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TERRORISM - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: NSC - MENGES

PAPER - STRATEGY AGAINST TERRORISM

FOIA

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February 12, 1986

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BY LW NARA DATE 9 22 17



#### A Strategy Against Subversive Aggression/International Terrorism

I. Since 1945, the US, other democracies, and Pro-Western Governments Have Faced Three Types of Threat from the Soviet Union

#### Defense

- II. Elements of the Threat from Subversive Aggression
- 1/ Soviet bloc countries
- 2/ Terrorist partner governments: Nicaragua, Cuba, Libya, Syria, North Korea plus Iran
- 3/ Stateless anti-western terrorist organizations which often attack across different geographic areas: regional communist or pro-Soviet groups (PFLP, PLO, ETA, etc.) and regional anti-western groups (e.g. Hizballah)
- III. Elements of a Counter-strategy
- 1/ Political actions
  - -- support for moderate, pro-western/pro-democratic leaders and institutions
  - -- communication: affirming the truth about the US and the democracies; countering in a systematic and energetic way the enormous volume of hostile propaganda
- "Dynamic containment" -- timely identification of vulnerable target countries, and the competent use of US and friendly resources to help defeat efforts by anti-western/pro-Soviet groups to take power
- 3/ Pro-western restoration -- help for reasonable and effective
  groups to replace terrorist governments

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#### November 1980

#### A Strategy to Counter Soviet Supported Subversive Aggression/Terrorism

#### The Threat

Experts have disagreed about the extent of Soviet control and direction of each and every anti-western terrorist or guerrilla group. However, the following construct offers a perspective on the nature of the political-paramilitary war being fought against US interests by hostile groups which agree on targets for destabilization and cooperate with each other in various degrees.

Political-Paramilitary War Against US Interests in Three Strategic Arenas

#### TARGET COUNTRIES

DESTABILIZATION COALITION

#### Latin America

Colombia Venezuela

Central America

Pariama Belize

Mexico\*

Cuba

Regional communist/guerrilla groups

USSR

Palestinian terrorists/Libya

#### Middle East

Israel Egypt

Iran (post-Khomeini)

Oman

North Yemen

Egypt

Persian Gulf regimes

Saudi Arabia\*

USSR

Pro-Soviet regimes (South Yemen, Syria)

Cuba

Palestinian guerrillas

Libya

#### Africa

Zaire Morocco Sudan Namibia

South Africa\*

USSR

Cuba

Libya

Pro-Soviet regimes (Ethiopia, Angola,

Mozambique)

Regional guerrillas/communist groups

(SWAPO)

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<sup>\*</sup>Designates the main strategic target

#### A Counter-Strategy

Effective political action by the United States is an essential but largely missing element of foreign policy. The following three main elements are the ingredients of a sound political action strategy:

#### Support for reformist, moderate, pro-western forces

- Better political analysis and intelligence to identify friendly/ moderate, neutral and hostile groups within the foreign nations of vital interest:
- Timely efforts to provide support to friendly groups such as political parties, labor unions, civic associations, media, religious (public but discreet, covert only if necessary).

#### International communication

- More energetic communications efforts which take political ideas seriously and bring about honest and vigorous debates with the zealous, often misinformed elites in developing countries who have accepted many of the myths preached by communist and other radical groups concerning the comparative international effects of the democratic and communist nations;
- Finding effective ways to affirm the accomplishments of the industrial democracies in social and economic as well as political terms while factually discussing the repression, economic failure, poverty and elitism of the communist societies.

Offensive action against terrorist, radical groups and their transnational supporting networks -- Soviet. Cuban...

- Improved analysis of the Soviet/radical transnational networks supporting terrorist and destabilizing groups.
- Covert, offensive action to reduce political violence in regions of direct interest by penetration, exposures, harassment and neutralization.
- The discreet use of economic sanctions (and incentives where appropriate) in situations where Soviet sponsored terrorism threatens to succeed before countermeasures can be implemented.
- Sustained efforts to help moderates replace <u>newly established</u> communist or pro-Soviet regimes in important regions; Nicaragua, Grenada, Ethiopia, Angola...

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WASHINGTON — History will mark the events in Iran, Afghanistan and Nicaragua in 1979 as a turning point in the invisible war between radical and moderate forces for control of the oil and destiny of the Middle East and control of Central America and Mexico.

In the Middle East, the outcome of the process now gaining momentum might include the replacement of the royal families in the oil states of the Arabian Peninsula by radical anti-Western regimes. Among the effects of such a change could be the use of Israel and oil supplies as the fulcrum to divide America from Europe and Japan, which depend on that region for more than 70 percent of their oil consumption. While encouraging radical destabilization in the Persian Gulf area. the Soviet Union could use a diplomacy of conciliation with Europe and Japan intended to end any meaningful alliance with America.

The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua last July encouraged leftist terrorists' assaults against the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala; these continue to gain force and might succeed soon. That in turn would open Mexico to the politics of polarization through leftist terror and to possible destabilization by a coalition of reformist, radical and Communist groups opposed to the current regime. Mexico might then become an Iran-next-door.

United States policy toward the Middle East and the Central America-Mexico region must begin with a realistic understanding that the invisible political war that is raging could be lost. In Central America, this requires additional support for peaceful reform and immediate action against extremist and Cuban-supported terrorism. In the Middle East, adequate Western military power is necessary. However this alone will not preserve our interests against three converging radical forces.

## Radicalism Abroad

#### By Constantine C. Menges

First, Palestinian terrorists, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, believe that after the ruling elites on the Arabian Peninsula are replaced by radicals, the Palestinians will be able to force the entire West to abandon Israel. Second, the radical Governments of Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iran and, to some degree, Iraq, share this view, but they would remain hostile to the democracies even without the pretext of Israel because their leaders believe much of the Marxist mythology about Western "evils." Third, the Soviet Union and its client governments, among them Southern Yemen's, aim to do anything possible, short of risking major war, that will bring the oil closer to their control.

Targets for these three destabilizing forces include President Anwar el-Sadat and the oil regimes on the Arabian Peninsula along with Yemen and Oman. The failure to meet the May 26 deadline for completing negotiations for Palestinian autonomy could be the cue for Palestinian terrorists to work with Libya and with Egyptian radicals to try to replace Mr. Sadat.

Last November, the attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca was aimed at overthrowing the monarchy in Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are even more vulnerable, since their Palestinian and Shiite Moslem minorities add up to about half the population in each state. The practical approach to

destabilization in the small oil states might combine pressures and threats from neighboring Iran or Iraq with internal upheavals encouraged by radicals.

Simultaneously, Soviet proxies might be active. After the summer Olympics have ended, Cubans and East Germans might help Communist Southern Yemen or Libya make use of the hundreds of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery and mobile airdefense missiles already stockpiled in those countries.

What should be done? Rather than waiting passively for destabilization to strike one country after another, a coalition of democracies and Islamic nations must take the offensive against radical and terrorist networks. Decades of repression of Islam inside the Soviet Union, and the brutality in Afghanistan, should be used to show Moslem peoples the consequences of Soviet dominance. There should be a solution providing for Palestinian autonomy based on democratically chosen authority and for the security of Israel. This will be possible only if the radical forces are contained.

It is, an illusion to believe that anything other than the disappearance of Israel would satisfy any of the three radical forces. The democracies must use conservation of energy, technology and unity to establish real economic counterpressures to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. And finally, there must be a concerted but private proposal to the Soviet Union: Stop your indirect war against the moderate governments of oil states or there will be a complete cessation of economic transactions with many of the democratic nations.

Constantine C. Menges, editor of "International Strategic Issues," a newsletter, is author of "Spain: The Struggle for Democracy Today."




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#### Strategy Against Subversive Aggression-Defensive Action

| Terrorist  | Illustrative   | Active De:                         | fense                                   |
|------------|--|------------------------------------|---|
| Government | Targets  | Disruption of Terrorist Facilities | Pro-Western<br>Restoration              |
| Libya      | Is, Egypt,<br>Tunisia, Sudan<br>US/NATO  | Egypt + Islamic<br>volunteers      | Egypt + Tuni-<br>sia + pro-W<br>Libyans |
| Syria      | Is, Leb., Jor.,<br>Turkey (ASLA)   | Turkey + Islamic<br>volunteers     | Turkey + pro-<br>W Syrians              |
| Iran       | Is, US, SA,<br>Persian Gulf  | Turkey + Islamic<br>volunteers     | Turkey + pro-<br>W Iranians             |
| Nicaragua  | Cent. Am. LA   | Friendly + UNO                     | Friendly +<br>UNO                       |
| Angola     | Namibia (SWAPO)<br>Zaire,<br>So.Af. (ANC)  | UNITA                              | UNITA                                   |
| Cuba       | LA/CA Af.,NE Af + UNITA vs 30,000 Ang Af + RENAMO vs 3,000 Moz NAf + ELF vs 5-10,000 Eth CA + UNO vs 9,000 Nic |                                    |   |
| N. Korea   | SEA, LA, Af  | S. Korea + regional volunteers     |   |
| S. Yemen   | Oman, N. Yemen,<br>Persian Gulf  | NY or SA + SY<br>Guerrillas        | P. Gulf + Guerrillas + pro-W SY.        |

Observations on taking prudent, effective and sustainable action:

- -- Armed subversion has been defined as aggression under international law, the initiator is the aggressor and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter formalizes the inherent right of self-defense;
- Disruption of terrorist facilities can include physical destruction and lesser actions; it is ethically correct to hold accountable the entire terrorist and directly supportive organizations—not just the specific perpetrators;
- -- Pro-Western restoration is the strategic answer and is warranted by the aggression already committed.



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First Draft June 21, 1985 137092

A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST VIOLENCE

Threat: The Destabilization Coalition

Since 1945, the United States and its allies have faced three types of threat from the Soviet bloc and its partners: (1) strategic attack with missiles and bombers; (2) conventional attack across international borders; and, (3) subversive aggression which uses propaganda, political action, terrorism, and military support for pro-Soviet guerrillas to bring pro-Soviet groups to power. This third form of aggression was begun by the Soviet Union shortly after the 1917 communist revolution and has employed an increasing number of methods and institutions starting with the Soviet government, the international communist parties and their front organizations, adding the Soviet satellite governments and, since the 1960s, working with partner governments such as Cuba, Libya, Syria, and Nicaragua to provide support for a variety of anti-Western terrorist and guerrilla groups.

The evidence is conclusive that the Soviet bloc provides intelligence, training, funding, and lethal support to these terrorist partner governments which, in turn, permit and encourage the anti-Western terrorist and guerrilla groups to operate from their territory as they attack the United States and its allies. The current Iranian regime is not a Soviet partner, but it shares the radical anti-Western ideology of the terrorists and is now working in cooperation with Syria and Nicaragua against the United States. It is also evident that the Soviet Union is making every effort to build on its long-established Iranian communist cadres to assure that the transition from the current radical Islamic regime will be toward a radical pro-Soviet government. Since Khomeini is 86, this transition may happen in the next 24 months.

Each of the major terrorist states is active in many countries (either directly or through the support it facilitates for the anti-Western terrorist groups). The cumulative effect of their actions risks the destabilization of many friendly countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia with the real threat that, over time, pro-Soviet regimes might be established in many additional countries, including the principal strategic targets: Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Philippines. Examples of hostile actions by each terrorist regime include:

Libya -- subversive operations against more than 10 countries in Latin America, 8 in Africa, 4 in the Middle East and the Philippines.

Syria -- direct support for terrorists who destroyed the US Embassy (April 1983), killed 241 Marines (October 1983), bombed the US Embassy annex (1984), kidnapped US individuals, including the June 1985 TWA hijacking; also for terrorists from ASLA attacking Turkey, others attacking Jordan, and for the marxist/leninist PFLP Palestinian terrorists.

South Yemen -- direct support for terrorists operating against Oman, North Yemen, the Persian Gulf oil states, and Saudi Arabia.

<u>Iran</u> -- direct support for terrorists attacking US personnel, neighboring Persian Gulf oil states, and collaboration with Nicaragua and Cuba against US friends in Latin America.

<u>Nicaragua</u> -- direct support for communist guerrillas attacking Central American neighbors, several other Latin American countries and a training area for pro-Soviet terrorists from Western Europe.

#### A Structural Solution to the International Terrorist Problem

Each terrorist episode has to be dealt with in its own terms. But, as we have seen during the last 15 years, the threat and the pace of violence simply grow (one expert estimates that 41,000 people have been killed in anti-Western terrorist attacks since 1970). There is also the important and well-understood dimension of effective police and intelligence work to prevent and deter terrorist attack. It is now time to add to the existing efforts by seeking the structural solution to the terrorist problem.

With respect to the four main terrorist regimes (Libya, Syria, Iran, Nicaragua), there should be a thoughtful, competent, and totally discreet effort to help the good people (who are the overwhelming majority of the population) restore moderate pro-Western government with the direct help of their neighboring states which have been under terrorist attack by those violent dictatorships. In schematic form, this would be the pro-Western coalition in each case: Libya -- moderates plus Tunisia, Egypt; Syria -- moderates plus Turkey, Jordan with Israel providing background support; Iran -- moderates plus pro-Western neighbors; and, Nicaragua -- democratic resistance plus Central American neighbors: note that Nicaragua is under obligation to the OAS since 1979 to establish a genuine democracy and that the US and its Central American allies have all insisted that this commitment be implemented. When that occurs, Nicaragua will cease to be a terrorist partner of the Soviet bloc.

#### Specific Actions

The President has designated the Vice President to coordinate a new effort to reduce terrorist violence. In addition to all the important police and intelligence actions designed to prevent terrorist episodes, this structural approach should have high priority as reflected in the following actions:

- 1/ Under the NSC or the Vice President, establish a small staff of individuals who can produce practical plans for each case as a result of their knowledge and understanding of the relevant political history and institutional realities in each of the four main terrorist countries and their neighbors.
- 2/ Use the NSPG to obtain final decisions on the plan for each case.
- 3/ Assure that under the NSC or VP the full range of US Government resources are available in a timely and coordinated way to provide support for each plan.
- 4/ Provide for regular monthly review by the President and NSPG of plan implementation (including changes needed, resource bottlenecks and problems).
- 5/ Assure total secrecy through regular polygraphing of all involved staff and of any congressional staff that might be informed (since the US is a facilitator of these efforts by foreign nationals, this might be defined as not requiring the congressional review process used for special activities—this is a legal question for decision).

#### SOVIET BLOC & PARTNER INDIRECT AGGRESSION/TERRORISM

#### Active Defense for Vulnerable Soviet Bloc/Partner Targets (20)

| Latin America   | Africa                                    | Middle East  | Far East    |
|---|---|--|-------------|
| Central America<br>Mexico<br>Bolivia<br>Peru<br>Chile<br>Guyana | Zaire<br>Ghana<br>Chad<br>Nigeria<br>Etc. | Israel Egypt North Yemen Tunesia Sudan Iran (post-K) | Philippines |

#### Pro-Western Restoration Opportunities (8) (not declared policy)

| Nicaragua* | Angola*                  | Afghanistan*                                       |  |  |
|------------|--------------------------|--|--|--|
|            | Mozambique*<br>Ethiopia* | Syria (Tk, Is, J) Libya (Eg, Tu, Su) Iran (post-K) |  |  |

#### (unclassified estimates)

| Country     | <u>Forces</u>       | Soviet Bloc/Cuban<br>Military Security<br>Personnel | Armed Resistance Forces                   |
|-------------|---------------------|---|---|
| Nicaragua   | 62,000<br>(119,000) | 4,000   | 15,000 (+5,000<br>available)              |
| Angola      | 80,000              | 30,000 (Cubans)                                     | 45,000                                    |
| Mozambique  | 40,000              | 2,000 +   | 15,000                                    |
| Ethiopia    | 110,000             | 20,000  | 30,000 +                                  |
| Afghanistan | 60,000              | 120,000 +   | 90,000-150,000                            |
| -           |                     |   | of which 70.000 in combat at any one time |

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BY LW NARA DATE 9 (22) 17

# Sandinistas have 'blueprint for subversive aggression'

Following is the text of a speech prepared for delivery by CIA Director William Casey to the World Business Council in San Antonio, Texas, tomorrow. A copy of the speech was obtained by The Washington Times.

Today, I would like to tell you about the subversive war which the Soviet Union and its partners have been waging against the United States and its interests around the world for a quarter of a century or more. This campaign of aggressive subversion has nibbled away at friendly governments and our vital interests until today our national security is impaired in our immediate neighborhood as well as in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

This is not an undeclared war. In 1961, [Nikita] Khrushchev, then leader of the Soviet Union, told us that communism would win not through nuclear war which could destroy the world or conventional war which could quickly lead to nuclear war, but through "wars of national liberation" in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. We were reluctant to believe him then. Just as in the 1930s we were reluctant to take Hitler seriously when he spelled out in "Mein Kampf" how he would take over Europe.

Over the last 10 years, Soviet power has been established:

• In Vietnam, along China's border and astride the sea lanes which bring Persian Gulf oil to Japan.

• In Afghanistan, 500 miles closer to the warm-water ports of the Indian Ocean and to the Straits of Hormuz. Through which comes the oil essential to Western Europe.

• In the Horn of Africa, dominating the southern approaches to the Red Sea and the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.

• In Southern Africa. The source of minerals which we and other industrial nations must have.

• And in the Caribbean and Central America, on the very doorstep of the United States.

This is not a bloodless war. Marxist-Leninist policies and tactics have unleashed the four horses of the apocalypse — Famine, Pestilence, War and Death. Throughout the Third World we see famine in Africa, pestilence through chemical and biological agents in Afghanistan and Indochina, war on three continents, and death everywhere. Even as I speak, some 300,000 Soviet, Vietnamese, and Cuban troops are carrying out savage military operations directed at wiping out national resistance in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and several other coun-

In the occupied countries -Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua - in which Marxist regimes have been either imposed or maintained by external forces, there has occurred a holocaust comparable to that which Nazi Germany inflicted in Europe some 40 years ago. Some four million Afghans, more than one-quarter of the population, have had to flee their country. The Helsinki Watch tells us that they have fled because the crimes of indiscriminate warrare are combined with the worst excesses of unbridled statesanctioned violence against civilians." It cites evidence of "civilians burned alive, dynamited, beheaded: crushed by Soviet tanks; grenades thrown into rooms where women and children have been told to wait."

In Cambodia, two to three million people, something like one-quarter of the pre-war population, have been killed in the most violent and brutal manner by both internal and external Marxist forces.

In Ethiopia, a Marxist military government, supported with extensive military support from Moscow and thousands of Cuban troops, by collectivizing agriculture and keeping food prices low in order to maintain urban support, has exacerbated a famine which threatens the lives of millions of its citizens. It has exploited the famine by using food as a weapon to forcibly relocate people fighting an oppressive government in the north hundreds of miles to the south where there is no preparation to receive them. In urban areas, food rations are distributed through party cells.

In Nicaragua, the Communist government killed outright a minimum of 1,000 former Somoza national guardsmen during the summer of 1979. In 1982, it forcibly relocated some 15,000 Miskito Indians to detention camps, forced many more to flee to refugee camps in Honduras, and burned some 40 Indian villages. Last month, the Sandinistas forcibly moved 60,000 campesinos from areas close to the Honduran regions, burning their houses and killing their cattle.

What is the purpose of all this carnage, this creeping imperialism? In my view, there are two primary targets — the oil fields of the Middle East which are the lifeline of the Western Alliance, and the Isthmus between North and South America. Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, as well as Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and Mozambique and Angola in southern Africa, bring Soviet power astride the sea lanes which carry those resources to America, Europe and Japan.

Capabilities to threaten the Panama Canal in the short term and Mexico in a somewhat longer term are being developed in Nicaragua where the Sandinista revolution is the first successful Castroite setzure of power on the American mainland. They have worked quietly and steadily toward their objectives of

building the power of the state security apparatus, building the strongest armed forces in Central America, and becoming a center for exporting subversion to Nicaragua's neighbors.

The American intelligence community over recent months unanimously concurred in four national estimates on the military buildup, the consolidation and the objectives of the Soviets and the Cubans and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. If I were to boil the key judgments of those estimates down to a single sentence it would be this: The Soviet Union and Cuba have established and are consolidating a beachhead on the American continent, are putting hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment into it, and have begun to use it as a launching pad to carry their style of aggressive subversion into the rest of Central America and elsewhere in Latin America.

Let me review quickly what has already happened in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have developed the best equipped military in the region. They have an active strength of some 65,000 and a fully mobilized strength including militia and reserves of nearly 120,000. These forces are equipped with Soviet tanks, armored vehicles, state of the art helicopters, patrol boats and an increasingly comprehensive air defense system. This gives the Sandinistas a military capability far beyond that of any other Central American nation and indeed all Central American nations put together.

In addition to the considerable military hardware, there are now an estimated 6,000 to 7,500 Cuban advisers and several hundred other communists and radical personnel in Nicaragua assisting the regime in its military buildup and its consolidation of power.

The Communist government under Cuban direction and guidance has been essential in helping the regime establish control over the media, create propaganda mechanisms and neutralize the effectiveness of those who oppose the Sandinista totalitarianism.

Today, we see Nicaragua becoming to Central and Latin America what Beirut was to the Middle East for almost 15 years since 1970 when Lebanon became the focal point for international and regional terrorists. Managua's support for training of Central American subversives is well documented - they support Salvadoran communists, Guatemalan communists, radical leftists in Costa Rica, and are attempting to increase the number of radical leftist terrorists in Honduras. More recent evidence indicates Nicaraguan support for some South American terrorist groups and growing contacts with other international terrorist groups.

Yet, just last week the American congress refused to approve \$14 million for people resisting communist domination of Nicaragua, on the very day that a Sovet ship unloaded more than \$14 million worth of helicopters, East German trucks, and other military cargo at Corinto, the principal port in Nicaragua.

On the very next day, [Daniel] Ortega, the Nicaraguan communist dictator, traveled to Moscow to ask the Soviet Union to make \$200 million available to him to consolidate a Leninist communist dictatorship across a stretch of land which separates South America from North America.

This development in our immediate neighborhood should not be viewed in isolation but as a part of a worldwide process which has already worked in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Let me now give you an insight on how all this happens. In early 1981, I had a talk with Bob Ames, our CIA Middle East expert, who died at the hand of a terrorist attack in Beirut in 1983. Stationed in Aden, South Yemen, in 1967, he met and befriended the young revolutionary Abd'al Fatah Ismail, who became president of South Yemen and is now back in Aden after being exiled briefly to the USSR. Abd'al Fatah told Bob of his experience in the higher Komsomol school which the Soviets maintain for training young revolutionaries from noncommunist countries. He explained that he had been taught in Moscow that he needed 20 years, a generation, to consolidate his revolution.

He would have to control the education of the youth and to uproot and undermine and ultimately change the traditional elements of society. This meant undermining the influence of religion and taking the young away from their parents for education by the state. He was taught that to control the people he would have to establish block committees as a powerful secret police. Finally, Abd'al Fatah spoke in impassioned terms of a need to export revolution to carry out his mission as a dedicated Marxist-Leninist and to ensure that attention was focused on neighboring countries thus diverting attention from his own country and allowing it to consolidate its revolution.

Bob Ames said that as he looked back, Abd'al Fatah — with Soviet Bloc help — had done as he said he would. He captured and subverted a legitimate war of liberation. He killed or drove into exile those members of the movement who believed in democracy and then went about the work of consolidating a communist regime and began armed subversion against Oman and North Yemen.

In Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, and Grenada, dedicated Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries followed this Soviet blueprint with only slight modifications.

Our analysts have studied this blueprint for taking over a government and consolidating a totalitarian regime as it has been exemplified in seven totalitarian regimes; six Marxist-Leninist in Cuba, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Grenada, Nicaragua, and the Islamic revolutionary government of Iran. They have identified 46 indicators of the consolidation of power by a Marxist-Leninist regime. These indicators measure the movement toward one-party government, control of the military, of the security services, of the media, of education, of the economy, the forming or takeover of labor or other mass organizations, exerting social and population control, curbing religious influence and alignment with the Soviet bloc.

Of the 46 indicators, Nicaragua in five and one-half years has accomplished 33. They have established control of the media, taken over radio and TV, censored the broadcasts of Sunday sermons of the Archbishop of Managua, and subjected the only free newspaper, La Prensa, to a brutal daily censorship. They have taken control of the education system. Nicaraguan textbooks now teach Marxism. They attack the tenets of Western democracy. They attack traditional religious teachings and encourage children to maintain revolutionary vigilance by watching for signs of ideological impurities in their neighbors, friends and relatives. The Sandinistas have taken control of the military. They have taken control of the internal secret police and have established a Directorate of State Security. That directorate. according to our reports, has 400 Cubans, 70 Soviets, 40-50 East German and 20-25 Bulgarian advisers. There are Soviet advisers at every level of the secret police. In fact, it is safe to say that it is controlled by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. Block committees have been established to watch and control the people. The church has been persecuted.

Witness the campaign mounted by the Directorate of State Security to harass and embarrass Pope John Paul II during his 1983 visit to Nicaragua. They have used political mobs (similar to the Red Guards of Soviet and Chinese revolutionary history) to attack democratic politicians, union members and religious leaders. And finally, just as Abd'al Fatah told Bob Ames what he must do, and following Hitler and Khrushchev, the Sandinistas have told the world that they would spread the example of Nicaragua beyond El Salvador to Honduras, Guatemala, and the entire region.

An integral part of this blueprint for subversive aggression is deception and disinformation to manipulate and influence public opinion and policies in western countries. This takes many shapes and forms.

A worldwide propaganda campaign has been mounted and carried out on behalf of the Sandinista regime and Salvadoran guerrillas which would not have been possible without the capabilities, the contacts, and the communication channels provided by the Soviet bloc and Cuba. The Sandinistas themselves have shown remarkable ingenuity and skill in projecting disinformation into the United States itself. Perhaps the best example of this is the systematic campaign to deceive well-intentioned members of the western media and of western religious institutions.

There are many examples of Nicaraguan deception. The Sandinista press, radio and government ministry have put out claims that the United States used chemical weapons in Grenada, that the United States was supplying Nicaraguan freedom fighters with drugs, and that the United States might give the opposition bacteriological weapons.

The debate in the Congress disclosed few who think that what is happening in Central America is a desirable state of affairs or that it is compatible with avoiding a possibly permanent impairment of our national security and a serious deterioration in the American geopolitical position in the world.

There are some who will be content with an agreement that the Nicaraguans will now forego further aggression. Our experience in Korea and Indochina provides some lessons on the value of agreements with communist governments. Korea started to violate the Korean Armistice within days of the truce signing

Under the 1973 Paris Accords, North Vietnam agreed to cease firing in South Vietnam, withdraw its forces from Cambodia and Laos, and refrain from introducing additional troops and war materiel into South Vietnam except on a one-for-one replacement basis. North Vietnam never observed the cease-fire and troop withdrawal requirements, and within little more than two months after it had signed the peace agreements it had already infiltrated some 30,000 additional troops and over 30,000 tons of military equipment into South Vietnam.

We believe the Sandinistas' main objectives in regional negotiations are to buy time to further consolidate the regime. History and the record and purposes of Marxist-Leninist regimes in general and the Sandinistas in particular lead us to believe that unless Nicaragua has implemented a genuine democracy as required by the Organization of American States such assurances could not be adequately verified and would not be complied with. Cuban officials have urged the Salvadoran communist guerrillas to slow down their attacks against the Duarte government in order to fortify and consolidate the Nicaraguan revolution. We believe that Cuba has assured the Salvadoran communists that it might take as long as five to 10 years, but as long as the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua remains, that country will serve as a base for communist expansion in the area and the Salva-

doran insurgency will be renewed once the Sandinistas have been able to eliminate the armed resistance.

What does this mean for America's future? Should Central America fall under communist control, it could mean a tidal wave of refugees into the U.S.

Every country that has fallen under communist control since World War II has sent refugees streaming over the borders — first Eastern Europe, then Cuba, and more recently Vietnam and Afghanistan — and the potential influx from Central America is even higher than from any of these. Since 1980, some 200,000 Salvadorans fleeing the communist-initiated violence in their own country have entered the U.S. illegally. Illegal movement from Mexico has increased, with some one million Mexicans illegally entering this country in 1983 alone. In 1984, the Bipartisan Commission on Central America warned that a communist Central America would likely be followed by the destabilization of Mexico and that this could result in many millions of additional Mexicans fleeing into the United States.

Today, the Cuban and Nicaraguan military forces are together four times the size of those of Mexico and are equipped with vastly superior weapons. Today, with armed forces larger and better equipped than the rest of Central America put together, Nicaragua could walk through Costa Rica, which has no army, to Panama, and Cuba can threaten our vital sea lanes in the Caribbean.

The insurgency is a major obstacle to Sandinista consolidation in that it encourages the erosion of active support for the Sandinistas by creating uncertainties about the future of the regime; by challenging its claims of political legitimacy; and by giving hope to the leaders of the political opposition.

The largest anti-Sandinista insurgent group, the FDN, is still providing strong military resistance despite cutoff of United States aid almost a year ago. Popular sympathy for the insurgents appears to be increasing in the countryside, and the FDN continues to receive significant numbers of new recruits.

That opposition can increase the pressure until the Sandinista support has eroded sufficiently to leave them no option other than modification of their rejection of internal reconciliation. The objective is to allow for the same process of democratization that is taking place in the rest of Central America to occur in Nicaragua.