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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name DEGRAFFENREID, KENNETH: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 8/31/2016

File Folder SOVIET ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE AND US
POLICY: AN OVERVIEW - CARNES LORD 3/24/83-4/20/83

FOIA

F02-0083/01

Box Number 27

PRADOS

2727

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
179882	MEMOS AND PAPERS	RE ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE	48	3/24/1983	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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
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To BE Provided

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 9, 1983

129387

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Recently there have been press reports of yet another new Soviet violation of the SALT II Treaty. You and your Administration have already accused the Soviet Union of violating the Biological Warfare Convention, the Chemical Warfare Convention, and the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement which resolved the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Your Administration has expressed concern that the Soviets may be violating the Thresh-hold Test Ban Treaty. Last September, Dr. Henry Kissinger conceded that the Soviets had violated the SALT I Agreements. Official Defense and State Department documents of 1962 and 1959 accused the Soviets of violating 50 other treaties. Thus there are now official U.S. government sources supporting the conclusion that the Soviets have violated almost every international agreement and arms control treaty they have signed since 1917.

The Preamble to the SALT II Treaty explicitly states that the treaty "proceeds" from the 1972 agreement on Basic Principles of U.S. - Soviet Relations, yet there is overwhelming evidence that the Soviets are violating the Basic Principles Agreement by their aggressive actions in Cuba, Afghanistan, Poland, Central America, Southern Africa, the Middle East, Western Europe, and Japan. Thus the very foundation of SALT II is being violated by the Soviets.

Specifically, there are press reports that the Soviets are exceeding the 2250 SALT II ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles, and also the 1320 ceiling on MIRVed missiles and bombers equipped with Long-range cruise missiles. There is Administration testimony before Congress that the Soviets are producing more than 30 Backfire bombers per year in violation of SALT II. Your Administration has expressed strong concern that the Soviets are almost completely encrypting the telemetry on their new missiles, in violation of the SALT II ban on deliberate interference with U.S. verification. Finally,

President Ronald Reagan

Page 2

March 9, 1983

there are reports that the Soviets are testing a second new type of ICBM, the PL-5, that is specifically disallowed by Article IV, paragraph 9, of the SALT II Treaty.

In your meeting with the press on February 23, you stated that:

"This last one comes the closest to indicating that it is a violation."

Thus you are on the record with a virtual accusation the Soviet PL-5 violates SALT II.

We have several specific questions: First, do your Defense and State Departments agree that the PL-5 violates SALT II? Second, what is your view on the other SALT II compliance issues? Third, what is the definition of Soviet actions which would "undercut" SALT II, and how would you define Soviet "equal restraint?" Fourth, if the U.S. is still uncertain about Soviet violations of SALT II, what specific time and U.S. resources will be required to resolve this uncertainty? Finally, is there still a tendency by the bureaucracy to apologize for Soviet misbehavior and violations which you criticized other Administrations for exhibiting? We believe these are important questions that need to be answered.

We agree with you that the SALT II Treaty is "fatally flawed," unequal, destabilizing, and not in the U.S. national security interest. It is our view that U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT II in the face of Soviet non-compliance even further undermines our national security. If the arms control process is to ever become meaningful and productive, we must hold the Soviets to the highest standards of compliance with the spirit and letter of SALT II, just as we have historically strictly complied with arms control treaties ourselves.

Very respectfully,

John P. Cost ✓ Steve Symms ✓
 Jesse Helms ✓ [Signature] ✓ Denton
 Jim McClure ✓ [Signature] ✓ Humphreys
 Chuck Grassley ✓

March 16, 1983

Dear Senator East:

On behalf of the President, I would like to acknowledge your recent letter, cosigned by six of your Senate Republican colleagues, on the issue of Soviet violation of the SALT II Treaty.

Your letter is now being shared with the President's national security advisers, and I assure you that prompt attention will be given to the specific questions which you and your colleagues have raised. We appreciate hearing from you regarding this most important issue.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President

The Honorable John P. East
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

KMD: CMP: sy6-KMD3

cc: w/copy of inc, NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT response
(with copy to Ken Duberstein)

✓ w/copy of inc, Pam Turner - FYI

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

March 11, 1983

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:


This letter is regarding treaty violations on part of the Soviet Union.


In the 1983 edition of Soviet Military Power, Secretary of Defense Weinberger reported that the Soviet Union has tested two new ICBM's (the PL-4 & PL-5), and that they have two others ready for testing later this year. In addition, that publication reports that the Soviets have expanded their ABM deployment around Moscow to include very large phased array radars and new missile interceptors.


These incidents have been reported in the press as possible Soviet violations of existing international agreements, and on February 23 you said, "This last one comes the closest to indicating that it is a violation." These reports are the most recent in a series that includes telemetry encryption of Soviet missile tests and the possible deployment of the SS-16 ICBM. Together, they indicate an expanding pattern of Soviet activities that are contrary to existing agreements.


The 1980 Republican Platform stated that, "The Republican Party deplores the attempts of the Carter Administration to cover up Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements..." What are the facts about these recent reports? Are the Soviets violating these international agreements, and if so shouldn't these violations be brought to the attention of the American people?

The House of Representatives is in the midst of debating the nuclear freeze resolution. The issue of Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements is vitally important to this debate. If the Soviets are in violation of existing arms control agreements, it is imperative that we announce these violations in order to have an open and thorough debate of the nuclear freeze issue. An announcement of the violations now would be of tremendous benefit to us as we support your arms reduction initiatives.



GERALD B. SOLOMON
Member of Congress

Sincerely,

WILLIAM CARNEY
Member of Congress



TRENT LOTT
Member of Congress




ROBERT E. BADHAM
Member of Congress



ROBERT S. WALKER
Member of Congress




JACK KEMP
Member of Congress




MICKY EDWARDS
Member of Congress



PHILIP M. CRANE
Member of Congress




DUNCAN HUNTER
Member of Congress




DAVID DREIER
Member of Congress



WILLIAM L. DICKINSON
Member of Congress



THOMAS F. HARTNETT
Member of Congress



CONNIE MACK
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable William Clark
The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
The Honorable George Shultz
The Honorable William Casey

TAB I

~~SECRET~~

(NSC/ICS-400270
57)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 10, 1982

National Security Decision
Directive Number 65

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION COMMITTEE (U)

Compliance with the provision of existing and future arms control agreements is essential to their success and therefore to US national security. Effective verification is necessary to ensure compliance with those agreements. Verification serves to detect possible violations of an agreement and provides timely warning of threats to our national security arising under an arms control treaty regime. Verification is also necessary to assure the confidence of the Congress and the public at large that specific arms control measures are compatible with our security. (U)

Effective verification may involve a number of policy judgments in addition to judgments about intelligence monitoring of the technical provisions of specific arms control agreements. The government must be organized and prepared to deal with all aspects of arms control monitoring, verification, and compliance issues in a systematic, orderly and timely manner. The degree of verifiability of proposed agreements must be adequately described for policymakers and judgments of effective verifiability must be fully integrated into the arms control planning and decision process. (U)

In the past, considerations of verification issues, especially allegations of violations and/or deceptions concerning various agreements, have proved to be unusually complex and difficult to resolve. In order to address issues of arms control verification and compliance more effectively and as an integral part of the arms control policy process, it is essential that an appropriate mechanism be established to deal with them comprehensively, in an integrated fashion, and on a continuing basis. (C)

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Authority

LR/M 2014-004

BY

NARA DATE

8/31/16

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Establishment of the Verification Committee

Therefore, in order to provide a focus for national arms control verification and compliance policy, a Verification Committee is established. The Verification Committee shall report to the National Security Council and shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (U)

Membership of the Verification Committee

Membership shall include: senior representatives of the Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (U)

Responsibilities of the Verification Committee

Responsibilities of the Verification Committee shall include the following: (U)

- Development of US Government policy relative to verification and compliance. (C)
- Formulation of strategies for dealing with compliance problems. (C)
- Review of all arms control provisions or agreements developed in the interagency process with a view to assessing their verifiability, including START, INF, MBFR, Nuclear Testing, and Chemical and Biological Warfare. (C)
- Monitoring on a continuous basis the compliance situation in all arms control areas. (U)
- Review of requirements and threats to US monitoring capabilities and recommendations for assuring the required capabilities. (C)
- Overseeing preparation of periodic and special reports on compliance issues for the NSC and the President. (U)
- Overseeing United States Government preparation of periodic reports to Congress on verifiability as mandated by Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. (U)

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Support of Interagency Groups

Appropriate interagency groups shall report to and support the Verification Committee on arms control verification issues as required. (U)

Immediate Tasks

The Verification Committee will undertake the following immediate actions: (U)

- Ensure the integration and prioritization of ongoing START and INF verification and monitoring work programs into a single coherent program of work. (C)

- A comprehensive review of current compliance issues with respect to all existing arms control agreements, particularly SALT, Nuclear Testing, and Chemical and Biological Warfare. (C)

- Creation of a permanent "Red Team" to challenge US verification capabilities, assumptions and policies. This team would anticipate how, in what ways, and for what purposes the Soviets might try to avoid compliance with the provisions of arms control agreements. START and INF should have highest priority. (S)

- A detailed examination of the benefits and limitations of cooperative verification measures, including "on-site" inspection. (S)

Implementing Procedures

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall establish procedures to implement this Decision Directive. (U)

Ronald Reagan

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