

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Graham, William R.: Files  
**Folder Title:** US-USSR Summit – Reykjavik  
10/11/1986-10/12/1986 (2)  
**Box:** RAC Box 2

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7527

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 17, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. DONALD GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President for  
National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. ROBERT B. ZOELICK  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON  
Senior Special Assistant  
to the Assistant to the  
Attorney General and Chief  
of Staff  
Department of Justice

MRS. HELEN ROBBINS  
Executive Assistant to the  
Secretary  
Department of Commerce

MR. JAMES J. DELANEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Health and  
Human Services

MS. RUTH KNOUSE  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of Transportation

MR. WILLIAM VITALE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Energy

MR. L. WAYNE ARNY  
Acting Associate Director  
for National Security and  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. WILLIAM STAPLES  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency

MR. CHARLES HOBBS  
Acting Assistant to the  
President for Policy  
Development

AMBASSADOR HUGH MONTGOMERY  
U.S. Mission to the United  
Nations, IO/UNA  
Department of State

CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER  
Executive Assistant to the  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. RICHARD G. JOHNSON  
Acting Director  
Office of Science and  
Technology Policy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *Amf* DATE *4/13/09*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. LARRY R. TAYLOR  
Chief of the Executive Secretariat  
U.S. Information Agency


MR. JAMES GEER  
Assistant Director,  
Intelligence Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

MR. FITZHUGH GREEN  
Associate Administrator of  
International Activities  
Environmental Protection Agency

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Materials on Reykjavik  
Meeting - II (U)

Attached for use by your official spokesman and others who have press and media contacts are talking points and authoritative statements by senior USG officials on the results of the Reykjavik meetings between the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland, October 11-12. Please ensure appropriate distribution. The White House Issue Brief entitled "The President's Iceland Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev" can be used for public distribution. (U)

As was the case prior to Geneva, all USG officials are being instructed to adhere totally to the press guidance provided by the President's own statements and approved by the White House and Department of State. No official will be authorized to originate public statements regarding the Reykjavik meeting that go beyond statements made publicly by the White House or Department of State. All written remarks concerning US-Soviet relations must be approved in advance by the White House or Department of State. Should public statements by other US Government officials on particular aspects of US-Soviet relations seem desirable, these may be undertaken only following the specific approval of the White House. Requests are to be submitted to the Executive Secretary of the NSC. (e)

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1

F

2

## ICELAND TALKING POINTS

- U.S. went to Iceland in order to narrow differences, where possible, between US and Soviet positions and lay groundwork for more productive negotiations.
- By that measure, meeting a success. Achieved significant movement on START, INF, Nuclear Testing; even aspects of ABM/SDI, though latter obviously remains formidable obstacle. Specifically:
  - START: Agreement on 50% offensive warhead reduction, to be implemented by reductions to 1600 SDNVs, 6000 warheads; important advances in counting rules; Soviet recognition of requirement for "significant cuts" in heavy ICBMs.
  - INF: 100 global warhead limit (zero in Europe) a major advance (over 90% reduction for Soviets); freeze on short-range INF, pending negotiation of reductions.
  - Nuclear Testing: Plan for US ratification of TTB/PNE treaties (contingent on adequate verification), to be followed by negotiations on further testing limitations in phase with nuclear weapons reductions.
  - ABM/SDI: Both sides moved on minimum time sides should limit themselves to research, development and testing of strategic defenses (US from 7 1/2 years to 10, contingent on adequate verification, and coupled with plan for 50% reduction in strategic forces in 5 years, elimination of all ballistic missiles in 10. Soviets moved from 15 years to 10; though very significant differences remain on overall approach.)
- Significant headway as well on other pillars of the relationship:
  - On human rights, U.S. stressed crucial importance of this issue; Soviets agreed to regularize discussions.
  - On regional conflicts, two sides had vigorous discussions of Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, Cambodia, Middle East, and Iran-Iraq; U.S. laid down important markers concerning Soviet behavior.
  - On bilateral exchanges, sides agreed on a work plan to accelerate negotiations in a number of areas including consulates, space cooperation, nuclear safety.
- In arms control we intend to build on Iceland results to seek further progress at Geneva.
  - Gorbachev has said that Iceland proposals are still on the table.
  - Ball now in Soviet court to assure continuation of Iceland momentum.

- Soviet attempt at Iceland to hold progress in all areas of arms control hostage to acceptance of Soviet views on ABM/SDI an unconstructive and unfortunate position; retrogression from Gorbachev's Geneva summit agreement to move forward in areas of common ground.

-- Historic opportunity to reach agreements in other key arms control areas demands responsible Soviet behavior; if opportunity lost, world will clearly understand where blame lies.

-- U.S. ready now to proceed, as matter of highest priority, to reach agreements on START, INF, Nuclear Testing along lines discussed at Reykjavik.

- ABM/SDI issue requires further work to reconcile fundamental US/USSR differences.

-- Soviets sought to kill by ban on essential testing outside the laboratories.

- Important for Soviets to understand SDI not a bargaining chip but a key element of US approach to more secure world for all.

- Case for transition from offense to defense-based systems a compelling one; in both countries' interests.

-- Only realistic hope to eliminate nuclear "balance of terror," threat of massive annihilation.

-- Wholly non-threatening to Soviet Union; no significant offensive potential in SDI systems (Soviet specialists understand this).

-- U.S. offer to share benefits of strategic defense a generous one; belies Soviet allegations of U.S. intent to exploit technological lead to Soviet disadvantage.

- SDI essential to U.S. even with agreement on reduction and ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles, in order to hedge against abrogation, cheating, and third country threats; provide continuing incentive for offensive reductions; and offer stability during critical transition period and insurance thereafter.

-- Scale of deployment will depend, in part, on scope of threat.

- Hope sober reflection will lead Soviets to recognize that SDI is not a threat to be killed through negotiation, but a key element of our mutual transition to a safer and more secure world.

-- We will be working to lay the logic of this position before the Soviets at Geneva, while trying to move them to proceed now to lock up agreements in other areas where major progress recorded at Reykjavik.

- In short, Reykjavik was worthwhile; no second thoughts about wisdom of acceding to Gorbachev's request for pre-summit discussions.

-- Road to agreement with Soviets is never smooth; ideological differences, distrust, divergent strategic outlooks and force structures complicate progress.

-- Reykjavik represents an important chapter in ongoing arms control dialogue between two countries.

-- Clear understanding of others' positions and motivations necessary for productive negotiation; progress achieved on that score as well as substantively in key areas.

-- We emerged having narrowed differences, and with clear appreciation that Soviets' obsession with SDI represents the most significant obstacle to be overcome at this point.

- Opportunities created by Iceland discussions too important to let languish. U.S. hopes for further near-term progress based on:

-- Essential balance, fairness, and mutual benefit of those agreements which were shown by discussions in Reykjavik to be achievable.

-- Soviets' capability to assess the negotiating climate realistically, and recognize when time has come to deal.

-- President's strong and unwavering position on essentiality of developing, testing, and ultimately deploying SDI.

-- Soviets' understanding that historic opportunities may well be forfeited if it does not reach agreement in time remaining to this US administration.

- Strong support of U.S. public has been and will continue to be essential to US success in complex task of reaching comprehensive and enduring settlements with Soviets.

-- Patience, persistence, and supportive Congress vital as well.

-- Renewed economic dynamism, refurbished U.S. military strength, and Allied cohesion also play critical roles.

2. - Gorbachev's challenge at this point is to rise to occasion in statesmanlike manner and collaborate with us in reaching agreements which will lay foundation for stable long-term strategic relationship between the two countries, leading to ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.



## THE PRESIDENT'S ICELAND MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

### Executive Summary

The President went to Iceland to promote the main objectives of American foreign policy: true peace and greater freedom in the world. He met with General Secretary Gorbachev for 10 hours of frank and substantive direct talks. We achieved our objectives.

The President focused on a broad four point agenda for improved U.S.-Soviet relations: Human Rights; Arms Reductions; the Resolution of Regional Conflicts; and Expanding Bilateral Contacts and Communications.

### Increasing and Overwhelming Public Support

Private media polls immediately following the Iceland meeting found overwhelming support by the American people for the President.

- o The Wall Street Journal/NBC News and the New York Times/CBS News polls registered 71% and 72% (respectively) approved of the President's handling of the Iceland meeting.

### Building Upon Iceland Meeting

- o Never before in the history of arms control negotiations has so much progress been made in so many areas, in so short a time.
- o The U.S. and Soviet Union came very close to an agreement that would secure massive reductions of the most threatening weapon systems: offensive ballistic missiles.
- o Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would have perpetuated America's vulnerability to Soviet missiles. Where the security of the American people and our Allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
- o SDI was a main inducement for the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in offensive arsenals. SDI remains the best insurance policy that any future arms reduction agreements will be implemented and complied with by the Soviets.
- o Notwithstanding the disagreements on SDI, the President is calling upon the Soviet leadership to follow through on arms reduction accomplishments at Reykjavik and continue to discuss our differences on strategic defense, which have been narrowed.
- o We will vigorously pursue, at the same time, progress in other areas of the agenda, especially human rights.

---

---

ARMS REDUCTION AT ICELAND -- HISTORIC PROGRESS

Unlike the past, the U.S. is now dealing from a position of strength and confidence. General Secretary Gorbachev suggested the Iceland meeting, and the President accepted in an effort to further the US/Soviet dialogue in all four areas of the agenda.

- o Because of U.S. strength and confidence, and the inducement of SDI to negotiate, unprecedented progress was made toward dramatically reducing offensive nuclear arsenals.
- o Mr. Gorbachev held progress in all areas, including arms reduction, hostage to his non-negotiable demand that the U.S. cut back and effectively kill SDI. The President insisted that SDI remain viable under the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which, unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. has complied with.
- o To break the deadlock, the President offered: A 10 year commitment not to deploy any future strategic defense system, coupled with 50% reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces in the next five years and mutual and total elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles over the following five years.
- o Mr. Gorbachev rejected the President's offer, refusing to allow SDI testing -- the heart of any research program.

Current Impasse; Future Opportunities

- o Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on SDI would have perpetuated America's vulnerability to Soviet missiles. Where the security of the American people and our Allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
- o The USSR wants to continue to base global security on the threat of mutual annihilation. President Reagan seeks a safer world with peace and deterrence based increasingly on defensive means.
- o In 1984, when the Soviets failed to achieve their objectives to weaken NATO's defensive capability in Europe, through negotiating intransigence and continuing SS-20 deployments, they walked out of all nuclear arms negotiations. In 1985, they were back at the table and, in 1986, for the first time, dramatic progress has been made toward mutual reductions.
- o The President believes that additional meetings can build on the major progress toward arms reduction and achieve final breakthrough agreements. The President's invitation for a U.S. Summit -- the objective that Iceland was intended to prepare for -- remains open.

## WHITE HOUSE ISSUE BRIEF

---

### SDI Not the Problem: It's the Solution

- o In SDI, we are investigating defensive systems to enhance future security for America and our Allies by being able to destroy attacking missiles. It will have no offensive function. There is no rational reason to oppose SDI research.
- o Insurance -- Why should the Soviets, in opposing SDI, insist that America and its Allies remain vulnerable to Soviet missile attack? Strategic defenses would help underwrite arms reduction agreements against cheating or abrogation, while defending against attack from other countries.
- o By denying a potential attacker hope of gaining meaningful military benefit, SDI is the best lever to achieve real arms reductions. SDI deters use of offensive systems, thereby rendering future investments in offensive systems imprudent.
- o The Soviets have longstanding and massive strategic defense programs of their own, going well beyond research, and have the only operational anti-ballistic missile system in the world, a system they are steadily improving.
- o By refusing the President's far-reaching arms reduction offer and making his own non-negotiable demand on the United States, Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity for progress toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
- o Nonetheless, the ideas and progress for radically reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons presented at Reykjavik can be built upon at the table in Geneva.

### Human Rights

Respect for human rights is as important to peace as arms reductions because peace requires trust. The President told Gorbachev the Soviets' human rights performance is an obstacle for improved relations between our two countries.

- o A country that breaks faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers.
- o The Soviet Union signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The Soviets should abide by them -- allowing free emigration and the reunification of divided families, and religious and cultural freedoms -- instead of throwing those who monitor the Soviet compliance (e.g. Yuri Orlov) in jail.
- o We will continue to press for improvements in the coming weeks and months.
- o The Soviets, for the first time, agreed to regular bilateral discussions on humanitarian and human rights issues.

Expanded cultural exchanges -- The President reaffirmed his commitment to continue to broaden and expand people-to-people exchanges -- where Soviet citizens and Americans may see first hand more of each other's country and culture.

Regional Conflicts -- The President raised the serious problems caused in the world by Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, and continued military support of the regimes in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, that are waging war on their own people. We cannot take seriously the token troop "withdrawals" from Afghanistan which they have announced.

## THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

The U.S. and her Allies are defenseless against a deliberate or accidental nuclear attack.

- o The U.S. presently deters nuclear attack by threatening retaliation. SDI offers a safer and more moral alternative: employing technology to protect people instead of threatening their annihilation.

### Challenge for the Present and Insurance for the Future

- o SDI is a broad-based program to demonstrate the feasibility of effective strategic defenses. Like the Apollo Project, SDI is a revolutionary program that merits a full-scale national effort.
- o SDI taps the finest scientific minds in the U.S. and other countries to investigate a range of defensive technologies. This research will lead toward an informed decision on defensive options in the early 1990s.
- o SDI has induced the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in offensive arsenals. It is the best insurance policy that any future arms reduction agreements will be implemented and complied with by the Soviets, and it guards against ballistic missile attack by third countries.

### SDI Progress

- o Some in Congress would cripple SDI with short-sighted budget cuts giving the Soviets a key concession they have not been able to win through negotiations. Sustained research has already produced major technical advances:
  - June 1984 -- a non-nuclear interceptor destroyed an unarmed warhead in space;
  - Fall 1985 -- successful laser tests compensate for atmospheric distortion while tracking rockets in flight;
  - Spring 1986 -- A high-power laser destroyed a static target;
  - June 1986 -- a self-guided missile intercepted a target moving at three times the speed of sound;
  - September 1986 -- Successful Delta launch, track, and intercept in space of target vehicles.

### SDI: Also a Prudent Hedge Against Existing Soviet Strategic Defense Programs

- o The Soviet Union has upgraded the world's only deployed Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system, which protects Greater Moscow, and is constructing a large missile tracking radar in Siberia, in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
- o The Soviets have deployed the world's only operational weapon for destroying satellites.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SDI

The media and political opponents of SDI have found it convenient to present SDI in caricature, as the "so-called 'Star Wars' proposal." It is no wonder that many Americans are confused about the President's proposal and think the U.S. currently has a defense against missiles!

- o An Associated press-Media General poll released in August found that 60 percent of Americans felt that the U.S. had either a good or an excellent defense against a Soviet missile attack.
- o In fact, the U.S. is utterly defenseless against Soviet rockets.

Americans Want Enhanced Security

When the American people are asked to evaluate concepts, rather than the labels such as "Star Wars," they support SDI. Evidence:

Two days after the President's return from Iceland, polls taken by major news organizations showed the public supports President Reagan's refusal to surrender his Strategic Defense Initiative.

- A New York Times/CBS News poll shows 68 percent support.
- Nearly 60 percent polled by the Washington Post/ABC News poll said Reagan should retain his commitment to SDI.
- According to the Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, only 15 percent of the American people think SDI is a bad idea.

Penn + Schoen Associates (9/27/86)

Question: SDI is a research program to develop a system to destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they reach their targets. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. going ahead with the research and development phases of SDI?

Favor -- 81%      Oppose -- 13%

Question: If such a system could be developed, would you favor or oppose using it in the United States?

Favor -- 78%      Oppose -- 13%

ABC News (1/4/85 - 1/6/85)

Question: Do you favor or oppose developing such defensive weapons (which use lasers and particle beams to shoot down enemy missiles), or what?

Favor -- 49%      Oppose -- 44%

Heritage Foundation/Sindlinger & Co. Poll (5/27/85)

89 percent of the American people would support a Strategic Defense program if it would make a Soviet Missile attack less likely.

## WHITE HOUSE ISSUE BRIEF

---

### SDI -- Enhance Peace/Safer World

Gallup Organization (1/25/85 - 1/28/85)

Question: In your opinion, would developing this system (Star Wars or space-based defense against nuclear attack) make the world safer from nuclear destruction or less safe?

Make world safer -- 50%      Make world less safe -- 32%

Decision Making/Information (2/8/86 - 2/9/86)

Question: SDI, is a good idea because it will help deter a Soviet attack, increase the chance of reaching an arms control agreement, and reduce the risk of war. Others say that SDI, is a bad idea because it will upset the balance of power, accelerate the arms race, and increase the risk of war. Is SDI research a good idea or a bad idea?

Good idea -- 62%      Bad idea -- 31%

### SDI -- Technical Feasibility

CBS News/New York Times (1/2/85 - 1/4/85)

Question: Ronald Reagan has proposed developing a defensive nuclear system in space that would destroy incoming missiles before they reach the United States, a system some people call Star Wars. Do you think such a system could work?

Yes -- 62%      No -- 23%

### SDI -- Arms Reduction

Louis Harris and Associates (3/2/85 - 3/5/85)

Question: Agree or disagree...Once the Russians knew we were successfully building a new anti-nuclear defense system, they would be much more willing to agree to a treaty that would halt the nuclear arms race.

Agree -- 52%      Disagree -- 44%

Gallup Organization (1/25/85 - 1/28/85)

Question: Would the United States' developing this system Star Wars, a space-based defense against nuclear attack, increase or decrease the likelihood of reaching a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union?

Increase -- 47%      Decrease -- 32%

October 16, 1986

## THE IMPORTANCE OF SDI

--The President's Strategic Defense Initiative offers our best hope of a safer world where our and our Allies' security would no longer rest on deterrence through the threat of mass annihilation.

--SDI is a research and technology development program to demonstrate by the early 1990s the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for targeting missiles in all phases of their flight--boost, mid-course, and terminal.

--SDI is critical to progress toward arms reduction agreements. It brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table and now acts as the necessary lever that for the first time has them talking seriously about deep reductions of the most dangerous weapons--offensive ballistic missiles.

--SDI is not only the needed lever to get the Soviets to reduce, but is also insurance underwriting arms reduction agreements by:

- o deterring the use of offensive arms;
- o removing any incentives for again building up offensive forces;
- o guaranteeing that cheating won't pay; and,
- o protecting against the potential threat of a madman obtaining ballistic missiles.

--The importance of SDI is underscored by the Soviets' long-standing and extensive strategic defense programs. These include:

- o the world's only ABM defenses, surrounding Moscow, which they are steadily improving;
- o construction of a large phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the ABM Treaty; and
- o research, development and testing, including for example a \$1 billion annual program on lasers alone, employing some 10,000 scientists and engineers.

--We cannot let the Soviets have a monopoly on strategic defenses. Possessed by both sides, such defenses can be stabilizing. Possessed by the Soviet Union alone, effective strategic defenses would be devastating to U.S. security.

--In short, we think it far better to rely increasingly on defensive systems--that threaten no one--with sharp reductions of offensive nuclear weapons, near term elimination of ALL US and Soviet ballistic missiles, and hopefully over time the ultimate elimination of ALL nuclear weapons. SDI is the key to that future.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1986

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

8:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

The implications of these talks are enormous and only just beginning to be understood. We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.

But first, let me tell you that, from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. Now you've heard their titles a thousand times -- the ABM Treaty and SDI. Those letters stand for, ABM, anti-ballistic missile, SDI, strategic defense initiative.

Some years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location in each country of a small number of missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear missiles, thus leaving our real defense -- a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side could retaliate. And this mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side striking first.

So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on each other and capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the few anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because the threat of nationwide annihilation made such a limited defense seem useless.

For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets may be developing a nationwide defense. They have installed a large modern radar at Krasnoyarsk which we believe is a critical part of a radar system designed to provide radar guidance for anti-ballistic missiles protecting the entire nation. Now this is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

MORE

Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and slaughter of their citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our military a few years ago to study and see if there was a practical way to destroy nuclear missiles after their launch but before they can reach their targets rather than to just destroy people. Well, this is the goal for what we call SDI and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Now, incidentally, we are not violating the ABM Treaty which permits such research. If and when we deploy the treaty -- also allows withdrawal from the Treaty upon six months' notice. SDI, let me make it clear, is a non-nuclear defense.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. And so far, no success.

On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for nearly 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders being allowed to reunite.

In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another agreement -- the Helsinki Accords they had signed in 1975. Yuri Orlov, whose freedom we just obtained, was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of that pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. But by their choice the main subject was arms control.

We discussed the emplacement of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be drastically reduced. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic ballistic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of SDI.

I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we would share the benefits of advanced defenses. I explained that even though we would have done away with our offensive ballistic missiles, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.

We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry although the General Secretary was registering opposition to SDI and proposing a pledge to observe ABM for a number of years as the day was ending.

MORE

Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together and find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude, I can inform you those teams worked through the night till 6:30 a.m.

Yesterday, Sunday morning, Mr. Gorbachev and I, with our foreign ministers, came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. The Soviets had asked for a 10-year delay in the deployment of SDI programs.

In an effort to see how we could satisfy their concerns while protecting our principles and security, we proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all strategic nuclear arms, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first five years. During the next five years, we would continue by eliminating all remaining offensive ballistic missiles, of all ranges. And during that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of SDI -- all done in conformity with ABM provisions. At the 10-year point, with all ballistic missiles eliminated, we could proceed to deploy advanced defenses, at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

And here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that, in effect, would have kept us from developing the SDI for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing SDI. And unless I agreed, all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons would go down the drain -- cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away SDI -- there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things: our freedom and our future.

I'm still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

So you can see, we made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest days of our administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. And that's why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

And yet, at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

MORE

Now, this policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction -- not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

As I mentioned, one such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "And, is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"

I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we're all from Missouri -- you got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. And this area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think, then, that you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our four-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

And let me return again to the SDI issue. I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up SDI for this agreement?

Well, the answer, my friends, is simple. SDI is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. SDI is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. SDI is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. SDI is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.

The Soviets understand this. They have devoted far more resources for a lot longer time than we, to their own SDI. The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union.

MORE

What Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of a 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the Soviet Union has already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States.

And the American people should reflect on these critical questions.

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles -- fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so -- forever?

So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

And on this point, I know you're also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I'm ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it's different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past five and a half years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there's one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we're dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

Our ideas are out there on the table. They won't go away. We're ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are heading back to Geneva, and we're prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready. So, there's reason -- good reason for hope.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our naval installation at Keflavik -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline.

MORE

.. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been...unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a nation. My fellow Americans, we're honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It's in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week. And it's in pursuit of that ideal that I thank you now for all the support you've given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

END

8:21 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1986

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY  
ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER,  
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

The Briefing Room

4:05 P.M. EDT

MR. HOWARD: Good afternoon. This briefing is ON THE RECORD, but not for camera, and our briefer is Admiral John Poindexter.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Because these issues are so complex, we made a decision yesterday evening that we would go ON THE RECORD with a great deal of detail about the discussions and talks in Iceland. So what I'd first like to do is to go through each of the major areas, specifically in the arms control, because I think the arms control areas are the most complex, and indicate to you what -- how the discussions went and what we achieved, and then after I finish all that, I'll take your questions. And then I may read something to you at the end, which is kind of a closing statement.

Q Why don't you read that first?

Q Yes, could we get to -- is there anything --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The bottom line first.

Q Yes.

Q -- that deals with the speech tonight?

Q Because we do have that pool report.

Q We're up against a deadline --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right.

Q -- that's going to force us to --

Q Is it true -- did you really kneel at the feet of the press on the plane yesterday? (Laughter.)

Q He asked our apologies.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not very long. It was too uncomfortable.

This very short statement here kind of summarizes what I think was the bottom line. We offered the Soviet side an agreement concerning strategic defenses that held the promise of a far safer and more stable world -- a world unburdened by offensive ballistic missiles in which defense would serve to ensure us both against third countries that might acquire these missiles and would ensure the free world against Soviet cheating.

In response to Soviet concerns, we offered to defer the

MORE

deployment of strategic defenses for 10 years, until after all ballistic missiles have been eliminated. And we agreed that during the 10 years in which the disarmament process went forward we would abide by the terms of the ABM Treaty.

But Mr. Gorbachev demanded more than that. He demanded that we agree to limit research on strategic defense immediately in a manner that went far beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. This demand could have no other purpose than to force the United States to abandon any hope of successfully developing the defenses that we would acquire to ensure that the disarmament process did not leave us hopelessly vulnerable to Soviet cheating as the last of our ballistic missiles were dismantled. And it would have required that we now abandon meaningful research on strategic defense without any assurance that the other elements of our proposed agreements would in fact be implemented fully and properly.

MORE



Again and again, the President asked Mr. Gorbachev what possible objections he could have to the deployment of defenses after ten years. And after having eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles. Again and again, the President pressed him to explain how defensive systems, wholly lacking in offensive capability could threaten the Soviet Union. The President never received a satisfactory answer, or even a plausible response.

To go through each of the areas -- well, let me give you a little bit of color, I guess, first. (Laughter.) We went to Iceland --

Q Empty-handed.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not empty-handed, by any stretch of the imagination. (Laughter.)

Q It's better than empty-headed.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's the Soviet line, though.

Q You've got that down, Helen. (Laughter.)

Q Come on --

Q Let's go.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We went to Iceland very well-prepared. Granted, we took all of you by surprise by agreeing to go so rapidly, but don't forget that we have been working toward a summit in the United States sometime near the end of this calendar year. We have been working for months on all of our arms control proposals, we had had expert-level meetings with the Soviets, both in Moscow and in the United States, as well as Geneva. So we very well knew what their positions were, and what our maneuvering room was. We had had expert- and political-level meetings in the other areas of our agenda on regional issues, human rights and bilateral issues.

But because we weren't sure whether the Soviets were ready to move on these various issues, we thought the best that we could probably hope to get out of Iceland was a focusing of the agenda for a Washington summit. But we were surprised, pleasantly surprised, that the Soviets were ready to talk in detail about some of the obstacles to progress, especially in Geneva.

So, out of the heads of state meetings and the working-level meetings that we held all throughout Saturday night and early Sunday morning, we were able to reach some significant solutions to many of the obstacles to progress. In the START area, we agreed with the Soviet Union that both sides, in a START agreement at some point in the future, would come down to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles on each side, that we would come down to 6,000 nuclear warheads on each side. We cleared up some of the problems that we'd been having with the Soviets on the counting rules, on how you count those 6,000 warheads.

We wanted to, and did engage them in discussions of some sublimits that we think should exist in a START agreement, but they were unwilling, at least at Iceland, to agree on any of these sublimits, so those sublimits remain a matter for negotiation in Geneva. They did say, though, that they were prepared to make significant cuts in the heavy ICBMs, which is a very high priority for us. And we were unable to pin them down, though, on exactly what "significant" means. But I think we're moving in the right direction.

Q What was the 50 percent, then?

MORE

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. The 50 percent, essentially is the 6,000 nuclear warheads -- is about 50 percent of where we are today.

Q But in the sublimits there were no percentages?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We had some percentages. I don't want to get into those right now, because we don't have agreement on them. But they were unwilling to agree to some of the specific sublimits. They were unwilling in Iceland to agree to a structure of sublimits. They said why not disagree on the 6,000 and then both sides can have whatever mix they want to make up the 6,000. We're not prepared to do that, because we want to make sure that we get proportional cuts in the more urgent, prompt delivery systems, such as the ICBM's.

Q Was this over a five-year period?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In the discussions in -- on START up to this point, there wasn't any discussion of time periods. I'll get to that in a minute. That came later.

Q Was this the first time they've ever made the suggestion that they were willing to make significant cuts in the big ICBM's?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't have --

Q -- heard that before?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't have my arms control expert here and I'm not sure enough to answer your question. I believe it is the first time, but I can't swear to that.

Q Well, presumably they're referring to the 308 SS-18s.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, exactly.

Q And do you have any notion what they mean by significant cuts at all?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No.

Q What would be significant from our perspective?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't want to get into that -- it gets into our negotiating position that's not agreed upon yet. But they say significant; we'll have to wait and see what that means.

All right. So, all of those things that I went over were agreed upon in the discussions on START.

Q When? This was on Saturday?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it was Saturday and Saturday night, Sunday morning -- the late night meeting.

Q When you -- Admiral, when you say these are agreed upon --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, yes --

Q -- do you feel that they remain agreed upon, despite the failure to reach an overall agreement?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, we are going to, as they say in the negotiating business, pocket these various pieces that they've said they would agree to. I think clearly whether they will admit now that they have agreed to these things or not remains to be seen,

MORE

but in the meetings they did agree to them and we will try to hold them to that agreement at some point in the future.

Q Didn't Gorbachev say that all of these proposals remain on the table?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Gorbachev -- that's what I was going to add, Sam. In the press conference, at least the summary of it that I read that he conducted in Reykjavik last night -- my read of that is that he's leaving these things that they're prepared to agree to on the table. So we will hold him to that.

Q As linked or --

Q -- a link?

Q -- as a link package or as a package in its individual --

MR. SPEAKES: Let me make a suggestion. Would it be better to have John walk everybody right through the whole thing, hold your questions until he finishes and then pick them up.

Q Yes.

Q Yes.

MR. SPEAKES: Because he's going to answer a lot of them as he goes through and he'll go through the negotiating back and forth in the evening and Sunday.

MORE

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. On INF, it was raised on Saturday afternoon. Our position was that the Soviet SS-20s in Asia must be addressed and they must be reduced by some amount, roughly in proportion to the reductions in Europe. The Soviet position was zero-zero in Europe for both sides, and they wanted a freeze on the systems in Asia with the U.S. having the right to deploy an equal number in the United States as they had in Asia. That was unacceptable to us because we have not wanted to shift the locust of the problem from Europe to Asia and burden our Asian allies with a problem -- a bigger problem than they now face.

Also because of the mobility of the SS-20s, they could be moved back and forth across the Ural Mountains, and because in the Western parts of Asia the SS-20 can still reach parts of Europe, we felt that we had to simply get them to agree to some sort of reduction in Asia.

So the President held out there for cuts in Asia and finally on -- and the negotiating -- the working group that night held firm with that position for the Soviets. And finally on Sunday morning, Gorbachev agreed to make some cuts in Asia. What he agreed on was 100-100 warheads globally. With the 100 for the Soviets in Asia and the 100 for the U.S. in the United States.

We agreed to that. That would make a 100 percent reduction in Europe and an 80 percent reduction in Asia. Or, stated another way, that would bring the Soviets from today 1,323 warheads down to 100.

On INF, earlier in the discussions, they had agreed on freezing their short-range INF and beginning negotiations on short-range INF after the long-range INF agreement was signed. There was discussion on verification. We have three major points that we want to get accepted on verification -- an exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place; second, we want on-site observation of the destruction of the weapons; and third, we want an effective monitoring arrangement to put in place after the weapons are destroyed with the provision for on-site inspections during this monitoring.

The Soviets although did not want to -- as usual, they did not want to get into detail in talking about verification, indicated that in principle they didn't have any problem with those provisions. But I'm not naive enough to think that we don't have a lot of hard work ahead negotiating out these verification provisions. But we're very pleased with this agreement on INF. We think that this substantial reduction in Asia accounts for what we were looking for and certainly the zero-zero in Europe is desirable from our point of view.

On nuclear testing, I think you're all familiar with the statement that the President made, or Larry made for the President, the night we arrived in Iceland, which was a slight change to our game plan on nuclear testing. Are you familiar with that, or do you want me to go through that?

MORE

Q We're familiar with that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. The -- in the discussions with the Soviets, they essentially agreed with that sort of game plan -- that we would begin negotiations in which the first item would be improved verification procedures, and we would not move beyond that first agenda item until it was agreed upon, and then we would move on to negotiating further limitations on nuclear testing, with the ultimate goal being a comprehensive test ban, as we reached the point that we no longer have to rely on strategic nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Now, there was disagreement, though, with the Soviets on how we characterize such negotiations. They want to characterize the negotiations as negotiating a comprehensive test ban and we want to characterize it as negotiations on further limitations on nuclear testing. And there is, of course -- the reason for the difference in the way it's described, there's a -- each side has a slight different objective out of a set of negotiations like this.

They want us to agree to a comprehensive test ban very soon. We have indicated that we will agree to a comprehensive test ban in the future, but it's in conjunction with a program that brings the offensive forces down so at the time you reach zero strategic nuclear weapons, at that point we would be willing to agree to a test ban.

But I think, as time goes on, we will be able to work this out with the Soviets and begin a set of negotiations in the nuclear testing area that will result in improved verification procedures. And then we can get the two treaties fully ratified and move on to discussing further limitations.

So all of these things that I've said were agreed upon at this point are held hostage by General Secretary Gorbachev to our agreeing to what they want on the ABM Treaty. Their opening position in the meetings in Iceland was that the United States should agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years and that we also agree to modifying the ABM Treaty to make it more restrictive than it presently is, even under our restricted definition of the ABM Treaty.

Q That was their opening position on Saturday morning?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's correct. In effect, they have -- that's not a new position for them. They have maintained that for a long period of time in Geneva, that they want us to agree to tightening up, making more restrictive -- they refer to it as strengthening the ABM Treaty.

Q The ten years was new.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The ten years was new in Iceland. Because up to this point, they had been talking about up to 15. Recall when they first started talking about this -- and I've lost track of time, but Gorbachev talked about 15 to 20 years. And then in -- I guess that was their June proposal in Geneva, 15 to 20 years.

MORE

And then, in Gorbachev's letter to the President, in response to the President's letter to him of July the 25th, Gorbachev said up to 15 years, and in Iceland, they came to 10 years.

Q Yes, sir. You mentioned -- you indicated that you believe that these agreements remain viable, yet Mr. Gorbachev holds him hostage to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, let -- yes?

Q I'm wondering whether they are viable in their separate parts, in your view, or whether it still is all interlinked?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, they're still linked. But let me go on, because I haven't quite finished the basic facts here. The Sunday morning session was devoted almost exclusively -- well, they got the INF issue out of the way rather rapidly, and the rest of the session was devoted essentially to ABM and SDI.

After the break that came, I guess at 1:30 p.m. or so on Sunday when they stopped the morning session, Secretary Shultz and I and some others met with Shevardnadze and some of his people at 2:00 p.m., in which we sat down and tried to see if we could find some way of getting around this problem with the Soviets wanting us to adhere to the ABM Treaty for 10 years, and make this more restrictive change to the ABM Treaty.

After the session that the Secretary and I had with Shevardnadze, we met with the President when he came back to Hofdi House, and we worked out a compromise position, a new proposal for us, that the President then tabled when he met with Gorbachev at 3:00 p.m. It was about 3:30 p.m., I guess. And the proposal goes like this: that the United States is prepared not to withdraw, or is willing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five years, during which time both sides would achieve the 50 percent cuts that they had agreed upon in START, and the United States would continue the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, and at the end of the five-year period, if the reductions take place,

MORE

and if the Soviets are willing to continue to reduce offensive ballistic missiles for the next five years so that by 1996, in this case, both sides would have eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles. Under those conditions the United States would be prepared not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the second five-year period, so for a total of 10 years.

At the end of that 10-year period, both sides would be free to deploy a strategic defensive system if they so chose unless both sides agreed otherwise.

Now we felt that that was an imminently fair position, it was a change to what we have proposed in the past, but we thought that if Gorbachev was really interested in eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, this would clearly indicate to him that we were not interested in developing any sort of first-strike capability and we couldn't see that there was any way that deploying a strategic defensive system after the offensive ballistic missiles were eliminated could in any way threaten the Soviet Union.

After tabling this proposal, Gorbachev almost immediately said that they didn't agree, and they came forward with a revision to ours, which would have had us agree that all research, development and testing of space-based strategic defense systems would be banned except that that was done in the laboratory.

Q Was that tied to reductions? Was that their version of the ABM side of the equation?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That is correct. That was also -- that was tied to reductions.

Q May I just -- is this the -- when they came forward with this counterproposal, was it one that you suggested earlier, you were really familiar with from the Saturday discussion?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, they had never -- they hadn't put it quite that precisely, and linked in that way. They had talked about wanting to make more restrictive the provisions on research, development and testing in the ABM Treaty,

MORE

and they had talked in terms of strengthening it.

Q So, they had on Saturday morning said they wanted to make more restrictive the treaty. And here came the exact language of the proposal.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. The way that they would make it more restrictive.

Q Thank you.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: At that point, or shortly after that, both sides caucused and we went over their rewrite of our proposal and moved their rewrite back in our direction by insisting on the ability to conduct research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty during the whole 10-year period. Their counter to our first one did not make explicit that at the end of the 10-year period, both sides would be free to deploy a strategic defensive system. They, obviously, would want to interpret that as being uncertain at that point and still open to negotiations at the end of the 10-year period, which we were unwilling to accept.

So we added the research, development and testing that's permitted by the ABM Treaty back into their proposal and we added the ability at the end of the 10-year period to deploy strategic defense -- we added that back in. After the caucus, the President -- in the caucus, the President decided that would be our last and final offer and he took that back in and Gorbachev would not agree. He insisted upon the research being restricted to the laboratory.

Now --

Q How long did that take, Admiral? Did that -- after the President goes back in with his final offer and the General Secretary turns him down, how long is this discussion at this point?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, let's see, I lost track. It was --

Q 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. It would be about -- I guess --

Q 5:35 p.m.?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, you probably have it better than I. I don't remember -- yes, I don't remember the times, because I wasn't looking at my watch.

MR. SPEAKES: It's just the end time of the second meeting. It started at 4:33 p.m.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: It was the time from the -- when they went back in after the caucus until we -- they finally broke up about 7:30 p.m.

Q Do you have any color on that in terms of what was said and how it finally was broken off?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The President said that after they had discussed it for a good long period of time, he realized they weren't going to get anyplace and so the President pulled his papers together and got up. And Gorbachev got up and they both walked out.

Q Can you explain how seriously would the Soviet restrictions on testing hurt us?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it would be, we think, essentially killing the SDI program.

Let me just see if I've got any other points I want to

MORE



make, and then I want to assess what I think all this means and then I'll take your questions.

Q Well did the President say anything when he pulled the papers together?

Q Was there an exchange on that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sure there was but I don't have it verbatim and so I don't want to --

Q Do you have the gist of it -- I mean --

Q Can you take that question?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Beg your pardon?

Q Could you take that question? It's a fairly important historical point, what was said in the meeting, and I wondered if you would take the question and get us an official --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They want us to take the question on exactly what the President said when he got up.

MR. SPEAKES: We take a lot of questions.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. (Laughter.)

MR. SPEAKES: We'll ask him when he comes over tonight and see if he --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. We'll take the question.

Q Do you have the tone of it?

MR. SPEAKES: We'll take a family newspaper first.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I think that the President was somber. We recognize -- the President certainly recognized that what he was proposing was an historic proposal. It would have resulted in 10 years in both sides eliminating all ballistic missiles. The world would be a lot safer. But our problem is and we're not questioning the sincerity or the trustworthiness of the present Soviet leaders, but the history --

Q Why do you want insurance, then?

Q Let him finish.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Let me finish here. The history of the relationship is such that in the past they have not complied with treaties. And when the national security of the country depends on the Soviets complying with a treaty such as this, and the national security of much of the free world, then it absolutely essential and the only prudent thing to do is to have some sort of insurance policy against failure to make the reductions or failure to comply with the total ban on into the future.

The other problem is the problem of nuclear weapons possessed by third countries -- if at some point in the future non-proliferation breaks down, nuclear weapons spread -- I mean, there are third countries today that have nuclear weapons that we would prefer not have them -- and it is only prudent and reasonable that not only the United States but the Soviet Union, in reality, would want some sort of defensive system to guard against non-compliance or the weapons of a third country.

Now I think -- those are all of the main points I wanted to make so I'll open it up to questions now.

MORE

Q I'm -- what I don't understand is why you expected that the Soviets would buy off on this in view of their -- the position that you say has been their traditional position they've maintained about SDI. Why was there a surprise that they wanted to restrict it to the laboratory and stick so strongly to this view?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, you know, one has to try to assess, you know, why are the Soviets opposed to SDI? Now, presumably, one of their concerns would be that they don't trust us, maybe, and they would think that what we were doing is working on a system that, once we achieved it, would give us a first-strike capability. So, you know, if we're willing before deployment to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles, then the problem of first-strike doesn't exist. So if that was their problem, this would have solved it.

Q Admiral, I'm going to make sure I understand you now. You're saying the President broke off the final hour of the talks, and at that point, can you give us any sense of what Gorbachev said, when the President took his papers --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I just -- you know, we have been so busy today --

Q I understand that --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER -- and we have not gone back, and I have not read the translators' record, so I don't know exactly what was said.

Q But what did Gorbachev do when the President took his papers?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That Gorbachev folded up his folder and he got up, and they both got up, and they both walked out of the room.

Q Admiral, is it correct that at no point during these discussions the U.S. side tried to, say, sweeten the pot by delving into the difference between the narrow interpretation of ABM and the broad interpretation? You never told the Soviets, well, instead of this -- confined only to the laboratory, let's talk about definitions of what's in the treaty right now. That never took place?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, that did not, and you would not expect that to take place in such a short session. That's a very complex subject.

Q John, can you give us a little help on what's going to happen in the speech tonight -- what the President's trying to achieve, and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: What he's trying to achieve is a clearer understanding by the American people what he proposed to the General Secretary, what that would have meant in terms of a safer world, why the strategic defense system is essential for our future, and why he was -- is unwilling and strongly supported by all of his advisers -- unwilling to give up the possibility of having a strategic defensive system in the next 10 years.

MORE

See, the problem here is -- I mean you can argue that, well, why not just restrict yourself to the laboratory for the ten years, then if you want to deploy a system, you go ahead and do it. But the problem -- there are several problems with that. One is that we feel that, frankly, SDI has been what has brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. We think that SDI will be the guarantor of their following up on the reductions they agreed to, and that, in the end, it will be the insurance policy against non-compliance.

Now, if you don't have a healthy SDI program, at the ten-year point, it's not a threat because you're still going to have maybe another ten years before you would ever be able to deploy such a system.

Q Admiral?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Barry.

Q Yes. You just said that, frankly, that SDI is what brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. That suggests that you understand clearly that they see it as a bargaining chip, do you not?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, bargaining chip is not the right way to describe it. I think it's the lever that makes the bargaining possible. And what I'm adding today, as I think we've said before but maybe not put so much emphasis on it, we've always felt that it was the thing that would guarantee compliance.

Q But is it not clear from this weekend session that, in fact, without the Soviets seeing it as a bargaining chip which drew them back, that that's where its value lies almost exclusively?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I disagree because I don't think that we're through with this process. The Soviets in the past have broken off negotiations on various subjects and they come back. And I think that it's going to take a little time. Both sides need to reflect on what happened and we're going to continue to push ahead for progress in all the areas. And as I said in the beginning, even though he has linked all these other agreements to our agreeing to their position on the ABM Treaty, he himself has said that those agreements are still out there.

Way in the back.

Q Sir, why have you all allowed this impression to go out over the world since the conference was over that we lost, that we failed, that we're the cause of everything that failed, and from what you say in your speech here today, it sounds like there's a lot of good things here?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, we think --

Q -- we've lost this initiative on public relations or propaganda by not saying something -- this utterance sooner.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We can't control what the press prints or what the media shows on their television. (Laughter.) Wait, wait.

Q On that point, Admiral --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I just want to finish answering her question. We have tried very hard to get our story out. Secretary Shultz had a press conference last night in Iceland. The President spoke at Keflavik.

MORE

I had staff members on the press plane flying back last night. I spent an hour and a half on the record on Air Force One trying to set the record straight. And that is why the President is going on the air tonight.

Now --

Q Well, that speech tonight, Admiral, if we could focus on that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Just a second.

Q Do you feel that the Soviets reneged on their promise, not as a link with SDI, but with INF?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They certainly backed -- went back on a position that we thought they had agreed on before.

Now, Terry?

Q On that point, will the speech tonight try to deal with the disappointment that has been expressed by some allies, and some of the public response, including the Congressional and others?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well --

Q Will the President try to deal with that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, I think so, in laying out the facts of what was proposed, why he took the position that he did, and why we feel that the Soviet position is so -- not understood by us as to why they won't agree to what is -- what we feel is a very reasonable, fair, non-threatening plan. And I'm convinced that we have a very strong understandable position, and the American people and the Congress, once they understand all the facts, will be very supportive. I'm very optimistic.

Q Admiral, I wonder if you could tell us if, at the end of this 10-year plan, the agreement had been implemented, what would have been left in the way of strategic bombers, cruise missiles, and other non-ballistic weapons -- tactical nuclear weapons?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, our proposal would have left the -- well, they would have been reduced under the START agreement, but we weren't proposing to make reductions in the non-ballistic missile strategic weapons in the second five-year period. We were proposing just offensive ballistic missiles.

Q So what would have been left in the arsenals of both countries?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: It would have been cruise missiles and air-breathing aircraft.

Q Admiral, the way you describe this today, the Soviets made a series of concessions on Saturday and Sunday -- START, some things on testing, INF on Sunday morning -- then finally came in at the end with the threshold that the President couldn't meet. Has anybody in the administration, reflecting on the whole range of events, come to the conclusion or even thought that maybe this was a trap that Gorbachev was setting for Reagan?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I don't think it was a trap. I think, you know, we have known all along that they were linking progress in START to agreement on the ABM Treaty, and

MORE

their way of thinking about strategic defense. So we were not surprised by that, but frankly, we saw a possibility of making an historic move forward here and that's why the President was willing to move to stay in compliance with the ABM Treaty for a 10-year period, which is twice as long as we've ever talked about before with the possibility of getting this major reduction in our strategic forces.

Q Well, if you knew all along that it was linked to that, although clearly from your description you didn't know at the outset how -- the specific language they were going to propose, why did you leave that to the end? Didn't anybody calculate that that was the toughest thing to do and they may come in at the end with a proposal you couldn't --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, no -- we -- I don't want to mislead you. I mean, it was very clear from the beginning -- before we got up there, as I said -- the connection with START. When we got to Iceland, it became clear -- the discussions -- and, as the discussions went on it became clearer -- and I think their position may have hardened a little bit, too, that they were linking the progress in START -- not only START, but INF and nuclear testing to our agreeing to their provisions on the ABM Treaty.

Q Admiral, you made a major point here -- and others have, too -- that the SDI got them at the negotiating table. What's the point of being at the negotiating table if SDI prevents you from reaching any agreement?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, SDI is not just simply a mechanism to get them to the negotiating table. We view SDI as the mechanism to eliminate ballistic missiles. That's been the vision all along that SDI would eventually make ballistic missiles obsolete, because they would be vulnerable to such a system. And so it doesn't make any sense just to use it for the factor of getting them to the negotiating table if you don't follow through. Because that's what drives the whole process we feel.

Way in the back.

Q Was there any discussion of technology sharing at the meeting?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President reiterated his proposal to share technology with the Soviet Union and indicated that he was willing to sign a treaty now that would be triggered at some point in the future when we decided to go into full scale engineering and development of such a system. And at that point, as he told the General Secretary in the July 25th letter, we'd be prepared to sit down and offer them a plan to share the benefits of SDI.

Q At what point in the meeting was that suggestion made?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That was made on Saturday afternoon.

Q What was their response to it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This was simply -- but I must make clear, I mean, this was a reiteration of what he told the General Secretary July 25th. Their response is they don't believe that we would actually share it with them.

Q Sell it or give it to them -- the technology?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sorry.

Q Sell it or give it?

Q Will we sell it or --

MORE

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We have said share. We have not specifically gotten in to the details of how we would share, because at this point it is too difficult, not knowing exactly how the systems are actually going to be designed and built, to figure out what sharing arrangements might be possible. And you can also -- you can envision sharing that doesn't necessarily involve both sides having the equipment, their command and control systems that could be shared and all sorts of other things.

Q Admiral, what evidence is there now to refute the notion that both were at a serious impasse -- that each side was in an intractable position and relations and negotiations have essentially gone down the drain.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it's our observation that the Soviets have taken very tough positions that look insurmountable in the past. Just for example, on INF -- they have consistently said they wouldn't make any reductions in Asia. Well, they're prepared to do that. And I think that we need to continue discussions with them and explore -- if they're doing this in good faith and we don't have any real reason to doubt otherwise, then we may be able to explain to them and overcome their concerns by adjusting our position a little bit.

Q But it seems at this point that SDI for each side is somewhat of a sine qua non. How do you get over this hurdle that you mentioned earlier that the Soviets perhaps mistrust us and think that we're going to use this for offensive purposes? How do you get over that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, now, at one point we did think that the Soviets -- one of their concerns of SDI was their fear that we would somehow develop an offensive system that could strike targets on earth. And we spend a lot of time looking at that -- the physics of the matter don't make that a realistic threat and we have talked informally with their scientists, they understand that. That, frankly, is a propaganda point with them and they aren't really worried about that.

Q They just came out with a study last week that reiterates that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, they simply -- the problem is that from a, let's say, a space-based laser -- you can't get

MORE

enough energy down through the atmosphere to the Earth to cause massive destruction. I think -- you know, even with the largest type of laser that we've thought about, it would take something like a week to burn a city block. And that's not a credible threat. And if you want to destroy targets on Earth, the systems we've got today do that a hell of a lot better -- and cheaper.

Q Can you achieve a deployable SDI system in 10 years without going outside the existing ABM Treaty? I thought the existing treaty restricts certain things you need to do to make a full-scale SDI --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, that is correct. Well, when you run it under the treaty, you run into problems when you begin to integrate the components into a system. And limiting the research, development and testing to the laboratory, we will need to calculate exactly how much time that would add to the development process. But it would be substantial, and we don't think that it is the same credible incentive to continue with the reductions. We'd also have problems on the Hill in terms of Congress continuing to support the program.

Jerry?

Q But excuse me. Can I follow-up? You said that after 10 years, you would then deploy. So if you stayed with an ABM for 10 years, what you're saying is, you would not be able to deploy, then, under the existing treaty. Is that right? That was the President's second proposal, another five years under ABM.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President's second proposal would add some more time on the end. It would probably be maybe as much as a couple of years.

Q Twelve years --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Maybe 12 years.

Jerry?

Q Sir, when the President and all of the senior advisers left Washington to go to Iceland, what was the element of surprise when the Soviets made so many, in spite of concessions, laid down -- characterized the "99 yard line." Can you describe that to me? Did you expect that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, as I said earlier, Jerry, we weren't sure exactly what issues they were prepared to move on. They didn't move on any issues that hadn't been discussed. I would say in Geneva, they have talked about strategic nuclear delivery vehicles around 1,600 in that category, we've talked about numbers around 6,000, plus or minus a couple of thousand. Counting rules was an achievement, and that gets rather complex, but it involves how you count the bombers with the bombs and the short-range attack missiles.

The movement on Asia was hoped for, and we were pleased that they moved. I don't know whether I would characterize it as unexpected. It's just that I think the point here is that when we went to Iceland, we thought that the only thing that we might get out of it was just a decision by the two heads of state that we would push on INF, for instance, and nuclear testing, so that by the time of the Washington meeting, they would be prepared to sign agreements.

What we didn't expect them to do in Iceland, very frankly, was to agree to make these moves in START, that although the moves are not surprising; it's just that we didn't think they were ready to do that, because in Gorbachev's last letter to the President, I don't even think he mentioned START.

MORE

Q So when you went to Iceland, in effect, you had the summit there you expected to have in Washington?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I don't think so. I wouldn't call that a summit because there wasn't enough time and there was no joint statement issued at the end. Even if we had reached all these agreements, we probably would have been much more closed-mouth at this point and had a very short thing, that they met, worked on the agenda and --

Q May I follow that up, sir? Given that you had rather minimal expectations when you left, and came back without those -- mainly INF, impulse or a summit date -- is the President sorry he went to Reykjavik?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not at all. Not at all. We think that we've made -- we know what solutions are possible in these areas where there's been conflict in the past and if we can figure out a way to bring the Soviets to our way of thinking about defense, I think that there's great promise.

Q Admiral, you said last night that now we know each other's barriers a little more clearly. You've also said that each side would go back and reassess, but that the President also wants to pursue these issues in other fora in Geneva. How long a time period will this reassessment take? When will you be able --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, our negotiators -- yes -- our negotiators are heading back to Geneva -- if not today, they'll probably leave tomorrow. I mean we're --

Q But will they take this matter up immediately or will they first take a reassessment time and go over what was and was not --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Karpov, their chief negotiator and the one that handles the defense and space talks, was in Iceland. Max Kampelman who handles it for us was there. And they were both -- they're both fully involved in all the discussions in Iceland. So they will pick up the agenda and keep working on it, keep trying to hammer away. And we'll try to get them to agree in Geneva to these INF provisions and to the START provisions.

Q Why would they agree there if they didn't agree in Iceland?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You know, it's like a drop of water on a rock. You know, just keep trying, just keep trying.

Q Do you think Gorbachev will change his mind and transfer to Karpov new instructions on this issue? Or you hope he will?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not right away.

Q Admiral, how do you read what you describe as the failure of the General Secretary to give the President the satisfactory or even plausible explanation for his concerns about SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's a hard question that I don't want to speculate on the record. I've got some ideas as to what --

Q You said it's not a matter of questioning his sincerity. What does that leave?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well --

Q Could he have been testing our commitment?

MORE



Q You said they don't trust us.

MR. SPEAKES: Tell them you need it on background --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me -- let's go on BACKGROUND and I'll answer that question. I think there are two possibilities. One is that Gorbachev has gotten himself out on a political limb so far on being opposed to SDI that he can't figure out a way to back off of it. So I don't think politically that he could go back to Moscow -- assessing and thinking about it since last night, I don't think that he --

MORE

he may have felt that he couldn't go back to Moscow, agreeing to a plan in which we could say that he gave in on SDI. That's one possibility.

The other possibility is that their rhetoric about their willingness to reduce offensive ballistic missiles has gotten out in front of reality. In other words, their claims about wanting to and being willing to reduce offensive, nuclear ballistic missiles, is beyond what they're really prepared to do at this time.

Q Sir, can we get back to the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Back ON THE RECORD.

Q -- back to the question of SDI timing, were there not the strictures of the ABM Treaty, how soon could you deploy? In other words, how much are you actually giving away by saying we won't deploy for 10 years?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I don't have a precise answer to that because we still don't have -- we're not at the point in our research and development to be able to specify the milestones that precisely. But that, Charles, is not so much the point as it is of the necessity we see of having a healthy, strong SDI program moving ahead as rapidly as we can afford because we think in the end it is a much safer way for us to be -- either with our having ballistic missiles or if we don't have them -- and certainly if we don't have them.

Q Let me follow-up on that, because you've given us two other time spectrums in saying that by the Soviet system it would take you an additional 10 years to reach a point of deployment, and by the President's proposal it would take you perhaps an additional two years. Earlier on you proposed this 5-2-6 month thing. Where would you have been in that sense? What I'm trying to do is establish the real technology vis-a-vis proposals here.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, what we have -- what we've generally said is sometime in the mid-90s, a lot of that -- it depends still of-course on -- there's a lot of guess work, educated to be sure, as to how long it's going to take to get some of these technology improvements that we need, but 10 years is roughly right and that's why in the original proposal we agreed to a five-year, two-year, six-month provision and we think that's on the optimistic side as to what we'd be able to do.

Q Admiral, was there any discussion at all of these 25 Soviet Union employees? Did that come up?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President had not planned to raise that. That was to be a discussion between Shultz and Shevardnadze. And to my knowledge I don't think it was discussed because there just simply wasn't time. Shultz and Shevardnadze, except for the first hour of the meetings on Saturday, participated in all the other head-of-state meetings and so I'm relatively sure that George didn't have time to discuss that. But our position is still firm that 25 leave --

Q Today -- the deadline?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Beg your pardon?

Q Today's the deadline? Tomorrow's the deadline?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Tomorrow, I think, is the deadline. But I haven't talked to the Secretary about this and he may feel because they did agree to talk together about it in Iceland. If they haven't had an opportunity to do that, we may want to adjust that a few days.

MORE

Q Admiral, what is it in the September 19th letter that took the President to Iceland? And, in effect, didn't he break off the talks? He picked up his marbles and went home.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, no. The --

Q I mean, what was it that Gorbachev told him in this letter that took him to Iceland?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, Helen. The President generally is always willing to talk and he felt that it was possible to get some decisions in some of these areas like INF, in particular. He thought that if you made it clear enough to Gorbachev that he wasn't going to agree on INF unless Asia was addressed, that he could get Gorbachev to move. And, in fact, he did. And the President still believes -- as I think I've told many of you before -- that he can be very persuasive in a face-to-face conversation. Now --

Q Well, what did Gorbachev tell him? I mean, did he say we can negotiate here and we can --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No. What he said was -- and I don't think I brought the letter with me -- what he said was that he thought that it would be helpful if both heads of state met promptly in Iceland or another location to discuss the issues that are between us so that when we meet in Washington, progress can be made and out of these discussions he envisioned that there would be instructions to their foreign ministers to proceed ahead in making progress in specific areas.

Q Admiral? Admiral, you mentioned that you were surprised that the Soviets opened the agenda in a far more ambitious range than you had expected. You went in with a fairly modest agenda hoping to get INF, nuclear testing, and then go on to Washington summit. What puzzles me is now you're talking about pocketing INF. Did nobody on our side try to pocket INF when that was agreed to and say to the Russians, look, if we don't come out with a whole big package, can you at least agree to keep INF separate and let's go on to a Washington summit and take care of START and SDI at a later date?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Certainly we tried that. And that would be our preferable way of doing it. We are --

Q When did you try that in the two days of talks?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That was tried from the very beginning when arms control -- when the President discussed our position on arms control on Saturday afternoon. And that was discussed in the working talks on Saturday night and Sunday morning.

Q And did they immediately, then, link INF to SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. And that -- although in Gorbachev's discussion on Saturday afternoon, it was not clear but reviewing it in hindsight, it's pretty clear that even on Saturday afternoon he was linking progress in all the areas to our agreement on ABM and SDI.

Q What I'm trying to find out is were you, perhaps, lulled into a going along with a very dramatic range of objectives in Reykjavik and did not sufficiently stick to your moderate agenda and not insist enough to hold the things to what could be achieved instead of going for the whole thing and lose everything?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No. Look, we're not in this thing to play games, you know. We're in this to make progress on these many serious issues that divide us. If they're prepared to talk about making -- agreeing to solutions to some of these knotty problems -- and, you know, it may seem trivial to you, but in terms

MORE

of reaching a START agreement, getting agreement on counting rules is an important achievement. And we're not -- if they're offering to talk about these things -- if they offer to talk about these things, we're not going to say, well, we didn't talk about them. We're always ready to talk and we're always ready to reach agreements.

MORE

But they've got to be agreements that are in our interests.

Q What is going to happen to SALT II now? Anything --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Interesting question. SALT II interim restraint did not come up over the whole weekend in Iceland.

Q Sir, could I follow up on that?

Q Did the President not make up his mind about --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: He has not made up his mind yet. He will by the end of the year.

Q You said that the -- that Gorbachev went beyond the ABM restrictions in his counterproposal, but isn't it true that there is controversy within this administration and certainly in this country, including among the authors of the ABM Treaty, exactly what those restrictions are?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You are correct. There -- we have -- we are presently following what we call a restricted -- restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We believe that a broader interpretation is legal. This is a result of a very substantial legal analysis of the treaty and the negotiating record, and there are some disagreements with some Members of Congress, and Abe Sofaer, the Counselor at State, and Paul Nitze are working with the Congress to resolve this misunderstanding, and if at some point in the future we want -- the President decides to move to the broader interpretation, we will certainly be consulting with Congress.

But the point I want to make is that what Gorbachev is talking about is not the difference between what we call the restrictive interpretation and the broad interpretation. He is talking about modifying the treaty to make it more restrictive than either side ever intended for it to be in the beginning.

Q But would his position coincide with --

Q -- the broad or the narrow interpretation?

Q Would his position coincide with the Warnke-Reinlander interpretation? Would Gorbachev's position coincide with the Warnke-Reinlander interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I am not that familiar with that -- their specific interpretation, so I can't answer that.

Q In Reykjavik, Admiral, were you -- was the administration offering five and 10 years delay on the broad or the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Our position on that is that the five-year -- the way it was worded, it would be the same position that we've had since the July 25th letter to Gorbachev -- that we still reserve the right to go to the broad interpretation of the treaty at some point in the future, but at present we are -- our program is designed to be consistent with the restrictive interpretation, and that is what we're still following.

Q So it's really the broad one. As far as Gorbachev is concerned, he is entitled to say, that's what they're up to.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That would be correct.

Q Admiral, you said that -- to make progress. I was reminded this morning about Robert McNamara's electronic wall that was supposed to stop infiltration in Vietnam. If we are in this to make progress, why allow a chance to get this much of a deal to be held hostage to something that may or may not be technologically

MORE

practical?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I'll use a word that has been used in the press for -- recently. Our problem is that we are afraid that the reductions that we would get without SDI would be illusory.

MR. HOWARD: One last question, please.

Q Admiral, you said -- Secretary Shultz gave us a very bleak report on the outcome of the summit. He not only said you came away with nothing, but indicated that he does not expect any sort of summit. There's no talk at all of a summit in '87. You seem to be trying to put a better face on it now, and as a matter of fact over in Brussels today he seemed to be trying to put a better face on it.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I think last night everybody was tired.

Q Do you disagree with the assessment that Secretary Shultz gave us immediately after the summit?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I think -- you know, we recognize that there was the possibility here of achieving an historic agreement. And when we were unable to do that, everybody was somewhat disappointed. But I think, on reflection, everybody involved in the process -- and we were all tired. We'd been working hard and you become deeply involved in the issue. But upon reflection, I think overnight we realized that we've made significant progress and the possibility of, indeed, getting agreement outside of an agreement of SDI and ABM is a significant possibility.

Q Well, whose move is it now?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't think that I would want to characterize it that way. Our negotiating position will be reviewed and we will reflect on what moves they made and, as I said earlier, try to figure out some way to figure out what their concerns are, if they're being -- if they're negotiating here in good faith and if we find some way of convincing them that it's in both of our interests to move forward to a strategic defensive system.

You see, the think that's so imponderable here is if -- they're really serious about reducing nuclear weapons, it doesn't make any sense that they should be concerned whether we deploy a strategic defensive system or not at that point in the future because we would have -- except for our air-breathing and cruise missiles, we wouldn't have any nuclear weapons to attack them with. And that -- then you have to get into the question that I addressed on background as to, well, why won't Gorbachev agree. And maybe time will help solve some of those problems.

Q Admiral, you mentioned SALT II, and the President has not decided yet. Would you expect that, whether or not you're able to hold the Soviets to the concessions they have made piecemeal will be part of that decision?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sorry, I missed the first part, and I've really got to go.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

5:15 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Release at 6:00 P.M.

October 14, 1986

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
DURING BRIEFING  
WITH NETWORK ANCHORS AND COLUMNISTS

The Roosevelt Room

1:24 P.M. EDT

MR. BUCHANAN: Let me just state the ground rules very briefly. The President will be first. He will be ON THE RECORD, brief opening remarks, Q and A for 15 minutes, followed by the Secretary of State, the same thing; Don Regan, the same thing; and it will be over in an hour. We'll have a transcript available in Room 45 for everyone here, and we are going to release the transcript today to the press.

THE PRESIDENT: Please, sit down, and welcome to the White House. It is a particular pleasure to have you here so soon after returning from a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and that meeting marked new progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.

For the first time on the highest level we and the Soviets came close to an agreement on real reductions of both strategic and intermediate-range weapons. For the first time we got Soviet agreement to a worldwide figure of 100 intermediate-range warheads for each side -- a drastic cut. For the first time we began to hammer out details of a 50 percent cut in strategic forces over five years. We were just a sentence or two away from agreeing to new talks on nuclear testing. And maybe most important, we were in sight of an historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996.

I can't help remembering being told just a few years ago that radical arms reduction was an impossible dream, but now it's on the agenda for both sides. I think the first thing that is important to do is to put these talks and what occurred into perspective.

You'll recall that just over a week ago in talking about going to Iceland, I said that we did not seek nor did we expect agreements. We described our trip as a base camp before the summit to be held here in the United States. And if there was a surprise in Reykjavik, it was that we discussed so much and moved so far. No one a week ago would have thought there could have been agreement in so many areas. While we didn't sign a document, and there remains significant differences, we must not mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of progress.

Historic gains were achieved. As you know, after a great deal of discussion, our talks came down to the Strategic Defense Initiative -- SDI. I offered to delay deployment of advanced strategic defense for 10 years while both sides eliminated all ballistic missiles, but General Secretary Gorbachev said that his demand that we give up all but laboratory research on SDI -- in effect kill the program -- was non-negotiable.

Now the Soviets have made a strategic defense program for years, they've breached the ABM Treaty, and as I noted last night, may be preparing to put in place a nationwide ABM system. For us to abandon SDI would leave them with an immediate permanent advantage and a dangerous one, and this I would not do. Abandoning SDI would

MORE

also leave us without an insurance policy that the Soviets will live up to arms reduction agreements.

Strategic Defense is the key to making arms reduction work. It protects us against the possibility that at some point, when the elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete, that the Soviets may change their minds. I'm confident that the Soviets understand our position. They may try to see if they can make us back off our proposals, and I am convinced that they'll come back to the table and talk.

So here's how I would sum up my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland. We addressed the important areas of human rights, regional conflicts, and our bilateral relationship. And we moved the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on arms reduction to a new plane. We laid a strong and promising foundation for our negotiators in Geneva to build on. And I'm disappointed, of course, that Mr. Gorbachev decided to hold all agreements hostage to an agreement on SDI. But during our Geneva summit we agreed to move forward where we had found common ground, especially on a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals, and an INF agreement. I hope he will at least remember that commitment in the next few weeks, because for our part, we'll seek right away in Geneva to build on the democratic -- or the dramatic progress that we made in Iceland.

Now I think you have a few questions.

Q Mr. President, before going to Reykjavik you characterized Mr. Gorbachev as one of the more frank Soviet leaders with whom you have had dealings. Do you stand by that characterization or do you think Mr. Gorbachev has perhaps engaged in a little duplicity in Reykjavik?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm not going to use the word "duplicity" there, but I do say, having had an opportunity in these past several years and before him to speak to, while not their outright leaders -- their general secretaries, because they kept disappearing -- talk to other Russian leaders. And I think the very nature of the talks that we had in Iceland, and the fact that we were finding ourselves in agreement in the extent to which we would disarm and all.

But, yes, he was more open than I have experienced before, and it wasn't until we then got down to this proposal of theirs with SDI, but we ran into a roadblock and finally -- and he made it plain then that everything that we'd been talking about was contingent on our agreeing to that one phase.

But there's -- no, I'm not saying to you he's an easy mark in any way. He's totally dedicated to their system, and frankly, I think he is -- I think he believes sincerely their propaganda about us -- that we're beholding to industrial and military complexes and so forth.

Q Mr. President, now that you have met that base camp, is the summit -- how important right now is this summit that was originally scheduled for after the election? Is there a chance that there will be a summit, or doesn't it matter?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he brought up the matter of summit, and referred to it several times as if he was expecting to be here for the summit. I have to say that our negotiators -- arms negotiators -- have gone back to Geneva. All of these things have gone with them, and it contains all of the notes and memorandums from all of the meetings as to the extent of the agreement that we had reached with regard to the various types of missiles and so forth.

And so I have to believe that as they continue to look at that and see that there was only one major point of disagreement that we had that -- I'm going to continue to be optimistic.

MORE



Q Mr. President, on the subject of the one sticking point that looms so large -- if you could just explain to us your reasons for the way you handled it, on one point particularly. When it became apparent that all of the concessions that General Secretary Gorbachev was willing to make in the offensive area were contingent on this demand with regard to SDI, did you feel that you had an option of saying, we'll get back to you -- we'll study this, we'll turn it over to our experts, I'll give it some more thought? If you had that option, you clearly didn't take it. You decided to make clear to him then and there and subsequently in public that you were rejecting it. Why was that necessary, particularly given the fact that you told us here only a week or so ago that no great agreements were expected out of this meeting? It's not as though we were all out there waiting for you to come out with either a big agreement or a big disagreement.

THE PRESIDENT: No, actually, as a matter of fact he, himself, from the very beginning had said that what we were talking about is the necessity for coming to some agreements that would then lead to being able to sign things and finalize things at the forthcoming summit.

So actually we progressed in those discussions farther than I think either one of us had anticipated we would. And with SDI, I think that is the absolute guarantee. First of all, I would pledge to the American people that there was no way that I would give away SDI. And looking at their own record -- the ABM Treaty -- they're in violation of that now.

Now the ABM Treaty, which he kept referring to as if it was the Holy Grail, I asked him once what was so great about a treaty that had our governments saying to our people, we won't protect you from a nuclear attack? That's basically what the ABM Treaty says. On the other hand, we know and have evidence that they have been going beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty with their Krasnoyarsk radar, which shows the possibility of being able to provide radar-directed missiles in a defense not just for one spot -- Moscow, as the treaty had provided. We never, of course, took advantage of the fact that we could defend one spot. We didn't think that was a very practical idea.

But that they are embarked on a strategic defense initiative of their own. And we feel that, first of all, there are other countries, other individuals, that now that everybody knows how to make a ballistic missile that could be and that are -- well, some have them already, others developing -- it's true that we are the two that endanger the world most with the great arsenals that we have.

But this would be the guarantee against cheating. You wouldn't have to be suspiciously watching each other to see if they were starting to replace missiles. This would be the guarantee against in the future a madman coming along. I've likened it, and I explained it to him in this way, that right after World War I -- and I reminded him that I was the only one there old enough to remember these times -- the nations got together in Geneva to outlaw poison gas, but we kept our gas masks, and thank heaven we did because now, years later, poison gas is being more and more recognized as a legitimate weapon.

Q But are you saying, sir, that he left you no choice but to say yes or no there on the spot, and that you had no option to say, very interesting, we'll study it, we'll get back to you?

THE PRESIDENT: There wasn't any need of that. There wasn't any way that I was going to back away from that -- from SDI.

Q Mr. President, are you confident that we are going to have another summit?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't say that I'm confident, that I

MORE

have any practical evidence other than the fact that he several times referred to the forthcoming summit that would take place here in the United States.

Q What did you say when he said that?

THE PRESIDENT: The only mention I made of it at all was at one point I asked him legitimately -- I said, "Would you like to propose a date -- suggest a date for that forthcoming summit?" And at that time his reason for not doing it, he said, was because, well, until we our people have all worked things out and we know about how long it's going to take to make the plans for the summit, why I think we should wait on naming a date. And that was the last time that it was mentioned.

Q Was that after the deadlock, sir? Was that after the deadlock or before the deadlock?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, that was before the deadlock, yes.

Q Before?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Mr. President, I'm puzzled about something. You two gentlemen talked for nearly 11 hours. Obviously there was harmony because there were unprecedented agreements between you two. And yet in the final analysis SDI became the major hang-up. I get the impression that all along Mr. Gorbachev never indicated to you that this was hanging back there in the dark. And my question is, was he deceitful?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not going to use that word or say that because where this came up was, both of us finally at a point proposed that -- on Saturday night -- that our teams take all of these voluminous notes that had been taken in all of the meetings and discussions with all of the things that had been discussed, and they go to work that night, and they did, and they worked all night in two groups -- well, I mean there were two -- their groups and our groups, but two on each side. One of our groups was dedicated to putting together all the discussion that we'd had on human rights and regional conflicts and so forth. They worked until, as I understand it, about 3:30 a.m. in the morning. And the other group was to go through all the things to come back and find where had we really been in agreement, where there was no problem between us, and where were the sticking points that had not been resolved? And I guess that group worked until about 6:00 a.m. in the morning, didn't they? And then Sunday we went into that -- what was supposed to be a two-hour meeting and wound up being an all-day meeting.

They brought back to us -- put together the things that we had all proposed and that seemed that we could agree on, and the places where we were stuck. And that was the first time really that it became evident about SDI, because what I had proposed early on was what I talked about here. I told him that what we were proposing with SDI was that once we reached the testing stage we would -- well, before that, that right now we were ready and willing to sign a treaty -- a binding treaty that said when we reached the testing stage that both sides would proceed, because we told him frankly that we knew they were researching also on defense, nor was that ever denied. And we said we both will go forward with what we are doing. When we reach the testing stage, if it's us, we'll invite you to participate and see the tests. And if it develops that we have -- and I said or if you have perfected a system that can be this kind of defense that we're talking about, then we share, so that there won't be one side having this plus offensive weapons, but that we eliminate the offensive weapons and then we make available to all who feel a need for it or want it this defense system so that safety is guaranteed for the future.

MORE

Q Mr. President, you don't want to use the word "deceit," but I'm still puzzled. You wouldn't -- it seems to me that you wouldn't have agreed with Mr. Gorbachev as you agreed if you had known that once you got to the 11th hour he would spring this all on SDI or nothing at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think this came out of the summary then that came back from our teams to us where all of this was put together in a kind of an agreement. And what -- they weren't denying SDI openly. What they were doing was framing it in such a way that in a 10-year delay they would literally kill SDI, and there just wouldn't be any.

Q Mr. President, did you tell Mr. Gorbachev that SDI was, as you described it to us, an insurance policy that they will live up to agreements to reduce weapons? And what did he say to you in response?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm trying to remember all the things that were said. It was just that they were adamant, that -- and the use of words, it came down to the use of words, and their words would have made it not just a 10-year delay, but would have meant that we would come to the end of the reducing the weapons and we -- well, SDI would have been killed. And we proposed wording that the research that we were carrying on would be carried on within the provisions of the ABM Treaty, and this wasn't good enough for them.

MR. BUCHANAN: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Appreciate it.

THE PRESIDENT: The boss says I'm through here. You can take them up with the Secretary of State.

All right, thank you very much.

END

2:40 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 14, 1986

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICERS  
OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Room 450  
Old Executive Office Building

3:08 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, and welcome to the White House complex. I wanted all of you to come over this afternoon to hear first-hand about our meetings in Iceland and I have a terrible feeling that almost anything I say is going to have already been said about that trip. But before I turn to my report, let me first say that I couldn't have gone to Reykjavik without the hard work and dedication above and beyond the call of duty of you men and women that I see before me. You labored night and day to get us ready for that first meeting, and I know we sort of sprung it on you at the last minute. I'm grateful to all of you for the fine work you did. And let me say thanks as well to the members of that small team that I took with me to the meeting. They worked around the clock and I mean that literally. A few of them got no sleep at all while we were there.

I've long had great respect for everyone of them and that respect grew even stronger in these four days. They were an outstanding team and all Americans can be proud of them and of the work they did. And you can be proud of the fruit that your work is bearing, for the Reykjavik meeting may have set the stage for a major advance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

At Reykjavik, the Soviet Union went farther than ever before in accepting our goal of deep reductions in the level of nuclear weapons. For the first time, we got Soviet agreement to a figure of 100 intermediate range missiles -- warheads -- for each side worldwide. And that was a truly drastic cut. And for the first time we began to hammer out the details of a 50 percent cut in strategic forces over five years. And we were just a sentence or two away from agreeing to new talks on nuclear testing. And maybe most important, we were in sight of a historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996.

Believe me, the significance of that meeting at Reykjavik is not that we didn't sign agreements in the end, the significance is that we got as close as we did. The progress that we made would've been inconceivable just a few months ago.

On issue after issue, particularly in the area of arms reduction, we saw that General Secretary Gorbachev was ready for serious bargaining on real arms reductions. And for me, this was especially gratifying. Just five and a half years ago, when we came into office, I said that our objective must be -- well, it must not be regulating the growth in nuclear weapons -- which is what arms control as it was known had been all about, I know -- I said that our goal must be reducing the number of nuclear weapons, that we had to work to make the world safer, not just control the pace at which it became more dangerous. And now, the Soviets, too, are talking about real arms reductions.

And let me say that this wouldn't have been possible

MORE

without the support that we've had from the American people over the last five and a half years. Because the American people have stood behind us as we worked over the years to rebuild our nation's defenses, we went to the Iceland meeting in a position of strength. The Soviets knew that we had the support, not only of a strong America, but a united NATO alliance that was going ahead with deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. So, yes, it was this strength and unity that brought the Soviets to the bargaining table.

And particularly important, of course, was America's support for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Now, as you know, I offered Mr. Gorbachev an important concession on SDI. I offered to put off deployment for a decade and I coupled that with a ten-year plan for eliminating all Soviet and American ballistic missiles from the face of the Earth.

This may have been the most sweeping and important arms reduction proposal in the history of the world, but it wasn't good enough for Mr. Gorbachev -- he wanted more. He wanted us to accept even tighter limits on SDI than the ABM Treaty now requires. That is, to stop all but laboratory research. He knew this meant killing strategic defense entirely, which has been a Soviet goal from the start. And, of course, the Soviet Union has long been engaged in extensive strategic defense programs of its own. And unlike ours, the Soviet program goes well beyond research, even to deployment. The Soviet proposal would've given them an immediate one-sided advantage and a dangerous one. And I couldn't not, and would not agree to that. I won't settle for anything unless it's in the interest of America's security. (Applause.)

Now, America and the West need SDI for long-run insurance. It protects us against the possibility that at some point when the elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete, the Soviets may change their mind. We know the Soviet record of playing fast and loose with past agreements. America can't afford to take a chance on waking up in 10 years and finding that the Soviets have an advance defense system and are ready to put in place more missiles -- or more modern missiles -- and we have no defense of our own, and our deterrence is obsolete because of the Soviet defense system.

If arms reduction is to help bring lasting peace, we must be able to maintain the vital strategic balance which for so long has kept the peace. Nothing could more threaten world peace than arms reduction agreements with loopholes that would leave the West naked to a massive and sudden Soviet buildup in offensive and defensive weapons.

My guess is that the Soviets understand this, but want to see how much farther they can push us in public before they once again get down to brass tacks. So here's how I see the meeting in Iceland adding up.

We addressed the important issues of human rights, regional conflicts and our bilateral relationship. And Mr. Gorbachev and I got awfully close to historic agreements in the arms reduction process. We took discussions into areas where they had never been before. The United States put good, fair ideas out on the table and they won't go away. Good ideas, after all, have a life of their own. The next step will be in Geneva where our negotiators will work to build on this progress.

The biggest disappointment in Iceland was that Mr. Gorbachev decided to make our progress hostage to his demand that we kill our strategic defense program. But, you know, I've had some experience with this kind of thing. One of my past jobs was as a negotiator of labor agreements in the motion picture industry, and I got used to one side or another walking out of contract talks. It didn't mean that relations had collapsed or that we'd reached an insurmountable impasse, it sometimes meant that a little maneuvering

MORE

was going on.

Well, it's important for us right now to see that the real progress that we made at Reykjavik and to unite so that we'll be strong for the next stage in negotiations. And if we do that, I believe that we have it within our grasp to achieve some truly historic breakthroughs.

Last week I described Iceland as a base camp on our way to the summit. Well, this week I want to report to you that I believe there exists the opportunity to plant a permanent flag of peace at that summit. And I call on the Soviets not to miss this opportunity. The Soviets must not throw this away, must not slip back into a greater arms buildup. The American people don't mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of progress. We made progress -- we must be patient. We made historic advances -- we will not turn back.

Thank you, again, all of you for all that you've done.  
God bless you.

END

3:16 P.M. EDT