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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

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SMF 11/16/2010

File Folder TERRORIST TARGETS: LIBYA (8)

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100626	CABLE	ROME 00163 <i>R 2/6/2018 M1088/1</i>	2	1/3/1986	B1
100627	CABLE	ROME 00164 <i>R 2/6/2018 M1088/1</i>	2	1/3/1986	B1
100628	CABLE	RE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO COMBAT IT <i>R 2/6/2018 M1088/1</i>	5	ND	B1
100634	ROUTING SLIP	<i>R 2/6/2018 M1088/1</i>	1	1/4/1986	B1 B3
100629	MEMO	FROM POINDEXTER RE NSPG MEETING RE LIBYA <i>R 3/6/2019 M1088/1</i>	3	1/4/1986	B1
100630	AGENDA	NSPG MEETING RE LIBYA	1	1/6/1986	B1 B3
100631	PAPER	ACTING AGAINST LIBYAN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	4	ND	B1 B3
100632	PAPER	THEMES FOR THE PRESIDENT <i>R 3/6/2019 M1088/1</i>	1	ND	B1
100633	TALKING POINTS	FOR POINDEXTER'S USE IN MEETING <i>R 3/6/2019 M1088/1</i>	2	ND	B1 B3

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder TERRORIST TARGETS: LIBYA (8)

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100635	PAPER	RE LIBYA PAR 2/6/2018 M1088/1	14	ND	B1 B3
100636	PAPER	QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS	3	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NLRR M1088 #100626
BY RW NARA DATE 2/6/18

~~SECRET~~ ROME 00163

FROM EMBASSY VATICAN/MESSAGE NUMBER 005/86

E. O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, IS, US, VT
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE CAUTIONS AGAINST REPRISALS FOR TERROR-
IST ATTACKS

REF: A) 85 STATE 392921 B) STATE 943 C) 85 ROME 32145

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT

2. VATICAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ARCHBISHOP ACHILLE SILVESTRINI, CALLED IN CHARGE JANUARY 3, 1986 TO EXPRESS "THE HOLY SEE'S SERIOUS CONCERN AND PREOCCUPATION OVER QADDHAFI'S ALARMING THREATS TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA" AS A DIRECT RESULT OF LIBYA'S HAVING BEEN ACCUSED OF ASSISTING THE ABU NIDAL RADICAL FACTION OF THE PALESTINIANS TO PLAN THE RECENT ATTACKS IN ROME AND VIENNA. HE ADDED THAT IN THE HOLY SEE'S VIEW, ANY VIOLENT RETALIATION AGAINST LIBYA IS LIKELY TO PROVOKE A SERIES OF CHAIN REACTIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. AN ADDITIONAL RESULT OF VIOLENT RETALIATION, HE SAID, WOULD NO DOUBT BE THE WEAKENING OF THE MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL POSITIONS TAKEN BY MOST RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS AND WORLD LEADERS.

3. SILVESTRINI, EMPHASIZING HE WAS ALSO SPEAKING IN THE NAME OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE (CARDINAL CASAROLI), REQUESTED THE U.S. DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO TEMPER THE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT "QADDHAFI IS OBVIOUSLY CRAZY - LIKE HITLER - AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW HE CAN REMAIN A CHIEF OF STATE". "HOWEVER, CONTINUED SILVESTRINI, "HE IS UNFORTUNATELY WELL EQUIPPED TO CARRY OUT HIS MAD THREATS". HE STATED THE HOLY SEE WAS WILLING TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH ALL EXPRESSIONS OF GENERAL SOLIDARITY AIMED AT DEFUSING THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

4. SILVESTRINI DID NOT MENTION THE STATE OF ISRAEL EXPLICITLY, BUT SPOKE OF "THREATENED RETALIATORY ACTS WHICH COULD CAUSE THE UNPREDICTABLE QADDHAFI TO SPREAD ORGANIZED

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TERRORISM ON AN EVEN GREATER SCALE". CHARGE ASSURED SILVESTRINI THE HOLY SEE'S EXPRESSION OF CONCERN WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON AT ONCE.

5. CHARGE EMPHASIZED THE USGOVT HAD TAKEN A NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA IN VIEW OF QADDHAFI'S BEHAVIOR IN SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. HE EMPHASIZED THE INTENTIONS OF THE GOVT OF ISRAEL REGARDING RETALIATION WERE UNKNOWN IN WASHINGTON (REFTEL A). SINCE THE RECENT ATTACKS IN ROME AND VIENNA, OTHER NATIONS HAVE INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE MORE FULLY IN ADDRESSING THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT. ARCH-BISHOP SILVESTRINI WAS ASSURED THE HOLY FATHER'S STRONG CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM FOLLOWING THE RECENT ATTACKS (REFTEL C) WAS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON WITH GREAT SATISFACTION. ONLY BY MEANS OF SUCH PROMPT AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONDEMNATIONS BY WORLD LEADERS, THE CHARGE STATED, WILL THE PERPETRATORS UNDERSTAND THEIR COURSE CANNOT BE ADVANCED BY TERRORIST BRUTALITY.

MURPHY
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TO AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 5587
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5246

INFO AMCONSUL FLORENCE 0190
AMCONSUL GENOA 9731
AMCONSUL MILAN 7783
AMCONSUL PALERMO 9631
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NLRR M1088 #100627
BY FW NARA DATE 2/6/18

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ROME 00164

TERREP

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, IT
SUBJECT: BOMB THREAT AT AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
- NAPLES
REF: ROME 00130

1. AT 3 P.M. ON JANUARY 3, 1986 THE CONGEN IN NAPLES ADVISED THE RSO THAT THE CONSULATE STAFF HAD RETURNED TO THEIR OFFICES. HE ALSO ADVISED THAT HE WAS RELEASING THE CONSULATE STAFF UNTIL TUESDAY MORNING, JANUARY 7 (MONDAY, JANUARY 6, IS AN ITALIAN HOLIDAY).

2. HE STATED THAT THE CALLER WHO HAD TELEPHONED THE BOMB THREAT HAD CALLED THE CARABINIERI EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBER (112) AT 10:10 A.M. AND HAD ADVISED OF A BOMB IN THE CONSULATE. HE REPORTEDLY CALLED AGAIN AT 11:20 A.M. AND STATED THAT THE STAFF WAS DOING EXACTLY AS HE, THE CALLER, WANTED--AND THAT HE (OR THEY) COULD DRIVE BY THE CONSULATE AND KILL THE ENTIRE STAFF WHO WERE STANDING OUTSIDE. THE CALLER REPORTEDLY STATED THAT HE WOULD CALL THE CONSULATE AT 3 P.M. TO TALK TO THE "CHIEF OF POLICE." AS OF 4 P.M. HE HAD NOT CALLED THE CONSULATE.

3. THE CONGEN ADVISED THAT THE CARABINIERI SEARCHED THE CONSULATE AFTER IT WAS EVACUATED AND HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY THE ACTING PSO. HE CONTINUED THAT A BOMB-DETECTING DOG WAS BROUGHT FROM THE U.S. NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY AND WAS TAKEN THROUGH THE CONSULATE TWICE. NO EXPLOSIVES WERE FOUND.

4. THE CONGEN STATED THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION AS IT IS KNOWN. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE CARABINIERI WOULD ATTEMPT TO MONITOR THE CONSULATE INCOMING PHONE LINES IN CASE THE CALLER PHONED AGAIN.

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HOLMES
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0086T

DIR: S/CT:RBBENTLEY NAME
EXT. 23451 TEL EXT
AMPER: S/CT:RBOAKLEY NAME

1 P:MARMACOST NAME
2 EUR:CTHOMAS
3 CA:MNEULIN CLEARANCES
7 S/S-0:

NEA:ARAPHEL NAME
4 INR:JKAHAN
5 EAP/J:CKARTMAN ANCES
S/S:

IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ATHENS IMMEDIATE, BERN IMMEDIATE BONN IMMEDIATE,
BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE, LISBON IMMEDIATE, LONDON IMMEDIATE,

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PREL

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: DIPLOMATIC
INITIATIVES TO COMBAT IT

REF: {A} STATE 371962 {B} STATE 371963
{C} STATE 392907 {NOTAL} {D} ROME 30902 {NOTAL}

1. S- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENTS SOONEST WITH
THE MINISTER OR VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERIOR AND/OR OTHER APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT LEADERS
TO MAKE THE POINTS IN THIS MESSAGE. PLEASE INCLUDE YOUR
ASSESSMENT OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT
WILL SUPPORT MEASURES OF THE TYPE PROPOSED OR OTHER
SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION.

3. EUROPE IS NOW SUFFERING FROM AN ESCALATING SERIES OF
ATTACKS BY MIDDLE EAST TERRORISTS, AS IT WAS IN THE EARLY
1970'S. MANY RECENT ATTACKS CAN BE TRACED TO ABU NIDAL
AND ARE CHARACTERIZED BY DELIBERATE VIOLENCE AGAINST
INNOCENT CITIZENS OF MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING OF THE

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UNITED STATES, THE BLOODINESS OF THE TACTICS, AND THE ATTACKERS' WILLINGNESS TO RISK DEATH. THEY ARE ALSO CHARACTERIZED BY EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION, RESULTING FROM THE FINANCIAL, LOGISTICAL AND TRAINING SUPPORT OF CERTAIN STATES, ESPECIALLY LIBYA, BUT WITH SOME SUPPORT STILL COMING FROM SYRIA AND OTHER STATES, SUCH AS IRAN, AND A CADRE OF TRAINED PERSONNEL IN LEBANON AND SUPPORT CELLS IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. ABU NIDAL HAS ALREADY BEEN CONDEMNED BY MANY MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHICH SUPPORT THE PLO, SUCH AS THOSE OF EGYPT, JORDAN, TUNISIA AND MOROCCO, AS WELL AS BY THE PLO ITSELF.

4. ACTIONS BY ABU NIDAL IN PARTICULAR, BUT ALSO BY OTHER MIDDLE EAST TERRORISTS, SUCH AS THE ABU ABBAS PLF FACTION AFFILIATED DIRECTLY WITH THE PLO AND THE ISLAMIC JIHAD/HIZBALLAH, ARE MEANT TO DESTROY THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, UNDERMINE MODERATION AND PROMOTE INSTABILITY AND EXTREMISM IN THE REGION. ABU NIDAL ATTACKS UPON JORDANIAN AND MAINLINE PLO OFFICIALS ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT, AS DOES THE ABU NIDAL ATTACK ON EGYPTAIR {ACCOMPANIED BY THE ASSASSINATION OF AMERICAN AND ISRAELI PASSENGERS}. SO LONG AS SUCH TERRORISM CONTINUES UNCHECKED, IT ~~WILL INCREASINGLY THREATEN~~ *remain a potential* ~~to~~ *to* POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS. THE ECONOMIC DAMAGES OF TERRORISM ~~WILL~~ *could* ~~CAN~~ *will* EXTEND EVEN TO COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA.

5. WE SHOULD TAKE COLLECTIVE ADVANTAGE OF THE GROWING CONSENSUS IN OUR COUNTRIES AND AMONG MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AGAINST THIS ESCALATING TERRORISM IN ORDER TO STOP ABU NIDAL AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST TERRORISTS BEFORE THE COST CLIMBS EVEN HIGHER. NOW IS THE TIME TO ACT, WHEN THE DANGER IS CLEAR -- AND BEFORE MORE BLOODY INCIDENTS TAKE PLACE. MANY TYPES OF MEASURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BILATERALLY AND IN VARIOUS MULTILATERAL FORA {E.G., SUMMIT SEVEN, EC, NATO, COUNCIL OF EUROPE}, BUT NOW WE SHOULD TAKE CONCRETE ACTIONS.

6. DESPITE ALL THE PUBLICITY, THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO PRESS FOR URGENT, SWEEPING ACTIONS BEYOND THE POLITICAL CAPABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS. RATHER WE ARE SEEKING TO INCREASE FURTHER THE MOMENTUM OF COOPERATION, COMMON AWARENESS AND COMMITMENT TO CONCERT POLICIES AND ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN GENERATED BY THE SERIES OF HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, INSTENSIFIED INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES AND OTHER ACTIVITIES, WHICH HAVE BEEN INCREASING OVER THE

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PAST YEAR. AS PART OF THIS ONGOING EFFORT, HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT GOVERNMENTS BE PREPARED TO TAKE SOON ADDITIONAL CONCRETE MEASURES TO RESPOND VISIBLY AND MEANINGFULLY TO THE RECENT MASSACRES IN ROME AND VIENNA, NOT MERELY MAKE STATEMENTS AGAINST TERRORISTS AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM.

7 WITH RESPECT TO LIBYA, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL BE TAKING STILL FURTHER ACTION ITSELF AND EXPECTS OTHERS TO DO SOMETHING, BUT WILL NOT BE PRESSING OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO AGREE RIGHT AWAY TO THE SORT OF BROAD ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA WE HAVE ALREADY APPLIED. WE SEE THE CONCERTING OF ACTION AGAINST THE STATE SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM AS A LONG TERM OBJECTIVE, BUT IN LIBYA'S CASE, WHICH IS THE MOST FLAGRANT ONE, WE DO INTEND TO PRESS FOR REALISTIC EARLY ACTIONS. THIS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE TELEGRAMS, AS WAS THE DEMARCHE TO SYRIA.

8. NO COUNTRY CAN ACT SUCCESSFULLY ALONE. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS THE KEY TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. WE MUST ALSO BE WATCHFUL OF PRESERVING DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS WHILE WE KEEP OUR COUNTRIES FREE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS. THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARGUE FOR COMMON DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO CIRCUMSCRIBE TIGHTLY THE ABILITY OF TERRORISTS TO TRAVEL FREELY, ACQUIRE WEAPONS AND ACT WITH THE BELIEF THAT PUNISHMENT CAN SOMEHOW BE AVOIDED {E.G., EXPULSION RATHER THAN TRIAL OR EXTRADITION}. THEY ALSO ARGUE FOR CONCERTED DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES TO MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES THAT ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM, PRESSURES ON THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORT MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISTS AND CONSIDERATION OF ACTIVE OR TACIT SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA, WHOSE SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ACTS IN EUROPE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY BLATANT.

9. AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF GENERAL ACTIONS NOT DIRECTED AT A PARTICULAR TERRORIST GROUP OR STATE SUPPORTING TERRORISTS WHICH WE WOULD ENCOURAGE AT THIS TIME INCLUDE:

-- MEASURES TO RESTRICT THE TRAVEL OF POSSIBLE TERRORISTS. WE ALL MUST COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEMS OF THE USE OF FORGED PASSPORTS BY TERRORISTS, AS WELL AS PREVENTING TERRORISTS' USE OF LOST AND STOLEN PASSPORTS. WE MUST ALSO DEAL WITH THE MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES OF THE ISSUING OF REAL PASSPORTS BY GOVERNMENTS TO TERRORISTS AND OF THE EVENTUAL NEED FOR GREATER COORDINATION OF VISA LOOKOUT POLICIES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF TOUGHER, BROADER VISA REQUIREMENTS. MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS

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THOSE OF MOROCCO AND TUNISIA, HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT ABUSE OF THEIR PASSPORTS. THE TASK NOW IS TO TURN THESE COMMON CONCERNS INTO EFFECTIVE ACTIONS TO DEFEND OUR SOCIETIES. {FYI. WE NOTE ATHENS 24510, WHICH WE HAVE REPEATED TO ROME. A SEPTTEL TO ROME OUTLINES OUR REQUEST TO THE ITALIANS TO CALL A CONFERENCE ON RESTRICTING TERRORISTS' TRAVEL. END FYI.}

-- MEASURES TO LIMIT TERRORISTS' ACCESS TO WEAPONS. A CONCERTED EFFORT WILL BE REQUIRED TO TIGHTEN RESTRICTIONS ON THE SALE OF WEAPONS BY GOVERNMENTS OR PRIVATE INDUSTRY TO PREVENT WEAPONS FROM GOING TO TERRORISTS. WE SHOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF HOW TO APPLY PRESSURE TO GOVERNMENTS THAT FURNISH WEAPONS TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF EXCELLENT POLICE INVESTIGATIVE WORK ON WEAPONS, BUT MUCH MORE COULD BE OBTAINED BY SYSTEMATIC SHARING OF THAT INFORMATION. WE WOULD WELCOME SUGGESTIONS ON HOW WE MIGHT DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS ON A BROAD SCALE.

-- {FYI. REGARDING BOTH PASSPORTS AND WEAPONS, THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO SEND A SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS TEAM TO EUROPE IN JANUARY WHICH WILL BE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT ANALYSTS ON WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS AND HOW WE USE THE INFORMATION IN IDENTIFYING TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR SPONSORS. THE GROUP WILL DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM TRENDS AND HOW WE VIEW THE SPECIFIC THREAT IN EACH COUNTRY. THIS TEAM IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR MORE SYSTEMATIC EXCHANGES, BUT WILL ILLUSTRATE THE BENEFITS TO BE GAINED FROM THEM. AT PRESENT, PER REFTEL C, THE TEAM IS BEING PROPOSED FOR ATHENS, BRUSSELS, LONDON, MADRID, PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE ONLY. OTHER ADDRESSEES PLEASE ADVISE IF THERE IS SPECIAL INTEREST IN THIS EXCHANGE. END FYI.}

-- FOR BONN, LONDON, OTTAWA, ROME AND TOKYO. NOW IS THE TIME TO RETURN TO TWO ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC SUMMIT COOPERATION. FRENCH PARTICIPATION IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN EUROPE-WIDE MEASURES TO RESTRICT TERRORISM. WE HAVE ALREADY UNDERTAKEN A DEMARCHE TO PARIS TO SEEK THEIR COOPERATION; WE HOPE OTHER ECONOMIC SUMMIT GOVERNMENTS WILL DO LIKEWISE IN TIME TO INFLUENCE THE FRENCH POSITION BEFORE THE JANUARY 31 SHERPA MEETING. SECONDLY, AT THE DECEMBER 11 INTERIOR MINISTRY MEETING IN BONN, THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT FOR THE PRESENT THE PROCESS OF INTENSIFIED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION SHOULD BE KEPT AMONG THE SIX {OR THE SEVEN}, BUT WE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE DESIRABILITY OF WIDENING THAT CIRCLE. IN

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LIGHT OF THE HEIGHTENED ABU NIDAL THREAT, PLEASE SOUND OUT HOST GOVERNMENT ON WHETHER IT WOULD NOW AGREE TO EXPAND AT LEAST SOME ASPECTS OF THAT COOPERATION TO BENELUX COUNTRIES, AND POSSIBLY SPAIN, GREECE AND TURKEY. A SEPTTEL IS BEING SENT TO TOKYO WITH OUR VIEWS ON PREPARATION FOR THE SHERPA MEETING.

-- FOR PARIS. PLEASE INFORM FRENCH OFFICIALS THAT WE WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN HAVING AN IN DEPTH EXCHANGE WITH THEM ON ALL ASPECTS OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM, IN BLACK AFRICA AS WELL AS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

10. FOR BERN, NICOSIA, VALLETTA AND VIENNA. BEFORE DELIVERING THE DEMARCHE OR LEAVING A NON-PAPER, PLEASE GIVE THE DEPARTMENT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE BEST ENGAGED ON MEASURES TO RESTRICT TRAVEL OF TERRORISTS AND THEIR ACCESS TO WEAPONS.444

ROUTING

~~TOP SECRET~~

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	John Poindexter		
2	THE PRESIDENT		
3	<i>North</i>		
4			
5			
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COPY NO. 1 OF 8

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 North (#3)
 Teicher (#4)
 Covey (#5)
 McDaniel (#6)
 Morton (#7)

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Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

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NLRR M1088 #100629

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

BY RW NARA DATE 3/6/19

January 4, 1986

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MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: January 6, 1986

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

FROM: John M. Poindexter 

I. PURPOSE

To decide upon U.S. actions for dealing with Libyan support for international terrorism.

II. BACKGROUND

Since the Rome/Vienna terrorist attacks on December 27, the CPPG and various subgroups have met to develop an inter-agency approved action plan for dealing with Libya. This effort has resulted in a phased four-step strategy:

- immediate economic and political sanctions;
- naval movements to signal U.S. resolve;
- military strikes against targets in Libya; and
- acceleration of ongoing programs aimed at Libya.

The agenda at Tab A permits the NSPG principals to review events and discuss the plan. Though the strategy paper at Tab B was prepared by the NSC, it has been thoroughly considered by the CPPG Department/Agency representatives. Secretary Weinberger's Military Actions paper (Tab C) has been very closely held and has not been distributed. Talking points for your use are at Tab D.

This meeting is crucial. Qadhafi's complicity in the death of the Americans at the Rome and Vienna airports is undeniable, and presents us with an important opportunity. There is unlikely to be another clear-cut case such as this to implement an integrated political, economic and military strategy against Libya in the foreseeable future.

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Declassify on: OADR

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cc Vice President
Don Regan

100629

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Your comments could address several critical factors:

- The need for immediate implementation of stringent economic and political sanctions.
- Should the U.S. use force to stop these provocations and end Libyan-sponsored terrorism?
- Should our options for using force include high technology military resources to reduce our own risks? What are the pros and cons?
- The absolute necessity for discipline in maintaining the security of the NSPG decisions and subsequent actions.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary Shultz
 Secretary Baker
 Secretary Weinberger
 Attorney General Meese

Director Casey
 Director Miller
 Donald T. Regan
 John M. Poindexter
 Admiral William Crowe
 Donald R. Fortier

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

See agenda at Tab A.

Prepared by:
 Oliver L. North
 James R. Stark
 Howard R. Teicher

Attachments

- Tab A - Agenda
- Tab B - NSC Strategy Paper
- Tab C - Military Actions Paper from Secretary Weinberger
- Tab D - Talking Points

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
100630	AGENDA NSPG MEETING RE LIBYA	1	1/6/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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100631	PAPER ACTING AGAINST LIBYAN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	4	ND	B1 B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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100632

THEMES FOR THE PRESIDENT

It would be very beneficial if you were to weave the following themes into your comments during the NSPG:

- Our allies must understand that this time we are truly serious. If they won't help, they must realize we will have to take progressively stronger action ourselves.

- We need more systems -- like long-range cruise missiles -- that give us the option to strike terrorists accurately without harming ourselves or innocents. We have to show we have technology to compete with terrorists.

- Can't overemphasize my anger and dismay over leaks of our military plans. This constrains our options.

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NLRR M1088 #100632
BY AW NARA DATE 3/6/19

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100633

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TALKING POINTS FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER'S USE
DURING LIBYAN NSPG

- We have convened in order to determine how to act against Libyan support of international terrorism in the wake of Rome and Vienna.

- A growing body of evidence directly links Libya to Abu Nidal's attacks, as well as other global terrorism.

- Bill Casey to elaborate.

- The core decision we face is how to orchestrate the available economic and military measures to:
 - o reverse the perception of U.S. passivity in the face of mounting terrorist activity;

 - o isolate Libya and reduce the flow of Western economic resources which help finance Libyan support of international terrorism. (I am not sanguine about the prospects for European cooperation.)

 - o put at increasing risk, and damage to the extent possible, the terrorist infrastructure, support bases and sanctuaries;

 - o exacerbate anti-Qadhafi sentiment in Libya and abroad.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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BY fw NARA DATE 3/6/19

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-- The recommended strategy involves four integrated steps:

- o immediate economic and political sanctions;
- o naval movements to signal U.S. resolve;
- o military strikes against targets in Libya; and
- o acceleration of ongoing programs aimed at Libya.

-- Ask George Shultz and Jim Baker to discuss economic and political sanctions.

-- Ask Secretary Weinberger and Admiral Crowe to present military actions.

-- Once we move down this path, there will be radical action against us. We must be ready to sustain military action.

-- Mr. President, I recommend that you decide to pursue the integrated steps that we discussed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/6/18

Original Notes For [unclear]
3 [unclear]

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100635

EO 13526 3.5(c)

Over 75 percent of Libya's foreign trade is with OECD countries. East Bloc and Soviet states account for the bulk of the remaining trade. Tripoli depended on western countries for almost 70 percent of its food supply, a wide variety of industrial goods to keep its economy afloat, and almost a quarter of its arms purchases last year.

Foreign expertise is essential to the operation of Libya's oil sector and industry, especially the Great Man-made River Project.

- As many as 375,000 foreigners still reside in Libya.
- About 64,000 western workers including some 1,000 US citizens continue to work in Libya.
- East Bloc and Soviet personnel may number as many as 65,000.

Remaining areas of US leverage over Libya's economy include:

- Several thousand Libyan students continue to reside in the US.
- Libya still enjoys most favored nation status.
- US exports to Libya of \$300 million last year are up almost 50 percent and include badly needed, although not unique, food and industrial goods.

We have no additional evidence regarding Tripoli's role in the Rome and Vienna bombings other than the report from the Tunisians that the passports used by the terrorists in Vienna came from Libya.

With regard to the white paper on Libyan support of terrorism and subversion worldwide a draft will be to you as scheduled by

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BY fw NARA DATE 2/6/98

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noon, Monday 6 January.

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(MILLION US \$)

TRADE WITH LIBYA BY SELECTED NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1985 ^A

	EXPORTS TO LIBYA	MAJOR EXPORTS	IMPORTS ^B FROM LIBYA
ITALY	1,293	ELECTRIC AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL EQUIP ARMS	2,755
WEST GERMANY	583	ELECTRIC AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL GOODS	2,012
UNITED STATES	304	HEAVY INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY	16
JAPAN	287	TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT	8
UNITED KINGDOM	281	MACHINERY	379
FRANCE	220	MANUFACTURED GOODS SOME ARMS	619
SPAIN	151	MACHINERY	809
NETHERLANDS	143	FOOD	470
SOUTH KOREA	115	CONSTRUCTION GOODS	151
TURKEY	105	CONSTRUCTION GOODS	137
SWITZERLAND	73	MACHINERY	302
AUSTRIA	68	MACHINERY	112
BEL/LUX	68	FOOD/MANUF. GOODS	54
CANADA	56	FOOD	0
IRELAND	33	BEEF	0
GREECE	17	FOOD	40

A. ESTIMATED

3. VIRTUALLY ALL oil

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The following information may be of some use to you so I pass it along for your consideration.

Our best guess as to the number of US citizens in Libya at the present time would be 800 to 1,000 US citizens including dependents. The Libyans have claimed that as many as 2,695 Americans resided in country at the start of 1984. This figure probably represents more of a flow of people during a period of time than an actual number at a given point in time. (C)

There probably is a correlation between the level of US business activity in Libya and the number of US citizens in country but coverage is so limited as to make such a calculation impossible to establish in a practical sense. It appears from available information that US oil firms operating in Libya occasionally employ US citizens but only for limited lengths of time. This situation also prevails in the case of US firms working on the Great Man-made River Project. Non-US personnel have been relied on to fill the void created by the departed US workers since 1982. (C)

The pursuits of US citizens in Libya is a more tenuous subject. Available information shows that as many as 450 US citizens and their dependents form a core group which calls Libya home and did not depart in 1982. This group is made up of teachers and other professionals as well as a few oil workers who have established roots in Libya. The remaining 350 to 550 US citizens include opportunists drawn by lucrative employment contracts in Libya's petroleum sector as well as businessmen who rotate in out of the country as is necessary. (C)

The location of US citizens is an equally difficult question. The core group is primarily located in Tripoli, Benghazi, and possibly Tobruk. The non-oil business types would also be located primarily in these urban centers. The petroleum workers are scattered throughout the petroleum industry which covers a large part of the country. I would guess that petroleum workers account for 75 percent of the non-resident group of US citizens in Libya. (C)

Written by [unclear] 11/21/84
3- [unclear] 16

US COMPANIES OPERATING IN LIBYA

1. Amerada Hess--\$850 million in assets and 430,000 b/d in oil production capacity of which they receive a share
2. Marathon " " "
3. Conoco " " "
- **** Ammerada Hess, Marathon, and Conoco are the US members of the OASIS partnership.
4. Occidental--perhaps \$250 million in assets and 275,000 b/d of oil production of which they receive a share.
5. Brown and Root--at least \$400 million in contracts as general manager for the GMRP
6. Price Brothers--\$300-400 million in supply contracts for the GMRP
7. Bechtel--via Arabian Bechtel involved in several projects including GMRP
8. National Southwire Aluminum--a major contractor for the Great Man-made River Project
9. Superior--oil services
10. Halliburton--oil services
11. Pool-Intaldril--oil services
12. Reda--oil services
13. C.E. Vetco--oil services
14. Boeing--major supplier to Libyan national airlines before 1982
15. W.R. Grace natural gas and petroleum production
16. Christian--oil services
17. IDC--oil services
18. US Food Development Corporation--agricultural and development
19. Charter Oil--60,000 b/d oil contract cancelled in June 1984
20. Coastal Corporation--probably still taking up to 150,000 b/d of oil
21. Kaiser Engineers and Constructors--a subsidiary of Raymond International
22. McGaughy, Marshall, McMillan and Holmes & Narver (Consultant Firm Joint Venture)--housing development
23. Stone and Webster
24. US El-Paso Company--oil and gas services
25. Scientific Design (New York)
26. Foster Wheeler Italiana (US owned company based in Milan) --oil industry
27. M W Kellogg Company--mining
28. Woodward-Clyde Consultants--\$6 million geotechnical work for GMRP
29. Banker's Trust--a major US correspondent bank for Libya
30. A number of US banks have loaned money to South Korean firms building the GMRP, including Citicorp, Continental Illinois and First Natinal Bank of Chicago--all have loaned at least \$9 million each.
31. General Electric--was to have some dealings in Libya but confirmation is not available.
32. Sofec, Inc.--US subsidiary of British firm Vickers, Ltd., was to supply \$40 million in mooring equipment.

**OTHER FIRMS WHICH HAVE REQUESTED EXPORT LICENCE OR MAY BE
INVOLVED IN LIBYA TO SOME EXTENT**

Taylor Instruments

A.O. Smith

Rosemont

Gould Modicon

CATCO

Bristol

Leed and Northrup

Hewlett Packard

ISSC

Research, LTD.

Robertshaw Controls

Systronics

Forney Engineering

Honeywell

Fisher Controls

Foxboro

Bailey's Controls

UOP Process Division

Beekman Instruments

Participation of US Oil Firms in Libya^a

<u>Company</u>	<u>Volume of Equity Production</u>	<u>Percent of Company's Worldwide Oil Production and Reserves</u>	<u>Annual Profit^b</u>	<u>Percent of Net Income^c</u>	<u>Book Value of Assets^d</u>
Amerada Hess	35,000 b/d	23/36	\$13 mil	10	\$120 mil
Conoco	70,000 b/d	18/18	\$26 mil	5	\$240 mil
Marathon	70,000 b/d	30/28	\$26 mil	10-15	\$240 mil
Occidental	70,000 b/d	17/28	\$26 mil	8	\$250 mil
W.R. Grace	10,000 b/d	NA	NA	NA	NA

a. Estimated mid-year 1985.

b. Profits on Libyan operation only and based on estimated \$1 per barrel average

profit margin earned on equity liftings in Libya.

c. Reported net corporate income for 1983.

d. Based on industry reporting. These figures do not include the value of profits lost in the event of an abrupt withdrawal from Libya. As a benchmark, Mobil's equity production totalled 30,000 b/d before they left Libya in late 1982, and the company is claiming \$313 million in lost assets and profits in their suit against the Libyan Secretariat of Petroleum and the National Oil Company (LNOC). The combined value of lost profits and assets of the remaining four US oil companies in Libya would exceed \$2.3 billion if a similar valuation method is used. Most physical assets in Libya have been written off for US tax purposes and probably are carried at a small residual book value on corporate balance sheets.

Appendix 11-Companies Working in the Libyan Petroleum SectorDevelopment of the Offshore Bouri Oilfield

<u>Company</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Equipment/Services</u>
AGIP	Italy	Field Operator
John Brown	UK	Project Manager
Tecnomare	Italy	Jacket Design
Micoperi	Italy	Jacket Construction
Bellili	Italy	Jacket Construction
Snamprogetti	Italy	Topside Designer
Hyundai	South Korea	Topside Manufacturer
Saipen	Italy	Field Hook Up
Dalmine	Italy	Wellheads
Turbotecnica	Italy	Gas Turbines
EB Communications	Norway	Telecommunications
EMH	France	Single Point Mooring System
Coflexip	France	Flexible pipe
Technip	France	Engineering Services

Oilfield Service Companies

Petty Ray	US	Seismic Services
Western Geophysical	US	Seismic Services
SSL (Sub of Raytheon)	UK	Seismic Services
Pool Interdrill	US	Drilling Services
Forex Neptune (Sub of Schlumberger)	France	Drilling Services

Oilfield Service Companies


Flopetrol (Sub of Schlumberger)	France	Well Logging
General Descaling	UK	Pipeline Inspection
C.E. Vetco	US	Pipeline Inspection
Bonatti	Italy	Oilfield Services
Niigata Engineering	Japan	Engineering and Construction
Prakla Seismos	FRG	Seismic Services
Mannesmann	FRG	Pipeline Engineering
Tsvetmetpromehksport	USSR	Gas Pipeline Construction

Equipment Manufacturers

Mannesmann	FRG	"	Tubular Goods/Pipelines
Baker	US	"	Downhole Equipment
Weir	UK	"	Downhole Pumps
Lummus Crest Inc	US	"	Production Equipment
Combustion Eng.	US	"	Process Equipment
Yokagawa Electric	Japan		Electronic Controls
Samsung	South Korea		Oil Storage Tanks Water Injection Facilities
NEC	Japan		Communication/Computer Gear

Industrial Projects

Hyundia	South Korea	Electric Power Plant
Technimont (sub of Montedison)	Italy	Ras Lanuf Petrochem Plant



Industrial Projects

ENI	Italy	Petrochemical Plant
Riva	Italy	Refinery Equipment
Mariani	Italy	Refinery Equipment
Uhde	FRG	Petrochemical Plant
Foster Wheeler-It,	Italy	Petrochemical Plant
Brown & Root	US	Ras Lanuf Refinery
Davy McKee	US/UK	Ras Lanuf Refinery
Marubeni	Japan	Coke Facility

Oil Exploration Companies

AGIP	Italy	Exploration
ELF	France	"
Braspetro	Brazil	"
Bulgarian Oil	Bulgaria	"
Coastal	US	"
Deminix	FRG	"
Rompetro	Romania	"
Shell	US/Netherland	"
Mobil	US	"
Occidental	US	"
Oasis	US	"
Conoco		
Marathon		
Hess		
Sun Oil	US	"



Oil Exploration Companies

OMV	Austria	"
Wintershall	FRG	"
Veba	FRG	"

Oil Producing Companies

Oasis

Conoco	US	Producer
Marathon	US	Producer
Hess	US	Producer
W.R. Grace	US	Producer
ELF	France	Producer
Wintershall	FRG	Producer
Veba	FRG	Producer
Occidental	US	Producer
AGIP	Italy	Producer

OECD (19)
Imports From LIBYA
Year = 1984
(Million US \$)

Reporter	TOTAL TRADE	FOOD-STUFFS	RAW MATRLS	FUELS	MANU-FACTRS	OTHER
OECD (19)	7975	0	1	7877	86	10
U. S.	10	0	0	7	2	1
JAPAN	0	0	0	0	0	0
GERMANY	2196	0	0	2187	2	7
FRANCE	819	0	0	817	2	0
U. K.	208	0	0	200	8	0
ITALY	2762	0	0	2692	69	0
CANADA	56	0	0	56	0	0
SPAIN	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUSTRALA	0	0	0	0	0	0
NETHRLND	403	0	0	401	1	0
SWEDEN	0	0	0	0	0	0
BELG/LUX	310	0	0	308	1	2
SWTZRLND	448	0	0	447	1	0
AUSTRIA	219	0	0	219	0	0
DENMARK	0	0	0	0	0	0
NORWAY	0	0	0	0	0	0
FINLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0
GREECE	545	0	0	544	1	0
IRELAND	0	0	0	0	0	0

OECD (19)
Exports To LIBYA
Year = 1984
(Million US \$)

Reporter	TOTAL TRADE	FOOD-STUFFS	RAW MATRLS	FUELS	MANU-FACTRS	OTHER
OECD (19)	4444	506	57	359	3313	209
U. S.	200	16	1	1	180	2
JAPAN	414	0	0	0	413	1
GERMANY	804	46	3	1	576	178
FRANCE	211	8	1	8	193	0
U. K.	330	21	1	2	303	3
ITALY	1660	137	26	326	1171	0
CANADA	56	30	0	0	26	0
SPAIN	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUSTRALA	23	21	0	0	2	0
NETHRLND	186	103	1	8	54	19
SWEDEN	70	0	4	0	64	2
BELG/LUX	104	23	1	10	69	2
SWTZRLND	104	20	0	0	84	0
AUSTRIA	96	9	10	0	76	0
DENMARK	26	6	0	0	20	0
NORWAY	3	0	0	0	2	1
FINLAND	27	3	3	1	20	0
GREECE	89	30	5	0	54	0
IRELAND	40	35	0	0	5	0

1985 - total trade 300% increase in specific categories roughly proportional to 84.

To LIBYA
Year = 1984
(Million US \$)

Reporter	TOTAL TRADE	MANU-FACTRS	CHEM-ICALS	SEMI-FINSHD	MACH-INERY	TRAN-SPORT	CONSMR GOODS
OECD(19)	4444	3313	387	778	1149	632	367
U. S.	200	180	3	20	133	17	6
JAPAN	414	413	3	67	132	171	39
GERMANY	804	576	40	168	263	86	19
FRANCE	211	193	26	53	73	29	12
U. K.	330	303	54	59	133	35	22
ITALY	1660	1171	194	292	221	249	215
CANADA	56	26	0	0	23	3	1
SPAIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUSTRALA	23	2	0	0	2	0	0
NETHRLND	186	54	17	11	13	6	7
SWEDEN	70	64	2	13	36	7	6
BELG/LUX	104	69	8	26	17	18	0
SWTZRLND	104	84	19	5	50	3	7
AUSTRIA	96	76	7	19	36	5	10
DENMARK	26	20	4	6	6	1	3
NORWAY	3	2	1	0	1	0	0
FINLAND	27	20	2	8	6	1	3
GREECE	89	54	6	30	3	0	14
IRELAND	40	5	1	1	2	0	1

OECD(19)
Exports To LIBYA
Year = 1984
(Million US \$)

Reporter	TOTAL TRADE	MANU-FACTRS	MACH-INERY	EN-GINES	FARM MACH	ELEC MACH	H IND MACH	BUSNS MACH	SCIEN. INSTR.	OTHER MACH
OECD(19)	4444	3313	1149	101	73	333	280	13	55	294
U. S.	200	180	133	8	6	16	42	0	5	54
JAPAN	414	413	132	25	10	54	22	2	3	17
GERMANY	804	576	263	16	5	88	71	2	12	69
FRANCE	211	193	73	17	1	25	10	1	5	13
U. K.	330	303	133	6	34	33	18	4	9	29
ITALY	1660	1171	221	8	15	50	62	2	9	75
CANADA	56	26	23	9	0	1	12	0	0	1
SPAIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUSTRALA	23	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NETHRLND	186	54	13	1	1	1	3	0	1	5
SWEDEN	70	64	36	0	0	23	7	0	2	3
BELG/LUX	104	69	17	0	0	7	5	0	0	2
SWTZRLND	104	84	50	10	0	19	12	0	3	6
AUSTRIA	96	76	36	0	0	9	14	0	1	12
DENMARK	26	20	6	0	1	0	2	0	1	2
NORWAY	3	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
FINLAND	27	20	6	0	0	1	0	0	2	0
GREECE	89	54	3	0	0	2	1	0	0	0
IRELAND	40	5	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	1

OECD(19) EXPORTS To LIBYA
By Reporting Country.

	27	KU	2	B	6	1	3
	89	54	6	30	3	0	14
IRELAND	40	5	1	1	2	0	1

OECD(19)
Exports To LIBYA
Year = 1984
(Million US \$)

Reporter	TOTAL TRADE	MANU-FACTRS	MACH-INERY	EN-GINES	FARM MACH	ELEC MACH	H IND MACH	BUSNS MACH	SCIEN. INSTR.	OTHR MACH
OECD(19)	4444	3313	1149	101	73	333	280	13	55	294
U. S.	200	180	133	8	6	5	42	0	5	54
JAPAN	414	413	132	25	10	54	22	2	3	17
GERMANY	804	576	263	16	5	88	71	2	12	69
FRANCE	211	193	73	17	1	25	10	1	5	13
U. K.	330	303	133	6	34	33	18	4	9	29
ITALY	1660	1171	221	8	15	50	62	2	9	76
CANADA	56	26	23	9	0	1	12	0	0	1
SPAIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUSTRALA	23	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NETHRLND	186	54	13	1	1	1	3	0	1	5
SWEDEN	70	64	36	0	0	23	7	0	2	3
BELG/LUX	104	69	17	0	0	7	5	0	0	4
SWTZRLND	104	84	50	10	0	19	12	0	3	6
AUSTRIA	96	76	36	0	0	9	14	0	1	12
DENMARK	26	20	6	0	1	0	2	0	1	2
NORWAY	3	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
FINLAND	27	20	6	0	0	1	0	0	2	2
GREECE	89	54	3	0	0	2	1	0	0	0
IRELAND	40	5	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	1

OECD(19) EXPORTS To LIBYA

By Reporting Country.

Million US Dollars

Reporter	B3Q2	B3Q3	B3Q4	B4Q1	B4Q2	B4Q3	B4Q4	B5Q1	B5Q2	B5Q3
OECD(19)	1446	1320	1408	1311	1024	1125	1250	947	960	866
US	60	43	43	64	47	43	46	42	94	92
JAPAN	76	115	97	68	49	148	148	80	87	48
GERMANY	238	190	196	194	207	187	217	146	148	143
FRANCE	79	86	93	80	43	39	49	61	65	39
UK	134	119	89	84	84	70	89	53	84	64
ITALY	539	500	532	503	312	395	450	354	319	297
CANADA	19	10	21	11	18	20	11	9	15	18
SPAIN	70	65	93	75	67	54	71	42	41	30
AUSTRAL	5	4	5	5	12	2	4	9	8	0
NETH	73	40	70	62	39	38	47	36	24	47
SWEDEN	24	20	16	20	21	14	16	14	12	15
BEL/LUX	19	19	25	36	20	19	29	18	18	15
SWITZRLD	24	26	25	24	27	25	24	16	13	26
AUSTRIA	27	27	30	29	25	24	19	22	16	13
DENMARK	16	10	10	5	8	8	6	5	:	6
NORWAY	2	2	2	1	1	0	1	2	0	0
FINLAND	9	6	6	5	10	9	4	2	2	9
GREECE	18	21	41	33	23	17	17	17	0	0
IRELAND	15	16	16	13	12	12	4	9	11	5

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