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File Folder TERRORISM - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (JANUARY 1986) (1 OF 3)

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137085	MEMO	FOR DONALD FORTIER RE ATTITUDES <i>D 9/22/2017 M442/1</i>	1	1/2/1986	B1
137086	REPORT	RE ATTITUDES (ATTACHMENT TO 137085) <i>D 9/22/2017 M442/1</i>	23	1/2/1986	B1

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Public Statements on Libya,
7-10 January

Next Steps

- o If these steps do not end Qadhafi's terrorism, I promise you that further steps will be taken. (RR, 7 January)
- o The U.S. will continue to reserve the right to act in an appropriate manner in our own self defense. All available measures will remain under consideration to bring terrorists to justice. Should Qadhafi continue his involvement in international terrorism, we're fully prepared to take additional measures...There are many other measures we can take, a full range of options. We will not go into those. (Speakes Press Briefing, 8 January)
- o We have indicated that the United States--is prepared to make a firm statement, as firm as we can make, short of military action, as far as cutting off the Qaddafi regime politically and economically. (Speakes Press Briefing, 8 January)
- o Q. Last night the President said that if these steps--referring to the sanctions--do not end Qaddafi's terrorism, "I promise you that further steps will be taken." Given the fact that administration officials themselves have admitted that the sanctions themselves will have minimal impact--minimum economic effect on Libya, do you believe that what has been done so far is really going to end Qadhafi's terrorism and if they--by what date will further steps be taken?
A. That remains to be seen what Qadhafi does, but I can assure you that if Qadhafi strikes again and Americans are involved, the United States will be prepared to hunt down and to take drastic action against those responsible for it.
Q. But you have said you--
A. If we can find them, we'll get them.
Q. But you say you have proof that there are training camps in Libya already, that you know where they are.
A. We do.
Q. Why do we need a further attack to strike?
A. As we have indicated, that our response, as always, will be according to our policy of a measured and focused response.
Q. Next time, huh?
A. Yes.
- o Q. If I could follow up on something you didn't answer over here, is there a time frame for this? I mean, are you waiting for Qadhafi to strike again or are you giving the allies sort of an open-ended time to make this decision or--
A. We are not setting any artificial timetables, but we will certainly monitor the situation and see what develops, and watch the Qadhafi regime very, very closely to see what further actions it takes.
Q. So you are waiting for some kind of overt action from

Libya to prove or disprove that his behavior has changed?

A. I don't think we are going to set any public criteria. We will judge Qadhafi on our own time. We will judge Qadhafi through our own means, and through our own criteria.
(Speakes Press Briefing, 8 January)

- o Q. Is it fair to ask you, when you say that this is a graduated course of action, we're prepared to consider additional means, that you're saying that now that virtually we've cut off all diplomatic ties and all economic ties, that we're talking about some kind of military action as a final end?

A. I think that I cannot go beyond what I said. I don't think anybody has been drawn into being specific in reply to that question, and I, too, shall leave it open. (Kalb Press Briefing, 9 January)

Effectiveness of the Sanctions

- o Q. Is there any reason for you to believe or for us to believe that things will be any different this time, simply because you are asking them, yet again?

A. I don't know. We're going to consult with them. I don't know that we're going to outright ask them. We're going to tell them what we're doing.

Q. Well, sir, but if they can't do it, it severely curtails the effect of your sanctions. Doesn't it frustrate you?

A. It may be frustrating, but we're going to go on with what we think has to be done. (RR, 7 January)

- o Those who have made statements that sanctions don't appear to work, well, one of the reasons is because for an individual nation to put forth such sanctions when their trade or the things that they're trading is available from any number of other suppliers, indicates that maybe sanctions haven't worked because we haven't jointly gone together. (RR, 10 January)

- o Q. Are you disappointed by the European attitude so far and what can you expect from the European--what kind of minimum cooperation do you expect?

A. Well I was not totally surprised. I recognize the problems they have with--in many of them with trade on a far larger scale than we have. (RR, 10 January)

- o Q. Well, if I can ask the question for the fourth time, though, why--do you have any reason to believe that they don't mean what they say, and what they have said repeatedly over the last week?

A. Once again, we have not had the opportunity to present our case in full to the allied governments. If they hear that and they decide not to do anything, then that is their decision. We hope they will go along. We think international cooperation is essential and important.
(Speakes Press Briefing, 8 January)

- o Q. So, you may have anticipated [the European reaction] and also the reaction of Arab states. In that case, why did you feel that you needed to go on with sanctions?
A. Well, for one thing, we were a little defenseless with regard to taking actions in response to this terrorism while so many of our citizens were there and potential hostages. So, we felt that we should untie our hands with regard to whatever action might be necessary in the future. (RR, 10 January)
- o Libya is a country that has been, is, and no doubt will continue to be involved in terrorist activities. They give safe haven. they give financial support. they have arms and explosives stored in their embassies; they pass them out. They are involved in terrorist activities, and we are making a statement to that effect. (Shultz, 9 January)
- o The President has come to the conclusion that the answer to the question [of whether we should continue dealing with somebody involved in terrorism] is no. And if it costs us a little bit initially, so be it, but we don't want to deal with him. (Shultz, 9 January)
- o Q. Larry, in answer to an earlier question I understood you to say that the Italian and the Austrian governments concur in their investigation that there is clear Libyan involvement.
A. That is correct.
Q. Possibly I missed something, but I thought the last thing Craxi was saying was that he did not have that kind of evidence and that he was looking for--
A. No, I think his statement is quite to the contrary. I believe I have it here. Do we have that statement? No, we don't.
- o Q. Does the Reagan Administration have any reasonable expectations that Qadhafi is going to moderate his behavior in response to what the President has just outlined?
A. Can't get involved in making that sort of prediction. (Kalb Press Briefing, 9 January)

Coordination

- o Q. I mean, there wasn't a decision yesterday that said we're going to put out this initial set of steps and then tomorrow we're going to hit them again with the freeze or the assets?
A. That's correct. (Senior Administration Official, 8 January)
- o Q. Are you ratcheting every day--is that something likely to happen tomorrow if there's a--
A. I'd rather not speculate on what's going to happen tomorrow. (Senior Administration Official, 8 January)

- o Q. Can we get back to the timing here a minute? It doesn't make sense to me unless you are purposely dribbling this out. Is that what you all are doing?
A. No.
Q. I mean, you are not sort of raising the stakes every day?
A. No.
Q. I don't understand why if you've been monitoring this all along and nothing in particular happened between last night when he announced that set of actions, and today--why this was not in last night?
A. Well, again without accepting the hypothesis that was contained in your question, I would just say that I would think that you would want the President of the United States to do is to make his decisions based upon policy recommendations grounded upon the best factual information that we can receive. Facts come to your attention on a continuing, evolving basis and I think the decisions that were made yesterday were based upon sound policy bases, sound factual bases, and they continued. (Senior Administration Official, 8 January)

- o Q. Is Shultz going to make some new announcements or--
A. (Speakes) I don't know of any specific announcement he's got. You don't know of any Shultz--
A. (Djerejian) He'll probably lead off with a statement on--but, beyond that, we have nothing.
Q. Any new steps--can we expect any new steps today?
A. (Speakes) I don't know of any. (Speakes Press Briefing, 9 January)

- o This Administration requires that any response to international terrorism be appropriate, measured and focussed. What the President announced meets that requirement. We are on a graduated course of action designed to convince Qadhafi that his support for terrorism is not cost-free. We want him to re-think and terminate his support for terrorism. What the President announced may not be a final response. If Qadhafi continues his involvement in international terrorism, we are prepared to consider additional measures. Libya will be affected by the steps the President announced. The impact will, of course, be even greater if others who have also suffered as a result of Qadhafi's support for terrorism take similar action. For our part, we will press forward regardless. (Kalb Press Briefing, 9 January)

Uncertainties in the U.S. Position on Libya

An analysis of public statements on Libya yielded the following results:

- o Forceful administration statements announcing the economic sanctions coexist with public statements--at all levels--admitting the probable ineffectiveness of the sanctions. Additionally, State appears to present the policy as "the President's," perhaps serving to distance itself from the measures.
- o Administration spokesmen set the criteria for success of the sanctions (they would only be effective if the Allies joined us) at the same time predicting that the Allies would probably not join us. By so doing, they may have undercut Whitehead's consultations with the Allies--our opportunity to draft additional support. They also state that the economic sanctions would probably not affect Qadhafi's behavior.
- o Purposely vague statements suggesting future resort to military action against Libya and presidential reticence on the subject coexist with clear statements that the U.S. will act militarily "the next time."
- o Statements denying any overall plan for the measures that have been taken against Libya are left unreconciled with acknowledgments that the actions being taken reflect "graduated escalation"; the very existence of both statements tends to confirm the disorder implied by the first.
- o Qadhafi's threats to the U.S. throughout the episode have probably added to the confusion--while the U.S. has been busy explaining its economic sanctions to the world, Libya has been talking about war.
- o The public is also likely to be confused by the apparent rejection of joint sanctions by the Allies. Additionally, although the President told them he has "irrefutable evidence" of Libya's complicity, the two targets (Italy and Austria) cast doubt on the quality of that evidence.
- o Finally, the public is almost certainly puzzled by the absence of reports of American nationals leaving Libya; this raises further questions about the effectiveness of the measures chosen by the President and, perhaps more important, the effectiveness of their execution.

Public support for U.S. actions against Qadhafi is likely to suffer in this environment. The original simplicity of the policy (retaliation for attacks against Americans) has been made complex by the sheer number and diversity of statements.