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Libya 10/01/1986-10/06/1986]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 11/26/2010

File Folder TERRORISM: LIBYA 10/01/1986-10/06/1986]

FOIA

F95-023/9

Box Number 105

WILLS

45

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
101142	PROF NOTE	FROM EARL RE NEWS ARTICLE	1	10/2/1986	B1 B3
101143	ROUTING SLIP		2	10/3/1986	B1 B3
101144	REPORT	RE LIBYA	14	10/3/1986	B1 B3
101145	ROUTING SLIP		2	10/6/1986	B1 B3
166233	PROFS NOTE	RE LIBYA	1	10/3/1986	B1
101146	REPORT	RE LIBYA-US	30	10/3/1986	B1 B3

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October 1, 1986 → OLN

OLN _____
 RLE e _____
 CPC _____
 FILE Libya III _____
 COMMENT _____
THEMES LIKELY TO INCREASE EUROPEAN APPROVAL FOR FUTURE
AMERICAN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA _____
 _____ COMMENT
 _____ FILE
 _____ CPC
 _____ RLE
 _____ OLN

USIA public opinion research in West Europe indicates that some public diplomacy themes are likely to be more effective than others in generating support among Europeans for future military actions against Libya. But far more powerful than any theme in affecting support for such action by the U.S. is the underlying sentiment of Europeans toward this country.

I. ANTI-AMERICANISM

In all countries (except France) approval of future U.S. military action against Libya is most closely linked to the degree of anti-Americanism as determined by self-identification. Those who are strongly pro-American are far more likely to support any future U.S. military action against Libya. Those who are strongly anti-American will likely register their opposition.

II. THEMES LIKELY TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR FUTURE U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA IN ALL COUNTRIES SURVEYED*

1. That future U.S. military actions will weaken Qaddafi's domestic position.
2. That future U.S. military action will cause a decrease in Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

III. THEMES THAT RESEARCH SUGGESTS ARE NOT LIKELY TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR FUTURE MILITARY ACTION:

1. That terrorism is, in general, a great threat
2. That terrorism, in general, can be fought successfully
3. That Soviet influence in Libya will decline.
4. That future U.S. military action will not escalate into major war

IV. CONCERNS WHOSE IMPACT VARIES AMONG COUNTRIES

	<u>Brit.</u>	<u>Fr.</u>	<u>Ger.</u>	<u>It.</u>	<u>Sp.</u>
That future U.S. military actions would harm U.S. relations with allies	X	0	XX	X	XX
That future U.S. military action would harm Western relations with Arabs	0	XXX	XX	0	0

In the table above, the relative impact of each concern is indicated by symbols ranging from 0, for "little impact," to XXX, for "strong impact."

*Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Spain. The importance of various factors was determined by multivariate analysis.

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V. DISCUSSION

The data suggest that approval (in all survey countries) for future military action against Libya will increase if it can be shown that Qaddafi's influence in Libya has diminished rather than increased since the American bombing of Libya.

In all of the survey countries (except France) it would be beneficial to stress the solidarity that exists between the US and its West European allies. In France the emphasis could better be placed on assuring the general public that western relations with the Arab nations will not be harmed. In Germany, it would be useful to emphasize both the solidarity of the Western Alliance and the maintenance of friendly relations between the West and the Arabs. In both countries, the issue of Western relations with the Arab world is most relevant among the center and center-right.

Research also suggests that some areas have little or no impact on public opinion and might be safely ignored. The belief that terrorism can be fought successfully, that a future military attack could escalate into major war, and that terrorism is, in general, a great threat appear not to be factors involved in levels of approval or disapproval.

Although there are country differences, the major themes leading to disapproval of future U.S. military action against Libya appear to be:

1. Belief that U.S. military action would increase the strength of Qaddafi.
2. Belief that U.S. military action would lead to innocent civilians being harmed.
3. Belief that U.S. military action would lead to increased terrorism.
4. Belief that U.S. military action would harm relations between the U.S. and its allies.

These fears have public diplomacy implications. If they can be reduced or eliminated, approval should increase.

VI.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. Political Party

Supporters of center and right-of-center political parties in France are more approving of future U.S. military action against Libya than are backers of left wing parties. Elsewhere in Europe, party affiliation plays little or no role.

2. Sex

Men are more likely than women to approve future U.S. military action everywhere but in Italy where there is no difference.

3. Education

Education is important only in the UK. There, the less well-educated (those without any university training) are slightly more approving of U.S. military action.

Note: There is virtually no difference between age groups, and whether an individual is attentive to international events appears to be irrelevant in all countries. In short, disapproval of combatting Libyan-sponsored terrorism by military force does not appear to be a "successor-generation" phenomenon.

*The center and right-wing parties are defined as the RPR (Chirac), the National Front (LePen), and the UDF (d'Estaing). The left-wing parties are the Socialist Party (Mitterand) and the Communist Party (Marchais).

Prepared by:
Barbara Smela P/RWE

Approved by:
Nils H. Wessell, Director

OLN
October 1, 1986

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IMPLICATIONS
Office of Research
United States Information Agency

CPC
FILE LIBYA
COMMENT

THEMES LIKELY TO INCREASE EUROPEAN APPROVAL FOR FUTURE AMERICAN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA

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166233	PROFS NOTE RE LIBYA	1	10/3/1986	B1

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<TOR> 861006140835

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<TEXT> REUTER 1409
R101R A1111)LZQTCZCZQT
AM-DISINFORMATION-PRESS

U.S. PRESS CONDEMNS REAGAN FOR LIBYA DISINFORMATION
NEW YORK, OCT 6, REUTER - THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS UNDER
ATTACK BY THE U.S. PRESS FOR SPREADING DISINFORMATION AGAINST
LIBYA'S COL. MUAMMAR GADDAFI, WITH ONE NEWSPAPER CALLING THE
SCHEME WORTHY OF THE KGB AND ANOTHER WARNING IT MAY HAVE
BACKFIRED AND "ROUSED A SLEEPING DOG."

TWO MONTHS AGO THE WHITE HOUSE ENDORSED A SECRET PLAN TO USE
THE PRESS TO SPREAD DISINFORMATION AIMED AT UNNERVING GADDAFI
AND PROVOKING HIS OVERTHROW. THE EXISTENCE OF THE SCHEME CAME
TO LIGHT LAST WEEK.

"HOWEVER DESIRABLE IT MAY BE TO GET RID OF THIS UNSTABLE,
DANGEROUS DICTATOR, THE CHOSEN TECHNIQUE WAS WORTHY OF THE
KGB," THE NEW YORK TIMES SAID. "TO THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION'S SHAME, THE "DISINFORMATION" WORKED ALL TOO
WELL, BUT ONLY HERE IN THE LAND OF THE FREE..."

bullshit.

"NO END CAN JUSTIFY THESE MEANS, NOT EVEN OVERTHROWING A
SPONSOR OF TERROR... THERE IS NO PLACE IN AMERICA FOR THOSE WHO
ENVY THE COMMUNISTS THEIR DECEPTIONS. THERE IS NO PLACE IN
AMERICA FOR DISINFORMATION."

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER DECLARED:

"DECEIVING FOREIGN ADVERSARIES IS ONE THING. MISLEADING THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC IS SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY. WITHOUT PUBLIC
TRUST, THE GOVERNMENT OF A FREE PEOPLE CANNOT DEVELOP THE
CONSENSUS IT NEEDS TO ACT DECISIVELY ABROAD -- BE IT IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, CENTRAL AMERICA OR, IN THE CASE AT HAND,
LIBYA..."

"IN TRIPOLI, THE FALSE ALARM MAY WELL HAVE ROUSED A SLEEPING
DOG. IN AMERICA, IT MAY WELL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT -- THE NEXT
TIME WOLF IS CRIED -- TO ROUSE AND MOBILIZE THE REPUBLIC. SUCH
ARE THE WAGES OF DISINFORMATION.

"THE LINE OF TRUTH -- OR A VERSION OF IT, AT LEAST -- IS WHAT
SEPARATES AN ENLIGHTENED PUBLIC FROM THE TYRANNY OF IGNORANCE
AND MANIPULATION. A GOVERNMENT THAT VIOLATES IT AT WHIM
FORFEITS ITS CREDIBILITY."

THE WASHINGTON POST, WHICH UNCOVERED THE SCHEME, ASSERTED:

"THE GOVERNMENT ACTUALLY CONVEYED TO REPORTERS THINGS IT KNEW
TO BE FALSE -- THAT OPPOSITION TO COL. GADDAFI WAS STIRRING,
THAT AN AMERICAN ATTACK WAS ON THE WAY. THIS WAS
"DISINFORMATION," AND IT DESERVES TO BE CONDEMNED. THE
GOVERNMENT IS NOT MEANT TO BE IN THE BUSINESS OF ORGANIZED
LYING TO THE PUBLIC."

oo

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES DECLARED THE SCHEME SHOWED THE
GOVERNMENT WAS "SO FRUSTRATED BY ITS INABILITY TO DEAL
EFFECTIVELY WITH TERRORISM, SOME OF WHICH DOES INDEED EMANATE
FROM LIBYA, THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO ADOPT THE EXTREME AND
DANGEROUS STEP OF CREATING A PHONY WAR SCARE. ITS AIM ... WAS
TO DECEIVE AND DAMAGE GADDAFI. BUT ITS BIGGEST DECEPTION WAS OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND THE GREATEST DAMAGE DONE HAS BEEN TO
THE ADMINISTRATION'S CLAIM TO BE TRUSTED AND BELIEVED."

THE BALTIMORE SUN SAID:

"WITHOUT AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST, THE GOVERNMENT WILL LOSE THE
CREDIBILITY ON WHICH THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED DEPENDS..."

"UNFORTUNATELY, (SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE) SHULTZ AND THE
ADMINISTRATION HAVE GOTTEN "PRETTY DARN CLOSE" TO TRAMPLING ON

A GOVERNMENT-PRESS RELATIONSHIP THAT GOES TO THE HEART OF A FREE SOCIETY. WE TRUST THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN (AND HIS SUCCESSORS) WILL LEARN FROM THIS UNFORTUNATE EPISODE AND AVOID DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS THAT CONTRAVENE THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE."

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE SAID THAT WHEN THE GOVERNMENT "ENGAGES IN THIS KIND OF BEHAVIOR, IT LOSES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CREDIBILITY.

"AND IT IS CONCERN ABOUT THEIR OWN CREDIBILITY THAT MAKES JOURNALISTS DECLINE TO TAKE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS" WORDS AS GOSPEL. PERHAPS SOMETIMES THEY ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT STATEMENTS THAT TURN OUT TO BE ACCURATE, BUT AS THIS LATEST EPISODE SHOWS, AT OTHER TIMES THE DOUBTS ARE NOT JUST REASONABLE -- THEY ARE ESSENTIAL."