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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 5/11/2012

**File Folder** TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (1984)Z

**FOIA**

M11-441

**Box Number** 49

HAENNI

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136493	LIST	<i>D</i> 9/15/2017 <i>M441/1</i>	1	ND	B1
136495	PAPER	RE QUESTION <i>PAR</i> 9/15/2017 <i>M441/1</i>	1	ND	B1
136498	MEMO	NORTH TO POINDEXTER RE TERRORISM <i>PAR</i> 9/15/2017 <i>M441/1</i>	2	10/17/1984	B1
136499	ROUTING SLIP	<i>R</i> 9/15/2017 <i>M441/1</i>	1	ND	B1
136500	NSC PROFILE SHEET	<i>D</i> 9/15/2017 <i>M441/1</i>	1	10/26/1984	B1
136501	PAPER	RE TERRORISM <i>PAR</i> 9/15/2017 <i>M441/1</i>	1	10/26/1984	B1
136502	LETTER	A.F. GREEN TO AMBASSADOR PARKER BORG RE COUNTER-TERRORISM <i>PAR</i> 9/15/2017 <i>M441/1</i>	1	12/12/1984	B1
136503	PAPER	WORKING PAPER RE TERRORISM <i>D</i> 9/15/2017 <i>M441/1</i>	3	ND	B1
136504	PAPER	RE TERRORISM	5	11/15/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136505	MEMO	PETER RODMAN TO SEC OF STATE RE NEXT STEPS <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	3	11/21/1984	B1
136506	LETTER	GREEN TO OLIVER RE TERRORISM <i>D 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	12/4/1984	B1
136507	PAPER	RE TERRORISM <i>D 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	6	11/22/1984	B1
136508	LETTER	ROBERT OAKLEY TO JOHN RE KEY PAPERS	1	12/21/1984	B1
136509	PAPER	RE TERRORISM (P. 12 ONLY) <i>R 3/8/2019 M441/1</i>	1	ND	B1
136510	PAPER	RE TERRORISM (P. 21-22 ONLY) <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	2	ND	B1
136511	CABLE	SECTO 19023	6	12/13/1984	B1
136512	CABLE	BONN 34445 <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	12/20/1984	B1
136513	MEMO	FROM OAKLEY RE FUNDING <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	12/21/1984	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136514	LETTER	PETER BAHNSEN, DOD, AND GLENN HAMMOND, DOE, TO OAKLEY RE TERRORISM (INCLUDING ATTACHED SUMMARY) <b>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</b>	3	12/5/1984	B1
136515	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST <b>R 7/18/2018 M441/1</b>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

136495  
2

135210  
E. 1978  
Amended  
Sec. 3.3b(1)(b)

The question of UK/US cooperation in dealing with the PIRA has attained an even higher priority since Admiral Poindexter's visit to London in November. The Doherty extradition case has attracted widespread attention in Britain and the general issue of extradition has been raised with Secretary Shultz by Sir G Howe. The Prime Minister is also expected to refer to the matter in her talks with the President on 22 December.



We would like to bring the [redacted] and the member of Chancery responsible for extradition matters. It is for consideration whether the Justice Department should be represented [redacted]. We do not envisage a discussion of legal issues. We are pursuing those aspects with the State Department lawyers. Rather, we envisage a meeting which would address itself to procedural questions so as to make sure that we are all working effectively together.

~~SECRET~~

ML M4411 #136495  
BY RW 9/15/7

TAB

A

...-TERRORISM (SCHEDULED)

U.S. SAID SLEEPING WHILE TERRORISM THREATENS

BY RODNEY PINDER

WASHINGTON, OCT 16, REUTER - THE UNITED STATES IS A SLEEPING GIANT VULNERABLE TO CRIPPLING ATTACK BY TERRORISTS AND SABOTEURS, A PANEL OF CRISIS EXPERTS REPORTED TODAY.

THE WORLD'S MIGHTIEST INDUSTRIAL POWER RELIES FOR ITS SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EXISTENCE ON A SOPHISTICATED NETWORK OF ENERGY, COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION SO INTERDEPENDENT THAT AN EFFECTIVE ATTACK ON ONE PART COULD DEVASTATE THE WHOLE, THEY SAID.

THE PANEL OF ANALYSTS, SCHOLARS AND BUSINESSMEN, CONVENED BY GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY'S RESPECTED CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS), CALLED FOR SWIFT ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS TO HELP THE NATION PROTECT ITSELF.

AT THE MOMENT, SAID PANEL CO-CHAIRMAN ROBERT KUPPERMAN, A WORLD AUTHORITY ON TERRORISM, "THERE IS NO EMERGENCY APPARATUS VAGUELY CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE EXTENT OF PROBLEMS THAT CAN BE CAUSED BY EVEN SMALL TERRORIST GROUPS."

KUPPERMAN, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR GOVERNMENT PREPAREDNESS IN THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE MARKING PUBLICATION OF THE CSIS REPORT THAT HE BELIEVED THE NEXT PHASE OF WORLD TERROR ACTIVITY WOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE INFRASTRUCTURES OF TARGETED NATIONS.

"WE ARE GOING TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS AHEAD OF US," HE SAID.

THE REPORT SAID PUBLICLY AVAILABLE MAPS SHOWED WHERE AMERICA'S THOUSANDS OF MILES OF ELECTRIC POWER LINES AND OIL AND GAS

Ollie North,

10/16

What does he want? A job?

As I recall he doesn't have a solution for combatting terrorism. All of his emphasis is on prevention and reaction. He obviously doesn't know about new NSDD on COMSEC.

Let's think about phase II of NSDD. 1 of 2  
Let's get scheduled NSPG on phase I.

J



PIPELINES COULD BE SEVERED TO ISOLATE ENTIRE REGIONS.

KUPPERMAN SAID SIMULTANEOUS ROCKET ATTACKS ON THREE POINTS OF THE ELECTRIC GRID SYSTEM COULD "TAKE OUT THE NORTHEAST FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS."

PRESSURE MINES ON BRIDGES COULD KNOCK OUT VITAL RAIL LINKS, SHIPS SUNK IN NARROW CHANNELS COULD BLOCK MAJOR PORTS FOR WEEKS, AND THE BANKING SYSTEM COULD BE DESTROYED BY SABOTAGE OF THE COMPUTERS ON WHICH IT RELIES, THE REPORT SAID.

THE BANKS' ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRANSFERRING FUNDS IS VITAL AND PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE, IT SAID.

THE REPORT SAID THE FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM UNDERPINNED ALL U.S. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, CARRYING AT LEAST THE EQUIVALENT OF THE \$1 TRILLION FEDERAL BUDGET EVERY TWO OR FOUR HOURS.

"YET THESE SYSTEMS MAKE HEAVY USE OF MINIMALLY-PROTECTED COMMON CARRIER NETWORKS, AND THE CRITICAL DATA ABOUT THE U.S. ECONOMY THAT FLOWS OVER THEM ENJOYS NOT EVEN THE SIMPLEST ENCRYPTION TO IMPEDE EAVESDROPPING," IT SAID.

THE PANEL URGED CONGRESS TO SET UP A COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE PROBLEM AND SEEK ANSWERS, AND THE PRESIDENT TO FORM A CRISIS TEAM IN THE WHITE HOUSE TO COORDINATE ACTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA.

"WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS THE POLITICAL AWARENESS AND WILL TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE BEFORE A MAJOR REGIONAL OR NATIONAL DISASTER OCCURS," THE REPORT SAID.

IGNORING THE SITUATION, IT ADDED, WAS LIKE BUILDING A HOSPITAL OVER THE SAN ANDREAS FAULT.

REUTER 1337

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # II

Package # 91084

0 1 2

1403

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
<del>Bob Kimmitt</del> Paul	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Not</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>*</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

*Prepare tasker*

~~SECRET~~

3  
SYSTEM II  
91084

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

136498

October 17, 1984

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

13526  
E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3b(1)

SUBJECT: Terrorism in the U.S.

The article at Tab A summarizes only four of the major domestic terrorist threats which we face. The CSIS group also noted our vulnerability to toxic chemical and biological agents, the risks posed by "inadequately protected" sub-fissile nuclear material and the potential for catastrophic attack on a major city's sewer and water system.

There are three other "conclusions" drawn by the panel:

- The national security of the United States is immediately menaced by a wide-spread, multi-faceted threat of terrorist action which is beyond the capabilities of the FBI, Treasury, U.S. Customs, or state/local law enforcement activities.
- The only solution is a White House special operations group with an integral covert investigative and enforcement capability.
- Bob Kupperman is the only man in the world who can head such a group.

On a more serious note, we should be concerned that there are some who are willing to create unique situations and then portray themselves as the only ones able to solve the problem. Kupperman, in his constant harping about "new" vulnerabilities, practically invites terrorists to try what they might not otherwise have considered.

In regard to the NSPG suggested on your note at Tab A, you had earlier decided that we would wait until after the first week of November before we address the following issues:

--



~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

MAR 14 1985 #136498  
BY RW [unclear] 9/15/17

*effectively  
It is not  
helpful.  
Loud & Bad  
as to Joe  
Jordan?*

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

- Phase II organizational proposals. The NSDD calls for an organizational review convened by the National Security Advisor. Recommendations would then be submitted to the President.
- Review of Phase I security/protection program. The IG/T prepared detailed recommendations on measures we should take during a five year upgrade program. The total cost of the proposal is in excess of \$5 million. The NSDD calls for Presidential approval.

OMB has been asked to provide a detailed assessment of both the CIA and IG/T submissions by November 9, 1984. Al Keel has been advised that we (NSC and OMB) will then review their product prior to an NSPG after our return from the London/Paris talks. Unless you wish to change this arrangement, we will proceed as indicated below:

*Good*

*ok*

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you we plan for an NSPG on NSDD-138 Phase I issues during the week of November 19-24.

Approve *J*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you consider convening the Phase II review during the first week of December with recommendations due by January 15, 1985.

Approve *J*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Draw up a tasker.*

Attachment

Tab A - Reuter Press Clip by Rodney Pinder of Oct 16, 1984

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council  
The White House

136499/5

DECLASSIFIED

System # II

Package # 91106

NLRR 12441/1 #136499  
BY fw NSRD DATE 9/15/17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>Staff Action North Cont Forth Kamp</u>
Situation Room <u>NORTH</u>	<u>X</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

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cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Ref on conversation the other day:  
We need to clear up whether Iraq on the list or not. J

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136500 NSC PROFILE SHEET

1 10/26/1984 B1

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EXEMPTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT  
ARE BASED ON EO 13526

13001

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence

26 October 1984

Iraqi Sponsorship of Anti-Western Terrorism

Iraq was removed from the Department of State's list of nations supporting terrorism in 1982. The impression that CIA opposed the Department's position may have resulted from a CIA briefing in March of this year in which we noted that the Black June Organization had been expelled from Iraq late last year, but that a Palestinian terrorist group called '15 May' reportedly was still operating out of Baghdad and was still active against Israeli targets.

We believe that Iraq has restricted '15 May' attacks against the West but turns a blind eye to strikes against Israel. There is no evidence that Iraq has sponsored terrorist activity against the US or any of its Western allies since August 1982, when a bomb planted by '15 May' aboard a Pan-Am airliner exploded, killing a Japanese youth and forcing the aircraft to land in Hawaii.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR/M4411 #136501

BY RW DATE 9/15/17

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

136502

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**BRITISH EMBASSY**  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008  
Telephone: (202) 462-1340

12 December 1984

Ambassador Parker Borg  
Office for Combatting Terrorism  
Room 2236  
State Department  
(Tel: 632 8541)

*Dear Ambassador,*

COOPERATION ON COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE OLYMPICS

During the bilateral talks held in Washington on 24 July between Admiral Poindexter and Mr Goodall, the American team very kindly offered a briefing on the security precautions which you had taken in connection with the Los Angeles Olympics.

I have now heard, very belatedly I fear, from the Police, that they would be extremely interested in such a presentation. If the offer is still open, they would be willing to send a team of four to the United States.

Perhaps someone could let me know whether it is still possible to pursue this?

*Yours Sincerely,*



A F Green

cc: Colonel Oliver North, NSC ←

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED PART

NLRR M44/1 #136502

BY *fw* DATE 9/15/17

13526  
E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 b(1)(4)



MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA

TO: Ollie North

+12/10/84 13:28:11

To: Ollie North

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: US - UK Talks on Combatting Terrorism

We need to propose dates for the next meeting for some time in Feb (I believe). Please coordinate with Bob Oakley and let me know. I told David Goodall I would get back to him shortly.

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA CA DATE 5/11/12

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136505 17  
United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

November 21, 1984

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM  
S/S

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TO : The Secretary  
FROM : S/P - Peter W. Rodman  
SUBJECT: Next Steps in US Counter-Terrorism Policy

Conflicting high-level public and private reactions to your October 25 address before the Park Avenue Synagogue indicate that this Administration is still divided on the issue of rapid military response to acts of terrorism. This division occurs, in part, because there is no clear and concerted government-wide consensus on the difficult policy issues associated with retaliation against terrorism. In the absence of such a policy consensus, moreover, there is a growing gap between official rhetoric, which warns of preemptive and retaliatory action, and official abstention from acts to carry out the warnings. As we head into the second-term Reagan Administration, therefore, areas which require additional emphasis are the need to focus and resolve the internal debate on US retaliatory policy, the planning of specific contingency options for response to terrorist incidents, and the development of a coherent public diplomacy/public affairs campaign to gain support for USG counter-terrorist policies.

NSDD 138 directed the Secretary of State to develop a full range of options for dealing directly with terrorism, both at the threat stage and after such acts are carried out. It also directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a full range of military options to combat terrorism throughout the entire terrorist threat spectrum. However, while agencies are proceeding with planning to implement portions of NSDD 138 under their respective charters, no fully coordinated and coherent menu of options to deal with specific contingencies has yet been developed.

For example, while the execution of military retaliation is obviously a DoD responsibility, State should participate in the selection of recommended targets in order to provide the necessary political judgements. Nor should the military option be considered alone, but rather in conjunction with possible diplomatic, legal, economic and public diplomacy measures.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M44/1 # 136505  
BY fw NARA DATE 9/15/17

Pre-planned political guidance, themes, and dissemination means should be prepared for specific audiences, international and domestic, to support the options chosen. There should also be agreement on what level terrorist incidents will trigger a U.S. response and what we can accept as evidence for the military attack of specific targets. This menu of options for specific high-threat areas should be prepared, updated frequently, and available for presentation to the President when the occasion demands.

The development of such detailed political-military contingency planning requires either a more centralized counter-terrorist management apparatus than currently exists, or the present interagency mechanism must be more effectively utilized. NSDD 138 directed an interagency review to develop recommendations on improving the overall management of national programs for assessing, combatting, and countering international terrorism, and to recommend any changes that should be made in the planning, integration, and oversight arrangements for terrorism countermeasures. These recommendations were to be presented to the NSPG by July 31, 1984. The White House, however, shelved the subject until after the election, but this review undoubtedly will be resurrected in the coming months. In the meantime, the weaknesses outlined above require fixing now and therefore should be addressed utilizing the present mechanism.

NSDD 30 states that the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, is responsible for the development of overall US policy on terrorism. Historically, however, the IG/T has not played a strong leadership role in the substantive development of counter-terrorist policy. We believe that this should change. The IG/T is the appropriate forum to develop and coordinate a menu of retaliatory options for contingency purposes. This would provide the necessary focus for thorough interagency discussion of the tough issues associated with the use of military force. While some of these tougher issues may not be resolved by the IG/T, at least an orderly process for interagency discussion and forwarding of options to the NSC for decision would be provided, where none exists today. This would also require the IG/T to provide the leadership on substantive issues called for by its charter, a necessary step if the present mechanism is to work more effectively.

Resolution of the internal debate and achievement of a government-wide consensus would then provide the basis for the planning, coordination, and implementation of a coherent public diplomacy/public affairs campaign to gain support for USG counter-terrorist policies. To facilitate this, a senior USIA representative should be added to the IG/T to participate fully in policy formulation discussions. Additionally, a counter-terrorism public diplomacy/public affairs interagency working group should be formed to support the IG/T in the

planning and coordination of activities designed to gain support for USG policies from both international and domestic audiences. This working group should also provide the necessary support to integrate public diplomacy/public affairs into the IG/T's preparation of retaliatory options. The same USIA senior representative and interagency working group could also be assigned to support the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), the mechanism established by NSDD 30 to provide direct operational support, to insure interagency coordination, and to provide advice and recommendations to the Special Situation Group during a terrorist incident.

While there is a tendency among the policy community to exclude public diplomacy/public affairs personnel from policy formulation discussions, this practice is particularly unwise when combatting terrorism, the very essence of which is psychological in nature. During the INR conference on terrorism held for Ambassador Oakley in early October, we noted with interest that ITT includes as a key member of its terrorism crisis management team a senior public relations executive. Similarly, at a recent CSIS seminar on terrorism, Zbigniew Brzezinski and several other panel members urged that the US enter more aggressively into the public opinion competition, because our opponents do not pass up opportunities to use their propaganda. For too long a period we have failed to recognize the importance of the psychological dimension in our counter-terrorist planning.

In summary, we should take the following steps to address the deficiencies outlined above:

- Direct the IG/T to prepare a menu of retaliatory options for timely consideration by the NSC. This process should begin by focussing on the high-threat area of Lebanon.
- Direct the IG/T to prepare a public diplomacy/public affairs campaign to gain support for USG counter-terrorist policies. Direct the appointment of a senior USIA representative to the IG/T and formation of a counter-terrorist public diplomacy/public affairs interagency working group to facilitate this planning.

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Wang No. 1431A

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136506	LETTER  GREEN TO OLIVER RE TERRORISM	1	12/4/1984	B1

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136507	PAPER  RE TERRORISM	6	11/22/1984	B1

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DATE SENT: 12/21/84 CLASSIFIED MATERIAL Copy For Addressee

v 2339023

FROM: Sen. Oakley M/CTP 2236 State  
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

TO: Radn. John Poindexter Dep. Asst to Pres.  
for Natl. Sec. Aff.  
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

PART V

DATE RECEIVED: 12/21/84 *Mik. Lelante*

IDENTIFICATION None dtd 12/21 w/attachments

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136508	LETTER  ROBERT OAKLEY TO JOHN RE KEY PAPERS	1	12/21/1984	B1

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Quadruplicate 18  
Dinner  
136509

Stress need for political commitment to act vigorously to arrest and extradite terrorists, and for cooperation among police and intelligence services

Terrorism is not on the formal agenda, but you will have discussed with Howe at Chevening the idea of pressing for greater international cooperation. Your objective (shared fully by the UK) is to keep up the pressure on the French and others to improve the prospects for better coordinated action -- unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally.

The French resist multilateral consideration of terrorism. They have recently shown greater receptivity to quiet bilateral cooperation with the USG through intelligence liaison. This followed the Poindexter-Oakley talks in Paris on November 14 and the arrest of an individual who reportedly belongs to the Arab terrorist group LARF responsible for assassinating one and attempting to assassinate another US diplomat in France. We are exchanging information with the French but there are unconfirmed reports that they may release him soon for lack of hard evidence. This illustrates the problem caused by French reluctance both to detain and to extradite terrorists.

The FRG has not played an active role, yet it heads the Bonn Group on hijacking and will chair the Economic Summit Seven for 1985. A meeting early in 1985 the Seven counter-terrorism experts would be a good way for the FRG to begin.

-- Recent arrests in Italy and France, the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner and murder of 2 USG officials and others on board, and a number of recent intelligence reports all point to a new surge of terrorism originating in the Middle East directed against the West.

-- Need enhanced intelligence collection and confidential bilateral exchanges among key governments.

-- Consider other measures: tighter controls over entry into and movement among Allied countries by persons from terrorism-prone countries and strengthened provisions for detention, expulsion and extradition of known or suspected terrorists.

-- Need to reinforce the will and intelligence capabilities of moderate Arabs to take action against terrorists and the governments that sponsor them.

-- We must reactivate the Bonn Declaration on hijacking. Perhaps the FRG could take the lead in reviving a strong, concerted Western response to this threat.

-- We should also consider establishing Western government clearing house to exchange information on physical security measures and contingency planning for our Embassies.

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NLRR M441 #136509

BY kw NARA DATE 3/8/2017

TERRORISM

While many NATO governments seem to understand, at least generally, the very real threat from Iran, Libya and Palestinian splinter groups, and several of them have improved their intelligence and police coverage of terrorists, most of them are still reluctant to face squarely the logical consequences for their policies and actions -- particularly when it comes to sanctions, political pressure or even public statements directed against governments such as Libya and Iran who clearly and directly support terrorism, much less governments such as the USSR (or even Syria and Bulgaria) where the connection is harder to demonstrate. Despite occasional participation in multilateral fora, most NATO governments apparently prefer to deal with the terrorist problem bilaterally and very confidentially, and especially so with the United States. Many of them also differ with us over the degree to which they believe (or wish) Middle East terrorism can be controlled by political means (e.g. policies on issues such as Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, the Palestinians, and the West Bank) -- thus tending to place the onus on the United States-Israeli relationship.

You could use this meeting to heighten further the anti-terrorist consciousness level of the NATO governments and encourage them to take more vigorous action bilaterally and/or multilaterally. First, you could address the nature, extent and origins of the international terrorist threats which most directly affect them, namely those of Middle East origin: Libyan, Iranian and Palestinian splinter groups. Among key factors in the equation are weak Western European entry and border controls, liberal French and Greek policies on extradition and the presence of terrorists, and the difficulty of identifying terrorists once they arrive. Your presentation should include references to Arab terrorist groups recently unearthed in Italy and France as specific examples both of the threat and what can be done by good, coordinated intelligence and police work. (A separate memo attached at this tab contains the latest information we have on these cases, but you should use only general observations because of extreme French and Italian sensitivities). You should also include a reference to the continued operation of Arab terrorists in Greece, where the Jordanian Ambassador escaped assassination on November 29 when his assailant's gun jammed.

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NLRPM441/1 #136510  
BY RW NARA DATE 9/15/17

TALKING POINTS

--Terrorism continues to be a very real threat to NATO countries, directed against our most basic values and often against our fundamental strategic interests.

--State supported terrorism is clearly increasing.

--This is especially true of the terrorist threat of Middle East origin, such as those terrorist actions supported by Libya, Iran, Syria, or Palestinian splinter groups. Several NATO governments have suffered attacks or threats from these groups over the past two years. (Among them have been UK, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey.)

--Also of concern are other terrorist groups such as the Provisional IRA, FP-19, Action Directe, or ASAL (Armenians).

--Key factors which aid international terrorist movements are rooted in our democratic freedoms, such as easy movement across borders, refuge to dissident and disparate political groups, difficulties in extradition of suspected terrorists, and liberal application of the Vienna Convention when it comes to diplomats (real or bogus).

--The recent successes by France and Italy in discovering dangerous Arab terrorist groups underscore both the existence of the threat and what can be done to counter it by good, coordinated intelligence and police work.

--We in NATO need to take more vigorous action against terrorism, both multilaterally and bilaterally.

--We need to take concerted actions to make it more difficult for terrorists to operate (e.g. tighter controls over access and borders; more attention to extradition; restrictive approach to Vienna Convention).

--Our cooperation in countering terrorism has been good, but we need to make it still better, both on the intelligence side and operationally.

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

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EXDIS

E. O. 12356; DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER  
SUBJECT: REVITALIZATION OF THE BONN DECLARATION ON  
- HIJACKING

REF: (A) STATE 366342  
- (B) BONN 30431  
- (C) BONN 34402

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN OFFICE EXPERT ON AIR HIJACKING SAID FRG WILL PROPOSE A MEETING OF SUMMIT SEVEN COUNTRIES ON HIJACKING IN BONN JANUARY 24-25. FRG ENVISAGES A TWO-TIER MEETING WITH POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES CONSIDERED IN SEPARATE GROUPS. END SUMMARY.

3. FOREIGN OFFICE (LIPPE, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION LEGAL AFFAIRS) TELEPHONED CIVIL AIR ATTACHE DECEMBER 20 WITH FURTHER INFORMATION ON FRG PLANS FOR PROMOTING ACTION AMONG THE SUMMIT SEVEN TO COMBAT AIR HIJACKING.

4. SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, FOREIGN OFFICE WILL PROPOSE A MEETING IN BONN JANUARY 24-25. IN ACCORD WITH DISCUSSION BETWEEN GENSCHER AND SECRETARY SHULTZ AT BRUSSELS QUADRIpartite MEETING, GERMANS WILL PROPOSE A TWO-TIER MEETING, WITH ONE GROUP TO DISCUSS ISSUES FALLING BROADLY INTO THE POLITICAL CATEGORY, AND ANOTHER GROUP TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL ISSUES. LIPPE SAID THAT FRG WISHED TO CONFER WITH US, AND POSSIBLY THE UK BEFORE GOING TO THE FULL SEVEN ON WHICH ISSUES TO DISCUSS IN THE "POLITICAL" GROUP AND WHICH IN THE "TECHNICAL" GROUP. LIPPE SAID IN HIS OPINION, MEASURES PROPOSED IN POINTS 1-8 OF U. S. PAPER ON REVITALIZATION OF THE BONN DECLARATION WERE POLITICAL, WHILE "POSITIVE MEASURES" IN LAST PARAGRAPH OF THAT PAPER WERE TECHNICAL. HE SAID FRG EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WOULD CONTACT AMB. OAKLEY'S OFFICE TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF AGENDAS OF THE TWO GROUPS. LIPPE ALSO REFERRED TO U. S. PAPER OF SEPTEMBER 19, SUGGESTING THAT IT CONTAINED A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE "TECHNICAL" GROUP. WOESSNER

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NLR #136512  
BY fw NARA DATE 9/15/17





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United States Department of State 38

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET/NODIS ATTACHMENT~~

MEMORANDUM

December 21, 1984

TO : M - Mr. Spiers  
FROM : M/CTP - Robert B. Oakley *RB*  
SUBJECT : Funding Counterterrorism R & D

Following more than one year of often heated debate, the R&D community within the USG has come together and made a joint presentation to the IG/T on the requirement to develop a centrally organized, directed and funded counterterrorism R&D effort. The two attachments to this memorandum are (1) a letter from the joint chairman of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the IG/T which spells out the community consensus and the funding requirements and (2) a Hill - McFarlane memorandum seeking NSC support with OMB for the required funding. Admiral Poindexter is expecting the memorandum.

While the bulk of the material noted in the two attachments is self-explanatory, I do want to emphasize the precedential nature of the effort which brought all USG agencies in the counterterrorism field around a common table and for a common purpose. I believe very strongly that the TSWG has produced a blueprint for future research that has long been needed, one which should go forward as expeditiously as possible and ask your endorsement in sending the two attachments forward.

~~CONFIDENTIAL w/ SECRET/NODIS ATTACHMENT~~  
DECL:OADR

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BY *hw* NARA DATE 9/15/17  
#136513



COMMAND, CONTROL,  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND  
INTELLIGENCE

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



Department of Energy  
Washington, D.C. 20545

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DEC 5 1984

DECLASSIFIED

Honorable Robert B. Oakley  
Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism  
and Emergency Planning  
Department of State  
Washington, DC 20520

NLRR 114411 #136514  
BY RW NARA DATE 9/15/17

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Following, per recent discussions of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), is a summary of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) recommendations for a program of counterterrorism research and development (R&D).

In recognition of the increasing level of terrorist activity and sophistication and in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 138, the TSWG, at the direction and on behalf of the IG/T, has prepared a 5 year R&D program designed to capture the benefits of emerging technology for the nation's efforts to combat terrorism. The program structure comprises four tasks: Threat and Technology Assessment, Defensive Countermeasures R&D, Incident Response R&D, and Technology Transfer. An outline of the structure and associated funding are given in the enclosed table; more details are available in the R&D Action Plan as transmitted to Ambassador Sayre on May 16, 1984. Revisions in the proposed funding reflects incorporation of explosives ordinance countermeasures. Program structure is designed to be comprehensive, according to current perceptions of threats and technologies, yet flexible enough to accommodate the changing nature of the terrorism environment. The program includes those elements that are necessary to carry out stated policy objectives.

The TSWG, which comprises experts from across the counterterrorism community, provides the focal point for program direction and oversight. To achieve the necessary level of expertise and promote the proper interchange of information while addressing concerns over sensitive and classified information, the TSWG is divided into seven subgroups: Threat and Technology Assessment, Defensive Countermeasures R&D, Conventional Incident Response R&D, Chemical and Biological Incident Response R&D, Nuclear Incident Response R&D, Explosives Ordinance Disablement, and Technology Transfer. The TSWG cochairmen from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, the subgroup chairmen, and the TSWG executive officer form the TSWG executive committee, whose functions are to insure program cohesion, develop overall program direction, and maintain appropriate channels for dissemination of technology.

Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal and administrative sanctions  
Derivative Classifier: Glenn A. Hammond  
Chief, TD&I Br. (Name)

Declassify on: OADR (Date)

Derivatively Classified by: Multiple Sources

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
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The TSWG has strongly recommended that funding for this program be placed in a single department or agency, most probably the Department of Defense. With the State Department as the spearhead for obtaining the funds, the selected agency will incorporate a line item in its budget to supplement existing program funds in the counterterrorism community. The program is not intended to replace or subsume existing efforts, but to build on them. The agency hosting the line item will be expected to parcel out the funds, as determined by the TSWG, to designated lead agencies and contractors. This arrangement will serve to prevent fragmentation of R&D monies and allow effective single-point program focus and initiative.

Sincerely,



Peter F. Bahnsen  
TSWG Cochairman  
Department of Defense



Glenn A. Hammond  
TSWG Cochairman  
Department of Energy

Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM R&D PROGRAM SUMMARY (\$K)

<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Task I: Threat and Technology Assessment					
Counterterrorism R&D Data Base	350	385	420	460	510
Vulnerability Analysis	500	550	600	660	720
Behavioral Effects	<u>1000</u>	<u>1100</u>	<u>1200</u>	<u>1350</u>	<u>1500</u>
Task Total	1850	2035	2220	2470	2730
Task II: Defense Countermeasures R&D					
HE Detection	5600	6100	6300	6600	7200
C/B Detection	6650	7100	6600	6600	7200
Nuclear Agent Detection	1000	1100	1200	600	--
Human-Based Agent Detection	2000	2200	2400	1500	500
Low-Profile Def. Countermeasures	<u>2000</u>	<u>2200</u>	<u>1200</u>	<u>400</u>	<u>--</u>
Task Total	17250	18700	17700	15700	14900
Task III: Incident Response R&D					
Portable Diagnostics and Disablement	3600	4000	4400	3000	2000
Surveillance	500	500	600	200	--
Incapacitation	500	550	600	300	100
Rapid Entry	250	280	100	--	--
C/B Response	2000	2200	2400	2600	2900
Crisis Management	<u>500</u>	<u>550</u>	<u>600</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>--</u>
Task Total	7350	8130	8700	6300	5000
Task IV: Technology Transfer					
Training	500	550	600	675	725
Technological Response Cadre	<u>500</u>	<u>550</u>	<u>600</u>	<u>675</u>	<u>725</u>
Task Total	1000	1100	1200	1350	1450
Program Total	<u>27450</u>	<u>29965</u>	<u>29820</u>	<u>25820</u>	<u>24080</u>



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for NSC Approval of a Special Budget  
Request to Provide For Counterterrorism Research &  
Development

The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the Inter-departmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) has submitted its report on the minimum requirements for additional research and development pertinent to an enhanced USG deterrence of, defense from and response to overseas terrorism. Our current technical capabilities in such related fields as explosives detection and entry deterrence are limited, resulting in acute vulnerabilities of which we are all aware. As you will note from the attachment to this memorandum, the budget requirement has been carefully honed down to what we believe to be an irreducible minimum over a five year period for a coordinated interagency program on terrorism above and beyond separate agency programs now underway and already budgeted.

It is the recommendation of the TSWG, supported by the IG/T that the funds be appropriated as a new line item and assigned to the Department of Defense for management, thereby providing single point program focus. It is also our judgement that this appropriation not be taken from other programs since it represents a significant new centrally directed and coordinated interagency effort to build a meaningful USG R&D counterterrorism program.

A thorough review of existing technical development programs which might bear on counterterrorism clearly demonstrates the fragmented and unfocussed nature of our present effort. Each "product" was designed and developed to meet specific parochial needs and its relationship or usefulness as a weapon in the counterterrorism field outside of its original agency focus is extremely limited. I would cite, as one very pertinent example, the Navy development of "CHARGER BLUE", a system designed to provide specific protection to naval vessels from command detonated explosive devices. This project was conceived by the Navy, funded by the Navy and produced by the Navy, all for undeniably valid Navy requirements. However, the value of such a system in protecting other USG establishments was never considered (it is not the Navy's mission to consider Embassy security) and we are now trying to come up with feasible means of adapting CHARGER BLUE to other needs; specifically including protection of embassy buildings from radio-controlled bombs (such as those used against us in Beirut).

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Creation of a centrally located, specifically funded program will, for the first time, provide a focal point for assuring the maximally effective use of United States technical capabilities across the spectrum of counterterrorism. More importantly, the program will provide, also for the first time, an organizational structure to coordinate medium and long-term plans which could permit the nation both to predict and interdict terrorist actions. Absent such a centrally managed interagency program, our technical efforts to combat terrorism will be almost completely reactive because the current problem will always require all available resources and the benefits of emerging technology, either in providing a better deterrent or in providing quicker, more effective response, will be largely lost.

The requirement therefore, is for two programs: one which is centrally managed and directed, charged with interagency responsibilities broadly focused and; a continuation of the current agency oriented individual programs which seek technical solutions for particular perceived needs. A simple shift of funds from the current program to the proposed interagency effort would, in our opinion, solve one problem only to create another, which is not acceptable.

Ambassador Oakley, Chairman of the IG/T has informed me of his endorsement of the proposal as well as that of the IG/T itself and recommends your concurrence and support with the Office of Management and Budget.

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Letter of December 5, 1984 from TSWG to IG/T

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