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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 5/24/2005

File Folder INCOMING - 08/15/1985 - CLASSIFIED (2 OF 3)

FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number 32

WILLS

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11483	MEMO	DOUGLAS MCMINN/ROBERT OAKLEY TO THE SECRETARY RE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM - CIVIL AVIATION AND OTHER INITIATIVES <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	4	8/5/1985	B1
11484	CABLE	#251352Z JUL 85 <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	1	7/25/1985	B1
11485	CABLE	#251353Z JUL 85 <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	2	7/25/1985	B1
11486	CABLE	#251355Z JUL 85 <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	1	7/25/1985	B1
11488	CABLE	#251349Z JUL 85 <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	1	7/25/1985	B1
11491	CABLE	#251929Z JUL 85 <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	3	7/25/1985	B1
11492	LIST	RE CABLE CONTENTS <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	5	ND	B1
11494	CABLE	#261838Z JUL 85 <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	1	7/26/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number 32

WILLS

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11495	MEMO	TO ROBERT OAKLEY RE: MEETING OF EXPERTS RE: ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	8	7/24/1985	B1
11497	PAPER	RE: TERRORISM <i>PAR 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

Date of Receipt | - 8/20/85 Router's Initials | *CRK*

Remarks:

Holloway	A	I	
Peck	A	I	
Coy	A	I	
Boink	A	<u>I</u>	<i>W</i> - BUT I MADE COPY OF 1st 3 PAGES. ILL TAKE FORAC. <i>CB</i>
Cole	A	I	
Daly	A	I	
Earl	A	I	
Hutchings	A	I	_____ <i>B</i>
McMunn	A	I	
Jamiese	<u>A</u>	I	<i>FILE</i>
<i>ARNOLD</i>	A	<u>I</u>	<i>W</i>
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Deadline Date

Incoming Chrono File *YES*

Data Base Keyword(s) *CIVIL AVIATION, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION*

Filer *JILL* Out *—*

Subject Working File *—* *# 0008*

SECRET

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

The information in this document is classified and as such will be treated according to OSD Security Instructions. Writing on this cover sheet is prohibited.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

dlb 5/12/05

11483

TO MR HUTCHINGS
BUNT - FY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

~~SECRET~~

August 5, 1985

TO: THE SECRETARY
FROM: EB - Douglas W. McMinn
M/CTP - Robert B. Oakley *RS*
SUBJECT: International Cooperation Against Terrorism -
Civil Aviation and other Initiatives

We must continue to press for better international cooperation against terrorism to follow up the July 24/25 Bonn meeting of the Experts Group on Terrorism (reporting cables at Tab A), and our campaign for other governments' support for action on BIA (current summary of responses at Tab B). Outlined below are initiatives we are pursuing to prevent terrorism against civil aviation as well as our plan for achieving cooperation in other areas of counter terrorism.

Civil Aviation

Although the French continued their reservations to action by the Seven, two important achievements on civil aviation emerged at Bonn: unanimous agreement to include effective aviation security articles in bilateral aviation agreements, both among the Seven and with other countries, and agreement to strengthen ICAO's work against aviation terrorism.

Effective aviation security articles will provide an express legal basis for action against governments which fail to maintain adequate airport security or which refuse to extradite or prosecute hijackers or saboteurs. Such articles will also make it politically and legally easier both to convince other governments to take action and to apply the new U.S. law mandating unilateral action when foreign airports fail to meet security standards. We will soon propose a new strengthened security article to other governments, beginning with the other members of the Seven. The negotiations will be demanding, especially as we will reserve the right unilaterally to restrict others' operating rights. L is currently drafting a new article.

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DECL: OADR

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

#0008

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- 2 -

Agreement to strengthen ICAO will help spur positive action in the ICAO Council on measures now under consideration there to implement proposals made by Secretary Dole and her Canadian and British counterparts June 27 . We will press the Seven and like-minded governments to elicit support of other concerned nations to ensure that ICAO adopts these proposals.

Since the Bonn Summit skirted the issue of terrorism, Foreign Minister Genscher's September dinner at the UNGA for the Seven Foreign Ministers will be the main forum for a Ministerial-level review of the experts' work. In particular, we will want to marshal pressure on France to cooperate in joint action against terrorism beyond that set forth by the Seven in the 1978 Bonn Declaration. The French have been able to obstruct such joint action by claiming the Experts of the Seven lack a formal mandate from the Heads of State and Government to address questions of jointly countering terrorism or responding to terrorist incidents other than the precise scenario envisaged in the Declaration: total suspension of air services in response to a state's failure to prosecute or extradite a hijacker. They also have reservations on strengthening the Bonn Declaration itself by extending it to cover sabotage and airport security, and amending it to permit flexible responses. These issues should be raised at the September meeting, preceded by demarches to elicit support of the other five governments. We want each of the Seven to express a definitive position on the question of a wider mandate for the experts group to consider questions of joint counter-terrorist cooperation and response to terrorist incidents (e.g. travel advisories, joint demarches, or graduated sanctions as discussed in the reports of the July 24/25 Bonn meeting at Tab A). The other five appear willing to cooperate in this approach, with Canada the most dynamic. We should not exclude the development of an "agree to disagree" formula with the French, pursuant to which we would still cooperate with them in areas like intelligence exchanges, technical assistance to LDC's, and operational liaison in hijack situations.

We intend to explore with certain governments the idea of forming a larger like-minded group, initially on an ad hoc basis. We will include governments with major aviation interests that should be willing to commit to concerted action against aviation terrorism: such as India, Turkey, and

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- 3 -

Singapore as well as the ROK, Australia, and several other Western governments. However, we will not seek to activate such a group until after the September meeting, since it could weaken our ability to get the FRG, Italy, and the UK to apply pressure on France for a more dynamic role by the Seven.

Finally, we will press other governments to reply to our proposals on BIA and will not accept vague non-committal responses. We must also generate additional pressure upon Lebanon and Syria, particularly as BIA remains open, to improve security (the EC approach to Lebanon is a good example of the indirect result of our pressure).

Broader Cooperation

We must continue to press for concerted action against all forms of terrorism in all potentially useful fora. This includes obtaining at the Foreign Ministers meeting in September a counter-terrorist mandate for the Seven's experts which goes beyond aviation; and holding another meeting of experts from Ministries of Interior (presumably without France) and including Spain and Belgium as participants (background at Tab C). Such an Interior Ministry meeting is useful in its own right and should further encourage Foreign Ministers to press France over a mandate for the Seven. We will also continue cooperation with like-minded governments through intelligence channels, making clear this involves matters of policy as well as intelligence exchanges. We are exploring the possibility of action at the UNGA, in other UN fora, including the Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime, or with regional organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Countries, the Gulf Coordinating Council, ASEAN, the OAS, and the European Community.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Reporting cables on Bonn Meeting
- Tab B - Summary of Results of Diplomatic Campaign on BIA
- Tab C - Embassy Bonn reporting Cable and FRG Ministry of Interior Letter re experts meeting

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DECL: QADR

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DRAFTED:M/CTP:RBOAKLEY
08/02/85; Ext. 29892; Wang # 3249N

Clearances: EB/OA/AVP:E.Vondensteinen) *[Handwritten signature]*
EB/TRA:RCScissors, Acting
L:Abraham D. Sofaer
L/LEI:G.Levitt
L/EBC:J.Byerly
M/CTP:E.Bailey
EUR:J.H.Kelly
EUR/RPM:M.Klosson
EB:EGConstable

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11484

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BOHN 21718 00 OF 02 251433Z
ACTION EB-03

8115

IMPORTANCE TO MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM GAINED ON AVIATION SECURITY MATTERS WITHIN ICAO AND TO CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES IN MONTREAL.

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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DOTE-00 STR-14 INRE-00 FAA-00 JUS-01 SYE-00 /046 W
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INFO AMCONSUL MONTREAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BOHN 21718

MONTREAL FOR US REP ICAO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, EATR
SUBJECT: BOHN MEETING ON CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

copy FAA

*July 24/25
com Mfg*

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY RECORD, NOT YET COMPLETE FOR SUBMISSION BY EACH DELEGATION TO RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS, IS AS FOLLOWS STARTING WITH PARA 3.

3. QUOTE - AS A FOLLOWUP TO THEIR MEETING ON MARCH 12/13 OFFICIALS OF THE SEVEN MET AGAIN ON JULY 24/25 AT BONN. THEY NOTED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER AND GRAVITY OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND PROPOSALS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS WERE MADE:

(1) THE EXPERTS STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE IN BILATERAL AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS PROVISIONS RELATING TO AVIATION SECURITY. THEY NOTED THAT ICAO WAS PREPARING A MODEL CLAUSE WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD BE APPROVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. EXPERTS WERE OF THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE TO INCLUDE SUCH A CLAUSE IN EXISTING AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES TO SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHERS.

(2) EXPERTS RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND PRACTICES IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES. THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INCREASE THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN THIS FIELD AND TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WHEREVER REQUIRED, ON A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL BASIS AND ESPECIALLY THROUGH ICAO.

(3) SOME EXPERTS NOTED THAT WHERE STATES FAILED TO TAKE SATISFACTORY ACTION TO DEAL WITH CONTINUING SECURITY PROBLEMS, APPROPRIATE TRAVEL ADVICE WOULD BE ISSUED BY AFFECTED GOVERNMENTS TO THEIR OWN CITIZENS. OTHER EXPERTS WERE OF THE VIEW THAT SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION COULD RAISE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS GIVEN DIFFERENT NATIONAL PRACTICES.

(4) THE EXPERTS NOTED THE VALUE IN APPROPRIATE CASES OF APPLYING SPECIAL CONTROLS AND CHECKS ON CARGO, BAGGAGE AND PASSENGERS ARRIVING ON AIRLINES, OR FROM AIRPORTS WITH SECURITY WEAKNESSES, INCLUDING TRANSIT PASSENGERS.

(5) THE EXPERTS NOTED THAT MANY OF THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD IN MARCH WERE NOW BEING DEALT WITH WITHIN THE ICAO COUNCIL. THEY WELCOMED THE DECISIONS TAKEN IN THESE MATTERS BY THE ICAO COUNCIL AND ATTACH GREAT

(6) THE EXPERTS NOTED THAT IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE INCIDENTS INVOLVING HIJACKINGS DEMARCHES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SEVEN ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS WOULD AS IN THE PAST HELP TO PERSUADE AND ASSIST GOVERNMENTS WITH THE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING AN INCIDENT TO OBTAIN THEIR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, AND ALSO HELP TO ENLIST THE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVING INFLUENCE WITH THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT.

(7) SOME EXPERTS WERE OF THE VIEW THAT A REVITALIZATION OF THE BOHN DECLARATION WAS REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH THE RESURGENCE OF HIJACKINGS. TO THIS END THEY CONSIDERED THAT TWO BASIC STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO INTRODUCE GREATER FLEXIBILITY:

- SETTING AN INITIAL LIMIT ON THE DURATION OF ANY JOINT ACTION INTRODUCED AGAINST OFFENDING GOVERNMENTS, WITH PROVISION FOR REVIEW OF THE ACTION BEFORE ITS EXPIRY, AND FURTHER EXTENSION IF NECESSARY;

- ACTION, WHERE LAWFUL AND APPROPRIATE, TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OR FREQUENCY OF AUTHORIZED FLIGHTS.

(8) SOME EXPERTS WERE OF THE VIEW THAT THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE APPLICATION BY STATES OF EXISTING

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE RELATING TO HIJACKING HAS CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO THE GROWTH OF TERRORISM AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION. ACCORDINGLY, THEY BELIEVED THAT THE BOHN DECLARATION SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO DEAL WITH SABOTAGE AND DERELICTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO AIRPORT SECURITY.

(9) OTHER EXPERTS UNDERLINED THE LEGAL PROBLEMS THAT THE PROPOSALS (7) AND (8) RAISED IN THEIR VIEW. ONE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IT WAS NOT WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP TO MAKE PROPOSALS IN THIS RESPECT WITHOUT RECEIVING A FORMAL MANDATE FROM THEIR HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT. FURTHERMORE HE STRESSED THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY SHOULD BE PURSUED THROUGH ICAO ACTION RATHER THAN THROUGH THE MODIFICATION OF THE BOHN DECLARATION. END QUOTE. DOBBINS

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BY BT, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

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11485

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 21719 00 OF 02 251432Z
ACTION ~~MCT-05~~

0113

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 EUR-00 SS-00
CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SY-05 L-02
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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

~~SECRET~~ BONN 21719

TERREP

STATE PASS DOT FOR SCOCOZZA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, EAIR
SUBJECT: MEETING OF SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS ON TERRORISM:
- REPORT OF FIRST DAY

REF: STATE 225894

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY - THERE WAS A BETTER MOOD AT THIS MEETING OF THE EXPERTS, WITH MOST DELEGATIONS SEEKING A CONSENSUS ON REVITALIZING THE BONN DECLARATION BASED ON PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE U.S. AND CANADA AT THE MARCH MEETING AND THE SUMMARY OF THESE PROPOSALS CIRCULATED BY UK IN EARLY JULY. THE FRENCH, AS ANTICIPATED, HAVE RESERVED THEIR POSITION, NOTING THEIR INABILITY TO AGREE TO ANY PROPOSAL. THEY CONTEND THAT THE EXPERTS GROUP LACKS AN AGREED MANDATE FROM THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT TO GO BEYOND THE EXACT WORDING OF THE CURRENT BONN DECLARATION AND THAT THERE CAN BE NO FLEXIBILITY IN MEASURES TAKEN UNDER THE DECLARATION (E.G. TIME LIMIT FOR SANCTIONS, LESSER SANCTIONS) AND NO EXTENSION OF BONN TO AIRPORT SECURITY OR SABOTAGE. U.S. DELEGATION MADE STRONG STATEMENT OF USG POSITION WITH RESPECT TO ATHENS AND BEIRUT AIRPORT SECURITY, NEED FOR GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE ACTION ON COMMITMENTS UNDER HAGUE AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS, NECESSITY TO REVITALIZE BONN DECLARATION, AND OUR INTENTION TO SEEK WIDE SUPPORT FROM LIKE-MINDED STATES IN THE EFFORT TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF CIVIL AVIATION. END SUMMARY.

3. U.S. DELEGATION, WITH STRONG SUPPORT FROM CANADIAN AND BRITISH DELEGATIONS, AND ON SOME SPECIFIC POINTS FROM ITALIAN, JAPANESE, AND GERMAN DELEGATIONS, PRESSED HARD ITS CASE FOR REVITALIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE BONN DECLARATION. THE FRENCH ARGUE THAT THE EXPERTS GROUP LACKS A PROPER, CLEAR AND AGREED MANDATE FROM THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER, AND HAVE RESERVED THEIR POSITION AS ANTICIPATED. OVERRIDING FRENCH OBJECTIONS, THE FRG AS CHAIRMAN HAS INCLUDED ON THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION TOPICS BEYOND THE NARROW BONN DECLARATION FRAMEWORK AS CURRENTLY EXISTING. ON SEVERAL TOPICS, MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE WITH ITALY AND JAPAN. ON EXPANDING BONN DECLARATION TO

INCLUDE SECURITY AND SABOTAGE, UK HAS PROBLEMS. FRG POSITION NOT YET FULLY CLEAR.

4. THE U.S. DELEGATION MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: ATHENS AIRPORT: THE U.S. TRAVEL ADVISORY WAS ISSUED IN RESPONSE TO SEVERE SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AT ATHENS AIRPORT, WHICH OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF THE SEVEN HAD ALSO NOTED AND SPOKEN ABOUT BILATERALLY WITH THE GREEKS, AND WAS ISSUED TO PROTECT THE SAFETY AND WELFARE OF AMERICAN CITIZEN TRAVELLERS, NOT FOR POLITICAL REASONS. IN RESPONSE TO GREEK EFFORTS AND IMPROVEMENTS TO ATHENS AIRPORT SECURITY AND REAFFIRMATION BY GREECE OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING AIR TERRORISM, THE USG WITHDREW THE TRAVEL ADVISORY. OUR ACTION, WHICH WE REGRETTED WAS NOT PUBLICLY JOINED BY OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS, SERVES AS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EVEN RELATIVELY SIMPLE MEASURES.

5. BEIRUT AIRPORT: THE U.S. DELEGATION CALLED STRONGLY FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER SIX FOR MEASURES TO DEMONSTRATE THE SEVEN'S CONCERN AND FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE URGENT NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY AT BIA, INCLUDING: ISSUANCE BY THE GROUP OF A JOINT STATEMENT OF CONCERN REGARDING SECURITY AT BIA AND A JOINT CALL UPON LEBANON TO ACT PROMPTLY TO RETURN THE TWA AIRCRAFT, RESTORE SECURITY OR SHUT DOWN BIA UNTIL SECURED, AND PERMIT AN INTERNATIONAL GROUP TO INSPECT BIA SECURITY YET ARRANGEMENTS. PENDING RESULTS OF SUCH AN INSPECTION STATES WERE URGED NOT TO RESUME AIR SERVICES ALREADY CURTAILED; STATES WHICH HAVE NOT SUSPENDED AIR SERVICES WERE CALLED UPON TO INITIATE SUCH A STEP AS WELL AS TO ISSUE TRAVEL ADVISORIES TO THEIR PUBLICS WARNING OF THE DANGER OF USE OF BIA; AND FLIGHTS COMING FROM BIA SHOULD BE QUARANTINED UNTIL FULL SECURITY SEARCHES ARE MADE OF PASSENGERS, BAGGAGE, CARGO AND THE AIRCRAFT. LASTLY, AGREEMENT WAS SOUGHT TO MONITOR BIA CLOSELY TO INSURE NECESSARY SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS ARE MADE, AND IF THIS IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED TANGIBLE SANCTIONS MAY BE IMPOSED BY THE SEVEN. IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT THESE STEPS ARE NOT AIMED AT THE GOL, THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON, OR LEBANESE AIRLINES; BUT ARE SOLELY DIRECTED AT INSURING IMPROVEMENT OF THE DEPLORABLE SECURITY SITUATION AT BIA, WHICH HAS NOT REALLY IMPROVED EVEN FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THEIR INTENTIONS TO EFFECT IMPROVEMENTS.

6. RE LAW ENFORCEMENT MEASURES AGAINST HIJACKERS, U.S. DEL MADE POINT THAT THE RECENT CONDUCT OF SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF LEBANON AND GREECE AS WELL AS IRAN, IRAQ AND ETHIOPIA, WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING AIR TERRORISM, AND THAT THESE SHOULD BE MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE GROUP. U.S. NOTED GREEK REAFFIRMATION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN THIS AREA. ON LEBANON WE STATED THAT THE SEVEN SHOULD MONITOR CLOSELY GOL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO PURSUE LAW ENFORCEMENT MEASURES AGAINST THE HIJACKERS, AND CONSIDER APPLICATION OF BONN DECLARATION SANCTIONS IF SUCH IMPLEMENTATION PROVED UNSATISFACTORY.

7. THE U.S. DELEGATION THEN NOTED THAT ITS PRIMARY CONCERN AT THIS MEETING CONTINUED TO BE THE LONG TERM REVITALIZATION OF THE BONN DECLARATION TO MAKE IT

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NLS F99-008/2 #11485
BY ML NARA, DATE 3/5/07

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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MORE PRACTICABLE BY INSTITUTING GRADATIONS OF SANCTIONS, TIME LIMITATIONS TO SANCTIONS, AND EXTENSION OF THE DECLARATION TO OFFENSES COVERED BY THE TOKYO, MONTREAL, AND CHICAGO CONVENTIONS (ALL AS DISCUSSED IN LAST MARCH'S U.S. AND CANADIAN POSITION PAPERS AND PARTLY PICKED UP IN PAPER CIRCULATED BY UK). THERE WAS SUPPORT FROM ALL DELEGATIONS FOR INCLUDING AVIATION SECURITY ARTICLES IN BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS AMONG THE SEVEN AND BETWEEN THE SEVEN AND OTHER COUNTRIES. U.S. DELEGATION CALLED UPON THE OTHER SIX TO WORK WITH IT IN SEEKING TO REVITALIZE THE BONN DECLARATION ALONG THESE LINES, AND NOTED THAT IF SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE NOT PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH AN EFFORT WE WERE PREPARED TO WORK WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE WILLING AND TO SEEK SUPPORT OUTSIDE THE SEVEN FROM AS MANY LIKE-MINDED GOVERNMENTS AS POSSIBLE WHOSE CIVIL AVIATION HAS BEEN VICTIMIZED BY TERRORISM. OBJECTIVE IS TO GET RAPID EFFECTIVE ACTION TO MEET INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN REAL WORLD, NOT ENGAGE IN DEBATE OVER FORM AND PROCEDURES.

8. SEPTEL WILL REPORT ENGLISH DRAFT OF LANGUAGE WHICH CAN BE SUBMITTED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS, SOME OF WHICH FRANCE APPARENTLY ACCEPTS AND SOME OF WHICH IT OPPOSES. ENTIRE TEXT, HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT TO GENERALIZED FRENCH RESERVATIONS. DOBBINS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BONN 21720 251356Z
ACTION EB-08

8647

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
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	SSO-00	HA-08	L-03	PH-10	EAP-00	PA-01	<u>MCT-03</u>
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AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 21720

DEPARTMENT PASS DOT SCOCCOZA

E. O. 12356: DEGL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, EATR
SUBJECT: ARIANA AFGHAN AIRLINES SANCTIONS

1. ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE QUESTION OF LIFTING EXISTING SANCTIONS UNDER THE BONN DECLARATION ON ARIANA AFGHAN AIRWAYS WAS DISCUSSED AT THE BONN MEETING. THE U.S. AND FRENCH, WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS AGREEING, TOOK THE POSITION THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED ONLY IN SUCH A WAY AND IN SUCH A CONTEXT THAT THE ACTION WILL NOT APPEAR AS A WEAKENING OF THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SEVEN TOWARD THE SOVIET INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. THERE WAS ALSO AGREEMENT UPON THE NEED FOR A STATEMENT BY AFGHANISTAN THAT FRG, AS CHAIRMAN, COULD USE TO SHOW THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WILL IN THE FUTURE ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON HIJACKING.
3. THE U.S. DELEGATION REPEATED THE USG INSISTENCE THAT LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AND IN SUCH A CONTEXT THAT IT WOULD NOT APPEAR AS A WEAKENING OF THE POSITION OF THE SEVEN ON TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION. THEREFORE, WE MUST INSIST THAT ANY FINAL DECISION BE TAKEN AT THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN IN SEPTEMBER WHEN THE LATTER WOULD ALSO DECIDE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE ON THE REPORT OF THE RESULTS OF THE JULY 24-25 BONN MEETING ON THE QUESTION OF REVITALIZING THE BONN DECLARATION.
4. THE DISCUSSION ON ARIANA PRODUCED THE FOLLOWING AGREED STATEMENT (PARA 5) FOR TRANSMITTAL BY EACH DELEGATION TO ITS FOREIGN MINISTER. ASSUMING THERE IS NO OBJECTION, THE FRG WILL PROCEED AS INDICATED THEREIN.
5. QUOTE - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WILL CONSULT WITH PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN REGARDING THE INTENTION OF THE SEVEN TO LIFT MEASURES AGAINST THE LATTER COUNTRY. IN ITS CONTACTS WITH PAKISTAN, IT WILL EXPLAIN THE REASONS FOR THE INTENDED ACTION OF THE SEVEN. WITH AFGHANISTAN, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WILL POINT OUT THAT THE LIFTING OF MEASURES WOULD BE

DEPENDENT ON THAT COUNTRY GIVING ADEQUATE ASSURANCES IN A FORM SUITABLE FOR PUBLICATION.

THESE ASSURANCES SHOULD SPECIFY THAT THE HIJACKERS ARE NOT IN AFGHANISTAN, THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION IF THE HIJACKERS APPEAR IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THAT AFGHANISTAN WILL LIKEWISE ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION IN THE EVENT OF HIJACKINGS IN THE FUTURE. AFGHANISTAN WOULD, FURTHERMORE AGREE TO PLACE NO OBSTACLE TO THE RE-ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS TERMINATED AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS TAKEN AT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT.

Handwritten: July 24/85
Bonn 21720

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WILL INFORM AFGHANISTAN THAT, ONCE ASSURANCES ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SEVEN HAVE BEEN OBTAINED, THE MEASURES WOULD BE LIFTED IN DECEMBER 1985.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WILL INFORM HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE RESULTS OF THESE CONSULTATIONS AT THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN TO BE HELD IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER.

THE QUESTION OF INFORMING THE PRESS OF THE DECISION TO LIFT MEASURES WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATIONS INITIATED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. END QUOTE.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: APPROVAL OR SUGGESTED CHANGES OF LANGUAGE IN PARA 5 FOR RAPID COMMUNICATION TO FRG. DOBBINS

Handwritten signature: END

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BY LBT, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

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5. ON OTHER HAND, SEPARATE TALKS WITH KEY FRENCH OFFICIALS OF QUAI AND SECURITY SERVICES CLEARLY CONFIRMED GREATER WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE ON QUIET BILATERAL BASIS, INCLUDING EXCHANGES OF INTELLIGENCE. SAME IS TRUE WHERE FRG IS CONCERNED. FRENCH SEE IRAHIAN SUPPORTED TERRORISM AS GROWING PROBLEM IN WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL AS MIDDLE EAST. DOBBINS

~~SECRET~~ BONN 21717

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM OAKLEY, M/CTP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON TERRORISM


1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT CURRENT BONN MEETING OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS ON TERRORISM, RECENT TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND THE MESSAGES FROM YOU AND PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT; BUT THUS FAR NOT NEARLY ENOUGH TO OVERCOME UNDERLYING RELUCTANCE ON PART OF ITALY AND JAPAN, NOR STRONG RESISTANCE BY FRANCE, WHERE COLLECTIVE ACTION IS CONCERNED. CANADA HAS BEEN STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE, UK ALSO POSITIVE, WHILE FRG HAS LIMITED ITSELF TO NEUTRAL, LARGELY PASSIVE CHAIRMAN ROLE. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THERE WILL BE A JOINT DOCUMENT WITH SPECIFIC IDEAS ON HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE BONN DECLARATION SO IT WILL APPLY TO THE ENTIRE GAMUT OF TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION. MOST FORCEFUL IDEAS, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE RESERVATIONS ATTACHED AND FRENCH OPPOSE ENTIRE PAPER AS BEYOND THE LIMITED COMPETENCE OF THE SEVEN'S EXPERTS. OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO OVERCOME/REMOVE THESE RESERVATIONS AT THE MEETING OF THE SEVEN'S FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SEPTEMBER AT UNGA AND OBLIGE FRENCH TO GO ALONG. THE FRENCH ARE PARTICULARLY ALLERGIC TO EXTENDING THE BONN MANDATE TO SABOTAGE AND SECURITY, AND TO ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE ROLE OF THE SEVEN.

3. ON BIA THERE REMAINS A DISINCLINATION EVEN TO ADDRESS ISSUE OF STOPPING OUTGOING MEA AIR SERVICE, ALTHOUGH ALL SEVEN CEASED INGOING SERVICE BY THEIR AIRLINES SOME TIME AGO FOR SECURITY REASONS. DESPITE SPECIFIC APPEAL BY PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND LETTER FROM VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHANCELLOR KOHL, THE FRG AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SEVEN HAS NOT YET PUT TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS THE QUESTION WHETHER THEY WILL AGREE TO SUSPEND ALL AIR SERVICE TO AND FROM BEIRUT. WE HAVE RAISED THIS FORCEFULLY WITH FRG CHAIRMAN OF EXPERTS MEETING AND EMBASSY WILL RAISE IT WITH THE FRG AT HIGHER LEVELS.

4. ON JULY 22 THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT EXPRESSING "DEEP CONCERN AT THE RESURGENCE OF TERRORISM, AIR PIRACY AND HIJACKING" AND NOTING THEIR AGREEMENT TO EXAMINE POSSIBILITIES OF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING STRENGTHENED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR AIRLINE AND AIRPORT SECURITY. THIS SHOWS GREATER AWARENESS OF PROBLEM, AS WELL AS FRENCH WILLINGNESS WORK WITHIN EC FRAMEWORK. HOW MUCH COLLECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT PAST RECORD IS NOT ENCOURAGING.

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BY WTS, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

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STATE PASS DOT FOR SCOCOZZA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, EAIR

SUBJECT: BONN MEETING ON CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY:
- POSITIONS TAKEN BY OTHER DELEGATIONS

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A FINAL REPORT ON THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY OTHER DELEGATIONS AT THE JULY 24-25 MEETING OF BONN DECLARATION GROUP EXPERTS. CANADIANS EXPRESSED STRONGEST SUPPORT FOR REVITALIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE BONN DECLARATION; UK TOOK FORCEFUL, POSITIVE POSITIONS ON ALL ISSUES EXCEPT EXPANSION OF THE DECLARATION TO INCLUDE SABOTAGE AND AIRPORT SECURITY; GERMANS, JAPANESE AND ITALIANS, WHILE RETICENT, WERE BASICALLY POSITIVE ON MOST ISSUES INCLUDING SECURITY LANGUAGE IN BILATERAL CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENTS. FRENCH REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH MOST CONCRETTE PROPOSALS BECAUSE THEY EXCEEDED THE GROUP'S "MANDATE;" ALTHOUGH THEY ALSO ACCEPTED IDEA OF SECURITY LANGUAGE IN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. FRENCH WERE WILLING TO ALLOW A SUBSTANTIVE "REPORT" (NOT RECOMMENDATION) WITH RESERVATIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES (MOSTLY FRENCH) WHICH WILL BE SUBMITTED INDIVIDUALLY TO GOVERNMENTS. MESSAGE ALSO DISCUSSES FINAL MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. CANADIAN DELEGATION STRESSED THE NEED FOR STRONG ACTION ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES AFFECTING CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY. CHARACTERIZING EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT AS "DEFICIENT", THEY INDICATED A PREFERENCE TO WORK TO IMPROVE THEM IN EXISTING MULTILATERAL FORA SUCH AS THE SEVEN AND ICAO, BUT SAID THEY WERE ALSO PREPARED TO GO AHEAD ON A BILATERAL BASIS OR IN OTHER MULTILATERAL GROUPINGS IF NECESSARY. THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH PROGRESS BEING MADE IN ICAO, AND NOW FELT IT WAS TIME TO CONCENTRATE WITHIN THE SEVEN ON REVISING THE BONN DECLARATION TO MAKE IT MORE EFFECTIVE. THE PREVIOUS PRACTICE OF ACTIVE CONSULTATION AMONG THE SEVEN IN CONNECTION WITH ACTUAL HIJACKING INCIDENTS SHOULD BE REVIVED; THERE

SHOULD BE PROVISION FOR A GRADUATED, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO HIJACKING INCIDENTS; AND THE FOCUS OF THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO COVER SABOTAGE AND AIRPORT SECURITY. ON BEIRUT AIRPORT, THEY WERE PREPARED TO JOIN IN APPLICATION OF THE BONN DECLARATION IF A CONSENSUS WERE ACHIEVED AND TO LOOK AT OTHER MEASURES WITHIN THE SPIRIT OF THE DECLARATION IN RESPONSE TO THE FACT THAT BIA HAD BECOME A "BLACK HOLE" IN TERMS OF AIRPORT SECURITY. THEY PUSHED FOR WIDER USE OF SECURITY CLAUSES IN BILATERAL CIVIL AGREEMENTS AND PROPOSED THAT THE SEVEN SHOULD AGREE TO IMMEDIATELY INCLUDE SUCH CLAUSES IN THEIR BILATERALS WITH EACH OTHER. THEY AGREED WITH U.S. POSITION THAT PUBLIC WARNINGS ON DEFICIENT AIRPORTS MIGHT BECOME NECESSARY IF SECURITY PROBLEMS WERE NOT CORRECTED AFTER PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS AND OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE TO THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. CANADIAN DELEGATION OFFERED TO TAKE LEAD IN CO-ORDINATING EFFORTS BY GROUP OF SEVEN AND LIKE-MINDED STATES AT THE ICAO TO ACT AS CLEARING HOUSE FOR MONITORING, ANALYZING INFORMATION/REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN AVIATION SECURITY AREA TO ENSURE THERE WAS NO DUPLICATION AND RESOURCES WERE ALLOCATED TO AREAS OF GREATEST NEED. ON BROADER TERRORISM ISSUES, THEY PROPOSED THAT EXPERTS REVIEW ALL SUMMIT STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM TO SEE WHERE FOLLOW-UP WORK COULD USEFULLY BE UNDERTAKEN AND REPORT TO MINISTERS ON THIS.

4. THE UK AGREED THAT PROMPT ACTION TO REVITALIZE THE BONN DECLARATION WAS NEEDED, SPECIFICALLY TO INTRODUCE TIME LIMITS ON SANCTIONS AND TO ADD THE POSSIBILITY OF GRADUATED RESPONSES INCLUDING REDUCTION OF FLIGHTS. (ON THIS QUESTION, UK LEGAL COUNSEL DENZA MADE A NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS IN RESPONSE TO JAPANESE QUERY (SEE PARA. 6 BELOW) ON LEGAL BASES FOR SUCH MEASURES. SHE NOTED THAT SPECIFIC SECURITY CLAUSES COULD BE INCLUDED IN BILATERALS; THAT REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE WITHIN THE TERMS OF BASIC OPERATING AUTHORIZATIONS; AND THAT SHOULD NEITHER OF THESE BASES EXIST THEN POOR SECURITY PRACTICES OR SERIOUS BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS ON AIR TERRORISM COULD CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL OBLIGATION UNDERLYING A BILATERAL AGREEMENT AND THUS GIVE RISE TO A RIGHT TO TAKE CORRESPONDING MEASURES. FINALLY, IN CERTAIN CASES THE RIGHT OF PROPORTIONATE RETALIATION FOR A BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS MIGHT BE INVOKED.) ON EXPANSION OF THE DECLARATION TO COVER SABOTAGE AND AIRPORT SECURITY, HOWEVER, UK SAID THEY WERE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO RESERVE THEIR POSITION PENDING CONSULTATIONS IN LONDON. THEY AGREED THAT SEVEN BEGIN WORK IMMEDIATELY TO ADD SECURITY CLAUSES TO BILATERALS BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AND THAT PUBLIC WARNINGS ON AIRPORT SECURITY PROBLEMS SHOULD BE ISSUED UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES. UK ALSO SUPPORTED PROPOSAL THAT SEVEN EXPERTS PERFORM FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF ALL PAST SUMMIT STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM.

5. FRG HEWED CLOSELY TO ITS ROLE AS NEUTRAL CHAIRMAN, GENERALLY AVOIDING SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS OR DEBATE. THEIR DELEGATION SAID THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT NOTION THAT GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ISSUE WARNINGS TO THEIR CITIZENS ON AIRPORT SECURITY, ASSERTING THAT FRG GOVERNMENT LACKED LEGAL BASIS TO TAKE SUCH A STEP, BUT ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT DID HAVE AUTHORITY TO ASK AIRLINES TO CEASE OPERATING TO CERTAIN DESTINATIONS. THEY APPEARED TO SUPPORT

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CONCEPT OF TIME LIMITS AND MORE FLEXIBLE SANCTIONS WITHIN EXISTING BONN DECLARATION FRAMEWORK; INDICATED NO POSITION ON EXPANSION OF THE DECLARATION TO ENCOMPASS SABOTAGE AND AIRPORT SECURITY; AND HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSAL OF AN EXPERTS' REVIEW OF PREVIOUS SUMMIT STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM.

6. JAPANESE, THOUGH GENERALLY RETICENT, WERE MORE ACTIVE AND MORE POSITIVE THAN THEY HAD BEEN AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS. THEY SUPPORTED IN PRINCIPLE IDEA OF REVITALIZATION OF BONN DECLARATION, BUT INDICATED SOME MISGIVINGS OVER LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REDUCTION OF FLIGHTS AS A BONN SANCTION. THEY TOOK NOTE OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS ON THIS ADVANCED BY UK DELEGATION (WHICH WERE SUPPORTED BY U.S. AND CANADIAN DELEGATIONS), BUT APPEAR TO REQUIRE FURTHER HELP. (U.S. OFFER TO PROVIDE A PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT WAS POSITIVELY RECEIVED BY JAPANESE LEGAL COUNSEL.) ON EXPANSION OF THE DECLARATION TO COVER SABOTAGE AND AIRPORT SECURITY, THEY WERE CAUTIOUS, NOTING THAT IN CASES OF SABOTAGE PERPETRATORS WERE TYPICALLY HARDER TO IDENTIFY THAN IN HIJACKING INCIDENTS. THEY SAID THIS IDEA WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE SUMMIT LEVEL IN ANY EVENT, REMARKING THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL STUDY.

7. ITALIAN DELEGATION, WHOSE HEAD WAS NEW TO THE BONN EXPERTS FORUM, PARTICIPATED VERY LITTLE. THEIR ONE NOTEWORTHY INTERVENTION CAME ON THE SUBJECT OF INCLUSION OF SECURITY CLAUSES IN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, WHICH THEY STRONGLY SUPPORTED. THEY APPEARED GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO REVITALIZATION OF BONN DECLARATION, BUT EXPLICITLY RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON EXPANSION TO COVER SABOTAGE AND AIRPORT SECURITY.

8. FRENCH OPENING STATEMENT MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVELY ANY SUBJECTS OUTSIDE NARROWLY INTERPRETED BONN DECLARATION FRAMEWORK DEALING ONLY WITH TOTAL, INDEFINITE SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH HIJACKING INCIDENTS. ON REDUCTION OF FLIGHTS, THEY TOOK THE POSITION THAT THE ONLY LEGAL WAY TO DO THIS WHERE SUCH REDUCTION WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR WITHIN THE TERMS OF A BILATERAL, WOULD BE THROUGH TERMINATION OF THE BILATERAL. THEY REFUSED TO AGREE EVEN TO THE IMPOSITION OF TIME LIMITS ON BONN SANCTIONS, ASSERTING THAT SINCE THIS CONCEPT WAS NOT EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE DECLARATION ITSELF IT COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED WITHOUT A NEW MANDATE FROM HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT. THEY OPPOSED EXPANSION OF THE BONN DECLARATION TO COVER SABOTAGE AND AIRPORT SECURITY, STATING THAT THE NATURE OF SABOTAGE OFFENSES, WHICH WERE INHERENTLY MORE "NATIONAL" THAN HIJACKINGS, MADE APPLICATION OF COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH OFFENSES DUBIOUS. THEY INDICATED A CLEAR OVER ALL PREFERENCE FOR WORK WITHIN ICAO OVER WORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SEVEN, STATING THAT IN GENERAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES TO AVOID HIJACKINGS WERE MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE THAN REACTIVE MEASURES AFTER HIJACKINGS HAD OCCURRED, AND THAT ICAO'S WORK ON PREVENTIVE MEASURES WAS PROGRESSING WELL. THEY DID, HOWEVER, SUPPORT IDEA THAT SEVEN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE INVOLVED AND IN CLOSE CONTACT IN CONNECTION WITH ACTUAL HIJACKING INCIDENTS. ON BEIRUT, THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE AIRPORT "OBVIOUSLY" DOES NOT OFFER ADEQUATE SECURITY CONDITIONS, BUT SAID THAT SUCH PROBLEMS WERE NOT ENVISAGED BY THE BONN DECLARATION. AIR FRANCE HAD CEASED FLIGHTS TO BIA; CAREFUL ATTENTION WOULD HAVE

TO BE GIVEN TO THE QUESTION OF INCOMING MEA FLIGHTS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECIAL ARRIVAL CONTROLS. ON LEBANON'S FULFILLMENT OF HAGUE CONVENTION RESPONSIBILITIES, THEY ASSERTED THAT AS THE STATE WAS "NO LONGER OPERATIONAL" IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER APPLICATION OF BONN DECLARATION SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT. THEY SUPPORTED THE INCLUSION OF SECURITY CLAUSES IN AVIATION BILATERALS; AND OPPOSED THE NOTION OF PUBLIC WARNINGS ON AIRPORT SECURITY, DESCRIBING THIS AS "ALSO ADVICE TO TERRORISTS."

THEY DID NOT OPPOSE IDEA OF EXPERTS REVIEW OF EXISTING SUMMIT STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM, BUT DISPLAYED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR IT; THEY WERE PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO EXAMINE A WRITTEN PROPOSAL ON THIS. THE FACT THAT THE FRENCH ALLOWED A WRITTEN DOCUMENT TO BE PREPARED (WHICH FRG CHAIRMAN MIGHT NOT HAVE PUSHED HAD FRENCH OBJECTED) WAS A POSITIVE NOTE, GIVEN RECENT PAST, AS WERE SOME TACIT AGREEMENTS ON OTHER MATTERS, SUCH AS MORE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS. BUT GOF OPPOSITION TO THE FORUM OF THE SEVEN AND GOF ALLERGY TO BEING IDENTIFIED PUBLICLY WITH USG WERE VERY APPARENT.

9. THE REPORT ON PROPOSALS MADE WAS POSSIBLE ONLY BECAUSE FRG CHAIRMAN ACCEPTED U.S. PROPOSAL OF A DRAFTING COMMITTEE, ASKED THAT HEADS OF DELEGATION UNDERTAKE THIS TASK, AND ALLOWED THEM BOTH TO DO THE DRAFTING AND TO SORT OUT DIFFERENCES. THIS WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF PASSIVE FRG POSITION THROUGHOUT.

10. FINAL MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATION.

A. AT THIS MEETING, FINAL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON LANGUAGE FOR POSSIBLY REMOVING ARIANA SANCTIONS (SEPTEL).

B. IN ADDITION, U.S. REP AGAIN WENT OVER SPECIFIC U.S. PROPOSALS ON BIA, NOTING THEY HAD BEEN OBJECT OF BILATERAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN MINISTERS AS WELL AS DISCUSSION AT THIS BONN MEETING. USG IS EXPECTING REPLIES WITH SPECIFICS AS TO WHAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS WILL DO; INCLUDING A RESPONSE TO FORMAL UK REQUEST THAT FRG CONSULT OTHERS OF THE SEVEN ON APPLYING BONN DECLARATION; A REQUEST WHICH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAD ENDORSED IN A LETTER TO CHANCELLOR KOHL. U.S. REP READ TO GROUP REPORT OF WHAT FRG MINISTER OF JUSTICE ENGLEHARD SAID PUBLICLY JULY 2: ABOUT NEED FOR "WORLD-WIDE BOYCOTT OF AIRPORTS IN COUNTRIES WHICH REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM" AND NEED TO SUSPEND AIR TRAFFIC WITH COUNTRIES "WHICH FAIL TO CONVICT TERRORISTS UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION." ALL OTHER REPS TOOK NOTES BUT NONE MADE A REPLY, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WERE STUDYING THE MATTER.

C. CANADIAN REP REITERATED EARLIER PROPOSAL THAT THE SEVEN RESUME PRACTICES OF LATE 1970'S WHEN THERE WAS ALMOST AUTOMATIC, RAPID CONSULTATION AMONG THEM ON HIJACKING AND ACTION TO TAKE. UK AND FRG REPS POINTED OUT THAT 1979 GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF BONN DECLARATION SET FORTH SUCH PROCEDURES IN DETAIL. THERE WAS UNOFFICIAL AGREEMENT BY ALL SEVEN REPS THAT THIS SHALL BE DONE, WITH ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN (E.G. DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES) TO BE DETERMINED ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

11. FOLLOW-UP ACTION.

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A. ALL SEVEN GOVERNMENTS NEED TO HAVE EXPLICIT MANDATE BY (AND FOR) THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO TAKE DECISIONS ON REPORT OF JULY 24-25 BONN MEETING, ADOPTING OR REJECTING OR MODIFYING SPECIFIC MEASURES. THE FORMALISTIC FRENCH ESCAPE DEVICE OF CLAIMING THERE IS NO MANDATE NEEDS TO BE REMOVED. TO DO SO WILL REQUIRE OBTAINING ADVANCE AGREEMENT BY EACH OF THE OTHER SIX, AND FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE CLEAR IN ADVANCE TO DUMAS THAT A DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE SEPTEMBER MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. IF POSSIBLE, THERE SHOULD ALSO BE AGREEMENT AT THAT MEETING ON A SPECIFIC MANDATE EMPOWERING EXPERTS TO DISCUSS AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON A WIDE RANGE OF TERRORIST PROBLEMS. THE MOOD AND TIME SEEM BETTER THAN EVER BEFORE TO GET AGREEMENT BY AT LEAST SIX GOVERNMENTS ON THESE POINTS BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER MEETING.

B. LEGAL AND POLITICAL FOLLOW-UP IS NEEDED WITH JAPANESE, ITALIAN AND FRG GOVERNMENTS TO OBTAIN APPROVAL OF LANGUAGE IN REPORT ON MORE FLEXIBLE MEASURES FOR AND EXPANSION OF BONN DECLARATION SO THAT IT COVERS SECURITY AND SABOTAGE. JAPAN AND ITALY SEEM POLITICALLY POSITIVE BUT NEED ADDITIONAL WORK. IF THEY CAN BE BROUGHT ALONG, FRG MAY AGREE, DESPITE FRENCH RESERVATION.

12. PRESS INQUIRIES: EXPERTS AGREED NOT TO PROVIDE ANY DETAILS OF MEETING TO MEDIA; PRESS LINE WOULD BE THAT MEETING WAS A ROUTINE GATHERING OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS WHOSE DELIBERATIONS WERE CONFIDENTIAL.
DOBBINS

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ALGIERS: (7/7/85 #63525) Will align with Arab states - This action could make release of other hostages more difficult.

AUSTRIA: No official response, but in Press conference said would not participate in full boycott, would hurt average citizen more than terrorists. Can expect Official response shortly (Vienna 09967 7/12/85).

UPDATE: Support above cable. (Vienna 10609 07/23/85)

BAHRAIN: Wish to be supportive but believes closing BIA only affects the Lebanese and not the real sources of terrorism: Iran, Libya and Syria.

BELGIUM: (7/9/85 Brussels 09489) Will see, Not likely. Suspended SABENA services between Brussels and Beirut.

BRAZIL: Opposes unilateral measures to isolate the airport as well as "any other sanction which violates international law"; feels boycott is unjust. (Brazilia 07295 07/11/85)

BULGARIA: Must consider further; a commercial as well as political question.

CANADA: Has disapproved MEA request for landing rights and suspended bilateral civil aviation negotiations.

CYPRUS: Will give urgent consideration; Cyprus Airways flights to/from BIA have been cancelled since Feb. 1985.

DENMARK: Will give urgent consideration.

DJIBOUTI: Not delivered message, wants translation.

UPDATE: Agreed to Demarche but won't be ratified until October/November.

EYGPT: (7/5/85 C #17381) Concern over possible negative impact on tourism if BIA is boycotted.

FINLAND: Promise to study Demarche.

UPDATE: Suggests working through ICAO. (Helsinki 03182 07/22/85)

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FRANCE: (7/5/85 P #27306) No reply now, wait for Bonn Seven meeting 7/24 -7/25. Embassy feels no go based on principle and harm chances for release of their hostages.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (FRG): Under consideration - initial reaction not positive. (Bonn 20285 7/12/85).

GREECE: Proposal has special relevance to Greece; will consider.

HUNGARY: Post feels GOH doesn't want to "get out in front of Moscow on the subject of terrorism." (Budapest 05488 7/1/85).

ICELAND: Foreign Minister approves measures but is seeking cabinet approval.

UPDATE: GOI "...fully supports your ideas concerning serious, collective action. focusing upon ICAO to strengthen security...". (Reykjavik 01501 07/05/85)

INDIA: (7/8/85 ND 16523) No specific Demarche made - not an action addressee. However GOI expressed interest.

IRAQ: Will consider and might support. Iraq has no direct air traffic with Beirut.

UPDATE: (7/10/85 Baghdad 02075) Has not as yet answered GOL request and will consider US position.

IRELAND: Will require close EC consideration; worried about effect on UNIFIL, UNWRA and other relief agencies.

ITALY: Response from GOI not yet received. (Rome 16697 07/02/85)

UPDATE: "...favour the idea of extending collaboration on safety measures to like-minded Countries. (Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs dated July 10.)

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IVORY COAST: Haven't transmitted - need French translation from Department.

JAPAN: Will consider; Suspended flights to BIA in 1976.

JORDAN: Will consider but would prefer military action to close airport.

UPDATE: "...Willing to do all we can to deal with this intolerable situation." (Amman 06476) 07/10/85)

KUWAIT: Appreciate USG concern but feel should help GOL not punish it.

LEBANON: Plans to lodge memorandum with U.N. protesting USG actions with regard to BIA. (Beirut 03985 7/4/85)

LIBERIA: No reaction yet

LUXEMBOURG: Will consider. Should rely more on IACO.

NETHERLANDS: Has legal questions; does not fly to Beirut; more comfortable with specific goals = e.g. lifting suspension when remaining hostages released.

UPDATE: Will participate in (1) joint EC demarche; (2) EC study of additional aircraft safety rules/standards increasing of security measures of flights from Beirut. (The Hague 05137 07/31/85)

NIGERIA: Will consider; would consider concerted action with other ICAO members.

NORWAY: Will consider when Foreign Minister returns; does not fly to Beirut. (Oslo 03730 07/02/85)

UPDATE: "...will, within the international organizations, continue to participate in the fight against terrorism." (Oslo 04215, July 24, 1985)

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-4-

OMAN: (July 8/1985 Muscat 03504) Asked about why not boycott Tehran Airport after Kuwait; warned of Arab retaliatory moves if close BIA.

UPDATE: GOO calls for broad consensus of effective measures to be taken against terrorism.

PHILIPPINES: Supports US initiatives.

PORTUGAL: Will consider.

UPDATE: "...agree that the adoption of rigorous measures leading to increased airport and aircraft security is a matter of the utmost urgency." (Letter to Secretary Shultz dated 7/9/85)

QATAR: (7/8/85 Doha 01245) (1) Feel it is wrong policy, BIA not in GOL control; (2) policy would fail, most states involved are against policy (3) Policy of isolation = more enemies for the US. Problem of Terrorism is Palestine.

UPDATE: (7/14/85 Doha 01284) GOQ still very skeptical.

ROMANIA: (7/8/85 Buchar 04346) Will consider

SAUDI ARABIA: Still working out response - may defer response until GCC Foreign Minister Meeting July 8 - 9.

UPDATE: SAG feels it would be more appropriate for USG to first ask GOL and Syria for combined effort to solve problems. If that does not work then boycott. (RIYADH 06198)

SOMALIA: Cautious in expressing themselves. (Mogadishu 07659 07/15/85)

SUDAN: Does not fly to BIA; since GOL does not control BIA, action against GOL to no avail; nothing gained by action against MEA.

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-5-

SWEDEN: Will review situation and respond.

UPDATE: "...will continue to support international efforts to improve aviation security." (Stockholm 251557Z July 25, 1985)

SWITZERLAND: Considering; initial reaction: put BIA under UNIFIL control.

SYRIA: May go to ICAO to complain about USG action and public policy. (Damascus 04271 07/10/85)

THAILAND: Under consideration; expect to discuss with Secretary during visit.

TURKEY: Will carefully consider. GOT does not fly to Beirut.

TUNISIA: Urges USG to reconsider its hardline position. (Tunis 06257 07/11/85).

UAE: [7/2/85 #2988] Stands with US in fighting terrorism, will raise subject of BIA at upcoming GCC Ministerial, Gulf air had terminated air services into and out of Beirut.

UPDATE: (7/13/85 ABU DH 03106) Still considering, not likely

UK: Basically supportive and are urging Summit Seven to adopt measures this week, but have not yet joined us because they don't want a "US - UK show". Want sanctions in place before experts meeting July 24/25. They hope some of the Seven will join but feel France and Italy will not.

UPDATE: don't feel that it will work but will continue efforts to persuade other countries to join. (London 15807)

YEMEN ARAB REP.: (7/9/85 Sanaa 04306) Will most likely align with Arab front.

YUGOSLAVIA: Will be given close attention and promise early response.

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Tab C

11494



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Department of State

S/S-O
INCOMING

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY PARIS

~~SECRET~~ BONN 21976

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

EUR ALSO FOR AMB BURT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EAIR, GE, PTER
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FRG MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HAS PRESENTED FIVE GOVERNMENTS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN MARCH 7-8 MEETING WITH SPECIFIC WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP PROPOSALS. OAKLEY RECEIVED TEXT WHILE HE WAS IN BONN FOR THE AVIATION SECURITY MEETING. EMBASSY BONN WILL DISCUSS PROPOSALS FURTHER WITH MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO CLARIFY CERTAIN POINTS BUT THE PROPOSALS APPEAR VERY POSITIVE IN NATURE. THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IN WRITING AND IN CONVERSATION BETWEEN DR. HEUER AND RUPPRECHT AND CHARGE DOBBINS, OAKLEY, AND DEPUTY COORDINATOR LONAM (SIRO) URGED RAPID USG REPLY TO PROPOSALS AND CONVENING OF ANOTHER MEETING OF EXPERTS ALONG LINES OF MARCH 7-8 MEETING TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM. END SUMMARY.

3. IN COURSE OF DINNER HOSTED BY CHARGE FOR VISIT OF AMBASSADOR OAKLEY, INTERIOR MINISTRY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY HEUER DISCUSSED THE PAPER THAT HAD BEEN PASSED EARLIER TO OAKLEY CONTAINING PROPOSALS FOR FOLLOW-UP TO MARCH 7-8 MEETING OF SUMMIT SEVEN ON TERRORISM, AND DISCUSSED HIS MINISTRY'S ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS REGARDING FUTURE COOPERATION. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION ARE BEING HAND-CARRIED BY OAKLEY. IN SUMMARY, THEY RECOMMEND USE AMONG SIX OF FORM APPROVED BY TREV I ON IDENTIFICATION OF TERRORIST GROUP AND KEEPING RECORDS ON GROUP. THEY ALSO PROPOSE USE AMONG SIX OF ANOTHER STANDARD FORM DEVELOPED BY CENTRAL POLICE AUTHORITIES OF EC FOR REPORTING ON SPECIFIC TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND USE BY SIX OF AGREEMENT REACHED BY EC ON JUNE 21, 1985 FOR DENYING ENTRY TO POTENTIAL TERRORISTS. IT APPEARS THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THESE PROPOSALS IS IN LINE WITH STANDING USG POSITIONS, COMPLEMENTS EXCHANGES ALREADY IN PLACE, AND WILL GIVE US MORE SYSTEMATIC, OPEN ACCESS TO EC INFORMATION ON TERRORISM.

4. HEUER SAID THAT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND VARIOUS FRG SECURITY FORCES ARE ON SAME WAVE LENGTH WITH USG IN

PAGE 01 BONN 21976 261843Z 7230 0504571

COMBATTING TERRORISM AND APPRECIATE THE INCREASE OVER RECENT MONTHS OF INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED BY US ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND WANT MORE COOPERATION OF THIS SORT IN ORDER TO EDUCATE THEIR POLITICAL SUPERIORS AND REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT. NEW MEASURES OF HARASSMENT, SURVEILLANCE, AND EXPULSION OF LIBYANS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF PEOPLE'S BUREAU, ARE DESIGNED TO STOP THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE FRG. THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ALSO RECOGNIZES SERIOUS IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM THREAT FROM IRANIANS AND PRO-IRANIAN SHIITES WHO ARE PRESENT IN LARGE NUMBERS. THEY DO NOT INTEND TO ALLOW TERRORIST OR POTENTIAL TERRORISTS TO MAKE FREE USE OF FRG IN PLANNING ATTACKS ELSEWHERE AS, NEVER ALLEGED, THE FRENCH AND GREEKS HAVE ATTEMPTED IN PAST, BECAUSE IT WILL HARM FRG IN LONG RUN AND THREATEN ALLIES IN SHORT RUN.

5. HEUER MADE CLEAR THE VIEW OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR THAT THE MANDATE OF THE FRG FOREIGN OFFICE IN RESPECT TO COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS COVERED ONLY CIVIL AVIATION. EVEN IN THIS AREA, HEUER ALLEGED, THE FOREIGN OFFICE IS NOT INTERESTED IN SERIOUS ACTION. THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, HE SAID, IS NOT PREPARED TO SURRENDER ITS PREROGATIVES IN COOPERATING WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN OTHER AREAS.
DOBBINS

*Summit
Seven*

*1) RBO
2) Return
to RBS*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-008/2#11494

BY NDJ, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

ALERT COPY

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11495

DER BUNDESMINISTER DES INNERN

Geschäftszeichen (bei Antwort bitte angeben)

(0228)

datum

IS 3/P I 2 - 626 522/22

681-5415 24 July 1985

Der Bundesminister des Innern, Postfach 170290, 5300 Bonn 1

Dienstgebäude Nr. 1

Robert B. Oakley
Ambassador
Department of State, Head of the
Office for Combatting Terrorism,
State Department

Subject: Meeting of experts of the states party to the World Economic Summit on an "Analysis of Terrorism"
Reference: Meeting in Bonn on 7 and 8 March
Enclosures: - 4 -

Dear Mr. Oakley,

At the meeting in Bonn on 7 and 8 March 1985 the experts responsible for internal security considered a range of measures aimed at intensifying the exchange of information between the Seven with a view to warding off dangers arising from international terrorism. The experts issued the recommendation that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany as hosts to the meeting of experts engage in consultations with other Summit countries with the aim of implementing the measures agreed. In compliance with this decision I should like to propose the following options for concrete implementation of the measures planned:

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NLS F99-008/24/11495

BY LSJ NARA, DATE 3/5/07

und hergestelltes Papier

1. Possibilities of further improvement in the cooperation of the authorities and agencies of the Seven Summit countries in the fight against terrorism

Within the framework of cooperation between the member states of the European Community as regards terrorism, a standardized pattern for establishing records of terrorist groups was developed which serves as a basis for reports in the member states. In detail the pattern provides for the following points:

- name of the group
- origin
- ideological complexion and public backing
- strength, structure and logistics
- field of activities, targets, mode of action
- connections to and amalgamation with other groups/circles/agencies at home and abroad
- support of the group by third persons
- actual dangerousness, tendency and prognosis.

Membership? Bios? Photos?

At present experts in matters of terrorism of the member states of the European Community (so-called TREVI-cooperation) follow this pattern when establishing records of terrorist groups. As example you will find enclosed in this letter a description of the terrorist groups "Red Army Faction" and "Revolutionary Cells" active in the Federal Republic of Germany which is based on this pattern (enclosure 1).

Proposal for further action:

The pattern developed by TREVI could also serve as a basis for the exchange of information between the Seven in particular as regards terrorist groups operating on an international level.

Subsequent to the establishing of first records of terrorist groups a regular up-dating would have to be agreed upon in order to secure at any time topical information on active terrorist groups.

2. Exchange of data on past incidents in order to create a broader agreed data base and consideration of agreement on the basic information to be provided in reporting specific incidents

The working and information group on the fight against terrorism which basically consists of the competent heads of terrorism divisions of all central police authorities of the member states of the European Community but also of some other European countries has drawn up a standardized form for establishing records of terrorist activities and findings relating to these - in particular as regards any means and resources used by the offenders and mode of action (enclosure 2).

It is the purpose of this procedure to establish a joint inventory for the recognition of international terrorist activities. . .

Proposal for further action:

The standardized form could possibly also serve as a basis for the exchange of information between the competent security authorities of the Seven. The competent authority in the Federal Republic of Germany is the Federal Office of Criminal Police.

3. Intensification of measures to prevent from entering or remaining in their countries persons of other nationalities who are suspected of terrorism

One TREVI group of experts worked out a draft agreement on setting up an international system for the exchange of information among the member states of TREVI on undesirable aliens from third countries who constitute a terrorist threat. Details on the arrangements planned can be obtained from the agreement (enclosure 3).

The Ministers of the European Community responsible for internal security approved of the agreement at their meeting on 21 June 1985.

Proposal for further action:

An agreement along the same lines could also be concluded among the Seven.

4. Continuing to make full use of all intelligent sources of security authorities and established channels for exchanging information on terrorist threats and incidents, offenders (suspects), technical data and information on the behaviour and methods of responsible groups. Increase whenever possible the exchange of information on financial transactions by or for terrorist organizations.

This point should be covered by the exchange of information lined out in No 1-3.

5. Immediate bilateral and, as appropriate, multilateral consultations in case of a serious acute terrorist threat or a response or concerted action through established channels.

This point refers to a case by case measure.

Proposal for further action:

Further preparatory work as regards procedure does not seem to be necessary at present. Relevant consultations will, when appropriate, be started by a country subject to a terrorist threat or activity.

6. Cooperation to reach improved protective measures on site (embassies etc.) to counter terrorist threats more effectively

From our point of view the following German embassies are to be considered as being subject to particular threat:

South America/Central America

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| - Argentina (Buenos Aires) | - Mexico (Mexico City) |
| - Brazil (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo) | - Nicaragua (Managua) |
| - El Salvador (San Salvador) | - Peru (Lima) |
| - Guatemala (Guatemala) | - Trinidad and Tobago (Port-of-Spain) |
| - Jamaica (Kingston) | |
| - Colombia (Bogota) | - Venezuela (Caracas) |

Africa

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| - Angola (Luanda) | - Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou) |
| - Guinea (Conakry) | - Zambia (Lusaka) |
| - Kenia (Nairobi) | - Senegal (Dakar) |
| - Mozambique (Maputo) | - Chad (N'Djamena) |
| - Nigeria (Lagos) | - Uganda (Kampala) |
| - Nigeria (Kaduna) | |

Near and Middle East

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| - Iran (Teheran) | - Thailand (Bangkok) |
| - Lebanon (Beirut) | - Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby) |

Proposal for further action:

Embassies of the Seven located in the countries mentioned above - and as appropriate in other countries where according to your point of view a particular threat is given - could be instructed to hold regular joint discussions on the security situation and to report on it. These discussions should not only deal with an exchange of information on concrete threat assessment, protection of VIP's and vulnerable objects planned or carried out including experience gained, but should also cover questions of concrete cooperate and mutual assistance to reach improved protection against threats on site. Security experts should be dispatched to take part in the discussions if necessary.

The paper worked out by the Federal Office of Criminal Police on securing and protecting German diplomatic missions abroad (distributed at the London meeting of experts in April 1984) and the decisions on mutual assistance taken at the Washington meeting of experts in January 1981 could serve as a guideline for these joint security discussions.

7. Measures to counter misuse of diplomatic privileges by certain states sponsoring terrorist activities

Several multinational bodies have dealt with questions of terrorism in relation to misuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities. Most recently the Council of Europe and an ad hoc-working group set up by the Council have started work on the problem. It is not the purpose of this work to bring about a revision of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations but rather to deal with the implementation of the Convention.

Proposal for further action:

The Council of Europe should be supported in its dealing with the problem.

As a concrete measure the Seven should strengthen their cooperation when exchanging information on members of diplomatic missions of whom there is reason to believe that they are involved in terrorist activities. In general, a member state should refuse to accept any person as diplomat who was expelled from another country for his links with terrorism.

In the case of a possible joint response to a concrete case of misuse standing in relation to a terrorist activity the country concerned has the opportunity to initiate relevant consultations (no. 5).

8. Intensification of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism with other states and within international organizations

Within the Council of Europe and between the member countries of the European Community a readiness for closer cooperation in the fight against terrorism can be discerned. The a.m. measures planned by the experts of the Seven serve the same purpose. Some countries are furthermore supported in police training, equipment etc.

Proposal for further action:

Steps in the direction of a closer cooperation in the fight against terrorism should be expressly supported. Concrete short-comings and if possible ways of remedying them should remain on the agenda of future meetings of experts of the Seven.

I should be obliged to you if you sent me your opinion on the proposed implementation of the decisions taken at the Bonn meeting of experts on 7 and 8 March 1985 and possibly put forward further considerations.

Enclosure 4 is a revised edition in German and in English of the report on terrorism in the various regions of the world.

Moreover, I included several photographs of our last meeting in Bonn on 7 and 8 March.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Lenz". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent initial "G" and a long, sweeping underline.

TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

Date of Receipt | 8/20/85 | Router's Initials | AK

Remarks: Received from C. ALLEN. Travelers to specific countries take note.

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Deadline Date |

Incoming Chrono File | YES

Data Base Keyword(s) | MULTILATERAL, INTERNATIONAL, STRIKE FORCE

Filer | DORIS | Out |

Subject Working File |

SECRET

For use of this form, see AR 380-5; the proponent agency is ACSI.

THIS IS A COVER SHEET
FOR
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BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN
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THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFOR-
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NLS F99-008/2 #11497

By WJ, NARA, Date 3/5/07

SUBJECT: Multilateral Strike Force

FOIA(b) (1)

MADRID -- Spaniards believe closer international cooperation necessary; [redacted] Europeans may already be canvassing each other on an international strike force and may be looking to USG to broker it and supply an "umbrella" under which it could operate. [redacted] a senior staff aide to Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez expressed doubt that the idea would work; suggested existing strike forces meet and train together in each other's countries. For this, high-level political agreement necessary; USG should take the lead, but Gonzalez would be a good candidate to head the "public diplomacy" effort to support the force, and would probably be willing if everything worked out in advance and he not embarrassed by a fiasco.

TUNIS -- [redacted] idea has merit; [redacted] will raise with Tunisian contacts c. 29 July.

ROME -- The Chief of Italian Military Intelligence (SISMI) is supportive of concept as well as of possible Italian participation. Says must a) avoid Interpol and b) realize force can only deploy to friendly countries. [redacted] Club of Berne would probably refuse US participation even if they should involve themselves in such an effort.

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PARIS -- The Director of the French Internal Service (DST) and the Director of the External Service (DGSE) are both negative on the idea, claim it unworkable; ([REDACTED] French in general not keen on multilateral framework); The External Service Chief suggested possibility of one national force having assets and facilities in other countries. (Amb. Oakley reportedly told French that Spanish had recently suggested the idea of a multilateral counter-terrorist force, evidently reported in NODIS embtel)

LONDON -- [REDACTED] suggests convincing a small, neutral country (such as Sweden or Switzerland) to form a counter-terrorist strike force, possibly under UN or other multinational organization's aegis, says that a multilateral force would only compound existing problems in getting joint action on terrorism.

AMMAN -- The King of Jordan says idea good in theory but would never work in practice due to political and administrative problems; [REDACTED] he clearly prefers to retain an independent Jordanian capability.

RIYADH -- [REDACTED] questions need for another counter-terrorist strike force, suggesting instead that existing forces be used under some new international agreement.

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~~S E C R E T~~

BONN -- The State Secretary of the Federal Chancellor's Office firmly rejected suggestion, said didn't believe "anyone" would agree, since it entailed serious problems regarding national sovereignty and command-and-control. (GSG-9 could never act but under FRG control); [REDACTED] Interpol or the Trevi Group don't look good as sponsoring organizations. [REDACTED] will raise issue with new BND and BFV chiefs soon.

~~S E C R E T~~