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Special Report No. 110

Soviet Active Measures

September 1983



United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D.C.

This report, based on unclassified sources, describes "active measures" that have come to light since publication of Special Report No. 101 in July 1982. The Soviet Union employs the term "active measures" (a direct translation from the Russian aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to cover a broad range of deceptive techniques-such as use of front groups, media manipulation, disinformation, forgeries, and agents of influence—to promote Soviet foreign policy goals and to undercut the position of Soviet opponents. The active measures discussed in this report are necessarily limited to those that have been publicly exposed.

These often clandestine efforts by the Soviets and their surrogates to influence political and public opinion in the noncommunist world have grown in boldness and intensity, reflecting what appears to be increased use of active measures as a policy instrument by the Soviets and their allies. The principal target of Soviet active measures continues to be the NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe. Other active measures aimed against Europe involve the Polish Solidarity movement and the effort to discredit a possible Bulgarian connection in the attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul.

In Africa, active measures alleged U.S. interference in the internal affairs

of different countries and implied close military cooperation between the United States and South Africa. In Nigeria, Ambassador Pickering was accused of directing a political assassination plot. In Ghana, Ambassador Smith was charged with organizing a coup attempt. Disinformation efforts used forged documents as "evidence" of military links between-Washington and Pretoria despite the U.S. embargo on military sales to South Africa.

In the Middle East, active measures have tried to suggest U.S. collusion with Israel in the invasion of Lebanon and American animosity toward Islamic groups. In South Asia, the most striking active measure was the forged Kirkpatrick speech with its claim that the United States was in favor of "balkanizing" India.

In Latin America, where Cuba functions as the main Soviet surrogate, front groups have been the primary active measures vehicle. The fronts have been busy trying to generate international support for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and to increase opposition to U.S. policy toward Central America.

In East Asia, the Soviets used front groups and disinformation campaigns in an effort to deflect the damage to the Soviet image from the use by Moscow and its surrogates of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea. In addition, revelations of former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko spotlighted

HIGHLIGHTS OF MAJOR ACTIVE MEASURES

July 1983. Two fake U.S. Embassy Rome telegrams depict press coverage of the possible "Bulgarian connection" in the assassination attempt against the Pope as a U.S.-orchestrated campaign.

June 1983. The triennial gathering of the major Soviet front group, the World Peace Council, meets in Prague and makes opposition to INF deployment its main target.

April 1983. A forged U.S. Embassy Lagos document has Ambassador Thomas Pickering ordering the assassination of a principal Nigerian presidential candidate in "Operation Headache."

April 1983. The Swiss expel the correspondent of Novosti, the Soviet news agency, for "unacceptable interference in internal Swiss affairs," including funneling of funds and guidance to elements of the Swiss peace movement.

March 1983. Ghana, relying on a forged West German document, accuses the United States of plotting to overthrow the Rawlings government

February 1983. A fake speech by UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick on U.S. policy toward the Third World surfaces in India and is reprinted in communist media in the Soviet Union, Nicaragua, and elsewhere.

extensive Soviet active measures in Japan.

The First Directorate of the KGB has responsibility for developing and implementing active measures. The Interna-

tional Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union participates in active measures, especially when these involve front groups and foreign communist parties. The International Information Department also may assist. At times it is difficult to ascertain if a particular active measure is implemented by the Soviets or a surrogate intelligence service. However, the distinction is hardly significant given the close collaboration between the KGB and its sister services.

EUROPE

The Peace Movement

World Peace Assembly. Every 3 years, the World Peace Council (WPC), the major Soviet front organization, holds a world peace assembly. This year's meeting in Prague, June 21–26, faithfully echoed the Soviet line. The session focused on opposing NATO deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe as its main goal. At the same time, the Czechoslovak hosts made certain there was no criticism of Soviet SS–20 missile deployment.

Earlier efforts by noncommunist peace groups to equate the SS-20s with the NATO missiles drew strong criticism from Yuriy Zhukov, chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, alienating some West European peace groups from the WPC. The problem was further aggravated when a demonstration of some 300 young people in downtown Prague for "peace and freedom for all nations" was quickly suppressed by Czechoslovak police. Inside the conference hall, several representatives of the West German Greens Party walked out in protest over suppression of the demonstration and the refusal of the Czechoslovak hosts to permit them to meet with members of the Charter '77 dissident group.

Espionage and the Norwegian Peace Movement. On June 22, 1983, Assistant Soviet Military Attache Vladimir Zagrebnev was expelled from Norway. The Oslo press reported that, in addition to engaging in espionage activities, Zagrebnev had been trying to gain influence with the Norwegian peace movement.

Novosti Interferes With Internal Swiss Affairs. On April 29, 1983, the Swiss Government announced the expulsion of Alexei Dumov, the correspondent of Novosti, the Soviet news agency, and the closing of the Novosti office in Bern for "serious interference in Swiss internal affairs." A few days later, Leonid Ovchinnikov, the KGB officer who was reportedly supervising Dumov's political and media influence operations, was also expelled. Ovchinnikov was serving ostensibly as a first secretary in the Soviet mission in Geneva. According to Swiss authorities, the Novosti correspondent's activities included:

- Involvement in the December 5, 1981 Bern peace demonstration;
- Involvement in the Swiss Appeal for Peace and Against Nuclear War;
- Close cooperation with an activist youth group that became engaged in paramilitary training and took part in a violent demonstration in Bern;
- Encouragement of Swiss citizens to refuse compulsory military service;
- Help to organize a demonstration in the Swiss parliament in 1982; and
- Circulation of reports that falsely implicated Swiss intelligence in the death of Leonid Pantchenko, a Soviet delegate to an international coffee conference in Geneva, who died of natural causes there in April 1980.

Dutch Report on Efforts To Influence the Peace Movement. On November 6 and 13, 1982, the Amsterdam daily, *De Telegraaf*, reported on analyses by Netherlands intelligence of

Soviet and East European efforts to influence the Dutch peace movement. In the November 6 article, *De Telegraaf* spoke of "clear proof of Soviet involvement" and of close cooperation between the Dutch Communist Party and the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party in the campaign against the NATO nuclear weapons. The November 13 article stated, "The Soviet authorities are still actively influencing the Netherlands debate on NATO nuclear weapons modernization."

De Telegraaf stated that a key individual in the Soviet effort was Anatoli Popov, who headed a Soviet delegation to Holland for talks on the peace movement in January 1982 and was an official of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party. De Telegraaf noted that Popov had been expelled from Holland in 1961, when he fought with Dutch military police trying to protect a Soviet asylum seeker. At the time he was second secretary and press attache.

The Assassination Attempt Against Pope John Paul

In an apparent effort to discredit a possible Bulgarian connection in the papal assassination attempt, a Rome leftwing newsweekly, *Pace e Guerra*, published two fabricated U.S. Embassy telegrams in its July 21, 1983 edition.

Pace e Guerra, July 21, 1983

STEPPLANTS Ball B Bulgarian BATTERLANTS B

Ma quanti fatti strani intorno alla Bulgarian Connection.

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The first forgery, dated August 28, 1982, proposed a large-scale disinformation effort—in cooperation with Italian intelligence and friendly members of the Socialist Party—to implicate the Bulgarians and the Soviets in the papal assassination attempt. The second, dated December 6, 1982, judged the campaign a success. The bogus telegram claimed: "The European media have enthusiastically developed themes on the lines anticipated: that the gunman was directed by the Bulgarian secret police; that the Bulgarians are under the total control of

the KGB; that the KGB was headed at the time by the present Soviet leader."


The newsweekly, which has close links with the Democratic Party of Proletarian Unity (PDUP), attributed the documents to reliable but anonymous sources. Its charges were echoed by two PDUP members of parliament, who had been elected on a joint list with the Italian Communist Party. The American Embassy promptly branded the cables as forgeries and pointed out serious errors in cable format. The fabrication apparently was designed to provide "credible evidence" for Soviet media allegations that the United States had orchestrated the arrest of the Bulgarian intelligence officer Antonov as part of an effort to blame the Soviets and Bulgarians for the papal assassination attempt.

Events in Poland

Forged AFL-CIO Letter. On March 31, 1983, a forged letter from AFL-CIO official Irving Brown to an Italian labor official, Luigi Scricciolo, surfaced in the provincial Sicilian weekly, Sette Giorno. A cousin of one of the Red Brigade kidnapers of General Dozier, Scricciolo was taken into custody during the Dozier investigation. He then admitted that he had been working as an agent for Bulgarian intelligence. The fake letter suggested that Scricciolo was a CIA agent funneling funds clandestinely from the AFL-CIO to the Polish trade union Solidarity. The forgery's purpose was presumably to undermine the credibility of Scricciolo's testimony about Bulgarian intelligence activities and to suggest secret links between Solidarity and the CIA.

Fake National Security Council Memorandum. The February 7, 1983 issue of *Tiempo*, a Madrid newsweekly, published extracts from a forged 1978 National Security Council memorandum on Poland from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter. The memorandum identified Poland as "the weakest link in

Forged Project Democracy Telegram (left) and AFL-CIO Letter (right)



the chain of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe" and proposed a destabilization policy involving "politicians, diplomats, labor unions, the mass media and covert activity." The State Department denounced the document as a forgery. Dr. Brzezinski sent a personal letter denying the authenticity of the document to *Tiempo*, which published the letter in its May 16, 1983 edition. The presumed aim of the forgery was to suggest, in line with Soviet propaganda, that the United States was responsible for the troubles in Poland.

Project Democracy

In January 1983 a forged State Department telegram number 249222 dealing with the implementation of President Reagan's democracy initiative, circulated in Austria. The fabricated document referred to using the CIA "for training and sending to their countries of origin activist emigres who have hitherto kept themselves out of the limelight." The fake cable also called for efforts in allied countries to eliminate "communist parties and parties whose programs are alien to our ideals." Friendly governments were not to be informed of these measures "under any circumstances."

Problems With NATO

NATO Violates Swedish Neutrality? On November 2, 1982, a Swedish communist paper, Proletarian, carried a distorted news report that a consignment of NATO armored personnel carriers (APCs) had transited Goteborg en route to Norway in violation of Swedish neutrality. A concerted effort followed to ensure that noncommunist media were aware of this story. Initially successful, this attempt resulted in other Swedish media repeating the alleged violation of Swedish neutrality as straight news, and, in turn, this was replayed by Soviet media.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry then issued a denial, clarifying that the shipment-in fact, of Norwegian, not NATO, APCs-was entirely consistent with Swedish neutrality. The apparent goal of this effort was to divert attention in Sweden from the controversy over the discovery of an unidentified submarine, presumed to be Soviet, in Swedish territorial waters at the time.

Mediterranean Air Safety. In July 1982, while the United States and Italy were engaged in talks regarding Mediterranean air safety, a fake U.S. military document surfaced in Rome. The memo stated that, contrary to what U.S. authorities were telling their Italian counterparts, NATO air activities posed a safety hazard. The U.S. Embassy in Rome immediately denounced the document as a fabrication, and a July 23. 1982 report by ANSA, the Italian news agency, labeled it a communist disinformation effort.

AFRICA

Assassination Plot in Nigeria

On April 13, 1983, the two major opposition party newspapers in Ibadan, Nigeria, the Nigerian Tribune and the Daily Sketch, headlined charges that Ambassador Thomas Pickering had ordered the assassination of two prominent Unity Party of Nigeria figures. Chief Awolowo, the party's presidential candidate, and his colleague Chief Abiola. To substantiate these charges, the papers published a forged document purporting to be an internal U.S. EmPeople's Daily Graphic, April 1, 1983

"It is clear that all these fewerish attempts to over-throw the government are designed to prevent the truth about the connections between events since the 29th of October last year and certain elements connected with the S.I.B."

-Captain Kojo Tsikata (rtd)-

FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 1983. No. 10075. PRICE: €1.00

CIA ASSEMBLING ATTACK MERCENARIES TO int Special Adviser to the PNDC who is also in charge to State security has disclosed that GHANA

These malicious and baseless allegations have been made without regard to the observable facts and without reference to sources which might have been able to provide the TRUTH."

Mr Thomas Smith, 1.5 Ambassador to Ghane (Graphic, March 1. 198.



wasn't willing participant -Baba

From the secret files of

the West German Embassy ders of the Cam * The U.S. Ambassado Asantenene on Stn May for 8

GERMAN VERSION

Your Graphic

Tsikata throws counterchallenge

bassy memorandum recommending the assassination. It stated: "Chief Abiola has outlived his usefulness to our service . . . his flirtation with the opposition led by Obafemi Awolowo exemplifies the need to go ahead with operations Heartburn and Headache to solve the problem of these two personalities. . . . The Department must be well briefed on these wet affairs. . . . " The memo envisaged establishing "a friendly military government" after purging the present

"corrupt" regime.

The United States immediately denounced the document as a fake and the stories based on it as false. KGB authorship was suggested by the use of the term "wet affairs"-a direct translation of the term in standard Soviet intelligence lexicon to refer to assassinations. Despite U.S. denials, the story gained some credence in Nigeria, and press wire services circulated it elsewhere in African countries. Soviet and Czech media quickly replayed the report. Rude

Pravo carried the deception further, incorrectly suggesting that the Nigerian Government had made the allegation when in fact the charges originated in the Nigerian Tribune and the Daily Sketch.

Overthrow of the Ghanaian Government

On March 31, 1983, Kojo Tsikata, Special Adviser to the Provisional National Defense Council, called a press conference to charge the U.S. Embassy in Accra with trying to overthrow the Rawlings government. As "proof," Tsikata produced a copy of an alleged West German Embassy report informing Bonn that Ambassador Thomas Smith was dissatisfied with his CIA staffers. The document has Smith saying that the staffers "will only prove themselves if they achieve basic changes in the country and succeed in overthrowing Rawlings." The next day, the People's Daily Graphic, a government-owned paper, reported the story as authentic and displayed a photocopy of the document.

The West German Government called the report a fabrication on April 2, and the U.S. Government issued a sharp protest to the Ghanaian Government. Although Ghana eventually accepted the fact that the report was a forgery, the incident had an immediate, damaging impact on U.S.-Ghanaian relations by creating the false impression that the United States was supporting

Rawling's opponents.

Relations Between the United States and South Africa

Northrop Sales Letter. The November 17, 1982 Jeune Afrique, an influential French-language newsweekly published in Paris and widely read in Francophone Africa, reported that despite the U.S. embargo on arms sales to South Africa, Northrop Aviation was offering to sell South Africa its new Tigershark fighter. To "prove" the point, Jeune Afrique published a picture of a letter ostensibly sent by Northrop's vice president for marketing to the commander of the South African Air Force. When Northrop called the letter a fake, Jeune Afrique ran a new story on January 19, 1983, suggesting that the denial was untrue and the original letter was authentic.

In this case, the perpetrator of the active measure apparently obtained a copy of a genuine letter that Northrop had routinely sent to many countries.

but not to South Africa, and simply typed in the South African addressee. The purpose of this active measure was to suggest that the U.S. embargo on military sales to South Africa was a sham.

Cruise Missiles in Africa. A false report that the United States and Israel would be testing and later deploying Tomahawk cruise missiles in South Africa first appeared in Mozambique's Noticias on November 29, 1982. Since then East German, Bulgarian, and Soviet media have repeated the story. It has also been reported in the Ethiopian, Zambian, Seychelles, and Angolan press.

Aviation Personnel International Letter. The Herald of Zimbabwe of June 5. 1982 and several other African papers reported that U.S. helicopter pilots experienced in jungle warfare were working with South Africa. This was based on a fake letter to the South African Air Force from Aviation Personnel International of New Orleans, a company specializing in the placement of pilots. The company has provided an affidavit stating that it had no dealings with South Africa and assumes that the

author of the forgery obtained a company form letter and substituted its own text. The letter's terminology suggests that the author was a Soviet. It stated that the proposal had the approval of "competent bodies" of the U.S. Government. The term would not be used in this fashion in American bureaucratic jargon, but in Russian it is used to refer to official government or party organs.

Letter to Ambassador Kirkpatrick. The November 5, 1982 New Statesman, the prominent British newsweekly, printed as factual a fake letter to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick from the newly arrived press counselor of the Embassy of South Africa in Washington, D.C. The letter conveyed his personal greetings and also those of the chief of South African intelligence. Although the press spokesman of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations immediately branded the letter as a fabrication, the New Statesman reiterated its belief in the document's authenticity in its December 3, 1982 edition. The active measure's purpose, like the one noted above, was to provide "evidence" of close U.S.-South African ties.

New Statesman, December 3, 1982

UNITED NATIONS

Kirkpatrick's riposte

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American Blacks and Links to Africa

A forged Carter Administration document on Africa, which first appeared in 1980, suggested U.S. anxiety about the links between U.S. blacks and black Africans. It previously had surfaced a number of times, first in the United States in September 1980 when presidential press secretary Jody Powell denounced it as a forgery. Nonetheless, it reappeared in March 1983 in the Nigeria Standard and in April 1983 in the Upper Volta press.

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

U.S. Cooperation With Israel on Lebanon

Communist Fronts. Shortly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Soviet front machinery launched a major campaign to link the United States with the Israeli action. In July 1982 the World Peace Council held a special meeting on Lebanon in Geneva. In August the Soviets called for the creation of an international commission to investigate alleged Israeli "crimes" in Lebanon. Committees of solidarity with the Palestinians appeared in a number of countries. The lead, however, was taken by local communists rather than Palestinian Arabs. Throughout the summer of 1982, there was a spate of demonstrations in Canada, Europe, and Latin America on the Lebanon issue. Once more the lead groups appeared to be communist fronts rather than genuine Arab organizations.

Soviet Broadcasts. Moscow's Arabic-language broadcasts on Radio Peace and Progress during the same period sought to exploit Arab sensitivities over Lebanon and the Palestinians. For example, a July 7, 1982 broadcast voiced a typical theme that the invasion had been planned long in advance by the United States and its "Zionist clique." A July 18 broadcast charged that the U.S. "military-industrial complex" was selling the "Zionist aggressors" the most modern "weapons of destruction" to perpetrate a "bloody massacre" in Lebanon.

Downstream Operations Memorandum. In the fall of 1982, "Downstream Operations," a forged U.S. Department of Defense document purporting to be a memo signed by National Security Council Middle East specialist Geoffrey Kemp, circulated in a number of Arab countries and within Arab communities in Europe. The document suggested that the United States had prior knowledge of, and had given prior approval to, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Clandestine Radio Broadcasts on Iran

Since February 1983, the Soviet Union's clandestine National Voice of Iran (NVOI), broadcasting from Baku in the Caucasus region of the U.S.S.R., has grown increasingly critical of the Khomeini regime. NVOI has condemned Tehran's suppression of the communist Tudeh Party, urged the release of Tudeh leaders, and warned that "groundless charges of espionage" against them will damage Iranian-Soviet relations. At the same time, NVOI has continued to paint the United States as the "Great Satan" and to allege American machinations to subvert and overthrow the Khomeini government.

Inciting Trouble With Muslims

Although labeled a forgery in January 1979, a fabricated academic study by Richard Mitchell, a Middle East specialist, reappeared in Cairo in October 1982. This document, which outlines an alleged CIA plan to incite trouble within Islamic fundamentalist groups, was one of a rash of Soviet forgeries during the late 1970s to weaken U.S.-Egyptian relations. When the document reappeared, Shaykh Talmasani, a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, pointed to the study as "evidence" that the United States was trying to foment differences among Islamic groups.

The Balkanization of India

On January 25, 26, and 28, 1983, the procommunist New Dehli daily newspaper, *Patriot*, published a bogus expose of U.S. policy toward the Third World by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. The February 6 issue of *Link*, a far-left Indian newsweekly, ran a similar story. Both reports preceded the meeting of nonaligned nations in New Delhi.

According to these stories, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick had given the policy review to the American Conservative Political Action Conference in

Washington in February 1982. The articles included a fabricated telegram of the U.S. Information Agency purportedly transmitting the text of the speech to missions overseas. Although the speech covered the globe in a manner designed to annoy nonaligned nations, the point that attracted most attention in India was the allegation that the United States favored the "balkanization" of that country. The speech also included unflattering remarks about the government of Indira Gandhi.

The U.S. Embassy promptly stated that the articles were false. Although Ambassador Kirkpatrick had attended the conference, she made no speech. The influential newsweekly India Today and the Free Press Journal of Bombay described the episode as a Soviet disinformation effort. Nonetheless, communist members of the Indian Parliament denounced the United States, and the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India issued a call to resist U.S. "intervention." Soviet media continue to refer to the speech, and the Nicaraguan press also used it to criticize U.S. policy. In South Asia, some noncommunist papers, including Pakistan's conservative Urdulanguage Jang and Nepal's semiofficial Gorkha Patra, carried the story as hard

LATIN AMERICA

The main active measures vehicles have been front groups, with many working through regional affiliates, mostly head-quartered in Havana or Mexico City. These include the World Peace Council, Christian Peace Conference, World Federation of Trade Unions, International Union of Students, and the International Organization of Journalists. Their activities are supplemented by a variety of single-issue organizations focused on Central America, such as national committees for solidarity with Nicaragua and with the Salvadoran FMLN.

U.S. Policy in Central America

• In April 1983, the World Peace Council and its Nicaraguan affiliate CONIPAZ sponsored the Continental Conference for Peace and Sovereignty in Central Ameria to criticize U.S. policy. Predictably, the final resolution lambasted U.S. support for the "bloody" regime in El Salvador and denounced the U.S. stance toward Cuba and Grenada.

10

 On January 27, 1983, Nicaraguan media published as factual the fake Jeane Kirkpatrick speech on U.S. policy toward the Third World. Since it had just surfaced in Indian leftwing media, the prompt Nicaraguan rerun possibly was prearranged. Sections of the bogus speech highly critical of Mexican policy were highlighted in the Nicaraguan replay.

• In September 1982 a single-issue front group linked to the World Peace Council—the World Front of Committees of Solidarity for the People of El Salvador—gathered in Managua to castigate U.S. policy toward Central

America.

Bacteriological Warfare

 The Castro regime has tried to explain the resurgence of dengue fever in Cuba by blaming the Pakistani malaria research center in Lahore, which the Soviets had charged with implementing a CIA-sponsored bacteriological warfare program. (See Special Report No. 101 for details.) According to Cuban media, the center was not only breeding malarial mosquitos for Afghanistan but also to carry dengue fever into Cuba. A former Cuban health official, Eduardo Gomez Cabale, who defected to the United States in 1982, has stated that the Cuban Government chose this explanation to divert attention from the likely carrier of dengue fever: Cuban troops returning from Angola.

 In March 1983, the Mexico City office of the Salvador Human Rights Commission, which has ties to the FMLN, accused the United States of furnishing the El Salvador military with chemical and biological weapons.

• In the summer of 1982, Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress made much of allegations by an American citizen, Scott Barnes, who falsely claimed he had been asked by U.S. Special Forces in March 1982 to assist in the use of chemical and biological weapons against the El Salvador rebels. Barnes, who has been an occasional mouthpiece for Soviet disinformation, also incorrectly asserted that he was a former Green Beret, FBI agent, and CIA officer.

The Falklands Campaign

Reagan-Thatcher Tape. In late May 1983, 2 weeks before the U.K. general elections, copies of a fabricated audiotape of an alleged telephone conversation between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher during the Falklands campaign circulated in the Netherlands under an anonymous cover letter. On the tape, the President tries to restrain Mrs. Thatcher, who is bent on punishing Argentina, and to blame her for the loss of the HMS Sheffield. Technical analysis of the tape indicated that the voices were authentic. Comparison with President Reagan's public statements revealed that the President's remarks were excerpted from a November 22, 1982 speech that was broadcast to Europe. In a Dutch "transcript" circulated with the tape, phrases from the speech were rearranged and taken out of context.

Weinberger Press Statement. In early summer 1982, a false May 5, 1982 Department of Defense press release No. 217–82 circulated in Latin America. Apparently it was intended for private distribution. In the bogus statement, Secretary Weinberger was outspokenly supportive of the British and highly critical of Argentina, whose attitude was described as "stubborn and selfish." The actual DOD release No. 217–82 dealt

EAST ASIA

with contract awards.

Yellow Rain

In May 1983 the World Federation of Trade Unions, the main Soviet trade union front group, sponsored a major conference in Vietnam to oppose alleged U.S. use of chemical warfare. This activity seemed part of a broader Soviet effort to divert attention from its use of "yellow rain" in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea by claiming that the United States itself was engaged in chemical warfare.

Levchenko's Revelations About the KGB in Japan

In December 1982 the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence released testimony given earlier in the year by former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, who defected to the United States in 1979. At the time, Levchenko was in charge of Soviet active measures in Japan.

The testimony made clear that the Soviets were making an extensive effort to influence Japanese political and public opinion through the full panoply of active measures techniques:

• Use of agents of influence, including senior journalists and politicians, to spread rumors and disinformation (i.e., alleged "serious" splits in the Chinese hierarchy over the border fighting with Vietnam, rumors of a secret nuclear deal between China and Italy, a false last political testament of the Chinese leader Zhou En-lai, and a concerted effort to label President Carter "neutron" Carter); and

 Use of agents of influence in Japan's internal politics. (Through such agents of influence, Levchenko asserted that the KGB played a major behind-thescenes role in some Japanese opposition

groups).

Soviet active measures goals, prepared annually by the KGB residency, according to Levchenko, mirrored Soviet policy toward Japan, and active measures were designed to support specific policy aims to:

- Improve Soviet-Japanese relations;
- Increase tensions between Japan and China;
- Increase tensions between Japan and the United States;
- Convince the Japanese that it was hopeless to work for the return of the northern territories.

Levchenko estimated the strength of the KGB residency in Tokyo at about 50 with 5 officers working full time on active measures. Levchenko, whose own cover was as a correspondent of the Soviet magazine *New Times*, said that journalist cover was highly regarded since it permitted wider access than diplomatic cover. According to Levchenko, 10 of the 12 *New Times* foreign correspondents were KGB officers, and a high percentage of overseas representatives of other Soviet media were also from the KGB. The former intelligence officer stated that the Soviets had about

200 Japanese agents, all of whom could be utilized for active measures if the KGB felt that this was desirable.

CONCLUSION

Assessing the impact of active measures is difficult, but they seem to have greater success in developing areas, such as Africa, than in other regions, for example Europe, where their record has been uneven. Yet as Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger wrote in the April 1983 NATO Review: "In both developed and developing countries, beyond the success, or lack of it, of particular operations, active measures have a corrosive effect on open political systems."

In dealing with active measures, Under Secretary Eagleburger recommended in the same article that "While recognizing that active measures are but one aspect of our complex relationship, common sense requires that we counter these intrusions not only through effective counterintelligence but by keeping our citizens as fully informed as possible of the deceptive practices to which they are exposed."

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