Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: North, Oliver: Files
Folder Title: Responses to Issue Papers (6)
Box: 38

To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing

National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB

6/8/2005

File Folder

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (6 OF 9)

FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number 38

WILLS

ID Dog Type	Decument Description	No. of	62 D = - D = 1	D () ()
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions
13910 PAPER	COMMENTS ON ISSUES 6, 7, 10, 11, 24, 34, 38, 39	1	ND	B1
	R 8/22/2008 F99-008/2			
13911 FORM	COVER SHEET	1	ND	B1 B3
	R 7/12/2006 F99-008/2			
13912 MEMO	CHARLES ALLEN TO JAMES HOLLOWAY,	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3
	RE: ISSUE PAPERS			
	PAR 3/24/2008 F99-008/2			
13913 PAPER	COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPERS	5	ND	B1 B3
	PAR 3/24/2008 F99-008/2			
	DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDA	NCE WI	ΤΗ E.O. 132	33
13914 MEMO	CHARLES ALLEN TO JAMES HOLLOWAY,	1	11/6/1985	B1 B3
	RE: ISSUE PAPERS			
	D 7/12/2006 F99-008/2			
13915 PAPER	ISSUE #39-45	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Hostage Family Liaison

Domestic Public Awareness

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this measure. Similar efforts should also be made to sensitize the public to the threat of domestic terrorism.

Voluntary Restraint on Publicity During a Terrorist Incident

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this proposal and believes that the media must be persuaded to police itself and set its own policies for self-imposed discipline. The White House should serve as a catalyst to focus media attention on these issues. In this regard, it is suggested that the President convene a panel of distinguished journalists for the purpose of creating a code of conduct, but that no effort be made by the Government to negotiate a system of voluntary restraint. We do not believe that White House negotiation would be acceptable to the media.

Murder of U.S. Citizen Outside of United States

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction to encompass acts of terrorism which result in the murder of or serious assaults on United States citizens overseas. We are presently working closely with the State Department and members of Congress to refine S. 1429 in order to address our concerns in this area. It should be noted that the recent murder in El Salvador of four Marines did violate United States federal criminal laws, as the Marines were internationally protected persons. However, it was not a federal crime to kill the two other American civilians who died in the incident.

Deployment of Counterterrorist Forces

Current Policy Regarding the Operational Security of JSOC/DELTA

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this concept so long as the Public Affairs strategy does not compromise tactical abilities or sensitive techniques and methods. The FBI has used a similar strategy with regard to its Hostage Rescue Team, and it is thought that there has been some deterrent effect.

Prohibition of Training and Support/ Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice agrees that there should be a review to determine whether present federal laws are adequate in this area. Further, we are presently involved in efforts to develop a memorandum of understanding between our Department and the Departments of State and Treasury concerning the enforcement of the new ITAR regulations.

<u>Congressional Oversight</u> of Counterterrorist Operations

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this proposal. We suggest that one of the threshold issues which should be addressed by the working group is whether the War Powers Resolution and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment were intended to apply to terrorist acts.

Expanded HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Against Terrorism

Paramilitary Terrorist Response Capability

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice suggests that the legal ramifications of this proposal be carefully examined and that any legal restrictions which may be applicable to the development of a paramilitary capability be addressed.

Multilateral Counterterrorist (CT) Strike Force

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice defers primary comment on this proposal to the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI notes that if a multilateral CT strike force could be created, it would have to be through multinational organizations such as NATO, SEATO, or the U.N. which have the ability to support operational forces. The FBI notes that organizations such as INTERPOL or the TREVI Group collect and exchange information only and do not have operational capability.

This issue paper is classified Top Secret and was not disseminated to the Criminal Division.

Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement Elements Domestically and Overseas

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice agrees that we must increase our liaison capabilities and relationships with the foreign law enforcement community as part of our efforts to effectively combat international terrorism. In our judgment, these efforts should be managed by the FBI which has responsibility for the investigation of the federal crimes committed by international terrorists. We believe that the FBI's system of Legal Attaches is capable of effecting the liaison necessary to obtain terrorist-related law enforcement intelligence needed by all United States agencies. Enhancement of this existing capability is the best answer to increasing the flow of intelligence. Any effort by intelligence agencies such as the CIA to cultivate relationships with foreign law enforcement officials could well work to the detriment of the entire community in that it could undercut the FBI's activities in this regard. The FBI's experience has been that law enforcement officials the world over are more comfortable cooperating with law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. support the proposal, however, to the extent that it recognizes the need for sensitizing the intelligence community to law enforcement concerns.

Rewards

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice strongly supports the appropriate and effective use of rewards as a tool in combatting both international and domestic terrorism. We have supported and participated in the announcement of rewards under the State Department's authority in connection with the murder of United States Marines and other United States citizens in El Salvador as well as the hijackings of the Kuwaiti Airliner which resulted in the death of two AID officials and TWA 847 which resulted in the death of a Navy seaman. With respect to the offering of rewards in connection with acts of domestic terrorism under the authority of the Attorney General, the FBI is in the process of budgeting \$500,000 for use in the domestic terrorist rewards program.

International Informant Incentives

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports the concept of informant incentives. We question whether further legislation is necessary but will review the matter more closely with the Department of State and the CIA.

Terrorism as a Crime

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice regards acts of terrorism as criminal acts. It regards terrorists who commit acts of violence as criminals. We believe that present statutes encompassing specific violent crimes committed in the United States, as well as abroad, enable us to effectively prosecute most acts of terrorism. Where statutory gaps may exist, we intend to seek corrective legislation which addresses specific crimes.

We oppose efforts to make terrorism <u>per se</u> a crime. Such legislation would, in our judgment, present serious definitional, constitutional, practical, and federal-state problems, to mention just a few. Prosecutions under such a statute would also provide a terrorist with a ready-made forum to publicize his cause, since proof of motivation would necessarily be an element of such an offense.

Death Penalty for Hostage Taking

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice strongly supports efforts to provide for the death penalty when anyone is murdered during a hostage taking over which the United States has criminal jurisdiction. We would not limit the applicability of the death penalty to the death of United States citizens only. Moreover, the enactment of a death penalty for hostage taking should not adversely impact on the extradition of terrorists from countries opposed to the death penalty since the United States can waive the right to seek the death penalty when we seek extradition of defendants from those countries.

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice agrees that the issue of access to information by non-United States citizens pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act should be reviewed. It should be recognized that a legislative effort to restrict access to information under the Freedom of Information Act will be extremely controversial and that a clear showing of need for such legislation will be necessary for the effort to be successful.

Terrorism Intelligence Analysts

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this proposal. The FBI, in fact, has already created this career path within the FBI.

Parchalogical Operations to Combat Terroriem

Controlling Cross-Border Travel of Known or Suspected Terrorists

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this proposal. It should be recognized that these goals may be very difficult to achieve. For example, the relative ease in obtaining false identification and the use of aliases, as well as the ease of surreptitious entry, makes this effort extremely difficult. This matter will require more intensive review by the INS. The Department of State should work closely with the INS and the FBI in this international effort.

Review of Provisions of Vienna Convention

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice defers to the State Department.

Preventing Flyaway of Hijacked Aircraft

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this proposal. It should be noted, however, that the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has authority and responsibilities concerning these proposed activities when the aircraft is in flight pursuant to 49 U.S.C. App. 1357(e). When the aircraft is on the ground, this authority and responsibility rests with the Attorney General (FBI). Decisions concerning these matters should not be vested solely in the pilot of the aircraft. This proposal relates to extremely difficult and potentially dangerous decisions and guidelines should be worked out carefully by the FAA, FBI and the air transport industry.

Country Team Briefings

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this proposal. The Department must, of course, be included and participate in the briefings in view of the increasing extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over acts of international terrorism.

U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports such a study. The FBI is currently conducting cooperative vulnerability studies with the Department of Defense, Department of Energy and others. While we agree that this type of study has value, and agree that FEMA could have a role, the Department of Justice does not agree that FEMA should take the lead role in this effort.

Interference with the Movement of Nuclear Material

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice has recently met with representatives of the Department of Energy and the FBI to discuss the dimensions of this problem. The Department of Energy will submit specific legislative recommendations in the near future at which time we will review them and consider whatever legislation may be necessary.

Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice supports this proposal. S. 274 has passed the Senate in a form which was supported by the Department of Justice. We note that currently the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission do have access to FBI criminal and identification files through the executive agency name check process.

Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism

This Issue Paper is classified Top Secret and was not disseminated to the Criminal Division.

Legal System for Terrorism

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice questions the appropriateness as well as the need for governmental support of this private sector iniative.

Deployment Policy for JSOC

Justice Comment: The Department of Justice defers to the Departments of State and Defense as well as the National Security Council and the CIA for comment on this proposal.

U.S. Presence Abroad

International Research, Development, and Acquisition (RD&A) Initiatives

Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States





Office of Assistant Secretary

400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

NOV 4 1985

To:

Admiral J. L. Holloway, III

Executive Director

Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Subject: Review of Issue Papers

Thank you for the opportunity to review the Task Force's set of 45 issue papers. Attached are the substantive comments which you requested on eight issues. Our comments have been coordinated with the Federal Aviation Administration, which is the primary locus of technical capability on this subject in our Department.

I look forward to the discussion of these issues at the November 7 Senior Review Group Meeting.

Matthew W. Scocozza

Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs

Attachment

OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) ALIG 6/3/05

Declassified upon removal of attachment.

This	document	consists	of _		leaves
with	>	enclos	ures.		0
Сору		e 11	nijenerata 9.	Series	

Control # 85-5-582-1

SPINA

reaction to threats.

- 7. DOT should be listed as a cognizant activity. In cooperation with State, we have drafted a model security clause for aviation bilaterals. A delegation from the Transportation and State Departments recently completed visits to four of our European allies and found a general consensus in favor of inclusion of such a clause in bilateral aviation agreements.
- 10. DOT/FAA should be listed as a cognizant activity. We believe it imperative that hijacking exercises be conducted periodically on the foreign and domestic scene. The FAA/FBI as well as the U.S. military in some instances have a continuing domestic program for such exercises.
- 11. Although DOT/FAA relies heavily on CIA for foreign intelligence, there is often the need to coordinate with State and one or more defense elements to assure complete coverage. The all-source center could overcome this problem to some degree and is considered an excellent idea.
- 24. DOT/FAA should be listed as a cognizant activity. In almost all instances, law enforcement agencies provide for civil aviation security at foreign airports. This tie has been strengthened through civil aviation security training courses and an active role in the International Criminal Policy Organization.
- 34. It is highly unlikely that states would adhere to an international treaty dealing with the topic of preventing a hijacked aircraft from departing.

As to the option, FAA and the industry have developed tactical measures related to this issue. Predominant in such decisions, however, is the authority of the pilot in command. Unless there is a clear and absolute threat to lives aboard the aircraft, most authorities will defer to the wishes of the pilot to takeoff.

- 38. There is an equally compelling argument for aviation organizations (airline and airport authorities) to have access to FBI criminal history files. This could assist in better controls over who had access to sensitive airport areas and to airport airside. (See attached House Report 99-299, page 11, paragraph V, Recommendations Item #3.)
- 39. DOT/FAA should be included as a cognizant activity in this issue. FAA has a leadership role in the United States in explosive detection R&D as well as X-ray and weapon detectors.

NLRR F99-008/24/39

SECCET

Derivatively classified by Matt Scocozza, P-1, November 4, 1985 based on Adm. Holloway's Memo of Oct. 15, 1985 Declassify: OADR

TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

Date of Receipt	1	No	V 85	Router's Initials
Remarks:				•
	TO A	+	All and the second	
	"中心,更加"的经验的研究,对于"发现"的发现。			
Holloway	Α	_I_	has cope	• .
Peck	_A	_ <u>I</u> _	Ras seen	
Coy	_A	I	has seen	
Boink	<u>,</u> V	Ī		
Cole	Λ	(I)	Col	
Daly	Α	1	Day	
	_A	(I)	Kearl	
Hutchings	Λ	1		
McMunn	Α	1		
Doris	Λ	I	- file	
	A	I	V	
	A	I		
	A.	I		
•				
Deadline Date				·
Incoming Chrono File				
Data Base Keyword(s)				
r		·		Out
Subject Working File				

UNCLASSIFIED when blank - TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document - Automatically downgraded or declassified when filled in form is detached from the controlled document.

CIA	T.S. C ONTROL N	UMBER	CIA CO	PY NUMBER		DOCUME	NT DATE	DATE RE	CEIVED	
							VI DAIL	DATERE	CEIVED	
	DI-TS 3530					30 0	ctober			
NO. PAGES	NO. OF ATTA	CHMENTS (CIA T.	S. # of Attach	ment)	BRANCH,	BADGE #, 0	OR LOCATION	1	LOGGED BY	1
6					XXXX	ikx Er	ce on Terr	rorism		
SUBJECT:	Papers							/		
15546		CO INTERPLIATION			,					
		RCE INFORMATION	<u>N</u>			<u>E)</u>	TERNAL SOURCE		N	
DIRECTORATE		OFFICE/BRANCH	,		AGENCY		ORIGINA		Jac	
DDI			O/CT		AGENCI		CONTROL NUME	ER	CO	PY NC
outside of CI matter. Top custody in the	IA. Access to Top Secret Control One left-hand colum	officers who received	limited to To	ed to the doc p Secret Co lease the att	ntrol person	such time of	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh	led, destroyed nose official d	l, or transmitt uties relate to	ed the
outside of CI matter. Top	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who received	limited to To	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	ed the of n the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	cument until ntrol person cached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to	ed the of n the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	ed the of n the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	ed the of n the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	ed the of n the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	ed the of n the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	the of the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	ed the of n the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	the of the
outside of CI matter. Top custody in th right-hand co	Secret Within IT JA. Access to Top Secret Control O le left-hand colum olumns.	Secret matter is Officers who receivens provided. Each	limited to To ve and/or rel ch individual v	ed to the doc p Secret Coolease the att who sees the	ntrol person ached Top S Top Secret	such time onel and the Secret mat document	as it is downgrad ose individuals wh erial will sign this will sign and indi	led, destroyed nose official d form and ind cate the date SEEN BY	l, or transmitt uties relate to icate period o of handling ir	the of the

When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and forwarded to the Agency Top Secret Control Office.

DESTROYED	DISPATCHED (Outside CIA)		
BY (Signature)	ТО		
WITNESSED BY (Signature)	BY (Signature)		
DIRECTORATE & AREA OFFICE	DIRECTORATE & AREA OFFICE		
DATE	DATE		
	BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) DIRECTORATE & AREA OFFICE		

NLS ± 99-008/2 = 139,

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (3)

National Intelligence Council

30 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral James L. Holloway III (Ret.)

Executive Director, Vice President's Task Force on Combatting

Terrorism

FROM:

Charles E. Allen

National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

SUBJECT:

Issue Papers

- 1. Thank you for your memo of 15 October forwarding the issue papers formulated by the Working Group. Comments on each of the issues are attached.
- 2. Due to time constraints, I have not been able to garner the views of intelligence elements outside the Office of the DCI and the CIA. I am endeavoring to do so, however, and may wish to add to or modify the attached to reflect those views in subsequent iterations.
- 3. I believe these papers offer a useful survey of problems confronting the counterterrorism community. We may, however, wish to narrow and consolidate them to a more select set of recommendations on which the Task If the Task Force establishes a national Force can focus its energies. counterterrorism coordinator, provides him a well articulated national doctrine on counterterrorism, and equips him with an appropriate national counterterrorism resource program, I believe it will have assured significant improvement in our national counterterrorism posture. Many of the remaining issues could be properly referred to the National Coordinator for action, with whatever guidance the Task Force chose to convey.



Attachment

NARA, Date



POIA(b)(|)

FOIA(b) (3)

#1 National Program for Combatting Terrorism

#2 National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

#3 Organization for Combatting Terrorism

NES F99-008/2#13913 NARA, Date 3/24/08

Reda	cted	-Red	acted	Reda	cted	Reda	cted-
Redacted	Redac	ted	Rea	acted	Red	acied	R
Reda			~				
Redacted	Redac	ted	Red	ected	Red	acied	R
Reda	cied-	-Red	ected	Reda	cted	Reda	cted—
Redacted-	Redac	ted	Red	acted	Red	acied	R
Reda	cted	–Reda	acted	Reda	cied	Reda	cted
Redacted	Redac	ted	Red	 acted	Redi	acted	R
	acted	Rea	lacted	Reda	acted	Reda	 acied-
Redacted-	Redac	ted-i	Redi	acted	Reda	acted	Re
Reda	acted	Red	acied	Reda	acted	Reda	 acted
Redacted	Redact	ed	Reda	acted	Reda	acted	Re
Reda	acted	-Red	acted	Reda	 acted	Reda	cted—
Redacted	Redact	ed	Reda	cied	Reda	cted	Re
Reda	cied	-Red	ected	Reda	cted	Reda	cted
Redacted	Redact	ed	Reda	cted	Reda	cted	Re
Reda	cted	–Reda	acted	Rede	cied	Reda	cted—
Redacted	Redacti	ed	Reda	cied	Reda	cied	Re
Reda							
Redacted	Redacie	ed	Reda	cied	Reda	cted	Red
Reda	cted	-Reda	cted	Reda	cied	Redac	ted
Redacied	Redacie	ed	Reda	cted	Reda	cied	Rec
Redad	cied	-Reda	cted	Redad	cted	Redac	ted
Redacted	Redacte	d	Redad	cied	Redad	cted	Rec
Redac	cted	-Reda	cied	Redac	ied	Redac	ted
Redacted	Redacte	ď	Redac	ted	Redac	:ted	—Rec
Redac	ted-	-Reda	cted	Redac	ted	—Redaci	ted
edacied	—Redacte	d	Redac	ted	Redac	ted	—Rec
Redac							
edacted							
Redaci							
edacted							
Redact	ed	Redac	ted	Redact	e <i>d-</i>	-Redacte	∍d—
edacted	Redacted	·	Redact	ed	-Redact	e <i>d</i>	-Rec



#4 Definition of Terrorism

#5 Public Statements During Terrorist Incidents

#6 Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents

- #7 International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism
- #8 Extradition Treaties
- #9 Response Options
- #10 Counterterrorism Exercises, Simulations
- #11 Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism

								Redacted
								dacted
								Redacted
								dacied
								Redaciec
								iacied
Reda	rcted	Reda	cted	Reda	acted	Red	acted	Redacted
								dacted
Red	acted	Reda	cted	Rea	lacied	Red	acted	Redacted
1								 lacted
1								Redacted
4								 /acted
								Redacted
cted	Redi	acted	Reda	ected	Redi	acied	Red	acted
								Redacted
								Redacted
								 acied
								Redacted
								acted
								Redacted
								Redacted
								Redacted
								Redacted cied
								cīed
								Redacted cted
								Redacted
								cted
								Redacted
								cted
								Redacted
	·							ted
<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>								—Redacted
								ted
-Redac	ted	Redact	ed	Redac	ted	-Redac	ted	Redacted



-Redacted--

-Redacted---

--Redacted----

-Redacted-

-Redacted-

-Redac

-Redacted-

-Redacted-

		Recacted	Reda	ected	Redac	ed	Redac	cted	Redac
		Redac	cted	Redac	cted	–Redact	ed	Redac	:ted
		Redacted	Reda	ected	Redac	ted	Reda	 cied	Redec
#12	Hostage Family Liaison	Redac	cied	Redac	sted	–Redaci	ied	Redac	ted
#13	Domestic Public Awareness	Redacted——	Reda	ected	Redac	ted	Reda	cied	Redac
		Reda	cted	Redad	cted	-Redaci	ted	Redac	zied
#14	Voluntary Restraint on Publicit During Terrorist Incidents	Redacted	Redi	acted	Redac	ted	Reda	cted	Redac
		Reda	cted	Reda	cted	Redad	cted	Reda	cied
	1	Redacted	Red	acted	Redac	ted	Reda	cted	Redac
		Reda	ected	Reda	cted	Redad	cted	Reda	cted
#15	Murder of US Citizens Outside	Redacted	Red	acted	Redac	ted	Reda	cied	Redac
	of U.S.	Reda	acted	Reda	cted	Redad	cied	Reda	cted
#16	Deployment of Counterterrorist	Redacted	Red	acted	Redac	ied	Reda	cted	Redaci
<i>11</i> 10	Forces	Reda	acied	Reda	cted	Redad	cted	Reda	cted
		Redacted	Red	acted	Redac	ted	Reda	cted	Redaci
		Reda	acted	Reda	cted	Redad	cied	Reda	cied
		Redacted	Red	acted	Redac	ied	Reda	cied	Redaci
#17	Current Policy re the OPSEC of JSOC DELTA	Reda	ected	Reda	cied	—Redad	cied	Reda	cied
	USUC DEETA	Redacted	Red	acted	Redac	ied	Reda	cied	Redaci
		Reda	ected	Reda	cted	Redad	cied	Reda	cted
		Redacted-	Reda	acted	Redac	ied	Reda	cied	Redaci
		Reda	acted	Reda	cied	Redac	cted	Reda	cted
		Redacted-	Redi	acted	Redac	ied	Reda	cted	Redac
									cted
		Redacted-							
		Reda		.,					
#18	Prohibition of Training and	Redacted——	Reda	acted	Redac	ted	Reda	cted	Redac
	Support/Counterterrorism/ Mercenary Training Camps								
		Redacted							
#19	Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorist Operations	Reda							
	counterterrorist operations	Redacted——							
		Reda							
#20	Expanded HUMINT Capability	Redacted							
	Against Terrorism	Reda	cted	Reda	cted	Redac	ted	Redac	cted



Redacted-

#21 Paramilitary Terrorist Response Capability

#22 Multilateral CT Strike Force

#23 US Army Humint Program

#24 Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement Elements Domestically and Overseas

otod	D- 1					7100		Redacte
								dacted
								Redacte
:ted	Red	acted	Red	ected	Red	dected	Reo	lacied
Redac	ited	Redac	cted	Reda	ected	Red	acted	Redecied
								acted
-Redac	cted	Redac	ied	Reda	acted	Red	acted	Redacied
ied	Red	acied	Redi	acted	Rea	dacted	Red	acted
—Reda	cted	Reda	cied	Rea	acied	Red	dacted	Redacie
								acted
								Redacte
1								acted
								Redacted
								acted
								Redacted
			-					acted
								Redacied
								acted
								Redacted
								cted
						-		Redacted
								cted
								Redacted
								cied
								Redacted
								cted
								Redacted
ed	Reda	cted	-Redad	cted	Reda	cted	Redac	cted
—Redaci	ted	Redact	ed	Reda	cted	Reda	cted	Redacted
ed	—Redad	cted	-Redac	ted	Reda	cted	Redac	ted
Redact	ed	Redact	ed	Reda	cted	Reda	cted	Redacted
ed	-Redac	ted	–Redac	ted	Redac	cted	Redac	ted
–Redact	ed	Redacti	ed	Redad	ted	Redad	cted	—Redacted
ed	Redac	ted	-Redac	ted	Redac	ted	Redact	ted
	ed							

#25 Rewards

#26 International Informant Incentives

#27 Terrorism as a Crime

#28 Death Penalty for Hostage Taking

#29 FOIA Modifications

#30 Terrorism Intel Analysts

#31 PSYOPS to Combat Terrorism

- #32 Controlling Cross-Border
 Travel
- #33 Review of Provisions of Vienna Convention
- #34 Preventing Flyaway of Hijacked Aircraft
- #35 Country Team Briefings
- #36 Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
- #37 Interference with the Movement of Nuclear Material

Redacted	Redacti	ed	Redac	ted	Reda	cted	Redact
Redac	ied	-Redact	ed	Redac	ted	Redac	ted
Redacied	Redact	ed	Redad	oted	Reda	cted	Redact
Redac	ted	–Redact	ed	Redac	ted	Reda	cted
Redacied——	Redact	ted	Reda	cted	Reda	cted	Redac
Redac	ted	–Redaci	ied'	Redac	cted	Reda	cied
Redacted	Redac	ted	Reda	cted	Reda	 acied	Redac
Reda							
Redacied	Redac	ted	Reda	cted	Red	acted	Redac
Reda	cted	Reda	cted	Reda	cted	Reda	ected
Redacted	Redac	:ted	Reda	cted	Red	acted	Redac
Reda	acted	Reda	cted	Reda	ected——	Red	acted
Redacted——	Redac	 cted	Reda	acted	Red	acted	Redad
Reda	acied——	Reda	cted	Reda	acted	Red	acted
Redacted	Reda	cied	Reda	ected	Rea	acted	Reda
Reda	ected	Reda	cted	Red	acied	Red	acted
Redacted	Reda	cied	Redi	acied	Red	lacted	Reda
Redi	acted	Reda	cted	Red	acied	Red	acted
Redacted——	Reda	cted	Red	acied	Rec	iecied	Reda
Red	acied	Reda	acted	Red	acted	Rea	ected
Redacted——	Reda	cted	Red	acted	Red	iacted	Reda
Red	acied	Reda	cied	Red	acted-	Red	acted
Redacted-	Reda	cted	Red	acted	Red	dacted-	Reda
Red	acted	Reda	cted	Rea	lacted	Red	lacted
Redacted-							
Red	acted	Reda	acted	Red	lacted	Red	dacted
Redacted							
Rec	lacted	Reda	acted	Red	lacted	Red	dacted
Redacted-	Reda	cted	Red	lacted	Red	dacted	Reda

TOP SECRET

CLASSIFIED

SPECIAL ACCESS COVER SHEET

ACCESS ONLY TO THOSE ON THE SPECIAL ACCESS ROSTER FOR PROGRAM TOP SECRET

CALL MAJ STEVEN M PAYNE, X000E, EX 77580

TO VERIFY ACCESS/SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIREMENTS

NOT FOR USE ON SCI MATERIAL

CLASSIFIED

(Cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents

TOP SECRET

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

Withdrawer

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

DLB 6/8/2005

File Folder

FOIA

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (6 OF 9)

F99-008/2

WILLS

Box Number

38

62

ID Document Type

Document Description

No of Doc Date

Restric-

pages tions

13914 MEMO

1 11/6/1985 B1

CHARLES ALLEN TO JAMES HOLLOWAY, RE: ISSUE PAPERS

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer NORTH, OLIVER: FILES DLB 6/8/2005 File Folder **FOIA** RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (6 OF 9) F99-008/2 WILLS Box Number 38 62 IDDocument Type No of Doc Date Restric-**Document Description** pages tions 13915 PAPER 3 ND **B**1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

ISSUE #39-45

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.