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File Folder SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND THE FREEZE 8/21/82-8/31/82

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PRADOS

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
179786	REPORTS	RE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES	62	8/25/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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RG
"atomic
miami"

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 27, 1982

TO:

BOB SIMS
WALT RAYMOND
ROGER FONTAINE
ALPHONSO SAPIA-BOSCH
FRED WETTERING
KEN DE GRAFFENREID

FROM:

CARY LORD

FYI.

Summary of VOA Editorial for August 26, 1982

Soviet Disinformation in the Third World

From Nicaragua to Namibia the Soviets are deliberately spreading what is politely called disinformation about the means and purposes of American diplomatic efforts to achieve peace and greater stability in trouble spots around the world.

The USG-ed states the truth about our attempts to aid Central American countries threatened by Nicaraguan-based terror and the diplomatic effort to bring independence to Namibia and get the Cuban troops out of Angola.

Two Examples of Soviet Disinformation (0UR03)

Anncr:

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. government on Soviet disinformation activities.

Voice:

The Soviet information media constantly inundate the outside world with anti-American propaganda. What the Soviets say is not true. Two recent examples, both dealing with the Third World, show how Soviet disinformation works.

In recent dispatches and radio broadcasts, the Soviet media have accused the United States of waging an "undeclared war" against Nicaragua. The government-operated Soviet wire service, TASS, charged earlier this month that President Reagan has ordered what it called "a special group of bandits" to stage acts of sabotage against Nicaragua.

The truth is that what the United States has been doing is to provide economic and military assistance to several Central American governments which are threatened by terrorists and paramilitary operations that have Nicaraguan support. Most of the aid is economic, but some U.S. military aid has also been provided in small amounts in response to urgent requests.

(Opt) The United States has made several attempts to reduce tensions with the government of Nicaragua. These include proposals to control aggressive action across Central American borders, to limit the importation of heavy weapons and the presence of foreign military advisors

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in the region, and to negotiate a U.S.-Nicaraguan nonaggression pact. Those offers remain in effect. (End opt)

Another recent example of Soviet disinformation tries to portray the U.S. effort to help Namibia achieve independence from South Africa as just the opposite of what it is. According to Soviet information media, Washington is really trying to sabotage Namibian independence by calling for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from neighboring Angola.

In reality, the United States supports Cuban withdrawal from Angola because it is clear that the Cuban forces must be removed before South Africa can be persuaded to recognize the advantages of continuing the negotiating process. (Opt) A Namibian settlement is near because of the patient diplomatic efforts of the United States, the other members of the Western "contact group," the South West Africa People's Organization, the government of South Africa, and a number of black African "front line" states. The Soviet Union is emphatically not involved in this cooperative international process. (End opt)

The real Soviet interest in the negotiations on Namibia is that if the Cuban forces withdraw from Angola, Moscow's influence in the region will be lessened. It is the Soviet Union that has the interest in obstructing a peaceful settlement.

That is why in this case, as in the case of Nicaragua, the Soviet Union is charging the United States with precisely what it is doing. Abraham Lincoln once asked a friend how many legs a horse would have if you called its tail a leg. When the friend replied, "five," Lincoln said, "no, calling a tail a leg doesn't make it one." We trust that the rest of the world will compare what the Soviets say with the facts.

Anncr:

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. government.

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES TECHNIQUES:

- a. Political influence operations range from the use of agents of influence, to the manipulation of private channels of communication, to the exploitation of unwitting contacts. These operations have a common aim: to ~~insinuate the~~ insinuate Soviet policy views into foreign governmental, political, journalistic, business, labor, artistic, and academic circles in a nonattributable or a seemingly unofficial manner. The KGB, which is actively involved in this type of activity, entrusts a variety of individuals (KGB officers and other Soviets) with developing strong personal relationships with political, economic, and media figures in the West and Third World. KGB officers frequently serve abroad under journalistic cover; and Soviet journalists who are not KGB officers also play a major role in political influence operations.
- b. Disinformation, in KGB parlance, denotes a variety of techniques and activities to survey false or misleading information, including rumors, insinuation, and altered facts. In its efforts to carry out disinformation operations, Soviet authorities have repeatedly used accredited diplomatic personnel abroad in a fashion not usually considered appropriate diplomatic practice.
- c. Forgeries are used to mislead foreign governments, media, and public opinion. All types of printed and photographic material have been forged, either as alterations of genuine documents or as total fabrications. The concealed Soviet role may be uncovered by content and forensic analysis of the document, the method of surfacing, the relative level of sophistication of the forgery, or its quick replay by the Soviet media. Since the mid-1970's the number of forged documents known to have surfaced has increased from about three or four a year to twice that number in 1980-81 to one per month in 1982. Since early 1980 the Soviets have been involved in a number of damaging forgeries in Western Europe aimed at aggravating relations between the United States and its allies, and undermining West European support for NATO's theater nuclear force modernization.
- d. Press placements, i.e., falsely attributed or nonattributed press material, are frequently used as a means of reinforcing Soviet overt propaganda. These covert press placements, either Soviet authored or inspired, are placed in foreign publications over the name of a non-Soviet author, or through some anonymous manner, without any indication of their real source. The primary purpose of such press placements is to influence local public audiences. Additionally, press placements may be cited and replayed by other Soviet press assets and by the overt Soviet and Bloc media, in an effort to create the impression of broad international support for Soviet policies.
- e. Front organizations, both international and local, have been created and maintained by the Soviets over the past 30 years to support Soviet policies abroad. The leaders of such groups are amenable to Soviet direction of their organizations. Many of the rank and file, as well as much of the general public, may not be aware of the Soviet influence in the front organizations. Because they pretend not to profess Communist ideological goals and are designed to attract members from a broad political spectrum, the front organizations are more effective than admittedly pro-Soviet groups.

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f. Friendship societies are viewed by the Soviets as political tools, and activities involving them are manipulated by the International Department. They are used as a bridge to people who may be reluctant to participate in front organizations. Soviet friendship and cultural societies in various countries represent themselves as nonpolitical, intended to promote cultural and economic understanding between the Soviet Union and the countries involved. These societies are available to the local KGB residency as a spotting mechanism for potential active measures and espionage agents. The leadership of such societies is weighted in favor of the Soviets, and the local friendship society's board of directors often includes KGB officers under diplomatic or "unofficial" cover.

g. Manipulation of mass organizations is practiced both directly by Soviet representatives abroad and through pro-Moscow Communist parties, fronts, or other political organizations and parties already influenced by active measures programs. Activities range from the encouragement of anti-government or anti-U.S. mass demonstrations and protests involving any exploitable cause, to work with labor and student organizations, to efforts to protest and overthrow the democratically elected leadership of targeted organizations by subsidizing and supporting leftist or pro-Soviet forces or candidates, or even non-Communist political parties.

h. Clandestine radio stations support Soviet foreign policy goals without acknowledging Soviet sponsorship. The two main such stations now maintained are the National Voice of Iran (NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, which broadcast on a regular basis from the Soviet Union to Iran and China. NVOI represents itself as a voice of unidentified "progressive" elements of the Iranian people; Radio Ba Yi poses as a Chinese station representing Chinese political dissidents, particularly among the Chinese military. NVOI commentaries are couched in nationalistic and occasionally religious tones. Anti-U.S. propaganda has been an important feature of NVOI since its inception in 1959. NVOI broadcasts were particularly inflammatory in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979; they endorsed the actions of the militants in seizing the embassy and U.S. diplomatic personnel and encouraged other anti-U.S. acts.

To: Club Chairpersons, Section Organizers and State Committee members:
Re: Mobilization for June 12 Demonstration

Dear Comrade,

The movement against President Reagan's military policies is growing all over the world. Demonstrations are occurring with increasing frequency and getting larger. For the next few months, the focal point for much activity will be the United Nations, which is holding its Second Session on Disarmament from June 7 to July 9. About 100 International and National organizations have formed a coalition to build a demonstration which will coincide with the Special Session. Scheduled for June 12 in New York City, it could be the largest peace demonstration in U.S. history.

The party has been an active participant in the coalition. We have been involved in the various planning meetings and several of the task forces. Now we must mobilize the entire district to help insure a giant turnout on June 12. This demonstration on the West Coast.

Because the UN is in New York, our district has a special responsibility. Every club should try to get at least one organization to sponsor and actively participate in the June 12th demonstration. (This should be a minimum.) Our role is to insure that the composition of the demonstration and sponsoring organizations reflect the national, class and racial composition of working people - Black and Puerto Rican and of course trade union participation. Right now, the coalition is having problems maintaining unity. If we can increase the number of grassroots organizations active in the mobilization, we will be helping to preserve the fragile unity that exists in this diverse coalition. Organizations wishing to endorse the demonstration should contact:

New York June 12 Disarmament Campaign
135 W. 4th Street
(212) 460-8992

The New York Campaign is also doing some coordination for New York State as a whole, especially in those places where there is no June 12th committee. In NYC we should encourage organizations to send representatives to the city-wide meeting of participating organizations scheduled for March 31 at 241 Thompson St. (near Washington Square Park) at 8PM in Manhattan.

The national office of the June 12th coalition (853 Broadway, Suite 2109, Phone: 4608980) is ready to provide local organizations with information and literature. This office can be contacted by anyone interested in the demonstration and other activities related to the Special Session.

Another good way for the clubs to get involved in the campaign is through the nuclear freeze campaign. This movement which is spreading across the country, has received endorsements from a number of trade unions and prominent politicians. In addition, in a sense it is already half successful since the Soviet Union has already agreed to a freeze. Circulating freeze literature and collecting signatures on a freeze petition can facilitate the mobilization of organizations in your community for the June 12 action. For information on the freeze campaign, contact: The New Manhattan Project, 15 Rutherford Place, NYC 10003, Phone: 598-0971).

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BY: CA NGA DATE: 8/26/11

Some mass organizations in your area may be interested in holding an event for members of the Japanese delegation attending the Special Session. They will be arriving in NEW York at the end of May and plan to travel around the country speaking about nuclear war. If arranged now, they will also be able to travel up-state. For more information, contact:

U.S. PEACE COUNCIL
7 East 15th Street, Suite 408
New York, New York 100
(212) 989-1194

Clubs should begin discussing which comrades can march in a Party/YWIL contingent on June 12. We will also need volunteers to distribute the Daily World, Voz del Pueblo and the Young Worker to demonstrators.

Enclosed is some of the initial material on the demonstration and related activities. You will soon receive a club education dealing with June 12. Members of the District Peace and Solidarity Commission and section organizers will be contacting clubs to discuss the demonstration. Any club wishing a speaker or has questions, please contact Bruce Kimmel (924-2523 during day).

Comradely,

Bruce Kimmel, On behalf of the District
Peace and Solidarity Commission

URGENT FLASH ANNOUNCEMENT ...URGENT FLASH ANNOUNCEMENT....

There will be a demonstration on Tuesday, March 23rd 6:00 - 8:00 PM to speak out and demonstration against Reaganism. Reagan will be in NYC to accept an "Humanitarian Award". The demonstration is being sponsored by the Emergency Campaign to Save Human Services, with demands against - the budget cuts, the military budget and US policy in El Salvador, against unemployment etc.

More than one group is sponsoring a demonstration at more or less the same place. We encourage all aprty people and those they influence to:

- Demonstration at the NY Hilton
- 6 - 8 PM
- 6th Avenue and 52nd Street
- Emergency Campaign to Save Human Services

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Soviet "Active Measures" in the West
and the Developing World

A forgery purporting to be an official U.S. Government document appears in a West European country. In a developing country, false rumors are spread of U.S. involvement in a coup attempt. A clandestine radio station beams anti-Western broadcasts into Iran. A Western firm is warned that its commercial ties with the Soviet Union will suffer if it also sells equipment to China.

What is the thread which links together these seemingly unrelated activities? They are all examples of "active measures" carried out by the Soviet Union in a large scale campaign to complement its traditional diplomacy and weaken governments which are not subservient to direction from Moscow. The Soviets use the term "active measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to refer to operations intended to provoke a policy effect, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence. Soviet "active measures" include:

- written or oral disinformation;
- efforts to control the media in foreign countries;
- use of foreign communist parties and front organizations;
- clandestine radio broadcasting;
- economic coercion
- political influence operations.

The range of activities included in the Soviet repertoire of "active measures", the sustained nature of Moscow's "active measures" effort, the amount of resources devoted to this activity, and its close integration with Soviet foreign policy distinguish Soviet practices from those of other nations. In particular, Soviet "active measures" should be clearly distinguished from the "public diplomacy" carried out by virtually all nations, including the U.S. "Public diplomacy" includes, inter alia, providing press releases and other information to journalists, open public broadcasting, and a wide variety of academic and cultural exchange programs. By contrast, Soviet "active measures" are often undertaken secretly, in many cases violating the laws of other countries and involving illicit efforts to suborn individuals by exploiting their weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Soviet "active measures" do not always achieve their objectives, but they have had some success and remain a major, if little understood, element of Soviet foreign policy. In

DECLASSIFIED (RE/OKSP)

Authority NLR-134-27-1133

BY WJ NARA DATE 8/26/11

response to requests from governments and individuals concerned about such activities, this paper has been prepared as an introduction to the organization, methods, capabilities, and limitations of Soviet "active measures". A number of case studies of Soviet "active measures" campaigns have been included to demonstrate how these techniques are used to achieve specific Soviet objectives.

The Soviet regime devotes considerable financial, technical, and personnel resources to "active measures" and is willing to run the risk of political embarrassment should such operations in foreign countries be exposed. This effort is well integrated with other Soviet foreign policy initiatives, but the effectiveness of "active measures" varies depending on place and circumstances. In a number of cases, Soviet "active measures" operations have failed, either because of Soviet ineptitude or effective counter-measures by targeted individuals or governments. As with all important decisions in Soviet foreign policy, approval for a program of "active measures" in foreign countries is made at the highest level of authority in the USSR, the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee.

Soviet "active measures" activities are not the work of individual "super-spies", such as the fictional James Bond. Rather, they are designed and executed by a large and complex bureaucracy in which the KGB and the International Department of the Communist Party Central Committee are major elements. The International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee (IID) is also deeply engaged in managing these activities. Actual operations abroad are executed by both official and quasi-official Soviet representatives, including scholars, students, and journalists whose links with official Soviet organizations are not always apparent. The highly centralized structure of the Soviet state and its system of pervasive control and direction over all elements of its society give the Soviet leadership an impressive capability to draw on all segments of party, government and private citizens in orchestrating "active measures".

Industrialized democratic nations and developing countries are the main targets of Soviet "active measures". In many cases, the open nature of these societies and the relatively free access to their news media give the Soviets an opportunity for a wide range of such activities. The Soviet Union, by contrast, denies reciprocal access to its mass media for foreigners who might voice independent criticism of Soviet society or the foreign policies of the USSR. Moreover, there is a tendency in many western and developing countries to

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ignore or downplay Soviet "active measures" activities except when Soviet blunders lead to well-publicized expulsions of diplomats, journalists, or others involved in these activities. The Soviets are also becoming more adept at portraying their policies as compatible or parallel with the interests of a wide variety of peace, environmental, and other special interest groups active in Western and developing societies.

While the primary target of Soviet "active measures" remains the United States and its policies, Moscow has also devoted increasing resources to "active measures" against the governments of other industrialized countries in Europe and Asia and a large number of countries in the developing world. These activities are designed to influence the policies of foreign governments in favor of the Soviet Union; disrupt relations between other states; undermine foreign leaders; institutions and values, and discredit opponents of the USSR. Soviet "active measures" tactics are often adjusted to reflect changes in the international situation, but they continue, and may even be intensified, during periods of reduced tension or detente.

"Active Measures" Techniques

The tactics and emphasis of the Soviet "active measures" effort often change in order to meet new situations. For instance, the Soviet use of Marxist-Leninist ideology as an appeal to foreign groups often has turned out to be an obstacle to the promotion of Soviet goals in some areas and is now being deemphasized, although not completely abandoned. At the same time, some religious themes, such as the claimed favorable situation of the Islamic religion in the USSR, have assumed greater significance, particularly as a result of Moscow's courting of Muslim countries in Africa and the Middle East.

Although Soviet-dominated international front organizations still play an important role in Soviet "active measures" operations, Moscow has in recent years begun to pay greater attention to broadening its base of support by using more "ad hoc" fronts and single-interest groups to promote its goals in particular regions. While seeking to conduct "active measures" operations with greater sophistication, the Soviets continue to rely on a number of traditional techniques, including:

--Efforts to Manipulate the Press in Foreign Countries:
The Soviet "active measures" structure continues to make frequent use of falsely attributed press material which is inserted into the media of foreign countries. In one

developing country, the Soviets are known to have made use of more than two dozen local journalists to plant media items favorable to the USSR. The Indian weekly Blitz has been used by the Soviets to surface forgeries, identify alleged CIA personnel or agents, and disseminate Soviet-inspired documents. In still another country, Soviet overt cultural and information activities were used to establish contacts with local journalists which later enabled Soviet officials to exercise a substantial degree of control over the content of two major daily newspapers.

--Forgeries: Soviet forgeries have increased in frequency and quality in recent years. These forgeries, which may be completely fabricated or altered versions of actual documents, are produced and circulated to mislead foreign governments, media, and public opinion. Among the forgeries which have been produced and distributed by Soviet agents are bogus U.S. military manuals and fabricated war plans designed to create tensions between the U.S. and other countries. In some cases, actual documents passed to the KGB by U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, who was eventually arrested and convicted as a Soviet agent, were used as models for the style and format of Soviet forgeries. In one case, Soviet agents circulated a forged "Top Secret" letter from Secretary of State Vance to another Western foreign minister in an effort to disrupt the NATO TNF modernization effort.

--Disinformation: Soviet agents often use a variety of techniques including rumors, insinuation, and distortion of facts to discredit foreign governments and leaders. In late 1979, Soviet agents spread the false rumor that the United States was behind the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca. In another instance of Soviet disinformation, Soviet officials in a West European country warned host government officials that the CIA had increased its activities in the country and that a coup was being planned. These covert disinformation campaigns are sometimes played back in the foreign media suborned by the Soviets, thus enabling Moscow to cite foreign sources for some of the distortions and mistatements which often appear in the Soviet media. Recent and particularly outrageous examples of this practice were the August 1981 TASS allegations that the U.S. was behind the death of Panamanian General Omar Torrijos.

--International and Local Front Organizations: The Soviet Union exercises control over a number of pro-Soviet international front organizations through the International Organizations Section of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Because they pretend not to profess Communist ideological goals and are designed to attract members from a broad political spectrum, the front organizations are

more effective than openly pro-Soviet groups. Among the most prominent of these organizations are the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International Democratic Federation. Soviet "friendship" and cultural societies in many countries are used to establish contact with many people who are reluctant to participate in avowedly pro-Soviet or communist organizations. The function of both the front organizations and the "friendship" and cultural societies is to generate local support for Soviet foreign policy goals and to oppose local policies and leaders whose activities do not serve Soviet interests.

To complement organizations which have a known and often pronounced pro-Soviet bias, the Soviets are making increasing use of ad hoc front groups which do not have a history of close association with the Soviet Union. Although these groups seek to attract members from a wide political spectrum, their leaderships are sometimes dominated by pro-Soviet individuals and they are sometimes covertly funded by the USSR.

--Clandestine Radio Stations: Presently the Soviet Union operates two clandestine radio stations: The National Voice of Iran (NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, which broadcast on a regular basis from the Soviet Union to Iran and China. Soviet sponsorship of these stations has never been publicly acknowledged by Moscow, and the stations represent themselves as organs of authentic local "progressive" forces. The broadcasts of both stations are illustrative of the use of "active measures" activities in support of Soviet foreign policy goals. For instance, NVOI consistently urged that the American diplomatic hostages not be released, although Soviet official statements supported their claim to diplomatic immunity.

--Economic Coercion: The Soviet Union also uses a variety of covert economic maneuvers in "active measures" operations. For example, a Soviet Ambassador in a West European country warned a local businessman that his sales to the USSR would suffer if he went ahead with plans to provide technical assistance to China. In another industrialized country, Soviet agents were instructed to drive up the price of gold and thus increase local concern over the stability of the dollar. This was to be accomplished by manipulating a flow of both true and false information to local businessmen and government leaders. The gambit failed because the financial aspects of the operation were not fully understood by the Soviet officials who attempted to carry it out.

Political Influence Operations: Political influence operations are the most important but least understood aspect

of Soviet "active measures" activities. These operations seek to exploit contacts with political, economic, and media figures in target countries to secure active collaboration with Moscow. In return for this collaboration, Soviet officials offer inducements tailored to meet the specific requirements or vulnerabilities of the individual involved. In 1980, Pierre-Charles Pathe, a French journalist, was convicted for acting as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959. His articles --all subtly pushing the Soviet line on a wide range of international issues--were published in a number of important newspapers and journals, sometimes under the pseudonym of Charles Morand. The journalist also published a private newsletter which was regularly sent to many newspapers, members of Parliament, and a number of foreign embassies. The Soviets used Pathe over a number of years to try to influence the attitudes of the prominent subscribers to his newsletter and to exploit his broad personal contacts.

In other cases, Soviet officials establish close relationships with political figures in foreign countries and seek to use these contacts in "active measures" operations. Capitalizing on the host government official's ambition, his Soviet contact claims to be a private channel to the Soviet leadership. To play upon his sense of self-importance and to enhance his credibility within his own government, the host government official may be invited to meetings with high-level Soviet leaders. The Soviets then exploit the local official to pass a mixture of true, distorted, and false information--all calculated to serve Soviet objectives--to the host government.

--Use of Academicians and Journalists: Soviet academicians are frequently used in political influence operations because they are often accepted as legitimate counterparts of their non-Soviet colleagues. Unlike their free world counterparts, they must play two roles--their legitimate academic pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and their political activities on behalf of the Kremlin. They are often obliged to act on the basis of instructions from bodies which plan and control Soviet "active measures" activities. Similarly, Soviet journalists often engage in "active measures" operations in addition to serving as representatives of Soviet news agencies. One KGB Officer in an industrialized country used his journalistic cover to pass forgeries, as well as to publish numerous propaganda articles aimed at influencing the media of the host country. In other cases, Soviet journalists have served as conduits for messages from Soviet leaders to prominent politicians and other leaders in Western countries.

Case Studies

The Soviet Anti-TNF Modernization Campaign in Europe: The Soviet campaign in Europe against NATO TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) modernization is a good illustration of Soviet use of "active measures". After a long and unprecedented build-up of Soviet military strength in Europe, including the deployment of new SS-20 nuclear missiles targeted on Western Europe, the NATO Ministers in December 1979 decided to modernize NATO's TNF capabilities. Of course, not all opposition to the TNF modernization decision is inspired by the Soviet Union or its "active measures" activities. However, even before the NATO modernization decision was taken, the Soviets began an intensive campaign to develop a climate of public opinion unfavorable to implementation of the NATO decision. This campaign has been intensified in recent months.

Soviet diplomats in European countries have tried to pressure their host governments in a variety of ways. In one European country, the Soviet Ambassador met privately with the Minister of Commerce to discuss the supply and price of oil sold by the Soviet Union to that country. During the discussion, the Ambassador gave the Minister a copy of Brezhnev's Berlin speech dealing with TNF. He suggested that, if the host government opposed TNF modernization, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be able to persuade the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade to grant more favorable terms.

Moscow has spurred a number of front groups to oppose the TNF decision through well publicized conferences and public demonstrations. To broaden the base of support for the anti-TNF campaign, the front groups have proselytized non-communist participants, including anti-nuclear groups, pacifists, environmentalists and others. In some cases, the activities of these broad front groups have been directed by local communist parties. The Soviets have predictably devoted the greatest resources to these activities in NATO countries where opposition to the TNF modernization decision is strongest.

In the Netherlands, the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) has set up its own front group, Dutch Christians for Socialism. In November 1980, the Dutch "Joint Committee-Stop the Neutron Bomb-Stop the Nuclear Armament Race", which has ties to the CPN, sponsored an international forum against nuclear arms in Amsterdam. The forum succeeded in attracting support from a variety of quarters, which the CPN is exploiting in its campaign to prevent final parliamentary approval of the TNF decision.

The Soviet Campaign Against Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERW): The Soviets, throughout 1977 and early 1978, carried out one of their largest, most expensive, and best-orchestrated "active measures" campaigns against the production of enhanced radiation weapons--the "neutron bomb." While not all opposition to enhanced radiation weapons was Soviet-inspired, Moscow's intensive and costly "active measures" campaign undoubtedly had some impact on public opinion in the West.

This Soviet campaign has had two objectives. First was a halt in the planned deployment of enhanced radiation weapons by NATO. The second goal was to divide the NATO Alliance, encourage criticism of the U.S., and divert Western attention from the growing Soviet military build-up and the threat this posed to NATO.

--The first phase took place in the summer of 1977. In addition to an intense anti-neutron bomb and anti-U.S. propaganda blitz, the Soviets staged many demonstrations and protests by various "Peace Councils," and other host groups. This phase culminated in a Soviet-proclaimed international "Week of Action."

--Phase two focused on propaganda exploitation of letters sent by Leonid Brezhnev to Western Heads of Government in January 1978 warning that the production and deployment of the neutron bomb constituted a serious threat to detente. This was not intended as a private diplomatic communication but as a critical element in the Soviet effort to sway Western opinion. A barrage of similar letters from members of the Supreme Soviet were sent to Western parliamentarians. Soviet trade union officials forwarded parallel messages to Western labor counterparts.

--The third phase came in early 1978 with a series of Soviet-planned conferences designed to build up the momentum of anti-neutron bomb pressure for the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) of May-June 1978. These meetings and conferences, held throughout February and March, were either organized by the World Peace Council (under different names and covers) or jointly sponsored with established and recognized independent international groups.

The Soviet campaign succeeded in complicating Allied defense planning and focusing criticism on the U.S. A top Hungarian Communist Party official wrote that "the political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and successful since World War Two". The propaganda campaign did not end in 1978, but rather was incorporated into anti-TNF efforts. With the recent U.S.

decision to proceed with ERW production, a new barrage of Soviet propaganda and related "active measures" has already begun.

Soviet "Active Measures" Toward El Salvador: Complementing their overt public support for the leftist insurgency in El Salvador, the Soviets have also engaged in an "active measures" campaign to sway public opinion. These activities have involved a broad range of standard techniques, including forgeries, disinformation, attempted manipulation of the press, and use of front groups. The obvious dual purpose has been to increase support for the insurgency while trying to discredit U.S. efforts to assist the Government of El Salvador.

--In the Spring of 1980, the Salvadoran Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) was established with Soviet and Cuban support to represent the leftist insurgency abroad. In June, Salvadoran leftists meeting in Havana formed the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the central political and military planning organization for the insurgents. The FDR and DRU work closely with the Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans, but their collaboration is often covert in character.

The DRU also supported the establishment of Salvadoran Solidarity Committees in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Supported by local communist parties and leftist groups, these solidarity committees have served both as propaganda outlets and as organizers of meetings and demonstrations in support of the insurgents. Such committees, in cooperation with local communist parties and leftist groups, organized some 70 demonstrations and protests that took place between mid-January and mid-March 1981 in Western Europe, Latin America, Australia, and New Zealand.

The FDR and DRU are careful to conceal the Soviet and Cuban hand in planning and supporting their activities and seek to pass themselves off as a fully independent, indigenous Salvadoran movement. The DRU has had some success in influencing public opinion throughout Latin America and in Western Europe. The effort of the insurgents to gain legitimacy has been buttressed by intense diplomatic activity on their behalf. For example, at the February 1981 Non-Aligned Movement meeting in New Delhi, a 30-man Cuban contingent, cooperating closely with six Soviet diplomats, pressed the conference to condemn U.S. policy in El Salvador.

At another level, the Soviet media have publicized numerous distortions as part of the effort to erode support for U.S. policy. For example, an article in the December 30, 1980 Pravda falsely stated that U.S. military advisors in El

Salvador were involved in punitive actions against non-combatants, including use of napalm and herbicides. In another particularly outrageous distortion, a January 1, 1981 article in the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta falsely stated that the U.S. was preparing to implement the so-called "centaur plan" for "elimination" of thousands of Salvadorans.

Campaign Against U.S.-Egypt Relationship and the Camp David Process: Another target of Soviet "active measures" operations has been the Middle East where the Soviets have sought to weaken the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, undermine the Camp David Peace Process, and generally exacerbate tensions. A special feature of Middle East "active measures" activities has been the use of a series of Soviet forgeries including:

--A purported speech by a member of the U.S. administration which was insulting to Egyptians and called for "a total change of the government and the governmental system in Egypt." This forgery, which surfaced in 1976, was the first of a series of bogus documents produced by the Soviets in an effort to complicate U.S.-Egyptian relations.

--Another forged document, allegedly prepared by the Secretary of State, or one of his close associates, for the President, used language insulting and offensive to President Sadat and other Egyptians and also to other Arab leaders, including King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. This forgery was delivered anonymously to the Egyptian Embassy in Rome in April 1977.

--A series of forged letters and U.S. Government documents, which surfaced in various locations during 1977, criticized Sadat's "lack of leadership" and called for a "change of government" in Egypt.

--A forged dispatch, allegedly prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which was received by mail at the Egyptian Embassy in Belgrade in August 1977. This forgery suggested that the United States had acquiesced in plans by Iran and Saudi Arabia to overthrow Sadat.

--A false CIA report, which surfaced in the January 1979 issue of the Cairo-based magazine Al-Dawa, criticized Islamic groups as a barrier to U.S. goals in the Middle East and suggested tactics to suppress, divide, and eliminate these groups.

--A forged letter from U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Herman F. Eilts which surfaced in the October 1, 1979 edition of the Syrian newspaper Al-Ba'th. The forged letter declared that,

because Sadat was not prepared to serve U.S. interests, "we must repudiate him and get rid of him without hesitation".

Conclusion

The Soviet Union continues to make extensive use of "active measures" to achieve its foreign policy objectives and frustrate those of other countries. While Soviet "active measures" can be exposed, as they have often been in the past, the Soviets are becoming more sophisticated, especially in forgeries and political influence operations. On the basis of the historical record, there is every reason to believe that the Soviet leadership will continue to devote considerable resources to "active measures" operations and that such activities will continue to pose a significant threat to both industrialized and developing countries.