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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**File Folder** TERRORISM - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (MARCH 1985 -  
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137094	PAPER	RE COUNTER-TERRORISM <i>R 9/22/2017 M442/1</i>	8	3/10/1986	B1

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137094



**Defense Systems Inc.**  
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BY RW NARA DATE 9/22/17  
NLRM # 137094

COUNTER-TERRORIST PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:  
Recommendations for a Comprehensive Program

Despite the declared policy to retaliate against terrorist groups and states supporting them, the very nature of terrorism makes this policy very difficult to implement. There is rarely a "smoking gun;" it is usually nearly impossible to establish with certainty both the identity and location of the responsible group. Even when this is done, use of force without shedding innocent blood may not be possible. More importantly, a comparative study of the individual, group and organizational psychology of political terrorism indicates that a retaliatory policy may actually not only not deter the terrorist group but may even promote greater group cohesion and reinforce the terrorist "mindset."

While active retaliatory measures have an important role to play, and there will be circumstances when retaliation is the tactic of choice, it should be only one tactic in an array of approaches which can be flexibly employed and are integrated into a comprehensive strategy. What are the other weapons which should be in the counter-terrorist armory? Political terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological warfare waged through the media. Our adversary has already chosen his weapons in this duel. To effectively counter the political terrorist adversary requires countering his specialized --and highly lethal-- psychological warfare. This can only be accomplished through the vehicle of a comprehensive counter-terrorist psychological



} yet another definition

operations program.

COORDINATING CONCERNED AGENCIES

In designing such a comprehensive program, one of the knottiest problems concerns boundary regulation and coordination among the many agencies with legitimate interests in the problem. Within the defense establishment alone, JCS, JSOC, the services, and the CINC's all have legitimate--and sometimes conflicting and overlapping --interests. Within CIA, offices concerned with countering terrorism include , but are not limited to, the Office of Global Intelligence, the Office of Research and Development, the Directorate of Operations area divisions, the Directorate of Intelligence regional offices, the Political Psychology Staff, the Counter-Terrorism Group, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. At the Department of State, official statements may generate from the Office of the Secretary, the regional bureaus, or the Office for Combatting Terrorism. Official statements may also generate from the United States Information Agency, and of course from the National Security Council and the White House. Other agencies, with specific related responsibilities, which may at times involve public statements, include the Department of Energy, the Federal Aviation Authority, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Secret Service, and even the National Institutes of Health. This list is not meant to be inclusive but illustrative. It indicates the magnitude of the problem of defining organizational functions and responsibilities and coordinating them. Psychological warfare, to stand a chance

of being effective, must be applied intelligently and coherently across the spectrum of US government agencies involved.

Important questions to be explicitly addressed include:

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS Which U.S. government department and agencies are authorized to utilize the media without attribution? (Major actors in this field are the psychological operations elements of the Department of Defense and Covert Action elements of the Central Intelligence Agency) What mechanism should be established to insure that such media utilization accomplishes intended goals?

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Which U.S. government departments and agencies are authorized to make official government statements? What mechanism should be established to insure that official statements accomplish intended goals?

While the thrust of this paper is to address a psychological operations program, the role of public diplomacy is emphasized for psychological operations can not be conducted in a vacuum and the public diplomacy program must be cognizant of psychological operations programmatic goals and vice versa.. In particular, every media message has multiple audiences, and should be crafted with those audiences in mind.

In planning a comprehensive psychological operations program, it is important to differentiate five different target audiences:

1. potential terrorist recruits
2. terrorist group members and leaders
3. terrorist supporters
4. the general population in the targeted (or host) countries
5. leaders and decisionmaking elites in the targeted (or

host) countries  
6. the supporting state

For each of these targets there will be a different goal. For the potential recruit, for example, weakening the appeal of the group and messages designed to reduce the status enhancing role of the terrorist will be required. For terrorist members and their leaders, goals will be weakening the hold of the group on the members and producing dissension within the group. It will be important to prevent or reduce cooperation between groups. Sewing the seeds of distrust between terrorist groups and supporting states will be another important goal. Constraining the decisionmaking of the supporting state concerning its support of terrorism will of course also be a major goal. Indeed, gaining active counter-terrorist policies from countries that in the past have provided passive or tacit support through inaction or lack of international cooperation should not be ignored.

While the knowledge exists now to begin a program of psychological operations, some important basic research is required in order to scientifically focus a psychological operations program at these multiple audiences and increase its chances of success. Agencies such as OARPA, ONR, ARI, AFOSR, INR and ORD/CIA should be undertaking this type of basic research.

Among the elements in the research program are:

-Detailed assessments of the state leaders involved in directing and supporting terrorism

-Studies of the leaders/members of key terrorist groups by typology (Important to differentiate "nationalist-separatists"

from "anarchic-ideologues" from "fundamentalist" terrorists from "single issue terrorists").

-Research concerning images of terrorist in key audiences. Central to several goals of the psychological operations program is reducing the attractiveness of terrorism (to the recruit, to the members themselves, to the audience.) What kind of messages produce enhanced status for what audiences? reduced status?

-The basis for the attitudes of the elites and general population. Policy behavior of key European actors "soft" on terrorism may reflect explicit or implicit arrangements, for example. Until recently, Italy which was notoriously soft on terrorism, had had a remarkably unblemished record in terms of not being the host country for a major act of Palestinian terrorism.

#### Guidelines

On the basis of such a research program, it should be possible to revise and establish guidelines for :

1. a public information program
2. themes to be utilized in psychological operations material

In developing written and video material for dissemination to foreign leaders and elites, to foreign general populations, through media channels which may lead to potential recruits and the terrorists themselves, the psycho-social themes identified in the basic research should be emphasized and specifically addressed.

This suggests a task which many feel is hopeless but which nevertheless must be addressed patiently over time--the education of the media, for their cooperation will be essential

in disseminating this information. A program of conferences and terrorist simulations in which media plays a key role and in which media figures are active participants should be implemented. As documented evidence emerges concerning how the media creates favorable and unfavorable images of terrorists and their causes, responsible journalists can be assisted to develop guidelines that, while most restricting reportorial objectivity, avoid creating sympathy and support.

A matter of great current concern which promises to be a continuing --and growing--problem is state supported terrorism. For this high priority problem, a thorough research program is required which assesses for each of the countries of greatest concern: levers of power within the society, the political personality of the leader and his goals and motivations, the leadership circle, salient values within the society, key elite circles supporting terrorism and elite circles opposed. As exemplars of questions to be addressed: For Libya, the role of Qadhafi is clearly central. Given his suspicious, at times paranoid, nature, which are the major sources of his support and what types of material might manipulate his suspicious proclivities and weaken those ties? For Cuba, the bureaucratic machinery that provides support is much less personally oriented. How does it make decisions? How have the Cubans reacted in the past to public disclosure of their intelligence activities? Who makes the decisions? For Syria or Iran, the complex decision structures impacting state support for terrorism need to be placed in the context of their overall



societies.

For each of the target populations, in order to mount a sophisticated and precisely targeted program, data bases concerning the social psychology and attitudes are required. To establish these data bases, different collection mechanisms will be required and different analytic approaches.

-FBIS will play an important role in monitoring foreign elite attitudes

-USIA through polling will play an important role in monitoring attitudes of foreign elites and the general population

A program of basic research is required for the terrorist groups themselves, and the research approach will depend in part on the nature and location of the group. For assessing Hizballah, for example, while certain research can be accomplished through open sources concerning Shia Islam, for optimal understanding of the relative independence of this group and of the radical Shi'ite groups in general, cooperation with Israeli liason is required. For basic research concerning West German terrorism, German social scientists have provided a rich basis for several of the areas of concern, but again liason information would enrich the data base. This is also true for the Red Brigades of Italy.

There is every reason to believe that international terrorism will be a continuing problem for the United States for the foreseeable future. There is no "quick fix" to this problem. Conceptual clarity is required in disaggregating this problem, identifying short term, mid-range, and long term goals. For each of these objectives, a different array of tactics is required. For each of these objectives, psychological

operations has an important role to play. To precisely focus psychological operations, each level of response must rest on a foundation of research. Thus short-term goals will require tactical approaches, and will rest on a foundation of applied tactical descriptive research. But such research should thoroughly inform the acting agencies on the psychosocial nature of their targets, as exemplified by the suggestions made concerning studies of states supporting terrorism. Mid-range goals should be shaped by strategic considerations, but will continue to have tactical applications, and will require focussed collection in support of the necessary research. In the long run, programs must be established with the strategic goals of inhibiting terrorists from joining, weakening the hold of the terrorist group, and weakening support for the group. To mount such a program, basic social psychological research is required on a spectrum of problems ranging from the effects of images on status enhancement and reduction to the group dynamics of terrorism. What is essential in planning a comprehensive program is that research and programs be implemented on all three tracks--short-range, mid-range, and long-term--concurrently. To defer basic research and strategic programs is to defer dealing definitively with the terrorist problem.

Jerrold M. Post, M.D.  
Director of Behavioral Studies  
Defense Systems, Inc.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 19, 1984

TO:

WALT RAYMOND  
OLLIE NORTH  
KEN DE GRAFFENREID

FROM:

STEVE STEINER

Please call Francine at 5697 with  
your concurrence on the attached  
memo.

Thanx.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

March 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: STEVEN E. STEINER

SUBJECT: Public Handling of Terrorism

It has been proposed in inter-agency working groups dealing with terrorism, as well as in the public diplomacy community, that two working groups be formed to deal with public handling of terrorism:

-- a Tactical Public Affairs Group designed to manage on-going terrorist incidents, to be chaired by State's Office for Combating Terrorism (M/CT); and

-- a Long-Range Strategy Group designed to deal with terrorism as an overall foreign policy problem and to develop a unified public diplomacy approach, to be chaired by the USIA Deputy Director.

Both groups have been blessed by the IGT on the terrorism side, and by the IIC for public diplomacy. The Tactical Group is already being formed. The Long-Range Group would also be ready to get underway quickly, but State and USIA would like our green light for its formation.

We think both groups have a definite contribution to make and that we should get them moving. We believe we will have ample opportunity to shape them in the way the NSC considers best.

Walt, Ollie and Ken agree.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to give an NSC green light for the formation of both groups, particularly the Long-Range Strategy group.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 15, 2011  
BY NARA *CS* DATE *5/22/12*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*North*

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

April 16, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Statement on Terrorism

Bob Sims has called, asking what we can say about terrorism given the articles that have appeared in today's Post, L.A. Times, and Washington Times (Tab A). Please note the only name mentioned is at Defense. White House office of Legislative Affairs has also called asking for a copy of the NSDD. These calls have been referred to Bob Sims.

At this point it would appear that if we have to brief at all on the Hill, we should limit the brief to key Hill members, not staff. Candidates for such a briefing would be: Jeremiah Denton (Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism), Senators Tower (SASC), Percy (SFRC), Goldwater (SSCI) and, on the House side, Price (HASC), Fascell (HFAC), and Boland (HPSCI), along with their respective minority leaders.

The attached statement is designed to respond to the most immediate queries. We have asked State to develop additional contingency Qs and As and to coordinate these with State and Defense. In the interim, the attached is designed to be used in responding to press and Congressional queries. We need to staunch the hemorrhage of information about "pre-emptive attacks" or we will be inviting one upon ourselves.

Recommendation

1. That you approve the attached statement for use by B. Oglesby and Larry Speakes.

Approve *RCM/asm* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you discuss w/B. Oglesby a possible Congressional briefing (Room 208?) for the parties indicated above.

Approve *RCM* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab A Washington Post, L.A. Times, and Washington Times articles
- Tab B Proposed statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 1981  
BY NARA *CS* DATE *5/22/12*

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A



# CURRENT NEWS

## PART I - EARLY BIRD EDITION - 0730



Monday, April 16, 1984

THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE, MEANING AND IMPACT OF NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. USE OF THESE ARTICLES HERE, OF COURSE, DOES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TO THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

WASHINGTON TIMES 16 April 1984 Pg.1

# Move on terrorism ordered by Reagan

By Stephanie L. Nall  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Reagan has ordered U.S. military and government agencies to track terrorist groups actively into any corner of the world, administration officials said yesterday.

The president also endorsed the principle of pre-emptive attacks abroad, they said.

A senior administration official yesterday said Mr. Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 138, which endorses the principles of both pre-emptive strikes and reprisal raids.

The new policy allows the U.S. to use force against terrorists before an incident such as a hijacking or bombing occurs rather than wait and react defensively. The key element of the plan is a dramatic increase in intelligence gathering so that the U.S. learns in advance of terrorists' plans and can stop them.

As part of the directive, Mr. Reagan ordered 26 government agencies to suggest ways to deal with terrorism. Mr. Reagan also asked the agencies to "find ways to cooperate better with other countries to track down and identify terrorists," an administration official said.

The decision to seek out and stop terrorists was prompted by the truck-bomb massacre of 241 Marines in Beirut last October. The directive, signed April 3 by Mr. Reagan, followed months of inter-agency meetings and dozens of proposals on how to counter terrorism.

"It seems to me to be a straightforward and modest directive that sets forth our objectives but does not order direct action," an official said. "The president is asking the agencies involved how should we respond to terrorism — which is a modern fact of life."

Under the pre-emptive strike  
**REAGAN...Pg.2**

WASHINGTON POST  
16 April 1984 Pg.19

## Preemptive Anti-Terrorist Raids Allowed

By Robert C. Toth  
Los Angeles Times

In a major shift to counter terrorism, President Reagan has signed a policy directive that endorses the principle of preemptive strikes as well as reprisal raids against terrorists abroad, the Los Angeles Times has learned.

The new, get-tough policy, months in the making, was triggered by the truck-bomb slaughter of 241 Marines in Beirut in October. Secretary of State George P. Shultz has been most outspoken among administration leaders in pushing what he

**RAIDS...Pg.2**

WASHINGTON POST  
16 April 1984 Pg.1

## Covert Aid Salvage Try Under Way

By Charles R. Babcock  
and Bob Woodward  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Reagan administration is trying to salvage faltering congressional and public support for its secret war against Nicaragua by attempting to focus new attention on the size of the Soviet and Cuban military buildup in Central America and playing down the controversy over U.S.-directed mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

In an effort to rescue \$21 million in funding for the co-  
**AID...Pg.2**

NEW YORK TIMES 16 April 1984 Pg.3

## Soviet Says Arms Study Is Fiction by Pentagon

MOSCOW, April 15 (AP) — A Pentagon report on Soviet military might is a "hackneyed invention" aimed at misleading the public, the Communist Party newspaper Pravda said in an editorial distributed today.

The editorial, which is to be published on Monday but was carried in advance by the official Soviet press agency Tass, said the Defense Department's "Soviet Military Power" book-

let is a White House attempt to frighten allies of the United States into supporting American military policies.

The Pentagon annually publishes the survey of Soviet military power, and the Soviet press usually says the statistics are inflated and misrepresented. The latest report was made public Tuesday.

"In the election year, the Administration would very much like to convince Americans that its policy of building up tensions and of the arms race, of shameless plunder of taxpayers for the benefit of the military-industrial complex is allegedly justified," Pravda said.

AID...Continued

vert operations, CIA Director William J. Casey told the Senate last week that the controversial CIA-directed mining of Nicaraguan harbors was not an integral part of the program. President Reagan and intelligence officials also began giving stronger emphasis to specific figures about the scope of the threat they see in the region.

CIA officials have said that their intelligence collection shows:

- The Soviet Union is spending between \$4 billion and \$4.5 billion each year in Cuba and \$250 million to \$300 million elsewhere in Central America.

- The Soviets have about 10,000 personnel in Cuba; 8,000 of these are technicians and 2,000 are military. About 100 Soviets are in Nicaragua.

- The Cubans have between 7,000 and 10,000 personnel in Nicaragua, of whom between 2,500 and 3,500 are military. Casey has said that the Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua have shaved their Castro-style beards, discarded their Cuban uniforms and been integrated into many units of the regular Sandinista army.

The president cited similar, but slightly lower, figures on the Soviet-Cuban presence in Nicaragua in a radio address Saturday in which he said, "We cannot turn our backs on this crisis at our doorstep."

Others in and out of the administration are skeptical of the CIA figures. One congressional source familiar with the intelligence estimates said yesterday, "My fear is that in the effort to save the program they will overstate their case and undermine the truth, which is that there has been a very substantial buildup" by Soviets and Cubans.

This source noted that the Soviets have sent new generations of air-defense missiles, planes and maritime equipment to Cuba.

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), a member of the Senate intelligence committee who has supported the administration's requests for covert funding, said yesterday

RAIDS...Continued

calls an "active defense against terrorism," the use of offensive as well as defensive measures.

Despite the emphasis on preempting terrorist activity, the presidential directive reportedly stops short of authorizing assassinations of suspected terrorists. But it permits the use of force in other forms, such as by FBI and CIA paramilitary teams and Pentagon military squads.

As part of its program, U.S. officials say, the White House will ask Congress for new anti-terrorism laws, including one to permit payment of huge awards—\$500,000 has been proposed—for information on terrorism abroad or at home.

The FBI is permitted to pay informers in criminal cases, but far smaller amounts have been involved.

Noel C. Koch, the deputy assistant defense secretary in charge of Pentagon policy on terrorism, said in an interview last week that the new administration doctrine "represents a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the reactive mode to recognition that pro-active steps are needed."

The National Security Decision Directive 138, which Reagan signed April 3, also orders 26 agencies and offices of the U.S. government to provide him with options on how to implement the new policy.

One State Department official said, "In this country, we have never had a doctrine for dealing with low-level conflict where force is required . . . What we're trying to grapple with is how to use little amounts of force on little problems in distant places and how to convince the American public it's necessary."

U.S. officials from the State and Defense departments and other key agencies said the new directive seeks to make formal and to coordinate new steps the United States is taking, including:

- Intensified intelligence collection at home by the FBI and abroad by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
- Creation and training of FBI and CIA paramilitary teams and Pentagon military squads.

that he questioned the Soviet-Cuban troop numbers being used by administration officials.

"The Sandinistas are supposed to be moving Cubans out," he said. "There are probably substantially

REAGAN...Continued

plan, military units or government agencies could be authorized to make raids in foreign countries and kill would-be terrorists before they can carry out scheduled attacks.

That policy could be contrary to earlier presidential directives — and illegal — if the government forces were given a "blank check" to make strikes abroad. A presidential directive signed by former President Ford, and reaffirmed by former President Carter and Mr. Reagan, prohibits government employees or agents from participating in any assassination attempt.

In March Mr. Reagan rejected a proposal to relax his ban against assassinations as a tool against terrorism. One official said the new directive does not "contemplate any assassination conspiracies."

The official said an important distinction is that pre-emptive action is based on a specific planned event, but an assassination is based on general opposition to a group or person thought to be engaged in terrorism.

Under the guidelines of the directive, a pre-emptive strike could be made only after complete information about a terrorist plan is gathered.

Another official said that the directive says only that "as a matter of principle we must keep prepared to act when necessary to deal with terrorism. Authorizations [for pre-emptive strikes] will come later, if we have all the answers" on a planned attack.

One official said the directive makes no mention of the creation of para-military teams by intelligence agencies such as the CIA. The FBI and Army already have trained anti-terrorist squads.

White House aides said last month the administration is putting the final details on a legislative proposal to assist in the anti-terrorist drive.

fewer there than there were six months ago."

Durenberger also criticized the administration for making no real attempt "to sell" Congress or the public on the Kissinger commission's recommendations to fund long-term economic growth in the region.

"The really frustrating thing is the president has got to lift this out of mining and covert operations, and lift it into the larger context and get it out to the American people," he said.

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), an



# Preemptive Anti-Terrorist Raids Allowed

By Robert C. Toth  
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In a major shift to counter terrorism, President Reagan has signed a policy directive that endorses the principle of preemptive strikes as well as reprisal raids against terrorists abroad, the Los Angeles Times has learned.

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- Intensified intelligence collection at home by the FBI and abroad by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

- Creation and training of FBI and CIA paramilitary teams and Pentagon military squads.

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## STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON TERRORISM

Acts of terrorism continue to plague us and our friends and allies. The toll of bombings, assassinations and kidnappings bears terrible witness to the indiscriminate attacks and lawlessness that rules the behavior of terrorist groups. It is also apparent that selected states have adopted these lawless acts as instruments of state policy. While we diligently seek the means to control this scourge, we must also take the steps that are necessary to protect our citizens, our institutions and our friends and allies.

We have, in the course of a detailed review, reached some conclusions on what we must do to protect ourselves, and to assist others in protecting themselves, from this growing threat. Our actions will be guided by the following principles: first, no nation can condone international terrorism. Second, it is the right of every legitimate government to resist the use of terrorism against its people, institutions or property by all legal means available. Third, terrorism is a problem for all nations, and this Government will work as closely as possible with other governments -- particularly other similarly threatened democracies -- to deal with it.

While we have cause for deep concern about the states that now practice or support terrorism, our policies are directed against all forms of international terrorism. We will increase our efforts with other governments to obtain and exchange the information needed about states and groups involved in terrorist activities in order to prevent attacks, warn our people, our friends and allies, and reduce the risk. We will also do everything we can to see that acts of state-supported terrorism are publicized and condemned in every appropriate forum. When these efforts fail, however, it must be understood that when we are victimized by acts of terrorism we have the right to defend ourselves -- and the right to help others do the same.

Finally, it should be noted that our paramount interest is in foreknowledge and prevention. We believe we can best achieve these results through a combination of improved information and better security and protection. This does not represent any change in U.S. policy -- rather, a refocused emphasis.

[IF ASKED]

- Q. Isn't this inconsistent with mining the Nicaraguan ports or supporting the Contras?
- A. First, the Democratic opposition forces are Nicaraguans fighting in Nicaragua for the rights that have been denied them by the communists in Managua. That they have taken up arms should not be surprising under the circumstances. I would not refer to their civil war against the Sandinistas as terrorism. Unlike terrorists, who strike indiscriminately and without warning, regardless of the consequences, the Nicaraguan freedom fighters duly proclaimed that Nicaraguan territorial waters and ports were a war zone and announced the mining to prevent casualties. This is substantively different from blowing up an airliner, sending bomb-laden trucks to destroy an embassy, or brutally murdering third country diplomats in another country. Second, the fact that the U.S. supports democratic movements is appropriate and well-founded in history. If we fail to do so, the communists will eventually, through subversion, terrorism and polarization, deny democracy the chance it needs to flourish.
- Q. Does this NSDD 138 which has been reported in the press call for pre-emptive attacks on terrorist groups?
- A. In keeping with established practice, we will not comment on our specific National Security Decision Directives or classified documents. I can say, however, that our policy is primarily designed to improve protection and security. We also will take no actions that are in any way contrary to U.S. statutes, agreements, laws, or executive orders.