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Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

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DLB 6/2/2005

File Folder CONSULTATION/MEETING RECORDS, R-Z

FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number 32

WILLS

41

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
12764	REPORT	RE: DOE R 9/8/2006 F99-008/2	1	ND	B1
12765	REPORT	DUPLICATE OF #12732	1	ND	B1
12767	REPORT	RE: WESLEY RICE	1	ND	B1
12768	REPORT	RE: TERRORISM R 9/8/2006 F99-008/2	1	ND	B1
12769	REPORT	DUPLICATE OF #12574	2	ND	B1
12771	REPORT	DUPLICATE OF #12752, AUSTRALIAN COUNTERTERRORISM D 3/5/2007 F99-008/2	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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
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CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:

R + D *

2. Working Staff Action Officer:

McMUNN

3. Time/Place of interview:

8/27 - CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS / ALEXANDRIA VA.

4. Participants:

McMUNN

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):

PHD - SPECIALIZES IN DPS RESEARCH / C3
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN VIET NAM AND KOREA

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: Government faces a moral dilemma w/ taking
protective measures - minimize innocent victims
Kinetic energy of conventional delivery systems results in
mass destruction (eg. HARPOON mod = 8" shell even w/o warhead)

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in
combatting terrorism?

Develop munitions tailored to terrorist scenarios
- some with pyrotechnics (eg. propane gas) explosives.

C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness
in combatting terrorism:

- Look at options that need not be effective against
Warrior Post - cheap / simple / deliverable
- need R & D to focus on Terrorism.

* NAME HELD CONFIDENTIAL AT HIS REQUEST

Record, Jeffrey Dr.
Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, Inc.

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:
Dr. Jeffrey Record, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
463-7942

2. Working Staff Action Officer: Capt. Lou Boink, USN

3. Time/Place of interview:
1600, 25 Sept. 85, 730 Jackson Place

4. Participants:
Admiral Holloway, Ambassador Peck, Capt. McMunn, Capt. Boink,
LTC Earl, Mr. Hutchings, LCDR Coy

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s): Writer

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: The Government cannot afford a great disparity between state policy and the actual response. If grossly different, this disparity causes loss of Presidential credibility and effects his overall ability to lead. Also, our CT forces were not ready in Iran and they aren't ready now (as witnessed in Grenada).

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism? We need to address a key philosophical question which is, "Do we risk hostages' lives in attempting a response?" Record's position is that while lives are important, so is the greater good which will come out of our willingness to attempt a direct response, whether the risk is worth it, is open for debate.

C. What is being done that could be improved upon? If you don't have a viable military surgical option, you must have others in your back pocket. Must demonstrate in clear way that we will use violence discretely, discriminately, slectively.

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism: If our policy recognizes that the lives of hostages are more important than the principles upon which the country is built, and the leadership/country becomes preoccupied with it, then the terrorist has won! More and more hostages and incidents will occur--forever!!

Renwick, Lisbeth E.
DOE (Defense Programs)
Sci & Tech Intelligence

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:
Renwick, Lisbeth E.
Forsythe, Larry A.
fnu lnu

2. Working Staff Action Officer:
Burt Hutchings

3. Time/Place of interview:
Tuesday, 10 September 1985, 1330-1500, Amb. Peck's office

4. Participants:
Adm. Holloway, Amb. Peck, and all WG members

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):
Mr. Forsythe is the focal point for operations of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) at the Department of Energy HQs. Ms. Renwick is in the Office of Scientific and Technical Intelligence at DOE (Defense Programs) and is a primary point of liaison with Intelligence Community counterterrorism offices.

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: Briefing on DOE's role in counterterrorism. Nuclear terrorism is highly unlikely. Terrorists seeking mass destruction/impact more likely to use biological or chemical attacks.

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism? More sensitization of collectors, analysts, in intelligence community on potential nuclear terrorism, and what to do (who to contact) to quickly check out the validity of a nuclear terroroist threat. Do war games at decision maker level. DOE never gained at NSC level.

C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

The operators in the intelligence community are aware of the DOE role, but the analysts are not usually given access to the courses that DOE runs.

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

Define who's in charge. Increase exchanges in intelligence and operations community.

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Rice, Wesley H.
MGEN, USMC
Dir, Joint Special Ops Agency
OTCS

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12767	REPORT RE: WESLEY RICE	1	ND	B1

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S

Shibley^H Dr. James
Los Alamos Nat'l Lab
Chief of Advanced
Weapons Tech Div

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:
Dr. James Shipley, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Chief of Advanced Weapons Technology Division

2. Working Staff Action Officer:
Capt. Lou Boink, USN

3. Time/Place of interview:
9:30 a.m., 24 September 1985

4. Participants:
Ambassador Peck, Col. Cole, Capt. McMunn, LtCol Earl, Mr. Hutchings, LCDR Coy, Capt. Boink

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):
Extensive background in research and development of various weapons detection technologies.

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: A big hole exists in the perceived threat from biological and chemical terrorism. These present a far more likely threat than nuclear. The technical support working group established by the IG/T has four subgroups, one being the chemical and biological incident response subgroup headed by the Center for Disease Control (CDC).

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism? There has been no formalized technology exchange or interaction with foreign counterparts for combatting terrorism--there needs to be!

C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

CT RD&A budget needs amount to about \$29M for the various labs. OMB has not funded any of this (person unknown). What is needed is an executive agent through which interagency funds can be funnelled.

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

Because of the reluctance on the part of the CDC to actively pursue the chemical/biological threat, we are very vulnerable in this area. CDC needs to have a fire lit under them on this issue.

Shultz, Richard Prof.
Fletcher School of Int'l
Diplomacy, Tufts Univ.

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:
Professor Richard Shultz, Fletcher School of International
Diplomacy, Tufts University
2. Working Staff Action Officer:
Capt. L. H. Boink, USN
3. Time/Place of interview: 1330, 26 September 1985
4. Participants: Capt Dave McMunn, USN, and Lt Col Bob Earl, USMC
5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s): Lecturer, writer, and
recognized authority on "protracted warfare" (i.e., low intensity
conflict).
6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: Evidence obtained through defector debrief (12) and a host of captured documents leads to the undeniable conclusion that there is an international infrastructure or network connecting the Soviet Union with "most" terrorist groups and incidents. While not all incidents are Soviet directed or supported, he strongly believes there are a lot more than most authorities believe!

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism? We are making a big mistake in not recognizing the realities of protracted warfare against our interests, of which terrorism is a major part (other parts being insurgency and subversion). By uncovering evidence to support the infrastructure position, you create a lever which could be used against terrorists (e.g., isolation through sanctions, diplomacy with neighbors, etc.).

C. What is being done that could be improved upon? We need to begin thinking more offensively such as pre-emption. To do so however, we need much more/better intelligence. Penetration of these organizations is vitally important and must be done as a long-term investment. CIA needs to change its approach in the human intelligence area and increase this capability. Regarding terrorism in the U.S., Prof. Shultz speculated that we have not seen much here because Noone wants to galvanize U.S. opinion against terrorism. D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism: Protracted warfare must be managed better. It is recommended that an organization at the NSC level be formed to "study the issue and make recommendations to enhance interagency coordination. Upon being asked, Prof. Shultz concurred that an organization with both authority and responsibility would be preferred to a "study" organization.

Sick, Gary Dr.
Dord Foundation

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:

Dr. Gary Sick, Ford Foundation, (212) 222-9614 (home)
(212) 573-5000 (work)

2. Working Staff Action Officer:

Dave McMunn

3. Time/Place of interview:

1000, 30 Sept 1985, 730 Jackson Place

4. Participants:

Amb. Peck, Lou Boink, Pat Daly, Burt Hutchings, Dave Cole,
Dave McMunn, Bob Earl

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):

PH.D. in Mid-East studies - NFB, Former NSC Staff (Carter Administration), Extensive experience in Mid-East, ISA - USN Captain (Retired)

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: (1) Most of the impact of a terrorist action on US as a society is a self-inflicted wound. It has little effect on our actions (e.g., has not changed our dealing with Soviets or with Third World).

(2) Most hostage situations are domestic vice international crises. Media thrives on "human interest" aspect. Third World as a whole has about 60% of population under 21. This is unprecedented. Anticipate resultant political/social turmoil - endemic instability - increase in terrorist

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in /attacks on U.S. combatting terrorism?

(1) Lower public expectations that terrorism can be stamped ^{out}. Drop "war" rhetoric. Tough unrealistic talk is politically expedient in short term but bad in long term.

(2) Retaliate when you can (i.e., know how/how/when, etc.). Kill culprits but be conscious of threat to our own moral values as you embark on that course.

C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

(1) Keep terrorism in perspective. Don't overblow the impact in decision-making, rhetoric or with media.

(2) Try to distance the President from the event but recognize he will be drawn in. Develop a mechanism to give him some space and a person (a self-sacrificing type without future ambitions) to lead the CT effort and play the role of lightning rod for the President.

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

Get US public expectations in line with reality.

Distance the President from the future.

Retaliate selectively/flexibly.

Stapleton, Chuck
FBI Liaison Ofcr to
the Task Force

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12769	REPORT DUPLICATE OF #12574	2	ND	B1

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Stautberg, Susan
Dir Public Affairs
Touche Ross & Co.

10 Sept 85

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:
*Ms. Susan S. Stautberg, Director of Public Affairs
Touche Ross & Co*
2. Working Staff Action Officer:
Bob Earl
3. Time/Place of interview:
3 pm 10 September 1985
4. Participants:
Earl & Daley & Paula Dolbriansky (NSC staffer on USSR/E. Europe)
5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):
former White House fellow, MA in international affairs, journalist
6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.
 - A. Main theme: *If the Task Force is interested, Susan can set up a seminar in New York -- either on the record or background -- with older CEOs, investment bankers, and media. Such a seminar could help both our publicity as well as our information gathering.*
 - B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?
Susan will follow up with a letter proposal to Pat Daley.
 - C. What is being done that could be improved upon?
 - D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

Steiner, Richard
INTERPOL - U.S. Nat'l
Center Bureau

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:
Mr. Richard Steiner, INTERPOL-U.S. National Center Bureau
2. Working Staff Action Officer: Capt. Lou Boink
3. Time/Place of interview: 1030-1230, 11 Sept 85
4. Participants:
Admiral Holloway, LDCR Coy, LTC Earl, Mr. Hutchings, Capt Boink
5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s): Unknown

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: The National Center Bureau, Washington (and INTERPOL in general) is not in the intelligence analysis business. There is a strong "turfism" battle going on in Europe, therefore, not much exchange of information between the police and intelligence communities.

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?

C. What is being done that could be improved upon? What should be done by participating nations is they to make an honest search of their intelligence files and then turn over (to INTERPOL) information of a "police nature" that does not impact on respective national securities. Exchanges such as this cannot now occur because of the barriers now in place between police and law enforcement communities.

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

With respect to creation of an office for combatting terrorism management, suggest it be organized as a task force. Such an arrangement is useful to cut through the turfism/compartmentalization problem the U.S. is currently experiencing.

Stewart, Bernie
Stanford Research Inst.

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:
Dr. Roger Barnett and Mr. Bernie Stewart, Stanford Research Institute
2. Working Staff Action Officer:
Capt. Lou Boink, USN
3. Time/Place of interview:
1500, 25 September 1985, 730 Jackson Place
4. Participants:
Amb. Peck, Capt McMunn, LtCol Earl, Mr. Hutchings, Capt. Boink,
LCDR Coy
5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: The U.S. infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to low-level attack. Power grids, computerized banking networks and communications links are especially vulnerable. The Government considers this to be a commercial problem; and vice versa. State-sponsored terrorism is of particular concern because the support, manpower, and (possibly) resolve is there to seriously effect the country.

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?

The Government, in concert with industry, should begin a program of awareness and training. We need to publicize the vulnerabilities and begin corrective action.

C. What is being done that could be improved upon? Security upgrades in the physical sense and redundancies should be included where possible.

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

This issue needs to be elevated to one which takes on national security ramifications. Unfortunately, Noone feels threatened and therefore, little is being done to harden facilities and design redundancies into new systems.

TELFER, Mr. Harry
Australian Protective
Services Coordination
Center

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12771 REPORT

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AUSTRALIAN COUNTERTERRORISM

Duplicate of #12752

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Vaurio, Dave
MSA White House Fellows

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:
Dave Vaurio/WSA White House Fellows/688-7165
Kare Hitcho

2. Working Staff Action Officer: McMunn

3. Time/Place of interview: 8/15/85; 730 Jackson Place, NW.
Washington, D.C. 20500

4. Participants: Ambassador Peck/McMunn/Cole/Earl/Daly/Hutchings

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s): Did 2-year study on intelligence architecture WRT terrorism/Ollie North wants to use them

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.
 - A. Main theme: Terrorism transcends agencies. NSDD 138 calls for coordination/proactive policy. Neither is being done. Understanding of terrorism is shallow, no Government policy; intelligence community and law enforcement community uncoordinated.

 - B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?
Develop a policy and understand "the enemy." "Lead agency" approach does not work. Replace it and support with data base/architecture that does work

 - C. What is being done that could be improved upon?
Need permanent "IGT" to develop and implement a "master plan."

 - D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:
 1. Expand National Center for Analysis of Violent Crimes (NCAVC) at Quantico to interface with intelligence community and local police.

 2. Artificial intelligence/data base connectivity.

WOLSEY, R. James
Ctr for Strategic Studies

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:

R. JAMES WOOLSEY / Center for Strategic and International Studies / 828-2000

2. Working Staff Action Officer:

Dave McMunn

3. Time/Place of interview:

6 SEP - 1030 - 1215 / JACKSON PL.

4. Participants: ADM HOLLOWAY / BIRDAK / COLE / DARY / EARL / HUTCHINGS / COY / MCMUNN

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):

FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF NAVY / MEMBER SCOWCROFT COMMISSION / CHAIRMAN OF PANEL ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT (CO-AUTOR - AMERICA'S HIDDEN VULNERABILITIES).

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: ① US has had it easy so far from Terrorists who did not attack and property - but threats against highly vulnerable infrastructure targets - power grids, water supply, bank centers - interdependent nodes on which our society depends

② Weapons can be tailored to meet certain terrorist targets (eg. RPA's to deliver specific warheads or explosives that would minimize "innocent casualties".

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?

① Use Task Force report to stimulate necessary fixes (eg. stockpiles, data base redundancy, physical security enhancements).

② need to establish NSC/White House/FEMA level Terrorism Response Staff (probably as FERC) with 2 to 4 "top guys" to apply pressure to small groups

C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

① Focus R & D on Terrorism to develop range of weapons that give President a menu of options to deal with terrorists

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

① Introduce high leverage quick fixes to reduce vulnerability of our infrastructure then go to long term (eg. tax incentives, building codes) incentives

② Decision led to recommendation that this Task Force develop "criteria" for President to take active measures/preemptive for case by case resolution.

