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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** GRAHAM, DR. WILLIAM: FILES

**Withdrawer**

**File Folder** US-USSR SUMMIT, WASHINGTON, DC DECEMBER 1987

SMF 4/13/2009

**Box Number** ~~CF991~~ RAC Box 2

**FOIA**

F06-043/2

SAROTTE

26

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
68816 MEMO	GRAHAM TO BAKER/POWELL RE SUMMIT PARTICIPATION	2	12/1/1987	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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68816 MEMO

2 12/1/1987 B1

GRAHAM TO BAKER/POWELL RE SUMMIT  
PARTICIPATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX  
SYSTEM II  
91326

December 2, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. ROBERT B. ZOELLICK  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Treasury

COL WILLIAM M. MATZ  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON  
Assistant to the Attorney General  
and Chief of Staff  
Department of Justice

MR. WILLIAM V. VITALE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Energy

MR. L. WAYNE ARNY  
Associate Director for National  
Security and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

RADM JOSEPH STRASSER  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. WILLIAM STAPLES  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. JONATHAN F. THOMPSON  
Executive Assistant to the Director  
Office of Science and Technology

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *smf* DATE *4/13/09*

~~SECRET~~

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SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group Meeting  
December 4, 1987 (U)

There will be a National Security Planning Group meeting on December 4, 1987 at 2:00 p. m. in the Situation Room on United States Positions at the Summit. The agenda for the meeting is attached. (S)

Bill Courtney  
for Paul Schott Stevens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Agenda

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
Friday, December 4, 1987  
Situation Room  
2:00 p.m. -- 3:00 p.m.


UNITED STATES POSITIONS AT THE SUMMIT

Agenda

- I. Introduction Colin L. Powell  
(5 minutes)
  
- II. Discussion of Alternative START Positions All Participants  
(20 minutes)
  
- III. Discussion of Alternative Defense and Space Positions All Participants  
(20 minutes)
  
- IV. Non-Arms Control Issues All Participants  
(10 minutes)
  - Iran/Iraq War
  - Afghanistan
  
- V. Summary Colin L. Powell  
(5 minutes)

November 25, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH DUBERSTEIN  
WILLIAM BALL  
GARY BAUER  
JACK COURTEMANCHE  
ARTHUR CULVAHOUSE  
RHETT DAWSON  
TONY DOLAN  
FRANK DONATELLI  
MARLIN FITZWATER  
WILLIAM GRAHAM  
CRAIG FULLER  
ANNE HIGGINS  
JIM HOOLEY  
FRANK LAVIN  
REBECCA RANGE  
JOHN TUCK  
SAM WATSON  
CLAYTON YUETTER

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS   
SUBJECT: Summit Themes

Attached are themes for the Dec. 8-10 Summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. They were prepared for use by Administration officials in speeches, interviews, and for background information. We also hope the themes will be helpful in your dealings with Administration colleagues and constituents. In addition, the NSC staff is prepared to provide briefings and other assistance as needed.

Attachment

## US-USSR Summit Themes

### Basic Message: A Solid Foundation For A Safer World

- The President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev is the fulfillment of a long-standing promise to build a solid foundation for lasting peace with freedom.
- The Summit will be an opportunity to press for progress in all areas of our four part agenda, which is essential to lasting improvement in our relationship:
  - o to strengthen US and allied security, and reach agreements for stabilizing and effectively verifiable arms reductions;
  - o to press for lasting improvements in Soviet human rights practices;
  - o to remove the tensions provoked by Soviet expansionism and use of force in regional conflicts;
  - o to broaden constructive dialogue between our governments and peoples;
- Establishing more constructive US-Soviet relations requires a sustained commitment, based on realism, strength and dialogue.

### Human Rights

- Respect for human rights is as important as arms control for genuine peace. Dialogue on this issue is high on the agenda.
- USSR has made limited improvements in human rights performance, but we urge institutionalization of freedom of emigration, speech, assembly press and conscience. We expect Soviets to abide by the Helsinki Accords and other international agreements.

### Regional Issues

- US-Soviet discussions have intensified, but little real progress has been made. Soviet conduct in regional conflicts impedes substantial improvement in relations.
- Ending Soviet occupation and war against the people of Afghanistan is the essential basis for a negotiated settlement and normalization. If the Soviets are serious about withdrawal, the U.S. is willing to be helpful. Withdrawal of Soviet military support for repressive regimes or foreign troops in such countries as Ethiopia, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua are necessary in order to reduce tensions.
- On the Gulf War, it is time for Moscow to back its professed desire for peace by agreeing to substantive UN action, rather than trying to score political gains.



## Bilateral Issues

-- Increasing knowledge, contacts, trade and cooperation between our peoples help build mutual understanding. The President's Exchange Initiative opened new channels for dialogue.

- o Our exchange programs are based on principles of reciprocity, mutual benefit, and protecting sensitive American technology and information.

-- Continuing Soviet espionage, government-controlled media disinformation campaigns, and lack of reciprocity in media access undermine trust and cooperation.

## Arms Control

-- Arms control is one part of overall US strategy to strengthen security and ensure a safer peace.

-- INF: We are close to agreement to eliminate an entire category of US and Soviet missiles. INF Treaty eliminates four Soviet warheads for one US; most stringent verification ever, including several forms of on-site inspection. Unity and support of NATO alliance contributed to this success.

-- Strategic Arms Reductions: U.S. proposed reducing strategic nuclear arsenals by 50%, emphasizing reductions focusing on the most destabilizing weapons. Difficult verification issues also to be worked out.

-- Defense and Space: US objective is Soviet acceptance of jointly managed transition to safer peace based on increasing reliance on defenses -- should they prove effective -- which threaten no one. SDI is not a bargaining chip. Soviets have extensive strategic defense programs. Soviet monopoly in this vital area would jeopardize Western security.

-- Other Arms Control Initiatives: Verification of nuclear testing limits, chemical weapons ban and redressing disparities in NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

-- Compliance: Effective verification and compliance with agreements are essential to arms control.

## SUMMIT THEMES

### I. U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS - GENERAL

-- The third Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, to be held in Washington beginning December 7th, will be highlighted by the signing of an INF agreement and a thorough review of all aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship: human rights, regional and bilateral issues, and arms control.

-- The INF treaty and Soviet engagement with our four-part agenda represent a vindication of the policies of this Administration, policies based on realism, strength, and dialogue with our Allies. These policies, and cohesion among the Allies, have already made East-West relations more stable by encouraging caution in the Kremlin and confidence in the West.

-- Since Gorbachev came to power, considerable ferment has taken place inside the USSR; nevertheless, one-Party dictatorship remains in effect. We welcome any liberalization of Soviet society; but history does not allow us to assume it will occur.

-- While recognizing the limitations to our dialogue imposed by fundamental differences between our systems, we attempt to achieve progress on vital issues in our own national security interest and that of our Allies.

-- In both diplomatic and public initiatives, we continue to urge the Soviet regime to observe its human rights commitments and to join in constructive efforts to solve regional conflicts.

-- The U.S. seeks to build a solid foundation for peace, not a misleading climate of detente. Our goal is to seek progress in each of the four areas of our agenda, moving ahead where we can find common ground but without forgetting that the U.S. Soviet relationship will remain essentially competitive for the foreseeable future.

### II. HUMAN RIGHTS

-- The basic differences between the U.S. and Soviet systems are graphically illustrated in the respective ways we approach human rights. The U.S. is committed to defend human rights everywhere and believes governments that honor their citizens' human rights are more likely to abide by international agreements and truly respect other nations. A country that represses its population sows mistrust abroad.

-- Long guilty of flagrant, systematic violations of the spirit and letter of international human rights covenants, the USSR has made limited improvements in its human rights performance over the past two years. But these improvements have yet to be accompanied by changes in laws, institutions, and procedures that would guarantee their permanence.

-- Freedom of emigration, resolution of blocked marriages, reunification of families and divided spouses, and unrestricted visits of family members -- all human contact issues -- remain high on the list of criteria by which we judge Soviet human rights performance. More Soviet Jews have emigrated over the past month than the total number last year. Yet there are still an estimated 10,000 applicants' cases to be resolved and thousands more who might like to leave. Moreover, a new emigration law passed last year has actually complicated rather than facilitated the emigration process.

-- Until this fall, there was little progress on resolving cases of divided spouses and blocked marriages. We believe that these cases, as well as all divided family cases, should be promptly resolved.

-- An unknown number of prisoners of conscience remain interned in Soviet prisons, labor camps, and psychiatric institutions. More than one hundred fifty political prisoners were released over the past year and a half -- and we greet this positively. But some were not released because they refused to repudiate their beliefs, and others were threatened with punishment or additional sentences without trial. An amnesty for certain inmates was declared in June, but relatively few prisoners have actually been freed. Abuse of psychiatry for political purposes remains a source of serious concern.

-- Despite the fact that Gorbachev's glasnost, or openness campaign has eased some restrictions on literary and artistic expression, narrow limits remain on the right to express dissenting views.

### III. REGIONAL ISSUES

-- Regional issues will also feature prominently in the summit. Unlike the other three parts of our agenda with the Soviets, there has been little real progress on regional issues. We have achieved a more frank and non-polemical dialogue. However, now is the time to move to concrete actions. We have made clear to Moscow that Soviet failure to move forward on key regional problems like Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq, will affect the climate of U.S. Soviet relations and could adversely influence the INF ratification process.

-- The Soviets or their surrogates continue to try to impose or maintain repressive Marxist/Leninist regimes in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Africa and Central America.

-- Afghanistan is an ongoing outrage. As the President told the Afghan Resistance on November 12, the key to resolving the Afghan crisis lies in the rapid and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is a major impediment to improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

-- We have made it clear to the Soviets that, when they show convincingly their readiness to withdraw and to conclude a genuine political settlement, the United States will play a helpful role. But thus far the Soviets have refused to set a date when withdrawal would begin. Instead we have seen futile efforts by Moscow and its client regime in Kabul to keep this discredited clique in control.

-- We are also deeply concerned about Soviet behavior in the Persian Gulf. After cooperating with us last July to pass UN Security Council Resolution 598 calling for an end to the Gulf War, Soviet policy has become uncooperative and a cover for Iranian belligerence.

-- The Iranians have taken an increasingly aggressive posture against us and the Gulf Arabs. The Soviets have offered Iran tacit support, while condemning our responses to Iranian provocations, turned a blind eye to weapons deliveries from Soviet allies and clients, and delaying work on a second UNSC Resolution implementing 598.

-- It is time for Moscow to prove its good intentions in the Gulf by moving toward enforcement action in response to Iran's refusal to accept 598, rather than continuing a course which does nothing to reduce Gulf tensions.

-- A political settlement in Cambodia depends on prompt withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Soviet rhetoric on Cambodia has softened somewhat, but Moscow still supports Vietnam's intransigence and continues to supply Vietnam with massive arms shipments. Moscow has done little to help resolve the stalemated political situation in Cambodia.

-- In Angola, the Soviets continue to support the presence of Cuban troops and massive armament of a repressive regime.

-- The Soviets should persuade the Cubans to withdraw their southern and northern troop contingents, which would facilitate a regional peace settlement.

-- The Soviets should help alleviate tensions in and around Ethiopia by pressing the government to cooperate with its neighbors. Moscow continues to support a repressive regime in Ethiopia with substantial military and other assistance. They should urge the Ethiopian authorities to commit more resources to the looming famine and to allow the distribution of relief to all areas of the country.

-- In Central America, the Soviets continue to supply over \$500 million a year in military supplies to Nicaragua even as the parties pursue peace under the Guatemala Agreement. This assistance stiffens Sandinista reluctance to take steps toward democratization and real compromise with the Resistance.

-- Moscow should use its influence to halt the flow of arms through Cuba and Nicaragua to the guerrillas in El Salvador.

#### IV. BILATERAL ISSUES

-- In order to foster lasting peace and security, we support efforts to increase knowledge, understanding and cooperation between our peoples. One way to accomplish this goal is through a broad spectrum of educational, cultural, scientific, commercial and people-to-people contacts.

-- We favor bilateral exchanges that promote mutual understanding and mutual benefit. We oppose those that are undertaken in the interests of only one party and those designed to facilitate Soviet acquisition of otherwise proscribed high technology.

-- Among the most successful bilateral activities between the U.S. and USSR are cultural and educational exchanges. An agreement was signed at the Geneva Summit in 1985, reinstating national touring exhibits and other educational/cultural exchanges. Under the President's Exchange Initiative, a series of people-to-people activities emerged, including school exchanges, citizens' public meetings, and joint television broadcasts.

-- The U.S. encourages expanded media exchange activities based on reciprocity: Soviet spokesmen, for example, appear regularly on U.S. television and have free access to our media; we believe U.S. spokesmen should have the same chance to explain American policies to the Soviet people.

- Soviet media continue to publish untruths about U.S. actions as part of a widespread campaign of disinformation. Lurid stories have alleged that the U.S. created the AIDS virus in a germ warfare laboratory, or that unscrupulous American businessmen are obtaining children in Central America in order to sell their body organs for transplant operations. We have strongly objected to these disinformation stories, because we know that the Soviet press, unlike ours, is controlled by the regime. The Soviets have taken umbrage at our exposure of this cynical practice, but we won't stop bringing it up until they stop doing it.
- The U.S. and USSR are considering initiating or renewing cooperation in basic sciences, transportation, and other fields. Any such cooperation must be evaluated realistically, in terms of potential gains for this country and the protection of technological innovations that have military applications.
- Last year, we discovered a massive Soviet espionage program directed against our embassy and personnel in Moscow. The President has decided that we will not occupy the new embassy until it is safe and secure, and that the USSR will not be allowed to occupy its new chancery in Washington until a simultaneous move is possible. Our first priority is to make our existing Moscow embassy safe and secure. Extensive renovations are underway.
- Under Gorbachev, the USSR has begun a drive for economic modernization, greater autonomy for the economic and trade bureaucracy, and greater participation in the international economic system. The Kremlin is motivated by a desire to acquire advanced Western technology and capital for economic and military purposes, to diversify and expand hard currency earnings, and to make the Soviet economy more productive.
- The Soviets want to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). U.S. policy firmly opposes Soviet membership or participation in international economic institutions of primary functional importance, such as the GATT and IMF/World Bank.
- The Soviets are pushing aggressively for joint ventures with Western firms. Progress has been slow and only two joint ventures have been signed with U.S. companies. Several U.S. firms are anxious to proceed, but any joint venture must comply with U.S. export controls and regulations. We also have an obligation to our businessmen to give a frank appraisal of the risks and difficulties of operating in the USSR.

-- Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed in mid-September to discuss the US/USSR long-term grain agreement early in 1988. The Soviets may raise the issue in order to set the stage for these discussions. It is related to Export Enhancement Program sales to the USSR under the current grain agreement.

#### V. ARMS CONTROL

-- We are nearing an historic agreement to eliminate an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear weapons. This agreement is part of overall U.S. national security strategy, designed to build a safer peace and ensure a stable strategic balance over the long term through:

- o modernization of our strategic deterrent;
- o negotiations for deep, equitable, and verifiable arms reductions; and
- o seeking through the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative a safer and better way to deter war by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance US and Allied security.

#### INF:

-- Treaty will eliminate an entire category of US and Soviet missiles.

-- More than four Soviet warheads to be eliminated for every one the US eliminates.

-- The most stringent verification provisions ever concluded, including several kinds of on-site inspection.

-- Unity and support of the NATO alliance are what led to this success.

#### START:

-- US has proposed reducing US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals by 50%.

-- US draft treaty at Geneva negotiations emphasizes reductions of, and sublimits on, the most destabilizing weapons -- fast flying ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

-- Major difference between US, USSR positions: Soviet insistence on holding START reductions hostage to their efforts to cripple our SDI program. Also, difficult verification issues to work out.

Defense and Space:

-- US objective is eventual Soviet acceptance of a jointly managed transition to a deterrent regime based increasingly on effective defenses, should they prove feasible.

-- US proposed mutual commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from ABM Treaty and to observe Treaty provisions while continuing SDI research, testing and development, which are permitted by ABM Treaty. Cannot accept restrictions on defense beyond those actually agreed upon in ABM Treaty.

-- Soviet proposals designed to cripple SDI, while permitting their own extensive strategic defense programs. Dangerous to leave monopoly to Soviets in this vital area.

Compliance:

-- Effective verification and compliance with agreements are essential elements of arms control.

Other Issues:

-- US-Soviet negotiations on verification of nuclear testing limits opened November 9.

-- Next priorities: chemical weapons ban and redressing imbalances in NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional forces.