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File Folder TERRORISM: LIBYA [04/29/1986-04/30/1986]

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29

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100961	LETTER	LUBBERS TO RR RE LIBYA <i>R 1/9/2017 M1110/1</i>	2	4/29/1986	B1
100962	MEMO	COLONEL PADDOCK TO AMBASSADOR BORG RE PROPOSAL FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN	1	4/29/1985	B1
100963	PAPER	RE PROPOSAL RE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN <i>R 3/27/2019 M1110/1</i>	25	ND	B1
100971	MEMO	SULLIVAN TO NORTH RE ISLAMIC CALL SOCIETY	1	4/29/1986	B1 B3
100973	CABLE	RE LIBYA/CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA	14	4/30/1986	B1 B3
100976	TALKING POINTS	FOR NSC RE LIBYA	1	4/30/1986	B1 B3
100978	PAPER	RE LIBYAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY	4	4/30/1986	B1 B3
100979	PAPER	RE ECONOMIC COSTS OF LIBYAN TERRORISM TO WESTERN EUROPE	3	5/1/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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100961



MINISTER-PRESIDENT

6614951

Nr: U 1486050113.

The Hague, 29th April 1986

Dear Ronald,

Thank you for your letter of 11 April 1986 in which you expressed your concern about Libya's role in terrorist activities.

I fully share your concern over the growing scourge of terrorism and as you are aware the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Twelve have to date held two special meetings on this subject as well as one regular one. At the last meeting in Luxemburg on 21 April 1986 they decided to give concrete form to the decisions of 14 April to give a clear-cut substantial signal to Libya and other states clearly implicated in supporting terrorism.

The Twelve decided:

- to reduce to a minimum the number of Libyan diplomatic and consular representatives in the twelve countries. This minimum should be seen in the light of the number of diplomatic and consular representatives of the Twelve in Libya;
- to restrict the freedom of movement of Libyan diplomatic and consular representatives to their place of residence and make their movements elsewhere subject to prior authorization by the relevant country of accreditation;
- to implement strictly the visa procedure applicable to Libyan nationals.

Furthermore they decided to complement the measures taken on 14 April 1986 with the following:

- to examine whether the diplomatic representation in Libya of each of the Twelve can be reduced;
- to examine at the national level whether other Libyan representations in Europe can be reduced;

The Honorable
Ronald R. Reagan
President of the
United States of America
The White House
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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BY RW FOR DATE 1/9/17

- not to allow Libyan nationals expelled by one of the partners for implication in international terrorism to enter their respective countries;
- to examine whether it is possible to prevent abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities and to ensure stricter controls on their exercise in conformity with international rules.

The visit of attorney general Ed Meese was most useful for the work in the Trevi-group and is a good example of how the Twelve and the Netherlands authorities in particular can cooperate with the US administration in preventing terrorism.

Sincerely yours


Ruud Lubbers

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100962	MEMO COLONEL PADDOCK TO AMBASSADOR BORG RE PROPOSAL FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN	1	4/29/1985	B1

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I. SITUATION

A. The Problem: Terrorism. The Libyan government is providing political, economic, and military support for terrorist groups. The recipients of this support are active from Central America to the Philippines, from Northern Ireland to sub-Saharan Africa. Even with the recent U.S. military raid on Libya and with an intensification of Western European political and economic sanctions, Libyan support for terrorism continues.

B. The Consequences of Libyan Terrorism. Libyan support for terrorism intolerably threatens U.S. national security. So far, citizens of the U.S. and its allies have been murdered. Property of the U.S. and its allies have been destroyed. Politico-military discord among U.S. allies has been exacerbated. International destabilization has increased and been exploited by the Soviet Politburo. Some U.S. foreign policy objectives are further from attainment. Moreover, Libyan support for terrorism is serving as a model for other small, third-world nation-states and other power groups who may use similar means to the detriment of the U.S.

C. The Nature of Libyan Terrorism.

1. Libyan support for terrorism is based on three characteristics of its leader, Col Mu-ammur al-Qadhafi. First, he is deeply religious and messianic. He sees his revolutionary leadership as

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divinely inspired, an expression of Allah's will. Second, Col Qadhafi believes support for terrorism is a legitimate tool of foreign policy. To Qadhafi, terrorism is an equalizing force for a small third-world nation-state in avoiding superpower domination. He also uses terrorism in support of Soviet goals by fostering regional destabilization. Third, Col Qadhafi has psychological needs and dynamics which find expression through supporting terrorism. He has strong oppositional features in his makeup and a strong need for recognition. He is a shrewd political animal, a consummate survivor, who is usually in touch with reality but can behave irrationally when under stress. He has been diagnosed as suffering from a borderline personality disorder.

2. Terrorism as practiced by Qadhafi is a form of psychological warfare waged through the media. To effectively combat this terrorism, one must successfully confront his specialized--and highly lethal--psychological warfare. This can only be accomplished through a comprehensive psychological operations campaign--a major weapon in the counterterrorist and antiterrorist armory.

II. DESIRED SITUATION

A. A PSYOP Campaign. A comprehensive PSYOP campaign developed from this concept paper will be designed to decrease the intensity and frequency of the Libyan government's support for terrorism. The campaign will consist of multiple interdependent actions taken to complement the recent U.S. military raid on Libya and the Western European political and economic sanctions. The campaign will attempt to decrease the quality and quantity of weapons, money, training, operational effectiveness, support functions,

and incitement provided by Libya to terrorists. Consequently, the threat to U.S. national security may abate.

B. General Assumptions of the PSYOP Campaign.

1. Many target audiences already exhibit perceptions and behaviors which can be exploited through the PSYOP campaign. These perceptions and behaviors must merely be reinforced. Reinforcement can lead to new calculations of strategic interests, foreign policies, and how policy should be implemented. Reinforcement can lead to a greater readiness to take action, or to stop it. Reinforcement can lead to political, economic, and military decisions decreasing the intensity and frequency of Libyan support for terrorism. For example, the PSYOP campaign may accelerate shifting attitudes of the Western European political elite that Libyan support for terrorism is inimical to their own economic interests, political goals, and physical survival. This may lead them to more fully support U.S. actions taken to decrease Libyan support for terrorism (Objective F).

2. Reinforcing trends toward a change of government in Libya will decrease the intensity and frequency of Libyan support for terrorism.

a. As momentum towards a change of government increases, Col Qadhafi may become more concerned with his own physical and political survival and less concerned with supporting world-wide terrorism. He may be less likely to use terrorism to provoke the enmity of external enemies and thereby deflect the concerns of the Libyan populace from internal

problems. He may be more likely to willingly cease support for terrorism.

b. If a change of government occurs, the likelihood of a regime which supports terrorism as much or more than the Qadhafi regime is remote. Instead the resulting regime will more likely be focused on domestic problems and their resolution.

3. Reinforcing Libyan perceptions -- be they Col Qadhafi's or various military and political elites -- that support for terrorism will engender external military threat should be part of a successful PSYOP campaign. Reinforcing these perceptions will place physical survival ahead of ideological goals. Support for terrorism should lessen, if physical survival is at stake.

4. Reinforcing the counsel of Col Qadhafi's allies to reduce Libyan support for terrorism may be effective. If Qadhafi complies, Libyan support for terrorism will lessen. On the other hand, if he ignores or acts counter to the advice, he may publically repudiate those who provide it. The result may be a reinforcement of their ambivalence and their distancing from the present Libyan regime. Qadhafi may also reject their aid -- at least temporarily.

5. Effecting decreases in political, economic, and military support for the Libyan government may, in turn, decrease Libyan support for terrorism. This is because the Libyan government will then have less resources to provide terrorists. These decreases in support will also facilitate foreign acceptance of U.S. actions taken to modify Libyan

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support for terrorism.

6. The PSYOP campaign will be most successful, if it contains multiple objectives and means to achieve them. These objectives and means should be interrelated and synergistic. The total effect will be greater than the sum of its parts. For example, reinforcing Qadhafi's public image of being untrustworthy, erratic, and emotionally disturbed, may not only lead to a decrease in Soviet military support (Objective A) but facilitate exploiting his private psychological vulnerabilities (Objective G).

7. Target audiences and people in general are not necessarily rational, adaptive, or consistent all of the time. Moreover, their perceptions and behaviors may be influenced by factors of which they are not aware. Thus, a PSYOP campaign may be most successful when it contains some components that seem on face value to be irrational, nonadaptive, and inconsistent. Such components can contribute to decreasing the intensity and frequency of Libyan support for terrorism. For example, more intense Soviet counsel to reduce Libyan support for terrorism may lead Qadhafi to reject their aid, the very aid with which he supports terrorism (Objective B).

8. The PSYOP campaign is designed to decrease Libyan support for terrorism through direct and indirect approaches. An example of a direct approach is to convey that little political, economic, and military support from the Cuban government to Libya will occur, as long as there is significant Libyan support for terrorism (Objective C). An example of the indirect approach is to reinforce perceptions of Libyan support for

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insurgents in the Philippines. This, in turn, may lead the Japanese government with its concerns for regional stability to more strongly support U.S. actions against Libyan sponsored terrorism (Objective F).

9. Novel and uniquely-crafted techniques may be required, including specially-tailored videotapes conveying selected personality features of Col Qadhafi, to successfully carry out the PSYOP campaign.

III. OBJECTIVES

A. Qadhafi's Public Image.

1. The belief that Col Qadhafi is unstable, erratic, dangerous, and untrustworthy will be reinforced in his supporters within the Libyan government, the Libyan general population, the Soviet and Cuban governments, the governments of "hard-line" Mideast and North African nation-states, the governments of "moderate" Arab nation-states, and the governments of other African and third-world nation-states.

a. Appropriate reinforcement of this belief is designed to embarrass Soviet, Cuban, and "hard-line" Mideast and North African supporters and may increase their concerns that Col Qadhafi's policies may rebound to their disadvantage. The embarrassment and concerns, in turn, may lead to a decrease in political, economic, and military support for the Libyan government. These decreases may lessen what Libya has to materially

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and psychologically offer terrorists and is designed to decrease internal support for the Libyan government. The latter may reinforce trends toward a change of government in Libya.

b. Appropriate reinforcement of this belief is designed to lead Col Qadhafi's supporters within the Libyan government and the Libyan general population to decrease their allegiance. This may reinforce trends towards a change of government in Libya.

c. Appropriate reinforcement of this belief is designed to lead Qadhafi's supporters within the governments of "moderate" Arab nation-states to decrease their political and economic backing which contributes to legitimizing Libyan support for terrorism. As this backing decreases, the Libyan government may become more isolated internationally and trends towards a change of government may be reinforced.

d. Appropriate reinforcement of this belief is designed to foster a less hospitable environment in the Soviet Union, Cuba, "hard-line" Mideast and North African nation -states, and other African and third-world nation-states for Libyan-backed terrorists and their support personnel. Terrorists and their supporters may be more likely to be closely watched, deported, imprisoned, or prevented from planning, contributing to, and carrying out terrorist operations.

2. To attain Objective A, information and indicators will be conveyed that:

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a. Qadhafi is "crazy", takes prescribed tranquillizers and other "nerve medicine", has episodes of bizarre behavior, has been psychiatrically hospitalized, and has had shock treatments.

b. Qadhafi has often broken bilateral and multilateral agreements upon a whim. Many nation-states and power groups have been left to "hang out in the wind" and betrayed. These victims share a common fate and should satisfy their grievances.

c. Qadhafi has often manipulated and distorted history to justify Libyan foreign policy, military adventures, and the legitimacy of his regime.

B. Soviet Strategic Interests.

1. The Politburo will be even less convinced that Libyan support for terrorism serves Soviet strategic interests.

a. Appropriate reinforcement of this belief is designed to decrease Soviet political, economic, and military support for the Libyan government. The decrease in Soviet support may lessen what Libya has to offer terrorists and may reinforce trends towards a change of government in Libya.

b. Appropriate reinforcement of this belief may also lead the Soviets to continue to covertly communicate that Libyan support for terrorism should be reduced. Qadhafi may comply and lessen his support.

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On the other hand, the Soviets' counsel may lead Qadhafi to break from them. This break could precipitate a further decline in Soviet aid. Qadhafi may also reject their aid -- at least temporarily.

2. To attain Objective B, information and indicators will be conveyed to reinforce that:

a. Libyan-supported terrorism

1. Justifies Israeli reluctance to participate in a multilateral peace process,

2. Leads to an increased presence of U.S. naval resources in the Mediterranean,

3. Hinders Soviet attempts to infiltrate and "Finlandize" pro-western Arab governments,

4. Disrupts the quantity and quality of negotiations including strategic arms and conventional forces negotiations, between the two superpowers,

5. Is being linked to Soviet military support by Western European, Japanese, and moderate Arab governments.

C. Cuban Strategic Interests.

1. The Cuban Politburo's belief that Libyan support for

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terrorism is inimical to Cuban strategic interests and "sphere of influence" -- especially establishing normal relations and exporting revolution throughout Latin America, -- will be reinforced.

a. Reinforcing this belief is designed to ensure that Cuban political, economic, and military support for the Libyan government is not established. The continued decrease in Cuban support may lessen what Libya has to offer terrorists and may reinforce trends towards a change of government in Libya.

b. Reinforcing this belief may also lead the Cubans to communicate that Libyan support for terrorism should be reduced. Qadhafi may comply and lessen his support. On the other hand, the Cubans' counsel may lead Qadhafi to make anti-Cuban public statements which may further reinforce the Cuban intention to minimize aid to the Libyans. Qadhafi may also reject their aid --at least temporarily.

2. To attain Objective C, information and indicators will be conveyed throughout the Caribbean, Central America, and South America that:

a. Libyan support for terrorism is, in turn, supported by Cuban military aid.

b. Libya is competing with the Castro regime in a "turf" battle for exporting revolution to the Caribbean and to Central and South America.

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c. Libya is pushing for more violent tactics among terrorists and insurgents in Latin America.

D. The Libyan Domestic Economy.

1. The Libyan populace, both the poorest segments of the population and the middle class, will more strongly believe that Libyan support for terrorism causes shortages of domestic consumer goods, hard currency, capital investments, as well as other economic shortfalls.

a. Reinforcing this belief may strengthen trends towards a change of government in Libya. It may also lead Col Qadhafi to back off from supporting terrorism or, at least, support terrorism more selectively.

2. To attain Objective D, information and indicators will be conveyed that:

a. Libyan support for terrorism is causing domestic economic problems.

b. Not only the U.S., but Western European and Japanese governments will be implementing more comprehensive economic sanctions against Libya because of Qadhafi's support for terrorism.

c. Qadhafi's preoccupation with terrorism prevents him from

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effectively dealing with shortages in hard currency resulting from the spot market price of oil.

E. Libya as a Political Symbol.

1. Libyan political and military elites will more strongly believe that Libyan support for terrorism prevents their country from being perceived by other third-world nation-states and assorted power groups as a legitimate, respected political entity.

a. This belief may reinforce trends towards a change of government in Libya:

2. To attain Objective E, information and indicators will be conveyed that:

a. Col Qadhafi is using his external enemies, whose enmity he promotes through terrorism, as external rationalization for his fundamental inability to govern Libya. Qadhafi can only fight, not lead, and he tries to rally the population against an outside enemy he creates so they will ignore the terrible conditions within Libya.

b. Libyan support for terrorism is causing domestic economic problems (Objective D).

c. Diplomats from moderate Arab and other third-world

nation-states are becoming increasingly hostile towards Libya as a result of the terrorism-related deaths of their citizens.

d. Many citizens of moderate Arab and other third-world nation-states believe all Libyans are "crazy" because of Qadhafi's support for terrorism.

e. Libya is no longer a respected nation-state, but a vehicle for Qadhafi's self-aggrandizement, and idiosyncratic ambitions.

f. Qadhafi's murdering of domestic opponents e.g. Col Hassan Ishkal, intensifies family and tribal feuds and impedes Libyan unity and nationalism.

F. Western European Linkage to Libya.

1. Western European political and economic elite will more strongly believe that Libyan support for terrorism is inimical to their strategic interests--especially international trade and commerce, the safety and freedom of movement of their fellow citizens, and their own lives.

a. Accelerating and intensifying this belief may increase the probability that Western European leaders will implement more comprehensive economic sanctions against Libya. These, in turn, may reinforce trends towards a change of government in Libya. This belief also may increase the probability that Western European political

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leaders will further support U.S. actions taken to influence Libyan support for terrorism. Finally, this belief may foster a less hospitable environment in Western Europe for Libyan-backed terrorists.

2. To attain Objective F, information and indicators will be conveyed that:

a. Col Qadhafi is unstable, erratic, dangerous, and untrustworthy (See Objective A).

b. The political and economic elite in Western Europe have been murdered by Libyan-supported terrorists. Others are now being targeted for future terrorist operations.

c. Of the people murdered in terrorist incidents in 1985, only a very small number were U.S. citizens.

d. The business climate in Libya is unstable, there are physical hazards to foreign-owned factories and to foreign workers. There is significant political turmoil among Libyan workers. Nationalization of capital by the Libyan regime is a significant possibility.

G. Qadhafi's Private Psychological Vulnerabilities.

1. Both Col Qadhafi's reality-oriented and paranoid beliefs that his inner circle and trusted allies are conspiring against him will be reinforced.

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a. Reinforcing these beliefs may lead to Qadhafi purging, losing confidence in, and isolating himself from his most able and loyal advisers, as well as domestic supporters. This, in turn, may sow further domestic dissension and reinforce trends toward a change of government in Libya.

b. These beliefs may also lead Qadhafi to cut himself off from key foreign allies. This, in turn, may lead him to more erratic behavior which can reinforce Objective A.

c. A further result of these beliefs may be a strengthening of the Libyan military against an increasingly isolated Qadhafi.

2. To attain Objective G, information and indicators will be conveyed that:

a. Comments and actions by foreign allies, e.g. Hassan of Morocco, and key domestic personnel, e.g., revolutionary committee members and female bodyguards, voice doubt as to Qadhafi's leadership abilities, political legitimacy, and foreign and domestic policies.

b. Col Qadhafi is unstable, erratic, dangerous, and untrustworthy (See Objective A).

c. Several military coups are being planned.

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H. Qadhafi's Perception of External Threat.

1. Col Qadhafi will believe more strongly that his support for terrorism will lead to punitive measures by external forces--especially the U.S. military.

a. Reinforcing this belief may lead to Qadhafi realizing his own physical and political survival is temporarily more pressing than the good terrorism may provide. A temporary, voluntary decrease in his support for terrorism may follow.

2. To attain Objective H, information and indicators will be conveyed to reinforce that:

a. President Reagan is "frustrated" with Qadhafi and obsessed with "getting him", unless Libyan support for terrorism ceases.

b. Deployment and employment of U.S. military assets in the Mediterranean and Africa will continue unless Libyan support for terrorism ceases.

c. Further employment of U.S. military assets against Libya is likely, unless Libyan support for terrorism ceases.

I. Violation of the Koran.

1. Potential terrorist recruits of the Islamic faith, Islamic

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support cadre of terrorists, and Islamic segments throughout the world will more strongly believe that Qadhafi misinterprets and violates the Koran as well as provides secular, political rationales for terrorism.

a. This belief may lead to some Islamic terrorist personnel, potential recruits, and supporters decreasing the intensity and frequency of behavior which supports terrorism.

b. Fundamentalist Islamic segments may act on this belief to actively foster Qadhafi's demise, independent of any U. S. action.

c. Nonideological terrorists will probably not be affected.

2. To attain Objective I, information and indicators will be conveyed reinforcing that:

a. Qadhafi has specifically praised terrorist acts that involved the murdering of Islamic children and old men.

b. Qadhafi has engaged in anti-Koranic sexual and other personal practices.

c. Qadhafi is the product of a union between a Jewish woman and an Italian, military man.

d. Qadhafi mandates military training for women.

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e. Qadhafi provides support for non-Islamic terrorists.

J. The "Zionist" Card.

1. Political leaders of the moderate Arab states will believe that Libyan support for terrorism actually supports the interests of "Zionism".

a. This belief may lead to a decrease in diplomatic support from the moderate Arab states towards Libya. They may issue milder public declarations against U.S. actions taken to decrease Libyan support for terrorism. This may facilitate U.S. use of its assets to influence Libyan-backed terrorism.

b. This belief may also lead to a decrease in economic support, viz, "protection money", from the moderate Arab nation-states towards Libya. This decrease may lessen what Libya has to materially and psychologically offer terrorists and is designed to decrease internal support for the Libyan government. The latter may reinforce trends toward a change of government in Libya.

c. This belief may also lead the moderate Arab nation-states to covertly communicate that Libya reduce its support for terrorism. If Qadhafi complies, he will lessen his support. On the other hand, their counsel may lead Qadhafi to publically break with them which may reinforce their intention to minimize support for him. Qadhafi may also reject their aid--at least temporarily.

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2. To attain Objective J, information and indicators will be conveyed that:

a. Libyan support for terrorism

1. "Justifies" Israeli aggression in the eyes of Western European, Japanese, and U.S. decision makers,

2. Delays satisfactory resolution of the "Palestinian Question",

3. Allows the Israelis to consolidate the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

4. Strengthens the U.S. - Israeli alliance, and

5. Harms the image of Arabs in the minds of non-Arabs.

K. The Prestige of the Libyan Military.

1. Libyan military authorities will more strongly believe that Libyan support for terrorism detracts from their own social prestige, material rewards, and power within the Libyan government.

a. Reinforcing this belief may strengthen trends toward a change of government in Libya.

2. Information and indicators will be conveyed that:

a. Col Qadhafi will continue to relegate the Libyan military to a secondary position within the Libyan power hierarchy, as he builds up his revolutionary committees.

b. Materiel support for terrorism results in less materiel support for the Libyan military.

c. Qadhafi will continue to replace the traditional military--especially the army--with an "armed people".

IV. RISKS

A. The PSYOP campaign's operational security (OPSEC) will be violated, resulting in further strengthening Col Qadhafi's intent to support terrorism. OPSEC violations also may provide critics of the U.S. with propaganda opportunities and friends of the U.S. with reason to distrust our information efforts.

B. Information and indicators reinforcing Qadhafi's perceptions of external military threat (Objective H) may hinder reinforcing Western European intentions to implement more comprehensive economic sanctions against Libya (Objective F). The same information and indicators (Objective H) may:

1. Temporarily intensify worldwide terrorism

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2. Hinder strategic and conventional arms talks between the superpowers

3. Hinder resolution of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

4. Weaken pro-U.S., moderate opposition factions within Libya

5. Deflect domestic opposition to Qadhafi towards the U.S.

C. While Iran and Syria also may be constrained by the PSYOP campaign, they may increase support for terrorist groups "dropped" by Libya.

D. If the Libyan government is replaced, the successor regime may be either a stable, pro-Soviet asset in the strategic Mediterranean or an Islamic fundamentalist, rabidly anti-U.S., government.

V. CONCLUSION

A. This concept can be the core of a comprehensive PSYOP campaign. The concept's objectives are representative of pathways to decrease the intensity and frequency of Libyan support for terrorism. There is a synergy among the objectives which will generate an effect greater than the sum of their parts. Combinations of the objectives aggregate to reinforce nine pathways which can decrease Libyan support for terrorism (See Appendices 1 and 2).

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B. While some of the concept's objectives may have a more immediate payoff, those with mid-range and long-range payoffs should also be part of the overall plan.

C. After the concept has been developed into a plan, all linkages between PSYOP means, objectives, and their desired effects will be abstracted into symbolic logic and placed on a secure computer. Reliable and valid impact indicators will then be developed for each of the desired effects. Once implementation of the plan commences and feedback is being monitored, statistical analyses will indicate what significant effects are occurring and what causal factors may be involved. These analyses will allow quick and appropriate modification of PSYOP means, objectives, and their linkages to effects as dictated by feedback and unforeseen events.

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APPENDIX 1: DECREASING THE INTENSITY AND FREQUENCY OF LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM: 9 PATHWAYS

1. Reinforcing trends toward a change of government in Libya may result in a regime providing less support for terrorism.
2. Decreasing political, economic, and military support for Libya may result in less material and psychological support for terrorists.
3. Nation-states, especially those of Western Europe, will more strongly support U.S. actions to decrease Libyan support for terrorism.
4. Nation-states will provide a less hospitable environment for Libyan-supported terrorists.
5. Libyan allies will counsel a reduction of terrorism. Qadhafi may comply and lessen his support, or he may ignore or disobey the counsel, break with his allies or publically attack them, and reject their aid.
6. Col Qadhafi may sincerely decide to reduce his support for terrorism.
7. Col Qadhafi may distance himself from his own domestic and international allies--extinguishing their loyalty, or even having them murdered. This will occur independent of any U.S. action.
8. Some terrorists and terrorist supporters will decide to decrease their

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.. participation in Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

9. Islamic fundamentalists may contribute to Qadhafi's demise, independent of any U.S. actions.

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APPENDIX 2: HYPOTHETICAL CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP OF OBJECTIVES TO PATHWAYS

OBJECTIVES

PATHWAYS (SEE APPENDIX 1)

A —————→ 1, 2, 4

B —————→ 1, 2, 5

C —————→ 1, 2, 5

D —————→ 1, 6

E —————→ 1

F —————→ 1, 2, 3, 4

G —————→ 1, 7

H —————→ 6

I —————→ 8, 9

J —————→ 1, 2, 3, 5

K —————→ 1

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
100971	MEMO SULLIVAN TO NORTH RE ISLAMIC CALL SOCIETY	1	4/29/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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100973	CABLE RE LIBYA/CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA	14	4/30/1986	B1 B3

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100976	TALKING POINTS FOR NSC RE LIBYA	1	4/30/1986	B1 B3

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100978	PAPER RE LIBYAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY	4	4/30/1986	B1 B3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

4/30

Bob —

What do you think?

~~Bob~~

North —

Coy — C — Good

File: Press Guidance,
Libya

QUESTION: Two weeks have passed since the United States bombing raid against terrorist-associated targets in Libya. How do you assess the success of the attack on Libya? Do you expect it to stop Libyan-backed terrorism?

ANSWER: I don't think I should attempt to answer that from a technical military standpoint. However, I know that Defense Secretary Weinberger is very pleased with the military success of a complex operation that demanded precision performance. The intended targets were attacked and were destroyed or substantially damaged. In addition, the long and selective reach of U.S. military power was ably demonstrated.

From the standpoint of U.S. antiterrorism policy the raid was clearly successful. Our objectives were accomplished:

- ??.
- destroyed or damaged significant parts of the terrorism support apparatus of Libya.
 - delivered an unequivocal message to Qadhafi that his attacks on U.S. citizens and facilities will not be tolerated; a price will be paid for continuation of Libyan-backed terrorism; and he will not find the consequences acceptable.
 - sent a clear signal to other state sponsors and would-be sponsors of terrorism, that the United States will use military force to defend itself against attack, both by deterring future attacks and by destroying the capability for future attacks.
 - demonstrated U.S. resolve and leadership in actively confronting terrorism -- a message that other victim-states needed to see.

The United States is very pleased with the responsiveness being shown by our allies in the aftermath of the attack on Qadhafi's terrorist structure, and we hope that it will continue and that it will flourish. In particular, the actions by the European Communities' Ministers (e.g., to expel or severely restrict the movement of so-called "diplomats" from Libya, to institute tighter border and travel controls, and to increasingly cooperate in combatting terrorism) are helping to draw tighter the noose of isolation against Qadhafi. I know that President Reagan and the American delegation at the Tokyo Summit will continue to work on intensifying that cooperation and providing leadership in confronting terrorism.

We do not know the long term effect on terrorism, particularly on Qadhafi's support of terrorism; but we believe that he has gotten the message as have other sponsors of terrorism. However, if Qadhafi chooses not to be dissuaded from continuing to back terrorist operations, the U.S. is fully prepared to take even stronger action.

In the short term, there is likely to be an increase in terrorism. Qadhafi's terrorists were plotting many actions well before our raid occurred; and Qadhafi or his adherents, or even other sympathetic or competitive terrorists, may strike out at the United States. But that will not be easily sustained, and we will act against it.

There is no "magic bullet" for combatting terrorism; and international terrorism will not be eliminated by U.S. actions against Libya; but over the long run it can be suppressed, its state sponsors deterred, and we can prevail.

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100979	PAPER RE ECONOMIC COSTS OF LIBYAN TERRORISM TO WESTERN EUROPE	3	5/1/1986	B1 B3

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