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File Folder CONSULTATION/MEETING RECORDS, N-Q

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
12755	REPORT	DUPLICATE OF #12574	2	ND	B1
12756	REPORT	RE: ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM D 3/5/2007 F99-008/2	1	ND	B1
12757	REPORT	HANDWRITTEN RE: ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM D 3/5/2007 F99-008/2	3	ND	B3
12758	REPORT	RE: OLIVER NORTH	1	ND	B1
12759	REPORT	RE: LTC DICK NORTON	1	ND	B1
12760	REPORT	RE: GEN. ODOM R 3/15/2007 F99-008/2	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Collection: North, Oliver: Files

OA/Box: Box 32

File Folder: Consultation/Meeting Records, N-Q

Archivist: loj

FOIA ID: F99-008/2 Wills

Date: 3/13/2007

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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12760. report

Interview with LT GEN Odom on 8/15/85, 1p

ND

open 2/24/10
KMW

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Noesner, Gary
FBI

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Naval Inst. Seminar

28 August 1985

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:

US Naval Institute Seminar: *Terrorism and the Military Professional*

2. Working Staff Action Officer:

Earl & McMunn

3. Time/Place of interview:

1500-1800 · 27 August Ft. McNair

4. Participants:

Ambassador Bruce Lainger, Dr. Steve Sloan (Maxwell AFB), LCDR Derrer (clinical psychologist), Cdr Jerry Agee (NIS), LtCol Mauer, USAC (HQMC)

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):

Lainger - US charge in Iran hostage crisis. Sloan is FBI consultant on psychology of terrorists. Sloan develops simulation of terror incidents for training potential victims and rescuers. Agee runs Navy's anti terror alert center. Mauer coordinates USMC program to combat terror.

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: *Panel discussion & Q&A on personal security awareness of military personnel overseas.*

Consciously excluded as a topic was national policy and programs (e.g. how, when to retaliate), however, Amb Lainger felt it was important that the government keep its people and the US citizenry aware of our foreign policy and why we do what we do. Also to develop program to deal with hostages training and do reach out to hostages families.

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?

Dr. Derrer suggested some extreme measures of personal protection: when travelling overseas, sanitize all personal belongings of military identifiers (eg. service academy class rings); grow a beard, look scruffy; ship military articles separately, etc. Most of panel said we must raise the level of awareness in military / govt. employees that "it can happen to me."

C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

Code of Conduct modifications? Some panel members spoke as if these already exist.

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

Audience questions focused on the media; other terrorism was really a "new" phenomenon (as alleged by Dr. Sloan); why the Soviet Union was not a target of terrorism, etc. Most speaker emphasized need for training and awareness. Audience emphasized need for unconventional response to the unconventional threat (i.e. PRO-ACTIVE approach)

Manner - ~~Army~~ - from recruits to general -
form of combat → ops office - formal working groups at the
physical security - was poor, no standard - more PMP's ↑ device
word - Army on Port Security

? how to maintain the lean edge of our

↓ for under - new form of soap opera - pay more attention to history the
book can be used.

is U.S. doing anything to dispel the idea that we are the last in combat

U.S. culture is vulnerable to T acts - Soviet system is not
thanks - more volume works against Soviet but
not sign Germany

need unconventional response to this unconventional threat
need to develop doctrine to counter T.

reaction to 241 USMC KIA in Beirut let's T a threat to military

take 10 yrs to get pro active

TERRORISM and the MILITARY PROFESSIONAL



U.S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, Maryland 21402
(301) 268-6110

Time: 1500
Date: 27 August 1985
Place: Dwight D. Eisenhower Hall, Ft. McNair,
Washington, DC

SCHEDULE

1500-1600 Panel Discussion

Ambassador Bruce Laingen

Ambassador Laingen was the top ranking embassy official held hostage with 60 other Americans in Iran for 444 days during the Carter Administration. He will present his thoughts on what the individual can do to protect himself from terrorist acts.

LCDR Douglas S. Derrer, USN

LCDR Derrer is a clinical psychologist who has had extensive experience as a consultant to the FBI Academy on training exercises in terrorism and hostage survival. He will touch on many of the points that he made in his article titled "Terrorism" in the May *Naval Review*, and elaborate on how the individual can be better defended against terrorist attacks from a psychological standpoint.

Dr. Stephen Sloan

Dr. Sloan is currently the Senior Research Fellow at the Air University at Maxwell AFB. He has developed and conducted several simulations of terrorist attacks as a method for training potential victims. He will discuss his experience in this field and present his ideas on the best way for military professionals to be defended against terrorism.

CDR Jerry Agee, USN

CDR Agee is currently assigned to the Naval Investigative Service as a terrorism specialist. He will deliver an unclassified discussion of how the problem of increased terrorist assault on naval personnel and bases is being addressed by the Navy.

LTCOL Roger Mauer, USMC

LTCOL Mauer will discuss the important projects he has been working on as the Coordinator of the Marine Corps Program to Combat Terrorism.

1600-1715 Open Question and Answer Period

You are invited to pose your questions to the panelists on stage. James A. Barber, the Executive Director of the Naval Institute, will be moderating from the stage.

NOTE: Microphones are available in front of every other seat. In order to ask a question, once you have been recognized from the stage, push in the button on the side of the microphone, then speak clearly into the microphone. Release the button when you have finished asking your question.

1715-1800 Reception

Join us at the Fort McNair Officers' Club to meet the seminar panelists, fellow USNI members, and USNI staff. Refreshments will be served free of charge. You will need your name badge in order to be admitted into the reception.

A transcript of the seminar will be available for \$5.00. Write to:

Terrorism Transcript, *Proceedings*
U.S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, MD 21402

Notes

Laingen - T growth industry - no expert - physical protection -

govt. own security corp physical protection it can provide

(Derrin panel) - will change the way diplomacy is conducted

1. think "lean" - few as possible it will - close some ports
2. harder on defenses - but can be trained
3. train people for "outside" the international forum

as hostages - to cope - "be yourself" - all you can be - you can't
avoid something entirely new

→ avoid becoming passive victims - keep a "back it" attitude

- confidence in yourself - on religious - sense of humor - hold personal dignity
- keep cool, control anger - patience - keep fit - keep away from impact on others - confidence in country / service

* govt must keep its people aware of our country's policy - why / what we do

FAMILY FACTOR - knowledge should not, OK - get used / part of daily life
→ react to family (not part of problem interaction)

Derrer - Why Staudenheiser killed - US sailor / fundamentalist
to intimidate others /
US sailor / fundamentalist
to intimidate others /
to intimidate others /
to intimidate others /

more than a crime fit is an act of war - guilt by location
- needs to plan on "possible motives" as we did
HARVESTING public in WWII

Sloan - more than a crime fit is an act of war - guilt by location
- method of awareness that it can happen to me - lip service - things it is
real + understood war - family as a unit should get training

Ⓐ get change to Code of Conduct for Terror
need Army Service - for POW experienced

Agee - terror acts planned more frequently than human DOD (eg, Beach on My Army)
people are recognizing it as a real threat
directed at us - on facilities, political system, values, ourselves

Long report - intel defense - 140 - coll. - analysis

W/lot of changes

May - 24 ATAC - Phys Security -

Ⓐ get Sec Def guidelines from Harvard

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
ANTI-TERRORISM

AWARENESS/PROTECTIVE MEASURES



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This pamphlet was prepared by the Naval Investigative Service to inform and caution Naval personnel and their dependents regarding terrorism and measures to enhance personal security and minimize the terrorist threat. You and your dependents are encouraged to review it at your leisure and discuss all pertinent aspects. If you have any questions, please contact your local Naval Investigative Service Resident Agency.



DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (Security)

Introduction

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. Basically, the problem has been one of perspective. One man's freedom fighter is often another man's terrorist. Americans have tended to view terrorism in a somewhat distant and detached manner. However, with the U.S. Embassy in Tehran being overrun, General Dozier being kidnapped by the Red Brigades, the U.S. Embassy and the Marine Compound in Beirut being destroyed by terrorist car bombs, the American perspective of terrorism was thrust into reality. Incidents throughout Central and South America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East attest to the impact of terrorism upon those who serve our government overseas.

The terrorist threat may be directed at you individually, at work, home or while on liberty, against your command or persons with whom you associate. Statistically, the threat will probably manifest itself in the form of a bombing device, ignited with a delayed fuse, although kidnapping attempts and stand-off attacks are a demonstrated possibility.

An integral part and principle indicator of most terrorist activity is **surveillance of the terrorist's target** by the terrorist or his support echelon. No terrorist activity is rushed into and great effort is expended by the terrorist to closely examine and study his target. The greatest aid to the terrorist is a predictable target with a definite routine and pattern. **The greatest deterrent to the terrorist is an alert, observant target without any established routine.**

- Children and the household staff should be instructed to report suspicious people or incidents to you. Children should also be instructed in how to use the telephone. Emergency telephone numbers should be posted on the telephone.
- Develop strict key control. Upon arrival at a residence, install new cylinders in the locks. Maintain an inventory control log of all keys.

Hostage Survival

If you become a hostage due to a successful kidnapping, there are several points of which you should be aware. **DO NOT** be a hero. The first hour is the most dangerous for you; it is also the most confusing time for both you and the hostage taker. Anxiety is at its peak and we do not want the hostage taker to commit unintentional violence towards you. Remember, this kidnapping operation was probably meticulously planned and rehearsed.

Communicate with your captors. The establishment of rapport makes it increasingly difficult for your captors to direct physical violence towards you. Rather than the rhetoric the terrorist has been reading/espousing, the rapport allows the terrorist to see you as a person.

Stay fit. It is important for the hostage to keep the body and mind active. You can accomplish this by isometric exercise, an active imagination or other physical activity such as reading, etc. Ask your captors for some reading material, tooth brush, and paper and pencil. Deliberately slow your daily activities to extend them far beyond their normal duration. Be as mentally and physically active as the situation will allow.

Be alert and optimistic. Take comfort in the knowledge that great effort is being made to neutralize and resolve the incident. However, plan now for your family's course of action if you were to be kidnapped. Financial arrangements and insurance/survivor assistance should be thoroughly discussed with your spouse. You should also consider under what circumstances your family should return to the United States. Arrangements and decisions of this nature are best made in advance when all parties can be present, matters can be thoroughly researched and emotions are not taxed with the reality of a terrorist incident.

General Precautions

Be alert for strange or suspicious vehicles parked in your neighborhood or on your station. It may be a car, a van, a truck or any other type of vehicle which is not normally seen in that area.

Be alert for individuals sitting in vehicles parked in your neighborhood when there is no apparent reason for them to be sitting or waiting there.

Be alert for unidentified persons loitering or "hanging-around." They may be asking questions about you, your neighbors or your ship or station. This could be an indicator of pre-incident surveillance and could very well be followed by an attack or terrorist incident.

Be alert for persons photographing you, your neighbors or your ship or station. Again, this could be a sign or indicator of surveillance.

Be alert for unexpected visits. This could be indicative of surveillance and also a method to gain entry to your residence. Ask for identification and then call for confirmation. **DO NOT BE AFRAID TO DENY ENTRY TO UNEXPECTED VISITORS. NOTIFY AUTHORITIES ASAP.**

Be alert for telephone inquiries which include excessive wrong numbers, surveys or callers asking personal or other questions about your normal routine or that of your neighbors.

Report any out of the ordinary events to the authorities. **IF YOU THINK THE EVENT OR OCCURRENCE IS SUSPICIOUS. . .REPORT IT TO THE AUTHORITIES.**

Terrorism knows no boundaries. You or your command could become a target in the United States, overseas, while at work, at home, on liberty, in port and even at sea. The following are some general precautions to be followed by everyone.

Suggestions

- A well designed and professionally managed apartment is usually more secure than a single/detached unit.
- Select a residence with alternative routes for arrival and departure. Avoid dead end streets.
- Locate and identify other U.S. military personnel in the area.
- Meet your neighbors and involve them in your mutual security.
- The best all around preventive/detection alarm system for fires and burglary is a dog.
- Check doors, windows, locks, lights, and structural hardware for good working order.
- Install heavy deadbolt locks (1" throw) in key points of ingress (exterior doors, garage doors, safe-haven door).
- Keep vehicle in good working condition with plenty of fuel.
- If on a trip, neighbors and local authorities should be notified. Arrange for pick-up of mail, newspaper, etc.
- Have a knowledgeable official conduct a thorough residential security survey.

Transportation Security

Recent history has shown that the majority of terrorist attacks for the purpose of assassination or kidnapping have taken place while the target was in a travel status. The following are some recommended travel precautions to improve your personal security:

- Before entering your vehicle, always examine it for any sign of tampering or for any unexplained objects. Do not handle suspicious objects.
- Vehicles should be common to the locale, well maintained and equipped. Lock your car doors, keep windows closed and fasten your seat belts. During non-use, vehicles should be locked and garaged. Decals, base stickers or special license plates, etc., should not be used. Such items readily identify the vehicle as belonging to a U.S. military member. If vehicle passes or decals must be used, they should not be affixed to the vehicle but rather retained within the vehicle where they can be kept out of sight when not in use.
- Routes should be varied and arrival/departure times not routinely maintained or published. Select well-traveled streets and be constantly alert for any indication of surveillance or interdiction.
- Safe-havens such as police, hospital or government facilities can provide some degree of protection in case of trouble. Know where they are located. If a surveillance is noted, proceed to a safe-haven immediately and contact police. **DO NOT DRIVE HOME IF UNDER SURVEILLANCE.**
- Whenever possible, travel should be in civilian clothes, especially if you are without a trained driver or security detail.

Residential Security

Residential security is a consideration of utmost importance which is often neglected. Besides the basic house structure, one should consider access routes, police/fire protection and the neighborhood in general.

Once quarters are selected, exterior lighting, doors and door hardware (locks, hinges, etc.) and overall ground security should be developed and refined to provide in-depth security. No protective device gives total and complete protection; however, used collectively a system of barriers or protective devices will provide time to allow alerted forces to respond adequately to a given crisis at the quarters. If we cannot halt an intruder, barriers and/or protective devices may at least channel his approach in a manner more compatible with our desires, hopefully providing the time delay necessary for defensive action.

Each residence should have a room or area identified as the "Safe-Haven." This safe-haven should be in the most defensible part of the home, usually located in the bedroom area. Reinforced with substantial physical security enhancements and emergency communications, the safe-haven is the epitome of residential/family security in a terrorist attack.

It is to your advantage to view your residence from a criminal/terrorist point of view. Where there are weak access points, correct them by installing security doors and windows with good security equipment. The effectiveness of a good residential security program ultimately depends on how well the family practices good security habits. Your residence is only as secure as it is at the weakest point. If you are uncertain of any point, improve it. The extra dollars it may cost to make your residence secure will be well spent.

Another equally important aspect of residential security deals with the security of your dependents. The following are recommended precautions for dependents:

- Dependents should be aware of the overall contents of this pamphlet.
- Dependents should be aware that in the event of an intruder into their residence they are not to confront or attempt to apprehend the intruder. They should proceed to a safe-haven and notify appropriate authorities.
- Dependents are encouraged to become acquainted with their neighbors.
- Persons seeking entry to your quarters should be fully identified and the reason for their visit should be verified. Terrorists have posed as maintenance personnel for unscheduled "inspection" or "checks" of the residence.

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- Meet your neighbors and involve them in your mutual security.
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- Install heavy deadbolt locks (1" throw) in key points of ingress (exterior doors, garage doors, safe-haven door).
- Keep vehicle in good working condition with plenty of fuel.
- If on a trip, neighbors and local authorities should be notified. Arrange for pick-up of mail, newspaper, etc.
- Have a knowledgeable official conduct a thorough residential security survey.

Available NIS Support

Upon request, the Naval Investigative Service has the capability to provide the following support in consideration of the terrorist threat:

1. Terrorist briefings/lectures
2. Advice and guidance on terrorist related incidents and crisis management
3. Threat assessments for specific commands, areas, events and persons
4. Protective Service Operations for select individuals upon confirmation of a legitimate threat. (Note: Requires express approval of the Director, Naval Investigative Service)
5. Investigation of suspected/actual terrorist incidents



Distribution:
SNDL Parts I and II

Stocked:
CO, NAVPUBFORMCEN
5801 Tabor Ave.
Philadelphia, PA 19120

Nir, Amiran,
Spec Advisor to PM of
Israel (contact thru
Amb Oakley at State)

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12756	REPORT RE: ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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12757	REPORT HANDWRITTEN RE: ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM	3	ND	B1

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North, Oliver, LCOL
NSC Staff

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INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN
INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION
DOD 5200.1-R AS SUPPLEMENTED BY COMPONENT
REGULATIONS

THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFOR-
MATION CONTAINED IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S)
COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE SERIOUS
DAMAGE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION
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12758	REPORT	1	ND	B1
	RE: OLIVER NORTH			

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Norton, Dick LTC
Professor at US Military
Academy

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12759	REPORT	1	ND	B1
	RE: LTC DICK NORTON			

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Oakley, Robert B.
Dir, Ofc for Combatting
Terrorism & Emergency
Planning - Dept of State

23 Aug

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:

ROBERT B. OAKLEY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR ^{COMBATTING} COUNTER TERRORISM & EMERGENCY PLANNING (M/CTP)
DEPT. OF STATE • 632-9892

2. Working Staff Action Officer:

AMB. PECK

3. Time/Place of interview:

1630 HOURS 19 AUG 85

TASK FORCE HQs

4. Participants:

ADM

AMB

WORKING GP

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):

HIGHLY QUALIFIED

EX AMB. ZAIRE, SOMALIA

NSC STAFF

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main theme: • LEAD AGENCY CONCEPT DOES NOT WORK - FRUSTRATING ARRANGEMENT
AGENCIES ARE NOT WILLING TO SHARE/FOLLOW LEAD

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?

NEED SOME "OVERSIGHT" FUNCTION TO EASE COORDINATION
NSC IS NOT DOING IT.

C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

IMPROVED COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENCIES - OVERSEAS GOVTS.

QUICK FIX IS NOT ALWAYS BEST SOLUTION - NEED
LONG TERM THINKING - COORDINATED POST MORTUM'S

D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

OVERSIGHT FUNCTION

THINK LONG TERM → BETTER INTELL
BETTER RELATIONS W/ OTHER COUNTRIES
BETTER INTERAGENCY COOP.

D. COLE

Odom, LtGEN
Director, NSA

TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

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Remarks:

Holloway	A	I	
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Coy	A	I	
Boink	A	I	
Cole	A	I	
Daly	A	I	
Earl	A	I	
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Incoming Chrono File

Data Base Keyword(s) *Consultations - Odson*

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Subject Working

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CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS/ORCON~~

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:

LT GEN Odom/Director, NSA/688-7111

2. Working Staff Action Officer:

Dave McMunn

3. Time/place of interview:

1330, 15 August 1985, NSA Headquarters, Director's Office

4. Participants:

Dave McMunn, General Odom

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):

Former Army Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Nov 81-May 85)
Former Staff Officer on NSC (Jan 77-Jan 81)
Asst Army Attache, Moscow (72-74)

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

A. Main Theme:

Terrorism is just another form of military conflict and should be countered accordingly (eg. recce, to find the enemy and then adopt appropriate defensive and offensive approaches to it). We do not need to build a special organization tasked to counter terrorism. We have the necessary forces to deal with it. They need to be better coordinated. Keep terrorism in perspective. Terrorists have never toppled a democracy but acts of Parliaments do (eg. Cromwell). The USG is deliberately decentralized - reflects our democratic form of government.

B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?

Need a core group at NSC level that can be expanded as necessary. Get the operational and policy inputs over the NIOWON and then get to the President with a decision recommendation.

C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

Work interagency "turf problems" off line (but for what it is worth, Gen Odom thinks COS should work for Cdr JSOC in terrorist incidents overseas).

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-008/2 #12760

~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS/ORCON~~

BY LOI NARA, DATE 3/15/07

- D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

Think more about "pre-emption" to counter organizations like RAF but never announce that is what we are doing (as we did in NSDD 138). Develop a capability to handle on low level intelligence (eg. police reporting) to combat terrorists.

Pfaltzgraf, Dr. Robert
Tufts University

CONSULTATION/MEETING REPORT

1. Name/current position/phone number of subject(s) interviewed:

DR. ROBERT PFALTZGRAFF
TUFTS UNIVERSITY

2. Working Staff Action Officer: DAVE COLE

3. Time/Place of interview:

1500 4 SEP 85 730 JACKSON

4. Participants:

WORKING GROUP

5. Experience/qualifications of subject(s):

SEMINAR AT TUFTS

6. Summary of subject(s) comments and recommendations.

EXISTING MECHANISMS CANNOT MEET THREAT.

- A. Main theme:

TF MUST LOOK AT FOLLOWING

- INTELL COLLECTION INADEQUATE
- DRUG /TERRORISM CONNECTION
- STATE SPONSORED (CONDONED) TERRORISM

- B. What should be done, that is not currently done in combatting terrorism?

NEED TO TAKE PREEMPTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
(MUST HAVE INTELL TO DO IT)
LOOK AT RETALIATION

- C. What is being done that could be improved upon?

MEDIA SHOULD POLICE THEMSELVES - MUST BE RESPONSIBLE -
FORM SENIOR LEVEL GROUP (FROM MEDIA) TO REVIEW.

- D. Areas to focus on to improve U.S. Government effectiveness in combatting terrorism:

CT CAPABILITY SHOULD NOT BE SECRET
NO FOCAL POINT FOR CT NEED SOMEONE IN CHARGE
(NSC OR WH)
NO POLICY - TALK BUT NO ACTION

Q