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CAS 3/22/2011

File Folder TERRORISM (2)

FOIA

M10-339

Box Number ~~91555~~ Box 2

GUNN

39

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
107732	PUBLICATION	TERRORISM REVIEW PAR 8/29/2000 F95-023/2 #14; PAR 8/8/2013 M10-339 #107732	33	5/6/1985	B1 B3
107733	SUMMARY	RE FOUR STUDIES D 8/29/2000 NLSF95-023/2 #15	13	4/23/1985	B1 B3
107734	MEMO	RE UPDATE D 8/29/2000 NLSF95-023/2 #16	3	5/8/1985	B1 B3
107735	NSC PROFILE	SHEET R 6/21/2000 NLSF95-023/2 #17	1	ND	B1
107736	MEMO	NICHOLAS PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST R 5/31/2005 NLSF95-023/2 #18	1	4/26/1985	B1
107737	REPORT	ON PROGRESS PAR 5/31/2005 NLSF95-023/2 #19	2	ND	B1
107738	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST PAR 5/31/2005 NLSF95-023/2 #20	2	12/31/1984	B1
107739	LETTER	GLENN HAMMOND AND PETER BAHNSEN TO ROBERT OAKLEY RE RECOMMENDATIONS	2	12/5/1984	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
107740	CHART	RE PROGRAM SUMMARY	1	ND	B1
107741	MEMO	OAKLEY TI SPIERS RE FUNDING R 5/27/2005 NLSF95-023/2 #23	1	12/21/1984	B1
107742	CABLE	222247Z APR 85 D 8/29/2000 NLSF95-023/2 #24	3	4/22/1985	B1
107743	CHART	RE ORGARNIZATIONAL TREE R 7/10/2001 NLSF95-023/2 #25	1	ND	B1

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
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
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Terrorism Review



6 May 1985



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Terrorism Review

6 May 1985

1	Focus—Prospects for Palestinian Terrorism <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> DI/OGI
7	Highlights <input type="checkbox"/> DI/OGI
13	The LARF Enigma <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> DI/OGI
17	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> DI/OGI
19	Peru: The Continuing Sendero Luminoso Challenge <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> DI/ALA
23	The Terrorism Diary for June <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> DI/OGI
27	Chronology of Terrorism—1985 <input type="checkbox"/> DI/OGI

This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor

Terrorism Review [redacted]

6 May 1985

Focus

Prospects for Palestinian Terrorism [redacted]

Palestinian terrorists were responsible for about 30 percent of the international terrorist incidents of Middle East origin we recorded during the past year:

- Terrorist operations inside Israel and the occupied territories increased significantly over the level observed in 1983, with virtually every Palestinian group claiming credit for at least one attack.
- Terrorist attacks by Syrian-sponsored Palestinian groups in Europe also were up; Jordanian interests were the primary target.
- Intra-Palestinian conflicts, particularly the split within the PLO, continued to generate sporadic terrorist violence.

Palestinian terrorism involving these targets is unlikely to subside in the near term.

[redacted]
US facilities and personnel have not been targeted by any PLO group, whether pro- or anti-Arafat, in recent years. Two Palestinian groups outside the PLO—the Syrian-backed Abu Nidal Group and the Iraq-based 15 May Organization—did attack US interests in 1984 and continue to pose a dangerous threat. [redacted]

[redacted] anti-American operations would be a likely factor in any decision by Arafat or anti-Arafat groups to expand their terrorist operations in an effort to force the international community to deal with their grievances. [redacted]

Fatah's Restraint

The supporters of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat continue to adhere to the PLO's decadelong ban on international terrorism, although they still carry out attacks against civilian and military targets in Israel and the occupied territories. Palestinians refer to these attacks as the "armed struggle to liberate the homeland" and do not consider them to be terrorism. Virtually all Arab nations endorse the so-called armed struggle. [redacted]

Palestinian groups launched more than 50 attacks in Israel or the occupied territories in 1984. Fatah or other pro-Arafat cells inside the occupied territories probably were responsible for at least some of these attacks. In most cases, however, we have been unable to determine the exact perpetrators. Sometimes, several Palestinian groups claim responsibility for the same incident in an effort to demonstrate their dedication to the anti-Zionist cause and their continued capability to operate inside Israeli territory. At times the true perpetrators will not claim responsibility, so as not to reveal their operational infrastructure or prompt Israeli reprisals against their bases outside Israel. [redacted]

[Redacted]

The assassinations last December of two PLO officials—Ismail Darwish in Rome and Fahd al-Qawasmeh in Amman—almost certainly conducted by Syrian-backed Palestinian opponents of Arafat, raised the possibility of retaliatory attacks by Fatah against radical Palestinian targets in Europe. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Arafat's ability and willingness to restrain additional Fatah terrorism may be limited. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Syrian-Based PLO Groups

All the anti-Arafat PLO groups are based in Syria or Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon. From these locations they can infiltrate teams into Israel or the West Bank, either directly or through Jordan, and provide support to terrorist cells already in place. We believe that most of the Palestinian terrorist incidents in Israeli-controlled territory were the work of these radical Palestinians. [Redacted]

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) claimed credit for two of the most notable attacks. The first was a grenade attack in a Jerusalem store last February that wounded 21. Then, in April, three DFLP terrorists attacked shoppers on a crowded street in Jerusalem with automatic weapons and handgrenades. Forty-eight persons were wounded before the terrorists were overpowered. [Redacted]

Most of the Palestinian attacks against Israel were like the February incident—small bombs or grenades left in places where Israeli civilians congregate. In the last year there was also a resurgence of a type of attack common before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon: Katyusha rockets fired at Israeli border settlements. At least 10 such attacks occurred in the last 12 months. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Struggle Front (PSF) claimed credit for some of them. [redacted]

The Palestine National Salvation Front

Until March 1985, the Syrian-based Palestinians were divided into two loose coalitions: the **Democratic Alliance** composed of the PFLP, the DFLP, the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP), and the Palestinian Communist Party; and the **National Alliance** composed of Abu Musa's Fatah splinter group, the PFLP-General Command, the PSF, and Saiqa. The Democratic Alliance favored a return to a collective leadership of the PLO in which Arafat agreed to act only on the basis of a general consensus of leaders. It opposed the demands of the more extreme National Alliance to remove Arafat as head of the PLO and to continue the armed struggle against Fatah. The Hussein-Arafat agreement to develop a joint PLO-Jordanian peace initiative was opposed both by Syria and by the two radical Palestinian coalitions, and led to the formation of a new grouping called the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF). [redacted]

Created at the urging of Damascus, the PNSF proposes to undermine the Arafat-Hussein accord. The new grouping is widely viewed among Palestinians outside Syria as a Syrian proxy without an independent base of support among the Palestinian people. The decision of the PFLP—after Fatah, the most influential PLO group—to join the PNSF lends the coalition only limited additional credibility. With the PFLP's abandonment of the Democratic Alliance, Arafat may redouble his efforts to reconcile with the DFLP, the only important PLO group that remains uncommitted on the split within the PLO. [redacted]

Disagreements among the PNSF member groups probably will limit their ability to coordinate an effective terrorist or political program that would dissuade Arafat from his current diplomatic endeavors. [redacted]

[redacted]

Groups Outside the PLO

Of the three radical Palestinian groups that are not members of the PLO (and thus not constrained by Arafat's ban on international terrorism), the Abu Nidal Group is the most dangerous because of its tightly knit organization, its infrastructure in Europe, its long record of successful—and lethal—operations, and its willingness to attack US interests. The group has been based in Syria since its expulsion from Iraq in the fall of 1983. The group's goals are consistent with those of the Syrian Government, [redacted]

[redacted] The group's independent status, however, may have been weakened by the continuing serious illness of its founder, Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal), and Syria may now exercise considerable influence over the group's operational decision making. For example, the Abu Nidal Group is the leading suspect in the murder of a Jordanian diplomat in Romania last December, which was the first of a series of anti-Jordanian attacks in Europe following the meeting of the Palestinian National Congress in Amman last November. [redacted]

The Abu Nidal Group poses a direct threat to US interests. It claimed credit for the bomb that wounded two US citizens in the square located between the Intercontinental Hotel and the US Embassy in Amman on 24 March 1984, as well as for two bombs defused near British facilities on the same day. Available evidence [redacted] do indicate the Abu Nidal Group's interest in attacking US targets. In an interview with a French journalist in February, an individual claiming to be Sabri al-Banna threatened to conduct new attacks on US interests. [redacted]

In February, Abu Musa's Fatah splinter group and the Abu Nidal Group announced the formation of a joint command, the ultimate goal of which is to achieve a merger of the two groups by midyear. Given the ideological and personal differences between them, however, we doubt a true merger will take place. [redacted]

The Baghdad-based 15 May Organization remains of concern because of the sophistication and lethality of its previous operations. After the failure of several attempts to place bombs on commercial airliners flying to or from Israel in the first half of 1984, the group apparently stopped trying. The group's operations may have been constrained by Baghdad out of a desire to avoid being charged with

[redacted]

There is no evidence to indicate that the PFLP-Special Command (PFLP-SC) has carried out any terrorist operations since the 1981 car bomb outside a synagogue in Antwerp. The group remains based in South Yemen, where it probably still maintains several training facilities. Occasional reports that group members are receiving training for unspecified terrorist operations have not been corroborated. In August 1984, Zaki Hilalu, the PFLP-SC military chief, was wounded by unidentified gunmen in Spain. We do not know why he was in Spain. [redacted]

The above article is [redacted]

The Palestinian Groups

PLO Groups	Leader and Headquarters	Politics	Size
Pro-Arafat			
Fatah (loyalist faction)	Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar), Tunis	Main goal is to secure Palestinian political demands; largely nonideological	6,000 to 8,000 fighters scattered throughout the Middle East
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	Abd al-Rahim Ahmad, Baghdad	Controlled by Iraq	300 to 500 fighters located in Iraq
Uncommitted			
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	Nayif Hawatmah, Damascus	Marxist-Leninist; most ideological group; closest links with USSR	1,200 to 1,500 fighters scattered throughout the region
Anti-Arafat			
Palestinian National Salvation Front			
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	George Habbash, Damascus	Marxist-Leninist; committed to elimination of conservative Arab regimes as well as Israel; most prominent radical group	1,500 to 2,000 fighters scattered throughout the region
Fatah (dissident faction)	Sa'id Musa Muragha (Abu Musa) Abu Khalid al-Anla, Damascus	Militant advocate of armed struggle to eliminate Israel	1,500 to 2,000 fighters in Syria and Lebanon
PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)	Ahmad Jibril, Damascus	Lacks clearly defined political ideology; emphasizes armed struggle to eliminate Israel	800 to 1,000 fighters mostly in Syria and Lebanon
Saiqa	Issam Qadi, Damascus	Controlled by Syria	500 to 1,000 fighters in Syria and Lebanon
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	Samir Ghawshah (Abu Nayif), Damascus	Militant advocate of armed struggle to eliminate Israel	200 to 300 fighters scattered throughout the region
Faction of Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)	Taafat Yaqub, Syria	Militant advocate of armed struggle to eliminate Israel	300 to 500 mostly in Syria and Lebanon
Groups Outside PLO			
Fatah-Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal Group)	Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal), Damascus	Leader espouses pan-Arabist and Marxist-Leninist ideology; committed to elimination of Arab regimes as well as Israel	Fewer than 500 mostly in Syria and Lebanon
15 May Organization	Husayn al-Umari (Abu Ibrahim), Baghdad	Militant opposition to Israel	Fewer than 100 mostly in Iraq
PFLP-Special Command (PFLP-SC)	Salim Abu Salim (Abu Muhammad), Aden	Marxist-Leninist; rejects political solution; supports armed struggle	Fewer than 100 mostly in South Yemen



Highlights

Alert Item

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Key Indicators

Western Europe

Palestinian Terrorist Apparatus Uncovered

[Redacted] the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP) has set up a support network to conduct terrorist operations against Israeli targets in Western Europe. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Italy

Red Brigades Threat to US or NATO Official

[Redacted] Red Brigades activists may be targeting a US or NATO official in Naples. [Redacted] the attack may be timed to coincide with the regional and local elections on 12 May, although the plotters themselves had not specified a time frame. The Red Brigades recently assassinated an Italian university professor in Rome. [Redacted]

Greece

US Military Facilities Under Surveillance?

US military facilities in Greece have reported three separate instances of possible surveillance by unknown "dark-complected" individuals. Greek gate guards at the Nea Makri Naval Communications Station reported two men and a woman photographed the installation on 4 April. On the same day, three men photographed JUSMAAG personnel as they left the Athens headquarters. On the evening of 10 April, three men on a motorcycle were observed apparently watching the home of the US defense attache. [redacted]

[redacted] The Greek press has picked up the story, reporting that an American official is being stalked by three unidentified killers. [redacted]

El Salvador

Captures of Leaders Set Back Insurgents

Guerrilla plans to intensify terrorism in San Salvador have been hurt by the capture of key urban commanders. [redacted]

those captured include the chief of the Metropolitan Front of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)—one of the two largest guerrilla factions—who has claimed to control 200 full-time operatives in the capital. The rebel leader was captured with code books for communicating with insurgent headquarters in Nicaragua. The Metro Front's chief of logistics also was arrested. [redacted]


[redacted] the arrests have prompted the rebels to move up planning for a mortar attack against the US Embassy. [redacted]


In addition, the National Guard arrested a local labor leader said to be a rebel agent in an agricultural union. In another blow, the guerrillas have publicly admitted that a female rebel leader was captured in central El Salvador.

[redacted] she represented one of the five rebel factions during the first round of peace talks in October. [redacted]

The arrests suggest that government security forces are becoming more adept at penetrating insurgent cells. [redacted] members of another guerrilla faction responsible for fomenting insurrection within worker and student groups in the capital have been warned to restrict their movements and to improve security. The arrests also tend to support previous reporting that the guerrillas may have infiltrated some 400 terrorists into the capital over the last few months. [redacted]

Philippines






Significant Developments

France-West Germany

Cofounder of FRG Neo-Nazi Terrorist Group Arrested


On 13 April in Paris, authorities arrested leading neo-Nazi terrorist Odfried Hepp. Hepp had been associated with the banned West German extreme rightwing Hoffman Military Sports Group. In 1982, along with Walther Kexel (who committed suicide in prison last month), Hepp founded a small rightwing terrorist group that came to be known as the Kexel-Hepp Group. In addition to robbing banks, it conducted several bombing attacks against US military personnel in West Germany. It also advocated joining forces with leftwing extremists to eradicate US influence in West Germany. Five of its six members were arrested in 1983, and only Hepp had remained at large. Hepp is being held in Paris pending extradition proceedings.

France



Cyprus

Rightwing Extremist Groups Resurface




Israel

More Sentences Handed Down Against Jewish Terrorists

On 17 April, David Ben-Shimol was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and attempted murder. This is the stiffest sentence given to a Jewish terrorist to date. Ben-Shimol, a former sergeant in the Israeli Defense Forces, was convicted of firing a rocket into an Arab bus last October and of throwing a grenade into an Arab cafe in Jerusalem last September. One Arab passenger was killed in the rocket attack.

On 18 April, three other convicted Jewish terrorists received sentences of imprisonment ranging between two and three years for participation in the attempt to blow up the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem in February 1984. The Jerusalem District Court sentenced Dan Beeri to five years in prison, with two years suspended, for planning the attack and for possessing and transporting weapons. Yosef Edri was sentenced to 40 months in jail, with 15 months suspended, for helping to commit a felony and for possessing arms and explosives. Finally, Uri Maier received a 30-month prison term, with six months suspended, for belonging to a terrorist organization, attempting to cause serious damage, and possessing and transporting arms.


Libya




Bahrain

Iranian-Sponsored Subversion on the Rise

Iranian-sponsored dissident groups are broadening their activities in Bahrain. Increasing numbers of Bahraini Shias reportedly are going to Iran, Syria, or Lebanon for training at Iran's behest. A number of these Shias have returned from such training in the last two years.



Kuwait



Colombia

Criminal Court Justice Assassinated in Medellin

Justice Alvaro Medina Ochoa was gunned down outside his residence on the night of 8 April by two men on a motorcycle. Medina had been repeatedly threatened by reputed narcotics traffickers because of his investigations into the drug trade. Medina was the eighth judicial official killed in the past 12 months. Most of the victims were prosecutors or judges and almost all were shot by assassins on motorcycles.

El Salvador

Guerrillas Dressed as Government Soldiers Attack Hamlet

On 8 April, about 300 guerrillas dressed in uniforms of the El Salvadoran Armed Forces entered the small village of Santa Cruz Loma and executed off-duty members of the civil defense forces. A total of 21 people were killed or missing, including four children who were burned to death. Leaflets and graffiti left at the scene indicate that the Popular Liberation Forces of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front conducted the attack in order to neutralize the town's 15-man civil defense unit. The attack was probably also intended as a warning to other villages in the area not to cooperate with government troops.


Sri Lanka


Muslims Murdered by Tamil Terrorists

On 9 April, Tamil insurgents killed three members of the Muslim minority suspected of cooperating with government security forces. Two were killed while praying in a mosque. This incident, and rumors of further violence against members of the Muslim community, sparked riots that left between 20 and 30 Tamils dead and more than 12,000 homeless. Sinhalese youths reportedly helped organize the Muslim riots. Security forces did little to prevent anti-Tamil violence and may have actually aided the rioters.

The small but influential Tamil-speaking Muslim community composes approximately 6 percent of the Sri Lankan population. It has tried to stay out of the island's increasingly brutal communal strife.

Pakistan





Sudan

Libyan Subversive Activity Intensifies After Coup

[redacted] Libya has begun to infiltrate Sudanese dissidents and money into Sudan and has activated agents in place in preparation for subversive and possibly terrorist activity. Although some Libyan agents were picked up while trying to infiltrate through Egypt the day after the coup, others who reportedly plan to enter on flights from Syria may have greater success. [redacted]

[redacted] the vulnerability of US interests has increased, both because Sudan's internal security organization is in disarray, and because large numbers of Sudanese dissidents formerly backed by Libya were released from jail along with other political prisoners of the old regime. Some of these dissidents targeted US interests in the past. [redacted]

Central African Republic

Oppositionists Planning To Target Chadian Diplomats

[redacted] four terrorists infiltrated into Bangui in early April. [redacted] Libyan-backed Chadian dissidents reportedly conducted several terrorist operations in the Central African Republic during the last year. [redacted]

South Africa

South African Rebel Group Suffers Serious Setbacks

The arrest of a high-ranking Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) leader in South Africa in March and the forced retreat of many of the group's members from Lesotho in early April have further diminished the already weak capabilities of the group. [redacted]

[redacted] Neither Botswana nor Zimbabwe, however, will allow the group to run operations out of their countries. [redacted]

The PAC has been unable to launch a military campaign comparable to that of its larger and more powerful archrival, the ANC. [redacted]



The LARF Enigma (U)

The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) is among the most lethal terrorist organizations operating in Europe. Its virulent anti-American, anti-Zionist orientation has made the group the scourge of American and Israeli diplomats in France. The LARF probably has been responsible for at least eight attacks against US and Israeli targets on the continent since late 1981; killing five persons and wounding four. [redacted]

The composition and organization of the LARF remained largely unknown until late 1984, when Italian and French security forces arrested three members of the group. [redacted]

Although these counterterrorist successes would seem to have impaired the LARF's ability to conduct operations in Europe, its aggressive anti-American, anti-Zionist posture makes it a continuing threat to US and Israeli interests there and in the Middle East. Moreover, because of their arrests of LARF suspects, Italy and France have also been threatened by the group. [redacted]

The LARF Record

The LARF's known operations in Europe to date have consisted of firearm and bomb attacks against US and Israeli diplomatic targets. The organization first came to light in France when the "Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction—Salah al-Masri group" claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of US Charge Christian Chapman in Paris on 12 November 1981. Attackers using the same nom de guerre claimed credit for the murder of US assistant defense attache Charles Ray, who was shot on a Paris street on 18 January 1982. Since then, the LARF has claimed responsibility for the following attacks:

- On 31 March 1982 in Paris, three masked men fired automatic weapons at the Israeli Consulate. No casualties resulted, and damage was minimal.

- On 3 April 1982 in Paris, Israeli diplomat Yaacov Bar Simantov was murdered by a female assailant with a handgun in the lobby of his apartment house.
- On 21 August 1982 in Paris, US Commercial Counselor Roderick Grant was the target of an attempted car bombing. The bomb was spotted by a passerby who called police. Two members of a French bomb disposal unit were killed as they tried to disarm the device.
- On 17 September 1982 in Paris, Amos Manel, a member of the Israeli Defense Purchasing Mission, and two other men were seriously wounded when a bomb attached to their vehicle exploded.
- On 15 February 1984 in Rome, Leamon R. Hunt, Director General of the Multi-National Observer Force for the Camp David Accords, was shot and killed outside his home.¹
- On 26 March 1984 in Strasbourg, US Consul General Robert Homme was wounded by a man who fired a pistol at him as he sat in his vehicle. [redacted]

[redacted]

¹ The Red Brigades has also claimed responsibility for this attack. [redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The PFLP-SC is based in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, with cells in Baghdad and Kuwait, and reportedly maintains a presence in Lebanon. The group, which has not claimed credit for any attacks since October 1981, portrays itself as the elite vanguard of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement—an ideology apparently compatible with that of the LARF. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

We know neither where nor when the LARF was founded. Prior to its attack on Chapman in November 1981, it was not known to any US or European security or intelligence agency. [Redacted]

[Redacted] The PFLP-SC carried out bombings against Jewish and moderate Arab targets in widely separated countries, but never attacked an American target. Moreover, the group appears to have been in some disarray for the past several years. The LARF, conversely, holds the United States responsible for Israeli intervention in Lebanon, and has focused primarily on American diplomatic targets throughout its existence. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Palestinian Connections

When the LARF surfaced in Europe in 1981, many observers suspected it was an offshoot of one of the many Palestinian terrorist organizations. The group does have some Palestinian connections. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

European Ties

The LARF may also be linked to European terrorists who share its Marxist-Leninist ideology. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

² Salah al-Masri, in whose name the LARF committed the attacks on Chapman and Ray, was a Palestinian follower of Wadi Haddad killed by the Israelis in southern Lebanon in 1980. This use of Masri's name suggested that the LARF was composed of former PFLP members. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

and associating with known criminals. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Both the LARF and the Red Brigades claimed responsibility for the Hunt assassination, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

This is the only terrorist attack in Italy for which the LARF claimed credit, but the tactics were more typical of a Red Brigades operation. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

In December 1984, Italian police arrested Josephine Abdu at the Rome airport. She probably was traveling through Europe closing down LARF safehouses in several locations. Abdu remains under arrest in Italy, and the Italians have announced plans to try her and Mansuri beginning in May. Firyal Dahir and Jacqueline Esber will be tried in absentia at the same time. [Redacted]

In response to these arrests, the LARF earlier this year threatened "bloody reprisals" against France and Italy if the three "armed strugglers" were not released. On 25 March the director of the French Cultural Center in Tripoli was kidnaped. A handwritten communique delivered to a news agency office in Beirut claimed that members of the LARF had "arrested" the diplomat and "would not be responsible for his safety" unless France released their comrade Abdallah. The director was later released unharmed, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The evidence that he had committed crimes in France was weak, and pressure was mounting for his release in any case. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Counterterrorist Successes Unravel Mystery

It was not until August 1984, when Italian police in Trieste arrested a man identified as Abdallah al-Mansuri, that security forces in Western Europe began to obtain solid information about the LARF.

[Redacted]

On 1 April, however, French police achieved the most significant break to date in their investigations of the LARF. [Redacted]

[Redacted] they were able to locate a Paris safehouse used by the group. In the house they found a major arms cache—including the

Acting on information provided by the Italians, French police in Lyon arrested "Sa'di" in October, initially charging him with carrying forged passports

weapon, according to ballistic tests, that had been used to kill both Ray and Bar Simantov. [redacted]


[redacted] the new evidence has led the French to charge Abdallah with complicity in several of the LARF attacks in France. His fate, like that of Mansuri and Abdu in Italy, now rests in the hands of judicial authorities. [redacted]


Many questions remain to be answered about the LARF. [redacted]

The recent arrests probably reduce the immediate threat of violence from the LARF. Most, if not all, of the hardcore members probably have now returned to Lebanon. If they wish to resume operations in Western Europe, they will need to establish a new base there. Even after its losses, however, the LARF remains a dangerous foe of US, Israeli, and Jewish interests in the Mediterranean littoral. The French and Italians also remain at risk as long as they continue to hold LARF members, and their diplomats in Lebanon are especially vulnerable. [redacted]

The above article is [redacted]

~~Secret~~





Peru: The Continuing Sendero Luminoso Challenge []

[]
Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgents have expanded their areas of operation over the past year or so and are carrying out an active terrorist campaign in the south-central emergency zone, but the overall level and effectiveness of their activity declined last year. Improved performance of the Peruvian security forces and growing revulsion among Peruvians over the insurgents' wanton violence appear to be constraining the group. Nevertheless, the guerrillas remain a formidable challenge for the government, and their prospects may improve if the next administration, which takes office in July, fails to deal successfully with major economic difficulties. []

Ayacucho: The Sendero Luminoso Heartland

In recent months the security forces have begun to make progress in combating Sendero Luminoso in its original base area in Ayacucho and elsewhere in the south-central highlands. The improvement is due in part to a decision by the Army last May to establish some 50 counterinsurgency bases, from which units of up to 100 men have engaged in aggressive patrolling. Early last year the Army began forming peasant defense groups. Although poorly armed, these organizations have frequently stymied the insurgents. In addition, the government is trying to win the confidence of peasants in the south-central emergency zone through small-scale development projects, although lack of funding has hampered these efforts. []

The mobility of the guerrillas and the well-entrenched support network they have developed over the last 15 years have prevented the armed forces from dealing them a crippling blow. Nevertheless, the insurgents no longer dominate the region the way they did from 1980 through 1982. Instead, the shift in the military's approach has put Sendero Luminoso increasingly on the defensive. []

In addition, Sendero Luminoso has increased its use of terrorism—occasionally wiping out entire hamlets—in an attempt to deter villagers from cooperating with the government. Members of the Peruvian security forces have been accused—both by Sendero Luminoso and by several human rights groups—of also committing atrocities against villagers in contested areas. Lending support to such allegations, mass graves containing dozens of corpses of peasants bearing marks of torture have been discovered in various parts of the emergency zones. The culpability of the military in these deaths has not been firmly established; nevertheless, entire highland communities, fearing violence on the part of the security forces as well as the insurgents, reportedly have been abandoning their ancestral homes for the relative safety of Lima and other cities. []

Upper Huallaga Region

In an apparent attempt to reduce military pressure against its forces in the south-central emergency zone, Sendero Luminoso began operations in the upper Huallaga river valley about a year ago. The opening of a second insurgent front contributed to the impression that the movement was rapidly growing, but recent evidence indicates that the guerrillas have failed to gain a secure foothold there. Unlike in south-central Peru, where the insurgents over the years built an extensive grassroots network, they have been hampered in the upper Huallaga valley by a lack of advance preparations. []

[] One apparent reason the guerrillas found such low receptivity is that the inhabitants of this traditional coca-growing region believe that an SL presence would threaten their drug-trafficking income by attracting the attention of the security forces. []

In addition, however, a rapid response by the military has been crucial in deterring the guerrillas. Last July the armed forces created a new emergency zone for

the upper Huallaga region. By calling up reserve units, the Army was able to deal with the threat in the north-central highlands without reducing pressure on the insurgents in the south. A major offensive last September failed in its mission of encircling SL units, but it prevented the guerrillas from solidifying their presence in the upper Huallaga. Subsequent military operations have forced the guerrillas to flee into adjacent areas where they have been reduced to conducting sporadic attacks against government forces. On the negative side, however, the military's fear of jeopardizing its counterinsurgency campaign by alienating local cocagrowers led it to temporarily block vigorous police antinarcotics efforts earlier this year. [redacted]

Terrorism in Lima

The SL infrastructure in Lima, which had been crippled by the arrest of several urban commanders in mid-1984, resumed operations early this year by bombing the headquarters of two major political parties and assassinating several police officers. The complicated nature of many of these attacks, along with a new willingness to conduct daytime operations, suggests that the insurgents probably have rebuilt their terrorist network in the capital. The cost to the movement of resuming operations there remains high, however, because the security forces continue to identify and arrest SL members. [redacted]

Nevertheless, Sendero Luminoso benefits in several ways by pursuing a campaign of urban terrorism. Although guerrilla actions in the remote Andean highlands often go unnoticed by the international press, attacks in the capital receive prominent coverage, thereby enhancing the insurgents' image as a major revolutionary force. During the visit of Pope John Paul II in February, various SL operations in Lima underscored the movement's flair for dramatic gestures. Moreover, [redacted] urban terrorism is potentially destabilizing because it tends to undermine public confidence in the ability of the civilian authorities to maintain order. [redacted]

Election Offensive

In early March, Sendero Luminoso began an offensive reportedly designed to disrupt the national elections on 14 April. Although a similar attempt to undermine municipal elections in November 1983

generally failed to achieve its objective, it did result in the cancellation of voting in part of the south-central emergency zone. The evident goal of the latest insurgent campaign was to force voters—especially those in rural areas where SL is strongest—to boycott the elections. To prevent this from occurring, the military used some 40,000 troops to provide security at approximately 4,000 polling places throughout the country. [redacted] As a consequence, the SL effort was once again largely unsuccessful. [redacted]

Outlook

Despite its setbacks over the past year, the dispersion, mobility, and self-sufficiency of Sendero Luminoso—along with an intelligent reluctance to engage the military in direct combat—have enabled it to deny the armed forces a decisive victory. For the most part, guerrilla attacks have been directed against isolated Civil Guard posts, peasant self-defense groups, and vulnerable policemen in the cities. The cyclical nature of SL operations—characterized by alternating periods of vigorous action and relative inactivity—has enabled the guerrillas not only to regroup and replenish their supply of arms, but also to rest and recuperate after sustained offensives. The group's continuing independence from foreign support or direction, [redacted] and its practice of obtaining weapons locally either by theft or attacks on security forces also have contributed to the movement's durability by making it virtually invulnerable to interdiction efforts. [redacted]

The spread of the insurgency to new regions and its entrenched strength in the south-central emergency zone indicate that the government will be forced to continue to devote sizable numbers of soldiers to the counterinsurgency effort in coming months. If Peru's new guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Movement—Tupac Amaru, were to begin sustained operations, this would further tax the security forces and probably provide more breathing room for Sendero Luminoso. (There is little evidence that Tupac Amaru is planning any such offensive, however.) [redacted]

The SL goal of a successful nationwide revolution appears illusory, at least in the near term, but [redacted] the [redacted]

organization will remain a significant force for the foreseeable future [redacted]

[redacted]
the government may need five to 10 years to suppress the guerrillas. Although the group seems to have lost the momentum it demonstrated early in President Belaunde's administration, SL leaders probably are buoyed by Peru's deepening economic difficulties. They may reason that these difficulties will present new revolutionary opportunities in the years ahead.

[redacted]

[redacted]



The Terrorism Diary for June

Below is a compendium of June dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.

- June 1976* **Palestinians.** During this month, Syria entered the civil conflict in Lebanon on the side of the Christian Phalange and against the Palestinians and their Muslim allies. In response, Palestinian renegade Abu Nidal renamed his terrorist group (then based in Iraq) the Black June Organization and began attacking Syrian targets.
- 1 June 1963* **Kenya.** Beginning of self-government. Celebrated as Madaraka Day.
- 1 June 1972* **Cameroon.** Proclamation of the republic.
- 1 June 1973* **Greece.** Proclamation of the republic.
- 2 June 1946* **Italy.** Date of the referendum in which Italian voters chose a republican form of government.
- 2 June 1967* **West Germany.** Leftist student Benno Ohnesorg killed during demonstration in West Berlin. The terrorist group 2 June Movement (remnants of which eventually joined the Red Army Faction) took its name from this incident.
- 4 June 1970* **Tonga.** Independence Day.
- 4 June 1979* **Ghana.** Jerry Rawlings takes power for the first time.
- 4 June 1982* **Israel, Lebanon.** First Israeli bombing of Beirut.
- 5 June 1965* **Honduras.** Constitutional republic reestablished.
- 5 June 1967* **Middle East.** Beginning of Six-Day War.
- 5 June 1975* **Egypt.** Reopening of Suez Canal.
- 5 June 1977* **Seychelles.** Overthrow of President Mancham by Albert Rene. Celebrated as Liberation Day.
- 6 June 1982* **Israel, Lebanon.** Israeli forces invade Lebanon.
- 6 June 1984* **India.** Army storms Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar, ending most radical Sikh terrorism. This act considered "desecration" even by mainstream Sikhs. Sikh Akali Dal political party has designated first week of June "Genocide Week."

7 June 1975 *Greece.* Republican constitution adopted.

7 June 1982 *Chad.* Hissene Habre seizes N'djamena.

8 June 1967 *Palestinians.* Founding of terrorist group Saiqa (Thunderbolt).

9 June 1965 *Oman.* Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) begins armed struggle.

9 June 1969 *Sudan.* Proclamation of southern autonomy.

9 June 1983 *South Africa.* Three African National Congress (ANC) terrorists hanged.

10 June 1829 *Argentina, United Kingdom.* Date from which Argentina claims sovereignty over Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). Celebrated in Argentina as Malvinas Day.

11 June 1970 *Libya.* Transfer of US bases to Libyan control. Celebrated as Evacuation Day.

12 June 1898 *Philippines.* Proclamation of the republic. Celebrated as Independence Day.

12 June 1948 *Hungary.* Founding of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

13 June 1974 *North Yemen.* Coup by Col. Ibrahim al-Hamidi (accession of Second Corrective Movement).

13 June 1982 *Saudi Arabia.* Death of King Khalid and accession of King Fahd.

14 June 1975 *El Salvador.* Founding of Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN).

14 June 1982 *Argentina, United Kingdom.* Argentine surrender ends Falkland Islands conflict.

15 June 1960 *Japan, United States.* Signing of Japan-US Security Treaty. Violent protests by leftist opponents of the treaty were common on this date through the 1960s.

15 June 1979 *El Salvador.* Communist Party, under Soviet and Cuban pressure, adopts policy of armed struggle; its fighting elements are called Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL).

15 June 1979 *Nicaragua.* Somoza regime National Guard kills 185 insurrectionists near US Embassy.

16 June 1976 *South Africa.* Riots in Soweto.

17 June 1944 *Iceland.* Anniversary of the republic. Celebrated as Independence Day.

17 June 1953 *East and West Germany.* Berlin uprising.

17 June 1983 *France.* Mysterious disappearance of Guy Orsoni, leader of Corsican separatist group National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC).

18 June 1953

Egypt. Proclamation of the republic. Celebrated as Evacuation Day.

19 June 1961

Kuwait. Independence Day.

19 June 1965

Algeria. Overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella. Celebrated as Revolutionary Recovery Day.

20 June 1985

Muslim world. *Id al-Fitr* (end of *Ramadan*).

22 June 1969

South Yemen. Coup by National Liberation Front.

23 June

Luxembourg. Current grand duke's birthday. Celebrated as National Day.

24 June

Spain. King's Day.

25 June 1950

North and South Korea. North Korea invades South Korea, beginning Korean war.

25 June 1964

Mozambique. Founding of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Celebrated since 1975 as Independence Day.

26 June 1960

Madagascar. Independence Day.

26 June 1960

Somalia. Independence Day (northern region).

27 June 1977

Djibouti. Independence Day.

29 June 1976

Seychelles. Independence Day.

30 June 1960

Zaire. Independence Day.



Chronology of Terrorism—1985

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last issue. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included. []

Mid-March

Lesotho: Homes of PAC and ANC members attacked. The grenades and small-arms fire wounded one person slightly. The attacks may have been unofficial retaliation by Lesotho's security forces for the mistaken killing of one of their members by ANC recruits. []

31 March

West Bank: Israeli deputy mayor killed in al-Birah. Zalman Abulnik was shot with a 9-mm handgun. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed credit in the name of its "Martyr Abu al-Ghadab Forces" and pledged to carry out further such operations. []

Early April

Namibia: Government claims SWAPO abducted eight civilians in two incidents in Ovambo. One of the eight, a father of two whose children were also abducted, was reportedly killed shortly afterward. []

4 April

Iran: Explosion kills one man, wounds five others in central Tehran. An Iranian official indicated the dead man may have been preparing a bomb that blew up prematurely. []

5 April

Mozambique: RENAMO ambushes traffic on road north of Maputo. The attack, carried out with machineguns and a rocket launcher, left seven civilians—including three provincial officials—dead and five wounded. []

7 April

Iraq: Kurdish guerrillas kidnap two employees of Japanese computer company. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan reportedly kidnaped the two engineers to protest Japanese involvement in Iraq's economic development. []

8 April

West Germany: Attempt to enter military supply depot thwarted near Neukirchen. Three men in Bundeswehr (Army) uniforms approached the entrance in a German Army jeep, but departed while the guard was checking the access roster. The driver was initially identified as a member of the Red Army Faction, but German authorities now doubt that the RAF was involved. []

Ivory Coast: Burkinabe dissident residing in Abidjan killed. The victim, a prominent businessman, was reportedly a friend of the Ivorian President. The Ivorian Government has publicly accused the Burkinabe regime of sponsoring the shooting. []

9 April

Bolivia: Ex-Army captain assassinated on his farm, apparently by MIR. The late Carlos Helguero Larren was believed to have been involved in the murder of eight leaders of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in 1981. []

Chile: Two bombs cause minor damage in Santiago mall housing US banking facilities. It is not known whether the Chase Manhattan or First National City Bank offices were the intended targets. []

10 April

Portugal: FP-25 robs bank in Fao, sets off bomb in Oporto. The blast, at the offices of the Secretary of State, caused extensive damage, but no injuries. Shortly afterward, an FP-25 member was killed in a shootout with police and two others were wounded and arrested. []

Sri Lanka: Train bombed on eve of visit by British Prime Minister. The explosion killed a woman and injured three other persons as the train pulled into the station at Colombo's Katunayake Airport. Sri Lankan officials believe the Tamil insurgents probably were trying to embarrass the government before the arrival of Mrs. Thatcher the following day. []

10-22 April

Chile: Rash of bombings causes minor injuries to three persons. The targets, nine in Santiago and seven in the provinces, were lampposts, high-tension lines, and buses. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, which has conducted such attacks in the past, probably was responsible. []

11 April

Peru: Sendero Luminoso unit raids National Commerce School. An armed group of 30 young men entered the school in Cerro de Pasco, 300 kilometers southeast of Lima. Two teachers who refused to shout subversive slogans were brutally beaten and left in critical condition. []

12 April

Spain: French warehouse destroyed in San Sebastian fire. Three other buildings were also damaged in an arson attack by suspected Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) members. []

~~Secret~~

Portugal: Industrialist in Oporto killed by bomb planted in car. No group has claimed responsibility, but the terrorist group FP-25, which has frequently targeted landowners and businessmen, is suspected. []

Chile: Two members of Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front apprehended. The two men were charged with bombing the offices of the newspaper *La Nacion* on 26 March. []

Nicaragua: Catholic bishop survives rocket grenade attack on car. No group claimed credit for the attack on US citizen Salvador Schlaefter, who serves as bishop for Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. []

Mozambique: RENAMO deliberately targeting international relief workers. A UNICEF relief project was attacked and destroyed and the sole official present at the time—a Mozambican national—was killed. A Portuguese agricultural expert was abducted in a separate attack on the same day. []

13 April

Peru: Tupac Amaru detonates four bombs, airs subversive message in Lima. The extent of bomb damage is unknown. The group had also interrupted a radio address by President Belaunde to air a 10-minute statement denouncing the middle class. []

14 April

France: Bomb damages power transformer near Toulouse. The explosion caused a momentary loss of electricity at Aerospatiale, France's largest aerospace complex. Although no group claimed responsibility, antifascist slogans were scrawled on nearby walls. []

Corsica: Two bombs damage homes in Ajaccio. No group has claimed credit, but Corsican separatists were probably responsible. []

16 April

Spain: Several policemen in Pamplona wounded when boobytrapped car explodes. No group has claimed responsibility. []

France: Large ETA arms cache discovered at private villa in Saint-Pee-sur-Nivelle. A Basque separatist sympathizer tipped off police to the location of the long-buried cache and then committed suicide. Over 2 tons of explosives, along with antitank rockets and other munitions, were recovered. []

17 April

Belgium: Authorities expel Libyan carrying false documents. A Libyan who, together with his family, entered Belgium in February under the name Omar Ehmeida, claiming to be a doctor, has been expelled for possession and use of false documents. Under the name Omar al-Sudani, he was the press attache at the Libyan People's Bureau in London in April 1984, when the British policewoman was killed there. []

Lebanon: Israeli Air Force attacks DFLP base in Bekaa Valley. The raid near Barr Ilyas apparently was in retaliation for a previous DFLP operation. []

18 April

United Kingdom: British authorities deport Libyan suspected of terrorist activities. Mohammad Ali al-Ati had worked as a Libyan Arab Airlines traffic officer at Heathrow Airport for the previous five years. []

Lebanon: Four unidentified gunmen kidnap and release acting vice president of American University of Beirut. Georges Sayegh, a Lebanese Maronite Christian, was abducted from his apartment in West Beirut and held for some 20 hours. He could not identify his captors, and no group has claimed responsibility for the kidnaping. []

Peru: Sendero Luminoso plunges Lima into darkness once more. For the second time this year, Sendero Luminoso guerrillas struck at Metropolitan Lima's electrical transmission pylons, blacking out the capital area, along with a 500-kilometer coastal strip for approximately one hour. This was the 11th such attack by the group since 1982. []

Peru: Terrorists rob restaurant and abduct schoolgirls in Cerro de Pasco. The terrorists chanted subversive slogans and stole food before fleeing into the mountains with their hostages. []

19 April

West Bank: Explosion near bus transporting Israeli workers in Jerusalem. There were no casualties. In a radio broadcast from Baghdad, Fatah claimed responsibility for the attack. []

Israel: Police defuse bomb in Ramat-Eskol. Police detained several suspects, but all were later released. No group has yet claimed responsibility. []

West Bank: Israeli and Arab cabdrivers murdered. An Israeli cab driver was shot in the head in a village north of Jerusalem. A claim of responsibility by the PLO prompted threats of revenge from some Israelis, and on 22 April an Arab cab-driver was found shot dead on almost the same spot where the other body had been found. []

India: Assassination attempts against Sikh politicians in Punjab. In separate incidents, gunmen believed to be radical Sikhs wounded a Sikh general secretary of the ruling Congress (I) Party and the leader of a Sikh group close to the party. The assailants escaped and no group has claimed responsibility. Both victims had been accused by radicals of collaborating with the Hindu central government. []

Taiwan: Former military intelligence chief sentenced in murder of Chinese-American journalist. Vice Adm. Wong Hsi-ling was sentenced to life in prison for his part in the murder. Two subordinates convicted with him received three-year terms. []

20 April

Ireland: Firebomb explodes in Dublin store selling South African products. The device caused no casualties, because police had evacuated the store following a tip. The Irish National Liberation Army, which has conducted antiapartheid terrorist acts before, claimed credit, equating apartheid with British rule in Northern Ireland. INLA does not usually stage attacks in the Irish Republic. []

21 April

Gaza Strip: Bomb disarmed in Jabalya refugee camp. Those responsible for planting the device remain unknown. []

22 April

Peru: Tupac Amaru takes over radio station, broadcasts message. An MRTA guerrilla band briefly took over Radio Inti at Collique, 18 kilometers north of Lima and ordered the staff to play a taped appeal for armed struggle against the government. []

23 April

Kuwait: Moderate newspaper editor wounded. Ahmad Jarallah was shot six times by a gunman who escaped in a waiting car. His published views were pro-Saudi, pro-Egyptian, and critical of Palestinian extremism, the Iranian regime, and Iraq's territorial ambitions in Kuwait. The Arab Revolutionary Brigades— []
[]—claimed credit for the attack. []

24 April

Peru: Suspected Sendero Luminoso terrorists seriously wound elections board chief. The assailants hurled a suitcase filled with dynamite at his car and then sprayed the vehicle with machinegun fire. The official, Domingo Garcia Rada, was responsible for the official vote count of the first round of the 14 April presidential election. []

26 April


Switzerland: Bomb wounds Syrian diplomat. Dr. Ahmad Saker, plenipotentiary minister to the United Nations in Geneva, and his wife were slightly wounded when a bomb exploded under the hood of their car. Three passersby were also slightly wounded. A second bomb was found and defused in another Syrian diplomatic vehicle. No one has claimed credit for the bombings. []

Switzerland: Libyan Airlines office bombed in Geneva. There were apparently no casualties in the blast, but windows were shattered within 100 yards of the building. Swiss police are questioning two young Arabs, one of whom reportedly admitted placing the bombs. []

Israel: Police explosives expert wounded trying to defuse bomb. The bomb had been planted near some cooking gas cylinders in an apartment building in the town of Kiryat Malachi, 25 kilometers northeast of the Gaza strip. Israeli police detained 14 Arabs for questioning. []

27 April

United Kingdom: Scottish Liberation Army claims credit for arson at Defense Ministry headquarters. The fire in the virtually deserted basement of the London building was the first attack by the group since December, when it sent letter bombs to several prominent government officials.



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
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April 26, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for NSC Support In Acquiring Funding
for Counterterrorism Research & Development

I am forwarding for your consideration (Attachment 1), the most recent progress report of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the Interdepartmental Group On Terrorism (IG/T). As you will recall (Attachment 2), the TSWG was established to better focus and coordinate interagency R&D programs for counterterrorism. On behalf of the IG/T, we requested some \$27 million in the first fiscal year to permit the TSWG to not only coordinate the overall interagency R&D effort, but also provide the direction and planning necessary to ensure that our R&D programs will be responsive to changes in the terrorist threat. The recent establishment of a subcommittee of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee on Terrorism to provide better intelligence guidance to the TSWG on terrorist technology has enhanced the TSWG's capability to focus R&D efforts more precisely.

It is our understanding, that the National Security Council supported our TSWG request and forwarded it to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for consideration and that OMB is, at least in principle, favorable to the idea of a separate R&D fund, carried as a line item in an agency budget, and administered by the TSWG and IG/T. We also understand that OMB would prefer to have the Department of Energy act as the executive agent for the funds rather than the the Department of Defense, which is the preferred position of the IG/T. The IG/T, the TSWG and its supporting agencies are ready to proceed with an aggressive, additional R&D effort once they have received a definitive positive response from OMB.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 5/31/05

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NLS F95-023/2 # 17

By smj, NARA, Date 5/31/05

PROGRESS REPORT
on the
TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP
of the
INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON TERRORISM

(S) Improvements in our ability to combat terrorism is highly dependent on technology developments. There is an established body of scientific and engineering knowledge that can be usefully applied to the field of counter-terrorism. Much of the needed technology can be derived from related DoD, DOE, and other Agency research and development. By carefully selecting the applicable technologies relatively rapid and inexpensive methods of bolstering our counter-terrorism efforts can be achieved.

FOIA(b) (1)

(S) In recognition of this state of affairs, the Interdepartment Group on Terrorism (IG/T) has undertaken a major coordination effort designed to ensure the availability of improved technological countermeasures to terrorism. In order to establish a base for R&D action the IG/T commissioned a study of the current status of the field, the results of which were reported in

FOIA(b) (1)

This report was based on information supplied by the counter-terrorism community.

(S) In response to one of the report's recommendations, and in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 138, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), at the direction of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), has prepared a five-year R&D program amounting to about \$29M per year. The program structure comprises four tasks: Threat and Technology Assessment, Defensive Countermeasures R&D, Incident Reponse R&D, and Technology Transfer. The program is designed to be comprehensive, responding to the current perceptions of the threats and current state of the technology environment. The program also includes both tactical and strategic elements, which are necessary to carry out stated policy objectives. The intent is to provide a focal point for assuring the maximally effective use of resources, and maximal coverage of counter-terrorism problems. Perhaps most importantly, the program will result, for the first time, in coordinated medium-and long-range plans that will allow the nation both to predict and interdict terrorism trends.

(S) The TSWG, co-chaired by DOE and DoD, comprises technical experts from many agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services (The Centers for Disease Control), Justice (FBI), State, Treasury (Secret Service), and Transportation

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(FAA) as well as the CIA, NSA, and the National Security Council. This confluence of interested agencies, in which terrorism problems and solutions can be examined from a broad spectrum of viewpoints, is perhaps the most important achievement of the TSWG, beyond definition of the R&D program plan. The TSWG has generated better awareness of both the threats and the technologies that are emerging to combat those threats. Most of the institutional barriers to communication and cooperation have been circumvented, with the result that deficiencies and redundancies in our counter-terrorism capability development have been identified and addressed.

~~(S)~~ For example, the Nuclear Emergency Search Team has been in existence for some time and has a well-defined program of support activities. Therefore, the TSWG does not need to be concerned with additional effort in this area.

FOIA(b) (1)

~~(S)~~ Finally, the intelligence community is providing specific assessments of threats and technologies that are geared to the special needs of the TSWG. These assessments are designed to distill the technical essence of the terrorism environment, and thus guide the R&D effort, while protecting sensitive intelligence and technical matters. The fact that such carefully tailored arrangements have been made indicates a high measure of interest and cooperation, and will enable the R&D effort to be more precisely focused, thereby improving and accelerating the development process.

(U) Our understanding of the current funding status is that the program plan is in the Office of Management and Budget with positive recommendations from the Department of State and the National Security Council. The TSWG and its constituents are ready to proceed aggressively, given the necessary funding.



S/S 8435290 XR 8435289
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 31, 1984

M/CT

Copies to:

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'84 DEC 31 P8:16

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

FILED IN NODIS
(chs)

Subject: Request for NSC Approval of a Special Budget
Request to Provide For Counterterrorism Research &
Development

The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the Inter-departmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) has submitted its report on the minimum requirements for additional research and development pertinent to an enhanced USG deterrence of, defense from and response to overseas terrorism.

FOIA(b) (1)

As you will note from the attachment to this memorandum, the budget requirement has been carefully honed down to what we believe to be an irreducible minimum over a five year period for a coordinated interagency program on terrorism above and beyond separate agency programs now underway and already budgeted.

It is the recommendation of the TSWG, supported by the IG/T that the funds be appropriated as a new line item and assigned to the Department of Defense for management, thereby providing single point program focus. It is also our judgement that this appropriation not be taken from other programs since it represents a significant new centrally directed and coordinated interagency effort to build a meaningful USG R&D counterterrorism program.

FOIA(b) (1)

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
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By smf, NARA, Date 5/3/05

Creation of a centrally located, specifically funded program will, for the first time, provide a focal point for assuring the maximally effective use of United States technical capabilities across the spectrum of counterterrorism. More importantly, the program will provide, also for the first time, an organizational structure to coordinate medium and long-term plans which could permit the nation both to predict and interdict terrorist actions. Absent such a centrally managed interagency program, our technical efforts to combat terrorism will be almost completely reactive because the current problem will always require all available resources and the benefits of emerging technology, either in providing a better deterrent or in providing quicker, more effective response, will be largely lost.

The requirement therefore, is for two programs: one which is centrally managed and directed, charged with interagency responsibilities broadly focused and; a continuation of the current agency oriented individual programs which seek technical solutions for particular perceived needs. A simple shift of funds from the current program to the proposed interagency effort would, in our opinion, solve one problem only to create another, which is not acceptable.

Ambassador Oakley, Chairman of the IG/T has informed me of his endorsement of the proposal as well as that of the IG/T itself and recommends your concurrence and support with the Office of Management and Budget.



Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Letter of December 5, 1984 from TSWG to IG/T

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

December 21, 1984

Kump
12/31

TO : M - Mr. Spiers
FROM : M/CTP - Robert B. Oakley *Rob*
SUBJECT : Funding Counterterrorism R & D

Following more than one year of often heated debate, the R&D community within the USG has come together and made a joint presentation to the IG/T on the requirement to develop a centrally organized, directed and funded counterterrorism R&D effort. The two attachments to this memorandum are (1) a letter from the joint chairman of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the IG/T which spells out the community consensus and the funding requirements and (2) a Hill - McFarlane memorandum seeking NSC support with OMB for the required funding. Admiral Poindexter is expecting the memorandum.

While the bulk of the material noted in the two attachments is self-explanatory, I do want to emphasize the precedential nature of the effort which brought all USG agencies in the counterterrorism field around a common table and for a common purpose. I believe very strongly that the TSWG has produced a blueprint for future research that has long been needed, one which should go forward as expeditiously as possible and ask your endorsement in sending the two attachments forward.

Approve _____

Ma

Disapprove _____

28 DEC 1984

84 DEC 31 PM 1:19

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BY *anf*, NARA, DATE 5/27/05

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*thanks allen
5-00*

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BY CHS NARA, DATE 7/10/01