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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/22/2012

File Folder TERRORISM - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (MAY 1986 - JUNE 1986)

FOIA

M11-442

Box Number 106

HAENNI

15

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137095	CABLE	BUENOS AIRES 04763 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/23/1986	B1
137096	CABLE	RE TERRORISM R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/24/1986	B1
137097	CABLE	211406Z MAY 86 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	2	5/21/1986	B1
137098	CABLE	MONROVIA 05536 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/20/1986	B1
137099	CABLE	PORT LOUIS 01357 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/15/1986	B1
137100	CABLE	ANKARA 05444 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/21/1986	B1
137101	CABLE	MOSCOW 08720 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/22/1986	B1
137102	CABLE	VIENNA 07445 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	2	5/21/1986	B1
137103	CABLE	VALLETTA 01279 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/19/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137104	CABLE	PRAGUE 02619 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/16/1986	B1
137105	CABLE	PARIS 22816 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	2	5/23/1986	B1
137106	CABLE	LISBON 05281 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	2	5/22/1986	B1
137107	CABLE	JAKARTA 08353 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/21/1986	B1
137108	CABLE	KUALA LUMPUR 04609 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	2	5/20/1986	B1
137109	CABLE	SEOUL 05422 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	2	5/21/1986	B1
137110	CABLE	MANILA 16604 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	2	5/22/1986	B1
137111	CABLE	TOKYO 09667 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/19/1986	B1
137112	CABLE	DHAKA 3783 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/21/1986	B1
137113	CABLE	ISLAMABAD 11356 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/21/1986	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137114	CABLE	COLOMBO 03866 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/21/1986	B1
137115	CABLE	RABAT 05039 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/21/1986	B1
137116	CABLE	SANAA 3476 R 10/14/2016 M442/1	1	5/19/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET ATTACHED

MAY 28 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: Philip W. Arnold
Chairman,
Interagency Public Diplomacy Working Group on
Countering Libyan Terrorism

SUBJECT: Coordinating Meeting
Friday, May 30, 2:30 PM, Room 840

There will be a coordinating meeting at the working level this Friday to take stock and plan Agency activities for the coming few weeks.

We will also discuss comments from the field, a full set of which is attached.

The agenda:

1. Discuss comments from posts.
2. Plan Agency activities for early/mid-June period.
3. Discuss availability of experts and expertise.

DISTRIBUTION:

P/D - Mr. Pollock
Ms. Ashley
P/F - Mr. Newman
P/P - Mr. Cattell
Mr. Scherr
P/R - Mr. Wessell
P/G - Mr. Fischman
Mr. Romerstein
Cmdr. Farlow
Ms. Bruckner
Ms. O'Keefe
P - Ms. Super

TV - Mr. Timrud
Ms. Adam

E/V - Mr. Daks
Mr. Taylor

VOA - Mr. Chatten
Mr. Thompson

Area Policy Officers

AF - Mr. Haley

AR - Mr. Johnson

EA - Ms. Sullinger

EU - Mr. Crouch

NEA Mr. Caterini

May 27, 1986

Public Diplomacy Action Plan on
Countering Libyan Support for Terrorism

An overwhelming majority of responding posts requested an increase in wireless file coverage on terrorist issues. Many stated the most useable form is texts, statements, speeches, by-liners, etc. by US officials. Several posts requested evidence that would confirm Libyan involvement in terrorist activities. Noted were several indications that American Participants, Worldnets, EDs or TPCs would not be effective in raising the awareness of their reader/viewerships because of specific sensitivities involved.

Below is a more detailed breakdown of what posts are requesting to strengthen programming on this issue.

	AF	AR	EU*	EA	NEA
	--	--	--	--	---
# of Posts responding	10	8	14	6	10
Wireless File Policy texts/statements	6	7	8	6	10
Evidence/independent condemnations	3	2	6	-	1
Pamphlets/chronologies	1	1	3	1	2
Books	1	-	-	-	-
TV/Video	4	2	3	4	1
Briefings/interviews	2	-	2	3	1
VOA coverage	2	1	3	1	2
IV projects/journalists	2	1	3	2	4
Worldnet	-	2	4	1	-
Electronic Dialogue/Telepress Conf.	-	1	-	-	3
American Participants	-	1	-	1	1

* Several posts questioned the use of a documentary and the human rights group contacts.

May 28, 1986

MEDIA REQUESTS
Public Diplomacy Action Plan on
Countering Libyan Support for Terrorism

AFRICA

<u>Post</u>	<u>WFile/ Press</u>	<u>TV</u>	<u>VOA</u>	<u>AmParts, TPC, ED ED,NETs</u>	<u>IVs</u>	<u>Briefings</u>
Accra	X					
Antanarivo					X	
Bamako	X	X				
Kinshasa	X	X	X			
Lagos	X					X
Libreville		X				
Monrovia	X					X
Nairobi	X	X	X			
Niamey	X					
Port Louis	X					

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

<u>Post</u>	<u>WFile/ Press</u>	<u>TV</u>	<u>VOA</u>	<u>AmParts, TPC, ED ED,NETs</u>	<u>IVs</u>	<u>Briefings</u>
Buenos Aires	X					
Caracas	X			X		
Guatemala	X					
Kingston	X					
Mexico	X					
Nassau	X	X				
San Jose	X	X		X		
San Salvador	--					

EAST ASIA/PACIFIC

<u>Post</u>	<u>WFile/ Press</u>	<u>TV</u>	<u>VOA</u>	<u>AmParts, TPC, ED ED,NETs</u>	<u>IVs</u>	<u>Briefings</u>
Indonesia	X	X				
Malaysia	X				X	
Rangoon	X	X				
Seoul	X	X		X		X
Manila	X	X	X	X		
Tokyo	X				X	X

EUROPE

Post	WFile/ Press	TV	VOA	AmParts, TPC, ED ED,NETs	IVs	Briefings
Athens	X					
Ankara	X			X		
Bonn				X		
Brussels	X			X		X
Bucharest	X	X	X			
Budapest	X	X				
Helsinki	X					
Lisbon	X	X		X	X	
Moscow	X		X			
Paris	X				X	
Prague			X			
Valletta	X					
Vienna	X			X	X	X
Warsaw	X		X			

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA

Post	WFile/ Press	TV	VOA	AmParts, TPC, ED ED,NETs	IVs	Briefings
Amman	X					
Colombo	X					
Dhaka	X	X		X		
Doha	X		X	X	X	
Islamabad	X					
Jerusalem	X				X	
Kathmandu	X				X	
Kuwait	X			X		X
Rabat	X				X	
Sanaa	X		X			

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UNITED STATES
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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

JF

137095

PAGE 01

033934 ICA294
23/1916Z

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AR-03 P-01 /009 A4

0 231907Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7957

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 04763

USIA FOR P/G, LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING
GROUP

E. O. 12356: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 034713

ALTHOUGH THE SOUTHERN CONE IS SOMEWHAT ON THE PERIPHERY OF
THE U. S. -LIBYAN CONFRONTATION, WE CERTAINLY ARE COGNIZANT
OF THE NEED TO INTENSIFY MISSION CONTACTS WITH OTHER CON-
CERNED ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS A STEPPED-UP DISTRIBUTION
OF APPROPRIATE INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS. THIS HAS ALREADY
OCCURRED AS MATERIALS BECAME AVAILABLE. TO DATE, THREE OF
THE SEVEN PRINCIPAL DAILIES OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL HAVE
EDITORIALIZED IN SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN ACTION. WE ALSO
HAVE ORGANIZED A CONFERENCE CALL (ELECTRONIC DIALOG)
BETWEEN MIDDLE EAST EXPERT DR. COLL AND SELECTED MEDIA
HERE IN BUENOS AIRES WHICH PROVED TO BE VERY PRODUCTIVE.

IT IS WORTH REPEATING THAT OUR POSITION IN ARGENTINA IS
NOT CENTRAL TO THE CONFLICT BUT ANY TIME A SUPERPOWER IS
PERCEIVED TO BE "PICKING ON" A SMALL THIRD WORLD COUNTRY,
MANY PROBLEMS ARE CREATED WHICH WE ARE BETTER OFF WITHOUT.
IN THE CASE OF OUR UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION AGAINST
LIBYA, MANY ARGENTINE POLITICAL FIGURES EXPRESS CONCERN
THAT THIS WILL SOMEHOW SET A PRECEDENT FOR POSSIBLE U. S.
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. WE FULLY AGREE
THAT TO TURN THIS AROUND, A PLAN SUCH AS THAT CONTAINED IN
REFTEL IS NECESSARY AND, TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS
APPLICABLE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO APPLY IT. IT WOULD BE
PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IF SPECIAL STUDIES CAN BE COMMISSIONED
WITH WHICH TO POPULATE USIA'S WIRELESS FILE ON THE VARIOUS
ASPECTS OF THE STATE-PROMOTED TERRORISM COMING OUT OF
LIBYA AND THE LENGTHS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES WENT
BEFORE RESORTING TO RETALIATORY STRIKES. VALLIMARESCU
BT
#4763

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR M4421 #137095
BY RW NARA DATE 10/14/11

~~SECRET~~
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TELEGRAM

P/S

PAGE 01

027508 ICA328
21/0012Z

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AR-03 /008 A1 6

O 210014Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4740
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6775
BT
~~SECRET~~ GUATEMALA 05419

USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

(S) PLAN OUTLINED IN REFTEL DOES NOT HAVE APPLICABILITY
IN GUATEMALA SINCE LIBYAN TERRORISM HAS NO PROFILE HERE.
POST HAS SENT WIRELESS FILE MATERIALS AND OTHER PRINTED
INFORMATION ON LIBYAN TERRORISM TO KEY CONTACTS AS PART
OF POST'S EFFORTS TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE OVERALL PROBLEM
OF TERRORISM. POST CONTINUES TO WELCOME BACKGROUND IN-
FORMATION ON LIBYAN TERRORISM AS WAY OF KEEPING LOCAL
AUDIENCES' ATTENTION FOCUSED ON WORLDWIDE TERRORISM.

WATERS
BT
*5419

86 MAY 20 P 8: 27

86 MAY 20 P 8: 27

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY Ad NARA DATE 5/22/12

~~SECRET~~

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UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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137096

JF
034401 104426

PAGE 01

034401 104426
24780002

ACTION OFF OF P-R

INFO AEC-01 LTO-01 V6-01 DIO-01 AF-01 NEA-01 PG-01 ~~EC-01~~
PR-01 PFFL-01 PRFR-01 PFI-01 VBR-01 V6-01 VL-01
VRL-01 VEN-01 VEP-01 7020 45 8

0 247800Z MAY 68

FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO

TO ENCLASSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2930

RUMBLEWIDE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7045

BT

~~SECRET~~ MEXICO 11020

FOR LIBYA TELEGRAPH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP.

E. P. 13050 - DELEGATION BYRONNER, 7000. DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS WASHINGTON 66-34 - CONTINUING
LIBYAN TERRORISM

1. MEXICO'S PUBLIC OPINION TO DATE. MEXICO HAS NOT--
REFERENT, NOT-- OPEN A SUBJECT FOR STATE-ORIGINATED, AND SPEC-
IFICALLY LIBYAN, TERRORISM IN RECENT YEARS. THE MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT OPPOSED TERRORISM ON PRINCIPLE AND THE MEDIA
TENDS TO REFLECT THAT VIEW.

2. ADDITIONALLY, SOME MEXICAN MEXICANS FEAR THAT
THE U.S. WILL USE THE TERRORISM ISSUE AS A PRETEXT TO ILL-
LEGALIZE THE BORDER. THEY BELIEVE THAT A CONCENTRATED PUBLICITY
CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM, UNLIKE SUCH LONG STANDING PROBLEMS
PROFITING AS ILLLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND DRUG TRAFFICKING,
CAN ONLY WILL MOVE THE U.S. PUBLIC TO SUPPORT WHAT THEY
CONSIDER TO BE DRASTIC POLICE ACTIONS (FOR EXAMPLE, BACKING
UP THE BORDER PATROL WITH ARMY OR MARINE UNITS).

3. IN ANY EVENT, WHILE MEXICANS OPPOSE TERRORISM AND HAVE
LITTLE RESPECT FOR LIBYA, THEY HAVE NO DESIRE TO JEOPARDIZE
THEIR PRETENDED THIRD-WORLD LEADERSHIP BY DIRECT ATTACKS
AGAINST LIBYA. RADICAL LEFTIST ELEMENTS IN THE
MEXICAN MEDIA HAD A FIFTEEN DAY HURLING BARBS AT THE U.S. IN
THE WAKE OF THE BOMBING RAIDS ON LIBYA THROUGH SELECTIVE
USE OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY STORIES AND IN EDITORIAL
COMMENTS.

AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL, NO CONSENSUS EXISTS CONCERNING THE
U.S. ACTION AGAINST LIBYA. ON THE ONE HAND, THE PRI STANCE
AGAINST THE RAID AND THE VISCERALLY ANTI-U.S. PRESS
MADE OVERT SUPPORT DIFFICULT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOV-
ERNMENT HAS IN FACT BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THE U.S. POLICY.
MEXICAN LEADERS GENUINELY OPPOSE TERRORISM ON MORAL GROUNDS
MOREOVER, THERE IS A REAL FEAR OF TERRORISM DISRUPTING
JUNE'S WORLD CUP MATCHES. WITH THE MEMORY OF THE VIOLENCE
OF THE 1968 MEXICO CITY OLYMPICS STILL POWERFUL, NO
MEXICAN OFFICIAL WANTS TO SEE HIS COUNTRY PRESENT THE
WRONG FACE TO BILLIONS OF TELEVISION VIEWERS.

4. WHAT ARE WE DOING. EMBASSY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES
HAVE TAKEN TWO FORMS. FIRST, USIA HAS ISSUED A SERIES OF
RELEASES AND FACT SHEETS ON TERRORISM, ON THEMES RANGING
FROM THE BOMBING OF LIBYA TO THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF TERROR-
ISM. SECOND, WE HAVE PROGRAMMED A TERRORISM EXPERT, A USIA
ANPART, VIA AN ELECTRONIC DIALOGUE WITH THE PRESS, WITH
SOME FAVORABLE COVERAGE AS A RESULT.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS. FOR MEXICO, WE SUGGEST PLAYING UP
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF TERRORISM, AS WE ARE DOING
WITH MOST OF THE MEDIA. EVERY NATION, AND PARTICULARLY AN
OPEN SOCIETY LIKE MEXICO, IS VULNERABLE. THERE WILL BE NO
REAL SOLUTION UNTIL WE ALL WORK TOGETHER AGAINST THIS
INTERNATIONAL BANDITRY. WE RECOMMEND SPECIF-

TO ANTI-LIBYAN ARTICLES FOR THE MEDIA INCLINED
TO SUPPORT US. AT THE SAME TIME, I SUGGEST PLAYING DOWN
THE PROBLEMS OF THE OPEN BORDER. EMPHASIZING U.S. VULNERA-
BILITY TO TERRORISTS CROSSING AN OPEN BORDER WOULD LIKELY
PROVOKE ANTI-U.S. XENOPHOBIA AMONG MEXICANS RATHER THAN
A NATIONAL DEBATE, EVEN AMONG THOSE GROUPS NORMALLY
INCLINED TO BACK U.S. POLICY. (DRAFTED: G.L. GARLAND)
GPCONS
BT
#1030

86 MAY 23 P 9 : 47

SECRET

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BY RW

NARA DATE 10/14/16

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PAGE 01

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21/2129Z

ACTION OFFICE AR-03
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 SVC-01 VG-01 MAC-05 MS-03 DIS-01 NEA-03
PG-01 PR-01 PPFL-01 PPFN-02 PPF-01 VBB-01 VBXC-01 VBXN-01
VBL-01 VBN-01 VBR-01 /032 A5 9

R 212122Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7098
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 3778
BT
~~SECRET~~ KINGSTON 05060

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE 86-34-COUNTERING LIBYAN
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. WHILE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES NOT IMMEDIATELY RELEVANT TO THE CARIBBEAN OFTEN RECEIVE LIMITED ATTENTION IN THE JAMAICAN MEDIA, THE US ACTION IN LIBYA GENERATED WIDE MEDIA COVERAGE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE BOMBING. MOST JAMAICANS WERE QUICK TO CONDEMN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR SEEKING WAYS TO CONTROL THEM. THEY, NEVERTHELESS, HAD MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE RATHER THAN RELIANCE ON DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM. HOWEVER LOCAL ATTENTION QUICKLY SHIFTED TO MORE PAROCHIAL CONCERNS.
3. POST EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN MEDIA INTEREST IN LIBYAN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR US POLICY TOWARDS LIBYA INCLUDE STATEMENTS MADE BY US AMBASSADOR AND THE DISSEMINATION OF SELECTED WIRELESS FILE ITEMS BY USIS KINGSTON. POST DOES NOT FEEL MORE EXTENSIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS AS OUTLINED REFTEL WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL AT PRESENT IN JAMAICA.
(DRAFTED: USIS: J Moran/APPROVAL: USIS: DGBESOM)
SOTIRHOS
BT
#5060

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BY Ad NARA, DATE 5/22/12

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PAGE 01

025061 ICA144
19/1709Z

ACTION OFFICE P-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 AR-03 PG-01 /008 A3 1

R 191705Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2922
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 0805
BT
UNCLAS SAN SALVADOR 06901

USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 24713

1. SAN SALVADOR THINKS THE PLAN OUTLINED IS AN EXCELLENT ONE, BUT OF LIMITED APPLICABILITY HERE. WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED NO CRITICISM OF OUR ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM IN THE PRESS OR IN PERSONAL CONTACTS (EXCEPT, OF COURSE, FROM FMLN TERRORISTS, WHO ARE FRIENDS OF LIBYA AND THE PLO).
2. MOST SALVADORANS ACCEPT THE POINTS WITHOUT BEING ASKED TO, SO WE DO NOT PLAN HIGH PROFILE PROGRAM ON THIS.

HAMILTON
BT
#6901

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY AW NARA DATE 5/22/12

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PAGE 01

020106 ICA955
15/1744Z

MESSAGE TO A TARGET AUDIENCE AT THE OPPORTUNE
MOMENT.
STANLEY
BT
#4717

ACTION OFFICE AR-03
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 VG-01 DIS-01 PG-01 PR-01 PGF-02 PP-01
PPFL-01 PPF-01 VOAM-01 VBB-01 VBXC-01 VBXM-01 VBL-01
VBR-01 /021 A1 5

O 151744Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6463
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7932
BT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SAN JOSE 04717

FOR USIA P/G
-STATE "LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
- WORKING GROUP"

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PTER, CS
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN ON COUNTERING
- LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 03413

1. MEDIA/POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE: AS ONE OF THE THIRD WORLD'S LONGEST - STANDING DEMOCRACIES AND A FIRM ALLY OF THE U.S., COSTA RICA HAS LONG HAD A NEGATIVE VIEW OF LIBYAN TERRORISM, AS EXPRESSED BY GOCR FIGURES, MEDIA, AND SUCH PUBLIC OPINION AS INFORMAL TV "MAN IN THE STREET" POLLS. KHADDAFI'S SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM HAVE BEEN DENOUNCED REPEATEDLY IN LOCAL PRESS, WHICH ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTED 4/14/86 U.S. STRIKE AGAINST TRIPOLI AND BENGHAZI. ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT OSCAR ARIAS CRITICIZED STRIKE, HE DENOUNCED KHADDAFI'S ACTIVITIES; IN ANY CASE, MANY COSTA RICANS SUBSEQUENTLY ATTACKED HIM FOR HIS STATEMENT OPPOSING THE U.S. STRIKE.

2. BOMBING OF U.S. CONSULATE BUILDING IN SAN JOSE 4/17/86 WAS WIDELY RUMORED TO HAVE BEEN LINKED TO 4/14 U.S. STRIKE, THOUGH NO LEADS HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING. AT THAT TIME U.S. AMBASSADOR LEWIS TAMBS SAID POSSIBILITY OF LIBYAN-BACKED RETALIATION "COULD NOT BE RULED OUT."

3. GIVEN ABOVE, A MAJOR PD PUSH IN COSTA RICA IS NOT NECESSARY. IN BROAD TERMS, BOTH PEOPLE AND GOCR ALREADY SUPPORT U.S. POSITION ON LIBYAN TERRORISM.

4. POST HAS ALREADY CARRIED OUT A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ELECTRONIC DIALOGUE ON LIBYA WITH GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY MIDDLE EAST EXPERT ALBERTO COLL, WHICH RECEIVED BROAD PLAY ON THREE MAJOR COSTA RICAN RADIO STATIONS. SUCH INFO AS HAS BEEN AVAILABLE ON LIBYA'S ROLE IN TERRORISM (BOOKS, WF ARTICLES, VOA FEEDS) HAS BEEN SENT ALL ALONG TO APPROPRIATE CONTACTS.

5. OF ITEMS MENTIONED IN PLAN, MOST USEFUL TO POST WOULD BE SENDING SENIOR JOURNALIST TO IV PROJECT MENTIONED IN PARA 6 REFTEL; TV DOCUMENTARY AND WORLDNET PROGRAM ON THIS TOPIC; AND ONGOING FEATURE MATERIAL ALSO OUTLINED IN PARA 6 REFTEL. THESE WOULD PROVIDE US THE TOOLS TO REACH, AS APPROPRIATE, BROAD MEDIA AUDIENCES, SMALLER INFLUENCE GROUPS, AND INFLUENTIAL CONTACTS IN A CONSCIENT AND CONTINUOUS EFFORT TO GET THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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INCOMING
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ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 VG-01 AR-03 NEA-03 PR-01 PGF-02 PPFL-01
PPFN-02 PPF-01 VOAM-01 VBB-01 VBXC-01 VBKN-01 VBL-01
VBR-01 VVBN-01 /025 A1 5

P 241712Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5587
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 1775
BT
SECRET NASSAU 02105

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, BF
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: A) USIA 34711, B) USIA 34713

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POST FULLY SUPPORTS AGENCY'S SIXTY-DAY ACTION PLAN AND WILL DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO REACH MORE COMMUNITY LEADERS AND OPINION-MOLDERS.
3. POST WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INCREASE INFORMATION OUTPUT BY PRESS RELEASES, SPECIAL ARTICLE DISTRIBUTION TO KEY GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY ELEMENTS AND MEDIA REACTION REPORTING.
4. POST COULD PROBABLY PLACE A TV/FILM DOCUMENTARY FOCUSED ON TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION. ADVISE ON DETAILS AND WHEN POST CAN EXPECT IT.
5. REQUEST AGENCY INCREASE WF ARTICLES THAT CAN BE USED BY LESS "AFFECTED POSTS" (PARA 6, REFTEL B).
DOBRIANSKY
BT
#2105

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY CU NARA, DATE 5/22/12

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PAGE 01

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ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 VG-01 AR-03 NEA-03 PR-01 PPFL-01 PPF-01
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/021 A4 8

P 222001Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1770
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 7708
BT
UNCLAS CARACAS 04965

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PTER, PROP, VE
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. SUMMARY. ACTION PLAN CORRESPONDS CLOSELY TO MISSION'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OBJECTIVES ON THE SUBJECT. MISSION ACTED IMMEDIATELY TO COUNTER LIBYAN PROPAGANDA. WE HAVE MADE A MAJOR EFFORT TO CONTACT OPINION LEADERS PERSONALLY AND WILL CONTINUE TO SO. OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP THE LOCAL PUBLIC INFORMED OF LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM CONTINUES. MISSION PROPOSES IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN THROUGH EXPANDED PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA PLACEMENTS AS WELL AS INTERACTIVE TPC AND WORLDNET PROGRAMS. WE URGE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF LIBYAN PEOPLES' BUREAUS IN FOMENTING TERRORISM.

2. BACKGROUND. IN JANUARY, FOLLOWING OBSERVED SURVEILLANCE OF EMBASSY BY SUSPECTS WHO WERE FOLLOWED TO LIBYAN PEOPLES' BUREAU, GOV ORDERED A SWEEP OF LIBYAN FRIENDSHIP ORGANIZATIONS, CLOSING MOST AND PUBLICLY DISPLAYING SUBVERSIVE MATERIAL SEIZED. PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF ACTION BY VENEZUELAN STATE SECURITY POLICE RECEIVED NO LASTING PUBLIC ATTENTION. SUBSEQUENT EXPULSIONS OF DIPLOMATS AND OTHER NATIONALS WORLDWIDE HAS MORE THAN VINDICATED GOV ACTION. IN CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO COMBAT LIBYAN DISINFORMATION, WE URGE A FOCUS ON THE USE OF LIBYAN PEOPLES' BUREAUS AND "FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES" IN SPONSORING, DIRECTING AND SUPPLYING TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

3. GOV ABSTENTION IN VOTE ON SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNING US ACTION WAS CRITICIZED NOT ONLY FROM THE EXTREME LEFT, BUT ALSO FROM THE CENTER: I.E. THE ARGUMENT THAT US VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ITS ATTACKS ON LIBYA AND IS DOING SO IN THREATENING FURTHER MILITARY ACTION. WE NEED MORE, BETTER, MORE COHERENT MATERIAL EXPLAINING THAT WHAT WE ARE DOING IS LEGAL. THIS MATERIAL IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH OPINION LEADERS ON THIS ISSUE, AS WELL AS TO BROADEN AND DEEPEN PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF A STRONGER VENEZUELAN STANCE AT UN AND IN POLITICAL INTERNATIONALS.

4. HUMAN RIGHTS ANGLE IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING. VENEZUELANAS ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS INHERENT IN TERRORIST ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS. IN ADDITION, THE ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBYA IS AN UNTAPPED SOURCE FOR REFUTATION OF QADHAFI'S SELF-STYLED IMAGE OF RULER BY POPULAR ACCLAMATION. POST IS IN CONTACT WITH VENEZUELAN CORRESPONDENTS IN US WHO CAN BE PUT IN TOUCH WITH HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS

5. IMPLEMENTATION. POST HAS CONDUCTED TWO SUCCESSFUL TELEPRESS CONFERENCES ON SUBJECT FOR PRINT JOURNALISTS WITH DR. ALBERTO COLL. WE URGE MORE SPOKESPERSONS BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THIS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC MEDIA FORMATS.

6. WE HAVE FOUND WIRELESS FILE MATERIAL INVALUABLE DURING THIS CRISIS AND URGE MORE OF THE SAME. CERTAIN ARTICLES SUCH AS CHRONOLOGIES GET ALMOST AUTOMATIC PLACEMENT IN MAJOR DAILIES. LONGER PIECES, PREFERABLY IN SPANISH, ARE BEING MOVED IN PRESS/INFORMATION KITS TO PROMINENT OPINION-MAKERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

7. POST HAD SCHEDULED AMPART BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS FOR MAY TO SPEAK ON TERRORISM, BUT VISIT WAS POSTPONED. WE REMAIN EAGER TO PROGRAM HIM OR ANOTHER SPEAKER ON SUBJECT. FLOWER

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#4965

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ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AF-05 P-01 /011 A4 1

O 211653Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6290
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8446
BT
SECRET KINSHASA 08594

USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
- LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713-C

KINSHASA SUPPORTS THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN
DETAILED IN REFTEL AND WILL BE PLEASED TO PARTICIPATE
TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS PLAN IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO OUR PROGRAM BECAUSE MOST OF THE
ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS LISTED IN REFTEL DO NOT EXIST
IN ZAIRE. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN AUDIENCE FOR AGENCY
PROVIDED MATERIAL, INCLUDING WIRELESS FILE FEATURES,
TV AND VIDEOTAPE PROGRAMS, SATELLITE FILE AND VOA
FEATURES (IN FRENCH). HENNING, ACTING

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BY GA NARA DATE 5/22/12

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ACTION OFFICE PG-01
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VBR-01 /030 A1 10

R 210950Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 0431
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9272

BT
SECRET LAGOS 05809

USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

USIA FOR AF, NEA

STATF FOR AF/W, NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NI LI PTER
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. POST WELCOMES INITIATIVE OUTLINED IN REFTEL. ALTHOUGH QADHAFI DOES HAVE HIS SUPPORTERS IN NIGERIA AND THE U.S. AIR STRIKES MET WITH CONSIDERABLE OFFICIAL AND MEDIA CONDEMNATION, MANY NIGERIANS ARE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF LIBYAN INTENTIONS. THAT SUSPICION IS FUELED BY NIGERIAN CHRISTIAN HOSTILITY TO THE LIBYAN LEADER'S ISLAMIC FERVOR AND BY A PERCEPTION SHARED BY BOTH MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN NIGERIANS THAT QADHAFI HAS CLEAR TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN THE REGION. THIS BECAME EVIDENT IN THE WEEKS AFTER THE U.S. AIR RAID, WHEN THE INITIAL WAVE OF EMOTIONAL MEDIA CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ACTION GAVE WAY TO A TIDE OF OPINION PIECES AND LETTERS TO THE EDITOR CRITICIZING QADHAFI AND CALLING ON NIGERIANS TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE THREAT POSED TO NIGERIA BY THE LIBYAN LEADER. RECENT PRESS ARTICLES HAVE ALLEGED SUBVERSIVE LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA AND DESCRIBED LIBYAN EMBASSY INVOLVEMENT WITH CHADIAN AND GUNT SYMPATHIZERS RESIDENT HERE. NATURE OF THE STORIES INDICATED OFFICIAL SOURCES. ALL OF THIS POINTS TO A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OPPORTUNITY REFTEL SEEKS TO EXPLOIT. HEREWITH POST'S SUGGESTIONS.

3. MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON WE COULD USE WAS MENTIONED IN REFTEL AS A "COMPENDIUM OF BELLICOSE AND COMPROMISING QADHAFI STATEMENTS" SUPPORTING AND PRAISING TERRORIST ATTACKS. WE WANT TO USE HIS (AND OTHER APPROPRIATE LIBYANS') OWN WORDS AGAINST HIM, AND DOING SO WOULD CARRY GREATEST CREDIBILITY. WE KNOW THE LIBYAN LEADER HAS MADE MANY SUCH STATEMENTS IN THE PAST, AND BEING ABLE TO REMIND NIGERIANS OF THEM WOULD BE VERY USEFUL.

4. THREE NIGERIANS WERE REPORTEDLY INJURED IN THE ATTACK ON THE VIENNA AIRPORT IN DECEMBER 1985, BUT ONLY ONE NIGERIAN PAPER PICKED UP THE STORY AND THEN PROMPTLY DROPPED IT. THERE WAS NO SUBSEQUENT MEDIA COVERAGE OR INTEREST IN THE INJURED NIGERIANS. POST WOULD LIKE TO DETERMINE IF EMBASSY VIENNA HAS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THOSE INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING NAMES (WHICH LOCAL PAPER DID NOT HAVE) AND ADDRESSES IF KNOWN. WE

WANT TO FOLLOW UP AND FIND THE NIGERIANS INVOLVED FOR POSSIBLE MEDIA PLAY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SINCE THEY WERE AT THE AIRPORT AND APPARENTLY TRAVELING, THIS MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE, BUT WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN THEIR NAMES AND ADDRESSES.

5. STATEMENTS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD, CONDEMNING LIBYAN ACTIVITIES WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. INDIA, WE UNDERSTAND, RECENTLY CAUTIONED THE LIBYAN EMBASSY ABOUT RECRUITING FOR QADHAFI'S "ISLAMIC LEGION."

6. REFTEL PROPOSED MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES WITH HIGH-LEVEL U.S. OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS TERRORISM. MUCH OF THE NIGERIAN-GENERATED NEWS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES COMES FROM TWO NEWS AGENCY OF NIGERIA CORRESPONDENTS BASED IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON. THESE WOULD BE IDEAL JOURNALISTS TO INCLUDE IN IMPORTANT BRIEFINGS. IN NEW YORK, THE NAM CORRESPONDENT IS TONY IDIGO, AT (212) 688-4588 OR (212) 754-5135. IN WASHINGTON, HE IS BISI OLAMUNHI; AT (202) 662-7311.

7. FINALLY, REFTEL ALSO MENTIONS A SPECIAL IV PROJECT ON TERRORISM. POST SUPPORTS THIS IDEA AND WOULD LIKE TO NOMINATE A CANDIDATE IF PROJECT MATERIALIZES. PLEASE ADVISE.

MONBLATT, ACTING
BT
#5809

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

BY AW NARA DATE 5/20/12

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PAGE 11

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POST'S PLAN OF ACTION

P 211100Z MAR 66
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO WASHDC/STATE (2) AND PRIORITY 4573
RUMELAND/IN WASHDC PRIORITY 7692
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RIGHT STATE/USIA M. TICE

E.O. 12958: DECLASSIFY
DATE: 08/05, 09/01, 09/17
EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION EXCEPT ON COUNTERRING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 008710

1. IS - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE SITUATION: THE POST HAS GIVEN CAREFUL
CONSIDERATION TO LIBYAN AND KENYAN OPINIONS, IN
CONSULTATION WITH AMERICAN AND KENYAN RESIDENTS, THE
FOLLOWING RESPONSE: THIS MESSAGE IS DIVIDED INTO TWO
SECTIONS: (1) A DESCRIPTION OF THE LIBYAN
ORIGINATED SUPPORT OF THE 1970 U.S.-LIBYAN
RELATIONS, AND (2) A PLAN OF ACTION TO ADDRESS INTO
ACCOUNT THIS LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS ELEMENT.

LIBYAN COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT ON 1000Z 66

U.S.-LIBYAN RELATIONS

3. KENYA IS A REVERBERAL FACTOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL
DISCUSSION OF U.S.-LIBYAN RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF USG
PAID LAST MONTH OF LIBYAN. THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT, FOR
EXAMPLE, DID NOT PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE
FRAMULATION OF STRONG CONDEMNATIONS OF THE PAIDS
ISSUED BY THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY -- EVEN THOUGH KENYA IS
A MEMBER OF BOTH. THE BRIEF OFFICIAL FOR STATEMENT
ISSUED AFTER THE PAIDS SIMPLY EXPRESSED "GRAVE
CONCERN" AND APPEALED TO BOTH PARTIES TO "EXERCISE
UTMOST RESTRAINT" AND TO "UTILIZE THE ESTABLISHED
INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
DIFFERENCES..."

4. EDITORIALS IN THE KENYAN PRESS, ON THE OTHER
HAND, WERE PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF U.S. ACTIONS. THE
POST HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH EDITORS AND GAVE WIDE
DISTRIBUTION TO MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT CONTACTS OF THE
USG "FACT SHEETS" ON LIBYAN TERRORISM. ALTHOUGH THE
EDITORS EXPRESSED SOME DEGREE OF SYMPATHY FOR AND
UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. ACTIONS, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
OF THIS IN SUBSEQUENT EDITORIAL COMMENTS OR ARTICLES
ON THE ISSUE. IN THIS RESPECT, THESE CONTACTS SEEMED
TO CONFORM TO THE EXPERIENCE ELSEWHERE -- THAT
EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING ARE NOT
DIFFICULT TO HEAR IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION, BUT ARE
RARELY TRANSLATED INTO PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE NOTICED THAT LETTERS
TO THE EDITOR IN THE KENYAN PRESS SEEM TO BE SPLIT
ABOUT IN HALF BETWEEN THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE U.S.
ACTION AND THOSE WHO EXPRESS SOME DEGREE OF SUPPORT
FOR THE ACTION. THE FEW LETTERS THE EMBASSY ITSELF

6. GIVEN THE COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT DESCRIBED
ABOVE AND DRAWING ON THE POINTS OUTLINED IN REFREL,
THE POST HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES FOR
ACTION IN DEALING WITH THE KENYAN PUBLIC AND WITH
KENYAN POLICY FORMULATORS ON THIS ISSUE. FIRST, WE
WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY TO USG POLICY
STATEMENTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION IN THE
DISSEMINATION OF PRINTED MATERIALS. SECOND, WE WILL
CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE USG VIEWS ON LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN PRIVATE CONTACTS WITH KEY
KENYAN GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIC AND MEDIA
REPRESENTATIVES. THIRD, WE WILL BE MOST RECEPTIVE TO
AGENCY INFORMATION PRODUCTS WHICH WOULD HELP US
ARTICULATE USG VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE KENYAN
PUBLIC AND TO KENYAN POLICY FORMULATORS.

7. IN THE LAST OR SO DAY, WE WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE
THAT THE AGENCY PREPARE AND SEND TO POSTS IN SMALL
PAMPHLET FORM A CHRONOLOGY OF LIBYAN TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES, ACTIONS TAKEN BY U.S. AND OTHER
GOVERNMENTS AGAINST LIBYA, AND EFFORTS BY THE U.S. TO
RESOLVE DIFFERENCES -- IN LIBYA THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
MEANS. WE HAVE IN MIND THE FORMAT WHICH IS USED IN
AGENCY PAMPHLETS AND THEIR UPDATED VERSIONS
HIGHLIGHTING THE CHRONOLOGY OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL
INITIATIVES. WE BELIEVE THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE
INDIVIDUAL EVENTS MAY BE RECALLED BY OUR AUDIENCES, A
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BY RW NARA DATE 10/14/11

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P 211406Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4974
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 7893

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 NAIROBI 19336

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OPRC, SCUL, KE, LY
SUBJ: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING

SINGLE COMPILATION OF THESE EVENTS IN ONE DOCUMENT
WOULD BE AN IMPRESSIVE AND EASY-TO-REFERENCE
INDICTMENT OF LIBYAN POLICY.

8. WE WOULD ALSO BE RECEPTIVE AND WOULD GIVE WIDE
DISTRIBUTION TO WIRELESS FILE BACKGROUNDEERS OF THE
TYPE DESCRIBED IN REFTEL. FEATURES ON VOA (REFTEL)
WOULD REACH AN ADDITIONAL AUDIENCE. IF THE AGENCY
PRODUCED A VCR OR FILM ON THE SUBJECT, WE COULD USE
IT TO GOOD PURPOSE IN PUBLIC AND INVITATIONAL
AUDIENCES AT THE USIS CULTURAL CENTER AND IN OTHER
SUITABLE FORA. ALTHOUGH WE SEE LITTLE PROSPECT OF
PLACING SUCH AN ITEM ON VOICE OF PENYA TELEVISION.

9. WE ARE LESS SANGUINE ABOUT PARTICIPATING IN AN
AFNET ON THE SUBJECT. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A PROGRAM
WOULD CREATE A FORUM FOR KHEVANS WHO WOULD FEEL
COMPELLED TO STRIKE A POSTURE CRITICAL OF U.S. POLICY
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND TO POSE LOADED OBJECTIONS TO
THE WASHINGTON CRIST, EVINCING THE ATTITUDES
DESCRIBED ABOVE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH PENYAN EDITORS.

THOMAS

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22/0709Z

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
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PP-01 PPFA-01 PPF-01 VBRA-01 VBB-01 VBXC-01 VBXN-01
VBR-01 /023 A1 10

O 211630Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2113
BT
SECRET NIAMEY 03782

USIA

FOR P/G

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. S/- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POST SUPPORTS SUBJECT PLAN IN ITS BROAD OUTLINE, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF IT WOULD NOT BE APPLICABLE IN OUR ENVIRONMENT. HERETOFORE, US ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA HAVE MET WITH QUIET APPROVAL AT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE GON, WHERE LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR AND A GREAT DEAL OF WARINESS TOWARD QADHAFI PREVAILS. HOWEVER, THIS APPROVAL HAS NOT BEEN EXPRESSED PUBLICLY AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BE. RECENT US-LIBYA EVENTS, IF COVERED AT ALL BY THE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED PRESS, HAVE BEEN REPORTED WITHOUT COMMENT. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT CERTAIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR MEDIA ACTORS WOULD NOT MAKE GOOD TARGETS FOR AN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN DEALING WITH LIBYA'S ROLE IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM, OR THAT FUTURE EVENTS WOULD NOT LEAD TO MORE PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE ISSUE.

3. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO PROVIDE, WITHOUT FANFARE, DOCUMENTATION CONFIRMING THE LIBYAN ROLE TO SELECTED CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA, AND MORE BROADLY IN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY WHERE THE MOST SCEPTICISM TOWARD THE US POSITION LIES. THIS DOCUMENTATION WOULD BEST INCLUDE EVIDENCE OF A "SMOKING GUN" IN QADHAFI'S HAND AND SUPPORT FOR THE US POSITION FROM LEADERS IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US, INCLUDING THE MOSELM WORLD AND ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. NEEDLESS TO SAY, FRENCH LANGUAGE VERSIONS OF WHATEVER MATERIAL SUPPLIED WOULD BE ESSENTIAL.
BOGOSIAN
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BY CU NARA, DATE 5/22/12

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R 191445Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA *INF*
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 5342
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0343
BT
CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA 03819

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP, EICL, TV, AND AP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PROP, LY
SUBJ: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: (A) USIA 34711; (B) USIA 34713

1. AS MISSION AND MEDIA REACTION REPORTING DOCUMENTS, THE GOG AND ITS MEDIA APPEAR STRIDENTLY (AND TO MANY GHANAIANS REPUGNANTLY) PRO-QADHAFI. WITHIN THE LIMITS THIS IMPOSES WE MUST STEER CLEAR OF SEEMING TO EMULATE THE OVERSTATEMENT AND HYSTERIA WHICH CHARACTERIZE THE LIBYAN/US ISSUE HERE TO DATE. THANKS TO OUR POPULAR BI-WEEKLY PUBLICATION, AMANEE, AND EXCELLENT SUPPORT FROM P/PFA THROUGH USINFO AND AF FILE CHANNELS, OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, MOST ESPECIALLY BY REAGAN AND WALTERS, HAVE BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE. THE WEEKLY ABC NEWS, NOW SHOWN TWELVE TIMES A WEEK TO AN INVARIABLY JAMMED HOUSE, HAS HAD MAJOR IMPACT OF A MOST POSITIVE SORT AMONG ITS LIMITED AUDIENCE. APART FROM FIRST-CLASS AGENCY MATERIAL WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING THERE ARE, HOWEVER, MODEST BUT IMPORTANT MEASURES WHICH COULD HELP GREATLY.

2. ACTION REQUESTED:

-- AUTHORITY TO SHOW SELECTED ABC NEWS VCR'S OFF USG ~~PREMIER WITHOUT AN AMERICAN OFFICER PRESENT TO KEY AUDIENCES (E. G. MILITARY, JOURNALISTS);~~

*No can do
(per TV/PO)*

-- IMMEDIATE PROVISION OF 25 COPIES EACH (AT AGENCY EXPENSE) OF IMPORTANT ANALYTICAL WORKS ON QADHAFI AND TERRORISM, I. E. BOOKS SUCH AS COOLEY'S BIOGRAPHY, MONOGRAPHS, ETC. SUCH DOCUMENTATION WOULD BE STUDIED AND TREASURED BY MANY THOUGHTFUL GHANAIANS AT HIGH LEVELS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, IT WOULD SUPPORT ONE OF THE MISSION'S MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCES -- POLITICAL OFFICER ALAN ROY, PREVIOUSLY ON THE DOS LIBYAN DESK AND AN ELOQUENT SPEAKER. SIMILAR COLLECTION RUSHED TO OUR LIBRARY SHELVES WOULD BE ANOTHER SIMPLE BUT SIGNIFICANT HELP, GIVEN OUR LIBRARY STAFF OF ONE.

JONES
BT
#3819

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
NARA, DATE 5/20/12
BY *CL*

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~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

PAGE 01

019341 ICA539
15/1111Z

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AF-05 E-08 /018 A3 1

O 151107Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2558
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0277
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1122
BT
SECRET ANTANANARIVO 01865

Substantiate

USIS

USIA FOR P/G LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP
AND E/VGA STATE FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
WORKING GROUP AND AF/E, BOB SNYDER

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: NY, USUN LIBYA/TERRORISM BRIEFING FOR IV
- REMY RALIBERA BEFORE DEPARTURE MAY 24

REF: (A) USIA 34711, (B) USIA 34713

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. POST STRONGLY URGES THAT AN APPOINTMENT BE MADE FOR
IV FATHER REMY RALIBERA AT THE USUN DURING HIS UPCOMING
STAY IN NYC, MAY 21 THROUGH 24. (CONTACT IN NY: USIA
PRESS CENTER.) HE SHOULD BE BRIEFED ON ALL ASPECTS OF
THE LIBYAN/TERRORISM PROBLEM COVERED IN REFTELS.
RALIBERA IS EDITOR OF THE INFLUENTIAL CATHOLIC WEEKLY,
"LAKROA," ONE OF THE FEW FRANK, FORTHRIGHT AND INDE-
PENDENT PUBLICATIONS IN MADAGASCAR.

3. POST'S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO REFTELS WILL FOLLOW
SEPTEL. TORMEY, ACTING
BT
#1865

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 27, 1997
BY CS NARA, DATE 5/22/12

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PAGE 01

028743 ICA971
21/1349Z

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AF-05 P-01 /011 A3 1

R 211222Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 2660
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5137
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 02901

USIA

FOR LIBYAN TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS

REF: USIA 34713

1. GIVEN LOCAL CONDITIONS AND SENSITIVITIES, POST HAD ALREADY PLANNED ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT TWO AUDIENCES: GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKERS AND INFORMATION SOURCES; AND GENERAL AUDIENCE THAT UTILIZES CENTER AND LIBRARY.
2. FIRST AUDIENCE HAS BEEN TARGETED TO RECEIVE ALL AVAIL-ABLE POLICY TEXTS (IN FRENCH, FROM WIRELESS FILE AND ARS/PARIS IN USA DOCUMENT SERIES) AND RELATED BACK-GROUND MATERIALS.
3. PROGRAM OF SEVERAL ENGLISH LANGUAGE VIDEO TAPES ON EVENTS LEADING UP TO AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTACK ON LIBYA AND INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS (BACKGROUND AND TEXTS IN FRENCH AND ENGLISH INCLUDING STATE POLICY STATEMENTS) IS SCHEDULED FOR SECOND AUDIENCE.
JACQUETTE
BT
#2901

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY AL NARA, DATE 5/22/12

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PAGE 01

028677 ICA925
21/1338Z

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AF-05 P-01 /011 A3 1

R 211208Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4058
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5438
BT
SECRET LIBREVILLE 01611

USIA

USIA FOR P/G
STATE FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POST AND EMBASSY STRONGLY SUPPORT COORDINATED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACH OUTLINED REFTTEL. THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GABONESE GOVERNMENT ARE SOLIDLY BEHIND OUR ACTIONS ON LIBYA/TERRORISM, AND MEDIA COMMENTARY HAS BEEN LIMITED AND MODERATE. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT SECTOR OF PUBLIC OPINION IN GABON THAT REQUIRES ACTIVE COUNTERING. WE WOULD UNDERLINE TWO FOCI FOR THE WORKING GROUP WITH REGARD TO OUR LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT:
 - A. GABON RECEIVES A LARGE PROPORTION OF ITS INFORMATION THROUGH FRANCE. PLACEMENT IN AND CONCENTRATION ON FRENCH-BASED MEDIA (AFP, THE MAJOR TELEVISION CHANNELS, JEUNE AFRIQUE, RFI, ETC.) WILL YIELD DIVIDENDS HERE AND THROUGHOUT FRANCOPHONE AFRICA.
 - B. NOW THAT THE IMMEDIATE WAVE OF DIPLOMATIC AND MEDIA ATTENTION FOLLOWING OUR HUMILIATION OF KADAFI HAS ABATED, WE WILL NEED TO DRAW OUR INTERLOCUTORS ATTENTION WITH DOCUMENTARY, PHOTOGRAPHIC, AND OTHER INDISPUTABLE FACTUAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT OUR ARGUMENTS. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO RE-EXAMINE DECLASSIFICATION OF HITHERTO SECRET INFORMATION TO MEET THE NEEDS OF EFFECTIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.

3. THIS MESSAGE WAS JOINTLY DRAFTED BY PAO AND CHARGE.
HART
BT
#1611

~~SECRET~~

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 24, 1997
BY NARA, DATE 5/27/12

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PAGE 01

026908 ICA071
20/16072

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 VG-01 DIS-01 AF-05 NEA-03 PR-01 PGF-02
PP-01 PPFA-01 PPFN-02 PPF-01 VOAM-01 VBRA-01 VBB-01
VBXC-01 VBXN-01 VBN-01 VBR-01 /029 A1 5

R 201544Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4568
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4698
BT
SECRET MONROVIA 05536
USIA

USIA FOR P/G, INFO AF MONK. STATE FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP.

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OPRC, PTER
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. A/PAO AND POLOFF HAVE DISCUSSED REF CABLE AND ITS
APPLICATION IN LIBERIA. FOLLOWING IS OUR CONSENSUS
OPINION CONCERNING BEST POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION THIS
COUNTRY:

A. THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA AND THE LIBERIAN PUBLIC
ARE ALREADY PRO-U.S. ON THE LIBYAN ISSUE. A MASSIVE
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN CONCERNING THIS MATTER WOULD
BE, IN LIBERIA, PUSHING ON AN ALREADY OPEN DOOR.

B. LIBERIA HAS BEEN HELPFUL ON THE LIBYAN QUESTION IN
THE OAU BUT, UNDERSTANDABLY, DOES NOT WANT TO BE "OUT
FRONT" ON U.S.-SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL ISSUES BECAUSE
IT CONJURES UP THE IMAGE OF LIBERIA AS A PUPPET STATE.

C. PRIVATE FORA SUGGESTED FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS
ARE IN LIBERIA ALMOST COMPLETELY ABSORBED IN DOMESTIC,
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.

D. POST WILL CONTINUE TO FEED WIRELESS FILE STORIES
TO MEDIA, CONDUCT PRIVATE BRIEFINGS OF GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND REPORT RESULTS.

E. IN SUMMARY, POST AND MISSION BELIEVE WE ARE ALREADY
GETTING THE MAXIMUM COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE WHICH WE
ARE LIKELY TO GET IN LIBERIA. KEY

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/14/16

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PAGE 01

019409 ICA572
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019409 ICA572

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AF-05 NEA-03 P-01 /014 A3 1

R 151143Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 3374
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7416
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PORT LOUIS 01357

CORRECTED COPY (ADDING DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS)

USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJ: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: (A) USIA 34713 (B) PORT LOUIS 762
(C) PORT LOUIS 1111

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. POST APPRECIATES GUIDANCE PROVIDED REFTEL A. ALTHOUGH MAURITIUS HAS ACQUIESCED TO OAU AND NAM RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING U.S. BOMBINGS IN LIBYA, THE GOM HAS NO SYMPATHY FOR LIBYAN TERRORISM. THIS WAS PUBLICLY SHOWN BY THE VERY BALANCED STATEMENT IT ISSUED AFTER U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA ON APRIL 14 (REFTEL B). FURTHER, THE GOM ACTED PROMPTLY WHEN INFORMED BY THE EMBASSY OF POTENTIAL THREATS AGAINST THE MISSION FROM A FEW PRO-LIBYAN HOtheads FROM THE SMALL FUNDAMENTALIST MOSLEM COMMUNITY HERE. TWO YEARS AGO, THE GOM CLOSED THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN MAURITIUS ON SIX HOURS' NOTICE AFTER IT WAS PERCEIVED THAT THE BUREAU WAS MEDDLING IN INTERNAL POLITICS AND STIRRING UP TROUBLE BETWEEN MOSLEMS AND HINDUS IN MAURITIUS (REFTEL C). IN LIGHT OF THESE ACTIONS, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT THE GOM TAKES SERIOUSLY LIBYA'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, IS COMMITTED TO PRIVATELY SUPPORTING U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA, AND WILL CONTINUE ITS EVEN-HANDED PUBLIC STANCE. ANY REQUESTS BY THE USG FOR MORE PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF LIBYA BY THE GOM WOULD BE UNWELCOME INASMUCH AS THEY COULD DAMAGE MAURITIUS' CREDIBILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND REDUCE ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A MODERATING FORCE IN THE NAM AND OAU.

3. THE LOCAL PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA FUNCTION IN THE CONTEXT OF A LIVELY PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. THEY ARE ALL OPEN TO USIA MEDIA PRODUCTS AND ALL CARRIED EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE U.S. POSITION AFTER THE RECENT U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA. SEVERAL CARRIED POST-SUPPLIED FULL TEXTS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH. EXCEPT FOR TWO SMALL LIBYAN SUPPORTED WEEKLIES, WHICH HAVE NO CREDIBILITY OUTSIDE THE FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIM COMMUNITY, ALL MEDIA WERE EVEN-HANDED IN ITS TREATMENT OF THE U.S.'S ACTIONS.

4. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS LIBYA'S SUPPORT FOR WORLDWIDE TERRORISM ON A ONE-ON-ONE BASIS WITH GOM OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS AND OTHER MAURITIANS. WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO DISSEMINATE APPROPRIATE MEDIA PRODUCTS ON THIS THEME AS THEY ARE RECEIVED, TO HIGHLIGHT THEIR IMPORTANCE, AND TO REPORT ON THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. WE DO NOT FEEL THAT ANY NEW, HIGH-PROFILE INITIATIVE IS JUSTIFIED AT THIS TIME. CONNERS
BT

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 10/14/14

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PAGE 01

028918 ICA073
21/1504Z

028918 ICA073

ACTION OFFICE EU-03
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 VG-01 DIS-01 PG-01 PR-01 PGF-02 PP-01
PPFN-02 PPF-01 VOAM-01 VBB-01 VBXC-01 VBXN-01 VBN-01
VBR-01 /022 A1 5

O 211500Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5554
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9488
RUEHNT/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 9098
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ATHENS 09543
USIA

TERRORISM. POST CAN PUT TO GOOD USE ALL THE
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL WE CAN GET ON THIS SUBJECT,
ESPECIALLY BACKGROUNDBERS AND PIECES ON CURRENT
STATE OF AFFAIRS INSIDE LIBYA, WHICH MEET WITH
GROWING INTEREST HERE AMONG TARGET AUDIENCES.
WOZNIAK
BT
#9543

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AWA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
- LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713-C

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POST WELCOMES ACTION PLAN DEVELOPED REF AND FINDS TOPICS LISTED IN PARA 6 OF REF HIGHLY APPROPRIATE TO HOST COUNTRY PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS. POST'S PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION CONCENTRATE MAINLY ON MEDIA ACTIVITY AND PRESS PLACEMENTS (NOTE THAT IN LATTER HALF OF PLANNED SIXTY-DAY PERIOD, MANY KEY CONTACTS HERE WILL BE ON VACATION, BUT ATHENS PRESS IS DISTRIBUTED NATIONALLY AND SO WILL CONTINUE TO REACH THEM).
3. GOG HAS ANNOUNCED VISIT TO ATHENS OF SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD MAY 26-28. VISIT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REVIVE COMMENTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN SOME SECTORS OF LOCAL PRESS, TO THE EFFECT THAT PROOF OF LIBYA'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM IS NO GREATER THAN SYRIA'S, AND THUS THAT USG IS IN EFFECT OPERATING ON DOUBLE STANDARD IN TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE FORMER BUT NOT THE LATTER. ANY ADDITIONAL MATERIALS ON THE PARTICULARLY COMPELLING NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST LIBYA, PRESS GUIDANCE, ETC., WILL BE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT FOR POST IN THIS TIME PERIOD.
4. IN RECENT WEEKS, POST HAS DISTRIBUTED MANY USG PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM FROM ALLIED MEETINGS SUCH AS TOKYO SUMMIT (SEE PARA 3 OF REF) TO PRESS AND DRS MEMBERSHIP; CONDUCTED A TELEPRESS CONFERENCE ON LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM WHICH GOT PROMINENT FRONT-PAGE PRESS COVERAGE HERE; INTENSIFIED CONTACTS WITH POLITICAL SCIENCE GROUPS ON USG CONCERN OVER THE ISSUE OF UNITED ACTION IN THE FACE OF LIBYAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY, ETC.
5. ADDITIONAL TELEPRESS CONFERENCES ON SUBJECT IN NEAR FUTURE COULD RISK REDUNDANCY UNLESS A VERY HIGH-LEVEL ADMINISTRATION SPOKESPERSON WAS INVOLVED OR UNLESS SOME MAJOR LATE-BREAKING NEWS EVENT WAS DISCUSSED.
6. THE WIRELESS FILE HAS BEEN AN INVALUABLE TOOL IN EXPLAINING AND CREATING UNDERSTANDING FOR USG MEMBERS AND POLICY ON LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN

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BY aj DATE 5/20/12

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UNITED STATES
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PAGE 01

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21/1402Z

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028702 ICA001

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 P-01 EU-03 /009 A3 1

O 211402Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2066
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2741

BT
~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 05444

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: (A) USIA 034713-S, (B) USIA 034711-S

1. POST BELIEVES THAT THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN
OUTLINED IN REF A IS A GOOD GENERAL APPROACH TO THE ISSUE.
HOWEVER, WE HAVE A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLAN AS IT
NOW EXISTS AND ON THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS LIKELY TO BE
ENCOUNTERED IN TURKEY.

2. WE ENDORSE THE CALL FOR "MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES"
AT A HIGH LEVEL, URGING HEAVY USE OF WORLDNET TIME FOR
TERRORISM-RELATED PROGRAMMING AND FREQUENT ACCESS TO
RANKING AMERICAN OFFICIALS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
FOREIGN MEDIA. IN OUR VIEW, THE LEAST PRODUCTIVE
SUGGESTION IN THE ACTION PLAN IS LIKELY TO BE THE CALL
FOR GREATER INTERACTION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
GROUPS, SINCE IN OUR EXPERIENCE GROUPS OF THIS NATURE
ARE GENERALLY OPPOSED TO ARMED RETALIATION BY THE
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM AND PRONE TO EQUATE RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM WITH TERRORISM ITSELF.

3. IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, WHEN IT COMES TO ARMED CONFLICT,
NO AMOUNT OF PROOF OF QADAFI'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM
WILL COMPLETELY OUTWEIGH THE SYMPATHY FOR LIBYA
GENERATED BY COMMON OR SIMILAR CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS
BACKGROUNDS. THE TENDENCY AMONG THE MUSLIM MASSES TO
SIDE WITH ANY ISLAMIC COUNTRY IN A MORTAL CONFLICT WITH
ANY CHRISTIAN COUNTRY LIES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
TOO INGRAINED AND MURKY TO BE REMOVED BY OUR EXPLANATIONS
AND EXPRESSIONS OF OUTRAGE. PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF
LIBYAN TERRORISM BY THE LEADERS OF SUCH COUNTRIES WOULD

HELP DRAMATICALLY, BUT MORAL COURAGE IS NOT IN GREAT
SUPPLY THESE DAYS, EVEN AMONG SOME OF THE NATO COUNTRIES.

4. IN TURKEY, A DEGREE OF PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR LIBYA
IS FOUNDED UPON ISLAM, THE DAVID AND GOLIATH COMPLEX,
LIBYA'S SUPPORT FOR TURKEY DURING AND AFTER THE CYPRUS
INTERVENTION OF 1974, BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN TRADE AND
UNPAID DEBTS, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S HESITANCY TO TAKE A
PRINCIPLED STAND. OUR MOST POTENT WEAPON IN THE WAR OF
PERSUASION HAS BEEN THE UNSUCCESSFUL LIBYAN ATTEMPT TO
BLOW UP THE AMERICAN OFFICERS' MESS IN ANKARA IN APRIL
AND THE SUBSEQUENT TURKISH PRESS COVERAGE OF THE
INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIAL OF THE PERPETRATORS. IN
SHORT, GOOD POLICE WORK AND ACCURATE, TIMELY INTELLIGENCE
ARE THE KEY ELEMENTS IN SHAPING PUBLIC OPINION ON
TERRORISM, BOTH IN TURKEY AND ELSEWHERE.

5. FINALLY, SOVIET SUPPORT FOR LIBYA, SYMBOLIZED IN
TURKEY BY THE GRENADES INTENDED FOR THE OFFICERS' OPEN
MESS IN ANKARA, SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AND EXPLOITED
FULLY. SCOTTON

86 MAY 21 A10 : 24

~~SECRET~~

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/14/16

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PAGE 01

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22/1513Z

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
 INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PD-02 NEA-03 PDS-03 EU-03 PP-01
 PPFN-02 TV-02 VOAM-01 TVP-04 TVS-02 TVX-01 VBE-01 VBN-01
 PFFE-01 /032 A1 5

P 221418Z MAY 86
 FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
 TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2705
 INFO RUEHXE/EAST EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0545
 RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 0061
 BT
 S E C R E T BUDAPEST 04581

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
 LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. WE APPRECIATE BOTH THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL CONTENTS OF REFTEL.
 2. OFFICIAL GOH PRONOUNCEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY, AND NOTWITHSTANDING--OR MORE LIKELY--BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE IN LARGE NUMBERS OF LIBYAN STUDENTS IN HUNGARY (WHO ARE TYPICALLY REFERRED TO IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION IN TERMS OF "OVERPAID, OVERSEXED AND OVER HERE") PUBLIC OPINION--PRIVATELY EXPRESSED--CLEARLY FAVORS U. S. MEASURES AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM.
 3. NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN RESTRICTED POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES HERE ESPECIALLY ON THIS TOPIC, WE RELY ON OFFICIAL STATEMENTS FOR DISTRIBUTION THROUGH WIRELESS FILE TO OUR RATHER SUBSTANTIAL SUBSCRIPTION LIST.
 4. AGENCY PAMPHLETS--AND EVEN VCR'S ON REFTEL THEMES--CAN NOW BE DISCREETLY PLACED WITH SUCH FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTIONS AS THE HUNGARIAN COUNTERPART TO FSI.
- CHIKES
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 #4581

SECRET

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 Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21/1997
 BY AL NARA, DATE 5/27/12

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PAGE 01

030588 ICA737
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ACTION OFFICE EU-03
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 VG-01 MS-03 DIS-01 NEA-03 PG-01 PR-01
PGF-02 PP-01 PPFN-02 PPF-01 DR-01 DD-01 VBB-01 VBXC-01
VBXN-01 VBE-01 VBN-01 VBU-02 VBR-01 VOA-02 D-03 PPF-01
/038 A1 10

O 220923Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4814
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5141
INFO RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
BT
~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 08720

"FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP"

USIA FOR EU (RUTH), P/G

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: UR, US, LY, OPRC, PROP
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN COUNTERING LIBYAN
-- SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POST HAS NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE ACTION PLAN OUTLINED REFTEL. THE CABLE CORRECTLY NOTES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF MUCH DISINFORMATION REGARDING LIBYA. THIS WILL NOT CHANGE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, SO LONG AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PERCEIVES IT TO BE IN ITS INTEREST TO SUPPORT LIBYA, AT LEAST RHETORICALLY. WE ARE ADDITIONALLY HAMPERED HERE IN THAT THE SO-CALLED "THIRD COUNTRY RULE" MAKES IT QUITE DIFFICULT FOR US TO DISTRIBUTE GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT LIBYA.
3. GIVEN THESE CONSTRAINTS, WE FEEL THE MOST EFFECTIVE MATERIALS TO DISTRIBUTE TO OUR SELECT LIST OF SOVIET RECIPIENTS IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD ARE OFFICIAL TEXTS FROM THE HIGHEST ADMINISTRATION SOURCES, PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE. SUCH MATERIAL, WHICH WE TRANSLATE INTO RUSSIAN, CAN BE DISTRIBUTED HERE WITHOUT MAJOR PROBLEM. IT DOES GET READ.
4. OF COURSE THE BROADER SOVIET PUBLIC CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY THE RADIO SERVICES: THE VOA, RFE/RL. AS WE HAVE SEEN FROM THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT, THE SOVIET PUBLIC DEFINITELY DOES LISTEN TO THESE STATIONS. THE TOPICS LISTED PARA 6 REFTEL APPEAR APPROPRIATE FOR SOVIET AUDIENCES. PARTICULARLY USEFUL WOULD BE INFORMATION WHICH DEMONSTRATES QADHAFI'S ISOLATION FROM MUCH OF THE ARAB WORLD, AND THE FULL RANGE OF QADHAFI'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. COMBS

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#8720

~~SECRET~~

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NLRRM4421 (#13710)
BY RW NARA DATE 10/14/16

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TELEGRAM

P/G 137102

PAGE 01

029104 ICA155
21/1614Z

029104 ICA155

ACTION OFFICE PG-01
INFO ACO-01 DSC-02 DIS-01 P-01 EU-03 /009 A4 1

P 211428Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 9832
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4415
BT
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 07445

USIS

USIS FOR P/G

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: (A)USIA 34713-C, (B) USIA 2641-C

1. USIS VIENNA WELCOMES THE INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN REFTEL A, AND CONSIDERS MANY OF THEM TO BE POTENTIALLY VERY USEFUL ADDITIONS TO OUR ONGOING ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA.
2. SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS WILL ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO HIGHLIGHT TERRORISM IN THE COMING WEEKS:

-- THE JUST-CONCLUDED VISIT TO VIENNA OF DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER HAS SERVED TO HEIGHTEN AUSTRIAN PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM IN GENERAL. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND QADHAFI'S SUPPORT FOR IT, WERE INCLUDED IN THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AUSTRIA'S LEADERS. A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE AT THIS LEVEL WILL OCCUR DURING THE VISIT OF AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR SINOWATZ TO WASHINGTON, NOW SET FOR JUNE 24.

-- ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL OVER THE HORIZON, THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE, WHICH IS TO CONVENE IN VIENNA IN NOVEMBER, SHOULD PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO REINFORCE WESTERN CONCERNS ABOUT TERRORISM AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE (BASKET III) OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE, AND AS A THREAT TO ALL NATIONS. WE SUGGEST THAT THE WORKING GROUP DISCUSS WITH MEMBERS OF THE FUTURE U.S. DELEGATION THE PLACE TERRORISM SHOULD OCCUPY ON THE CSCE AGENDA, AND THE U.S. APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE IN VIENNA.

3. RE PARA FOUR OF REFTEL A, WE BELIEVE THERE IS WIDESPREAD PUBLIC AWARENESS IN AUSTRIA THAT TERRORISM IS A LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERN; BUT MANY WOULD NOT AGREE THAT THE EUROPEAN APPROACH UNTIL NOW CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS "APPEASEMENT". THIS IS OF COURSE THE HUB OF OUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS CHALLENGE: TO CONVINCING EUROPEANS THAT STRONGER MEANS -- INCLUDING ARMED FORCE -- OF DEALING WITH TERRORISM WILL IN FACT HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT. MOST AUSTRIANS WOULD PROBABLY REJECT COMPARISONS-- IMPLICIT IN REFTEL A -- BETWEEN THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH QADHAFI AND THE INTER-WAR SITUATION WITH HITLER. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION ATTEMPTS ARE LARGELY DISBELIEVED OR INEFFECTIVE. FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT IN VIENNA, WE PERCEIVE WIDESPREAD DISAGREEMENT WITH U.S. RECENT ACTIONS, BUT ALSO A DEGREE OF PUBLIC APPRECIATION FOR THE POSITION IN WHICH THE U.S. FOUND ITSELF AFTER THE MOST RECENT SERIES OF TERRORIST OUTRAGES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SOVIET EFFORTS WILL WORSEN WHAT CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN HONEST DISAGREEMENT OVER TACTICS BETWEEN TWO CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS AND

PEOPLES.

4. WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS OF THOSE CONTAINED IN REFTEL A WOULD BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE GIVEN THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH WE OPERATE:

-- A SERIES OF WORLDNET INTERACTIVES WITH HIGH-LEVEL ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, WHO CAN BE AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE CONCERNING EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN COMPLICITY IN TERRORIST ACTS. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH INTERACTIVES WOULD BE TO GENERATE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH THIS SUBJECT MATTER, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, TO GENERATE NEWS COPY.

-- ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEWS WITH TOP ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WOULD BE EAGERLY RECEIVED HERE. WE HAVE MET WITH MIXED SUCCESS IN RECENT ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE JUST SUCH INTERVIEWS THROUGH USIA FOR PROMINENT AUSTRIAN JOURNALISTS, WHO ARE EAGER TO WRITE ON THIS SUBJECT.

-- WE ALSO WOULD BE INTERESTED IN NOMINATING PARTICIPANTS FOR AN I.V. PROJECT. IN THE INTERIM, AS PER THE SUGGESTION IN REFTEL A, OUR TWO JOURNALIST PARTICIPANTS IN THE ONGOING "CURRENT ISSUES IN ARMS CONTROL" REGIONAL PROJECT, PETER MARTOS AND ERHARD STACKL, SHOULD BE BRIEFED.

-- AMERICAN PARTICIPANT TOURS WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL, PARTICULARLY IF THE INDIVIDUALS SELECTED COULD SPEAK FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND HAVE NEWSWORTHY THINGS TO SAY.

-- UNDER OTHER ACTIVITIES LISTED IN THE REFTEL, WE

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FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING

PARTICULARLY WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF INCREASED INFORMATION ON "UNCLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIED DATA ON TERRORIST GROUPS, NETWORKS, BANKING TRANSACTIONS, ETC." THE MORE SUCH HARD DATA WE CAN PRODUCE, THE MORE UNTENABLE WILL ARGUMENTS ABOUT LACK OF JUSTIFICATION FOR CONCERTED ACTION BECOME. THE CHRONOLOGY OF LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND A LISTING OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN EUROPE WOULD ALSO BE VERY USEFUL.

-- WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, PERCEIVE THAT A TV/FILM DOCUMENTARY ON TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WOULD BE USEFUL HERE.. AUSTRIAN STATE TELEVISION WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE INTERESTED IN AIRING SUCH A PRODUCT, AND OTHER USES WOULD BE LIMITED.

5. WE LOOK FORWARD EAGERLY TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE INITIATIVES, AND PARTICULARLY TO ENHANCED ACCESSIBILITY OF OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN ON THIS SUBJECT. KOOB

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USIA FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PL

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN FOR COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE OFFICIAL POLISH POSITION WHICH WILL BE AND HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED MEDIA HAS FOLLOWED AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN EVERY RESPECT. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A LARGE PORTION OF THE POLISH PUBLIC WHICH (THANKS PRIMARILY TO FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS) IS WELL INFORMED ON THE LIBYAN ISSUE. JUDGING FROM THE TELEPHONE CALLS AND LETTERS TO THE QHTOOEEN TO MONITOR CAREFULLY THE POLISH PRESS AND TO RESPOND TO SPECIFIC ARTICLES WITH LETTERS FROM THE IO OR PAO STATING U. S. POSITIONS AND PROVIDING AS MUCH FACTUAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS EFFORT, TIMELY AND COMPREHENSIVE WIRELESS FILE COVERAGE IS INVALUABLE.

5. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING (BUT WE WILL SAY IT ANYWAY) THAT, BECAUSE FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS ARE SO IMPORTANT TO THE POLISH PUBLIC, VOA PROGRAMMING IS ABSOLUTELY IRREPLACEABLE IN THIS EFFORT.

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USIA

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
 - LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT
2. THIS MISSION FULLY SUPPORTS 60-DAY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AS DESCRIBED REFTEL. BECAUSE OF MALTA'S PROXIMITY TO LIBYA AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOM AND LIBYA THIS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT HERE.
3. PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO AND CRITICISM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS STRONG IN MALTA AND FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED IN THE INDEPENDENT PAPERS THE TIMES/SUNDAY TIMES AS WELL AS IN THE OPPOSITION NATIONALIST PARTY PRESS. THE LABOR PARTY/GENERAL WORKERS UNION PRESS AND XANDIR MALTA, LIKEWISE, OPPOSE TERRORISM, BUT HAVE DESCRIBED THE U. S. ATTACK ON LIBYA AS AN ACT OF TERRORISM ITSELF. ALL SECTORS OF MALTESE PUBLIC OPINION ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS TO MALTA FROM ANY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA. MALTESE ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT WITH LIBYA, IN THE FORM OF EMPLOYMENT FOR MALTESE IN LIBYA AND LIBYAN INVESTMENTS IN MALTA, MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GOM TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM LIBYA. HOWEVER, THE MORE SPECIFIC EVIDENCE WE CAN PUT BEFORE THE MALTESE PUBLIC, THE STRONGER WILL BE MALTESE OPPOSITION TO LIBYAN-SUPPORTED TERRORISM AND THE HIGHER THE PROBABILITY OF THE GOM LIMITING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE QADHAFI REGIME.
4. THE KINDS OF MATERIALS DESCRIBED PARA 6 REFTEL, IN A FORMAT SUITABLE FOR PRESS PLACEMENT, WILL BE MOST USEFUL. WE DO NOT SEE ANY ROLE FOR AN AMPART ON THIS SUBJECT, ALTHOUGH ALL OTHER IDEAS REFTEL WOULD BE APPLICABLE HERE.

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SECSTATE FOR LIBYA TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PROP, CZ, US
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713-S

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. GIVEN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS CLIMATE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
ONE OF THE MOST LOYAL SOVIET ALLIES AND A FIRM "FRIEND"
OF LIBYA, THERE IS LITTLE ACCEPTANCE OF OUR MESSAGE
WITHIN THE AUDIENCE OF GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA LEADERS HERE.

3. AS WITH OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, THIS MISSION
WILL CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS ON FOREIGN MINISTRY
AND OTHER OFFICIALS WHO, WHILE PUBLICALLY DISPUTING
OUR POSITION, MAY BE REACHABLE BENEATH THE SURFACE
AND OVER THE LONG TERM. CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA
WILL ADHERE ONE-HUNDRED PERCENT TO THE SOVIET POSITION
VIS-A-VIS LIBYA.

4. VOICE OF AMERICA IS
EFFECTIVE AND
THE ~~LIBYAN~~ MAN IN THE STREET AS WELL AS OFFICIALS
AND INTELLECTUALS BECAUSE OF THE WIDESPREAD LISTENERSHIP
AND THE HIGH DEGREE OF RELIABILITY AND CREDIBILITY ENJOYED
BY VOA ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND, PARTICULARLY, CZECH/SLOVAK
LANGUAGE BROADCASTS.

5. THIS IS A MISSION-CLEARED CABLE. SCHMIDT

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USIA FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE ARE IN GENERAL ACCORD WITH THE PROPOSED PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN OUTLINED IN THE REFTEL. FRANCE
HAS BEEN VERY MUCH AT THE CENTER OF THE TERRORIST
HAELSTROM, BOTH AS A VICTIM AND AS AN ACTIVE COMBATANT
AGAINST TERRORISM.

3. AS A CONSEQUENCE, TERRORISM HAS BEEN VERY MUCH ON
THE MINDS OF THE PRESS HERE AND WE HAVE BEEN ACTIVE ON
THE SUBJECT FOR MANY MONTHS. MANY OF THE IDEAS
OUTLINED IN THE REFTEL (ESP. PARAS THREE AND SIX) ARE
CONSISTENT WITH OUR ACTIVITIES IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN
ENGAGED -- MEDIA EXPOSURE FOR SENIOR ADMINISTRATION
OFFICIALS (E.G. DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD);
FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE TO JOURNALISTS INTERESTED IN
TERRORISM AND TRAVELLING TO THE U.S. (SEE SEPTEL EN
ROUTE REQUESTING ASSISTANCE ON BEHALF OF
"INTERSCOOP"); POST BACKGROUNDEERS FOR BOTH FRENCH AND
AMERICAN JOURNALISTS; WORLDNET (E.G. WITH OAKLEY, ON
LIBYA, ETC.); DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED MATERIALS. WE
WOULD WELCOME ENHANCED OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRENCH
JOURNALISTS SUCH AS THOSE OUTLINED IN PARA SIX (MEDIA
OPPORTUNITIES, HIGH LEVEL I.V. PROJECT) AND WOULD HAVE
NO TROUBLE COMING UP WITH WELL-QUALIFIED, INFLUENTIAL
JOURNALISTS TO PARTICIPATE.

4. WE DO HAVE A FEW SPECIFIC QUESTIONS/MISGIVINGS
WHICH WE WILL RAISE HERE:

- PARA THREE'S PROPOSAL FOR INTENSIFIED CONTACTS WITH
AND THE EXPLORATION OF "TANGIBLE ACTIONS" BY
ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS PILOTS' ASSOCIATION, TRAVEL
INDUSTRY, ETC. REQUIRES CLARIFICATION. IT WOULD NOT
BE AN APPROPRIATE USIS ACTIVITY; IF IT WERE TO BE
PURSUED BY EMBASSY OFFICERS, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AND
INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED.

- CONTACT WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS (PARA THREE)
MIGHT PROVE OF LIMITED VALUE. WE SUSPECT THAT
ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN FAMINE RELIEF, AID TO AFGHAN
GUERRILLAS OR SUPPORT FOR SOVIET REFUSENIKS WOULD BE
RELUCTANT TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH PUBLIC
STATEMENTS ON LIBYAN TERRORISM, NOT NECESSARILY
BECAUSE THEY DISAGREE BUT BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE UNEASY
ABOUT ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THEIR SPECIFIC
AREA OF INTEREST.

- AMONG THE LIST OF TOPICS ON WHICH MATERIALS WILL BE

PROVIDED (PARA SIX), SOME ITEMS WILL BE OF MORE
INTEREST TO OUR AUDIENCES THAN OTHERS. IN GENERAL,
THE FRENCH WILL BE MORE INTERESTED IN SPECIFIC FACTS
AND FIGURES (E.G. DESCRIPTION OF TERRORIST TRAINING
CAMPS IN LIBYA) THAN IN GENERAL MATERIALS (E.G.
COMPENDIUM OF BELLICOSE AND (UN)COMPROMISING QADHAFI
STATEMENTS).

- WE ARE DUBIOUS ABOUT THE UTILITY HERE OF A TV FILM
ON TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION (PARA SIX). IN THE FIRST
PLACE, WE DOUBT THAT WE COULD PLACE IT ON TV AND WOULD
HAVE LIMITED USE FOR IT ELSEWHERE. MORE IMPORTANTLY,
THE FRENCH DO NOT LIKE TO PUT INTERNATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT; THEY
BELIEVE THAT PART OF THE EFFICACY OF SUCH
COOPERATION COMES FROM A LACK OF PUBLICITY AND WOULD
PROBABLY NOT WANT TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES, AT LEAST
NOT OVERTLY, WITH A USG FILM ON TERRORISM.

- IN A MORE GENERAL SENSE, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY EFFORT ON TERRORISM MUST BE SELECTIVE AND
MUST CONCENTRATE ON QUALITY RATHER THAN QUANTITY OF
ACTIVITY. ONE OF THE WORST THINGS WE CAN DO IN FRANCE
IS TO SUGGEST AN IRRATIONAL OBSESSION WITH THE
SUBJECT, AND PARTICULARLY WITH LIBYA. FRENCH
AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S., EMANUEL DE HARGERIE, SET THIS
TONE IN AN OP-ED PIECE IN THE MAY 20 EDITION OF THE
NEW YORK TIMES. HE WRITES: "IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED
THAT UNDUE ATTENTION TO TERRORISM MAGNIFIES ITS
EFFECTS A HUNDRED-FOLD. SUCH ATTENTION IS VIRTUAL
ADMISSION THAT TERRORISTS HAVE ACHIEVED ONE OF THEIR
OBJECTIVES." WE WILL HAVE TO RESPECT THIS CONCERN IF
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USIA FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING

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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356 DECL: OADR PAO STEPHEN M. CHAPLIN
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE 86-34 -
- COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR
- TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713 - C

1. POST BELIEVES THAT PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT ON COUNTERING TERRORISM IS LONG OVERDUE AND WE CONGRATULATE AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT FOR BREADTH OF EFFORT PROPOSED IN REFTEL. THIS TELEGRAM WILL RESPOND TO SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED IN REFTEL ABOUT WHAT IS APPLICABLE TO PORTUGUESE SITUATION BUT AT THE OUTSET WE WISH TO EXPRESS OUR CONVICTION THAT WHILE A CONCERTED PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT MUST BE MADE BOTH TO DEFEND OUR ATTACK ON LIBYA AND TO HOLD THE LIBYANS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ROLE IN STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM WE BELIEVE THE EFFORT SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT BROADER AND DEAL WITH THE OVER-ALL THREAT THAT TERRORIST ACTIVITY ANYWHERE (NOT JUST MIDDLE EAST-ORIGINATED) POSES TO THE CITIZENS OF DEMOCRACIES WORLDWIDE. SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD OBVIOUSLY EMPHASIZE THE LIBYAN ROLE BUT WOULD ALSO POINT TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ELSEWHERE WHICH THREATEN THE STABILITY OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS AND THEREBY REINFORCE OUR CONVICTION THAT TERRORISM IS A THREAT COMMON TO US ALL WHATEVER THE SOURCE.

2. REFTEL PARA 3: "POST INVOLVEMENT": POST AGREES WITH GENERAL THRUST OF SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING USIS POSTS. STATEMENTS BY THE GROUPS MENTIONED IN THIS PARAGRAPH WOULD BE HELPFUL, PARTICULARLY BY THOSE INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL TOURISM-RELATED FIELDS, INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND BY PROMINENT EUROPEAN POLITICIANS. IN THE CASE OF PORTUGAL THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT HAS CAUTIOUSLY FOLLOWED THE LEAD OF THE MAJOR EEC MEMBERS AND WAS ONE OF THE LAST TO ACT IN IMPLEMENTING SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO ISOLATE LIBYA. THE MEDIA HAS MADE RELATIVELY LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENT BUT CAREFULLY-CRAFTED BY-LINERS WITH STATISTICS ON THE HUMAN COSTS OF TERRORISM CAN PROBABLY BE PLACED WITH SELECTED JOURNALS. IN THIS REGARD THIS POST PROPOSED IN JANUARY THAT THE LEADING LOCAL NEWSPAPER, "DIARIO DE NOTICIAS" SEND A REPORTER TO THE U.S. FOR WEEK-LONG SERIES OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERTS ON TERRORISM. TO GIVE THE REPORTER A "EUROPEAN FLAVOR" WE ARRANGED FOR HIM TO ALSO SPEAK WITH BRITISH

EXPERTS. THANKS TO ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE AGENCY'S FOREIGN PRESS CENTER AND AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON THE REPORTER'S TRIP IS TAKING PLACE THIS WEEK. WHILE WE CAN NOT PREDICT THE CONTENT OF THIS SERIES OR ITS EVENTUAL IMPACT IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE SERIES WILL TAKE AN ANALYTICAL LOOK AT THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND THE HEAVY HUMAN PRICE CITIZENS OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS HAVE PAID AND WILL CONTINUE TO PAY IF TERRORISM IS NOT DEALT WITH.

3. REFTEL PARA 4: OBJECTIVES OF 60 DAY PLAN:

POST CONCURS WITH THESE OBJECTIVES. THE PORTUGUESE PUBLIC BY-AND-LARGE SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ISOLATE TERRORISTS. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL CONDEMNS TERRORIST ACTIVITY IT HAS BEEN SLOW TO TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS AGAINST THE LIBYANS. AS ON OTHER MAJOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES THE GOP TAKES ITS LEAD FROM COUNTRIES SUCH AS FRANCE, GERMANY AND ENGLAND.

4. REFTEL PARA 5: AUDIENCES AND APPROACHES:

WE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THE GOAL STATED FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN AUDIENCES ASSUMING THAT WE ARE PROVIDED WITH COMPREHENSIVE, DISPASSIONATE AND FACTUAL PROGRAM MATERIALS AND TALKING POINTS.

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OBJECTIVES. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT ALL POLITICIANS AND JOURNALISTS PARTICIPATING IN THE IV PROGRAM SHOULD IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER BE EXPOSED TO SOMEONE (BE IT A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, JOURNALIST OR SOMEONE ELSE) WHO CAN INFORM THEM OF THE DEPTH OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S OUTRAGE AT TERRORIST ACTS AND OUR CONCERN THAT OUR ALLIES BE SUPPORTIVE. CHAPLIN

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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR PAO STEPHEN M. CHAPLIN
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE 86-34 -

5. IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC PROPOSED PROGRAM ACTIVITIES WE WELCOME ALL ATTEMPTS AT EXPOSING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO KEY ADMINISTRATION POLICY-MAKERS (AND IMPLEMENTERS OF THAT POLICY). SINCE THERE ARE NO PORTUGUESE FULL-TIME CORRESPONDENTS BASED IN THE U.S. WE WOULD HOPE THAT MEANS CAN BE DEvised TO INCLUDE THE PORTUGUESE IN A FOREIGN JOURNALIST TOUR AND IV PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, IT OBVIOUSLY STRENGTHENS THE ADMINISTRATION'S CASE TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND TAKE ACTIONS SUPPORTIVE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE PROPOSED TV EFFORTS IF DONE WELL COULD HAVE ENORMOUS IMPACT AND WE ANTICIPATE PROBABLE PLACEMENT ON PORTUGUESE TELEVISION OF A COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENTARY TREATING TERRORISM'S GLOBAL IMPACT. WORLDNET INTERVIEWS WOULD BE MORE USEFUL THAN FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFINGS BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF PORTUGUESE JOURNALISTS BASED IN WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK. THE OTHER STANDARD PRODUCT PROPOSALS (WF ARTICLES AND TEXTS, VOA FEATURES, ETC.) WOULD HAVE SOME USE BUT EXPERIENCE SHOWS THESE WOULD BE MAINLY FOR BACKGROUND VALUE RATHER THAN PLACEMENT.

6. REFTEL LISTING OF TOPICS TO BE TREATED ON LIBYA: WE CONCUR WITH THEMES AS FAR AS THEY GO. AGAIN, WE THINK BY EXPANDING THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS FOCUS TO INCLUDE OTHER SOURCES OF TERRORISM WE WOULD NOT BE DILUTING OUR EFFORTS BUT RATHER WE WOULD BE INCREASING OUR CREDIBILITY AND ENHANCING OUR CHANCES FOR GREATER IMPACT BOTH IN PERSONAL CONTACT OPPORTUNITIES AND IN PLACEMENT PROSPECTS.

IN SUM, FOR PORTUGAL WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE: MORE BY-LINERS BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WHICH CAN BE PLACED EXCLUSIVELY WITH NEWSPAPERS OR MAGAZINES; A FOREIGN JOURNALIST TOUR AND IV PROGRAM DESIGNED TO FAMILIARIZE JOURNALISTS WITH OUR POLICY AND PROPOSED ACTIONS; A TV DOCUMENTARY WHICH DEALS WITH THE GLOBAL THREAT OF TERRORISM; ONE OR TWO AMPARTS WHO CAN PROVIDE NON-SPECIALIST AUDIENCES WITH AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT ON THE BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF INDIVIDUAL TERRORIST GROUPS; ONE OR MORE PUBLICATIONS PROVIDING CHRONOLOGIES OF TERRORIST ACTS DURING THE LAST 20 TO 30 YEARS AND IDENTIFYING THE GROUPS INVOLVED, THEIR METHODS AND

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USIS

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
-- LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: (A) USIA 34711, (B) USIA 34713

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BECAUSE FINLAND IS NOT PART OF THE NATO ALLIANCE, IS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN UN MIDDLE EAST PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, HAS A VERY RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION (AND REFUGEE) POLICY AND HENCE A VERY SMALL FOREIGN (AND ARAB) COMMUNITY, AND HAS NO LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE, ONLY PART OF THIS ACTION PLAN CAN BE APPLIED HERE. OUR MAIN GOAL IN FINLAND, WE BELIEVE, SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE UNAMBIGUOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. STAND AGAINST TERRORISM, AND TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYAN SUPPORTED TERRORISM.
3. A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN FOR THIS COUNTRY MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TWO OF FINLAND'S PRIME CONCERNS: IT MUST NOT FORCE FINLAND TO TAKE SIDES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND IT MUST MAINTAIN A SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING AT ALL TIMES OF THE SITUATION OF SMALL NATIONS. FINLAND PLACES GREAT EMPHASIS ON COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS ANY USE OF VIOLENCE TO SOLVE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, AND THESE FACTORS MUST ALSO BE RECKONED WITH.
4. A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN FOR FINLAND SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR DESIRE TO WORK WITH FRIENDLY STATES IN COMBATTING THE TERRORIST THREAT, SHOULD AVOID CASTING THIS AS AN EAST/WEST ISSUE, SHOULD IDENTIFY THE STRUGGLE AS ONE AIMED AT TERRORISM, AND SHOULD STRESS THAT TERRORISM INCREASINGLY THREATENS THE BASIC NORMS OF CIVILIZED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE. SINCE OPINION-MAKERS SOMETIMES ARGUE THAT THE ROOT CAUSE OF MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM IS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, WE MUST ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE U.S. PLANS TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD A NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF THAT PROBLEM BUT THAT IT IS ILLUSORY TO THINK THAT A RESOLUTION OF THAT OR ANY OTHER REGIONAL ISSUE WOULD QUICKLY REMOVE TERRORISM FROM THE SCENE.
5. OUR AUDIENCE HERE WOULD BE DRAWN MAINLY FROM INFLUENTIAL INDIVIDUALS AND MEDIA. THE BEST MEANS OF REACHING THIS AUDIENCE, WE BELIEVE, IS INTENSIFIED PERSONAL CONTACT AND STEPPED-UP DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATE INFORMATION MATERIALS. WE WOULD WISH PARTICULARLY IN OUR MATERIALS TO EMPHASIZE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF COOPERATION AND ACTION FROM OTHER NATIONS -- PARTICULARLY SMALL AND NEUTRAL NATIONS. O'CONNOR

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R 211351Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 5316
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 03605

USIA

THIS IS A JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN FOR COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)
 2. POST AGREES WITH THE GOALS OF THE ACTION PLAN, BUT OUR ABILITY TO CARRY IT OUT AS OUTLINED IS LIMITED BY THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH WE WORK.
 3. WIRELESS FILE MATERIAL, WHICH WE DISTRIBUTE TO A SELECT AUDIENCE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, AND MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES, IS ONE OF OUR MOST EFFECTIVE METHODS OF EXPLAINING OUR POSITION. SOME OF THE ITEMS WE HAVE DISTRIBUTED RECENTLY ARE PRESIDENT RFAGAN'S SPEECH TO THE NATION FOLLOWING THE LIBYAN MISSION, WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEETS ON LIBYAN AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND A STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASE EXPLAINING THE U. S. POLICY ON TERRORISM.
 4. WE ALSO HAVE A GOOD AUDIENCE FOR SCREENINGS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VIDEO TAPES AT OUR LIBRARY AND ALREADY HAVE USED A NUMBER, INCLUDING AN ABC NEWS SPECIAL CONTAINING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH ON TERRORISM AND BRIEFINGS BY SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER. MORE TAPES ON THE SUBJECT WOULD BE WELCOME.
 5. EMBASSY AND USIS OFFICERS HAVE DISCUSSED TERRORISM IN GENERAL AND THE LIBYAN SITUATION IN PARTICULAR WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND A WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NATURALLY PARROT PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU'S STRONG CONDEMNATION OF OUR ACTION IN LIBYA, BUT WE FOUND AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FOR OUR ACTIONS AMONG OTHER CONTACTS.
 6. FOR LARGER AUDIENCES WE RELY ON VOA, WHICH HAS A GOOD LISTENERSHIP HERE. STROVAS
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USIA

FOR: P/G

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713-C

1. THIS IS A JOINT EMBASSY/USIS RESPONSE.
2. WE CONCUR WITH THE PROPOSED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY WITH EXCEPTION OF TV/FILM DOCUMENTARY FOCUSED ON TRANS ATLANTIC COOPERATION WHICH WOULD HAVE LITTLE PROGRAM USE IN BELGIUM
3. THIS MISSION HAS PURSUED A VERY ACTIVE ROLE IN DENOUNCING MR. QADHAFI'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THE FACT THAT BELGIUM REPRESENTS USG INTERESTS IN LIBYA, MEANS THAT THE BELGIAN PUBLIC IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN WHAT TRANSPIRES BETWEEN LIBYA AND THE USG. THIS MEANS THAT ON A GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT LEVEL, THIS MISSION IS IN DAILY CONTACT WITH HIGH LEVEL GOB OFFICIALS TO EXPLAIN OUR POLICIES AND TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION. WE CONSIDER THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS IN THIS AREA TO BE OUTSTANDING.
4. THAT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, MEAN THAT WE SEE EYE-TO-EYE WITH THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT OR THE BELGIAN PUBLIC ON ALL ISSUES SURROUNDING TERRORISM AND OUR RESPONSE TO LIBYA. THIS EMBASSY HAS MAINTAINED A HIGHLY VIGOROUS PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROGRAM AT ALL LEVELS TO CONVINCED BELGIANS THAT OUR ANALYSES OF THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM AND OUR RESPONSES HAVE BEEN CORRECT.
5. THE FOLLOWING ARE A FEW EXAMPLES OF WHAT WE HAVE DONE OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS:
 - A. IN JANUARY, AMBASSADOR SWAEBE HOSTED A BREAKFAST FOR DEPSEC WHITEHEAD AND AMBASSADOR OAKLEY WITH THE BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER, JUSTICE MINISTER AND DEFENSE MINISTER TO EXPLAIN THE LIBYAN ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE ATTENDED BY MORE THAN 40 BELGIAN AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPRESENTATIVES;
 - B. THE PRIME MINISTER HOSTED DEPSEC WHITEHEAD ON A RETURN VISIT IN APRIL AT A BREAKFAST WHERE TERRORISM WAS THE TOPIC OF DISCUSSION. A PRESS CONFERENCE OPEN TO THE BELGIAN PRESS WAS ALSO HELD AT NATO HEADQUARTERS ON APRIL 18;
 - C. FROM BEFORE THE FIRST WHITEHEAD VISIT, THE POST HAS

MADE HEAVY USE OF WIRELESS FILE ARTICLES, WHITE HOUSE DOCUMENTS AND STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASES ON TERRORISM. WE HAVE DEVELOPED A SPECIAL MAILING LIST ON THIS THEME WHICH INCLUDES JOURNALISTS AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS;

D. USIS BRUSSELS HAS PARTICIPATED INTERACTIVELY IN AT LEAST FIVE WORLDNETS WHERE TERRORISM AND LIBYA HAVE BEEN THE MAIN TOPICS OF DISCUSSION. THESE HAVE INCLUDED:

- MARCH 25 WITH WEINBERGER
- APRIL 7 WITH ARMACOST
- APRIL 16 WITH SHULTZ
- APRIL 18 WITH WEINBERGER
- APRIL 24 WITH SHULTZ

E. WE ALSO ARRANGED FOR A SPECIAL INTERVIEW IN FRENCH, APRIL 25 WITH UN AMBASSADOR WALTERS AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE FRANCOPHONE BELGIAN MEDIA WHICH LED TO EXTENSIVE AND VERY FAVORABLE COVERAGE;

F. THE MISSION PROGRA
MED AMPART AMB EDWARD MARKS,
FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF STATE'S OFFICE ON TERRORISM,
AT A SERIES OF MEETINGS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH BELGIAN
PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES, MFA OFFICIALS, EIGHT
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA AND SEVERAL UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS.

G. FINALLY, WE HAVE HAD A SERIES OF ONE-ON-ONE MEETINGS WITH MFA OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA TO DISCUSS THE USG APPROACH TO TERRORISM.

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 TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 0217
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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
 LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713 - C

- (U) THIS IS A JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE.
 (C) THE PLAN AS GIVEN FOR EUROPEAN PUBLICS IS
 APPLICABLE IN THE FRG.
- (C) A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MISSION EFFORT HAS
 ALREADY BEEN DIRECTED TO THE ACTIVITIES AND AUDIENCES
 IDENTIFIED IN PARAS 3 AND 5 OF REFTEL. WE PLAN TO
 CONTINUE THESE EFFORTS.
- (C) USIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY SUCCESSFUL RECENTLY
 IN UTILIZING OUTSTANDING AMPARTS ABIF TO SPEAK AT EXPERT
 LEVEL WITH COUNTERPARTS. AMBASSADOR EDWARD MARKS WAS
 SUCH A SPEAKER WHO PERFORMED EFFECTIVELY WITH KEY
 AUDIENCES IN THE FRG. THE PROVISION OF SUCH AUTHORITATIVE
 SPEAKERS SHOULD BE CONTINUED. CATHERMAN

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FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: A. USIA 34713-C; B. USIA 2641-C

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POST WELCOMES SUBJECT INITIATIVE AND BELIEVES MOST ELEMENTS DESCRIBED REFTEL ARE RELEVANT FOR THIS COUNTRY. INDONESIA HAS ALSO BEEN THE TARGET OF TERRORISM (AIRCRAFT HIJACKING IN 1981, BOMBINGS IN 1984, AND ROCKET/BOMB ATTACKS ON FOREIGN EMBASSIES INCLUDING THE U.S. THIS MONTH) AND HAS TAKEN FIRM STEPS TO APPREHEND AND PROSECUTE PERPETRATORS. THE MEDIA AND GOI SPOKESMEN HAVE CONDEMNED THE USE OF TERRORISM FOR POLITICAL ENDS, AND EVEN THE NORMALLY LEFTIST PRESS IS CRITICAL OF SUCH ACTIONS.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, INDONESIA IS A NON-ALIGNED NATION AND WILL NOT TAKE A STRONG PUBLIC STANCE WHICH RISKS A BREACH WITH THE NAM, THE OIC, ETC. FOR THIS REASON THE GOI THIS WEEK DECIDED TO RECEIVE THE LIBYAN DELEGATION TRAVELING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, ALTHOUGH WE ARE ASSURED IT WILL BE DONE WITHOUT PUBLICITY AND NO PEOPLES BUREAU WILL BE OPENED IN JAKARTA AS A RESULT. THE GOI WILL LIKELY MAINTAIN THIS AMBIVALENT PUBLIC POSTURE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

4. POST WILL USE AGENCY MATERIALS OUTLINED IN REFTEL TO INCREASE INFORMATIONAL PROGRAMS ON TERRORISM. WE ESPECIALLY SUPPORT AND URGE PROMPT ACTION ON THE PLAN (PARA 6) FOR MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES WITH TOP ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN AND FEEL THIS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY TIMELY IN VIEW OF RECENT EVENTS IN JAKARTA. FYI, THE SOLE FULL-TIME INDONESIAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE IN THE US REPORTS FOR "KOMPAS," THE NATION'S LARGEST AND MOST PRESTIGIOUS DAILY NEWSPAPER. SHE IS:

- MS. THREES NIO
- 305 EAST 40TH STREET, APT. 7X
- NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. 10016
- TELEPHONE (212) 661-2839

5. WIRELESS FILE FEATURES AND SATELLITE FILE CLIPS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO BE WELL RECEIVED BY LOCAL MEDIA. POST LOOKS FORWARD TO THIS AND OTHER MEDIA PRODUCTS OUTLINED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT LOCAL AWARENESS OF THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM. BERG

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ACADEMICS. ROUTINE ATTENDANCE IS ABOUT 70, BUT WHEN VTR NEWS ITEMS ON THE AMERICAN ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA BEGAN COMING IN ATTENDANCE JUMPED TO OVER 100 AND WOULD HAVE GONE HIGHER HAD THERE BEEN SUFFICIENT SPACE. ANY VTRS MADE AVAILABLE CAN BE USED AT THE CENTER AND WILL BE SEEN BY AN INTERESTED AND INFLUENTIAL AUDIENCE. KYLE
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FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND CPAO

E.O. 12356: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713-C

1. THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT AND BURMESE NEWS MEDIA (ALL OWNED AND CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT) HAVE AVOIDED ALL PUBLIC COMMENT ON TERRORISM OCCURRING OUTSIDE BURMA, INCLUDING RECENT EVENTS INVOLVING LIBYA AND THE UNITED STATES. COVERAGE OF THE RAID ON LIBYA WAS RESTRAINED AND BALANCED AND THE SRUB IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL PUBLIC STANCE. THIS IS STANDARD PRACTICE AND THE EMBASSY HAS NO REASON TO EXPECT AN EXCEPTION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. CONSEQUENTLY, MANY OF THE GOOD INITIATIVES OUTLINED IN REFTEL WOULD NOT APPLY IN THE BURMESE CONTEXT.
2. THE IMPRESSION GAINED THROUGH DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN EMBASSY OFFICERS AND BURMESE OFFICIALS IS THAT THERE IS A QUIET UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE BURMESE FOR THE AMERICAN POSITION AND ACTIONS TAKEN.
3. PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM GENERALLY AND THE MOST RECENT EVENTS PARTICULARLY IS OBTAINED THROUGH WIRE SERVICE ARTICLES (OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPLIED BY AP AND REUTERS) CARRIED IN LOCAL NEWSPAPERS, VIS NEWS ITEMS CARRIED ON BURMESE TELEVISION AND BY LISTENING TO FOREIGN BROADCASTS. THE VOICE OF AMERICA AND BBC SHARE A NEAR MONOPOLY ON FOREIGN BROADCAST AUDIENCES IN BURMA. ABOUT 10,000 COPIES EACH OF TIME AND NEWSWEEK ARE IMPORTED AND DISTRIBUTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
4. FOREIGN MISSIONS ARE NOT PERMITTED ACCESS TO THE BURMESE NEWS MEDIA BUT ON THIS ISSUE THE EMBASSY PERCEIVES NO PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBSTACLES. NEWS COVERAGE HAS BEEN ADEQUATE AND FAIR AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN SO.
5. HIGH LEVEL BURMESE OFFICIALS ARE CLEARLY INTERESTED IN RECEIVING INFORMATION ON THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM AND THE EMBASSY HAS WELL ESTABLISHED CHANNELS FOR GETTING IT TO THEM. PRINTED MATERIALS GIVING U.S. POSITIONS AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ARE THE EASIEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE MEDIUM FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE HAVE BEEN PASSING TO THE SENIOR LEVEL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SUCH MATERIAL AND KNOW THAT THESE MATERIALS WERE INITIALLY AT LEAST PASSED TO THE PRESIDENT.
6. THE USIS AMERICAN CENTER HAS A WEEKLY VTR PROGRAM REGULARLY ATTENDED BY MID-LEVEL OFFICIALS, EDITORS AND

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DEPT FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

USIA FOR EA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, MY
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
- LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: (A) USIA 34713, (B) USIA 34711

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE WELCOME THE CONCERTED 60-DAY ACTION PLAN, BUT CAUTION THAT SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES IN MALAYSIA ON TERRORISM OVER THE NEXT 60 DAYS WILL REQUIRE SENSITIVITY TO THIS ENVIRONMENT AND MUST BE IMPLEMENTED WITH CARE. THE GOM'S ORIGINAL CONDEMNATION OF THE BOMBING AND SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS BY PRESENT AND FORMER SENIOR OFFICIALS PLACED THE MARKERS FOR A PRESS SENSITIVE TO THE DESIRES OF ITS GOVERNMENT. THEY HAVE AS WELL CREATED A CLIMATE THAT DISCOURAGES THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF OTHER VIEWS. THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUES TO CHARACTERIZE ACCUSATIONS OF LIBYAN TERRORISM AS "ALLEGED," MOST RECENTLY ON MAY 5 IN A SPEECH OPENING THE SOUTH/SOUTH CONFERENCE IN KUALA LUMPUR. MORE RECENTLY, IN MID-MAY, THE GOM RECEIVED THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF QADHAFI IN A MODERATELY PUBLICIZED FIVE-DAY VISIT, CONDEMNING ONLY THE U.S. BOMBING.

3. WE MUST ALSO NOTE THE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL TONE OF THE MALAY PRESS, REPEATEDLY REPORTED BY THIS POST, IN COMMENTING ON ANY POLICY OR ACTION PERCEIVED AS AN ATTACK ON THEIR CO-RELIGIONISTS. ON SOME MIDEAST ISSUES, AND THIS IS ONE OF THEM, THEY APPEAR TO BE BEYOND REASON. CRITICISM IN THE NON-MALAY PRESS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS TENDED TO SEE OUR BOMBING OF LIBYA AS AN UNWELCOME RECRUDESCENCE OF GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY.

4. NONETHELESS, SOME ELEMENTS OF THE 60-DAY ACTION PLAN ARE INDEED APPLICABLE HERE. THE POST HAS PLAYED THE TERRORISM ITEMS IN THE EXTERNAL WIRELESS FILE IN FULL WITHOUT COMPLAINT AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. IN EARLY MAY, AMPART JERROLD GREEN (SEE KL 04133) DISCUSSED LIBYA AND TERRORISM WITHOUT PUBLICITY WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE MFA, THE DEFENSE COLLEGE, AND THE STRATEGIC INSTITUTE WHO, ABOVE ALL, SOUGHT THE EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM THAT LED TO THE BOMBING RAID.

5. THE MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN THIS ENVIRONMENT IS TO ESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN DIRECT SUPPORT OF TERRORISM BEYOND ANY DOUBT. UNTIL THAT IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED,

MOST OF WHAT WE SAY WILL SIMPLY BE DISMISSED AMONG SOME IMPORTANT AUDIENCES IN THIS ENVIRONMENT.

6. WITH THAT IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN MIND, OF THE ACTIVITIES PROPOSED IN PARA. 6, THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN MALAYSIA:

- (1) THE PARTICIPATION OF SENIOR GOM OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM SEMINAR. A FEW MONTHS AGO THE GOM ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE SECRETARY'S INVITATION FOR TEN TO TWELVE SENIOR OFFICIALS TO ATTEND THIS SEMINAR AT OUR EXPENSE. THIS PROGRAM, STUCK ON OUR INABILITY TO FIND MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATES, MUST NOW BE IMPLEMENTED.

- (2) AN IV GRANT ON THE THEME OF TERRORISM FOR SENIOR EDITORS.

- (3) A U.S.G. OFFICIAL ABLE TO FURNISH CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFINGS TO GOM OFFICIALS DISPOSED TO BE SKEPTICAL OF LIBYAN FUNDING AND DIRECT SUPPORT OF TERRORISM.

- (4) MATERIALS IN ANY FORMAT, PARTICULARLY THE WELL-PUBLICIZED EAST BERLIN PEOPLE'S BUREAU INTERCEPT, THAT STRENGTHEN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST QADHAFI FOR SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION.

- (5) THIS POST WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DEVELOP WORLDNETS, EDS, OR OTHER PUBLIC, HIGH-PROFILE PROGRAMS IN MALAYSIA DURING THE NEXT SIXTY DAYS THOSE WHOSE VIEWS DIFFER FROM THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE GOM, INCLUDING SOME EDITORS, ARE SIMPLY NOT GOING TO
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DEPT FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

USIA FOR EA

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, MY

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING

EXPRESS THEM PUBLICLY IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT.

7. THE MISSION WILL UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF ONE-ON-ONE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR EDITORS AND MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSIONAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMUNITY TO DISCUSS LIBYA AND TERRORISM. IN THESE MEETINGS, WE WILL CAREFULLY PLANT THE IDEA THAT TO THE EXTENT MALAYSIA IS PERCEIVED AS SUPPORTIVE OF LIBYA AND TERRORISM IN A GENERIC SENSE, THERE WILL BE AN UNQUANTIFIABLE BUT NEGATIVE IMPACT HERE ON INVESTMENT AND TOURISM. WE WILL ALSO POINT OUT THAT LIBYA'S ACTIONS CAN ONLY ERODE SYMPATHY IN THE WEST FOR THE PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS. QADHAFI'S RECORD OF ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILIZE OTHER ISLAMIC NATIONS IS ANOTHER THEME WE WILL PURSUE HERE. FOR THIS WE WILL NEED BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON LIBYA'S EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE LEBANON, TUNISIA, THE SUDAN, AND WEST AFRICAN NATIONS.

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ACTION OFFICE EA-03

INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 PF-02 PFL-01 VG-01 PFN-01 PFW-02 DIS-01
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO USIA WASHDC 8897

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 05422

USIA

E.O. 12356 N/A
SUBJECT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM.

REF: USIA 34713

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE MISSION COMMENTS ON THE PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY PLAN'S APPLICABILITY TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
AND MISSION PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

2. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE ROKG
PUBLIC POSTURES AND THOSE OF THE ROKG-GUIDED MEDIA TOWARD
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. THESE ARE:

CONCERN FOR THE LARGE KOREAN INVESTMENT IN CONSTRUCTION
FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS IN LIBYA
(ABOUT 5 BILLION DOLLARS)

- CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF KOREAN
CITIZENS IN LIBYA (APPROXIMATELY 23,000)

- KOREAN RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD--A MAJOR
SOURCE OF KOREAN OIL IMPORTS

- KOREAN RELATIONS WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WITHIN
THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, WHICH ALSO HAVE BEEN
CRITICAL OF US ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA

- KOREAN SENSITIVITY TO NORTH KOREAN ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE
ON ROKG ACTIONS THAT CAN BE PORTRAYED AS SOUTH
KOREAN SUBSERVIENCE TO THE US, PARTICULARLY ON
ISSUES OF GREAT IMPORTANCE WITHIN THE THIRD WORLD

- GENERAL KOREAN PERCEPTIONS THAT PROBLEMS AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN AREAS BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE
SERIOUS SECURITY CONCERNS IN AND AROUND THE KOREAN
PENINSULA ARE NOT ONES IN WHICH KOREANS SHOULD
BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

- THE FACT THAT KOREA IS ITSELF THE VICTIM OF STATE-
DIRECTED TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY THAT OF NORTH
KOREA, AND THAT A LARGE MEASURE OF ROKG AND MEDIA
EFFORT IS DIRECTED TOWARD MAKING KOREAN PUBLICS
AWARE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT.

- THE WISH OF KOREA, AS A CLOSE MILITARY ALLY OF THE
US, TO MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF COOPERATION WITH
THE US ON ALL SECURITY ISSUES.

3. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THESE FACTORS, THE ROKG HAS
APPARENTLY FOUND THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION IN PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY ON THIS ISSUE IS TO SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE.
THE ROKG HAS NOT ISSUED ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE US
ATTACK AGAINST LIBYA. KOREAN MEDIA COMMENTARY HAS URGED

CAUTION AND RESTRAINT IN ANY MILITARY ACTION, UNILATERAL
OR OTHERWISE, AGAINST LIBYA, WHILE CALLING FOR GREATER
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO ISOLATE AND COMBAT TERRORISM.

4. PRIVATELY, THE ROKG HAS TOLD US THAT THEY SUPPORT THE
US MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA, THAT THEY HAVE STEPPED
UP THEIR SURVEILLANCE OF LIBYAN CITIZENS IN KOREA, THAT
THEY WILL NOT SELL ARMS TO LIBYA AND THAT THE ROK
PRESENCE IN LIBYA WILL GRADUALLY DIMINISH. THEY HAVE ALSO
STATED THE ROK WILL SUPPORT OTHER INTERNATIONAL COOPER-
ATIVE MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM. HOWEVER, KOREAN
DELEGATIONS TO MULTINATIONAL GATHERINGS LIKE THE IPU HAVE
BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN "NEUTRAL" ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
US ATTACKS ON LIBYA.

5. THESE FACTORS SUGGEST THAT KOREAN PUBLIC AND THE ROKG
WOULD ONLY RESPOND RELUCTANTLY AND UNDER SIGNIFICANT
PRESSURE TO REQUESTS FOR GREATER PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT AND
SUPPORT OF U.S. POLICIES DIRECTED AT LIBYAN-SPONSORED
TERRORISM.

6. GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS THAT PRESENTLY EXIST ON KOREA
ITSELF UNDERTAKING MORE ACTIVE AND SUPPORTIVE PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY ON THIS SUBJECT, THE MISSION BELIEVES THE BEST
COURSE FOR U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HERE IS A TWO-PRONGED
APPROACH.

7. THE MISSION BELIEVES WE CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN OUR
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WITH THE ROK PUBLIC IF OUR MESSAGE
FOCUSES ON MORE GENERAL ISSUES OF STATE-SPONSORED
TERRORISM AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO
COMBAT IT RATHER THAN ON THE CARPACI PROBLEM. IMMEDIATE
PROGRAMS, VCR PROGRAMS AND FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFINGS
INVOLVING KOREAN CORRESPONDENTS ARE ELEMENTS THAT WOULD BE
PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN REACHING KOREAN MASS AUDIENCES.

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/19/16

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 05422

USIA

E.O. 12356 N/A
SUBJECT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR

8. MISSION PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THROUGH PERSONAL CONTACTS, PRIMARILY WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MEDIA EDITORS AND COMMENTATORS, AND ACADEMIC SPECIALISTS, CAN BE EFFECTIVE ON BOTH THE BROAD ISSUES OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND THE MORE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES OF LIBYA. IN PARTICULAR, TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE WIRELESS FILE MATERIALS AND PAMPHLETS ON THE VARIOUS TOPICS LISTED IN REFTEL PARA SIX WILL BE USEFUL IN REACHING KEY KOREAN ELITES WITH AMERICAN POLICIES IN THESE AREAS. REID

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FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 0622
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 16604

USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. THE POST WELCOMES THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. TO DATE, FILIPINO ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAVE RANGED FROM PAROCHIAL TO INDIFFERENCE. THE LATTER STATE HAS BEEN EXEMPLIFIED BY THE DIFFICULTY WHICH THE USG HAS HAD IN RECENT MONTHS IN CONVINCING FILIPINO AUTHORITIES THAT SECURITY MEASURES AT MANILA'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ARE SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT. REPEATED WARNINGS THAT THE AIRPORT WILL BE DECLARED UNSAFE FOR US CARRIERS HAVE BEEN NEEDED TO GET REMEDIAL ACTION STARTED (THAT PROCESS IS NOW UNDERWAY). FURTHER, REACTION OF THE GOP TO THE US ATTACK ON LIBYAN INSTALLATIONS WAS, IN THE WORDS OF VP LAUREL, "NEUTRAL".

2. THE MANILA MEDIA PROVED TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE EXPRESSIVE. USING FOREIGN SOURCES, MOST MANILA PUBLICATIONS REPORTED THE U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN LIBYA AS A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL NEWS EVENT, NOTING REACTION IN EUROPE AND THE ARAB WORLD. WHILE THE U.S. POSITION ON TERRORISM WAS ACCURATELY REPORTED, IT WAS NOT EMPHASIZED. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE COMMENT IN THE MEDIA ON THE INCIDENT, EXCEPT FOR AN ARTICLE ON THE OP-ED PAGE OF THE MANILA BULLETIN ACCUSING THE US OF FOLLOWING AN ANTI-MUSLIM FOREIGN POLICY. THE "DIPLOMATIC PRESS CORPS" FROM MANILA DAILIES MADE THE USUAL ROUNDS OF THEIR BEAT REPORTING ON VP LAUREL'S COMMENT AND VISITING THE LIBYAN AND U.S. EMBASSIES. THE LIBYAN EMBASSY ISSUED A STATEMENT ALLEGING THAT U.S. ACTIONS WERE ACTUALLY RETALIATION AGAINST LIBYA FOR LOSS OF WHEELUS AIR BASE. THIS OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO PLAY ON ANTI-BASE SENTIMENTS AMONG SOME FILIPINOS RECEIVED SCANT ATTENTION IN THE MEDIA. RATHER, FILIPINO MEDIA AND OFFICIAL CONCERN AND COMMENT FOCUSED ON THE NEED TO PROTECT THE WELL-BEING OF "20,000" FILIPINOS ALLEGEDLY WORKING IN LIBYA AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK. NO REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THAT ANY FILIPINOS WERE, OR HAVE BEEN, HARMED. MOST RECENTLY, HOWEVER, AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF A DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, PRESIDENT AQUINO RECEIVED A FOUR-MAN LIBYAN DELEGATION WHICH CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. WAS MANIPULATING THE NEWS REGARDING THE U.S. ATTACK ON LIBYA. THE PHILIPPINE NEWS AGENCY REPORTED THE MEETING AND INCLUDED A DENIAL BY THE CHIEF DELEGATE THAT LIBYANS WERE BEHIND TERRORIST ACTS, CLAIMING THAT "LIBYA HAS ALL THE TIME REJECTED ANY TERRORIST ACTION AND THERE IS A LAW IN OUR COUNTRY THAT PUNISHES SEVERELY ANY ACT OF TERRORISM."

3. THE REACTION OF THE FILIPINO MUSLIM COMMUNITY HAS BEEN MORE PRO-LIBYAN AND ANTI-US THAN THE REST OF THE

POPULATION. NON-SPECIFIC THREATS TO AMERICANS WERE RECEIVED FROM THE MUSLIM AREAS OF MINDANAO, REQUIRING THE EMBASSY TO ISSUE A WARNING THAT AMERICANS "AVOID NON-ESSENTIAL TRAVEL IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREAS" OF THE COUNTRY. SEVERAL HUNDRED FILIPINO MUSLIMS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE EMBASSY FOR A DAY OR TWO, BUT NO VIOLENCE WAS REPORTED AND THEIR EFFORT WAS LOST IN THE GENERAL MELEE OF PRO-MARCOS, ANTI-US AGITATION WHICH WAS ENSUING, IN GREATER NUMBERS, AT THE SAME TIME. ANTI-US MUSLIM DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO TOOK PLACE IN MAJOR CITIES OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO, INCLUDING DAVAO WHERE USIS HAS A BRANCH POST. IN THE LATTER INSTANCE, THE MUSLIM DEMONSTRATORS HELD A BRIEF RALLY IN FRONT OF THE USIS CENTER, TORE DOWN THE US FLAG AND BURNED IT WHILE DENOUNCING U.S. INTERVENTION IN LIBYA DURING THE NAVAL EXERCISE CONFRONTATION IN THE BAY OF SIDRA.
4. THE "NEUTRALITY" OF THE GOP AND THE TENDENCY OF THE FILIPINO MUSLIMS TO SUPPORT LIBYA DO NOT PROVIDE A FERTILE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT WITHIN WHICH TO HIGHLIGHT QUADHAFI'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. HOWEVER, THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES AND VENUES IN WHICH WE CAN DIRECT FILIPINO ATTENTION TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TO DESCRIBE U.S. AND OTHER NATION'S ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE GROWING THREAT AND TO PERSUADE FILIPINO AUDIENCES OF THE NEED TO TAKE MEASURES TO COMBAT THE COMMON DANGER.

5. THE POST HAS ALREADY BEEN ENGAGED IN DISTRIBUTING APPROPRIATE WIRELESS FILE ITEMS, SPEECHES AND TEXTS TO THE MEDIA. SELECT ARTICLES ON TERRORISM FROM A WIDE RANGE OF PERIODICALS HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN OUR POPULAR ARTICLE ALERT SERVICES TO HUNDREDS OF OPINION-HOLDERS AND SPECIAL
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MANILA 16604

USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING

ITEMS, SUCH AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT GIST ON TERRORISM, HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO OUR ENTIRE DRS PARTICIPANT AUDIENCE. MOST RECENTLY, WE HAVE ALSO PLACED SPECIAL VOA REPORTS ON THIS SUBJECT WITH OUR RADIO CALL-IN LINE, WHICH SERVES OVER FORTY FILIPINO RADIO STATIONS. CONCURRENTLY, BACKGROUND MATERIAL, INCLUDING THE ABOVE, HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE MISSION IN ORDER TO BETTER PREPARE THEM FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT WITH THEIR PERSONAL CONTACTS.

6. FOR FUTURE PLACEMENT, MORE PRINT ITEMS ALONG THE LINES OF THOSE CITED IN REFTEL WOULD BE USEFUL. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WOULD BE CHRONOLOGIES ON LIBYAN TERRORISM, U.S. ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE LIBYAN PROBLEM THROUGH DIPLOMACY, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO DEFEAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THESE WOULD BE USEFUL AS MAILERS TO DRS AUDIENCES AND FOR SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM USIS DAVAO TO MUSLIM CONTACTS. THE FILIPINO AUDIENCE IN MANILA AND OTHER METROPOLITAN AREAS IS MOST LIKELY TO BE RECEPTIVE TO INFORMATION ABOUT THE DANGER OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY TO THEIR INTERNATIONAL VISITORS, THEIR OVERSEAS WORKERS (MANY OF WHOM WORK IN THE MIDDLE EAST) AND OTHER INNOCENT PERSONS. THE MESSAGE COULD ALSO BE REINFORCED WHEN CONVEYED BY VISITING US AND OTHER SPEAKERS TO TOURIST AND TRAVEL ASSOCIATIONS (A MAJOR ENTERPRISE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNER IN THE PHILIPPINES) WHICH CONVENE FREQUENTLY IN THIS COUNTRY. FILM CLIPS OF SUCH SPEAKERS ARE PLACEABLE ON TV AND INSERTS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL FOOTAGE FOR FILIPINO TV STATIONS, ESPECIALLY WHEN TIED TO NEWS ON INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS, SPEECHES, AND REPORTING ON INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS. IF APPROPRIATE MATERIALS CAN GET PLACED ON INTERNATIONAL WIRE SERVICES IT WOULD BE HELPFUL LOCALLY SINCE THESE SERVICES ARE USED EXTENSIVELY IN THE PHILIPPINES. ALSO, ARTICLES FROM INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED PUBLICATIONS, SUCH AS THE LONDON ECONOMIST, WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED. AND, FINALLY, IF THERE ARE APPROPRIATE MATERIALS PRODUCED BY MUSLIM STUDY CENTERS IN INDONESIA OR MALAYSIA, THEY WOULD BE USEFUL FOR PLACEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION IN THIS COUNTRY. MORTON

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JAPAN IS ONE OF THE SUBJECTS FOR THE AGENCY'S MULTI-COUNTRY SURVEY ON TERRORISM AND LIBYA.

ACTION OFFICE PG-01

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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP?

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713 (S)

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. MISSION HAS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP'S ACTION PLAN AND COMMENDS THE INTERAGENCY GROUP FOR A THOUGHTFUL AND COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS AN ISSUE OF EXTREME INTERNATIONAL URGENCY. SEVERAL OF THE APPROACHES DESCRIBED IN THE INTERIM PLAN ARE RELEVANT TO JAPAN AND SHOULD FIND RECEPTIVITY HERE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE RECENT EVENTS THAT HAVE MADE THE JAPANESE MORE AWARE OF THE ADVERSE DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THE JAPANESE (AT LEAST UNTIL VERY RECENTLY) HAD ALWAYS VIEWED TERRORISM WITH A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE FROM THAT OF THEIR WESTERN ALLIES. ONE NEEDS ONLY LOOK AT JAPAN'S PAST HISTORY OF YIELDING TO THE DEMANDS OF THE JAPANESE RED ARMY AND ITS RELEASING OF RADICAL FACTION MEMBERS TO UNDERSTAND THIS. THE JAPANESE PASSENGERS KILLED IN THE AIR LANKA BOMB EXPLOSION EARLIER THIS MONTH, THE DEBATES ON TERRORISM DURING THE TOKYO SUMMIT AND THE BOMBING OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY IN JAKARTA LAST WEEK HAVE FORCED THE JAPANESE TO TAKE A LONG, HARD LOOK AT ITS FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING TERRORISM. THUS, DESPITE JAPAN'S HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON OIL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, THESE RECENT AND UNEXPECTED EVENTS HAVE MADE DIRECT IMPACT ON JAPAN AND ITS CITIZENS AND MAY HAVE A SOBERING EFFECT ON JAPAN'S VIEWS REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST, PARTICULARLY TOWARDS LIBYA.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS REGARDING THE PROPOSALS DESCRIBED IN THE INTERIM ACTION PLAN:

(A) POST INVOLVEMENT -- (1) POST RECOMMENDS THAT APPROPRIATE U.S. AND ALLIED STATEMENTS BE CHanneled THROUGH THE WIRELESS FILE FOR SPEED AND EASE OF REFORMATting AT THE POST FOR WIDER (BUT SELECTIVE) DISTRIBUTION, (2) IF RESOURCES AVAILABLE, POST WILL CONSIDER OUTSTANDING AND SEMINAL ARTICLES FOR TRANSLATION AND INCLUSION IN SPECIALLY DESIGNED PACKET (LIKE THE SDI PACKET) FOR SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION TO KEY MEDIA CONTACTS AND APPROPRIATE DRS CONTACTS, (3) POST WILL BE ON THE LOOK OUT FOR APPROPRIATE ARTICLES AND FULL TEXTS WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO THE AGENCY AND FORWARD TO WASHINGTON VIA USINFO, (4) POST ALSO REQUESTS THAT ANY PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT BE UPDATED PERIODICALLY; THESE MATERIALS SERVE AS VALUABLE BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR OFFICERS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THEIR CONTACTS.

(B) PUBLIC OPINION POLLS: IT SHOULD BE NOTED TOO THAT

(C) AGENCY PROPOSALS: THE POST STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 6. MOST, IF NOT ALL, WILL BE APPLICABLE IN JAPAN. WE ESPECIALLY ENDORSE THE ONE-ON-ONE MEDIA INTERVIEWS AND THE TERRORISM SEMINAR FOR FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN WASHINGTON WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE HOW TERRORISM DISRUPTS A COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE -- TOURISM, AIRLINES, INVESTMENT IN BUSINESS, ETC. CONTINUED BACKGROUNDERS AND OTHER BRIEFINGS ON THIS SAME SUBJECT AT THE FOREIGN PRESS CENTER SHOULD ALSO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE ACTION PLAN. AS THE AGENCY IS AWARE, JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS REGARD FPC ACTIVITIES AS EXTREMELY USEFUL. ONE QUESTION ON THIS SECTION, HOWEVER: WHO IS EXPECTED TO FUND THE HIGH-LEVEL IV PROJECT -- THE AGENCY OR THE PARTICIPATING POSTS? PLEASE ADVISE.

4. MEANWHILE, POST WILL AWAIT ADDITIONAL DETAILS REGARDING PROJECTS PER PARAGRAPH 6 FOR ANY UPDATES. SHELLENBERGER
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SOPN, PREL, JO
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MISSION WELCOMES PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN TO DEAL WITH LIBYA AND TERRORISM. WHILE JORDANIAN MEDIA HAS PROMINENTLY RUN EXTENSIVE STRAIGHT-FORWARD COVERAGE OF RAID, INCLUDING FULL TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S TV STATEMENT OF TOKYO SUMMIT RESOLUTION AND OF EEC COUNTRIES' ACTIONS EXPELLING LIBYAN DIPLOMATS, ETC., QADHAFI STATEMENTS DENOUNCING U.S., TV NEWS COVERAGE OF AFTERMATH OF RAID, HOSPITAL SCENES OF INJURED CHILDREN AND CIVILIANS, AND ARAB LEADERS' STATEMENTS CRITICAL OF U.S. HAVE ALSO BEEN PLAYED UP. EDITORIALS AND COLUMNS HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMINGLY CRITICAL OF U.S. AND SYMPATHETIC TO LIBYA, WITH ONE SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTION, AN AD-DUSTOUR APRIL 27 EDITORIAL CALLING ON ARABS TO CURB TERRORISM AND ON QADHAFI TO STOP NEEDLESS PROVOCATIONS.

3. JORDANIANS HAVE NO LOVE FOR QADHAFI (HE BURNED THEIR EMBASSY IN THE EARLY 1980S AND HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN ATTACKS ON JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS). HOWEVER, J.S. ATTACKS ON HIM HAVE PROMPTED A KNEE JERK REACTION IN SUPPORT OF ARAB LIBYA AMONG MOST OF THE JORDANIAN PUBLIC, ALWAYS SKEPTICAL OF U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST ANY ARAB COUNTRY.

4. WE HAVE MADE GOOD USE OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, BRIEFINGS AND WIRELESS FILE CHRONOLOGIES OF THE LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WITH THE MEDIA AND IN DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHER EMBASSY CONTACTS. WE AGREE THAT USE OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, ESPECIALLY RADIO, WILL BE VERY PRODUCTIVE CHANNEL TO KEEP DEGREE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN MINDS OF JORDANIANS. BOEKER

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY AV NARA, DATE 5/22/12

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ACTION OFFICE PG-01
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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: N/A
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON LIBYA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

REF: (A) USIA 34713-S; (B) DHAKA 2958-LOU

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE ENVIRONMENT FOR ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE MODERATE, BUT NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE U.S. AIR STRIKE AGAINST LIBYA. WHILE A FEW LETTERS TO THE EDITOR AND EDITORIALS CRITICIZING THE U.S. ACTION CONTINUE TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS, HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT PRIVATELY EXPRESS A GREATER UNDERSTANDING FOR THE U.S. ACTION AS AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS COL. QADHAFI. AMONG THIS GROUP OF BANGLADESHIS, THE LIBYAN LEADER HAS FEW SYMPATHIZERS. THEY ALSO FEEL THAT THE U.S. OVER REACTED BY USING MILITARY FORCE TO COMBAT QADHAFI. HOWEVER, THE NEED TO MAINTAIN BANGLADESH'S STATUS AS A NON-ALIGNED, MUSLIM NATION PLACES LIMITS ON THEIR PUBLIC RESPONSES TO THE U.S. CAMPAIGN TO COUNTER TERRORISM. UNLESS OTHER NAM AND OIC COUNTRIES ALTER THEIR PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS, BANGLADESHIS WILL MOST LIKELY CONTINUE TO RESPOND ON TWO LEVELS: DIMINISHING PUBLIC DECLARATIONS CRITICAL OF THE U.S. STRIKE AND URGING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS AND PRIVATE EXPRESSIONS OF DISDAIN FOR QADHAFI AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. ACTION.

3. LOCAL POLICE AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS KEEP A WATCHFUL EYE ON LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN BANGLADESH. THEY HAVE BEEN MOST COOPERATIVE IN PROVIDING HEIGHTENED SECURITY FOR THE MISSION IN THE WAKE OF THE U.S. AIR STRIKE. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR REQUESTS, WE HAVE SHARED AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

4. AS OUTLINED IN REFTEL B, WE BELIEVE THAT HIGHLIGHTING THE LOCAL IMPLICATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1979 HIJACKING OF A PLANE BY THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR COL. FAROUK, RECRUITMENT OF BANGLADESHIS FOR TRAINING IN LIBYA) RATHER THAN FOCUSING EXCLUSIVELY ON LIBYAN ACTIONS WILL BEST CONVEY THE U.S. POSITION ON THE ISSUE TO BANGLADESHI AUDIENCES. WE NEED TO SHOW HOW THEY ARE DIRECTLY CONCERNED. THE SUBJECT OF LIBYAN OR MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM NEED NOT BE TABOO, BUT WE MUST CAREFULLY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ALSO NEED TO STRESS THAT THE U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY IS NOT A EUPHEMISM FOR ACTIONS AGAINST THE BDG'S FELLOW NAM AND MUSLIM NATIONS.

5. THUS FAR, WE HAVE APPROACHED THE SUBJECT OF LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, AND JOURNALISTS IN A STEADY, LOW-KEY MANNER. THE PRESS SECTION HAS USED THE WIRELESS FILE FOR PRESS

RELEASES AND BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR THE LOCAL MEDIA. THE POLITICAL SECTION HAS USED SOME OF THESE SAME MATERIALS WITH MFA OFFICIALS WHO, AT U.S. URGING, ARE WORKING TERRORISM INTO THE SAARC AGENDA. THE KIND OF DETAILED INFORMATION DESCRIBED IN PARA 6 OF REFTEL A WILL HEIGHTEN THE IMPACT OF THESE EFFORTS. THE MORE DETAILED THE INFORMATION, THE BETTER WE CAN CONVEY THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ISSUE.

6. AMONG THE OTHER INITIATIVES MENTIONED IN PARA 6, SPEAKER PROGRAMS OR TELEPRESS CONFERENCES WITH HIGH-LEVEL USG OFFICIALS ARE APPROPRIATE IN THE BANGLADESH ENVIRONMENT. A U.S. SCHOLAR ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHO CAME TO DHAKA SHORTLY AFTER THE U.S. AIR STRIKE WAS MOST SUCCESSFUL IN EXPLAINING THE SERIOUSNESS OF LIBYAN ACTIONS, THE US'S TEMPERED RESPONSE THROUGH DIPLOMACY AND SANCTIONS, AND THE REASONS WHY PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS LEFT WITH NO OPTION BUT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE. HE ALSO HIGHLIGHTED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN US RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD AND US POLICY TOWARDS LIBYA. FUTURE SPEAKERS COULD TOUCH ON THESE SAME THEMES WHEN ADDRESSING BANGLADESH AUDIENCES.

7. POST PLANS. WE BELIEVE THAT A STEADY, LOW-KEY APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM IS BEST SUITED TO THE BANGLADESH ENVIRONMENT. DISSEMINATING INFORMATION FROM WASHINGTON IN THE FORM OF WIRELESS FILE ARTICLES, BROCHURES AND WHITE PAPERS WILL BE OUR MAIN ACTIVITY, SUPPLEMENTED BY A SPEAKER, TELEPRESS CONFERENCE, OR AUDIO-VISUAL PROGRAMS. WHILE THIS EFFORT WILL EXPLAIN THE U.S. POSITION ON THE ISSUE, IT WILL PROBABLY NOT CAUSE AN ABRUPT CHANGE IN THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY OUR BANGLADESHI CONTACTS.

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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP
SECDEF FOR ISA BELLETHEAU
WHITE HOUSE FOR OJEBERJAN AND NOO RAYMOND

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. POST WELCOMES AGENCY EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SUBJECT ACTION PLAN.
2. AS OUR MEDIA REACTION REPORTS HAVE REGULARLY ILLUSTRATED, PAKISTAN'S SEVERAL NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS HAVE UNIFORMLY EXPRESSED NEARLY TOTAL LACK OF UNDERSTANDING, AND MOST OFTEN RATHER SCATHING DENIGRATION OF U.S. EFFORTS TO THWART THE TERRORIST-SUPPORTING AND ENCOURAGING ACTIONS OF MUJAMMAR QADHAFI IN LIBYA. THAT OPPOSITION TO THE U.S. POSITION WAS MOST VISIBLY DEMONSTRATED FOLLOWING THE U.S. AIR STRIKE ON TRIPOLI AND BENGHAZI, NOT ONLY IN THE PRESS BUT ALSO BY MEANS OF A NUMBER OF ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED ELECTRONIC MEDIA HAVE NEITHER EXPRESSED AN OPINION REGARDING THE U.S. RAIDS ON LIBYA NOR REPORTED THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THAT ACTION AND OUR POLICY IN GENERAL VIS A VIS LIBYA, THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED NATIONAL PRESS TRUST NEWSPAPERS HAVE JOINED UNCLEANLY IN THE CLAMOR TO REPORT PAKISTANI PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO THE U.S. STANCE AND TO EXPRESS THEIR OWN NEGATIVE EDITORIAL OPINIONS.
3. THAT SAID, IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT CONVERSATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND NEWSPAPER EDITORS, FOR EXAMPLE, INDICATE THAT THERE IS AN INHERENT DISTASTE FOR TERRORISM AT LEAST AMONG PAKISTAN'S INTELLIGENTSIA, AND THAT THEY HAVE NO RESPECT FOR QADHAFI'S RECOGNIZED EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THAT MEANS TO AN END. HOWEVER, WHEN IT IS THE U.S. (AND ISRAEL) VERSUS A (ANY) MUSLIM STATE (S), THE PAKS PUBLICLY WILL CHOOSE THE MUSLIM CAUSE EVERY TIME.
4. THUS, WHILE ATMOSPHERE IN PAKISTAN IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN ITSELF, THERE ARE THINGS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DOING AND WILL BE ABLE TO DO BETTER WITH SOME OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS MATERIALS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE UNDER THE ACTION PLAN. SOME OF THE AVENUES OF POST INVOLVEMENT OUTLINED IN REFTEL PARA THREE ARE APPLICABLE HERE, PARTICULARLY THE DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATE INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE AVAILABLE, WE CAN BEST USE STATEMENTS, ARTICLES REFLECTING ANTI-TERRORISM (IF NOT

ANTI-LIBYAN) VIEWS BY THIRD WORLD LEADERS. ARTICLES PROVING THE LINKS BETWEEN LIBYA AND TERRORISM MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL. AS YOU SUGGEST, CONTINUED PLAY OF STATEMENTS BY U.S. AND EUROPEAN LEADERS OF DETERMINATION TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND TO COOPERATE IN THAT EFFORT ARE USEFUL. MORE SO ARE ITEMS ILLUSTRATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH DETERMINATION AND COOPERATION.

5. FACTUAL MATERIALS OF THE SORT LISTED AT THE END OF REFTEL PARA SIX WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN PAKISTAN, POSSIBLY GARNERING SOME PUBLIC MEDIA ATTENTION. HOWEVER, WE WILL PRIMARILY USE OUR MONTHLY HINDI LANGUAGE "NEWS AND VIEWS" PUBLICATION AND OTHER DIRECT MEANS TO DISSEMINATE SUCH USEFUL MATERIALS TO THOSE WHO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION IN PAKISTAN -- IN GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIA AND THE MEDIA.

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--A TPC WITH SIMILAR AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS MIGHT ALSO BE
ARRANGED WITH OFFICIALS OR AIRLINE REPS.

--POSSIBLE ED OR NEAHET; HOWEVER, MININF HAS DECLINED TO
PARTICIPATE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.

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E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: A) USIA 34713 (S), B) KUWAIT 2263 (LOU)

FROM AMBASSADOR AND PAD

1. DISCUSSION IN KUWAIT OF LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
WOULD BE AFFECTED BY STRONG POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FACTORS.
ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, KUWAIT IS A COUNTRY THAT SHARES A
DEEP CONCERN ABOUT TERRORISM WITH THE U.S. THIS COUNTRY
HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF TERRORISM, AND IT SHARES WITH US A
DETERMINATION TO ACT RESOLUTELY TO COUNTER SUCH ACTIVITY.

2. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, KUWAIT--ALONG WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION--HAS EXPRESSED SHARP PUBLIC
CRITICISM OF THE U.S. AIR STRIKE AGAINST LIBYA. STATE-
MENTS OF CONDEMNATION HAVE COME FROM THE GOVERNMENT, THE
PRESS AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES. MANY KUWAITIS REGARD
THAT STRIKE AS AN ACT OF TERRORISM. A SPECIFIC CONSE-
QUENCE OF THE GOK'S UNWILLINGNESS TO PERMIT A PUBLIC
CHARACTERIZATION OF COL. QADDAFI AS A TERRORIST WAS ITS
REFUSAL TO PERMIT DISTRIBUTION OF THE ISSUE OF "VOICE"
MAGAZINE WHICH INCLUDED A QUOTATION OF SECY SHULTZ
CHARACTERIZING HIM THUS.

3. PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT IDENTICAL
WITH PRIVATE OPINIONS. THERE ARE MANY IN THE GOVERNMENT
AND OUTSIDE OF IT WHO CONDEMN STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
IN GENERAL AND QADDAFI IN PARTICULAR. SUCH INDIVIDUALS
WOULD BE OPEN TO DISCRETE EXCHANGES ON COUNTERING LIBYAN
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC FORA.

4. POST REGARDS THE FOLLOWING APPROACHES AS THE MOST
PRODUCTIVE (PLEASE SEE ALSO SUGGESTIONS IN REF B):

--AN INTERVIEW IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS WITH AMBASSADOR
QUAINTON, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE FOR COMBATTING
TERRORISM, BY THE LEADING ARABIC DAILY, "AL-QABAS," WHICH
CIRCULATES THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD AND IN EUROPE. THE
SUBJECT OF LIBYA IS BOUND TO ARISE, AND THE INTERVIEW
WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN OUR POLICY OF
COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.

--STEPPE-UP OVERSEAS DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATE INFORMA
TIONAL MATERIAL, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE WIRELESS FILE,
INCLUDING FULL TEXTS OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS.

--BRIEFING FOR SECURITY BRANCHES OF THE GOK. POST HAS
PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED BRIAN JENKINS OF RAND CORP., CHERIF
BASSIOUNI OF DE PAUL U., FORMER SY/TAGS OFFICER BOWMAN
MILLER AND COL. AUGUSTUS HORTON OF WEST POINT AS POSSIBLE
BRIEFERS. THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ALSO BE POSSIBILITY OF
USING BRIEFERS FOR ON-THE-RECORD INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL
PRESS.

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USIA

DEPT FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP
USIA FOR P/G, NEA THORNHILL

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAY ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: (A) USIA 34713-C, (B) USIA 34711-C, (C) COLOMBO
02970-C, (D) USIA 27694

1. LAST MONTH, USIA IN REFTEL (D) SOUGHT OUR VIEWS ON WHAT WAS CONSIDERED BEST FOR US REGARDING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS IN SRI LANKA VIS-A-VIS LIBYA AND TERRORISM. THOSE VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED IN REFTEL C, AND WE FEEL THAT THEY STILL HOLD, AND SHOULD HOLD FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. FOLLOWING IS A REITERATION OF THOSE VIEWS WITH SOME ELABORATION:

- (A) OUR INTERESTS CAN BEST BE SERVED BY PERSONAL CONTACTS AND BY THE CONTINUED, EXPANDED AVAILABILITY OF MATERIALS FOR MEDIA PLACEMENT ON TERRORISM FROM THE WIRELESS FILE AND OTHER SOURCES (E.G., USINFO'S AND GIST). OUR TRACK RECORD ON MEDIA PLACEMENT OF MATERIALS ON TERRORISM HAS BEEN VERY GOOD, IN SPITE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTROL OF THE MEDIA, AND ITS PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE HAM CONDEMNATION OF THE U.S. BOMBING OF LIBYA.

- (B) FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE, AND PERHAPS ONLY UNTIL SOME KIND OF OPTIMISM IS POSSIBLE REGARDING THE THE RESOLUTION OF SRI LANKA'S TAMIL TERRORIST-SEPARATIST PROBLEM, OUR BEST INTERESTS MAY NOT BE WELL SERVED - AND MAY EVEN BE HARMED - BY A HARD-HITTING ANTI-TERRORIST, ANTI QADHAFI PUBLIC POSTURE IN SRI LANKA INVOLVING THE USE OF OTHER RESOURCES SUCH AS AMPART SPEAKERS AND ELECTRONIC DIALOGUES. WE BELIEVE THIS BECAUSE OF A NUMBER OF DOMESTIC CONCERNS, INCLUDING:

- (1) THE GOVERNMENT, FOR ITS OWN REASONS, NEEDS AND WANTS MOSLEM SUPPORT, AND WOULD BE LOATH TO SUPPRESS MOSLEM ANTI-AMERICAN ACTIVITY. PUBLICLY, SINCE SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE MOSLEM POPULATION ARE PUBLICLY PRO-QADHAFI (HIS PICTURE IS PROMINENTLY ON DISPLAY IN MOSLEM HOMES) AND ANTI-AMERICAN (ON THE LIBYAN RAID ISSUE), ANY ATTACK - DELIBERATE OR EVEN PERCEIVED - BY USIS ON QADHAFI, COULD PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR POSSIBLE VIOLENT COUNTER-REACTION. NOTE: THE PLO, IRAN AND LIBYA ALL HAVE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN COLOMBO.

- (2) THE GSL IS LESS THAN PLEASED WITH THE U.S. POLICY OF CONDEMNING AND MILITARY ATTACKING LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM, WHILE REFUSING TO PERMIT THE SALE OF U.S. MILITARY HARDWARE THE GSL SAYS IT NEEDS TO SUPPORT ITS ANTI-TAMIL TERRORIST CAMPAIGN. A

HIGH ANTI-LIBYAN TERRORIST PUBLIC PROFILE ON OUR PART WILL ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS IRRITATION.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF MEDIA PLACEMENT AND PERSONAL CONTACT, WE KNOW THAT ON THE PART OF MANY PEOPLE WHO COUNT IN SRI LANKA, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA, THERE IS A VERY REAL ABHORRENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AS SUCH, AND OF QADHAFI'S VERSION IN PARTICULAR. HOWEVER, THESE PEOPLE, MOST OF WHOM ARE OUR KEY CONTACTS, CAN'T OR WON'T BE MORE PUBLIC IN THEIR VIEWS GIVEN THE DOMESTIC CONCERNS MENTIONED ABOVE. THEY ARE, NEVERTHELESS, NOT OPPOSED TO SEEING THEIR VIEWS AIRED INDIRECTLY IN THE FORM OF PUBLISHED ARTICLES SUPPLIED BY USIS, AND BY CHANCES TO SHARE THEIR VIEWS - AND HAVE THEM REINFORCED - THROUGH DIRECT, PERSONAL CONTACT WITH MISSION PERSONNEL.

3. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD EXPLOIT THESE POSITIVE FACTORS AND CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON MEDIA PLACEMENT AND PERSONAL CONTACT, WHILE KEEPING OUR OTHER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RESOURCES IN RESERVE FOR USE WHEY THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE, AND THERE IS LESS DANGER OF A COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE EFFECT. OPPEN

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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON LIBYAN SUPPORT
- OF TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POST BELIEVES THAT THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN OUTLINED IN REFTEL WILL BE USEFUL IN ENCOURAGING PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE RISE OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM. QATAR DOES NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LIBYA AND GOQ LEADERS ARE NOT SYMPATHETIC TOWARDS QADHAFI'S RHETORIC OR ESCAPADES. LOCAL MEDIA, HOWEVER, IS MUCH MORE CRITICAL OF U.S. ACTIONS. THEREFORE, WE SEE THE PRIMARY TARGET FOR ACTION PLAN TO BE THE GENERAL PUBLIC, WITH QATARI LEADERSHIP AS A SECONDARY AUDIENCE TO INVOLVE IN INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS.

3. WE WELCOME ALL EFFORTS TO STEP UP DIRECT AND INDIRECT DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATIONAL MATERIAL THROUGH PLACEMENT IN INFLUENTIAL EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN MEDIA. WE CAN ALSO USE INCREASED ARABIC WIRELESS FILE MATERIAL SUCH AS ARTICLES ON THE HISTORIC RISE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND LIBYAN SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS, PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM, AND CHRONOLOGIES OF LIBYAN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM.

4. MISSION DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE QATARIS WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO A VISIT BY AN AMPART ON TERRORISM. HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A TELEPRESS CONFERENCE WITH A TOP EXPERT ON TERRORISM, PREFERABLY SOMEONE WHO HAS WRITTEN ON THE SUBJECT. TWO NAMES WHICH COME TO MIND ARE DAVID LONG (STATE DEPARTMENT) AND CLAIRE STIRLING, BUT WE ARE OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS. THE TPC WOULD BE FOR EDITORS OF LOCAL PAPERS AND THE QATARI NEWS AGENCY. IT WOULD FOCUS ON THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORKS AND LIBYA'S ROLE IN SUPPORTING THESE GROUPS. IDEALLY, THE TPC WOULD CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT TERRORISM IS A GLOBAL CONCERN NEEDING COLLECTIVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL. WE WOULD LIKE TO HOLD THE TPC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE END OF RAMADAN FESTIVITIES IN MID-JUNE.

5. WE ALSO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF AN IV PROGRAM FOR SENIOR JOURNALISTS AND REGIONAL SEMINARS ON TERRORISM. THESE ACTIVITIES COULD BE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE IF SUITABLE CANDIDATES CAN BE IDENTIFIED. VOA PROGRAMMING AND OTHER ELECTRONIC MEDIA SUPPORT SUCH AS VCR'S WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON A SMALL, BUT SELECTIVE AUDIENCE IN QATAR. MACINNES

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USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN FOR COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
REF: USIA 34713

1. ENTIRE MESSAGE LOU.
2. PROGRAMS AND OTHER ACTIONS OUTLINED REFTEL SOUND EXCELLENT ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS, BUT HAVE LIMITED APPLICABILITY TO MY PROGRAM IN JERUSALEM. SPECIFICALLY, THE WORLDNET AND OTHER SATELLITE PROGRAMS ARE NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF ANY INDIGENOUS VISUAL MEDIA IN THE WEST BANK. ALSO, AN AMPART PROGRAM ON THIS SUBJECT IS NOT RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME, SINCE IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO FOCUS ON THE LIBYAN/TERRORISM ISSUE WITHOUT BEING SIDETRACKED ONTO THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN ISSUES.
3. WE DO, HOWEVER, SEE A POSSIBILITY IN PARTICIPATING IN THE HIGH LEVEL IV PROGRAM FOR SENIOR JOURNALISTS MENTIONED PARAGRAPH SIX, AND WOULD LIKE TO BE KEPT ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES FOR PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A PROGRAM AND IT COULD HAVE A VERY GREAT IMPACT AT THIS TIME. ADDITIONAL PRINTED INFORMATION FOCUSING ON ALLIED COOPERATION IN FUTURE MOVES AGAINST LIBYA AND TERRORISM ARE ALSO VALUABLE TO US.

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FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NEPAL IS A STRICTLY, CONSCIENTIOUSLY, NON-ALIGNED THIRD-WORLD COUNTRY. STATEMENTS ISSUED AFTER LIBYAN AIR RAID BY GOVERNMENT CONDEMNING LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM (BUT NOT U. S. AIR RAID) WERE IN FACT CRITICIZED IN INDEPENDENT PRESS AS NOT BALANCED ENOUGH. PRESS DENOUNCED ALL INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE, INCLUDING U. S. ATTACK, AND CALLED FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES. OBVIOUSLY, GREATEST NEED HERE IS FOR EDUCATION ON TRUE NATURE OF TERRORISM, AND EXTENT OF STATE SPONSORSHIP OUTSIDE BOUNDS OF CIVILIZED BEHAVIOR, ESPECIALLY BY LIBYA.

3. THERE HAVE BEEN TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN NEPAL, OVER DOMESTIC ISSUES (MONARCHY/PANCHAYAT SYSTEM VS. MORE COMPLETE DEMOCRATIC/SOCIALIST SYSTEM). CLEARLY, PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT ARE AGAINST TERRORIST ACTS. HOWEVER, INFORMATION ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AND STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM WILL HELP UNDERSTANDING OF AND INCREASE SUPPORT FOR U. S. POLICY.

4. THUS, GOALS ONE AND FIVE, PARA FOUR REFTEL (ACHIEVE UNDERSTANDING OF U. S. POSITION, AND ENCOURAGE STRONGER STANDS AGAINST TERRORISM) APPLY TO THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT IN NEPAL.

5. FULL RANGE OF INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORT ITEMS, ESPECIALLY WIRELESS FILE ITEMS AMPLIFYING OFFICIAL

STATEMENTS, AND INCREASED DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS, WILL MOST EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE ABOVE GOALS.

6. NO ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS, EXCEPT THAT TERRORISM SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN MANY IV GROUP PROJECTS, SUCH AS "DECISION-MAKING IN U. S. FOREIGN POLICY," AND THE JOURNALIST-DIRECTED "CAMPAIGN '86." HARLEY

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JF TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4898
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6025
BT
~~SECRET~~ RABAT 05039
USIA

FOR LIBYA TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR-O (SMITH, JAMES E)
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. (U) THIS IS A JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE.
2. (C) MISSION ELEMENTS HAVE REVIEWED THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM OUTLINED IN REFTEL AND OFFER THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON ITS APPLICABILITY IN THE MOROCCAN ENVIRONMENT NOTING MISSION PLANS, OR ACTION ALREADY TAKEN, TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE SUGGESTIONS.
3. (S) MOROCCAN ENVIRONMENT: AS DESCRIBED IN RABAT'S 3965 AND 3829 THE MOROCCAN REACTION TO THE U.S. RAID ON LIBYA WAS MIXED, STIRRING A DEBATE BETWEEN THOSE HOLDING A SUSPICIOUS VIEW OF QADHAFI AND THOSE IDENTIFYING WITH THE UNION WITH LIBYA OR WITH IDEALS OF ISLAMIC, ARABIC SOLIDARITY. FOR THE PUBLIC, OR AT LEAST THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL PRESS, THE REACTION TO THE RAID WAS COLORED WITH A STRONG ELEMENT OF IDENTIFICATION WITH THE NORTH AFRICAN, ARAB, ISLAMIC TIES THAT EXIST WITH LIBYANS. THUS, MISSION EFFORTS TO COUNTER LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM MUST EXPLOIT THE MOROCCAN REMEMBRANCE OF QADHAFI'S ERRATIC AND OFTEN HOSTILE BEHAVIOR TOWARDS MOROCCO OVER THE YEARS AND AVOID THE REKINDLING OF NEGATIVE REACTIONS TOWARDS MILITARY ACTION AGAINST A SISTER ARAB STATE AND ITS PEOPLE.
4. (S) THE POST HAS, SINCE THE RAID, TAKEN A SERIES OF ACTIONS, MANY OF WHICH ARE RECOMMENDED REFTEL, TO AMPLIFY U.S. AND ALLIED PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM PROMINENT PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS. THE POST WILL EXPAND ITS STEPPED-UP DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATE MATERIALS TO INCLUDE A WIDE RANGE OF CONCERNED ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE BUSINESS/COMMERCIAL COMMUNITY. THIS WILL BE IN CONTEXT OF INTENSIFIED CONTACTS WITH THESE GROUPS TO COMMUNICATE OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM AND TO STATES SUPPORTING IT.
- A FOCUS ON OTHER STATES SUSPECTED OF SUPPORT OF TERRORISM WILL LEND STRENGTH TO U.S. ARGUMENTS THAT ALL SOURCES OF SUPPORT TO TERRORISM ARE CONDEMNED.
5. (C) THE POST'S MEDIA REACTION REPORTING WILL REPORT FULLY ITEMS SUPPORTIVE OF THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM.
6. (S) WHILE IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT MOROCCO WOULD PUBLICLY SUPPORT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA, THE MISSION HAS COMMUNICATED AT ALL LEVELS OF OFFICIAL CONTACT THE UNITED STATES' CONCERN WITH OFFICIAL MOROCCAN TIES TO THE LIBYAN STATE AND U.S. DETERMINATION TO CURB LIBYAN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM. THE POST WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT THE AMBIVALENCE AND SUSPICION TOWARD SUPPORT OF LIBYA THAT HAS

BEEN OCCASIONALLY EVIDENT IN OFFICIAL AND EDITORIAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING QADHAFI'S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

7. (S) AMONG THE APPROACHES OUTLINED IN THE REFTEL, INDIRECT REINFORCEMENT FROM EUROPEAN MEDIA SOURCES WOULD CERTAINLY HELP WITH MOROCCAN LEADERS WHO RELY HEAVILY ON EUROPEAN MEDIA SOURCES TO STRENGTHEN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. POSITION.

8. (C) NOMINATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL VISITORS FOR WHOM THESE ISSUES ARE PERTINENT (SOME ARE FORESEEN FOLLOWING THE 60-DAY ACTION PLAN) WILL BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF WASHINGTON SO THAT THEIR PROGRAMS MIGHT INCLUDE APPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS ABOUT TERRORISM.

9. (S) THE MISSION LOOKS FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE ADDITIONAL AGENCY AND DEPARTMENTAL MATERIALS DESIGNED FOR USE WITH HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS AND MEDIA ON THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM. WHITE

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NLRR M4421 #137115

BY RW NARA DATE 10/14/11

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UNITED STATES
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OF
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137114

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FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9739
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3885
BT
SECRET SANAA 3476

USIA

FOR LIBYA/TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: USIA 34713

1. S- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: YEMENI AUDIENCE, WITH FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF
LIBYAN TERRORISM, WILL BE RECEPTIVE TO SUBJECT ACTION PLAN.
MOST EFFECTIVE ITEMS ARE THOSE AUTHORED BY ARABS, WHO MORE
EASILY ESCAPE THE STIGMA OF ATTACKING A FELLOW ARAB STATE
THAN DO AMERICANS OR EUROPEANS. END SUMMARY

3. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE REFERENCED ACTION PLAN ADDRESS VITAL
CONCERNS OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC (YAR).
YEMENI OFFICIALS WILL READILY CONCEDE IN PRIVATE CONVERS-
ATIONS THAT THEY HAVE EXPERIENCED FIRST HAND THE TERRORIST
TACTICS OF QADHAFI'S REGIME. LIBYA SUPPLIED ARMS AND MONEY TO
THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT DURING THE 1979-82 INSURGENCY
AGAINST NORTH YEMEN, IT THREATENED VITAL YEMENI SECURITY AND
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS BY MINING THE RED SEA IN 1984; AND LIBYAN
AGENTS WERE SUSPECTED OF PLAYING A ROLE IN AN ABORTIVE COUP
ATTEMPT AGAINST PRESIDENT SALIH. FURTHERMORE, LIBYA'S SUPPORT
FOR IRAN IN THE GULF WAR CONTRASTS VIVIDLY WITH YEMEN'S SOLID-
ARITY WITH IRAQ. THUS, AN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN WHICH CHRONICLES
LIBYAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE DIRECTED
AGAINST OTHER ARAB REGIMES, COULD REACH A HIGHLY RECEPTIVE
AUDIENCE IN THE YAR.

4. ONE IMPORTANT OBSTACLE LIMITS THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE ACTION PLAN, HOWEVER. BOTH UNILATERAL U.S. ACTIONS
TAKEN AGAINST QADHAFI AND COLLECTIVE WESTERN INITIATIVES
ALIKE ARE REGRETTABLY PERCEIVED IN YEMEN AS OUTSIDE "AGGRESSION"
AGAINST A FELLOW ARAB STATE. WHILE LESS APT TO TAKE THIS
POSITION IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, YEMENI OFFICIALS APPARENTLY
FEEL CONSTRAINED BY POPULAR SENTIMENTS WHICH CHAMPION LIBYA'S
CAUSE WHEN CONFRONTED BY ANY NON-ARAB POWER.

5. IN YEMEN, THE MOST EFFECTIVE INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS
AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM ARE ACCORDINGLY THOSE AUTHORED BY
ARABS RATHER THAN BY AMERICANS OR EUROPEANS. ONE EXCELLENT
EXAMPLE, CARRIED IN THE MAY 9 ARABIC WIRELESS FILE, WAS THE
POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES TAKEN AT
THE TOKYO SUMMIT BY THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ANOTHER
EFFECTIVE ITEM, CARRIED IN THE APRIL 28 ENGLISH FILE ONLY,
WERE THE EXCERPTS OF AN APRIL 25 EDITORIAL BY THE
JORDANIAN DAILY AL-DUSTOUR. THE AL-AHRAM EDITORIAL OF
MAY 7 (WIRELESS FILE, NEA 319) WAS ANOTHER.

6. THE VOA ARABIC SERVICE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO ACQUAINT
THE GENERAL PUBLIC WITH U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COUNTER ILL-

CONSIDERED SUPPORT FOR QADHAFI ON THE SOLE BASIS OF HIS ARAB
AFFILIATION. TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE, HOWEVER, VOA PROGRAMS FOR
THE YEMENI AUDIENCE SHOULD IDEALLY BE DRAFTED BY NATIVE
SPEAKERS OF ARABIC, WHO CAN BEST CONVEY THE ARGUMENTS THAT
ARE MOST LIKELY TO BREACH CULTURAL BARRIERS. THEY SHOULD MAKE
FULL USE OF ITEMS MENTIONED IN PARA 4. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF VOA BROADCASTING TO YEMEN IS LIMITED BY THE
GENERALLY WEAK SIGNAL LISTENERS RECEIVE.

7. AS A FINAL NOTE, THE ARABIC WIRELESS FILE SHOULD CONTINUE
TO CARRY COMPLETE TEXTS OF U.S. AND ALLIED STATEMENTS OF
THESE ISSUES. WHILE OF LIMITED USE WITH THE GENERAL PUBLIC,
THESE TEXTS ARE IMPORTANT TOOLS FOR BRIEFING THE YEMENI
LEADERSHIP.


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NLRR M4421 #137114
BY AW NARA DATE 10/24/11

June 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Interagency Public Diplomacy Working Group on
Countering Libyan Terrorism

FROM: Philip W. Arnold 
Working Group Chairman

SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting
Monday, June 16, 10:00 AM USIA Room 868

I suggest the following agenda for the June 16 meeting:

- Status of current projects
- Discussion of field responses and comments
- Preparation of mid-term report to the NSC

Please pass any comments or further suggestions to Joel
Fischman, USIA P/G, 485-8644.

LE POINT, Paris
23 June 1986

Libya

GADHAFI: ONE NO LONGER FOLLOWS THE LEADER

Between an Army Which Is Stirring and the People
Who Are Doubting, He Is Increasingly Isolated

Gleaming portraits of Col. Gadhafi dotting the avenues of Tripoli, triumphal arches studded with martial slogans, frescoes showing the valiant Libyan army shooting down myriad American planes... The ritual iconography had been respected for one of the revolution's most sacred days: the anniversary of the 1970 evacuation of the American base, Wheelus. The traditional parade also took place: scouts and Bedouin horsemen in ceremonial dress. A rather thin crowd, obviously thinking of something else, watched these festivities. But the outstanding event was elsewhere: the podium intended to receive Gadhafi for his big speech remained desperately empty. Instead of one of those theatrical performances of which the "leader of the revolution" has the secret, Libyans had to be satisfied with a dull televised speech obviously recorded in advance.

With a puffy face, hesitant speech, and an absent-minded air, laboriously reading his text, Gadhafi looked like the shadow of himself. From this insipid statement, Libyans will have at least retained one thing: they will have to tighten their belts a few more notches. Priority will be given "to the country's strategic needs," and "the output of the public service will be reserved for export." Libya, which a short while ago was very generous with its dinars which it distributed in abundance to the four corners of the earth to support such and such a "revolutionary" enterprise, has entered a period of "thin camels." For the festival of Fitr, the breaking of the fast marking the end of Ramadan, Tripolitans not belonging to the nomenklatura had to give up the usual feasts. Store shelves show gaping holes. Butter has become an almost unobtainable commodity, and soap has disappeared from the shops.

If, according to Lenin, communism was the soviets plus electricity, "Gadhafism" was up to now the Little Green Book plus video recorders. His people listened to Gadhafi's ideological-warlike ramblings with indulgence as long as plenty prevailed. The decline in oil revenues and the U.S. Air Force raid dealt a rough blow to the image of the "leader." Within six years, Libya has seen its receipts from black gold collapse. They have fallen by 80 percent, going from \$23 billion in 1980 to \$4 billion in 1986. The American bombing on 16 April had shattered the myth of the invincibility of the revolution. The American planes were hardly bothered by the ground-to-air missiles or by Libyan air defense, and the inhabitants of Tripoli and Benghazi abruptly became aware of their vulnerability. The idea that Gadhafi's adventurism represents a danger for the population is gradually gaining credit. Grumbling is perceptible not just among the lower classes and the middle class: the army is also said to be shaken. The military refuses to be considered responsible for the inadequacies discovered

at the time of the American bombings.

In the face of this latent rebellion, Gadhafi is getting tough. He is strengthening the powers of the people's committees which control the country, the administration, and the army. He spends most of his time in the oasis of Beyda, about 100 km east of Tripoli, and never sleeps in the same house two nights in succession. His personal guard has been severely purged: it is now made up exclusively of members of his own tribe. Prudent, he seems to have temporarily toned down his terrorist initiatives. American secret services even say they are convinced that some planned operations were cancelled after the 16 April raid.

Gadhafi is also seeking support from Moscow where the regime's number two man, Maj. Abdel Salem Jallud, went in late May. The Kremlin had shown remarkable prudence at the time of the American raid. But the Soviet Union might well take advantage of the situation to increase its influence. A Russian military delegation arrived last week in Tripoli to examine the means to "strengthen Libya's defense capabilities." But wary of Gadhafi's uncontrollable temperament, the USSR might be tempted, according to some experts, to encourage the "leader's" gentle ouster to the advantage of more resolutely pro-Soviet elements. Already the revolutionary command council seems to be exercising much tighter control over Gadhafi's acts and deeds. The one who wanted to be the standard bearer for all the world's oppressed, the one who imagined inflaming the universe one day, the inspired Bedouin who dreamed of Saharan cavalcades and an empire of the sands extending from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, is today only an isolated horseman lost in his mirages.

Pierre Beylau

Caption

The anniversary in Tripoli: a thin crowd and portraits of Gadhafi held at arm's length.

The Washington Times

MONDAY, JULY 14, 1986

Exit this way

Even as reports spread from Libya that Col. Muammar Qaddafi has lost much of his power over the Revolutionary Command Council, and as terrorist acts involving Libyans have fallen out of the limelight since the U.S. bombing attack, Western governments still are pressing for greater reductions in the number of dubious diplomatic personnel attached to the Libyan people's bureaus. Austria is the latest, requiring Libyan diplomatic representation in Vienna to be cut in half.