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FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137147	MEMO	ROBERT OAKLEY TO MR. ARMACOST RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R 9/22/2017 M442/1</i>	5	7/22/1986	B1
137148	MEMO	FISCHMAN TO DISTRIBUTION LIST RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COMMITTEE (INCLUDES ATTACHED -PROPOSAL) <i>R 10/14/2016 M442/1</i>	10	4/26/1985	B1
137149	MEMO	RODNEY MCDANIEL TO NICHOLAS PLATT RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R 10/14/2016 M442/1</i>	2	7/10/1986	B1
137150	PAPER	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R 9/22/2017 M442/1</i>	5	ND	B1
137151	MEMO	MARVIN STONE TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE IIC WORKING GROUP <i>R 10/14/2016 M442/1</i>	4	7/17/1986	B1
137152	CABLE	221851Z JUL 86 <i>R 1/20/2015 M442/1</i>	2	7/22/1986	B1
137153	CABLE	KINGSTON 07204 <i>R 10/14/2016 M442/1</i>	4	7/23/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CC: Craig Coy
Howard Kuehn
Elaine Morton

Editorial 0-1992 (4LY30)

July 19, 1986

THIS SIDE OF PARADISE

Anncr:

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

Voice:

"Libya now is paradise." That's what Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi told his countrymen last month. But his audience may have difficulty finding paradise in the food shortages and empty store shelves they now confront. Until recently, Libyans enjoyed the benefits of their country's most plentiful resource, petroleum. For most of the last decade, oil revenues financed Gadhafi's schemes and subversions, as well as a higher standard of living. But this year less than four billion dollars worth of oil revenues are expected -- about half of last year's income. Shrinking revenues mean Gadhafi must choose between adventurism abroad or providing for his own people. He seems to be making the wrong choice.

"Local production must be exported," Gadhafi said last month, in a three-hour long, often incoherent speech. "State resources must be used for the construction of factories and the purchase of weapons." To people who are finding it difficult to buy the necessities of life, Gadhafi suggested that each Libyan should pay six hundred dollars to his local revolutionary committee so that enough money will be collected to buy rifles for one million people. Gadhafi's vision of Libyan paradise, however, is more than guns and no butter. In his June 12th speech, the Colonel urged Libyans to return to the past. Instead of a cash economy, he said, "I suggest to you barter....As for money, we no longer need it." Libya's three and one half million people are meant to retreat into economic isolation and self-sufficiency. "Whoever eats European food, he is eating a forbidden food," said Gadhafi.

The United States government has begun a program of economic sanctions, prohibiting American companies from trading with Libya -- and we have

encouraged other industrial countries to adopt sanctions of their own. These measures are not meant to harm the Libyan people, but to reduce Gadhafi's ability to sponsor terrorism. Libya's oil revenues may be dropping -- but they are still more than enough to assure a good standard of living for the Libyan people.

Unfortunately, the man who disposes of Libya's oil wealth -- Moammar Gadhafi -- is more concerned with promoting subversion abroad than satisfaction at home.

Anncr:

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

7/23

Date

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TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
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 FILE _____

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Ambassador Oakley asked that I send you the enclosed materials.

There is a possibility the Armacost meeting originally scheduled for tomorrow may be postponed.

Also, FYI, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (chaired by Rep. Mica) is holding a hearing this afternoon with Bernie Kalb and Gerry Helman on Public Diplomacy as a followup to last week's with USIA's Stone. (see attached wireless file report).

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
Mike Kraft S/CT	2236
<i>MK</i>	Phone No. 7633

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137147



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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S/S

July 22, 1986

TO: P - Mr. Armacost

FROM: S/CT - Robert B. Oakley *ROO*

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy on Counter-terrorism:
Your Meeting on July 24

REF: McDaniel-Platt Memo of July 10

The issues raised in the July 10 NSC memo and by the Miller report (the need for more resources for public diplomacy on counter-terrorism and the appointment of a high level coordinator) are not new. They are generally consistent with the work we have been doing through the IG/T and with the recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism although the Miller report calls for what I consider to be excessive resources. The questions which need to be addressed are 1) what are the necessary minimum resources to meet the demands, given the current budgetary restraints, and where to obtain them; 2) how to utilize these resources for the most effective program, and how to integrate that program with ongoing diplomatic efforts; and 3) selection and organizational location of an able coordinator. Lack of resolution of these issues has impeded progress in public diplomacy on counterterrorism.

Yes Oakley complains of not having enough people....

Background

Recognizing that more attention to public affairs was necessary for the counter-terrorism effort, the IG/T and the International Information Committee (IIC), chaired by USIA, jointly established in early 1985 the Public Diplomacy Working Group (PDWG). It was to serve both the IIC and the IG/T. (See Tab A). All agencies participating in the IG/T and IIC were invited to participate (including the NSC), but the only active interest came from USIA, State (PA and S/CT) and DOD. During 1985 the PDWG drew up its organizational plan and developed its coordinating mechanisms. It was clear from the beginning that none of the agencies was willing to dedicate enough resources for a concentrated

slam at NSC....

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BY *HW* NARA DATE *9/22/17*

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effort. Nonetheless, the PDWG did a fair job at mobilizing the resources and coordinating efforts of the separate agencies both generally and in its first major campaign: the effort to convince Americans and other countries of recent Libyan culpability, explain the bombing raid and capitalize on the anti-Libyan decisions of the EC and Summit Seven (see memo to George High at Tab B). However, the importance attached to the effort prompted other agencies (and bureaus) to try to seize control of public diplomacy against terrorism. The Libyan campaign inspired the NSC (Raymond) interest, prompted the Miller report and the July 10 memorandum, as well as the separate high-level USIA interest, which prompted the sixty-day special effort, ideas on long-term reorganization, and claims of USIA success to Congress and the media. true was.

During the discussion within the Department in the fall of 1985 on resources proposed for the supplemental to implement the Inman recommendations. We requested three additional positions to strengthen this office and the IG/T's public affairs effort. We were turned down because M/COMP decided new public affairs resources were to be allocated to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security which could handle counter-terrorism, as well. This did not happen. We subsequently developed a proposal that included a deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large to handle public and Congressional affairs and serve as Coordinator of the PDWG -- in response to the importance of the public affairs effort and the recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force for more effective coordination. This was turned down for reasons of bureaucratic considerations -- that there should be consistency in size and rank structure of staff for the offices of all Ambassadors-at-Large, as well as the policy of cutting back on senior positions generally. ✓

David Miller looked at the public affairs problems of counter-terrorism, primarily in the light of his experience in setting up the South African public affairs effort and to a lesser degree looking at the Otto Reich effort. He concluded that there is a need for major additional resources and a senior director. I believe his recommendations are impractical, first, in terms of the amount of resources he suggests, given current budget constraints; and second in terms of its relation to the inter-agency process. State's concentrated public affairs efforts on Central America and South Africa both had primarily a domestic focus; for counter-terrorism, the most

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important focus of the public affairs effort is working with the foreign audience to develop a better understanding of the international terrorism threat and the importance of strong, joint actions by all concerned states. Close collaboration for the long-term and especially in so many fast-breaking situations between State, USIA and other agencies is more important for the counter-terrorism effort than was the case for either of the other two efforts. It is also extremely important to closely integrate the effort with the regional specialists in S/CT and the regional bureaus. This would obviate the need for full-time regional specialists as recommended by Miller.

The NSC memo and recent activity by USIA points up the continued existence of a disconnect by State between the policy priority it assigns counterterrorism and the ability to provide the resources required to fulfill adequately its lead agency role. Over the long term, if we are not able to do the job, others will try to take it over.

We are working on an updated analysis of objectives, operational considerations and techniques for the PDWG, based upon the past eight months of experience. However, this need not and should not delay agreement upon a reinforced effort. Given the unexpected public hyping of the issue, and the Congressional hearings, we need to move fast. It is my judgment that the NSC, USIA and PA will agree to the above course of action; and that it should not be a serious problem for the M area since there are no permanent changes in the S/CT staffing pattern. This latter issue can be addressed after Jerry Bremer is aboard and everyone has had a chance to review operations of the Public Diplomacy effort after it has been reinforced.

? ←

Issues for Consideration

- A. At your meeting on July 24, I believe your objectives should be to:
- 1) reassert State's lead role in combatting terrorism and the related public diplomacy effort;
 - 2) strengthen the role of the Public Diplomacy Working Group as the focus of the inter-agency public affairs programs for counter-terrorism through expanded and higher level participation;
- ?

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- 3) secure recognition that resource constraints on each agency make the establishment of the heavy structure recommended by David Miller impractical at this time; and
- 4) obtain agreement by other offices and agencies therefore to allocate emergency resources to the PDWG on an interim basis for the concentrated effort directed by the NSC in its July 10 memo. ?

B. You might also suggest the following interim measures, pending decisions on permanent resources and organization:

- State appoints a qualified over-complement officer from the SFS with experience in public speaking as new full-time Chairman of the PDWG, working for the Ambassador-at-Large. S/CT and PA should initially each designate an officer to spend at least half of his/her time on the PDWG. OO Part-timer never do the job!
- The NSC directs USIA and DOD to appoint one person each as full-time members of the PDWG, and physically locate them in State. OO
- NSC has CIA appoint a full-time officer in charge of psychological counter-terrorism operations who will also be liaison with the PDWG and participate actively in its endeavors and those of DOD (as originally agreed last year when the PDWG was organized and recommended again by Miller). something does need to be done in this area...
- H, PA and the regional bureaus should all designate liaison officers to the PDWG and agree to coordinate public diplomacy efforts relating to counter-terrorism with the PDWG (on occasion the regional bureaus have resisted the IG/T coordinated effort). OO
- That other agencies, particularly Justice (or the FBI) and Transportation (or the FAA) also appoint liaison offices.

Attachments:

- Tab A - PDWG Program
- Tab B - Memo to George High on Libyan Public Affairs Activities
- Tab C - NSC Memo of July 10

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while I agree & sympathize w/ Oakley's assessment of the problem, his solution sucks. It is not a solution, but a temporary patch job... which won't help all that much initially and will fall apart completely after 3 months....

State's traditional solution -- get NSC to direct other agencies to give us people....

Drafted by: S/CT:RBOakley:ms
7/22/86 647-9892

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D C 20547

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~



April 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: USIA P/G - JAFischman *JAF*

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
COMMITTEE - Proposal for Structure and
Organization

Attached is the version of the proposal which is being distributed to the IIC and the I/GT.

It is time to constitute the actual Public Diplomacy Committee under the direction of State M/CTP and put it to work in developing a strategy and action plan. Any remaining concerns on the draft can be worked out as we proceed with that next phase.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank all of you for your patience, assistance and thoughtful perspectives. You have provided a lot of the fine tuning that will be essential for the ultimate success of this effort.

DISTRIBUTION:

State:

M/CT - Ambassador Borg
M/CTP - Mr. Campbell
S/P - Col. Paddock
INR - Mr. Heichler
PA - Mr. McCarthy
PA/PRS - Ms. Ascher

Defense:

JSOA-OJCS - Col. Yon
DOD/DUSP - Mr. Warren
DOD/OSD - Ltc. McHugh

USIA:

P - Mr. Courtney
P - Mr. Schneider
P/G - Mr. Berg
P/G - Mr. Romerstein

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Classified by: P - Charles E. Courtney
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BY *RW* NARA DATE 10/14/11

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INTERAGENCY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COMMITTEE TO SUPPORT COMBATTING TERRORISM
PROPOSAL FOR STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

This is a proposal for the creation of an interagency committee to develop a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy to combat terrorism and coordinate its implementation by the respective responsible agencies. The basic and most important purpose of this comprehensive public diplomacy strategy would be to generate greater global understanding of the threat from terrorism and states which support it and the importance of intensive efforts, including practical action plans, to resist that threat.

Although the precise status and authority for the committee remain to be determined, it should be responsive to both the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), operating under authority of NSDD 30 (Managing Terrorist Incidents), and the International Information Committee (IIC) and its parent body the Senior Planning Group (SPG), operating under authority of NSDD 77 (Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security).

CHAIR: State M/CT

MEMBER AGENCIES: NSC, State, USIA, DOD/OSD, JCS/JSOA, DOJ.

FOUR WORKING GROUPS:

- International Information
- Incident Management
- Domestic Public Affairs
- Psychological Operations

FUNCTIONS:

- Develop a comprehensive USG public diplomacy strategy and implementation plan. (One specific feature of the plan will be a lexicon referring to acts of terrorism that would bring consistency to all USG statements and materials and deny any status of legitimacy to the criminal acts of terrorists.)
- Develop a continuing coordinated interagency public diplomacy policy advisory capability, to provide informed advice on contingency planning and future policy concerns, providing the public diplomacy dimension for options under consideration.

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Classified by: P - Charles E. Courtney
Declassify: OADR

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/14/16

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-Provide leadership to ensure ongoing coordinated implementation of counterterrorism public diplomacy by all involved agencies.

-Develop and implement a reporting mechanism on progress and impact.

In its first phase, the committee will assume responsibility for drafting a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy and action plan covering the four areas of international information, incident management, domestic public affairs and psychological operations, each of which will culminate in a separate working group to ensure continuous effective interagency coordination and implementation. The committee itself will provide the leadership to ensure that these four specific functions interrelate for mutual reinforcement and maximum sharing of information and materials.

The public diplomacy strategy and action plan is intended to define planning needs for greater coordination and collaboration in the respective agencies' public diplomacy efforts by defining public diplomacy objectives and themes and assigning responsibility for and monitoring all phases of implementation. It will examine and, where appropriate, recommend refinements of existing efforts as well as propose new initiatives and actions.

Once the strategy document has been approved and the plan put into effect, the committee will continue in an oversight function, providing active leadership for the planning, coordination, and implementation of counterterrorism public diplomacy efforts. The committee will continue to meet periodically to ensure coordination among the four working groups and provide status reporting to the NSC and member agencies.

The committee will develop a private sector liaison and an intelligence liaison capability to ensure access to appropriate data and advice from those two sectors. These two functions are described in greater detail at the end of this document.

Descriptions of the four working groups follow.

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION

Involved agencies: USIA P/G Lead; USIA VOA, State M/CT, NSC, DOD/OSD, State S/P, JCS/JSOA.

Target Publics: Foreign elites, particularly those in a position to influence attitudes and policy on dealing with terrorism, and general (informed) audiences. A more elaborate description of attitudes and perceptions for different countries and portions of the world will be needed as an early step in the planning process.

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Objectives:

Stimulate the international community toward a determination to cooperate actively in combatting threats and acts of terrorism by:

-portraying terrorism as an ultimate denial of human rights and a dangerous destabilizing force of urgent global concern, which is threatening the fundamental order and structure of nations and society;

-publicizing, as appropriate, international vigilance against terrorist acts and successful prosecution of terrorist perpetrators;

Encourage greater understanding and acceptance of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

Mobilize global and specifically targeted condemnation of transnational-and state-supported terrorism and state-sanctioned violation of the rule of law to serve notice to the offending states and terrorist networks that the eventual costs of such acts far outweigh the perceived immediate benefits.

Counter hostile and confusing propaganda.

Functions:

Review existing public policy pertaining to all aspects of current efforts to combat terrorism with particular sensitivity toward the overseas public ramifications of policy alternatives under active consideration. Make recommendations for new initiatives and refinement.

Commission public opinion survey research in selected countries. Make recommendations based on survey results.

Review all media products, exchange programs and other public affairs activities currently under way supporting this effort. Make recommendations for new initiatives.

Review existing data sources which can contribute to public understanding of the threat of terrorism. Identify documents and data from intelligence collections and research which can be sanitized and/or declassified. Examples of useful material are terrorism trends and totals and psychological profiles of terrorist groups and their leadership.

Review all appropriate international fora where this issue has been or should be discussed publicly. Make recommendations for new initiatives and fora.

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Prepare further recommendations which take into account the full range of public diplomacy tools and give consideration to:

- encouraging NGO writings in journals with impact abroad, e.g. Reader's Digest, major newswEEKlies, centrist and left-centrist foreign journals;
- encouraging public activities by anti-terrorism, human rights, legal and judicial organizations;
- considering possible series by VOA and/or TV for censure of terrorists and their supporters, including tangible sanctions under consideration -- economic, diplomatic, political -- and how these might be publicized to U.S. advantage;
- developing lines of cooperation (through embassies) among governments which lay groundwork for assignment of respective information/public diplomacy initiatives for parallel and mutually reinforcing activities.

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Membership: State M/CT Lead; State/PA, USIA P/G, USIA VOA, NSC, DOD/OSD, State S/P, JCS/JSOA, DOJ.

Target Publics: Media and publics in immediate environment of incident. Critical also in communicating with incident perpetrators.

Objective:

Update existing public affairs guidelines for implementation during overseas crisis situations and augment them with a tactical plan to provide public affairs incident management capability during periods immediately following overseas terrorist incidents of concern to the official USG presence in a given country. Develop a rapid reaction public affairs incident management capability that would:

- assure that all official public statements are geared toward facilitating resolution of the incident;
- take into consideration the effect of USG public statements on the perpetrators and their supporters;
- maximize the possibility for improving bilateral relations with the country where the incident is occurring or in any country connected in some way with the incident.

Functions:

Review existing public affairs guidelines, recommending refinements. Once adopted, the revised guidelines would become the operational basis for the public affairs incident management capability which would convert into a tactical incident management mode in the event of a terrorist incident functioning as a component part of the crisis management team. This capability would provide quick public affairs management and guidance, adjusting its tactical approach to match the substantive realities of the incident.

The guidelines would also assure that embassies and other need-to-know users are fully apprised and equipped to implement effective public affairs in the absence of communication with Washington, particularly during the critical 24-hour period immediately following an incident, when specific public affairs guidance may not be available to the involved embassy/ies.

In times of crises involving terrorists, where lives are at stake, effective coordination is critical. While the working group would have the function of developing public affairs guidance and would expect responsiveness from official USG spokesmen in Washington or at embassies overseas, it would not supersede their role of dealing with the public media. The crisis management team, including the public affairs component, would have no direct contact with the press.

The working group would continue in an advisory capacity as well, recommending continuing refinements to the IGT as experience indicates.

DOMESTIC PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Involved agencies: State PA Lead, State M/CT, White House (Spokesman's Office), DOD/OSD, USIA (observer)

Objectives:

Domestic public affairs programming should:

- increase American public awareness of terrorism and the threat it poses to international order and U.S. interests;
- enhance public understanding of U.S. counterterrorism policy;
- build support among informed publics and Congress for the Administration's counterterrorism policy and legislative proposals.

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Target Publics: Domestic U.S. media, target groups concerned with:

-regions of the world in which terrorism is likely to occur (e.g., ethnic groups concerned especially with the middle East and Latin America, such as the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, and groups concerned with security issues for the same areas);

-U.S. national security (e.g., major university-affiliated groups such as Georgetown's CSIS; major think tanks; related expert groups such as the Association of Former Intelligence Officers; or advocacy groups with wide public and Congressional contacts such as the Coalition of Peace Through Strength (300,000 members), or the American Conservative Union (400,000 members), the Veterans of Foreign Wars, etc.);

-law enforcement, both for terrorism and related fields such as narcotics control (e.g., National Association of Attorneys General, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the American Federation of Police, etc.); and

-international banking, business, and transportation. The interests of such groups (e.g., American Banking Association, National Association of Corporate Directors, Flight Safety Association, Airport Security Council, etc.) are affected by terrorist attacks against Americans working or traveling abroad.

U.S. Public Opinion:

Recent opinion poll data on terrorism is limited. However, in a January 1984 Roper poll, nearly three-fourths of the respondents agreed in principle with actions such as "spying" and "quick" strikes to protect clear-cut U.S. interests abroad.

Public awareness of the terrorism issue is high, particularly during major episodes, but media attention and public interest diminishes rather quickly afterward. Interest among specialists in the subject and those affected by it is more stable, however, and our principal programming, at least initially, should be directed in a coordinated manner toward groups which are 1) generally supportive of Administration national security policy, 2) involved in the issues from a theoretical or law enforcement standpoint, and 3) affected directly or indirectly by terrorism.

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Functions:

Favorable editorial opinion is an important element of public persuasion; so far, however, editorial opinion on counterterrorism policy has been mixed.

Consequently:

Special attention should be paid to editorial writers, which PA can do through in-house media/diplomat briefings and editorial "direct lines," as appropriate. In such briefings, editors of magazines such as Congressional Quarterly and National Journal should be included. In addition, attention should be paid to editorial writers in regional areas, which can be done through "direct lines" and briefings of local media and editorial writers, as appropriate, by speakers visiting those areas.

To secure national coverage, central office backgrounders with Copley, Scripps-Howard, and Hearst chains and, whenever possible, on-the-record "exclusives" with other major newspaper groups such as Gannett and Newhouse should be sought.

As circumstances warrant, we may want to place senior officials on major TV and radio programs such as Nightline, McNeil-Lehrer, 20-20, All Things Considered, etc., following terrorist attacks and also during periods of Congressional activity on the subject.

-State/PA will continue to print major U.S. policy statements and testimony by State Department officials in conjunction with M/CT and others. Publication series such as GISTs should be updated as appropriate and a basic reference piece on the subject developed as quickly as possible.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Involved agencies: DOD/OSD Lead; JCS/JSOA, CIA, DOJ, State M/CT, State S/P, NSC, State INR, USIA P/G.

Target Publics: Adversary military forces and related foreign terrorist groups, their host populations and other selected foreign target audiences.

Objective:

Develop guidelines and mechanisms for implementation in military and paramilitary conflict that would facilitate carefully focused overt peacetime PSYOP media messages designed either to deter incidents

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abroad, deny terrorists their desired projected self-image to the world and support CJTF assault force operations.

Functions:

- Recommend proposed national-level overt peacetime PSYOP objectives to the IGT and the IIC for NSC approval, as appropriate;
- Develop and coordinate specific foreign PSYOP campaign plans for specific terrorist groups designed to reduce their support based on prioritized guidance;
- Develop ongoing guidelines based on relevant intelligence information for initiatives aimed at host foreign populations.
- Coordinate closely with psychology of terrorism specialists (with support from Intelligence Liaison and Private Sector Advisory) to determine methodologies for developing and communicating messages to specific foreign target audiences.
- Develop mechanisms to assure that timely and pertinent elements of overt peacetime PSYOP intelligence information are utilized during development and maintenance of campaign plans.
- Develop a coordinating mechanism with the incident management subgroup to advise and render overt peacetime PSYOP assistance aimed at successful resolution of an incident.
- Provide support to such contingency planning as may be conducted for the deterrence or preemption of terrorist incidents.

PRIVATE SECTOR LIAISON

The committee's functions will include a private sector liaison mechanism for systematic access to private sector research and expertise. This mechanism will be designed:

- to establish and maintain continuing liaison between the USG public diplomacy community and private sector (individual and institutional) interests, including the recently appointed Overseas Security Advisory Panel, involved in the effort to combat international terrorism;
- to establish a reservoir of private sector expertise for programs and initiatives;

-to provide for regular interchange of information between the private sector and public diplomacy agencies on developments and trends and the findings of private sector research;

-to recommend new research initiatives; and

-to assist with co-sponsorship and organization of international visitor exchange, conferencing, publication and other media product development and media liaison.

Private sector assistance will also be valuable in identifying potential authors for original material and experts who can travel as American Participants for overseas programs and perform as principals in USIA's electronic media programming and DOD public affairs outreach.

Strong consideration should be given to the early convening of a "closed-door/in-house" conference with private sector (academic, media, corporate) interests to provide a structured substantive exchange of information and lay the groundwork for a continuing active working relationship. Guidelines for this meeting would have to be tightly drawn in advance.

SPECIAL LIAISON GROUP

The special liaison group, would operate with State/INR coordination and be composed of a limited and specialized membership experienced in the public diplomacy/intelligence liaison function. It would serve as a link to the intelligence community, perform an ongoing function in identifying materials that can be used as public items and advising, as appropriate, specific directions for the four functional working groups. In implementation, the group would function along lines similar to the Interagency Soviet Active Measures Working Group, which also operates under INR leadership.

Membership: State/INR Lead, State M/CT, USIA P/G, others as needed.

Functions:

-Assure effective coordination and cooperation with existing information gathering and reporting, such as identifying useful documents and other available information which can be declassified or sanitized for public dissemination.

-Stimulate possible new areas of activity needed for effective support of the four functional aspects of the plan, particularly (but not limited to) the development of psychological profiles of terrorist leaders and/or groups, and the gathering of reliable information on state-supported terrorism and other transnational networks.

July 17, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

TO: PA - George B. High
FROM: S/CT - Robert B. Oakley
SUBJECT: Information on Counter-Terrorism Public Diplomacy
Working Group

Attached is the requested data for the hearing. I
assume you'll keep in touch regarding the testimony.

INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COMMITTEE

A. INCEPTION

1. Established in April 1985.
2. Originated by the IIC and the Senior Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) ?
3. The primary mission is to generate greater understanding of the threat from terrorism and states which support it and the importance of efforts to resist that threat. It is an important reinforcement for conventional diplomatic efforts, since experience has shown that public pressure is often the best means of changing government policies.

B. DIRECTION/COMPOSITION

1. The Committee is chaired by S/CT. Ambassador Parker Borg, deputy Director of S/CT, is the chairman.

There are several subworking groups: International Information, chaired by USIA (Joel Fischman); Incident Management, chaired by S/CT (Michael Kraft); Domestic Public Affairs, chaired by PA, (Joanna Martin) and DOD Information programs (Al Paddock).

2. Agencies represented are NSC, State, USIA, DOD/OSD, JCS/JSOA, CIA, DOJ.

3. It is a permanent standing committee, which helps develop and coordinate policy and action.

C. IMPLEMENTATION/COORDINATION

1. The group generally originates its own taskings, develops themes and strategies for communicating them. The taskings have primarily been to State, USIA and DOD, and from time to time to CIA or DIA for background material which can be used for unclassified documents. The channels for communicating themes range from speeches and talking point material prepared for White House and other Executive Branch officials to USIA activities, publications and speeches.

2. Actions/recommendations are: coordinated with the White House and NSC as needed as well as with PA and regional bureaus of State.

3. Coordinating mechanism: meetings and clearance of documents.

When is the last time the Incident Mgt subgroups met?

D. EFFECTIVENESS

1. It is not realistic to measure effectiveness by quantity of publications or contacts. Attitudes of governments and publics overseas are influenced by a variety of factors, including natural reactions against terrorist atrocities, conventional diplomatic efforts, concern about lost tourism and investments and reactions to actual or potential military activities. Countering terrorism requires a persistent effort over a long term using a variety of tools. Public diplomacy is an important tool, especially on an accumulative, persistent basis.

-- Recent USIA surveys indicate European public attitudes as well as government positions are increasingly supportive of stronger stands against terrorism and that the opposition to US military action is decreasing. There is no doubt that the cumulative impact of our public diplomacy effort has played a major role in this change.

-- Specific strategies were worked for the President's announcement of tightened sanctions against Libya, Mr. Whitehead's trip to Europe in January, the April raid itself and USG follow-up actions. This includes a just-completed 60-day action plan to counter Libya.

- a. About half a dozen publications have emerged specifically from the Public Diplomacy working group effort, including January's "White paper" on Libya, several shorter papers, a pamphlet on U.S. policy against paying ransom, and chronologies and data sheets.

→ haven't seen this...

- Another half a dozen speeches and/or Congressional testimony statements on terrorism were edited and reprinted via PA for distribution, and contributions were made to the Vice President's Task Force paper which was later published in unclassified form. .
- Several other mini-white papers are in the "pipeline" but the research, clearing of classified material for use, writing, and editing has been severely hampered by the lack of manpower.

OO

- b. At least 300 speeches have been given by Administration officials and associates, such as former officials and consultants working closely with S/CT.
 - Foreign journalists, including television, and visitors have received high priority. The Foreign Press center hosted a major day-long Seminar on July 9. World net and the foreign press center have held more than half a dozen interview sessions on terrorism, with participants including the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, Ambassador Oakley, and others. In addition, S/CT has provided briefings for about half a dozen groups of foreign journalists and officials visiting the US under USIA programs and has provided individual interviews and briefings to about 30 foreign writers this year alone. Numerous meetings/briefings and packets of background material also were provided for US journalists.
 - A specific effort was made to incorporate Public Diplomacy themes into press guidance as appropriate.
- c. No specific visual material has been produced yet due to lack of staff, but USIA is working on one and another is in discussion stage with PA.
- d. About half a dozen briefings have been held for members of Congress, their staff and another half a dozen speakers have been provided at the request of members for their constituent groups.
 - Talking points and background material have been provided to members of Congress meeting with foreign counterparts or traveling to Europe.
 - Briefings and material have been provided to some non-government organizations interested in terrorism, such as the Airline Pilots Association. Efforts to reach out and initiate contacts with other groups with overseas links, however, have been hampered by lack of resources.

2. Accomplishments.

- a. Congress: A public diplomacy effort was made primarily by S/CT and L, including use of op ed articles, to obtain Senate Foreign Relations Committee approval of the UK Supplemental Extradition Treaty. (The Treaty is awaiting floor action.) Speech and other background material has been used by some members. Efforts have been made

to help make sure foreign journalists and governments were made aware of the strong Congressional demand calls for vigorous anti-terrorism actions and closer cooperation with the U.S. by NATO and other countries, including in the civil aviation and maritime security field.

- b. Foreign governments: see response to D 1. In addition, the Public Diplomacy effort helped publicize and promote actions taken by the Tokyo Summit Seven meeting and the EC Foreign Ministers with a view to encouraging follow up actions by other governments.
- c. Other accomplishments include initiating and publicizing the U.N. Security Council resolution last year condemning the taking of hostages, and UN Security Council President statements condemning specific acts. The UN General Assembly resolution condemning terrorism as criminal acts also was publicized as part of the effort to underscore the theme that terrorism is unacceptable.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 10, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy on Counter Terrorism (U)

Following discussion with the Interagency Group on Terrorism, we asked Ambassador David Miller to undertake a detailed study of our current public diplomacy efforts on counter terrorism and to make recommendations for how these efforts can be strengthened. His report is attached at Tab A. (S)

After extensive consultations with State and other agencies, Miller concluded that there is a fundamental weakness in our approach to public diplomacy on this subject because we have not devoted sufficient personnel and resources to the issue. The NSC shares the recommendation that we must make a significant manpower commitment to this effort somewhat along the lines of the "Otto Reich" team. We should put this interagency public diplomacy team directly under the command and control of the IG/T. Moreover, we need to identify a top-flight coordinator, and have assigned to him personnel on detail from the key participating agencies including State, USIA, and DoD, to staff this office on a full-time basis. (S)

We are less concerned about the actual structure and organization of the public diplomacy office, because that should follow the appointment of the key coordinator and his staff. Clearly, the Miller report will be a helpful document for the new coordinator to consider. The selection of the coordinator, however, will be critical. (S)

The coordinator should be of ambassadorial rank, possess a creative flair and a background in effective interagency coordination. Previous experience in the NSC and in European affairs would also be most helpful for the candidate. I think we should seek to identify and bring on board the coordinator and his team immediately. (S)

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We would appreciate your earliest attention to this subject and your reaction to the Miller report. (U)



Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A - Ambassador Miller's Report

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Public Diplomacy on Counter Terrorism

The "public diplomacy" efforts to win support for the President's counter-terrorism activities are mired in an inefficient and confusing series of inter-agency committees, with virtually no dedicated resources. Not surprisingly, little besides committee memoranda has been produced. While public support in the United States for the President's policies remains high, this is apparently not the case in Europe and the Middle East where the attack on Libya highlighted the different opinions on counter-terrorism held among countries whose friendship and cooperation we value.

The paper proceeds on the basis that (1) we are "at war" with a range of state-supported terrorists who share a common objective of destroying the influence of the United States; (2) we must develop a political philosophy and campaign to counter the terrorist message; (3) we cannot continue on the present course of inter-agency committees which is both inefficient, ineffective, and potentially embarrassing; and (4) we must dedicate a limited amount of human and financial resources, as has been done on other public diplomacy efforts, if we wish to see any real progress.

The War With Terrorism

While there are many terrorist organizations, if we focus on state-supported terrorism with radical Arab sponsorship or Soviet surrogate sponsorship, I believe that we are in a protracted struggle with enemies who share a broad philosophic objective and political strategy. Presumably this strategy is built around discrediting and eventually rendering impotent the United States/Western coalition -- at least in the Middle East, if not the world as a whole -- based on the well-recognized themes of decadence, imperialism, exploitation, Zionism, and so on.

The violent incident on which we tend to focus is simply a tool to advance their political objectives. If the violent incident "goes well" for the terrorist, the attendant media coverage will focus on the "justifiable political grievances" of the terrorists and not on the brutal, illegal behavior of psychopathic, anti-social individuals.

For us to win this struggle we must be actively advancing our ideology of the non-violent resolution of social conflict, typically within a democratic, market-oriented framework. While the ability to respond to the violent incident is imperative, we have probably focussed a disproportionate share of our resources on military response and not enough on "selling" our positions to Europe, the Islamic world, and our own public.

I am not sanguine that we are winning this struggle. While we have had covert success and responded forcefully to Libya, it is arguable that the terrorists are obtaining their overall objective of reducing American presence in the world. The "hardening" of our Embassies with attendant expense, the reduction of

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official personnel, increasing restrictions on personal movement of officials abroad all leave the image of a society on the defensive, threatened and insecure. Our private sector increasingly mirrors this image. Thus, even if we are coming closer to winning the incident struggle, the terrorists' objectives of reducing our presence, limiting our influence and distancing us from allies is arguably succeeding.

The "Public Diplomacy" Response

Public diplomacy in its broadest sense, as it must be pursued in this case, is the coordinated efforts of all agencies of our government to win public support at home and abroad for a particular policy. It includes assets in State, USIS, DOD, CIA, and the NSC. Some are obvious (speakers programs), some are not (videotapes of terrorist leaders).

It is ineffective, inefficient, and dangerous, to say nothing of exhausting, to try to win an effort of this importance and magnitude through four inter-agency committees with no dedicated personnel or resources. After more than a year of memos and meetings, four inter-agency committees (Public Affairs, Incident Management, Information, and PSYOPS) have been established whose primary output appears to be paper and meetings. A good deal of thoughtful time and effort has been put into this effort, frequently by people whose primary responsibilities have been exhausting, but the end result remains the same -- not much.

In addition, as we move towards implementation of some public diplomacy program, it is dangerous to leave responsibility in the hands of "inter-agency" committees. The subject matter is too delicate.

The current committee structure is confusing. Assets (PSYOPS) and sub-problems (Incident Management) appear as committees. Assuming that it is possible to obtain a few full-time people and financial resources, the committee structures should be recognized. I support the new organization.

In designing an organization it is useful to remember that form should follow function, and that with counter-terrorism we have very distinct "customer groups" for whom messages will have to be carefully crafted.

Thus at the outset let us focus on function. That is to say, to what customers are selling our product.

The American Public and Leadership

We need to maintain the broad public support for the President's recent initiatives, translate that into specific legislative objectives as required, and develop mechanisms to maintain the support for a sustained effort. Without domestic public support all else eventually comes to a halt. It cannot be taken for

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granted, particularly where the struggle will involve covert successes which cannot be publicized versus the occasional public setback which will certainly get media attention.

Western Europe

The recent exercise in Libya certainly highlighted the problem of public support, or lack thereof, for our counter-terrorist efforts. The costs to Mrs. Thatcher appear to have been, at least temporarily, high and the damage to American public perception of European allies is serious. We need to have a country-specific program -- developed in conjunction with each Embassy -- to ensure that President Reagan's counter-terrorism statement is understood not only by the broad public but by key leadership groups. How do we move the perception of the President from John Wayne to Socrates, thoughtfully defending Western values?

The Moderate Islamic Community

Many of our moderate Middle Eastern friends, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco -- to say nothing of Indonesia, Nigeria, and other non-Middle East Islamic states -- are caught in what they perceive as a virtually inescapable "political box." If the terrorists appear to be anti-Zionist, Moslem fundamentalists, refugee camp orphans supported by "fellow Islamic states," and our policy appears to generally be anti-Arab/Islamic, how do they support us -- publicly or privately? We must work hard to find ideological common ground, and get that message to the publics in these countries as well as the States.

The Hostile Islamic Countries

In hostile Islamic countries, "public diplomacy" is simply another tool in the struggle -- usefully viewed as the least violent notice to another sovereign entity that we find their conduct unacceptable. It is important for the long run defusing of the terrorist situation, that the body politics, or the elites of states that support terrorism, understand why we oppose terrorism and what the cost to them will be if their country continues to support terrorists. Libya, Syria, Zion, Palestinian camps (?), (to say nothing of Nicaragua) should be the targets of a concentrated effort to get this message out.

Soviet, Eastern Block, and China

As part of a long-run effort to get the facts to the general Soviet public, information on their government's training of terrorists should be included on RFE, VOA, and other channels. A special effort should be made to reach the Bloc countries, to explain to their populations and leadership groups how the Soviets are using them, thus damaging their image in the rest of the world, and limiting their acceptance among the community of actions.

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It is possible that this also is a subject in which the Chinese card could be usefully played.

The Organization

If we are going to pursue a public diplomacy strategy on counter-terrorism, we are going to have to devote people and resources. It cannot be won with a seamless web of inter-agency committees directed by a part-time, over-extended "Director of Public Diplomacy." This should come as no surprise as the two previous public diplomacy efforts -- Central America and South Africa -- have both required people and money.

What organizational structure fits our objectives? What structure will give us accountability for programs, plans, use of assets, and success or failure. I would recommend the following structure which would provide the guidance, strategy, hands-on management of the wide range of assets existing in the existing committee structure and throughout the government. (See attached chart.)

enough → Comments on the chart may be helpful. The organization will take five to ten full-time professionals who know their region and public diplomacy, secretarial and administrative support, office space, and a budget of \$500,000. Many of the players can be loaned from State or USIS or DOD or CIA for a year on non-reimbursable details. The State Department, as the lead agency, must provide office space, administrative support, and salaries for the "non-detailees." The research requirements would be principally undertaken by the major participating agencies under tasking from the Public Diplomacy Staff.


✓ The covert side must be completely separated from the overt public diplomacy efforts. For a wide range of reasons, including security, philosophic incompatibility, somewhat different objectives, and protection of credibility, covert support activity should be managed out of the CIA with close informal links to the overt side.

The incident management team would be composed of the three "lead individuals" enclosed in the "Red box" above, who would be responsible to senior operational officials for the public affairs/public diplomacy component of an incident as required to optimize the planning, execution, and aftermath. They could call on the resource pool reporting to them only when security requirements allowed, but by the very structure of the organization would be in the best position to reproduce rapid and efficient tasking.

As the "lead agency" it is up to the State Department to resolve the current "public diplomacy" situation. State has twice before proceeded vigorously to pursue a public diplomacy program -- presumably it can repeat the performance a third time.

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INTERAGENCY GROUP ON TERRORISM (I/GT/TIWG/OSG)



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July 17, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Marvin L. Stone *M/S-*
Chairman
International Information Committee

SUBJECT: IIC Working Group on Countering Libyan
Terrorism - Final Report

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of May 19

SUMMARY

The Sixty-Day Action Plan and the establishment of the IIC Working Group enabled us to initiate projects and activities and develop materials which have contributed to heightened awareness of the Libyan connection with terrorism in Europe and elsewhere. A July USIA survey indicates favorable, if still incremental, shifts in European opinion. Pending the establishment of a permanent unit, we propose to continue activities and data preparation focused on the full range of state-supported terrorist activities.

The Working Group recommends: 1) the creation of a permanent counter-terrorism public diplomacy staff; 2) a continuing high priority to counter-terrorism public diplomacy, sustaining the current effort without pause while broadening the focus beyond Libya specific activity; 3) activating a mechanism for sustained collection of substantiating data for public use; and 4) developing a computerized data base on a priority basis for the long term.

ASSESSMENT

The IIC Working Group focused its effort on generating selected major programs and products (e.g. the full day seminar for foreign bureau chiefs opened by Secretary Shultz) and the identification, declassification and collation of data for use as public substantiation of Administration charges and concerns. The latter effort has led to the public release of several items on Libyan support for terrorism and about international measures being undertaken to counter terrorist activities. A number of additional papers are under development or in the clearance process.

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A detailed report on USIA output is attached as TAB A. These materials were used by our missions abroad.

Overseas posts have also intensified their priority attention to this theme. Although it cannot be precisely measured, their activities have played a role in building greater awareness internationally of the terrorist threat and the need to take cooperative steps. The telegram summarizing posts' responses is TAB B.

USIA's Office of Research conducted comparative surveys at the beginning and end of the sixty-day period. These show significant, if incremental, shifts in European public opinion. Support for measures to deter Libyan terrorism is increasing and the disapproval figure for a future U.S. air strike against Libya (if warranted) is less than the number who disapproved of the air strike in mid-April. Those reports are TAB C and D.

A number of projects are planned or in production. Four interactive WORLDNET productions and a videodocumentary are in the development stage. The White House interview request for the publisher of the influential Paris-based newsmagazine, Jeune Afrique, has been approved. Among the several additional documents scheduled for release within the next few weeks are a comprehensive chronology, an issue paper on Libyan terrorism (updating the January White Paper), an issue paper on terrorist incidents in Europe, and profiles of prominent terrorist groups.

We intend to see these ongoing projects through to completion and to maintain the momentum generated by the current effort. We recommend shifting from the intensive Libya focus into a broader strategy concerning terrorism which would serve as a starting point for the work of the new public diplomacy coordinator. As a first illustrative step, several members of the Interagency Working Group are preparing a brief public diplomacy game plan for the Tokyo Economic Summit follow-up meeting scheduled for September 3-4.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For your immediate consideration, we offer the following recommendations based on our experience with the Sixty-Day Action Plan.

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1. A SPECIAL COUNTERTERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COORDINATOR AND STAFF SHOULD BE CREATED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

- The public diplomacy effort currently consists of an interagency group whose chairman and members all have other competing functions. A full-time public diplomacy coordinator with his/her own staff -- and program budget that can be used for special projects -- is urgently needed to ensure coherent long term attention to this priority issue. That staff should include capability for full time skilled data collection; media, private sector and congressional liaison; writing/editing of shell speeches, press releases, etc.; public affairs policy development for incident management and public affairs training for emergency action simulation. However that staff be configured and wherever it be housed, it should place priority on the international dimension. We assume it would take policy direction from the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism.

2. PROJECTS INITIATED UNDER THE ACTION PLAN SHOULD BE COMPLETED BUT BE INCORPORATED AS PART OF A LARGER COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION STRATEGY WITH SUSTAINED MOMENTUM.

yes, as has been the case!

- Although the justification for the intense focus on Libya may be passing, we should not drop our effort and lose the momentum recently acquired, until a permanent staff is fully functioning. The Working Group effort should continue on a high priority basis. The Libya and Qadhafi aspects can be dealt with within the context of an overall effort to combat terrorism.

yes → 3. THE SPECIAL [INTELLIGENCE] LIAISON GROUP, OR A VARIATION THEREOF, SHOULD BE ACTIVATED IMMEDIATELY.

- The original 1985 Public Diplomacy Organization Plan included a liaison group, to function along lines similar to the Soviet Active Measures Working Group, to identify data which can be used publicly and provide direction for searching out publicly available material. This liaison group, or a variation thereof, should be activated at the earliest possible time to provide substantiating data through a reliable, ongoing and methodical mechanism.

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4. RESOURCES SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
COMPUTERIZED DATA BASE.

- Over the long run, a more efficient mechanism for ready retrieval of accurate and appropriate data is essential if we hope to provide substantiating data while ensuring protection for sensitive intelligence methods. We understand that the State Department is preparing a proposal, with projected costs, for a computerized data base as part of its response to NSDD-207. It should be given urgent consideration.

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THE FEDERAL PAGE

8/18/88

New Front in War on Terrorism: Cultivating Foreign Opinion

State Department May Open 'Public Diplomacy' Office Modeled After Successful Latin America Agency

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration, concerned by adverse European reaction to the U.S. air strikes against Libya in April, is considering establishing a special new State Department "public diplomacy" office that would seek to make foreign public opinion more sympathetic to U.S. antiterrorist activities.

U.S. officials said in recent interviews that the proposed new office would be modeled on the department's highly active Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean. Since its creation in 1983, the Latin America operation has been a major force in the administration's efforts to build popular support for President Reagan's controversial Central America policies.

However, the officials added, while the Latin America public diplomacy effort has been aimed mainly at domestic American audiences, the new office would focus on foreign countries—primarily in Western Europe and the Middle East—where public opinion has generally been hostile to Reagan's advocacy of an aggressive stance against international terrorism.

The officials said that tentative plans involve an office within the State Department that would direct and coordinate the efforts of all federal agencies in the foreign policy



ROBERT B. OAKLEY
... runs counterterrorism office

area to argue the U.S. case through speeches, contacts with press and academic circles and the preparation of position papers. The officials said the leading candidate to head the office appears to be Marshall Bremment, a career diplomat who was formerly ambassador to Iceland.

However, the officials noted that a decision to move ahead has been delayed by concerns about costs at a time when Congress is imposing tight budgetary restraints on the State Department. They added that some of the agencies involved, citing

the highly secret nature of counterterrorism work, fear that such an office might become a source of leaks or be so constrained by security considerations that it could not perform its mission effectively.

As a result, some administration officials reportedly feel that a wiser course would be to scale down the idea and, instead of creating a separate office, give the State Department's Office for Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning, headed by Robert B. Oakley, more personnel and authority to engage in public diplomacy.

But, the officials stressed, whatever course is chosen, there is agreement that the administration, instead of reacting to individual terrorist incidents in piecemeal fashion, must make a much more concerted effort to convince public opinion in friendly countries of the need for cooperation.

The April 15 air strikes in retaliation for Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's alleged support of terrorism sparked a hostile reaction in most of Europe and threatened to strain U.S. relations with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.

The recriminations hurled back and forth across the Atlantic became so acrimonious that Lord Carrington, the NATO secretary general, felt compelled to call for a "West-West dialogue" to prevent the debate from being reduced to a



MARSHALL BREMMENT
... would head new office

level that he described as "American cowboys versus Euro-wimps."

That concern is shared by the administration, which in the aftermath of the Libya raids set up an interagency working group, with representatives from the State Department, the National Security Council, the U.S. Information Agency and the Defense Department, to consider ways of explaining the U.S. position more effectively to domestic and foreign opinion.

The working group, following what some participants described as

"a 60-day action plan," took a number of initiatives. In addition to cranking out documents detailing the size and nature of the international terrorist threat, the group arranged a recent seminar at the State Department for foreign journalists that included an address by Secretary of State George P. Shultz. But, officials said, the main emphasis was on dealing with the public diplomacy aspects of the problem over the long range.

The proposed new office would formalize that role. Its activities would include dealing with American audiences and explaining U.S. responses to future acts of terrorism. However, the officials said, it was agreed from the outset the principal focus should be on educating the public in other countries to the dangers of terrorism and arguing the U.S. view that it is necessary to fight back rather than submit to terrorist blackmail.

The officials said that at different times consideration was given to putting the office under the National Security Council or assigning it to USIA, which has responsibility for most U.S. information activities abroad. In the end, though, it was decided that the office, if it is created, should be located within the State Department, where its activities can mesh closely with those of Oakley's counterterrorism office.

*POL310 07/16/86

(Following FS material not for publication)

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT ON TERRORISM TERMED EFFECTIVE
(Article on House hearing on public diplomacy) (700)
by Ed Scherr
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- United States Information Agency (USIA) officials have pointed to a recent agency program on terrorism as an example of how an effective public diplomacy program can be run.

Marvin Stone, USIA deputy director, noted July 16 that during a 60-day program to inform foreign audiences about the threat of terrorism, especially Libyan-supported terrorism, there was a shift in West European public opinion.

In those cases when USIA is brought into the decision-making process of foreign policy actions, Stone stressed, "we can do a very, very fine job" with public diplomacy.

Appearing before the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee, Stone recalled that when Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead went to Western Europe in January to convince America's allies to impose economic sanctions against Libya, opinion in that region was overwhelmingly against such actions. Whitehead was unable to convince the allies to take active measures against Libya.

He said that was a "failure in public diplomacy, because we had no opportunity to build up a case against Libya and terrorism." The result he continued, was that the United States was forced into the unpopular step of an air strike against terrorist-support targets in Libya.

After the bombs were dropped on April 15, Stone said that USIA had to "pick up a lot of the pieces." In the aftermath, he said that the National Security Council asked USIA to construct a 60-day public diplomacy program to explain state-sponsored terrorism and Libya's terrorist role.

During those 60 days, he said, a lot happened in Europe. "A lot of these countries that resisted sanctions, indeed decided to go the route that we had fruitlessly suggested in January."


Stone emphasized that one of the factors that made this effort a success was that USIA had "strong input" into U.S. policy during this post-attack period.

The deputy director and other witnesses emphasized that in those foreign policy situations "where we (USIA) are

survival!

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took*

brought in at the outset, in those cases where things are not so closely held...I think we can do a very, very fine job." 

Stone also pointed to the public diplomacy effort to convince NATO allies to accept new intermediate nuclear forces as another success in which USIA was part of the policy planning process. He noted that there was close coordination among the concerned U.S. departments on this issue and there was time to mount this success effort in five West European nations.

He made the comments during the subcommittee's hearing on public diplomacy.

Stone noted the importance of public diplomacy in the foreign policy decision-making process. He defined public diplomacy as the "means by which a country seeks to inform and thus influence the citizens of another country and through them, their government."

The deputy director said that USIA's integration into the policy councils of the U.S. government "reflects the significance of our role." 

Stone and another witness, Edwin Feulner, Jr., chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, stressed that USIA should have an expanded role in U.S. decision-making.

"The commission believes strongly that public diplomacy must play an active as opposed to reactive role in the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy," Feulner said. "Public diplomacy must be involved fully and consistently in the making of policies -- not just in explaining them after-the-fact."

Feulner, chairman of the commission that assesses USIA programs, also emphasized that "there is a need to consider the public aspects of foreign policy earlier and more frequently in the policy process."

Dante Fascell, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, also testified before the subcommittee. He praised the last two administrations, especially the Reagan administration, for the budgetary requests to bring USIA into a more modern position. Noting the proposed budget for the agency, he said that USIA "will need all the help that the advisory commission can muster" to overcome the budget cuts and prevent a "step backwards."

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- NSDBR *NOMAIL* LIBYA
- NSELM LIBYA
- NSHRT LIBYA
- NSHS LIBYA
- NSJAM LIBYA
- NSJRS *NOMAIL* LIBYA
- NLSLP OIL
- NSNAM OIL
- NSPHR LIBYA

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M11-442 #137152
BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/15

WHSR COMMENT:

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FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
~~SECRET~~-NOFORN-NO CONTRACT-WNINTEL-ORCON

FOR: NSA FOR ZKZK RR ZSL DE
LIBYAN FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES; IT-LIBYA
THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET-NOFORN-NO
CONTRACT-WNINTEL-ORCON" IN ITS ENTIRETY.
FOREIGN POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE:
DATE OF INFORMATION: JULY 2, 1986
SOURCE: A LIBYAN NATIONAL IN THE UNITED STATES WHO HAS

CONTRACT/WNINTEL/ORCON
FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST.
CAVEAT: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT AND NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
SOURCE ADVISED THAT LIBYAN YEARLY OIL REVENUES HAVE
SLIPPED FROM ABOUT \$23 BILLION IN 1983 TO ABOUT \$4.5 BILLION.
THIS IS HAVING A DRASTIC EFFECT ON THE FOUR BASIC BUDGET
DEPARTMENTS, WHICH ARE DESCRIBED AS:
ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET, RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL SALARIES.

!

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEVELOPMENT BUDGET, RESPONSIBLE FOR NEW PROJECTS.
MILITARY BUDGET, RESPONSIBLE FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURES.
SPECIAL BUDGET, AID TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TERRORISM.
CURRENT OIL REVENUES DO NOT EVEN COVER THE USUAL
ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET. ALL LIBYANS ARE AFFECTED BECAUSE ALL

SALARIES ARE PAID BY THE GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE, THE
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND ATTEMPTS ARE BEING
MADE TO RE-SCHEDULE LOANS ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES. QADHAFI
WILL LIKELY BE FORCED TO MAKE BIG CUTS IN THE SPECIAL BUDGET.
THE DECREASE IN OIL REVENUES HAS CAUSED THE FOLLOWING
POLICIES, EITHER CURRENTLY IN EFFECT OR SOON TO BE EFFECTED:

CONTRACT/WNINTEL/ORCON

SALARIES ARE NOW PAID EVERY SIX WEEKS INSTEAD OF FOUR
WEEKS WHICH CUTS THE NUMBER OF PAY PERIODS TO EIGHT PER YEAR.
EACH EMPLOYEE'S SALARY IS CUT \$600 PER YEAR. SOURCE ALSO
ADVISED THAT REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS WHO
ARE EMPLOYED, ONLY ONE MEMBER PER FAMILY GETS A SALARY. ALL
SPECIAL COMPENSATIONS HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED.

AS AN APPARENT ECONOMIC MOVE, SCHOOL CLASSES FOR CHILDREN
UP TO THE FOURTH GRADE HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED, AND MOTHERS ARE
EXPECTED TO TEACH THE YOUNG. THIS SOURCE ALSO ADVISED THAT A
YOUNG INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN APPOINTED EDUCATION MINISTER.

SOURCE IS OF THE OPINION QADHAFI IS STILL IN CHARGE, BUT
IS FACED WITH SUCH AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE
TOO LOUD. SOURCE IS ALSO OF THE OPINION QADHAFI IS LETTING
ABDUL SALEM JALLUD AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SPEAK SO
THAT HE, QADHAFI, DOES NOT HAVE TO FACE THE PUBLIC.

FINALLY, SOURCE INDICATED THAT CONTACT WITH THE LIBYAN
OPPOSITION INSIDE LIBYA IS LIMITED BECAUSE SO FEW PEOPLE ARE
COMING OUT.

C BY G-3, DECL: OADR

CONTRACT/WNINTEL/ORCON

** END OF CABLE **

~~SECRET~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

137153

NSCPC

PAGE 01
IBM605

KINGSTON 7204

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**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 KINGSTON 07204

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, GE, LY, JM
SUBJECT: INSIGHTS ON MUAMMAR QADHAFI BY NEW WEST GERMAN
AMBASSADOR

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. NEWLY ARRIVED IN JAMAICA, WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR
ROLF ENDERS HAS JUST COMPLETED A TOUR OF DUTY IN LIBYA.
DURING A COURTESY CALL ON THE AMBASSADOR JULY 16, HE
MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON LIBYAN AFFAIRS AND
FRG-JAMAICAN RELATIONS:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

QADHAFI

3. DESCRIBING MUAMMAR QADHAFI AS "MENTALLY ILL" AND "MANIC DEPRESSIVE," THE WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR INDICATED

THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD A REAL CONVERSATION WITH THE LIBYAN LEADER BECAUSE HE AVOIDS ALL SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. ENDERS ALSO STATED THAT QADHAFI IS "NOT ANTI-WESTERN" AND "NOT AT ALL A FRIEND OF THE EAST." WHEN ASKED BY AMBASSADOR SOTIRHOS IF HE DID NOT FEEL THAT QADHAFI "LEANED TOWARD THE EAST," AMBASSADOR ENDERS REPLIED THAT "LEAN" WAS TOO STRONG A WORD BUT THAT QADHAFI "HAS SOME INTEREST IN THE SOVIETS BECAUSE THEY ARE SELLING HIM ARMS." THE WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR FEELS THAT QADHAFI IS "NOT AT ALL IN FAVOR OF COMMUNISM" AND IS "NOT A PARTNER FOR ANYONE" BECAUSE HE IS SO UNPREDICTABLE AND UNRELIABLE.

AMERICAN BOMBING OF LIBYA

4. AMBASSADOR ENDERS SAID THAT HE HAD NOT MET WITH QADHAFI SINCE THE AMERICAN BOMBING AND THAT THE LIBYAN LEADER SEEMS TO BE AVOIDING SPEAKING PUBLICLY. ENDERS FEELS, HOWEVER, THAT THE BOMBING CAUSED QADHAFI TO REALIZE FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT "THE AMERICANS ARE ABLE TO HIT HIM WHEREVER AND WHENEVER THEY WANT."

5. CHARACTERIZING THE LIBYANS AS A "PASSIVE" PEOPLE, THE WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT "ANOTHER PEOPLE MIGHT HAVE CHASED QADHAFI AWAY ALREADY." ENDERS MENTIONED THAT FOLLOWING THE AMERICAN BOMBING, LIBYANS APPEARED TO BE "SPEAKING MORE FRANKLY THAN THEY USED TO," AND HE INDICATED THAT THE MAN ON THE STREET WAS ASKING WHY THE AMERICANS DIDN'T CONTINUE THE ATTACK AND ACTUALLY LAND ON LIBYAN SOIL. WHEN AMBASSADOR SOTIRHOS ASKED IF AMBASSADOR ENDERS WAS IMPLYING THAT THE LIBYANS HOPED THAT SOMEONE ELSE WOULD DO "WHAT THEY WON'T DO," AMBASSADOR ENDERS REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF WILLINGNESS BUT ALSO OF ARMS. EVEN THE ARMY, HE SAID, DOESN'T HAVE THE WEAPONRY NECESSARY TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE QADHAFI DOESN'T TRUST IT.

DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IN LIBYA

6. AMBASSADOR ENDERS FEELS THAT THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IS ISOLATED IN LIBYA. THE LIBYANS ARE PLEASANT BUT AVOID CONTACT WITH WESTERNERS. EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS COMPLAIN THAT THEY HAVE NO PRIVILEGES AND, IN FACT, APPEAR TO BE WATCHED MORE CAREFULLY THAN THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES.

7. WHEN ASKED IF LIBYA HAD AN EFFECTIVE SECRET POLICE, AMBASSADOR ENDERS REPLIED THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONS FULFILLING THIS FUNCTION. HE SAID A SECRET POLICEMAN HAD BEEN PLACED IN FRONT OF HIS RESIDENCE.

MOSLEM RESPONSE TO QADHAFI

8. AMBASSADOR ENDERS FEELS THAT QADHAFI OFTEN CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HE HASN'T DONE. DESCRIBING ARAB LEADERS AS DISENCHANTED WITH QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR, ENDERS SAID THAT MANY OF THEM WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE THE COLONEL OUT OF THE WAY. HE BELIEVES THAT QADHAFI IS "ISOLATED AND EASY TO GET AT."

9. THE WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT LIBYA'S SUNNI MUSLIMS CONSIDER QADHAFI TO BE A HERETIC. QADHAFI CALLED A CONFERENCE OF THE COUNTRY'S HIGHEST RANKING MUSLIM SCHOLARS AND REQUIRED THAT THEY CHANGE THE BASE DATE OF THE RELIGIOUS CALENDAR FROM THE YEAR THAT MOHAMMED WENT FROM MECCA TO MEDINA TO THE YEAR THE PROPHET DIED. OTHER MUSLIM NATIONS DID NOT ACCEPT QADHAFI'S REQUEST THAT THEY ALSO CHANGE THEIR CALENDARS. HIGHLIGHTING SOURCES OF TENSION BETWEEN QADHAFI AND THE SUNNI MUSLIM COMMUNITY, AMBASSADOR ENDERS MENTIONED QADHAFI'S JAILING OF THE MUFTI (THE HIGHEST RANKING RELIGIOUS LEADER), HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE KORAN BE
** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 KINGSTON 07204

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, GE, LY, JM
SUBJECT: INSIGHTS ON MUAMMAR QADHAFI BY NEW WEST GERMAN

REGARDED AS THE ONLY TRUE SOURCE OF THE RELIGION, AND HIS CLOSING OF A MOSQUE WHERE ANTI-QADHAFI SLOGANS HAD BEEN WRITTEN ON THE WALLS. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST DISSATISFACTION WITH QADHAFI BECAUSE OF HIS RELIGIOUS DISREGARD FOR TRADITION WAS CITED AS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY.

GERMAN-JAMAICAN RELATIONS

10. AMBASSADOR ENDERS SAID THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN WEST GERMAN POLICY AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT NOW RECOGNIZES JAMAICA AS A "TREND SETTER" IN THE REGION. HE MENTIONED THAT HE WAS FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

MAKE THE APPROPRIATE APPOINTMENTS FOR A 3-MEMBER
PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION THAT WAS SOON TO BE VISITING
JAMAICA. THE MP'S ARE MEMBERS OF THE WEST GERMAN
PARLIAMENT'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR
SOTIRHOS SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR
MAKE THE COMMITTEE'S INTENTIONS KNOWN TO THE PRIME
MINISTER AND MAKE THEIR APPOINTMENTS THROUGH THE PRIME
MINISTER'S OFFICE. AMBASSADOR SOTIRHOS ALSO GAVE
AMBASSADOR ENDERS BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE JAMAICAN
POLITICAL SITUATION AND URGED THE WEST GERMAN
AMBASSADOR TO "EMPHASIZE THE NO VIOLENCE THEME" AND TO
MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSIST JAMAICA.

(DRAFTED:POL:LRDORSEY/APPROVED:AMB:MSOTIRHOS)

SOTIRHOS

** END OF CABLE **

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 29, 1986

OLN _____

RLE _____

CPC _____

FILE _____

COMMENT
AUG 1 1986

TO: The Secretary

FROM: PA - Bernard Kalb

SUBJECT: Terrorism Remains Public's Top Foreign Policy Concern

Summary:

Two national polls taken last month reveal:

1. Countering terrorism still ranks as the top foreign policy priority with the American public. A Roper poll showed eighty percent of Americans preferred a "major effort" by the government to "combat terrorism" -- similar to the proportion wanting a "major effort" to deal with "crime and drugs" (80%), the public's top domestic concern, and greater than the proportion wanting a "major effort" to negotiate agreements to "limit nuclear weapons" (68%).

2. A large majority continues to approve of the mid-April military action against Libya (about 75% approve vs 23% disapprove), according to a national poll by the G. Lawrence Co. of California.

3. Maintenance of this high level of support two months after the raid stems largely from the public's predominant perception that the raid has actually "reduced terrorism," contrary to the public's earlier predominant expectation that the raid would have the opposite effect.

4. The public's willingness to take "military action" to "reduce terrorism sponsored by another nation" has risen 10 percentage points since the Libya raid (from 49% to 59%). However, most of those willing to use military force still want it directed at "terrorist facilities" in the offending country (40% of the total public), rather than at "any economic or military target in that country" (19%).

5. The public is wary of using the Libya raid as a precedent in other situations. About two-thirds view the "bombing of Libya" as a necessary, one-time "message to terrorists" (65%), compared to one-third who view it as the "first step in a process of repeated military measures we must take to combat terrorism" (34%). Similarly, no more than

The G. Lawrence poll also found that the percentage of those preferring "military action" to reduce state-sponsored terrorism rose from 49 percent in March to 59 percent in June. Most of this increase occurred among those holding the minority view that the military force should be directed against "any economic or military target" in the offending country (up from 10% of the total public in March to 19% in June). The question:

"Which of the following do you think the US should do to reduce terrorism that is sponsored by another nation?"

	June 1986	March 1986
Take military action against any economic or military target in that country	19%	10%
Take military action against terrorist facilities in that country (Total: Take military action)	40 (59%)	39 (49%)
Enact economic sanctions against that country	22	27
Enact diplomatic sanctions against that country (Total: Enact econ. or dipl. sanctions)	10 (32)	14 (41)
Take no action	7	7
No opinion	2	3

The groups most willing to "take military action" to counter state-sponsored terrorism were males, conservatives, and those earning \$25,000 or more annually (about 65% favored "military action"). The groups with the lowest pluralities preferring military force were females, liberals, and those earning less than \$25,000 annually (about 50% favored "military action"). Not surprisingly, those who expected the "US bombing of Libya" to reduce terrorism were more supportive of "taking military action" against terrorists than those who expected the US raid to lead to increased terrorism (67% favored "military action" in the former group vs 50% in the latter group).

Most Americans Remain Wary of Repeating Libya-type Raids

Two findings from the G. Lawrence poll show that widespread approval of the Libya raid has not reversed the public's cautious attitude toward applying military force against terrorists in specific future situations. Two-thirds of those polled believed: (1) the "bombing of Libya" was a necessary "message to terrorists" that need not be repeated (65%); and (2) there should be no military action against Syria -- despite evidence linking it to terrorist incidents -- unless Syrian-sponsored terrorists "strike once more" (67% -- see Table 2, attached).

Public Attitudes Toward Terrorism

Table 1. Public's Priorities for Government Action
(Roper Poll, June 1986)

"There are many problems facing our nation today. But at certain times some things are more important than others, and need more attention from our federal government than others. I'd like to know for each of the things on this list whether you think it is something the government should be making a major effort on now, or something the government should be making some effort on now, or something not needing any particular government effort now." (Percentages of "no opinion" are omitted.)

	<u>Major Effort</u> 80%	<u>Some Effort</u> 16%	<u>No Particular Effort</u> 3%
TAKING STEPS TO COMBAT TERRORISM			
Trying to solve the problems of crime and drugs	80	16	2
Trying to reduce unemployment	70	24	3
TRYING TO SEEK AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER NATIONS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS			
Taking steps to reduce the deficit	68	24	5
TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA			
Trying to solve the problems caused by ghettos, race and poverty	67	26	3
Trying to slow down inflation in our economy	61	30	7
TAKING STEPS TO HELP AMERICAN BUSINESS BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE IN FOREIGN MARKETS			
Trying to solve the problems caused by ghettos, race and poverty	60	31	6
TAKING STEPS TO HELP AMERICAN BUSINESS BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE IN FOREIGN MARKETS			
Trying to slow down inflation in our economy	53	34	10
TRYING TO HELP NEGOTIATE A PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL THE ARAB NATIONS			
Trying to slow down inflation in our economy	46	37	12
TRYING TO HELP NEGOTIATE A PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL THE ARAB NATIONS			
Trying to slow down inflation in our economy	42	39	14
TRYING TO HELP NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENTS OF THE FIGHTING IN CENTRAL AMERICA			
Trying to slow down inflation in our economy	35	45	14