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Withdrawer

CAS 8/23/2016

File Folder SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND THE FREEZE 1/1/82-3/31/82

FOIA

F02-0083/01

Box Number 27

PRADOS

2703

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
179733	PAPERS	RE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES	11	2/19/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of the Director

11 MAR 1982



USICA

1735

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT ATTACHMENT)

MAR 10 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Gilbert A. Robinson *GA*
Acting Director

SUBJECT: Soviet Forgeries Field Manual

I thought you might be interested in the attached unclassified report on Soviet and Soviet-proxy forgeries of U.S. Government documents. It will be distributed to all USICA Posts for their use as a reference manual.

The first section describes characteristics of forgeries and general patterns of occurrence. Section two (tabbed) is an annex of ten forgery case studies keyed to references in the previous text.

Classified operational guidance to Posts, which accompanies the manual, recommends actions both to discourage forgeries and to limit their damage to U.S. interests.

In preparing the report, we received valuable guidance from both State and CIA. We think the report will be useful in our efforts to combat Soviet active measures.

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(UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT ATTACHMENT)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *DDSW/WR*
BY *CH* NARA DATE *8/23/16*

RECEIVED 20 MAR 82 09

5

TO CLARK

FROM ROBINSON, G

DOCDATE 10 MAR 82

CU 8/23/86

"extensive measures"

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

SUSPENSE

KEYWORDS: USSR

ICA

SUBJECT: SOVIET & SOVIET PROXY FORGERIES OF US GOVT DOCUMENTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 24 MAR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

LORD

MYER

DeGraffenreid
JJ

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIF ID (N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council The White House

Package # 1735

32 MAR 11 AM 11:05

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>JP</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>JH</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Meese	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Baker	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Deaver	_____	Show CC	_____
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

COMBATting SOVIET FORGERIES: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

Entire text is confidential.

The following guidance is designed to accompany the unclassified Research Report entitled "Forgeries of U.S. Documents" (R-5-82, February 1982). This paper provides recommendations on how to discourage forgeries and to limit their damage to U.S. interests.

What To Do:

1. To Help Discourage Forgeries

Posts can take precautions to help prevent the Soviets or others from acquiring the materials needed to produce credible forgeries.

- o Control access to office materials such as official letterhead, telegram and telex forms, signature and other official stamps, and to photocopying of both classified and unclassified materials.
- o Regulate access to names of Embassy contacts (e.g., the DRS list), as well as to such seemingly "routine" documents as unclassified memoranda, agendas, personnel rosters, appointment schedules, and calendars of upcoming events.

2. To Try to Prevent A Forgery From Surfacing

- o Programs to educate the local media should become a more salient feature of countries' programming activities. For example, a presentation might be developed using concrete examples of past forgeries to alert media both to the circumstances in which they are most likely to surface and to their common characteristics.

If a forgery is suspected, the PAO should take several immediate steps:

- o Try to delay publication. Tell the journalist that the document or information doesn't "feel" right. Attempt to specify what is wrong if possible, but in any case, ask for time.
- o Do not point out too many specifics in exposing the document. The more tricks of the trade that are exposed, the easier it is for the Soviets to improve their efforts in the future. It may be necessary to reveal some of the indicators on a "background" basis.
- o Try to obtain the original document along with the cover letter and wrapping. Settle for a good copy if necessary. Do not write on or deface the original documents or copies.

DECLASSIFIED

Classified by: John Hughes
RDS-2 3/02/02

Authority DIS Walker
BY CW NARA DATE 8/23/16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- o Talk with the Political Counselor and other appropriate Mission personnel. Show them the document; they may have something in their files or spot a feature you have missed.
- o Send specifics to Washington. Only limited guidance is likely to be available in Mission files. In order to circulate information worldwide, USICA and sister agencies should receive the exact text of the document and details on the source:
 - tag messages PROP and UR at a minimum
 - subject line is to begin: "Soviet (or Soviet Proxy) Active Measures:...."
 - messages on active measures, whether prepared by USICA or State officers, should be transmitted as State telegrams with USICA as an info addressee and slugged: ATTN: PGM/G, EU, PGM/R
 - the forgery itself or a copy together with wrappings should be sent to Washington via PARS or addressed to INR/INC for transmission to PARS to assure proper technical analysis. (Refer to State 335811, DTG 191931Z DEC 81, for further instructions.)
- o Closely monitor and report local reaction to the forgery and any press coverage, including, if available, information on the publication in which the forgery (or a reference to it) appeared (e.g., if the publication has passed Soviet disinformation before, and which writer was involved).

3. To Minimize Damage After A Forgery Surfaces


It is important to get information to the affected government immediately to convince it that a forgery is involved. In some cases, Washington can supply professional forgery analysts who can make technical presentations in-country.

Just because a forgery has been exposed as such, however, does not mean it is no longer useful. Good forgeries can be accepted at face value--even by sophisticated audiences--long after they have been denounced as forgeries, and a forgery can continue to re-surface intermittently. For example, Army Field Manual FM 30-31B, which surfaced first in 1975, was used effectively in the aftermath of the Moro murder three years later.

A useful general reference for how to deal with forgeries is the February 6 and 19, 1980, testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence which contains an extended discussion of the "Forgery Offensive" and other examples of forgeries.

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RESEARCH REPORT



USICA

**Office of Research
International Communication Agency
United States of America**

11

FORGERIES OF U.S. DOCUMENTS

This report was prepared by
the European Branch

February 1982

R-5-82

FORGERIES

Introduction

This report is on forgeries of U.S. documents. Most such forgeries are done by the Soviets, and some by the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks -- those espionage services with the technical capability.

During 1945-1975, roughly three to four forgeries were detected each year. Since 1976, the number of known forgeries has doubled.

A single forgery may be used many times, many places. The most frequently used forgery to date (see the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31B, Tab A) surfaced in some 20 countries since 1975.

Many problems can be caused by even a single appearance in one country. Moreover, a good forgery seldom is discredited in a single effort. It can surface in various forms around the world during its life and be replayed endlessly in the press.

Characteristics Of Forgeries

Anything can be forged. Soviet forgeries have included entire issues of Newsweek magazine, complete U.S. Army field manuals, maps, classified cables, personal letters, and mailgrams. No document is above suspicion simply because of its form.

Forgeries contain false, misleading, or incomplete information. They may be:

- o complete fabrications--such as the entire Army Field Manual ("Stability Operations--Intelligence", FM 30-31B, Tab A), which was used to allege a strategy of U.S. subversive activities, including that the U.S. was linked to the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro.
- o altered versions of genuine documents and official forms--such as the forged "State Airgram A-8950" in Tab B which purported to show that the U.S. government was bribing foreign officials.

- o composites of several documents--some genuine and others altered or fabricated--as in the recent "Holocaust Again for Europe" document (Tab C) which supposedly revealed U.S. plans on the use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Since 1976, Soviet forgeries have been used in support of the following propaganda themes: (1) U.S. subversion activities, e.g., Army Field Manual FM 30-31B (Tab A); (2) U.S. relations with its NATO Allies, with particular emphasis on Greek-Turkish relations, illustrated by a forged State Department telegram (Tab F) and the text of a phony Presidential speech (Tab G); and (3) the Middle East peace process, with emphasis on Sadat, e.g., forged State documents "signed" by the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt (Tab J).

These forgeries seem to have two general aims. The first is to show U.S. meddling in other countries' internal affairs. This is usually attempted with forgeries of general-purpose documents (such as Field Manual FM 30-31B) that can be used again and again in different contexts to substantiate claims of U.S. interference.

The second aim of a forgery is to create personal enmity between U.S. and foreign leaders, as was the case with a forged text of an interview with then-Vice President Mondale (Tab D) in which he allegedly disparaged Begin and Sadat.

Forgeries try to warp the decision process in target countries by misleading government leaders and opinion-makers. Such forgeries are not always publicly released. A forged letter in which a U.S. Air Force colonel allegedly confirmed that the U.S. colluded with NATO Allies and China to supply weapons to Zaire is a case in point (Tab E). The letter was handed quietly to members of the Belgian Cabinet, probably to encourage them to re-think their NATO ties.

Forgeries are also used to influence public opinion in target countries, usually by being planted in the domestic media. An example is the "Holocaust" document (Tab C).

Can Forgeries Be Anticipated?

The Soviets can move very quickly to exploit an opportunity. While most major forgeries require months of intensive effort, a recent forgery (a State Department classified cable) took only two weeks to produce.

While the Soviets seize specific targets of opportunity, forgeries do not appear randomly. Forgeries occur most often:

- o In periods of increased U.S.-Soviet tensions. Active measures are a major element of Soviet foreign policy whatever the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Forgeries, however, are a barometer of U.S.-Soviet relations. During the height of detente in the early 70s, there were very few Soviet forgeries. The pace quickened after 1976 when tensions between the superpowers increased.
- o During intense anti-U.S. progaganda campaigns. Forgeries often are used to substantiate major themes of Soviet propaganda offensives. The "Heard letter" (Tab E) supported propaganda charges that China was joining NATO in a collusion of imperialists and Maoists against Third World liberation movements. Forgeries of a Presidential speech (Tab G) and of a State Department telegram (Tab F) sought to create strains within NATO.
- o After major international events--e.g., summit meetings or acts of terrorism in NATO countries. The forged U.S. Army field manual (FM 30-31B, "Stability Operations--Intelligence, Tab A) which first surfaced in 1975, was used, in conjunction with a major Soviet propaganda offensive, to support the Soviet claim that the U.S. was linked to the Red Brigades' 1978 murder of Aldo Moro.
- o After Western press and government criticism of the Soviet bloc--e.g., Western comment on a link between the Moro kid-nappers and the Soviet bloc.
- o After widely-publicized incidents embarrassing to the U.S. An example is "Airgram A-8950" (Tab B) which sought to exploit the damage already done to the U.S. image by revelations of the bribery practices of U.S. businesses abroad.

Detecting Forgeries

Forgeries of USG documents and communiques often are authentic-looking, particularly if there is ample time to prepare them. The Soviets have become so proficient that even experts sometimes have difficulty detecting forgeries by technical criteria or format alone. An example of an authentic-looking forgery is on the next page.

Only a very close examination of this forgery reveals several minor, but telling, discrepancies: (A) improper expiration date; (B) an incorrect country code for the Netherlands; (C) a required paragraph classification symbol missing; and (D) the use of outdated downgrading instructions.

A

Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20501		CONFIDENTIAL	
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT			
See Distribution List	A. DATES REFERENCE 17 Oct 68 31 Mar 76	EXPIRATION DATE ALWAYS LAST DATE MONTH	URGENT COM HPH
Anti-US Activities and their Sponsors Western Europe (U)	1A	1-1-1976	See Distribution List
See Distribution List	REQUIRE & PARAGRAPH DECLASSIFICATION MISSING	MY PRIOR... 1-1-1976	See Distribution List
a. Requirements: Request information as follows on anti-US activities and their sponsors in the host country:			
(1) Identity of sponsoring and of participating organizations and political parties, areas of their activity, titles and details of official publications, names and political affiliations of leaders, locations of their offices and their home addresses, total number of participants, when feasible, furnish photographs and/or recognition characteristics of active participants in anti-US activities.			
(2) Plans, dates, time and site of activities.			
(3) Interest displayed toward US military facilities, possible intentions to demonstrate at facilities, to distribute propaganda to US military personnel or in housing areas, to erect or to paint signs at facilities, to instigate incidents with personnel, to disrupt military operations or festival-type activity, and to destroy, damage or bespoil US government or US private property.			
(4) Main themes of public demonstrations, texts of banners, posters, leaflets and other literature (furnish samples), identity of speakers and themes of major speeches, nature of other attractions and identity of performers.			
(5) Details of incidents, involvement of US military personnel, activity of inter-demonstrators, public reaction.			
(6) Plans of host country services and police to control anti-US organizations and their activities, means applied (both overt and covert), intervention in and prevention of incidents, confiscation of propaganda materials, overall effectiveness of police and counterintelligence measures.			
Annex A Listing of Anti-US Organizations			
Form 1065, Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.			
CONFIDENTIAL			

C

B

THIS TYPE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN USED SINCE 1974/75

ATTACH TO DOCUMENT 214-1076-75

D

For the PAO, the most useful advice is: Get Help! Do not attempt to prove forgeries on your own.

In detecting forgeries, knowledge of U.S. policy is indispensable. Very often a document may intuitively not "feel" right or, more importantly, be at variance with U.S. policy. In either case, the PAO should turn immediately to appropriate people in the Mission for assistance.

Forgeries may contain several types of errors that experienced officers can detect. Obvious format errors such as an improper action office (e.g., Personnel being asked to deal with a matter more appropriately handled by the Desk), technical errors (e.g., wrong typeface), poor grammar, or inappropriate classification may be clues.

Also, forgeries often contain statements that the USG simply does not make. For example, a forged classified cable stated that the U.S. might "force" NATO Allies to accept the U.S. position on an issue; or a forged interview with the Vice President that had him saying that neither Begin nor Sadat were suitable to the task of achieving peace in the Middle East (Tab D).

Some patterns have been observed that may help in exposing forgeries:

- o Use of security classifications. Because classified documents attract more attention than unclassified ones, most forgeries will bear a classification. On occasion, an improper classification is used, for example, a TOP SECRET classification given to the forged U.S. Army Field Manual (Tab A). In some cases, when the forgery is to be passed off as private correspondence between high-ranking officials, their status serves the same purpose as classification.
- o Use of official letterheads. Soviet-bloc countries make great efforts to collect U.S. forms, letters, official signatures, and the like as models for their forgeries. And they use real, not fictitious, names of officials and organizations. Their efforts are not limited only to USG forms or letters. In one instance, the letterhead of the NATO Secretary General was used for a forged letter to the U.S. Ambassador to NATO (Tab H).

Montage techniques in which parts of different documents are combined to form a single document, as well as the use of original forms, are common.

- o Use of photocopies, not originals. The photocopy machine has replaced photographic forgeries. Photocopying permits "cutting and pasting," so that facsimile signatures can be printed and multiple copies made. Use of photocopies prevents technical examination of the original. Documents often are not in sharp focus or full size.
- o Use of cover letters. Cover letters are often used to transmit forgeries to target groups or individual--e.g., government officials, newspaper editors. The letter is usually anonymous--the writer excusing the absence of a signature by claiming fear for his life or position.

The letter explains why the recipient is getting the document and usually characterizes the content of the forgery. For example, in the case of the forged U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31B (Tab A), the cover letter was supposedly sent from an American who opposed "U.S. military involvement in matters beyond the scope of reasonable American interest." Another forged document was distributed because, the writer of the cover letter said, the document contained information that constituted a U.S. plot in the Middle East.

- o Use of logical scenarios. Rather than fanciful plots or coups, Soviet forgeries tend to be more general concerns that can exacerbate negative feelings about the U.S. and its intentions. Vague charges about spying by the Peace Corps, anti-host government intrigue by the U.S., or anti-host country attitudes by key officials are easy to believe and difficult to disprove.

Allegations that can be easily checked are almost never made. Forgeries usually capitalize on perceived local prejudices and anti-U.S. feelings, and tend therefore to be believable. A recent example is the "Green Letter" (Tab I) formally denying that the deaths of 80 infants in Italy were due to chemical and bacteriological weapons stored on a U.S. military base (in fact, no such weapons are stored on the base).

- o Use of documents given gratis. Soviet forgeries are usually sent by mail with no request for payment. Sometimes (as in the forged field manual FM 30-31B, Tab A) the document is posted in a public place where it can be discovered. There is no direct link between the person offering the document and the recipient, nor any chance to ask questions. The forgery is offered, often to journalists, by "idealists" concerned about nefarious activities of the U.S.

- o Designed for media replay. An objective of many forgeries is to get enough replay of the issue so that the original source becomes obscured and the lie acquires a life of its own. Press stories in a second country quoting a media source in the country in which the forgery surfaced can be picked up and replayed indefinitely, giving new impetus to the disinformation operation. The forgery of field manual FM 30-31B is perhaps the best example. Since 1978, the manual and/or articles concerning it have appeared in the world press in more than 20 countries.

In summary, the Soviet "formula" is low-key and authentic-looking: signatures of known officials, real organizations, actual letterheads and government forms, classified or personal communiques, real symbols and identifiers, realistic format and physical appearance, logical (not fanciful) plots, and unsensational exploitation of existing strains, prejudices, and hostilities. Rarely is anything "new" manufactured. Typically, the forgery accentuates and exacerbates what is already present.

19

U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL FM 30-31B

A. Content of Forgery--A U.S. Army Field Manual purporting to give guidance to Army intelligence regarding interference in host country affairs, subversion of host country officials and military officers. Asserts that the U.S. envisions "the use of extreme leftist organizations to safeguard the interests of the United States in friendly nations where communists appear close to entering the government."

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--To raise host country suspicions of American military presence, thus reducing U.S. foreign military presence abroad. Also used to show that CIA plays similar role to military intelligence.

The most widely replayed Soviet forgery, FM 30-31B has surfaced in over 20 countries since 1978. Soviet propagandists have exploited this forgery:

- o to link the U.S. to various terrorist groups , e.g., 1978 kidnapping and murder of Italian Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades and the Red Brigade kidnapping of U.S. Army General James Dozier.
- o to contribute to the Soviet anti-nuclear campaign.

Several foreign governments have made inquiries concerning the document since it first surfaced.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The first mention of Army Field Manual FM 30-31 (which actually exists) was contained in a Turkish newspaper "Baris" in March, 1975. The newspaper did not reprint a facsimile of the document. In September of the next year a photocopy of the forged FM 30-31B was left on the bulletin board of the Embassy of the Philippines in Bangkok, Thailand, with a cover note from an anonymous "concerned citizen" addressed to President Marcos.

This surfacing attracted little attention. However, the forgery reappeared in 1978 when it was reprinted in two Spanish publications--"El Pais" (18 September) and "El Triunfo" (23 September)--due to efforts of a Spanish communist and a Cuban intelligence officer.

Since then, the manual and/or articles concerning it have appeared in the press of more than 20 countries. Its greatest impact came from replays in the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, and Portugal in 1978. The forged manual also surfaced in Mozambique in 1978 and the United States in 1979.

D. Format of Forgery--A rather fuzzy photocopy of a forged, typewritten document purporting to be U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B, "Stability Operations--Intelligence," bearing the forged signature of then Army Chief of Staff General William Westmorland. Document is stamped "TOP SECRET." Note: Genuine field manuals FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A exist, but FM 30-31B is a total fabrication.

September 14, 1976

His Excellency
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacanang Palace
Manila
Republic of the Philippines

Dear Mr. President:

In 1974 I sent to Mr. Kukrit Pramoj, who is well-known to you and whom I deeply respect, some secret American documents revealing the dangers for the countries concerned of having U.S. troops and advisers stationed on their territories. Recent developments in Thailand suggest that those documents were both timely and to the point for Mr. Kukrit Pramoj.

Now I am sending these documents to you in the hope that they will also be of use to your Government. I am doing this as one of an American opposed to excessive U.S. military involvement in matters beyond the scope of reasonable American interest.

Respectfully,

Inclosure 2 to RA-9X-114-76

Personal/Confidential

His Excellency
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacanang Palace
Manila
Republic of the Philippines

PERSONAL

H.E. President Ferdinand E. Marcos
c/o H.E. Manuel Z. Yan
Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines
400, Sukhumvit Road
Bangkok



FORGOTTEN

TOP SECRET

FM 30-31B

Supersedes Part B
to FM 30-31Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.
10 March 1970STABILITY OPERATIONS
INTELLIGENCE - SPECIAL FIELDS

	Paragraph	Page
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION		1
Chapter 2. BACKGROUND		
General	1	3
Need for Political Flexibility	2	3
Characteristic Vulnerabilities of HC Regimes	3	4
Chapter 3. U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS		
Identification of Special Terrain	4	5
Recognition of HC Vulnerabilities	5	6
U.S. Army Intelligence Action	6	7
Chapter 4. INTELLIGENCE NEEDS		
General	7	9
Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes	8	9
Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad	9	10
Penetration of the Regime's Movement	10	10
Agency of Special Operations	11	11
U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages	12	11
Distribution List		13

GROUP-1
Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading

(Reverse Blank)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FM 30-31B

Supplement B
to FM 30-31

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.
12 March 1970

STABILITY OPERATIONS
INTELLIGENCE - SPECIAL FIELD

	Paragraph	Page
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION		1
Chapter 2. BACKGROUND		
General	1	3
Need for Political Feasibility	2	3
Characteristic Vulnerability of Regimes	3	4
Chapter 3. U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS		
Identification of Special Interests	4	5
Recognition of the Vulnerabilities	5	6
U.S. Army Intelligence Action	6	7
Chapter 4. INTELLIGENCE INTAKE		
General	7	9
Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes	8	9
Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad	9	10
Penetration of the Insurgent Movement	10	10
Agency Special Operations	11	11
U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages	12	11
Distribution List		13

GROUP-1
Excluded from
Automatic Deselection

(Reverse Blank)

TOP SECRET

23

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AIRGRAM A-8950

A. Content of Forgery--A U.S. State Department airgram instructing recipients to collect information on ways to bribe European officials and to develop other covert means by which to damage or eliminate foreign trade competition.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The document evidently was intended to exploit damage already done to the U.S. image following revelations that U.S. companies operating abroad had engaged in bribery of foreign government officials. The cover letter also contained the message that the CIA was linked to State Department operations abroad, with a particular emphasis on U.S. allies in NATO.

The "London Sunday Times" picked up the allegations and published a story in November 1976 that identified the charges as being based on a forgery. In a technique often used by the Soviet Union, the TASS news agency reported the "Times" article, but omitted any mention of the bogus nature of the airgram, thus extracting additional mileage from the forgery.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The forged airgram was sent with a cover letter (in French) by one "Robert Pont" (fictitious) to NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns and several West European governments in late 1976.

D. Format of Forgery--The bogus document was an altered version of a genuine State Department airgram (A-8950) dated 3 December 1974. The valid airgram was simply a statement of economic, financial, and commercial information requirements worldwide for FY 1975.

This forgery is considered by the U.S. to have been a success despite the numerous discrepancies in the document. These included: the signature of a fictitious person on the cover letter; use of titles such as "President," "Chancellor," and "Prime Minister" which were not capitalized; use of slash marks instead of parentheses to offset phrases; and employment of photocopies of the forgery which were dim and minimally legible.

Paris, le 5 août 1976.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Je suis entré par hasard en possession d'un document de l'Ambassade des Etats Unis à Paris dont le contenu m'a, en tant que Français, profondément ému et indigné. Il s'agit en effet d'une instruction de la CIA et du Département d'Etat, transmise aux Ambassades et Consulats américains et instruisant comment les représentants des USA doivent pratiquer l'espionnage principalement contre les alliés des Etats Unis, membres de l'OTAN.

Je me permets de vous transmettre ce document avec l'urgente prière de le porter à la connaissance des membres du Conseil de l'OTAN et de vous demander de protester de la manière la plus catégorique envers le gouvernement des Etats Unis en exigeant qu'il cesse ce genre de pratiques révoltantes envers des Etats-amis.

Je transmets en même temps ce document à la connaissance de certaines personnalités françaises et d'autres pays-membres de l'Alliance Atlantique.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

Monsieur Joseph M. A. H. LUNS
Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN

1110 BRUXELLES

Robert Lant

C O P Y

E M B A S S Y
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
P A R I S

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A I R G R A M

Handling:Classification:Message reference No:

/CONFIDENTIAL/

A - 299c

TO: ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AND USOECD PARIS,
USEC BRUSSELS, USNATO BRUSSELS, US MISSION GENEVA,
USIAEA VIENNA, USUNIDO VIENNA, USUN NEW YORK

FROM: Department of State

LG52: GDS

TAGS: ECRP XX

SUBJECT: FY 1975 Coordinated Statement of Priority Economic, Financial,
and Commercial Intelligence Requirements Worldwide of the
Washington Economic Community

REF: Department of State Airgram A - 2281, 24 March 1973

The referenced Airgram, the first in this series, commenced with a statement that remains valid:

The Executive Branch's priority needs for economic intelligence on foreign countries are determined by important of interests and the strategies adopted to protect or advance them. These interests and strategies have a new importance resulting from the changed place of the US economy in the world. US economic intelligence needs center around the motivations and assessments of changes in the intentions, plans, and capabilities of other countries in the economic field.

CONFIDENTIAL

By: J.FORD/A.SOKOLSKI	Drafting date: 11/27/74	Phone No: 143-5577	Contents and classification:
Index: CIA/OER H.ERNST	EB/SA: R.COLD		caution approved by:
MIO R.SLINGTON	EB/OCA/REP:HEBYRON		EB/CBA: J.BILLER
	EB/OCA: N.S.LAKAS		SEE LAST PAGE FOR EC MEMBER CLEARANCES

CONFIDENTIAL

In particular, reporting is requested on how host-country domestic and international economic policies and programs are likely to support or conflict significantly with US policies and programs. The past has been of interest to the extent that it illuminates those essential ingredients of US economic policy formulation.

In the intervening period, since March 1973, detailed guidance has been supplied triannually to eight regions of the world by the Economic Alert Lists (EALs). (The annual Economic Reporting Guides, after a poll of representative embassies, have been abolished.) The EALs are prepared by the US Intelligence Board's Economic Intelligence Committee and include inputs from the entire Washington economic community. They are disseminated by the Department as executive agent of the Combined Economic Reporting Program (CERP). The current update of the overall statement (now on a fiscal year basis) places in context specific guidance provided subsequently by the Economic Alert Lists and is intended for all officers charged with responsibility bearing directly or indirectly on the broad economic/financial/commercial area.

The general priority subjects set forth below are to a varying degree applicable to all diplomatic and consular posts. They are the eight economic topics contained in the Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) for FY 1975, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and are designed to be responsive to and to support the following substantive objective for the intelligence community: "Provide reliable, timely, and comprehensive information and assessments relevant to US international economic policy decisions and negotiations."

These questions were formulated, it will be noted, in consultation with senior policy officers of the principal departments and entities concerned with international economic relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

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U.S. WAR PLANS

A. Content of Forgery--A series of documents purporting to present U.S. war plans for Europe, including the listing of nuclear targets.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--This fabrication is designed to exploit European concern about nuclear weapons by claiming, among other things, that the U.S. would use such weapons against the territory of its NATO Allies. A series of surfacings since summer 1980 suggests that the documents are being used in the Soviet effort to encourage West European opposition to NATO nuclear force modernization.

The introduction to the war plans declares that the documents show that "U.S. thinking is still dominated by preparation for war..." It also alleges that the U.S. will sacrifice Western Europe to nuclear war in order to save itself.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--This collection is one of the most extensively used Soviet documentary fabrications. The documents first appeared in 1967 in a Norwegian magazine called Orientering. From 1967 to 1971, some or all of the documents were sent to numerous newspapers and magazines in at least ten West European countries.

The documents have started to surface again over the last two years, beginning in London in June 1980, about the time the British government announced its decision on GLCM basing sites. The documents surfaced in 1981 in the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Malta, Greece, Britain, and France.

In each recent surfacing, the documents were mailed as a pamphlet (published in Britain) to a recipient from the London area. No return address was provided.

D. Format of Forgery--The collection consists of fabricated or altered U.S. war plans dating from the early 1960s that the U.S. considers to be outdated. At least some of these documents were passed to the Soviet Union by Sgt. Robert Lee Johnson, who in 1965 was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 25 years in prison.

The documents now surface usually as a pamphlet entitled "Top Secret Documents on U.S. Forces Headquarters in Europe, Holocaust Again for Europe." The pamphlet bears the notation that it is "Information Books No. 1," suggesting that other fabrications of this type may be forthcoming.

~~TOP SECRET~~
DOCUMENTS



HOLOCAUST

AGAIN FOR EUROPE

~~TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS~~

ON US FORCES HEADQUARTERS

IN EUROPE

INFORMATION BOOKS No 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPERATION PLAN
USCINCPAC R 100-1
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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Headquarters
US EUROPEAN COMMAND
APO 128, US Forces

OPERATION PLAN
USCINCPAC OPPLAN NR 100-1

Appendix 3 to Annex H Civil Affairs
USCINCPAC OPPLAN NR 100-1
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

ANNEXES:

- A Not used
- B Assignment of Forces
- C Command Relationships
- D Intelligence
- E Logistics and Personnel
- F Communications-Electronics
- G Not used
- H Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare
- I Unconventional Warfare (Issued separately)
- J Psychological Operations
- K Not used
- L Not used
- M Maps and Charts
- N Civil Affairs
- O Information Activities

AUTHENTICATION:

B Espino
B. E. ESPINO
Major General, US Army
Director, J-3 Division

DRAFT OF AN EMERGENCY STATUS OF FORCES (SOF) AGREEMENT

(It is assumed that such an Emergency SOF Agreement will be concluded in the form of an Exchange of Notes between the Foreign Ministry or other appropriate authority of (country) and the US Ambassador, or Commander of the US Forces in (country).)

PREAMBLE

1. The Embassy of the United States of America (the Commander US Forces in _____) presents to (his) compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to state that the discussions that have taken place between us concerning the status of US Forces deployed, or to be deployed, in _____ at the request of the Government, have led to agreement as follows:

SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

2. a. The designated US commander or, in his absence, the senior US military commander present shall have exclusive control of the US Forces and the direction thereof.
- b. The US Forces shall have the right to occupy any area of (facility) considered necessary for the accomplishment of their duties or for their safety and continued security, as determined by US military commanders, and to install such equipment therein as they shall deem necessary for these purposes.
- c. Military commanders of the US Forces may take such measures as they deem necessary to provide adequate security for their installations, personnel and equipment, and for the movement of supplies and personnel in _____. Within installations utilized by the US military forces, military commanders shall have absolute and full authority to maintain discipline and order among members of the US Forces. Outside such installations, military police of the US Forces shall have full authority, subject to such further arrangements as may be made with the local police authorities, to maintain discipline and order among members of the US Forces. In the event of acts of violence against US installations, equipment, or personnel by persons other than members of the US Forces, such persons may be apprehended by the US Forces and turned over to the Government of _____ for appropriate disposition in accordance with laws of that country.

Change 1 to USCINCPAC OPPLAN NR 100-1

THIS APPENDIX CONSISTS OF 4 PAGES

Change 3 to USCINCPAC OPPLAN NR 100-1

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS, NOT AUTOMATICALLY

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MONDALE INTERVIEW

A. Content of Forgery--A bogus interview with then Vice President Mondale quoting him as saying that he did not consider either Prime Minister Begin of Israel or President Sadat of Egypt as suitable to the task of conducting the Camp David negotiations for a Middle East peace settlement. The Vice President also was quoted as saying that "everyone knows" Begin has a terminal illness and that President Sadat cannot govern Egypt.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The bogus interview was intended to compromise the Middle East peace process and embarrass the U.S. Administration in the eyes of the Israeli and Egyptian leaders. There was no media replay of the "speech."

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--In July 1978 xerox copies of a forged U.S. Embassy Paris press release were mailed anonymously to newspaper and news service correspondents in Paris.

D. Format of Forgery--The forgery purported to be an interview with Vice President Mondale by one Karl Douglas, who turned out to be a fictitious person. From a technical standpoint, the forgery left much to be desired, containing misspellings, typographical errors and grammatical constructions unlikely to be used by the Vice President or any other educated American.

for the press

Vice President Mondale talks to Karl Douglas

July 11, 1978

Excerpts.

Douglas. Mr. Vice President, first of all I want to thank you on behalf of my newspapers' readers for agreeing to see me...

Mondale. Not at all, everyone here knows my door is open to all comers. I have time until 4 o'clock.

Q. Then I'll come right to the point. Mr. Vice President, what is your opinion about the trend in American-Soviet relations and the present status of the SALT talks? When may we expect a SALT agreement?

A. I guess you couldn't have found a more difficult question to lead off with, but I will sum up my opinion briefly on this composite question which has such vital importance for the whole world. American-Soviet relationships have deteriorated, in fact declined, during recent months. Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa, the strengthening of the aggressive potential of the Warsaw Pact forces and the stalling of the SALT discussions have created serious tensions in relations between the two countries.

Q. A few months ago it seemed - and President Carter affirmed this several times in public - only certain unimportant points needed to be cleared up before signing the SALT II agreement.

A. Yes, here there once it looked as if all serious hurdles had been cleared and it was a matter of days or weeks and SALT II would be signed, yet nothing happened. At the last minute the Soviet Union either made another political move or came up with a new proposal which prevented the signing of the SALT II agreement. We all are so anxious to see concluded.

- Q. What political moves do you have in mind?
- A. Measures of both domestic and foreign policy. Take the activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Shaba, or the political trials going on in the Soviet Union, not to speak of the Soviets presenting proposals and proposals while they steadily expand their arsenal of nuclear and conventional weaponry. For example there is the SS-20 ballistic missile which substantially increased the Soviet threat to military and civilian targets. I mention this merely to illustrate one of the many things which conflict with our goals. We are committed to the further reduction of nuclear weapons, to the stricter limitation of updating and new delivery systems, but we cannot do it alone. If the SALT II talks are to be successful, the Soviet Union must display the same commitment.
- Q. From what you say, you believe the events in Africa are also having a broad negative impact on the SALT II talks...?
- A. Yes that is very true. In our opinion the reduction of tensions must not be confined to one or two continents. Not only Europe, but Africa also wants to benefit from reduced tensions, and this is understandable. Present Soviet policy in Africa has nothing in common with this noble goal. When can we expect a SALT II agreement? It is very difficult to give an unequivocal answer at this moment because so much could happen in the interim. In all events one thing is sure, we will not conclude an agreement at any price, we will wait patiently until the Soviet Union comes up with a proposal acceptable to us. Fully aware of the present status of the discussions, I would close the question by saying I have no hopes for a quick solution. I am confident though we will be able to wrap up a SALT II agreement if not in the near future then in the distant future.
- Q. I believe that and so do our readers. For long years now the Middle East has contained the danger of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. What do you think on this score now, especially after visiting Israel and Egypt?
- A. I think it is going too far to take such a gloomy and pessimistic view of the question since basically the Middle East problem must be solved by the countries directly involved, first of all by Israel and Egypt, and not by us and the Soviet Union. A big step forward was made toward settling the Middle East problem when Sadat recognized he holds one of the keys to it and began discussions with Israel.

Unfortunately, Sadat stopped short on the way to achieving this goal. We are continuing our efforts to get the talks moving again between Israel and Egypt, but to tell the truth - as was emphasized by the talks with Begin and Sadat - I do not consider either Begin or Sadat suitable for the task, especially because as everyone knows Sadat has a terminal illness, and all Sadat's energy is pinned down by his domestic worries, and he probably won't be able to stand up long in the face of his internal opposition. So there is good reason to expect shifts in personalities in the two countries involved. Should changes of this nature occur, we would welcome at the head of both countries experienced and unbiased politicians able to pursue a realistic policy and willing to mutually and peacefully settle their differences. This would clear the way for the peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem as a whole.

- Q. By realistic politicians whom do you have in mind?
- A. You've got me there because at the moment it would be hard to mention a concrete name. How do you think I put it... in Egypt maybe it could mean a man like Fahmy.
- Q. You mentioned that basically it was not up to the United States to solve the Middle East problem. By that do you imply that the United States should play the role of a passive onlooker?
- A. Not at all, I didn't say that. As is clearly apparent, we also have military, political and economic interests in the area so any ideas we have for a settlement will take the interests of the oil producing countries and Israel into consideration.
- Q. Therefore, two opposite poles, or to be more precise gulf and Israel or the Israeli lobby, play a large part in the United States plan for settlement?
- A. That's exactly it.
- Q. And to what extent is the process of settlement helped or hindered by America shipping arms to both sides?
- A. As to hindering, it does not hinder by any means; in fact I may say it helps, because our reason for sending weapons to both sides is to create a balance in the region which will assure a firm peace.
- Q. Asia has traditionally had an important role in U.S. foreign policy in the past. Is that still true today?
- A. Yes, of course. Asia continues to play an important part in our foreign policy. I am thinking first of all of Japan and China, but I would not want to give the impression I am overlooking the importance of the other countries of Asia in our policy in Asia. We are committed to guaranteeing that this much-suffered region will become a symbol of the policy of peaceful coexistence. That is why we are making serious efforts to settle our relationships with Vietnam either this year or early next year. We must, of course, rely basically on Japan and China in achieving our policy in Asia. One major task in this region is to prevent the

HEARD LETTER

A. Content of Forgery--A forged letter from an Air Force official acknowledging that the U.S. would render transport assistance in sending military advisers, light weapons, and equipment from the People's Republic of China to Zaire, and that additional weapons could be dispatched to Zaire from West Germany and Britain.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The letter was intended to embarrass the U.S. and its NATO allies and to support the Soviet propaganda allegation that Western "imperialism" is cooperating with China to suppress national liberation movements in Africa.

Unlike prior examples of Soviet forgeries, this one was not publically released. Rather, it was sent to several Belgian government officials, perhaps with the hope the fabrication would be replayed in the media after the Belgian government made it public. However, this did not happen because the Belgian government immediately was suspicious of the document's origins and never released the letter. The Belgian government did make an inquiry into the matter.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The letter was sent anonymously in late 1978 or early 1979 to selected members of the Belgian Cabinet. It was not released publically by the sender.

D. Format of Forgery--A totally fabricated letter on U.S. Air Force letterhead allegedly sent by Colonel Allen P. Heard, Chief, Foreign Liaison Division, U.S. Department of the Air Force, to a Belgian defense attache in Washington, Colonel Armand Troquet.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



14 July 1978


Colonel Armand Troquet
Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Embassy of Belgium
3330 Garfield Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Colonel Troquet:

I have been authorized to inform you that the U.S. Air Force will render certain assistance with the transport of a limited number of military advisers, light weapons and equipment, from China to Zaire. This action will be implemented in accordance with an ad hoc agreement reached in Peking this year, and after final detailed negotiations between the governments of Zaire and China.

Further contingents of light weapons and equipment, under the same agreement, will be dispatched to Zaire from the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. Headquarters Command, USAF has assumed responsibility for safeguarding this mission, which is being carried out in congruity with our mutual interests in this region of Africa.

Sincerely,


ARTHUR P. HEBB, Colonel, USAF
Chief, Foreign Liaison Division
Office of the Vice Chief of Staff



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U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM *

A. Content of Forgery--A forged State telegram purporting to outline U.S. policy toward the Greek-Turkish dispute as favoring Ankara over Athens.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The telegram was intended to strain U.S.-Greek relations and to undermine NATO. There was no media replay or government inquiry connected with the forgery.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--A copy of what was alleged to be a September 1976 State telegram entitled "Greek-Turkish Dispute in the Aegean" was tabled in the Greek Parliament in March, 1978.

D. Format of Forgery--The document was described by the State Department as a "gross alteration" of the original telegram.

* A copy of this forgery is not available.

PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH FORGERY

A. Content of Forgery--In the phony speech, President Carter allegedly made demeaning references to the Greek government and reproached Athens for not living up to its responsibilities in NATO.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The bogus speech was intended to strain U.S.-Greek relations. The speech was published by two Athens newspapers, "To Vima" and "Rizospastis" (the official organ of the Moscow wing of the Greek Communist Party).

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The text of the speech was mailed anonymously to several Greek publications in Athens in late December, 1977.

D. Format of Forgery--A low quality reproduction of a bogus U.S. Information Service press release in the "American Perspective Series" of a non-existent speech attributed to President Jimmy Carter. The items contained numerous errors of style and language usage indicating that English was not the native language of the author.

american PERSPECTIVE
UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE ATHENS

September 29, 1977

PRESIDENT CARTER ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK



PRESIDENT CARTER ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK

After the signing of the base agreement between the United States and Greece, President Carter commented on several additional problems concerning this area:

The U.S. administration has undertaken a number of steps in order to justly and successfully resolve issues between allies on the southern flank of NATO, and to strengthen the alliance against the danger threatening the Free World in the face of the steadily increasing attempts of Warsaw Pact countries to attain military superiority over the West.

Both parties concerned - Greece and Turkey - must realize that it is their duty to wholeheartedly support these efforts of the United States since resolving this issue is their own concern as well.

The agreement on U.S. bases in Greece signed early in August must be viewed as the first step Greece had to take in an effort to improve its relations to the West. A further step, and the earlier the better, must be Greece's full return to NATO and making ensuing provisions. I disagree with statements of some prominent Greek politicians indicating that the accord with the U.S. does not mean Greece's rapprochement with NATO. Quite the contrary. For Greece, in much the same way as for the U.S., the interests of the NATO alliance must be the first and foremost consideration.

I would like to point out that NATO members have the obligation to fulfill their political and military commitments connected with NATO operations, not only in case of a direct communist aggression but also at the time of peace. This also pertains to Greece, which plays a specific role in the defense plans of the alliance, and such commitments are mandatory even for the Greek government.

During the recent NATO Council meeting in May, the necessity for increased efficiency and modernization of the NATO alliance were considered. The overwhelming majority of NATO members comprehended this necessity and agreed to increase their financial appropriations for this program. In this connection it is essential to emphasize that, in certain instances and if the situation demands the potential weakening of the alliance, the U.S. and other NATO countries are entitled to require from all members to fulfill their commitments even if they may not seem to be consonant with the program of the government concerned, and this applies to all countries without exception, including Greece.

We are aware that in recent years the policy of the United States and NATO has become the target of unwarranted criticism by several Greek political leaders, and certain walks of the population including the younger generation. I want to re-emphasize that this criticism is unwarranted and stems from purely individual and nationalist viewpoints. The Greek government as well as the Greek people should realize that the policy of the United States,

based upon the moral principles of the Free World, will never harm the interests of its faithful allies. This policy must, however, be uncompromisingly principled and ensure the protection of the interests of the Free World even at the cost of sacrifices and risks involved. If Greece desires to continue to enjoy the advantages and protection of the United States, it must be prepared to make these sacrifices.

I would like to point out that last July 3 years had elapsed since the beginning of a period of Greece's abnormal relations to its western allies and to our country. We and our allies have exhibited much patience in an effort to allow these problems to resolve themselves. For reasons of ensuring mutual security, to continue to wait, however, is no longer feasible. It is necessary to be decisive, and I personally believe that at the very earliest the Greek government will take such measures which are our mutual interest.

During my meeting with the Greek Premier in London, I received with deep satisfaction Mr. Caramanlis' assurance that he would do his utmost to resolve the disputes between Greece and Turkey in accordance with the interests of the alliance and the U.S. This would enhance prospects for increased efficiency in the defense of NATO's southern flank, and a firm wall of defense of the Free World would be erected in this area.

O C/O

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LUNS LETTER

A. Content of Forgery--A bogus letter from NATO Secretary General Luns alleging that the Belgian Ministry of Defense was preparing for the U.S. a list of journalists opposed to the neutron weapon. The implication was that journalists whose names appeared on the list could expect to receive official harrassment of some sort.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The letter was part of the Soviet anti-neutron bomb campaign. It also was an effort to damage the U.S./NATO relationship and discredit the NATO Secretary General. NATO authorities immediately disclaimed the letter and publically labeled it a forgery.

In June, 1978, Atlantic News published an article presenting the NATO position. However, the next month the Belgian "De Nieuwe" published a copy of the forged letter with an accompanying article but did not mention that the letter had been officially identified as a forgery. In August, the Dutch newspaper "De Volkskrant" replayed the "De Nieuwe" article.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--In early June, 1978, photocopies of the letter were sent with an anonymous cover letter to several Belgian newspapers.

D. Format of Forgery--The letter--a total fabrication--was written on NATO letterhead from Secretary General Luns to U.S. Ambassador to NATO W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. This forgery bears a distinct resemblance in many aspects to the forged State Airgram A-8950 which was circulated two years earlier. In particular, the format of the anonymous cover letter bears a striking similarity to the one used with the forged Airgram.

Anonymous Cover Letter
1978 Forgery

Messieurs,

Moi, je suis un lecteur régulier de votre journal et l'estime que je vous porte me décide de vous écrire non sans avoir longtemps hésité. Je suis indigné des mesures prises par le Ministère de la Défense nationale contre les journalistes pour leur conscience éveillée et leur souci de la sauvegarde de la paix dans le monde.

La liberté de l'expression de la pensée est une des bases fondamentales de notre société démocratique. La violation de ce droit serait un grand pas vers le totalitarisme. En tant qu'étranger dans votre pays hospitalier j'éprouve de la honte à cause de l'activité de certains étrangers tels que M. Luns et l'ambassadeur américain à l'OTAN M. Bennett qui ne semble-t-il par leurs activités dont il est question dans cette lettre, passent la limite des pouvoirs que nos pays-membres leur ont accordés.

J'espère que vous vous rangerez à mon avis que sur de pareilles questions il est impossible de se taire.

Votre ami



P. S. Je vous prie de vouloir bien me pardonner les fautes commises car le français n'est pas ma langue maternelle.



ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SECRETARY GENERAL

3093223 15 February 1979

Dear Mr. Bennett,

I regret that owing to my official duties it will be hardly possible for us to see each other as we had agreed upon earlier. Today, as you know, I am saying my farewells to my countryman Ambassador Martens and on Friday, the same to Georg Leter in Bonn. Therefore, I am sending you this short note.

Going back to our previous talks I am willing to tell you that with the help of my friends from the Belgian Defence Ministry the listing of the journalists showing negative attitude to the hydrogen bomb and to certain aspects of the policy of the Alliance and of your country as well is under way. To avoid any complications, we agreed upon having all this carefully done. There are also some details to be reconsidered since, I am afraid, one of our Belgian friends is, I would say, overzealous in doing his job.

My friends promised to influence the local Foreign Ministry to take appropriate measures concerning the H-bomb too. In this respect it is worth-while considering what sort of material are we to offer to the loyal journalists and to those from the special category to interpret the Alliance's policy in our mutual interest.

In my opinion such a course of things will give better results than the ones we were hoping to get earlier.

Looking forward to seeing you,

(Dr. J. A. M. Luns)

63 772 309

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GREEN LETTER

A. Content of Forgery--A letter denying rumors that 80 infant deaths in Naples, Italy were attributable to chemical and bacteriological weapons stored at a nearby U.S. military base and that destruction of oyster beds at Naples was caused by alleged spillage of chemical and bacteriological substances.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--This forged letter was intended to "confirm" that the U.S. stores chemical and bacteriological weapons at a base near Naples (it does not), and to create pressure for removal of the base.

The forgery was designed to exploit local concern over the infant mortalities, which also was being stirred up in handbills on the same subject that were being distributed anonymously.

Two Italian newspapers--Corriere Della Sera and Il Messaggero--carried the forgery in May 1979.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The forged letter was mailed to several newspapers in Naples in April, 1979. There was no cover letter.

D. Format of Forgery--A totally fabricated letter on official U.S. Embassy Rome letterhead with a reproduction of the signature of the U.S. Defense Attache in Rome, William C. Green.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defense Attache Office
Rome, Italy

29 March 1979

Chief Editor of PRESENZA SOCIALDEMOCRATICA
Via Maddaloni 6,
80134 Naples

Dear Sir:

I wish to notify you officially that the rumors suggesting the death of the children in Naples could be due to chemicals or bacteriological substances stored at NATO, or rather American bases near Naples, are completely unwarranted. I think those rumors hinting that the containers which disappeared in December, 1977 held substances dangerous to human beings are especially harmful. Just as absurd is the idea that the oyster beds at Naples will have to be periodically destroyed if the substances spill into the sea.

There is no truth to the gossip that the Italian and foreign specialists investigating the matter are acting under duress and the influence of US military agencies.

U.S. officials believe the present Naples administration, which is incapable of handling the sanitation problem of the city, is solely and exclusively responsible for the regrettable epidemic among the children.

I hope your newspaper will inform the Italian public about the matter in line with the above. I am also taking this opportunity to convey my profound condolences to the parents of the dead children.

Sincerely,

W.C. Green
WILLIAM C. GREEN
Captain, U.S. Navy
U.S. Defense and Naval Attache

WCG/jdm

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

A. Content of Forgery--U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann F. Eilts purportedly attacked President Sadat for his lack of leadership, foresight, and political acuity. A final paragraph alleged that the CIA Chief of Station in Cairo concurred with Eilts' assessment of Sadat.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The bogus memorandum was intended to compromise Ambassador Eilts' working relationship with Sadat and to embarrass the U.S. Government. While there was an inquiry by the Egyptian government, the matter received no coverage in the press.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--Photocopies of this forgery were mailed to ten Egyptian newspapers and magazines in June 1977. There was no cover letter.

D. Format of Forgery--The item was on a genuine "Operations Memorandum" form bearing the forged signature of Ambassador Eilts. The form itself was filled in, with errors, by the forger and was classified "TOP SECRET."

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON
 FROM: EMBASSY IN CAIRO
 SUBJECT: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT
 REF: W.O.-C-7985-H-77

Date: March 28, 1977

With reference to my previous reports and the new guidelines discussed in Washington, I have paid close attention to political developments here with special emphasis on how the Sadat Government is tackling the problems posed by the January disturbances.

As time passes, it becomes clear that two major factors helped trigger the January riots: for the first time over a long period, President Sadat came up against the opposition of his advisers, and the Cabinet displayed a large degree of impotency.

President Sadat's attempts to blame the communists and Nasser followers for the January events failed miserably and was poorly conceived even as a propaganda ploy. The Government reshuffle was not carried out and nepotism is as bad as ever. Serious differences persist in the Government. The ministers of information and of welfare openly criticized the President's domestic policy and, in particular, his wife's activity and meddling in political matters.

Since January, there have been no signs of improvement in the posture of President Sadat and his Government. The country's economy is still in crisis. Aid received so far is insufficient for an intensive economic upturn since a good part goes down the drain of corruption. Unfortunately, the same can be said about the aid given by us which, some Egyptian friends say, is being dissipated by the Government. Business leaders in the Government do not have the conception to enable them to find a way out of the country's deplorable economic situation. According to Deputy

TOP SECRET

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Prime Minister Kaisuni, aid for this year was obtained only after intensive and protracted negotiations, and even then as the result of personal contacts. Additional loans from the gulf countries of Arab states will be harder to get in the future and Arab capital funds can be ruled out for the time being.

The Government also was unsuccessful in decreasing the chronic budget deficit. Kaisuni believes the only realistic way to do it is to drastically raise prices of industrial and agricultural products and consumer goods. He claims to have the agreement of President Sadat and Prime Minister Salem on this, although they are afraid of political repercussions similar to those in January.

Some Egyptian politicians view the stalemate on the Geneva Conference issue as a major reason for the difficulties, arguing it has undercut Egypt's stance which, in turn, discourages investment in Egypt.

Despite salary raises, bonuses and M. Gamassi's February tour, army morale has not improved. Not a single branch of service possesses adequate reserves or spare parts, and this is creating a hiatus in military matters. The country's economic situation and the political measures introduced prevent Gamassi from acting on the army's demands; consequently, his position in the army is being eroded, and weaponry modernization is also suffering. President Sadat's latest decision to station the army outside Cairo is not the most fortunate step. The army resents it as a sign of lack of confidence.

Discontent is burgeoning among all segments of the population. The fact that former Nasser politicians are resuming their activity, the incompetence of the Sadat leadership and the incredible economic and political corruption all indicate an explosive potential which may get out of our control.

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The President's leadership style leaves much to be desired and this could be an obstacle to our plan for a settlement in the Middle East. Close associates of the President are shocked to see that recently he has displayed reluctance to read the reports, analyses and proposals prepared on the country's affairs or to devote proper attention to the country's problems.

I discussed the problem at length several times with Mr. Fees who was of the same opinion. The defects in President Sadat's style of leadership were described very well in a character study prepared by a friend of Mr. Fees. After reading the characterization, I am even more convinced that Mr. Sadat may not be the most suitable person to put across our plan for Egypt and the Middle East.

Norman G. Citty

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