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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 11/15/2010

**File Folder** TERRORIST TARGETS: LIBYA (6)

**FOIA**

F95-023/9

**Box Number** 48

WILLS

14

| ID     | Doc Type | Document Description                                | No of Pages | Doc Date   | Restrictions |
|--------|----------|---|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 100427 | CABLE    | STATE 392921<br><i>R 3/21/2017 M1086/1</i>          | 2           | 12/28/1985 | B1           |
| 100428 | CABLE    | TEL AVIV 18926<br><i>R 3/21/2017 M1086/1</i>        | 4           | 12/28/1985 | B1           |
| 100430 | PAPER    | RE LIBYA/ALTERNATIVES<br><i>R 3/21/2017 M1086/1</i> | 2           | 12/28/1985 | B1           |
| 100431 | PAPER    | RE LIBYA  | 3           | 12/30/1985 | B1 B3        |
| 100432 | PAPER    | RE LIBYA W/ANNOTATION                               | 3           | 12/30/1985 | B1 B3        |
| 100433 | CABLE    | TUNIS 12013<br><i>R 3/21/2017 M1086/1</i>           | 4           | 12/31/1985 | B1           |
| 100434 | CABLE    | 311605Z DEC 85                                      | 2           | 12/31/1985 | B1 B3        |
| 100435 | CABLE    | 312234Z DEC 85                                      | 7           | 12/31/1985 | B1           |
| 100436 | CABLE    | 311857Z DEC 85                                      | 2           | 12/31/1985 | B1 B3        |
| 100437 | CABLE    | 311635Z DEC 85                                      | 2           | 12/31/1985 | B1 B3        |

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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|--------|----------|--|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 100438 | REPORT   | LIBYA  | 2           | 12/31/1985 | B1 B3        |
| 100439 | PAPER    | LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM<br><i>R 8/28/2018 M1086/1</i>    | 4           | ND         | B1 B3        |
| 100440 | PAPER    | CHRONOLOGY OF LIBYAN TROUBLEMAKING<br><i>R 8/28/2018 M1086/1</i> | 5           | 12/31/1985 | B1 B3        |
| 100443 | MEMO     | RE LIBYA   | 4           | 1/1/1986   | B1 B3        |

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100427

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2921  
SIT050

DTG: 280530Z DEC 85 PSN: 013473  
TOR: 362/1128Z

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EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PTER, IS, US  
SUBJECT: TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ROME AND VIENNA

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES: DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT CONDEMNATION OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS AT ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS BY YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS WOULD ASSIST IN MOBILIZING WORLD OPINION AGAINST THESE LATEST ATROCITIES AND WOULD HELP NEGATE ANY SUGGESTION THAT THEY EITHER ACQUIESCE IN OR ACTIVELY SUPPORT GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE ACTS. WE DO NOT YET HAVE ANY INFORMATION AS TO THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE INCIDENTS. IT APPEARS THAT "MIDDLE EASTERN/PALESTINIAN" NATIONALS WERE RESPONSIBLE; THE PRESS HAS SPECULATED ON ABU NIDAL GROUP INVOLVEMENT. WE ARE SENDING CONDOLENCE MESSAGES TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, AND ASKING THEM TO CAREFULLY WEIGH THEIR RESPONSE, IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE PEACE-PROCESS, AS WELL AS THE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

3. WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS AT PRESENT TIME OF WHAT RESPONSE ISRAEL WILL MAKE TO THESE ATTACKS, NOR HAVE WE BEEN TOLD OF ANY PARTICULAR GOI ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE ACTS. AS ISRAEL CONSIDERS ITS RESPONSE, STRONG CONDEMNATIONS OF THE ATTACK BY YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS MAY BE IMPORTANT IN SHAPING GOI DECISIONS. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE U. S. HAS NO RPT NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY PLANNED ISRAELI RETALIATION.

4. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS FOR POSTS' USE:

-- THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ROME AND VIENNA ARE SENSELESS ACTS OF INDISCRIMINATE BRUTALITY WHICH OFFEND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD. THE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF THESE ACTIONS ARE NATIONALS OF MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES.

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
NLRRM 10916 #100427  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/17

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SECSTATE WASHDC 2921

DTG: 280530Z DEC 85

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-- VIOLENCE OF THIS TYPE THREATENS ALL NATIONS, AND MUST BE CONDEMNED BY ALL CIVILIZED STATES.

-- TERRORIST ACTIONS SUCH AS THESE CANNOT ADVANCE THE INTERESTS OF ANY GROUP OR CAUSE. THEY INVITE AN ESCALATION IN THE ALREADY TRAGIC CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION, AND DO DIRECT HARM TO ALL IN THE REGION WHO SUPPORT PEACE AND STABILITY.

-- WE HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL PROMPTLY CONDEMN THESE VICIOUS ACTS, AND MAKE CLEAR TO THEIR PERPETRATORS THAT THE WORLD WILL NEITHER SUPPORT NOR ACQUIESCE IN THEIR MURDEROUS ACTIONS.

ARMACOST

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3  
100428

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 8926  
SIT052

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TOR: 362/1138Z

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OP IMMED  
STU8735  
DE RUEHTV #8926/01 3621130  
O 281128Z DEC 85  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4912

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 9237  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3130  
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 3573  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3595  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0463  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7776  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1691

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 18926

TERREP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, EAIR, CASC, ASEC, IT, IS  
SUBJECT: TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ROME AND VIENNA -- COMMENTS  
- BY PRIME MINISTER'S ADVISOR ON TERRORISM

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.  
--

2. SUMMARY  
-----

THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADVISOR ON TERRORISM BELIEVES THE ROME AND VIENNA ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT BY ABU NIDAL, BUT IS STILL NOT COMPLETELY CERTAIN. HE CREDITS PROMPT ACTION BY ISRAELI GUARDS FOR PREVENTING MUCH GREATER CASUALTIES. HE BELIEVES THE ATTACKS WERE DESIGNED TO DISCREDIT ARAFAT AND TO STIMULATE A MASSIVE ISRAELI RETALIATION WHICH WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.  
--

3. IN PHONE CONVERSATIONS LATE FRIDAY NIGHT AND EARLY SATURDAY MORNING, AMIRAN NIR, THE ADVISOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON TERRORISM, PROVIDED A SUMMARY OF ACTIONS IN ROME AND VIENNA AND OFFERED PRELIMINARY ISRAELI CONCLUSIONS. MUCH OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACKS HAS BEEN REPORTED ELSEWHERE BUT IS REPEATED HERE TO GIVE ADDRESSEES THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE ON THE ATTACKS.  
--

4. ROME  
-----

NIR SAID THE ATTACK IN ROME WAS CONDUCTED BY 4 OR 5 PEOPLE AT THE TWA AND EL AL COUNTERS SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE SAID THE MAIN ATTACK CAME FROM THE TWA COUNTER. HE SAID ISRAELI

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BY *RW* M1086 #100428  
NARA DATE 3/21/17

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 281128Z DEC 85 PSN: 013488

GUARDS REACTED IMMEDIATELY, AND INDICATED IT WAS ALL OVER IN 20 TO 30 SECONDS. HE SAID ISRAELI GUARDS KILLED 3 OF THE TERRORISTS AND WOUNDED 1. HE SAID THE ITALIANS MAY HAVE PICKED UP A FIFTH SUSPECT BUT WAS NOT CERTAIN. NIR SAID THAT NONE OF THE DEAD IN ROME WERE FROM THE EL AL FLIGHT, BUT THE EL AL STATION MANAGER, 1 ISRAELI GUARD, AND 3 ASSISTANTS TO THE GUARDS WERE WOUNDED. HE SAID 10 ISRAELIS WERE WOUNDED. NIR SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION THIS MORNING IS THAT THERE WAS A TOTAL OF 13 KILLED IN THE ROME ATTACK PLUS 50 TO 60 INJURED. NIR SPECULATED THAT THE ROME AIRPORT WAS SELECTED BECAUSE IT OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET BOTH U.S. AND ISRAELI TARGETS AT THE SAME TIME.

--

5. VIENNA  
-----

NIR SAID THAT THERE WERE 3 TERRORISTS WHO ATTACKED THE EL AL COUNTER IN VIENNA. HE SAID THAT THEY THREW GRENADES AND FIRED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FROM A LOWER LEVEL KILLING 2 EL AL PASSENGERS, 1 ISRAELI AND 1 AUSTRIAN. HE SAID THERE WERE 15 EL AL PASSENGERS WOUNDED, 4 ISRAELIS AND 11 AUSTRIANS. AGAIN HE SAID THE ISRAELI GUARDS RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY, BUT THE TERRORISTS FLED THE AIRPORT IN AN AUTOMOBILE. THE ISRAELI GUARDS JUMPED INTO AUSTRIAN POLICE CARS AND PURSUED THE ATTACKERS, FIRING AS THEY DROVE. HE SAID THE ATTACKERS' CAR WAS STOPPED ABOUT ONE KILOMETER AWAY FROM THE AIRPORT; ONE OF THE ATTACKERS WAS KILLED AND THE OTHER 2 WOUNDED, ONE OF WHOM ONLY SLIGHTLY.

--

6. NIR CLEARLY WANTED US TO KNOW THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELI GUARDS WERE THE EFFECTIVE OPERATORS IN BOTH CASES. WITHOUT THEIR IMMEDIATE ACTION, HUNDREDS MIGHT HAVE BEEN KILLED. HE SAID THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT PUBLISH THIS INFORMATION IN ORDER  
BT

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 8926  
SIT053

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TOR: 362/1139Z

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OP IMMED  
STU8739  
DE RUEHTV #8926/02 3621131  
O 281128Z DEC 85  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4913

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 9238  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3131  
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 3574  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3596  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0464  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7777  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1692

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 18926

TERREP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, EAIR, CASC, ASEC, IT, IS  
SUBJECT: TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ROME AND VIENNA -- COMMENTS

TO AVOID EMBARRASSING THE LOCAL POLICE  
AND CAUSING DIFFICULTIES FOR THE ISRAELI  
GUARD FORCE. HE WILL ATTEMPT TO GIVE LOCAL  
POLICE CREDIT PUBLICLY FOR THE PROMPT ACTION.  
--

7. ABU NIDAL?  
-----

NIR SAID THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT YET COMPLETELY  
SURE OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ATTACKERS.  
HE SAID THE METHOD OF OPERATION AND THE PRECISE  
TIMING OF THE SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS POINT VERY  
CLEARLY TO ABU NIDAL. HE SAID THE GOI HAS NOT  
YET BEEN ABLE TO ANALYZE THE PHONE CALL IN  
SPAIN WHICH CLAIMS CREDIT FOR THE ABU NIDAL  
GROUP. NEVERTHELESS NIR SAID HE IS ONLY  
ONE PERCENT UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF  
THE ATTACKERS. HE SAID THE ISRAELIS WILL BE  
WORKING VERY CLOSELY WITH AUSTRIAN AND ITALIAN  
POLICE IN INTERROGATING THE ATTACKERS. HE SAID  
HIS FIRST OBJECTIVE IS TO KNOW IF THERE ARE  
OTHER THINGS THAT ARE PLANNED FOR OTHER AIRPORTS.  
--

8. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, MFA DIRECTOR  
GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE WAS MORE GUARDED IN  
ASSESSING BLAME. HE SAID THE GOI HAS SO  
FAR MADE NO JUDGMENT ON WHO IS RESPONSIBLE,  
ADDING ONLY THAT THERE IS SPECULATION THAT  
THE ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE ABU NIDAL  
GROUP.  
--

9. MOTIVATION  
-----

BUILDING ON HIS TENTATIVE CONCLUSION THAT  
IT WAS AN ABU NIDAL ATTACK, NIR SAID THAT

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 8926

DTG: 281128Z DEC 85 PSN: 013490

THE BASIC MOTIVATION SEEMED TO BE TO DISCREDIT ARAFAT, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ARAFAT DOES NOT CONTROL THE PALESTINIAN FACTIONS, AND TO DISRUPT THE PEACE PROCESS. IT WAS DESIGNED TO PROVE THAT ARAFAT CAN'T DELIVER ON A DEAL SUCH AS THE MUTUAL NON-BELLIGERENCE AGREEMENT THAT WAS WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE PLO AND ITALY'S CRAXI. SECONDLY, IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT ARAFAT DOES NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO DELIVER ON THE CAIRO DECLARATION. ON THE VIENNA ATTACK, NIR SPECULATED THAT IT WAS SOMEHOW CONNECTED WITH EFFORTS OF THE ABU NIDAL GROUP TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE ABU NIDAL AGENT CONVICTED OF THE ATTACK ON A SYNAGOGUE IN VIENNA IN 1982. NIR FURTHER SPECULATED THAT THE COORDINATED ATTACKS AT BOTH AIRPORTS AT THE SAME TIME WERE DESIGNED TO DRIVE ISRAEL TO "CRAZY RETALIATION" THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS. HE SAID THAT THE TERRORISTS PROBABLY EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A MASSIVE ISRAELI REACTION, PERHAPS INVOLVING THE KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN LEBANON, THAT WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR MODERATE ARABS TO CONTINUE WITH THE POLITICAL PROCESS. NIR IMPLIED THAT THE ISRAELI REACTION WOULD NOT FALL INTO THIS TRAP BUT WOULD BE MUCH MORE SELECTIVE.

--  
10. COORDINATION WITH THE U. S.

-----  
NIR ASKED WHAT THE THINKING IN WASHINGTON WAS ABOUT REACTION TO THE ATTACKS. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD BE COORDINATING WITH US VERY CLOSELY IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT 48 HOURS ON FURTHER ACTION TO BE TAKEN. IN A FOLLOW-UP CALL, NIR SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS INSTRUCTED HIM TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY THROUGHOUT THE DAY.  
FLATEN  
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(passed out by Crisis Management Staff)

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100430

Non-Military Alternatives

Economic. The United States still possesses considerable unilateral economic leverage over Libya, particularly during a time when the oil market has caused Libyan financial reserves to drop to new lows and when popular discontent is rising in response to economic privation and Qadhafi's various forms of social engineering. The economic sanctions imposed against Libya in December, 1981 and March, 1982 were deliberately partial in nature and were designed to be "ratcheted upward" if continued Libyan misbehavior warranted.

-- At present, imports of Libyan crude oil and oil refined in Libya are banned from the U.S.; exports of U.S. items on the National Security List are banned for export to Libya, along with oil and gas technology which cannot be obtained elsewhere; and U.S. passports are invalid for travel to Libya.

-- Activities not captured by these sanctions include:

- o The presence in Libya of approximately 1500 U.S. citizens, many of whom are fulfilling highly specialized oil and construction jobs (without using their passports);
- o The contribution to the Libyan economy constituted by U.S. oil companies which lift 80% of Libyan oil (which is then marketed in Europe) and which enjoy half of the proceeds; and
- o The contribution to Qadhafi's domestic political image caused by U.S. participation in major construction projects like the "Man-made River" water complex. Hard trade in this area amounts to \$200 million per year; at least \$200 million more is in the form of consultant services.

Both existing export trade to Libya and commerce done in Libya by U.S. oil companies can be eliminated by use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In addition, this Act can be used to make it a criminal offense for those U.S. citizens now in Libya to remain there in conscious subversion of the intent of our passport restriction. Invocation of IEEPA would be easier now than when it was first considered in 1981 and 1982 because it has successfully been invoked in the case of Nicaragua. (Before this, it had only been used when the U.S. froze Iranian financial assets during the hostage crisis. Treasury argued that its further use, even if Libyan assets were

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NLRR M10816 #100430  
BY rw NARA DATE 3/21/17

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not similarly frozen, would trouble financial markets and make other countries hesitant to invest their assets in U.S. banks).

State is currently assessing the advisability of utilizing IEEPA with respect to Libya. There are two major advantages of this approach. First, in contrast to military options, the impact of economic sanctions is easier to control and unforeseen consequences less likely to arise. Second, the language required in using IEEPA -- declaration of an emergency threatening the foreign policy or national security interests of the U.S. -- is tailor-made for making a strong point about the dangers of state-supported terrorism.

Diplomatic. Although it is difficult to obtain multilateral support for diplomatic sanctions, increasing public revulsion against specific terrorist incidents -- many of which will occur in Europe -- may make it possible to launch an initiative for closing Libyan People's Bureaus. Again, there would be concrete as well as symbolic advantages. The People's Bureaus are used as conduits in support of terrorist activities, under the cloak of diplomatic immunity. Closing them would complicate Libyan support of terrorism as well as making a strong point about Libyan failure to live up to the norms of civilized international behavior, a failure that makes it appropriate to deny the Libyans the rights (like diplomatic immunity and representation) that the international community has to bestow.

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| 100432    | PAPER<br><br>RE LIBYA W/ANNOTATION                  | 3                            | 12/30/1985      | B1<br><br>B3                    |

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TUNIS 2013 DTG: 311536Z DEC 85 PSN: 017873  
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GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED TO INVALIDATE MOST PASSPORTS NOW IN CIRCULATION AND REPLACE THEM WITH NEW DOCUMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.

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INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 8449  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4009  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8939  
AMEMBASSY ROME 2988  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0346  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 12013

TERREP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, TS, LY  
SUBJECT: LIBYAN CONNECTION IN TUNISIAN PASSPORTS  
- USED BY VIENNA TERRORISTS

REF: TUNIS 11943

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. TUNISIAN RADIO, TELEVISION, WIRE SERVICES AND PRINT MEDIA GAVE WIDESPREAD COVERAGE TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR PRESS CONFERENCE ON USE OF TUNISIAN PASSPORTS BY TERRORISTS IN VIENNA DEC. 30 AND 31. FOREIGN WIRE SERVICES ALSO FILED REPORTS ON GOT STATEMENTS. AS EXPLAINED REFTEL, PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF GOT WAS TO STRESS TUNISIAN CITIZENS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN ATTACKS. WHILE MIN INTERIOR SPOKESMAN (CHEF DU CABINET TAHAR FELLOUS) WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID DIRECT IMPLICATION OF LIBYA IN VIENNA INCIDENT, HE NEVERTHELESS UNDERLINED THAT ALL THREE PASSPORTS IN QUESTION HAD BEEN EITHER CONFISCATED BY LIBYAN AUTHORITIES OR LOST IN LIBYA. INTERESTINGLY, EACH PRESS ACCOUNT WAS NUANCED IN A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT MANNER. SEVERAL ACCOUNTS STRESSED THAT TUNISIAN SECURITY SERVICES HAD GIVEN PASSPORT NUMBERS (BOTH OF THOSE USED IN ATTACK AND OTHERS) TO INTERPOL PRIOR TO ATTACK AS WELL AS GOT INTENT TO MAINTAIN CONTINUED CLOSE COMMUNICATION WITH INTERPOL ON QUESTION OF CONFISCATED OR MISSING TUNISIAN PASSPORTS, WHICH MAY NUMBER IN THE THOUSANDS. ARABIC LANGUAGE DAILY ASSABAH EXPLICITLY CRITICIZED INTERPOL FOR IGNORING OR NOT DISSEMINATING INFO. PRESS CONFERENCE WAS CLEARLY GOT ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO PROBLEM OF TERRORIST USE OF TUNISIAN PASSPORTS. WHILE OUR CONTACTS APPEAR BOTH EMBARRASSED AND DEFENSIVE ABOUT SUBJECT, THEY HAVE MOVED FORCEFULLY TO MAKE LIBYAN LINK. WHILE THIS ACTION IS SURE TO INFURIATE QADHAFI, IT IS ALSO WORTHY OF U.S. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT (IN DISCREET, NON-PUBLIC FASHION). GIVEN AWARENESS OF THE ABUSE OF NORTH AFRICAN DOCUMENTS BY TERRORISTS AFTER RECENT TRAGIC INCIDENTS, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE TIMELY FOR USG TO OFFER FINANCIAL/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO

3. MFA SECSTATE MAHMOUD MESTIRI TOLD CHARGE DEC. 31 THAT PRESS CONFERENCE PREVIOUS DAY IN WHICH GOT DISCLOSED LIBYAN CONNECTION TO PASSPORTS USED BY VIENNA TERRORISTS WAS FAR BETTER THAN ANY STATEMENT GOT COULD HAVE MADE CONDEMNING THE ACTS. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE GOT SPOKESMAN, MESTIRI SAID, PROVIDED A VERY STRONG INDICATION OF A LIBYAN ROLE IN THE ATTACK. NEVER HAD THERE BEEN SO MUCH CLEAR PROOF AS IN THIS CASE. IN FACT, HE SAID, THERE WAS NEVER ANY DOUBT FOR GOT OF QADHAFI'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM.

4. THE REVELATIONS IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE HAD NOT HURT ANY WESTERN NATION, MESTIRI NOTED, AND TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE GOT'S EXPRESSION OF "REPROBATION" IN FONMIN'S LETTER TO HIS AUSTRIAN AND ITALIAN COUNTERPARTS, SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT AS TO TUNISIA'S VIEWS ON THE ACTS.

5. TUNISIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION PICKED UP REPORTS OF GOT MINISTRY OF INTERIOR PRESS CONFERENCE EVENING DEC. 30 AND HIGHLIGHTED MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S EMPHASIS ON LACK OF TUNISIAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST

ATTACK AT VIENNA AIRPORT. THESE BRIEF ACCOUNTS MENTIONED APPEARANCE OF TUNISIAN CITIZENS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, NOTING THAT PASSPORTS CARRIED BY THE TERRORISTS HAD BEEN CONFISCATED OR LOST IN LIBYA.

6. ALL TUNISIAN DAILIES DEC. 31 CARRIED DETAILS OF PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PHOTOS OF TERRORISTS NEXT TO PHOTOS OF TUNISIAN CITIZENS, WHOSE PASSPORTS REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN CARRIED BY THE TERRORISTS. MOST ARTICLES CITED PASSPORT NUMBERS, DATES OF ISSUE AND DATES OF BIRTH OF THE PASSPORT HOLDERS. ALL THREE OF TUNISIANS INVOLVED HAD WORKED IN LIBYA AT ONE TIME AND TWO OF THE INDIVIDUALS HAD BEEN EXPELLED BY LIBYAN AUTHORITIES DURING THE WAVE OF EXPULSIONS OF TUNISIAN MIGRANT WORKERS DURING AUG-SEPT 1985.  
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BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/17

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 TUNIS 2013  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2916

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 8450  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4010  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8940  
AMEMBASSY ROME 2989  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0347  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 TUNIS 12013

TERREP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, TS, LY  
SUBJECT: LIBYAN CONNECTION IN TUNISIAN PASSPORTS

PASSPORT DATA CITED IN PRESS ACCOUNTS IS AS FOLLOWS:

A) ABDELAZIZ MARZOUGUI (ALSO SPELLED MARZOUKI)  
DOB: 3/12/60; POB: KAIROUAN; PASSPORT NO: B/056082;  
DOI: 8/6/82. MR. MARZOUGUI WAS REPORTEDLY EXPELLED  
FROM LIBYA 8/14/85, HAVING BEEN DETAINED BY LIBYAN  
AUTHORITIES 8/12/85 AS PART OF A GENERAL ROUND-UP  
OF TUNISIANS RESIDENT IN LIBYA. HIS PASSPORT WAS  
SEIZED WHEN HE WAS DETAINED.

B) MONGI BEN ABDALLAH SAADOU; DOB: 1959; POB: BEJA;  
PASSPORT NO: B/733426; DOI: 8/27/81. HE WAS EXPELLED  
BY THE LIBYANS 9/5/85 AND HE STATED HIS PASSPORT HAD  
BEEN CONFISCATED BY LIBYAN AUTHORITIES PRIOR TO HIS  
EXPULSION.

C) AHMED BEN BRAHIM ATAHAR CHAROUAL (ALSO SPELLED  
CHAROUEL) DOB: 11/7/47; POB: GABES; PASSPORT NO:  
073381; DOI: 11/9/75. MR. CHAROUAL INDICATED THAT  
HIS PASSPORT HAD BEEN LOST IN LIBYA IN 1977 AND HE  
RETURNED TO TUNISIA BY USING A "LAISSEZ-PASSER"  
SOMETIME THEREAFTER.

7. GOVERNMENT-OWNED FRENCH DAILY LA PRESSE, PARTY  
RUN L'ACTION (FRENCH) AND AL AMAL (ARABIC) GIVE  
STRAIGHTFORWARD ACCOUNTS OF PRESS CONFERENCE. WHILE  
L'ACTION AND AL AMAL HEADLINE STORIES ON INSIDE  
PAGES: "VIENNA TERRORISTS HAD TUNISIAN PASSPORTS  
CONFISCATED FROM OUR WORKERS IN LIBYA," LA PRESSE  
LEADS WITH "TUNISIAN PASSPORTS USED BY AUTHORS OF  
ATTACKS ARE FALSE." EMPHASIS ON ALL THREE ARTICLES  
IS THAT TUNISIAN CITIZENS TO WHOM THOSE DOCUMENTS  
WERE ISSUED ARE HERE IN TUNISIA AND EITHER HAD THEIR  
PASSPORTS CONFISCATED BY LIBYAN AUTHORITIES, OR IN  
ONE CASE, LOST A PASSPORT IN LIBYA.

8. PRO-GOVERNMENT, BUT INDEPENDENT PAPERS LE TEMPS  
AND ASSABAH FOCUS ON THE LIBYAN ANGLE IN THEIR  
FRONTPAGE TREATMENT OF ISSUE ASKING "WHY WERE THESE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 TUNIS 2013

DTG: 311536Z DEC 85 PSN: 017881

PASSPORTS KEPT? AND "WHAT USE WERE THEY DESTINED FOR?" THESE ARTICLES GO ON TO MAKE EXPLICIT A LIBYAN CONNECTION BEHIND THE ATTACK IN VIENNA. LE TEMPS ARTICLE CARRIES SUB HEADLINE: "THE PASSPORT NUMBERS HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO INTERPOL." ALL PAPERS MAKE EXPLICIT TUNISIAN AUTHORITIES DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH INTERNATIONAL POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES IN STOPPING TERRORISM. TUNISIAN PRESS AGENCY (TAP) IN THEIR REPORT CITED RESPONSE OF MR. FELLOUS TO A QUESTION POSED AT THE CONFERENCE IN THIS REGARD, NOTING THAT FELLOUS AFFIRMED THAT THE TUNISIAN SECURITY SERVICES HAD INFORMED INTERPOL PROMPTLY OF THE CONFISCATION AND/OR DISAPPEARANCE/LOSS OF THESE PASSPORTS "WELL IN ADVANCE OF THIS LAST OPERATION." (HE DID NOT SPECIFY A DATE, HOWEVER.) ALL ARTICLES ALLUDE TO FACT THAT THESE THREE PASSPORTS ARE NOT THE ONLY ONES IN LIBYAN HANDS (AFP CARRIED GOT FIGURES OF 32,000 EXPULSIONS SINCE AUGUST AND FELLOUS REPORTEDLY ALLUDED TO "HUNDREDS" OF UNACCOUNTED FOR TUNISIAN PASSPORTS AS A RESULT OF LIBYAN EXPULSIONS), AND BOTH TAP AND LE TEMPS REPORT CONTINUED EFFORTS BY TUNISIAN AUTHORITIES TO KEEP INTERPOL INFORMED OF MISSING TUNISIAN PASSPORTS. ASSABAH WENT AS FAR AS TO CRITICIZE INTERPOL FOR NOT DISSEMINATING THIS "PRECIOUS INFORMATION."

9. COMMENT: WE SENSE BOTH DEFENSIVENESS AND EMBARRASSMENT IN THE GOT OVER WHEN THE PASSPORT INFORMATION WAS ACTUALLY GIVEN TO INTERPOL. WE

UNDERSTAND IN FACT THAT IT WAS ONLY PASSED A WEEK AGO. ADDRESSEES WILL RECALL THAT THE INFORMATION WAS PROMISED TO US ON AUGUST 14 (STATE 252990, TUNIS 7343) AND IS ONLY NOW BEING PASSED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE LIST CONTAINS ABOUT 280 NAMES.

10. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOT HAS ACTED IN FORCEFUL FASHION IN ANNOUNCING THIS INFORMATION PUBLICLY, WHICH IS CERTAIN TO INFURIATE QADHAFI, AND WE BELIEVE THE ACTION IS DESERVING OF PRIVATE/PRIVATE EXPRESSIONS OF U. S. GRATIFICATION. PUBLIC STATEMENTS WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE WELCOMED BY A GOT STILL LEERY OF ITS U. S. CONNECTION IN THE EYES  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
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DE RUEHTU #2013/03 3651545  
O 311536Z DEC 85  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2917

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 8451  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4011  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8941  
AMEMBASSY ROME 2990  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0348  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

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TERREP

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, TS, LY  
SUBJECT: LIBYAN CONNECTION IN TUNISIAN PASSPORTS

OF ITS PUBLIC.

11. MEANWHILE, GIVEN THE RECURRING PROBLEM OF ABUSE OF NORTH AFRICAN TRAVEL DOCUMENTS BY TERRORISTS, WE WONDER WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF FUNDING THE REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING PASSPORTS FOR COUNTRIES SUCH AS TUNISIA AND MOROCCO AND, PERHAPS, ALGERIA. TUNISIA ALREADY HAS A GRADUAL REPLACEMENT PROGRAM UNDERWAY, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT COULD BE ACCELERATED WITH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.  
ANDERSON  
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| 100438    | REPORT<br>LIBYA                                     | 2                            | 12/31/1985      | B1<br>B3                        |

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## LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

Libyan leader Mu'ammur Qadhafi has used terrorism as one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy. The main targets have been expatriate Libyan dissidents and leading officials of moderate Arab and African governments. In addition, Tripoli has provided encouragement, funding, training, and arms to insurgents and dissidents from many countries whose government policies or leaders displease Qadhafi.

The level and types of Libyan terrorism as well as the mix between terrorism and other kinds of subversion have varied considerably over the years, but the goals it is designed to achieve have remained constant:

- to neutralize Qadhafi's domestic opponents abroad.
- to make Qadhafi a recognized leader of the Arab world.
- to make Libya the dominant state in North Africa.
- To establish Libyan political leadership in black Africa, eliminating the French position and influence there.
- to strike at Israel.
- to spread Qadhafi's vision of Islam as a weapon for the Third World in its struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

### Attacks Against Exiles

Regime exiles are Qadhafi's leading target. The Libyan Government in 1980 began a concerted effort to assassinate anti-Qadhafi exiles. By the time the first phase ended in 1981, 11 Libyan dissidents living abroad had been murdered. Since then, Qadhafi has alternated between urging the exiles to return home to Libya and ordering new liquidation campaigns against the dissidents among them.

Libya in 1985 sponsored five attacks against exiled Libyan dissidents. Qadhafi maintains a "hit list" of exiles and pursues these individuals whenever the opportunity presents itself. In almost all cases, the assassins use handguns to kill their victims. Qadhafi generally uses Libyans for antiexile operations; for other types of attacks he tends to employ surrogates or mercenaries.

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- 35
- Libyan exiles were attacked in five different European countries in 1985--Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy and Austria.
  - The Libyan exile community in Egypt has also been a frequent target, but Egyptian authorities have been effective in thwarting attacks. A four-man Libyan team was arrested in November during an attempted attack against a gathering of exiles near Cairo.
  - Libya also plotted antiexile attacks in the United States. In May 1985, a Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata and 16 nonofficial Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a US grand jury in connection with a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four different states.

#### Plots Against Moderate Arab Officials

Qadhafi also targets moderate Arab governments for their refusal to continue the military struggle against Israel and for their links to the West. Terrorism supplements military threats, vitriolic press attacks, the sponsoring of dissidents, and other types of subversion--interspersed with occasional periods of diplomatic courting.

There have been persistent rumors of assassination plots against such Arab leaders as President Mubarak of Egypt and former President Nimeiri of Sudan. In November 1984, Egyptian security forces arrested four Libyan-hired mercenaries for plotting to kill a prominent Libyan exile. The arrestees stated that Libya's target list for assassinations included President Mubarak as well as prominent Libyan exiles in Egypt.

Qadhafi's primary targets in 1985 were the governments of Egypt and Tunisia.

- Egypt during the year captured several teams of Libyan-supported Egyptian dissidents who reportedly planned to destabilize the government by sabotage and other disturbances.
- Tripoli expelled more than 30,000 Tunisian workers from Libya in August 1985, probably hoping to destabilize Tunisia's shaky economy. Soon thereafter, a Libyan diplomat used the diplomatic pouch to smuggle letter bombs addressed to Tunisian journalists into the country. After two postal workers were injured when several of these bombs exploded, Tunisia severed relations.



Support to Radical Palestinians

The recent attacks against the El Al Airline counters in Rome and Vienna have focused attention on the alarming links between Libya and radical Palestinians.

- Tunisian authorities announced that the passports used by the Abu Nidal terrorists in the El Al attacks were confiscated from Tunisians when Libya expelled Tunisian workers. The passport link is the first concrete evidence of operational support by Libya.
- Abu Nidal reportedly has bases in Libya.
- Libya reportedly provides financial support and training to several radical Palestinian groups.

Support for African Insurgents and Terrorists

Tripoli provides arms, training, and money to insurgents in the Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic and Zaire, and encourages them to conduct terrorist attacks. Qadhafi usually prefers to ensure plausible denial in acts of terrorism which Libya sponsors. The use of surrogates is one way in which he distances Libya from attacks; many of the surrogates belong to dissident groups whom Libya supports. Libya is particularly active in supporting these groups in sub-Saharan Africa.

- In February 1985, Chad complained to the UN that Libya had attempted to assassinate President Habre in September 1984. Photographs of the Libyan-made attache case bomb that was to be used in the attack were provided as evidence.
- Tripoli funds, trains, and arms Zairian dissidents and then sends them home on terrorist and subversive missions. Zairian officials claim to have thwarted a Libyan-sponsored plot against President Mobutu in September 1985.
- Libya has conducted extensive subversive activity in Sudan since the April 1985 coup that overthrew the Nimeiri regime. No terrorist incidents have occurred to date, but a terrorist network is in place and could be activated at any time.

Activities in Latin America and Asia

Qadhafi appears increasingly intent on extending his revolution to areas far removed from Libya. He has provided funding and arms to dissident groups in Asia and Latin America.

In the Caribbean, Libya hopes to gain political influence and undermine US and French interests. According to local press,

Tripoli offered dissident support on the condition that they perform acts of violence. According to Colombian authorities the M-19 in Colombia receives support--including money and arms--from Libya.

The Libyan effort in Asia and the Pacific is less substantial but growing. Most Libyan activity is subversive--the provision of funds and training to dissidents--but Tripoli occasionally offers support for specific events.

100440  
30

31 December 1985

Chronology of Libyan Troublemaking 1980-85

1985

|           |                |   |
|-----------|----------------|---|
| December  | Italy/Austria  | Passports used by Abu Nidal terrorists in attack on El Al counter provided by Libya.  |
| November  | Malta:         | Hijacking of Egyptair airliner by Abu Nidal supporters may have involved Libyan support.  |
| October   | Greece         | Libyan merchant wounded in Athens by two gunmen the victim had left Libya five years earlier.   |
| September | Tunisia        | Libyan diplomat smuggles about 100 letter bombs addressed to journalists into Tunisia. Several explode injuring two postal workers and causing Tunisia to sever diplomatic relations.   |
| May       | United States: | A Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata, and 16 non-official Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in connection with a plot to kill dissidents in several different states. |
| April     | West Germany:  | Moroccan citizen resident in the FRG since 1960 killed by Libyan, who was arrested at the scene.  |
|           | West Germany:  | Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student killed in Bonn by Libyan gunman who was arrested. The assassin also wounded two German passersby, one seriously. The victim had been a target of the Libyan regime for at least two years.                    |
|           | Cyprus:        | Libyan businessman assassinated in downtown Nicosia by an unidentified gunman. The victim was the director of an offshore holding company and was believed to be an opponent of the Libyan regime.  |
| March     | Italy:         | Libyan jeweler murdered in his shop in Rome. A silencer-equipped pistol was left at the scene by the assassin.  |
| February  | Austria:       | Former Libyan Ambassador to Austria severely wounded by two shots fired from a car outside his home in Vienna. The victim had supported Qadhafi's seizure of power in 1969, but he quit his post in disgust at the regime in 1980.        |

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BY RW NARA DATE 8/28/18

1984

November Egypt: President Mubarak announces that four assassins sent to Egypt by Libya to kill former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush had been arrested and forced to send fake pictures to the Libyan Embassy in Malta showing Bakoush apparently dead. Official Libyan press sources then claimed Bakoush had been executed by suicide squads sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the revolution."

September Italy: A Libyan exile was found gagged and strangled in a hotel in Rome. The victim had been the subject of Libyan requests for deportation to Libya.

Chad: Chadians discover plot to assassinate President Habre with an attache case bomb. Evidence of the plot, including photographs of the bomb, was provided to the United Nations the following February when Chad lodged a complaint against Libya.

August United Kingdom: One of six Libyans awaiting trial for bomb attacks in London in March, 1983 found shot to death in a London apartment. The victim may have been silenced by the Libyan government.

Belgium: A bomb wrecks a car parked in front of the Zairian Embassy in Brussels.

July Belgium: A bomb exploded in the Brussels office of Air Zaire.

Red Sea: Libya mined the Red Sea, damaging 18 merchant ships of varying nationalities.

Greece: Two Libyan students found murdered in their apartment in a crime reminiscent of Libyan killings of anti-Qadhafi students in 1980 and 1981. The two were beaten, strangled, and gagged before being shot twice in the back.

June Greece: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan editor of an Arab newspaper in Athens killed by two men on a motorbike.

Greece: A Libyan-born citizen known to distribute anti-Qadhafi literature at his store shot by a Libyan employee of Libyan Arab Airlines.

May Libya: Jana, the official Libyan news agency, announces "the Libyan masses have decided to form suicide commandos to chase traitors and stray dogs wherever they are and liquidate them physically."

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|-----------------|-----------------|--|
| April           | United Kingdom: | A bomb hidden in an unclaimed suitcase probably unloaded from a Libyan airliner explodes at London's Heathrow Airport, injuring 25.  |
|                 | Libya:          | A number of British subjects in Libya arrested on trumped-up charges as hostages in order to pressure British government during siege of Libyan People's Bureau in London.   |
|                 | United Kingdom: | British policewoman killed and 11 anti-Qadhafi demonstrators wounded by gunfire from London Libyan People's Bureau. After a siege, British authorities found weapons and spent shell casings in the vacated embassy. |
| March           | United Kingdom: | Four bombs explode in London and Manchester near homes of Libyan exiles or at businesses frequented by them. Over 25 people injured. Three other bombs defused. Nine Libyan suspects arrested.                       |
|                 | Sudan:          | One Libyan TU-22 bomber drops bombs on Omdurman, Sudan, site of a radio transmitter used by anti-Qadhafi oppositionists.   |
| February        | Libya:          | Following annual Libyan General People's Congress, the Libyan Revolutionary Committees announce that all Libyan exiles must return to Libya or face "the death penalty."   |
|                 | Libya:          | Libyan authorities take no action while a mob burned the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli.   |
|                 | Congo:          | Chadian dissidents ready to negotiate with Government of Chad threatened in Brazzaville, Congo.  |
| <br><u>1983</u> |                 |  |
| August          | Upper Volta:    | Libya gave material support to coup in Upper Volta.  |
| July            | Chad:           | Libya invaded Chad for the second time. Occupation continues into 1985.  |
| June            | West Germany:   | Eight Libyan students in West Germany, all members of an anti-Qadhafi group, complain Libyan agents are harassing and threatening them.  |
| February        | Libya:          | Libyan General People's Congress warn all Libyans in exile to return home or face the "anger of the Libyan people."  |

1982

No incidents known.

1981

- November Sudan: Several bombs explode near government installations in Khartoum.
- October Sudan: Planned assassination of visiting Chadian official, Hussein Habre, failed when those sent to conduct the operation surrendered.
- Egypt: Two bombs explode in luggage being unloaded from a plane coming from Libya via Malta.
- August Libya: Two Libyan SU-22s that fired at US Navy F-14s over Gulf of Sidra shot down.
- July United States: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student killed Ogden, Utah.
- June Sudan: Bomb explodes in front of Chadian Embassy in Khartoum.
- February Italy: Libyan gunmen open fire on passengers arriving at Rome's airport on a flight from Algiers. Prominent anti-Qadhafi exile was the target.

1980

- November United Kingdom: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student brutally murdered in London.
- United Kingdom: Two children of an anti-Qadhafi Libyan poisoned by eating peanuts containing thalium.
- October Chad: Libyan forces occupied Chad. Qadhafi attempted to force a Libya-Chad union.
- Gambia: Libyan subversion in Gambia caused break in relations. Senegalese troops intervene under a mutual defense treaty.
- June Italy: Anti-Qadhafi exile wounded in Rome.
- Italy: Libyan exile killed in Milan within hours after expiration of a deadline set by Qadhafi for all Libyan exiles to return home.
- May Italy: Libyan exile shot at in Rome. The arrested Libyan gunman says he was sent by Libya "to kill an enemy of the people."

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Greece: Libyan exile killed in Athens. His throat was slit.

Italy: Libyan businessman found strangled to death in Rome.

West Germany: Libyan exile gunned down in Bonn.

Italy: Libyan exile killed in Rome by two gunshots to the head.

April United Kingdom: Libyan lawyer shot and killed in London.

Italy: Well known Libyan businessman killed. The arrested assassin said he was an enemy of Colonel Qadhafi.

United Kingdom: Two gunmen kill an anti-Qadhafi Libyan journalist.

February Libya: Tunisian and French Embassies in Tripoli sacked and burned by a mob while Libyan authorities took no action.

Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of AggressionCharacter of Libyan Policy

Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, a zealot with messianic pretensions, seized power in a military coup in 1969. Since then he has forcibly sought to remake Libyan society according to his own eccentric revolutionary precepts. In 1979 Qadhafi declared Libya a "state of the masses," ostensibly a direct democracy governed by local committees but in reality a brutal police state enforced by young radicals loyal to Qadhafi. At the apex of power in Libya is Qadhafi, although he disingenuously claims not to be a head of state, preferring instead the title "Leader of the Revolution."

Qadhafi's ambitions are not confined within Libya's borders, however. He fancies himself a leader and agent of historic forces that will reorder Third World politics. His vision provides both a motive and a rationale for providing military and financial aid to radical regimes, and for undermining moderate governments by supporting--or manufacturing--subversive groups and on occasion abetting terrorists.

Qadhafi's aggressive policies increasingly have focused on undermining US and other Western interests in the Third World as he sees these as the main barrier to his radical and expansionist goals. Qadhafi's commitment of political, economic, and military resources in support of anti-Western activities worldwide is surpassed only by the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and possibly North Korea or Cuba. He is particularly hostile to Israel and the US. His tactics include a mixture of threats and support for terrorism, offers of cooperation, economic incentives and intimidation, and outright military aggression.

Radicalism in the Arab World

Qadhafi's foremost ambition is to dominate and unite the Arab World. He frequently compares himself to Garibaldi or Bismarck and has justified his use of violence against moderate Arab regimes as necessary to achieve Arab unity.

Egypt, because of its peace treaty with Israel, is a special target. Libyan agents have been active in Egypt since the 1970s, and Qadhafi has offered support to various opponents of the Egyptian government. In October 1981, immediately after President Sadat was assassinated, Qadhafi called on Egyptians to overthrow their government; within a week at Cairo International Airport two bombs concealed in luggage unloaded from a flight originating in Tripoli exploded.

More recently Qadhafi has sought to embarrass the government of President Mubarak and undermine the Egyptian economy. A Libyan ship captained by a senior Libyan naval commando is believed to have laid mines in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez that



damaged 18 merchant ships in July and August 1984. In May 1985 the Egyptians thwarted what they believed was a plot by radical Palestinians backed by Libya to destroy the US Embassy in Cairo with a truck bomb. Last summer Qadhafi expelled over 10,000 Egyptian workers in Libya--confiscating their savings and most of their belongings--in what was in part an effort to place a greater burden on the strained Egyptian economy. Qadhafi has at least twice tried to murder Libyan exiles in Egypt only to have his agents intercepted by Egyptian security.

Sudan also is a priority target. Qadhafi has long offered training and support to Sudanese dissidents and sponsored acts of sabotage against the government of former President Nimeiri. He was a major source of arms and money for southern Sudanese rebels that began a guerrilla war against the central government two years ago. In February 1983 the Sudanese, with Egyptian assistance, thwarted a Libyan-sponsored coup attempt, and in April 1984 a Libyan TU-22 bombed Omdurman, Sudan in a failed attempt to destroy a radio station there that broadcast Sudanese condemnations of Qadhafi's policies.

Since Nimeiri's fall from power Qadhafi has exploited the resumption of diplomatic ties with Sudan to build a network for subversion inimical to Sudan's efforts to establish a parliamentary democracy. A number of known Libyan terrorists have been assigned to the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) or airline office in Khartoum. Qadhafi also has provided arms, funding, training and probably direction to the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, a small group in Sudan dedicated to establishing a government on the Libyan model in Sudan. In May a planeload of these dissidents arrived in Khartoum armed with assault rifles.

Qadhafi also is working to expand his influence in the countries of the Arab Maghreb. Qadhafi refuses to negotiate with Algeria to determine the correct location of the Libyan-Algerian border, which he disdains as a colonial creation. Perhaps angered over President Bendjedid's moderation, Qadhafi reportedly provides money to Algerian dissidents such as Ahmed Ben Bella.

In Tunisia, Qadhafi has long sought to bring down the pro-Western government of Habib Bourguiba. In 1980 Libyan-supported guerrillas attacked the southern Tunisian mining town of Gafsa; when Tunisia braced for conflict with Libya and France offered its support to Tunis, Libyan mobs burned the French and Tunisian embassies while security forces stood idly by. Following bread riots in Tunisia in January 1984 saboteurs originating in Libya dynamited a pipeline near the Libyan-Tunisian border. In an effort to exacerbate social tensions, this past year, Qadhafi expelled over 30,000 Tunisian workers and confiscated their property. In September, when Tunisian newspapers attacked Qadhafi for the expulsions, a Libyan diplomat attempted to mail letter bombs to the critical journalists, but most were fortunately intercepted by Tunisian authorities.

Libya is staunchly opposed to the Middle East peace process and is doing all he can to subvert it. In Lebanon, Libyan arms and money flowed to different militias and Palestinian groups actively opposed to the government of President Gemayel. Qadhafi has been especially eager to undermine the influence of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat because Qadhafi perceives him as too willing to consider a negotiated settlement with Israel. As a result Qadhafi has thrown his support to radical Palestinian groups--including the Fatah Revolutionary Council led by Abu Nidal--that advocate continued war against Israel. Since 1981 Qadhafi has shipped these groups items as prosaic as uniforms and as powerful as tanks and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. In 1984 Libyan troops participated in the Syrian-backed assault on Arafat's forces in northern Lebanon.

The Persian Gulf also is an arena for Libyan meddling. Qadhafi has allied himself with Iran in its war against Iraq, and has provided Tehran with T-55 tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, ammunition, and even SCUD rockets. In addition Libya provides arms and money to Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq and to the antigovernment group the "Union of Iraqi Democrats." In 1984 and 1985, Libyan agents attempted to disrupt the Islamic pilgrimages ceremonies in Saudi Arabia; in 1984 entire planeloads of Libyan "pilgrims" were discovered to be carrying arms. Libya continues to enjoy good relations with and has provided support to the National Democratic Front that operates out of Marxist South Yemen against the government of President Salih in North Yemen. Although Libya restored diplomatic relations with Somalia last May, there is no evidence that Qadhafi has severed his relationship with Somali opposition groups he has long supported.

#### Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa

Tripoli views Black Africa as a principal arena for forging a group of non-aligned, radical states that will strengthen Libyan influence in international fora and confer upon Qadhafi status as a world leader. Qadhafi's aggressiveness probably has been strengthened by the failure of the international community to prevent his often blatant disregard for the sovereignty of small African nations.

Chad, of course, is the most egregious example. In 1973 Qadhafi forcibly annexed the northern portion of Chad known as the Aozou Strip. Throughout the 1970s Libya supported various tribal and guerrilla groups in Chad in a bid to install a pliable regime in N'Djamena. Having failed to achieve this indirectly, in October 1980 the Libyan army invaded Chad and attempted to impose a union between the two countries. The Libyan occupation force withdrew in November 1981, but returned in 1983 when the pro-Libyan Chadian leader Goukouni Oueddei was ousted by current President Hissene Habre. Only intervention by French and Zairean armed forces confined the Libyan occupation to the northern half of Chad. French forces were withdrawn in the fall of 1984, but Qadhafi reneged on an agreement reached with President Mitterrand and continues to occupy northern Chad with his army.

The drought-battered countries of the Sahel offer Qadhafi many opportunities for meddling. Qadhafi continues to provide arms and training to the nomadic Tuareg tribesmen in an effort to undermine the governments of Mali and Niger. In 1983 Libyan support was instrumental in bringing Thomas Sankara to power in Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), a country Qadhafi now refers to as the "second state of the masses."

Qadhafi also is determined to topple President Mobutu of Zaire. Qadhafi is motivated by hostility to Kinshasa's close ties to the West, its recognition of Israel, and its support for Chadian President Habre. Qadhafi also is aware of Zaire's role as a leading producer of cobalt and other strategic minerals. Tripoli provides training in sabotage and small arms to several different guerrilla groups including the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo and the Congolese National Movement. Libyan diplomatic facilities in countries bordering Zaire are centers of support for these groups.

#### Meddling in Central America and the Caribbean

Qadhafi's determination to strike at US interests and to spread his philosophy of revolution have led to a more aggressive Libyan posture in Latin America. Although many governments and groups in this region are wary of Qadhafi, there are some willing to accept his financial and military support.

Tripoli views Nicaragua as its main base in Central America and accordingly seeks to strengthen the Sandinista dictatorship in Managua. In addition to several hundred million dollars in economic assistance, Qadhafi has provided the Sandinistas with light strike aircraft, helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and launchers, and small arms. At least several dozen Libyan military personnel are in Nicaragua. Libyan support has indirectly enhanced the Sandinistas' ability to subvert neighboring states. In addition, Libya periodically provides arms and money to insurgents in Guatemala, El Salvador, as well as the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia.

Libyan agents have been increasingly active among the Caribbean islands, especially since the summer of 1984. The loss of its People's Bureau in Grenada following the collapse of the Bishop government in 1983 forced Tripoli to establish its centers for subversion in other diplomatic posts in the region. Qadhafi also has used religion as a cover for intelligence activities in the area, sponsoring Islamic conferences in which the Libyan participants often are intelligence officers or operatives of the Libyan Revolutionary Committees. Leftist leaders from the Dominican Republic, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and elsewhere have also been invited to Libya for "seminars" and paramilitary training. Particularly worrisome is the Libyan penchant for urging leftist politicians to undertake violent action rather than pursue legal means to replace moderate governments in the region.

South and Southeast Asia

As elsewhere, Libyan diplomatic missions in this region provide the infrastructure for Libyan subversion, disbursing funds and arranging for the training of leftists and other dissidents.

In South Asia, Libyan activities are focussed on the Islamic states. No doubt reflecting his dependence on Russian arms Qadhafi is one of the few Muslim leaders who does not criticize the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although Libya maintains relations with Pakistan, it has also been involved with the "al-Zulfiqar" terrorist group. Qadhafi in addition has provided training and money to opponents of President Ershad of Bangladesh.

In Southeast Asia, Qadhafi concentrates on Muslim minorities. For some time he has provided paramilitary training to the small Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand. In the Philippines, Libyan assistance continues to reach the Muslim Moro separatists on Mindanao despite a 1976 agreement with Manila to cease such aid. New Caledonia, a French possession in the South Pacific, has no appreciable Muslim population, but Libya has nevertheless provided military training and some funding to the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, the group responsible for most of the pro-independence violence on the island. Libyan intelligence operatives are known to be active on other islands in Oceania.

The Erosion of International Norms

Qadhafi's subversion is not confined to those countries that are the direct object of his ambitions. The international community as a whole suffers from Qadhafi's disrespect for international norms of behavior and accepted practice. Qadhafi has abused diplomatic privilege for terrorist purposes, reneged on international agreements, and blatantly used violence against opponents. In addition, Qadhafi's moral support of terrorism, regardless of his direct operational involvement in a given terrorist act, helps legitimize terrorism as an acceptable political activity. Over time, the Libyan example may encourage other states or groups to engage in similar irresponsible behavior.

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