safely handling these agents are readily available in open literature.
- Lack of consensus on the question of whether weapons of mass destruction will ever be used by terrorists. Some of the experts expressed rising fear, however, that certain precipitating factors, such as the resurgence of religious fanaticism in parts of the world and sharpening ideological cleavages, expressed in feelings of alienation from the existing society, might well lower the threshold for the use of such weapons.

<sup>1/</sup> This report draws heavily on Yonah Alexander's account of the conference. Alexander, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Georgetown University, acted as conference rapporteur. Other outside participants were J. Bowyer Bell (International Analysis Center), Maxwell Finger (City University, N.Y.), Ernest Halperin (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), William Hyland (CSIS), Michael Ledeen (CSIS), Joseph Margolin (George Washington University), John Murphy (University of Kansas Law School), George Quester (Cornell University), and Theodore Taylor (Consultant Physicist).

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Decontrol on August 25, 1983

SSW 2/26/16

Report 212-AR  
August 25, 1981



In the discussion of state-supported terrorism, there was considerable dispute among the visiting experts as to the definition of the term and the related issue of "wars of national liberation." As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, they agreed that Moscow, historically, has taken a pragmatic approach to the question of terrorism. While not making it a principal foreign policy tool, the Soviets have refused to condemn resort to terrorism by what they regard as legitimate "liberation movements," or struggles of people for their independence. Soviet support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a case in point.

Conversely, expert judgments diverged when the discussion took up Soviet support for terrorist groups acting largely as a destabilizing force rather than as a precursor for the revolutionary transformation of a given society. One of the academics argued that:

- Indirect Soviet support may not seek the communization of a region but, as is the current case in Central America, may aim at stirring up trouble for the US, particularly if such a policy entails no serious financial burden and is politically low-risk.
- Similarly, Soviet support for terrorist groups in Western Europe, regardless of their often hostile attitude toward Soviet-style communism, is not only an instrument to weaken NATO but also a means of reducing the perceived destabilizing impact of a more attractive capitalist West on an increasingly restive Soviet empire.

Others, however, professed skepticism about the degree of Soviet support for outright terrorist groups. They pointed out that the Soviets themselves are vulnerable to various forms of terrorism and interpreted Moscow's general support of certain protective measures against terrorists as an indication of ambivalence about the usefulness of international terrorism.

Participants agreed that different precepts govern state-supported terrorism in the Middle East, where the dynamics of Arab culture have come to clash with the geopolitical reality of Israel in particular ways:

- Arab disregard for conventional national boundaries reflects a tradition of cultural and religious unity that paradoxically has also engendered a great deal of inter-Arab violence. Israel, long regarded as an occupying force in the region, undergirds support for terrorists by Arab regimes which regard their policy in this respect as "legitimate" inasmuch as it represents a continuation of their efforts to influence the future of their own lands.



--The spread and use of more sophisticated weaponry by Arab-supported terrorists doubtless owe much to the recently acquired oil wealth of such states as Libya and Iraq and the rather indiscriminate supply of such weapons by a variety of sources, including the Soviet Union. It would be misleading, however, to regard the level of terrorism in the Middle East as being dependent on these new circumstances. Even without the present material support, terrorist violence in that area would not likely decline significantly in the coming decade.

In the case of terrorist networks and linkages, the visiting experts differed on the importance of external support, by other terrorists or by states, for the survival of terrorist groups:

--Some experts placed much greater emphasis on the context in which many terrorist groups live and regarded external support as incidental and transitory, rarely attaining a degree of institutionalization that has significant operational meaning. While these experts did not seek to minimize the danger created by occasional alliances between terrorist groups, they cautioned against drawing broad generalizations from existing links.

--Another school of thought presented an entirely different view, citing the case of Italy as an example. Focusing on the left extremist terrorist movements and their sometimes murky relationships both with Arab terrorist organizations and ultimately with the Soviet Union, the more general proposition was advanced that these networks not only facilitate terrorist acts but also make combatting them more difficult. From the context of the argument, it was not clear whether the problems encountered in combatting left-wing terrorism were more serious than those surrounding its rightwing counterpart because of the domestic context or as the result of external help.

In the analysis of deterrent strategies, the rising cost of protecting US business abroad against terrorist attacks was highlighted. There seemed little hope that this picture would change for the better, nor that US corporations appeared likely to follow the government's policy of no ransom payments. Longstanding personal relations, particularly among senior personnel, as well as the aggressive manner displayed by insurance companies in selling kidnapping insurance, make it difficult for a board of directors to refuse ransom demands if one of their own falls victim to a terrorist kidnapping.

On the legal front, the conferees agreed that there seems to be no dearth of national and international law to combat terrorism.

The major difficulty for enforcement in the next decade, however, is likely to derive from the political dimension of international terrorism. The greatest stumbling block will be in the interpretation of agreements. What is most needed is generally accepted definitions of "terrorism" and "political offense," both of which will be hard, if not impossible, to obtain.

In their policy prescriptions, none of the visiting experts differed basically with current US policy measures for combatting terrorism abroad. Nevertheless, they saw flaws in the way these measures have been implemented as well as in the weight given them in the overall conduct of US foreign policy. Briefly, some felt greater damage might be done to the cohesion of terrorist groups by publicly separating terrorists from "freedom fighters" and according more weight to the redress of grievances by complainants against a government--yet avoiding being caught in the ideological left-right divisions concerning the commission of terrorist acts by either group.

Concerning the relationship between US foreign policy and an effective counterterrorism strategy, better coordination seems called for, particularly where enforcement policies have to rely heavily on cooperation among countries that might balk at too inclusive a concept of terrorism, thus weakening the concert of nations necessary to modify the behavior of states that support terrorism.

In essence, these experts argued for:

- first, greater awareness in US policy of restraints operating on other countries in the execution of joint anti-terrorist policies; and
- second, a certain reordering of objectives that would place broader US foreign policy goals in the forefront, lest an overemphasis on counterterrorism play into the hands of the terrorists by giving them too much power.

\* \* \* \* \*



Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

One of the more chilling aspects in any discussion of terrorism in the 1980s is the question of whether terrorists will be willing and able to resort to weapons of mass destruction to pursue their objectives. Although some differentiation seems called for in terms of the relative accessibility of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to terrorists, the prevailing judgment at the meeting was that a huge and rapidly growing number of different types of weapons of mass destruction is available to them. The principal reason for this widening option for terrorists is expanding technical knowledge worldwide.

Technical details aside, there are literally thousands of highly toxic chemicals, virulent biological organisms, and intensely radioactive materials that are potential candidates for use in dispersal weapons. Detailed procedures for producing, storing, and safely handling these agents are readily available in open literature. Expert opinion suggests that access to rather small amounts, 10 kilograms or less, of commercial- or military-grade plutonium, or less than 20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium not mixed with radioactive materials, would enable even a single person working alone to build a nuclear device with an explosive yield of one kiloton.

Devices of this sort would be highly transportable, to the point of being carried by hand. In certain circumstances, the explosion of such a device could kill more than 50,000 people, destroy facilities worth more than \$1 billion, or force the decontamination of many square miles of land to make it again fit for human occupancy.

On the more elusive question of the likelihood of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, there was no unanimity among the experts. To the argument that hardening of the more conventional targets will make nuclear targets increasingly attractive to terrorists, there is the counter-argument that use of weapons of mass destruction might well

alienate the very population the terrorists are seeking to sway. What mind-set determines a terrorist's objectives is, of course, not clear-cut. The idea has been advanced that as arms technology escalates, the level of violence might experience a similar rise. However, the evidence for establishing such correlations is fragmentary. Nevertheless, weapons of mass destruction, if available, might well prove to be attractive to individuals who pursue highly idiosyncratic rather than political causes.

Some experts at the meeting expressed great concern about the likely lowered threshold in the coming decade for terrorists of using weapons of mass destruction. They cited several possible reasons for such a development: religious fanaticism that would sanction such acts; the brutalizing effects of a lengthy struggle; and loss of comrades, feeding a desire for revenge and a conviction that the "cause" was lost and recourse to an "ultimate weapon" was justified.

#### Patron States and State-Supported Terrorism

Not all nations look upon terrorist acts in the same light. Some communist and Third World states regard resort to terrorism by "national liberation movements" as "legitimate." The experts proceeded to shed some light on the motivations of such patron states and to assess the policy implications of those motivations.

The Soviets, On the One Hand... As far as Soviet support for terrorism is concerned, the policies and behavior of the Soviet Union, historically, seem to suggest a pragmatic approach. While it has not made terrorism a principal tool of its foreign policy, the Soviet Union has balked at regarding "national liberation" struggles as acts of terrorism. Moscow often has waffled when so-called liberation movements have been involved in specific acts of terrorism, such as skyjacking, hostage taking, and assassination of foreign diplomats. It has soft-pedaled these incidents if they arose from pursuit of a "legitimate" struggle for national, economic, and social independence. Such a policy seems to aim at the broad goal of maximizing Moscow's influence with emerging elites by helping them in their struggle for self-determination. The extensive support the Soviet Union has rendered to the Palestine Liberation Organization is a case in point.

A rather different policy calculus seems to govern the Soviets in cases where their influence is more indirect, or where they have little control over particular terrorist groups but still may derive some instrumental value from the existence of terrorism. With regard to the current situation



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in Central America, this view gives less credence to a Soviet plan for communizing the region than to the idea of Moscow's readiness to give Castro a relatively free hand in helping to stir up trouble for the US in its own backyard. In Soviet eyes, however, pursuit of the latter policy is worthwhile only so long as it is not financially burdensome and is politically low-risk.

Similarly, Soviet involvement with terrorist groups in Western Europe helps to create disorder and, from Moscow's point of vantage, serves to weaken the political, economic, and military infrastructure of NATO. In addition, as was suggested by one academic, concern about the destabilizing role in Eastern Europe of Western Europe's relative prosperity may have prompted Moscow in turn to these groups, regardless of their hostility toward Soviet-style communism. With the West European communist parties pretty well out of the running as instruments of destabilization, terrorist elements might create sufficient turmoil in Western Europe to reduce its destabilizing effect on an increasingly restive Soviet empire.

Several of the experts did not agree with this analysis. They were skeptical regarding claims of substantial, direct Soviet support for outright terrorist groups, noting Moscow's general dislike of becoming heavily involved in ventures that it cannot control. They also pointed out that the Soviet Union itself has not been immune to various forms of terrorism. This factor may account for Soviet support of international measures against attacks on diplomats, skyjacking, and hostage taking, which suggests some ambivalence on Moscow's part about the benefits of international terrorism.

...the Middle East, On the Other. To understand state-supported terrorism in the Middle East, one should recognize three major factors: 1) the long tradition of political violence in the area; 2) the political challenge to Israel, as well as its unique geostrategic location; and 3) the acquisition of techniques and technologies from the outside.

One important corollary of the practice of violence in this area is Arab disregard for national boundaries. Arabs generally see themselves as a single nation, united by one culture and a common religion. Hence Arab unity paradoxically feeds inter-Arab violence, because boundaries are psychologically viewed as artificial partitions of the Arab community. Arab support of terrorism beyond the Middle East is buttressed by the historical fact that many Arab countries experienced political violence in the course of their own struggle for independence from colonial domination.



Arab regimes see their support for terrorism against Israel, therefore, largely as a "legitimate" policy which represents nothing more than a continuation of their effort of seeking to influence the future of their own lands. What is more, Arabs have long rationalized their opposition to Israel by regarding it as an occupying foreign power--thus Arab countries have as much right to meddle in Israeli affairs as, for example, de Gaulle had in exile in London when he fought the Germans in occupied France.

Finally, the particular form that state-supported terrorism takes in the case of Israel owes much to the country's location. Surrounded on most of its land frontiers by hostile Arab states, Israel is uniquely dependent on air transportation, which by its nature is vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Hence skyjacking, though not first practiced in this area, soon became a preferred tool against Israel. What is more, it provides a rather easy way for Arab states to extend their support to terrorism by offering nothing more than a place for terrorists to land the planes they have seized.

It is also no surprise that oil-wealthy Arab states have engaged in the purchase of all sorts of advanced military equipment for terrorist operations. Libya and Iraq are examples here. Weapons have also been supplied to them by various sources, including the Soviet Union, often in disregard of the use to which they might be put.

While Qadhafi's riches have contributed to his ability to back terrorist groups around the globe, he undoubtedly would rank support of terrorists within the Arab world as more important than support of those outside. Regardless of external material support, state-supported terrorism in the Middle East in the rest of the 1980s is likely to remain at about the current level.

#### Networks and Linkages

On the question of linkages among terrorist groups, the views of the visiting experts presented an interesting contrast. On one side were those who regarded external support for such groups, either by other terrorists or by states, as incidental to their survival; the other side attached great importance to this relationship. What this boiled down to, in spite of the nuances introduced by both sides, was a basic difference in judgment regarding the factors governing the relative viability or persistence of terrorist activity in certain parts of the world.

It is generally accepted that terrorists are not born, but are the result of a complex conditioning process in which ideological precepts and certain historical, cultural, ethnic, political, and economic factors all play a role. It is precisely for this reason that the current terrorist groups defy easy categorization.

It can be argued that assumptions about the dependence of many terrorist groups on external support are likely to be misleading. Caution should be exerted against lumping together Armenian terrorists, South Moluccans, the Italian Red Brigade, the PLO, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and hit-teams like those that kidnapped the OPEC oil ministers in 1975. Some, like the PIRA, have a long organizational history or, like the PLO, have acquired considerable legitimacy and are represented at international meetings. Others, e.g., the 1975 hit-team led by Carlos, represent no one but their own members.

Failure to recognize these distinctions leads one, according to this approach, to overlook the fact that linkages among groups often arise from a certain climate in which people react spontaneously to events even though they themselves are physically removed from the focal point of action. The throwing of stones in other parts of the world after the death of a PIRA hunger-striker is a case in point.

Only in a relatively few cases does one find operationally significant cooperative arrangements among terrorist groups, e.g., intelligence sharing or aid involving training, financing, weaponry, or sanctuaries. The relationship among various African liberation movements and the role of the PLO as an umbrella organization are examples.

Even though the danger of such alliances for their intended targets cannot be discounted, the point is that these arrangements are matters of chance and the result of a confluence of forces that are murky, intuitive, uncertain, and thus not amenable to analytical investigation.

One expert advanced a rather different assessment of the value of linkages as well as state support in furthering the cause of terrorism. Focusing on the case of Italy, he abjured any notion that Italian terrorism was the creation of outside forces rather than the result of deeply imbedded social, cultural, and historical factors. Nonetheless, he chided those who fail to take seriously evidence of certain terrorist ties, as between the Red Brigade and the Soviet Union.



Drawing upon the historic relationship among Italian para-military organizations in the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the early postwar period, he pointed to continuing links between the extreme left wing of that party and Moscow by way of Prague. The significance of this relationship, according to the expert, derives from the fact that key personages in the terrorist movement not only have had ties to the PCI but frequently have been visitors to Prague. He concluded from all this that the Soviets have been exploiting the existence of such terrorist groups as the Red Brigade. By training and/or supplying individuals in them with weapons and, directly or indirectly, offering them some form of protection in case of difficulties, Moscow has helped to prolong their existence.

In a more general fashion, the case can be made, according to this view, that the presence of a variety of networks has facilitated the operation of international terrorist organizations. In this vein, the PLO can be regarded as serving as a sort of mothership for many terrorists, with the Soviet Union, its vassal states in Eastern Europe, and, last but not least, Cuba, all undergirding its activities. In short, were it not for the network, international terrorism would be greatly reduced; and domestic terrorism, particularly of extreme leftwing persuasion, would be much easier to deal with.

#### Deterrence Strategies

The conference participants turned next to the problem of deterrence and the success or failure of certain deterrent strategies. They endeavored not so much to provide policy prescriptions as to look at the record and draw some conclusions for the future.

Reduced to essentials, the requirements for a sound deterrent strategy may seem fairly simple: good intelligence, sufficient hardening of potential physical targets, and good crisis management in the event of an incident. These bare requirements, however, hardly scratch the surface when it comes to implementation of an effective prevention policy.

US Businesses. Given the exposed nature of US businesses abroad and the fact that they are regarded in many parts of the world as symbols of the hated "capitalist system," terrorists regard them as a ready source of income. In this connection, payment of ransoms amounting to millions of dollars for kidnapped executives is not unusual.



With terrorist attacks on US businesses constituting almost 40 percent of all international incidents in the 1970s, and prospects for this decade equally bad, if not worse, US corporations are facing a bleak overseas future. Protective measures by a growing number of them probably have helped in warding off potential terrorist attacks, but the skyrocketing cost of this kind of defense could prove ruinous for some businesses. What is more, the restrictive nature of some of the necessary measures has come to threaten the conduct of business itself.

Aside from installing or upgrading security systems and training personnel to cope with terrorist incidents, there is no way in many parts of the world for business to escape such attacks as long as the current political and social climate prevails. As for reducing the vulnerability of US corporations to extortion by terrorists in cases of kid-napped personnel, private business is unlikely to follow the government's example of refusing ransom payments.

In essence, corporations simply are unprepared to adopt such a hard-nosed policy, particularly when it involves senior people with long service in the company, even though some stockholders have sought to sue boards of directors for paying excessive ransom out of company funds. Moreover, large corporations seem to be under some pressure from insurance companies seeking to sell them kidnapping insurance. Although the amount or even existence of such insurance is kept confidential for obvious reasons, it is much harder for a board of directors to turn a deaf ear to ransom demands if the victim of a kidnapping by terrorists is covered by such insurance.

Legal Enforcement. In the face of continued terrorist acts, a tendency exists in some quarters to want to pile additional conventions on what is already a sizable body of law to meet the problem. At present, there is no shortage of national and international law that aims to combat terrorism.

The problem, if these legal provisions and processes are to act as effective deterrents, lies with their interpretation and implementation. In this context, one should note the importance of public support for the maintenance of anti-terrorist efforts; it is essential that the public continue to view terrorism as an unjustified criminal activity. The mind-set of the terrorist himself, of course, would incline him to reject any characterization of his behavior as criminal.



This circumstance raises problems with the imprisonment of terrorists, as is evident in the case of the PIRA hunger-strikers. The PIRA regards prison as a place where further sacrifices for the cause can be undertaken while at the same time additional terrorist aggression to secure prisoners' release can be inspired. Thus the presumed benefit society derives from taking terrorists off the street is counter-productive when it produces more terrorism or other forms of violence.

Regarding regional and international conventions designed to prevent or suppress terrorism, considerable progress in coordination, preventative measures, and exchange of information among concerned nations has been made. But where the enactment of conventions has stipulated extradition or prosecutorial obligations, the record is spotty. In the first place, many of the existing conventions contain no coercive sanctions to enforce the tenets set forth in them. The declaration concluded in Bonn in 1978 aims to fill the void left by previous multilateral compacts but is yet to be tested. Second, no state has any real obligation to extradite terrorists or prosecute them within its own territory if the crime was committed in another state's territory. Third, many states, including this country, have no official concept of terrorism as a crime, although criminal acts committed in connection with terrorist acts are subject to prosecution.

On balance, the usefulness of many multilateral conventions as deterrents to terrorism is problematic, to say the least. But the real issue affecting both multilateral and bilateral arrangements is the political dimension of international terrorism, wherein the greatest difficulty arises in the interpretation of agreements. The major reason for this problem derives from the lack of generally accepted definitions of "terrorism" and "political offense." These are the areas where some of the biggest loopholes occur, and the establishment of a necessary consensus is likely to be difficult, if not impossible.

### Implications

The divergence of opinion on aspects of international terrorism that surfaced in the visiting experts' comments throughout the conference was also reflected in their assessment of US foreign policy implications. Nevertheless, in spite of somewhat different approaches, a number of their policy prescriptions largely complemented one another.

The chances of developing any universal deterrent in the foreseeable future can be discounted in view of the ubiquitous-



ness of the terrorist threat for US officials and citizens abroad and the possibility of terrorist campaigns in the US. The likelihood of sufficiently destabilizing the terrorist apparatus or changing the mind-set of the terrorists themselves seems slim. But more could be done, in the view of some of the experts, to enhance current deterrent strategies, particularly in terms of seeking to polarize certain groups and thereby rendering them less capable of coherent action. For example:

- publicly separating terrorists from "freedom fighters" and being more willing to give a hearing to complaints about grievances against a government; and
- trying to avoid being caught in the classical ideological right-left divisions when it comes to the commission of terrorist acts by either group.

How these and other elements might be woven into an effective US counterterrorism strategy abroad would, however, depend on interrelated factors that move beyond what might be called largely defensive mechanisms, consisting of intelligence, embassy security, and a no-concessions policy. In brief, what seems to be needed is not a change in the aforementioned measures themselves, but a reexamination of the context in which they would be applied:

- For example, would a no-concessions policy prove viable in cases where high-technology terrorism was involved and pressure on the government for negotiation might prove compelling?
- Is the attempt to solidify international agreements that are aimed at preventing terrorists from gaining asylum best advanced by a definition of terrorism that would apply to so many states as to frustrate any chances of modifying the behavior of those which support terrorists?

The problem in the latter instance is that one cannot count only the four states (Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen) that the US has officially identified as aiding terrorism. Additional countries--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, France, Chile, Argentina, and others--have at times provided financing, weapons, asylum, or resorted to terroristic acts themselves. If one adds those supporting "national liberation movements," the list grows still further. Leaving out some countries while adding others tends to detract from the credibility of any policy effort to deny terrorists support and asylum that must rely to a large extent



on international cooperation. What is needed, therefore, is a tighter definition of state-supported terrorism for cases where the evidence adduced effectively supports any US measure for taking concerted action against a culpable state.

The prospect for enhanced international cooperation against terrorism would seem greater if US policy could be defined in terms of mutual interests rather than broad political principles that may have more resonance in the domestic than in the international political arena. This factor ties in directly with the constraints that other governments may operate under in moving jointly on the anti-terrorist front. The gingerly way in which some West European states have dealt with Arab terrorists reflects economic and foreign policy considerations.

In essence, this approach proposes a US counterterrorism policy that is driven by broader policy objectives than at present. Allowing counterterrorist policy to control broader policy objectives would affect adversely the general conduct of US foreign policy and implicitly play into the hands of the terrorists by giving them too much power.

Prepared by Eric Willenz  
x22225

Approved by E. Raymond Platig  
x11342

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FROM CARLSTROM, R

DOCDATE 02 SEP 81

*Terrorism*  
*Kef*

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

SUBJECT: PROPOSED JUSTICE RPT ON HR-451 TO PROVIDE FOR EXCLUSION FM US OF  
ALIENS AFFILIATED W/ TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO LENZ TO CARLSTROM DUE: 24 SEP 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SCHWEITZER

GUHIN

JENNINGS

STEARMAN

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OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

16

September 2, 1981

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer

Department of State


✓ National Security Council

SUBJECT: Proposed Justice report on H.R. 451

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than cob Friday, September 25, 1981.

Questions should be referred to Maurice White (395-3856), the legislative analyst in this office.

  
Robert E. Carlstrom for  
Assistant Director for  
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc:

Ms. Anderson  
Ms. Collins  
Mr. Sasser  
Mr. Uhlmann



U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr.  
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request for the views of the Department of Justice on H.R. 451, a bill to provide for the exclusion from the United States of aliens affiliated with terrorist organizations, to require investigations of registered agents of such organizations, and for other purposes. The Department of Justice is opposed to this bill as currently drafted for the following reasons.

This bill would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act by amending Sections 212(a) and 241(a), by creating a new class of excludable and deportable aliens, namely those who are members of or are affiliated with a "terrorist organization" as defined by the bill. <sup>1/</sup> Several conforming amendments affecting existing Section 212(a), are included to cover the new class of aliens who are members of or affiliated with terrorist organizations. The bill concludes by amending the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, by requiring the Attorney General to investigate "the activities of any organization in order to determine whether such person has engaged in illegal acts in connection with such organization." A new criminal offense is created prohibiting any person required to register as an agent of a foreign principal under the Foreign Agents Registration Act from knowingly and willfully receiving funds from any foreign group which such person, at the time of receipt, had reason to know was a terrorist organization under penalty of a \$25,000 fine or imprisonment for a minimum of ten years, or both.

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<sup>1/</sup> As a technical point we note that because of the amendment to the Act by P.L. 95-549, new exclusion and deportation grounds should be denominated as sections 212(a)(34) and 241(a)(20), respectively.



With respect to the Immigration and Nationality Act, H.R. 451 is substantially duplicative of existing Sections 212(a) and 241(a). Section 212(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in the chapter, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:

\* \* \*

(9) Aliens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude...;

(10) Aliens who have been convicted of two or more offenses...regardless of whether the offenses involved moral turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to confinement actually imposed were five years or more;

(27) Aliens the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States;

(28) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, members of any of the following classes:

(A) Aliens who are anarchists;

(B) Aliens who advocate or teach, or who are members of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or...teaches, opposition to all organized government;

(F) Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or teaches...(ii) the duty, necessity or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officers...of the Government of the United States or of any other organized government because of his or their official character; or (iii) the unlawful damage, injury or destruction or property; or (iv) sabotage;

(29) Aliens with respect to whom the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reasonable ground to believe probably would, after entry (A) engage in activities which would be prohibited by the laws of the United States relating to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activities subversive to the national security....



Aliens who are members of a terrorist organization which engages or threatens to engage in killing, causing serious bodily harm, kidnapping, or violent destruction of property, as defined in the bill, would appear to be substantially encompassed within the existing classes of aliens ineligible to receive visas and subject to deportation if found within the country.

Furthermore, it might be noted that the bill's amendment to Section 212(a), covers an alien who is a member of or affiliated with an organization "which the consular officer or the Attorney General has reason to believe is a terrorist organization." The Immigration and Nationality Act states, under Section 212(d)(3) that an alien may be admitted temporarily even if he is known or believed to be ineligible under section 212(a) after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State. This provision of the Act provides the Federal Bureau of Investigation with needed flexibility to further various investigations. For example, if an alien associated with a terrorist group is an asset or is deemed to be recruitable as an asset, an investigation might be hampered if his entrance into the United States was prohibited.

Sections 8 and 9 of the bill, amending the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, would introduce an unwarranted element of criminality in an essentially civil statute. Whatever might be the merits of a bill requiring the Attorney General to investigate the activities of an agent of a terrorist organization (Section 8) or the creation of a new criminal offense prohibiting the receipt of funds from a terrorist organization (Section 9), such legislation should not be made a part of a statute requiring the registration of persons engaged in legitimate activities.

The Registration Act is designed to inform the Congress and the American people of the identities, activities and funding of persons attempting to influence public opinion or official action on behalf of foreign principals. Criminality under the Foreign Agents Registration Act primarily involves one's failure to register or comply with regulations issued pursuant to provisions of the Act, or the making of a false statement or willfully omitting any material act in the completion of the registration statement required by the Act.

The Department of Justice Booklet on the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, and the Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Attorney General, state:

Registration under the Act in no way places any limitation on the activities in which an agent of a foreign principal may engage and places no stigma on the person registering. It may be assumed that persons who are legitimately engaged as agents of foreign principals have nothing to fear from public disclosure of their activities. Page 1.



With respect to any direct or implied requirement that a registrant characterize himself in any way as an agent of a "terrorist organization" particularly as defined in the bill, the government would face a serious problem under the "self-incrimination" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. A member or even an agent of a "terrorist organization," could properly be deemed the subject of an inquiry in an area "permeated with criminal statutes." Albertson et al, v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1971). See also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).

Finally, in a prosecution under section 9 of H.R. 451, the government would have to establish (1) that the organization in question was in fact a "terrorist organization," as defined in the bill and (2) that the person receiving the funds from such a foreign organization actually "had reason to know" the organization in question was a "terrorist organization." The difficulty of establishing these two elements, particularly with respect to a foreign organization, would be formidable.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's program.

Sincerely,

Robert A. McConnell  
Assistant Attorney General  
Office of Legislative Affairs

RECEIVED 05 OCT 81 15

TO WEINBERGER, C FROM MEESE, E

DOC DATE 02 OCT 81

Terrorism

*DeGraffenreid*

KEYWORDS: THAILAND

REFUGEES

ANDERSON, JACK

TERRORISM

MEDIA

SUBJECT: GULF OF THAILAND PIRACY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ALLEN TO MEESE DUE: 06 OCT 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LILLEY

GREGG

SCHWEITZER

KAMINSKY

GUHIN

POINDEXTER

DEGRAFFENREID

URGENT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Colson</i>	<i>X 10/6</i>	<i>Gov decision</i>	<i>10/8</i>	<i>CT</i>
	<i>C 10/8</i>	<i>Allen and memo to Meese</i>		<i>LIC</i>
	<i>2 10/8</i>	<i>Department 5/5 2/29/81</i>		
<i>Lilley</i>	<i>5 10/8</i>	<i>Department 5/5 2/29/81</i>		

DISPATCH *done by VCP* WATCH FILE *PA* *(10/8)*



S/S 8129542



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: International Assistance for the Thai  
Government's Anti-Piracy Program

The President, in a Memorandum of October 2, 1981 from Mr. Meese to Secretary of Defense Weinberger (copy to you), asked about the feasibility of the U.S. Navy providing patrol boats to the Government of Thailand for use against pirates who attack Vietnamese boat people in the Gulf of Thailand. The response to this request for information is being sent separately.

The President's interest in the piracy problem stems from his reading of the Jack Anderson column in the Washington Post on October 1, 1981 (attached) which describes the terrible plight of these boat people when attacked by pirates. They are easy prey on the open sea for armed marauders who rob and kill their victims and unmercifully rape and abduct teen-aged girls and women refugees unfortunate enough to fall into their hands. In an effort to prevent some of these attacks and provide assistance to the boat people, the U.S. and Thai Governments instituted an anti-piracy program in February, 1981 to patrol in the air and on the ocean the area of pirate attacks and to deter attacks when possible. The U.S. Government provided \$2 million from Refugee Program funds of the Department of State to initiate this program which has succeeded in the apprehension, arrest and conviction of several persons caught in the act of piracy against refugees. On September 30, 1981, the Department of State pledged to provide the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva an additional \$600,000 in funds as a contribution to an international effort to assist the Thai Government in its anti-piracy efforts.

The problem of dealing with pirate attacks against refugees in the Gulf of Thailand however transcends the limited efforts made by the U.S.-Thai anti-piracy program. Concurrently, and with the cooperation of the Thai Government, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UNHCR are attempting to mobilize

81 OCT 10 AIO: 38

international support for the Thai Government's antipiracy activity. UNHCR will be presiding over the annual meeting of its Executive Committee in Geneva October 12 at which donor governments will be asked to contribute, as the U.S. Government has, to a UNHCR-managed anti-piracy fund to assist the Thai Government. The Norwegian and Netherlands Governments have already indicated their intention to make contributions.

It would be very useful and appropriate if the President, in view of his interest, would approve the attached telegrams to the leaders of the two international organizations most directly involved; Mr. Poul Hartling, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Mr. Alexandre Hay, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross. These telegrams express the President's support for a successful outcome of the international appeal for anti-piracy contributions. To be of maximum effect, the telegrams should arrive in Geneva prior to the meeting on October 12.

We understand that the President has already been briefed on this piracy problem by James Lilly of the NSC staff in connection with the recent visit of Prime Minister Prem of Thailand.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary



Oct 1, 1981 24

# JACK ANDERSON

## A Scenario Made To Order for Ronald Reagan

There was a time, early in this nation's history, when the Barbary pirates terrorized helpless merchant ships in the Mediterranean and held the crews for ransom. The United States sent Stephen Decatur, with a detachment of Marines, to put a stop to the pirates' depredations.

It's time the United States found another Decatur to sweep the Gulf of Thailand clean of the pirates who prey on helpless Vietnamese boat people fleeing their troubled homeland. It is a lucky refugee boat that makes it to Thailand without being attacked, its pathetic passengers subjected to rape, robbery and murder by the vicious crews of the pirate ships.

The Reagan administration has made terrorism its No. 1 foreign policy target. The desperate, unarmed boat people are in dire need of protection from the cowardly Thai corsairs. If the U.S. Navy were to set up a pirate patrol in the South Seas, America would regain its historic reputation as protector of the defenseless.

President Reagan should order the Navy to blow the seagoing terrorists out of the water. So far, the

U.S. effort has been strictly a pocketbook venture: We have given the Thai government a few million dollars to do the job. But the Thais' anti-piracy operation has been half-hearted at best.

The Thais simply will never do the job; we must do it ourselves. An administration that insisted on defending the freedom of the seas with naval exercises off Libya should have no qualms about taking on the inhuman scum who are terrorizing innocent refugees in the Gulf of Thailand.

And there is no doubt of the need for a campaign against the Southeast Asian pirates. About 3,000 Vietnamese a month make it to refugee camps in southern Thailand. Few, if any, women reach Thailand who have not been raped by at least one gang of pirates. The small boats are at sea for days, and some are attacked as many as a dozen times.

An English-speaking Vietnamese journalist who was on one of the boats described the ordeal to my associate Donald Goldberg:

"The sea pirates attacked us like beasts of prey devouring lambs. They took everything. They used a pair of scissors to take out the golden teeth. Blood filled the mouth and spilled down the victim's shirt. They raped, before my eyes, the girls they selected, mostly 14- and 15-year-olds. One 14-year-old girl was raped successively by one pirate after another."

Some of the young girls are taken away by the pirates, never to be heard from again. Many used to be taken to Ko Kia, known as "rape island," where pirate crews stopped to abuse the refugees at their leisure. The Thai navy finally stationed a patrol there.

Reports are heard daily in the refugee camps of women and girls who were raped literally dozens of times; of pirate crews promising to return with help, only to come back with more pirates, and of refugee boats being pillaged and then sunk with the wretched witnesses aboard.

Despite the unarguable extent and bestiality of the atrocities, international efforts to protect the boat people have been minimal. Thailand, with 10,000 fishing boats and 1,100 miles of coastline to look after, doesn't have the naval strength to do a proper job.

Many of the pirates are fishermen who have turned to brigandage as an escape from hard times, and the Thai government is not enthusiastic about prosecuting its own people, especially when the victims are Vietnamese, whose presence has been a burden to Thailand.

President Reagan is often derided abroad as "the cowboy." But I suggest that millions of people around the world wouldn't mind seeing Uncle Sam in a white hat, routing the bad guys of the South Seas. It's a scenario made to order for Ronald Reagan.

UNCLASSIFIED

RP/OAR:WCNENNO:ND  
10/9/81 x25318

EA/T:RHOWLAND  
FO/UNP:RRANDOLPH  
DOD/ISA/EA AND P:RHENDERSON{INFO}  
RP:RVINE

NSC:JLILLY  
NSC:MGUHN  
RP:SLOWMAN

IMMEDIATE GENEVA

PRIORITY BANGKOK, OSLO PRIORITY, THE HAGUE PRIORITY, BONN  
PRIORITY, LONDON PRIORITY, PARIS PRIORITY, OTTAWA PRIORITY,

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SREF

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE THAI  
GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-PIRACY PROGRAM

1. MISSION IS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT HAY OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
COMMITTEES OF THE RED CROSS.

2. QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WAS GLAD TO LEARN OF YOUR EFFORTS, AND THOSE OF U.N.  
HIGH COMMISSIONER HARTLING TO OBTAIN PLEDGES OF SUPPORT  
FOR THE ANTI-PIRACY PROGRAM OF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT  
AT THE MEETING OF THE UNHCR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE BEGINNING  
OCTOBER 12. AS YOU KNOW, MY GOVERNMENT MADE A PLEDGE TO  
THE UNHCR FOR THIS PROGRAM ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1981. I  
SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN RECEIVING  
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER DONOR GOVERNMENTS AT THE  
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR PERSONAL  
INTEREST IN THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT TO DETER PIRATES FROM  
ATTACKING BOAT REFUGEES.

SIGNED RONALD REAGAN UNQUOTE

WCN *W*  
RH *W*  
JL *W*  
RR *W*  
MG *W*  
RH *W*  
SCL *W*  
RV *W*



UNCLASSIFIED

1

2

3. DEPARTMENT DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THIS MESSAGE.  
THERE IS HOWEVER NO OBJECTION TO ICRC RELEASING IT.  
MISSION MAY WANT TO SUGGEST THAT THIS MESSAGE WOULD BE  
APPROPRIATE FOR RELEASE AT THE EXCOMM MEETING. 44

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RP/OAR:WCNENNO:ND  
10/9/81 x25318

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE THAI GOVERNMENT'S  
ANTI-PIRACY PROGRAM

ADDITIONAL INFO ADDRESSEES:

STOCKHOLM PRIORITY, CANBERRA PRIORITY, TOKYO PRIORITY



UNCLASSIFIED

RP/OAR:WCNENNO:ND  
10/9/81 x25318

EA/T:RHOWLAND  
FO/UNP:RRANDOLPH  
DOD/ISA/EA AND P:RHENDERSON[INFO]  
RP:RVINE

NSC:JLILLY  
NSC:MGUHN  
RP:SCLOWMAN

IMMEDIATE GENEVA

PRIORITY BANGKOK, OSLO PRIORITY, THE HAGUE PRIORITY, BONN  
PRIORITY, LONDON PRIORITY, PARIS PRIORITY, OTTAWA PRIORITY,

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SREF

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE THAI  
GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-PIRACY PROGRAM

1. MISSION IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HIGH COMMISSIONER POUL HARTLING OF  
THE UNHCR.

2. QUOTE DEAR MR. HIGH COMMISSIONER:

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PRESIDENT HAY OF ICRC, TO OBTAIN PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR  
THE ANTI-PIRACY PROGRAM OF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT AT  
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ATTACKING BOAT REFUGEES.

SIGNED RONALD REAGAN UNQUOTE

WCN *mw*  
RH *hw*  
JL *ma*  
RR *kw*  
MG *nc*  
RH *rw*  
SCL *lw*  
RV *w*

UNCLASSIFIED

1 2

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UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

RP/OAR:WCNENNO:ND  
10/9/81 x25318

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE THAI GOVERNMENT'S  
ANTI-PIRACY PROGRAM

ADDITIONAL INFO ADDRESSEES:

STOCKHOLM PRIORITY, CANBERRA PRIORITY, TOKYO PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET 3 7 13

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**WASHFAX RECEIPT**  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**B**

S/S #

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*add-m*

RECEIVED

89 OCT 9 9

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 000362 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages 9

FROM: CEMcManaway S/S 23126  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Bremer/Allen "International Assistance for the Thai Government's Anti-Piracy Program" 8129542 with cable to Geneva "International Assistance for the Thai Government's Anti-Piracy Program"

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>JANET COLSON</u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>JIM LILLY</u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>
<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>
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FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

S/S Officer: *[Signature]*

*for*



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 7, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*

SUBJECT: Thailand Piracy

The following is a status report on our actions on checking Thai piracy:

-- We have alerted both Defense and State to raise this with their Thai counterparts and discuss additional measures taken to check piracy against Vietnam refugees. This would be preferable to having the President raise it with Prem, the Thai Prime Minister. The Thai are very sensitive on this subject and a great deal has and is being done.

-- In February '81 we provided \$1.3 million to the Thai for an anti-piracy campaign. The money was not particularly well-used so a second payment of \$2.3 million in August of this year was held up and the Thai were given \$600,000.

-- We and the Thai agreed to take this \$600,000 and give it to the United Nations in Geneva as seed money to get international backing for a wide-scale effort against piracy. This program seems to be working and we should get donations from other countries sufficient to meet the \$5 million the Thai say they need. International flavor is important for this operation.

-- We also must keep in mind that we cannot release an unrestrained flow of refugees from Vietnam. The flow has slowed down and piracy in recent months has diminished. But if the Vietnamese believed they had a free shot at Thailand, the flow could become uncontrollable.

-- Diverting the 7th Fleet to this kind of work would impede its strategic mission and could involve it in operations inside Thailand and Malaysia territorial waters. A good part of the piracy takes place in these waters.

-- An anti-piracy operation would have to be subtle as many of the pirates are plain, ordinary fishermen most times. One would have to catch them in the act to be effective.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 6, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JANET COLSON

FROM: JIM LILLEY *W*

SUBJECT: Piracy Report for Ed Meese

Attached is a report per your request. I did not receive this until late on 5 October. Hence, the delay in answering it.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward Tab I to Ed Meese.

Approve *W* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I RVA memo to Ed Meese  
Tab II Weinberger Memo to Ed Meese

cc: Charles Tyson



MEMORANDUM

2 OCT 1981  
5832

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

FROM: EDWIN MEESE III *EW*  
SUBJECT: Gulf of Thailand Piracy

Attached is a column by Jack Anderson which appeared in the Washington Post on 1 October 1981. The President read this item and asked me to inquire of you whether there was any feasibility or desirability of the suggestion that the United States provide patrol boats in this area to protect the refugee boats against piracy.

Please have this idea analyzed on a confidential basis and let me know the results of your inquiry. Thank you.

cc: ✓ Richard V. Allen  
Ed Meese follow-up file



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RECEIVED

81 OCT 2 PM 2: 41

JANET COLSON

*J*

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

*WA 3*

IRENE DERUS

*right 57*

JANET COLSON

*J*

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

*I would like a followup on this fast. Don Gugg to contact Rich Ornberg. I think this is something of importance to the P. I want to see where a setup soon.*

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5832

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81 OCT 6 P 4: 11

JANET COLSON	<u>        </u>		
BUD NANCE	<u>        </u>		
DICK ALLEN	<u>        </u>		
IRENE DERUS	<u>        </u>		
JANET COLSON	<u>        </u>		
BUD NANCE	<u>        </u>		
PETER	<u>        </u>		
CY TO VP	<u>        </u>	SHOW CC	<u>        </u>
CY TO MEESE	<u>        </u>	SHOW CC	<u>        </u>
CY TO BAKER	<u>        </u>	SHOW CC	<u>        </u>
CY TO DEAVER	<u>        </u>	SHOW CC	<u>        </u>
CY TO BRADY	<u>        </u>	SHOW CC	<u>        </u>

Comments:

10/7 not IS'd yet



36

RECEIVED 05 OCT 81 15

TO WEINBERGER, C

FROM MEESE, E

DOCDATE 02 OCT 81

T

KEYWORDS: THAILAND

REFUGEES

ANDERSON, JACK

TERRORISM

MEDIA

SUBJECT: GULF OF THAILAND PIRACY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ALLEN TO MEESE DUE: 06 OCT 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LILLEY

GREGG

SCHWEITZER

KAMINSKY

GUHIN

POINDEXTER

DEGRAFFENREID

URGENT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

Don Sugg -  
See RVA notes .

ja

10/05



RECEIVED

81 OCT 2 P12:41

JANET COLSON

*J*

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

*WA 3*

IRENE DERUS

*right 57*

JANET COLSON

*J*

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

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SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

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MEMORANDUM

2 OCT 1981  
5832

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2 October 1981

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# JACK ANDERSON

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There was a time, early in this nation's history, when the Barbary pirates terrorized helpless merchant ships in the Mediterranean and held the crews for ransom. The United States sent Stephen Decatur, with a detachment of Marines, to put a stop to the pirates' depredations.

It's time the United States found another Decatur to sweep the Gulf of Thailand clean of the pirates who prey on helpless Vietnamese boat people fleeing their troubled homeland. It is a lucky refugee boat that makes it to Thailand without being attacked, its pathetic passengers subjected to rape, robbery and murder by the vicious crews of the pirate ships.

The Reagan administration has made terrorism its No. 1 foreign policy target. The desperate, unarmed boat people are in dire need of protection from the cowardly Thai corsairs. If the U.S. Navy were to set up a pirate patrol in the South Seas, America would regain its historic reputation as protector of the defenseless.

President Reagan should order the Navy to blow the seagoing terrorists out of the water. So far, the

U.S. effort has been strictly a pocketbook venture: We have given the Thai government a few million dollars to do the job. But the Thais' anti-piracy operation has been half-hearted at best.

The Thais simply will never do the job; we must do it ourselves. An administration that insisted on defending the freedom of the seas with naval exercises off Libya should have no qualms about taking on the inhuman scum who are terrorizing innocent refugees in the Gulf of Thailand.

And there is no doubt of the need for a campaign against the Southeast Asian pirates. About 3,000 Vietnamese a month make it to refugee camps in southern Thailand. Few, if any, women reach Thailand who have not been raped by at least one gang of pirates. The small boats are at sea for days, and some are attacked as many as a dozen times.

An English-speaking Vietnamese journalist who was on one of the boats described the ordeal to my associate Donald Goldberg:

"The sea pirates attacked us like beasts of prey devouring lambs. They took everything. They used a pair of scissors to take out the golden teeth. Blood filled the mouth and spilled down the victim's shirt. They raped, before my eyes, the girls they selected, mostly 14- and 15-year-olds. One 14-year-old girl was raped successively by one pirate after another."

Some of the young girls are taken away by the pirates, never to be heard from again. Many used to be taken to Ko-Kra, known as "rape island," where pirate crews stopped to abuse the refugees at their leisure. The Thai navy finally stationed a patrol there.

Reports are heard daily in the refugee camps of women and girls who were raped literally dozens of times; of pirate crews promising to return with help, only to come back with more pirates, and of refugee boats being pillaged and then sunk with the wretched witnesses aboard.

Despite the unarguable extent and bestiality of the atrocities, international efforts to protect the boat people have been minimal. Thailand, with 10,000 fishing boats and 1,100 miles of coastline to look after, doesn't have the naval strength to do a proper job.

Many of the pirates are fishermen who have turned to brigandage as an escape from hard times, and the Thai government is not enthusiastic about prosecuting its own people, especially when the victims are Vietnamese, whose presence has been a burden to Thailand.

President Reagan is often derided abroad as "the cowboy." But I suggest that millions of people around the world wouldn't mind seeing Uncle Sam in a white hat, routing the bad guys of the South Seas. It's a scenario made to order for Ronald Reagan.



RECEIVED 17 NOV 81 12

TO PRES

FROM GLENN, JOHN

DOCDATE 03 NOV 81

FRIEDERSDORF, M

12 NOV 81

*Toussaint*

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

CO

SUBJECT: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FORN ASSISTANCE ACT TO PREVENT INVOLVEMENT OF  
US CITIZENS IN INTL TERRORISM

ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY DUE: 27 NOV 81 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

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COMMENTS

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REFERRAL

DATE: 17 NOV 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRES

SOURCE: GLENN, JOHN

DATE: 03 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

CO

SUBJ: AMENDMENT TO FORN ASSISTANCE ACT TO PREVENT US INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIS

REQUIRED ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY

DUE DATE: 27 NOV 81

COMMENTS:

*Cathy Millison*  
FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO SHOEMAKER

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KIMMITT

BAILEY

November 12, 1981

Dear Senator Glenn:

This is to thank you for your November 3 letter to the President regarding your amendment to the Foreign Assistance bill. We appreciate the concerns you have underscored in regard to participation by U.S. citizens in activities supporting international terrorism or terrorist activities.

I have taken the liberty of sharing a copy of your letter with the President's national security staff to ensure that your comments and recommendations receive full consideration and review. We look forward to working with you and your colleagues in addressing this very important issue.

With cordial regard, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable John Glenn  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

MLF:CMP:asr

cc: w/copy of inc, NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT response (with copy to MLFriedersdorf).

cc: Powell Moore - FYI. ✓

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# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 3, 1981

NSC

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

006503

Dear Mr. President:

I fully agree with the words of State Department spokesman Dean Fischer, who yesterday labeled as "reprehensible" the involvement of U.S. citizens in the escalating and destabilizing activities of the Libyan government.

On October 22, 1981, during Senate consideration of the Foreign Assistance bill, I gained Senate approval for an amendment aimed at ensuring that Americans are prevented from acting in the service of terrorism or the proponents of terrorist activities. I made note at that time of your Administration's firm and active opposition to the spread of international terrorism and the special attention that has been given to the escalating and destabilizing activities of Colonel Qadaffi's government.

While the Foreign Assistance bill has not yet gained final Congressional approval, I write today to urge that the Administration begin at once to develop a program to ensure against the involvement of Americans in such terrorism by implementing the steps called for in my amendment.

That amendment requires, within six months of enactment, a report to include:

(1) a description of all legislation, currently in force, and of all administrative remedies, presently available, which can be employed to prevent the involvement, service, or participation by U.S. citizens in activities in support of international terrorism or terrorist leaders;


(2) an assessment of the adequacy of such legislation and remedies, and of the enforcement resources available to carry out such measures, to prevent the involvement, service, or participation by U.S. citizens in activities in support of international terrorism or terrorist leaders; and

The President  
November 3, 1981  
Page Two

(3) a description of available legislative and administrative alternatives, together with an assessment of their potential impact and effectiveness, which could be enacted or employed to put an end to the participation by U.S. citizens in activities in support of international terrorism or terrorist leaders.

With best regards.

Sincerely,



John Glenn  
United States Senator

JG:ddk



47  
(Rohrabacher)  
December 2, 1981

ED HICKEY: SPEECH ON TERRORISM

Since the late 1960's Western nations have increasingly suffered from acts of political terrorism. By the early 1970's a clear pattern of international terrorism was developing -- a pattern that continues to this day.

If the late 1960's and early 1970's are remembered as years of protest, the 1980's, unless we come to grips with this very real problem, could well be remembered as a decade of terror.

The first year of the decade, 1980, was a record year for international terrorism. State Department figures show there were 760 international terrorist acts, which resulted in more casualties than in any year since the U.S. Government began keeping statistics on the subject. Last year, 642 people were killed in international terrorist acts; 1,078 were wounded. Ten Americans were among the dead; 94 Americans were among the injured.

Recent statistics suggest a frightening trend. Death and injury resulting from terrorist violence is up and much of it is directed against Americans. Of the 760 acts in 1980, 278, or 38 percent, were directed against Americans or American property. In 1981 the high level of terrorist activity continued.

Terrorism is something that everyone seems to be against, yet few can define. So perhaps we should start with a

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definition. It evolved from the Latin word "terror", which means to frighten. For our purposes today, we will define terrorism as the use of violence or destructive force to frighten a government or population in order to achieve "political ends."

While domestic political violence is a problem faced by many countries, the threat of international terrorism is a matter of extreme gravity for all non-communist nations -- especially those within the Western alliance.

I am not talking about insurrection -- our focus is international terrorism. It should not be confused with insurrection; if it were the same, all those who fight oppression would be labeled as terrorists. One of the more damaging cliches currently making the rounds is that "One man's terrorist is another's Freedom Fighter." This absurd notion compares the Red Brigade and the Symbionese Liberation Army with Afghan Freedom Fighters and heroes of the American Revolution.

Anyone who compares George Washington to the Weather Underground just isn't playing with a full deck of cards. The radical chic notwithstanding, there is no basis for comparing terrorist to those who have fought for freedom. The principle targets of terrorists are innocent civilians or unarmed officials who are killed in order to terrorize populations or goad the government into unwarranted repression.



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Does this description match the Afghan Freedom Fighters who battle Soviet tanks or the patriots of the American Revolution? George Washington, as it will be recalled, met the British army head on. Furthermore, when guerrilla tactics were used, it was against British troops and other combatants. This is a far cry from terrorists who bomb and kidnap unarmed civilians and plot the assassinations of political opponents.

One of the grossest image distortions of recent years is the portrayal of terrorists as Robin Hoods and romantic swashbucklers. In reality, a terrorist is a ghoul -- an individual inflicting death and destruction from hiding on unarmed opponents. Placing a bomb in the rest room of a bank or shooting down a school superintendent takes no courage. Instead these are the dishonorable of acts of cowards who smugly hide and watch their destruction from a distance rather than facing the enemy. These are the acts of defective personalities who see themselves as messianic saviors of mankind, yet don't have the character to compete for influence democratically.

The romanticization of terrorism is no surprise, however. Terrorism in the Western democracies sprang from the protest era of the late 1960's, which itself was romanticized by the media. During that era, leftist marauders were glamorized and idealized by a news media which never mentioned the totalitarian philosophy which served as the underpinning of

many radical activist organizations. It was as if the police were Nazis repressing peace demonstrations because they were inclined toward war. The police, in reality, were often coping with organized groups who considered themselves revolutionaries, seeking violence and confrontation and hiding amidst a crowd of peace marchers.

As protest marches faded it was a small step for the wilder members of the violent Students for a Democratic Society to become bombers for the Radical Weather Underground. In Europe, Germany's Baader-Meinhof gang and Italy's Red Brigades seem to have come from the same "New Left" roots.

They were formed around a nucleus of young people who were radicalized by the street violence and university Marxism of the late 1960's. Unlike their counterparts in the United States, they have been highly successful in kidnapping and assassination. The Red Brigades popularized the term "knee-capping" -- which is nothing more than crippling innocent victims by shooting them in the legs. Their most dastardly act was the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, a man who headed the Christian Democratic Party and would likely have been the Italian Prime Minister except for the intervention of these fanatics.

Similarly, Germany's Baader-Meinhof gang conducted a war of terror which took the lives of innocent Germans for over half a decade. One of the most famous of their crimes was the brutal slaying of industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer



in 1977. Recently the remnants of this gang have been attacking American military personal.

What kind of people are these terrorists? They are, generally, individuals who have never worked at a regular job, yet constantly talk about representing the working people. Sounds familiar; doesn't it? Far from being workers, terrorists, especially those in America, are often from affluent families. One study by the German government revealed that 36 percent of those arrested in connection with terrorist organizations in the 1970's were college graduates from the upper income levels of German society.

In the United States, Kathy Boudin, who was recently arrested for alleged terrorist activities, comes from a wealthy family as did several other prominent members of the Weather Underground. Many in her particular clique, it should be noted, began as a protest group on Columbia University -- hardly a working class school.

Unfortunately, the escapades of these Mercedes-Benz revolutionaries have left a road littered with maimed bodies. Their last bit of alleged activism -- the Brinks armored car robbery -- left three men dead . . . working people with families, with children who will no longer have a father to help them along in life.

Another revealing aspect of the personality profile of alleged terrorists is the political background of their family. Many are not only from wealthy homes, but also from

families whose politics are ultra left. Kathy Boudin's father is a wealthy lawyer well known for his defense of left wing radicals.

Similarly, the world's most wanted terrorist, known as Carlos, comes from a wealthy Venezuelan family. His father is so far to the left that he named all of his children after Illich Vladimir Lenin. Carlos's real name is Illich Ramirez Sanchez.

It appears that these revolutionaries are not revolting at all. Instead they are dedicated to fulfilling long-held and deeply-rooted aspirations. This, by the way, is in stark contrast to suggestions that these are psychopaths who are revolting against all authority. These are not anarchists.

Not all terrorist organizations, however, evolved from student activism. The Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Puerto Rican FALN and the Basque ETA all started with some territorial or nationalistic claim; all have bloody histories. The ETA, alone, in the past 13 years has killed more than 350 carefully chosen victims. The bloodletting of the IRA and the PLO is infamous.

And what is it that these and other terrorist organizations really want? Why do these individuals, among millions of their fellow citizens feel justified in conducting campaigns of murder, destruction and kidnapping.

Much can be said of their motives, but one thing is certain, contrary to their image these groups -- especially



the former student activists -- are not democratically-minded reformers faced with the stone wall of authoritarianism.

The Puerto Rican separatists, for example, are not facing the fist of the United States. Instead, they are primarily thwarted by the will of the people of Puerto Rico. Only a miniscule number of Puerto Ricans want independence, they turn it down by huge majorities every time it is voted upon, just as they reject political parties dedicated to independence.

Italy, on the other hand, may be less than perfect, but it is still a relatively free society. Yet terrorism in Europe's boot has been rampant. And those singled out by Italy's terrorists are not the fascists or raving monarchists. The Red Brigaders kidnap and murder Democratic moderates like Aldo Moro.

The infamous Carlos comes from Venezuela -- one of the freest and most prosperous nations in the Western Hemisphere.

No. Today's terrorism is not a case of individuals struggling against tyranny. The plague of terrorism now sweeping the West is far more insidious than that.

All too often the ideology of terrorists is ignored, just as it was of the New Left in the late 1960's. A close examination reveals most of these groups are dedicated to some form of revolutionary communist ideology, a significant yet largely unassimilated fact.

Terrorists, far from being revolutionaries fighting for freedom, are actually totalitarian soldiers trying to destroy liberty. They, clearly, seek more repression. Let me repeat that: Terrorists want the governments they oppose to become more repressive.

Repression, the terrorist calculates, turns idealists into violent revolutionaries. It also can be manipulated to radicalize a specific segment of society -- a minority group, young people, farmers or whoever is most susceptible.

The last thing terrorists want are free elections and civil liberties where ideas compete in a political arena. That is not the type of society they desire. Nor are they simply opposed to all state power as the anarchist as of the last century. Instead, they are Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, seeking dictatorship of the proletariat; until this is recognized, terrorism will continue to plague the Western Democracies.

Demonstrating this all important fact is not difficult. Why does the Puerto Rican FALN conduct bombings in the United States? The answer is simple: Their goal is to provoke Government retaliation upon the citizens of Puerto Rico, thus radicalizing them and turning them into leftist cannon fodder. To our credit and in testimony to the strength of our democracy there has been no such retaliation.

But what happens in nations without such a strong Democratic heritage? Twenty years ago Cuba almost succeeded



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in undermining democracy in Venezuela even before it had a chance to get off the ground. Venezuelans are aware that Castro's terrorist campaign almost scuttled their chance for Western-style Democracy -- something they'd struggled so long to obtain. With a little help from God and the United States of America, the Venezuelan military did not intervene. That would have played into the hands of the terrorists and resulted in civil war.

In Spain terrorism increased after Franco's death. The attempted military coup earlier this year is an example of the knee-jerk reaction terrorists try to provoke. Luckily for Spain, King Juan Carlos is a leader with courage and character. He beat back the coup and continues to oppose terrorism vigorously. That is why the Reagan Administration has unequivocally stood behind King Juan Carlos and the Democratic forces in Spain.

Contemporary terrorism appears to be emulating an Algerian role model. In Algeria the French mistook the terrorism of a small group for an insurrection. French retaliation against the Moslem population resulted in popular revolt.

Most terrorists seek popular revolt because they are convinced it will eventually lead to Marxist-Leninist dictatorship -- and that is their true goal.

Even groups based on territorial or nationalistic claims are often little more than communist revolutionaries

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coopting national sentiment to lay the foundation for a new Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.

In Northern Ireland, for example, the IRA conducts a reign of terror in the name of uniting North and South, but the long-range goal of the IRA is not just a united Ireland. Bernadette Devlin, it should be noted, says the struggle in Northern Ireland is "an integral part of the international working-class movement." Now what does that mean? To make it clear, listen to the words of IRAer, Michael Farrell.

"Victory in the north," he states, "means not just defeat of the Loyalists" -- that's the Protestants -- "and the unity of Ireland, but also the collapse of the government in the south and an anti-imperialist revolution in that country."

To claim that these people are Catholics is a cruel joke. These are not even Irishmen at heart.

This terrorism is insidious, does not happen in a vacuum. Earlier this year Secretary of State Haig testified that Communist states, especially the Soviet Union, "bear a large measure of responsibility of international terrorism." There is a mountain of evidence to back him up. At the very least, international terrorism as we know it could not function without the support -- the aid and comfort -- given by the Soviet Union.

First, a large number of terrorists have been trained by the Soviets. The infamous "Carlos," for instance, was educated at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. Shortly



after leaving, his terrorism career began. You can bet he learned more about explosives than literature at ole Lamumba U.

Terrorism schools in Soviet puppet states grind out terrorist soldiers who create havoc all over the Western world. Czechoslovakia has such a terrorist school. It is under the direct supervision of the KGB, and according to a senior Czech defector, at least 13 of the senior members of Italy's Red Brigade were trained there -- including the men who murdered Aldo Moro.

Cuba is a notorious training and staging area for terrorists. This point was reconfirmed earlier this year when a band of terrorists were caught crossing into Columbia. They admitted being trained and equipped in Cuba. Importantly, Nestor Garcia, a high ranking Cuban intelligence officer who recently defected, says that the Soviet KGB has completely controlled and financed Cuban intelligence since 1969. The terrorist training, then, is at least condoned, and perhaps bankrolled by the Soviets. This is true of Czechoslovakia, Cuba, South Yemen and Libya. This Soviet involvement seems to be part of an overall international strategy.

If you are missing my point, I'll spell it out: Much of the terrorism experienced in the Western Democracies is, as Secretary Haig says, the responsibility of the Soviet Union. And it goes beyond training.

Soviet arms are being funneled to terrorists through Cuba, Libya, and other puppet states. In 1973 the Irish Navy seized the S.S. Claudia. It was crammed with Soviet weapons on the way to the IRA via Libya. Similarly, in 1971 the Dutch intercepted a shipment of weapons from Prague destined for Irish terrorists. At the same time, in the Western Hemisphere, Cuban support for terrorists goes unabated.

Worse yet, there is ample evidence that Soviet puppet states offer refuge for international terrorists. They are not, as some would have us believe, holed up in some dark little inner city apartment. Carlos has been reported to be living a lavish life in Libya. Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, an Italian terrorist, was blown apart trying to attach a bomb to power lines outside of Milan. A police investigation revealed that he had made 22 visits to Czechoslovakia under a false name; does anyone really believe he took all those trips to Czechoslovakia as a tourist?

In our own country radical leftists were helped along by Cuban Intelligence, which, as I've already said, is totally controlled and bankrolled by the Soviet KGB. Two examples of this: In the early 1960's Progressive Labor Party, which labels itself a revolutionary Marxist Party, sent some of its leaders to Cuba. One of them, Philip Abbott Luce, says he came back with a pocket full of cash to help him in his "revolutionary" activities -- activities that included teaching ghetto blacks how to make Molotov



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cocktails. More recently, defectors from the Weather Underground indicate the Cuban Embassy in Canada served as a communication liaison when they were on the run.

All of this is obviously happening with full knowledge, if not at the direction of the Soviet government. Soviet motives deserve scrutiny.

One should never forget that the Soviets still have an ideological commitment to the communist philosophy -- a philosophy tied to the concept of violent revolution and dictatorship. Their system -- without profit motive or religion -- is, in fact, so dull and unproductive that support of revolutionaries is one of the few things that gives meaning to their system. But ideology is surely not the only motive. A primary consideration for Soviets is and always has been their own national defense. They surely perceive terrorism as a cheap method of destabilizing the West, which in turn has positive security implications for their own military posture vis-a-vis the West. If so, it certainly is a cheap method of defense as compared the the enormous cost of today's modern weapons systems.

The question remains of what we can do, and what we are doing, to meet this challenge. Obviously, there is not a simple answer; however, the following are some things that can make and will make a difference.

1. First the foremost, America must never turn to repression to combat terrorism. Some nations in Latin

America retorted to brutality, repression and torture to combat terrorism. Doing so, they destroyed their own freedom and created societies that are a little better than those behind the Iron Curtain.

2. The alternative to repression is intelligence. The Reagan Administration is dedicated to rebuilding America's badly damaged intelligence system. We are moving to eliminate unwarranted restrictions placed on those who provide the information necessary to combat terrorism and protect our citizens from this threat.

3. We must continue to call the Soviets to task for their support of international terrorism. Secretary Haig has continued his leadership role in this area. If relations between our nations are to improve the Soviets must agree -- at least privately -- to pull back from their support of international terrorism.

Some people call this linkage. Well that's what it is. It doesn't preclude any cooperation without an agreement on terrorism, but it suggests that relations will be better and agreements more substantial if the Soviets are acting in a civilized way.

4. The Reagan Administration also intends to strictly enforce current law and support any further legislation needed to prevent Americans from aiding terrorist groups. Whether it's financial support for the IRA from Irish Americans



or the contracting of experts to help Libya -- this sort of thing has to stop.

5. We are committed to work even more closely with our allies to combat this international problem. Cleaning up our intelligence mess will help because some of our allies hesitate to work with us for fear of restrictions and leaks.

6. Number six is not so easy. The handling of some terrorist events by the media has been disturbing. Los Angeles Police Chief Darrell Gates at a recent meeting of the International Association of Police Chiefs complained of hostage or terrorist incidents, "It becomes instant drama -- a live show, even entertainment." The news media in these situations must remember what the word "responsibility" means. We do not advocate legal restrictions, but terrorists must know that taking hostages will not insure publicity for their cause. This will require much more voluntary cooperation between authorities and the news media.

7. We must take a close look at the punishment of those convicted of terrorism. Imprisoning terrorists won't work. It leads to further violence during attempts to free jailed gang members. It was just this sort of thing that led the Baader-Meinhof gang to murder Hanns-Martin Schleyer. It also encourages several hijackings in Europe. Terrorists who cause the death of innocent people, even if by accident, should face the death penalty; punishment should be swift and certain.

8. The United States and each of its allies must protect its diplomats and embassies and maintain the special military capability needed to handle any terrorist threat. The Reagan Administration is fully committed to this. As Libyan pilots in the Gulf of Sidra found out, the United States is not afraid to exercise force when necessary to protect the lives and freedom of American citizens. In a speech to West Point's graduating class, President Reagan proclaimed America's era of self-doubt is over -- and it is.

9. Any nation directly aiding terrorists should be diplomatically, economically isolated until such behavior ceases. The first steps toward this have been taken by private airlines who now refuse to fly nations that harbor hijackers. For this reason, earlier this year the U.S. Government gave the boot to the few Libyan diplomats remaining in this country since the cessation of diplomatic relations.

10. Finally, the terrorism that confronts the Western Democracies must be recognized for what it is: a totalitarian threat to freedom. Terrorists are no better than Nazis or fascists. Simply because they do not wear uniforms and march in a row does not make them any less totalitarian. The free people of the world must commit themselves to winning the battle against terrorism, just as they committed themselves in the battle against tyranny a generation ago.

The Reagan Administration is committed to maintain the security and freedom of the people of the United States, and



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we need your support in this effort. When President Reagan welcomed home the hostages only a few days after his inauguration, he promised "swift and effective retribution" for acts of terrorism. I support that stance with all my heart because, as an American, I know we must have courage to meet this challenge. Those engaged in terrorism do not respect reason; they do not respect sincerity. But I can tell you with Ronald Reagan as President they will respect the United States. We are confident that we will prevail over the threat of terrorism, just as Americans have triumphed over threats to our freedom in the past. We will do it because it is our responsibility to do it. We owe it to those who came before us. We owe it to the next generation of Americans.

Thank you for having me with you today.

RECEIVED 22 DEC 81 15

TO LENZ

FROM SALCEDO

DOCDATE 18 DEC 81

*Terrorism*

KEYWORDS: ACCESS

TERRORISM

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR CY OF PRM-30 RE TERRORISM

ACTION: REPLY FOR LENZ SIGNATURE

DUE: 28 DEC 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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KIMMITT

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# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

December 18, 1981

Mr. Allen J. Lenz  
Staff Director  
National Security Council  
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. Lenz:

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for coordinating all civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive agencies (E.O. 12148, Sec. 2-101). FEMA is also responsible for the coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents (E.O. 12148, Sec. 2-103).

We are in the process of identifying interrelationships, roles, and interfaces among government agencies having responsibilities in the area of terrorism, and have learned of the existence of a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM-30) on terrorism. We would appreciate receiving a copy of PRM-30.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

*Frank S. Salcedo*

Frank S. Salcedo  
Chief  
Civil Security Division