Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: North, Oliver: Files Folder Title: Terrorism: French Cooperation (1) Box: 14

To see more digitized collections visit: <u>https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library</u>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: <u>https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection</u>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <u>https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing</u>

National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	NORTH,	OLIVER: FILES				ndrav		
				SMF 3/25/200				
File Folder	TERROR	ISM: FRENCH CO	OPERATION (1)	FOIA				
)7-081		
Box Number	14				NOU 218	JZILL	E	
ID Doc Type	Doc	ument Description		No of Pages	Doc Date	Rest	rictions	
53270 REPORT	RE LI	EBANON		12	5/23/1983	B1	В3	
53271 CABLE	25214	3Z MAY 84		3	5/25/1984	B1		
	R	4/9/2010	NLRRM2007-081					
53272 MEMO		TH TO POINDEXTER I FRENCH,	R RE DIALOGUE	1	8/10/1984	B1		
	R	1/26/2012	M081/1					
53273 NOTE	TO N	ORTH RE ATTACHE	ED PAPER	1	8/6/1984	B1		
	R	4/9/2010	NLRRM2007-081					
53274 PAPER	RE D	ISCUSSIONS WITH	FRENCH	2	ND	B1		
	R	4/9/2010	NLRRM2007-081					
53275 MEMO		LICATE OF 53272, W	TTH NOTATION	1	8/10/1984	B1		
	R	1/26/2012	M081/1					
53276 PROF NOTE			I, ET AL RE FRANCE	1	8/21/1984	B1		
	R	4/9/2010	NLRRM2007-081					
53277 CABLE		51Z DEC 84		15	12/1/1984	B1		
	R	4/9/2010	NLRRM2007-081					
53278 MEMO		SSISTANT TO THE I ONAL SECURITY A		4	1/7/1986	B1	B3	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	NORTH,	OLIVER: FILES			Witl	hdrawer
					SMF	3/25/2008
File Folder	TERROF	RISM: FRENCH C	COOPERATION (1)		FOL	A
					S200	07-081
Box Number	14				NOU	JZILLE
ID Doc Туре	Doc	cument Description	on	No of Pages		Restrictions
53279 MEMO			IE PRESIDENT FOR Y AFFAIRS, ET AL	3	1/7/1986	B1 B3
53280 CABLE	2419	58Z MAR 86		2	3/24/1986	B1
	R	4/9/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
				2	3/28/1986	B1
53282 CABLE	RE C	COOPERATION W	IIIIFKENCH	4	5/20/1/00	DI

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

To Name and Ad	JTING dress	Date	Initials	٨	
1 Kenp/Teic	. / Dun	6/17	GN/10	6/22 \$ 4/22	-SECRET-
2 D North		6/17	10.1		
3		1		UNCLASSIFIED UPON OF CLASSIFIEL ENCL	REMOVA
4				Amp	NTROL NO 454
5					410454
6				NSC/ICS CO	NTROLNO.
ACTION	FILE				
APPROVAL	INFO	RMATIC	DN		COPY NO OF
COMMENT	PREP	ARE REF	PLY		
CONCURRENCE	RECO	MMENI	DATION		
DIRECT REPLY	RETU	IRN			
DISPATCH	SIGN	ATURE			
REMARKS: Separata Sert	to No	ter		HANDLE V	IA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized <u>Disc</u>losure Subject to <u>Criminal Sanctions</u> MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

-

original of system iv file $\underline{820401452}$ removed from iran contra investigation files.

REMOVED	FROM I	NORTH B	<u>ox</u> M	ARKED	AS:	Outer	14		
вү	10m	Acal	int	brene		DA	TE _	3	128/90

-

COPY OF THIS SYSTEM IV FILE WAS SUBSTITUTED:

YES _____ NO _____

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

	ction Name TH, OLIVER: FILES	Withdrawer SMF 3/25/2008					
File I	Folder		FOIA				
TERF	RORISM: FRENCH COOPERATION (1)		S2007-081 NOUZILLE				
Box N	Number						
14			218				
ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions			
			<u>.</u>				
5327	0 REPORT	12	5/23/1983	B1			
	RE LEBANON			B3			
· ·			а. . Х				
:							
a Constantino de la constantino de la cons Constantino de la constantino de la cons							
		• • • •					

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

EXD D S

> EXD D S

EXDIS

EXD D S 532

1

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø3 SECSTATE WASHDC 5524 SIT831 ANØØ96Ø8	TOR: 149/1850Z
DISTRIBUTION: KIMM HKY <u>Nort</u> EOB /ØØ3	
PRIORITY	
DE RUEHC #5524 1462337 P 252143Z MAY 84	
FM SECSTATE WASHDC	
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3510	
SECPET STATE 155524	
EXDIS	
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PTER, FR, US	
SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH ON	TERRORISM
REF: PARIS 18704	
1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.	ب
2. SUMMARY. EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM MARTI	N THAT US
ACCEPTS FRENCH INVITATION FOR DISCREET CO	NSULTATIONS ON
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TERRORISM. YOU SHOULD U	
OUR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE CONSULTATIONS ON ELEMENT OF THE TERRORISM PROBLEM AT THE L	
LEVEL DOES NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR OUR DESIRE	
FRENCH ON THE OVERALL TOPIC OF STATE SUPP	
TERRORISM AT A HIGHER LEVEL. A SMALL US	
DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER MCGOVERN COULD BE IN	PARIS JUNE 25
- 26 FOR THESE TALKS. END SUMMARY.	DECLASSIFIED
	NLRR (107-081#5327/ BY CN NALADATE 4/5/10
,	DT VI NATA DAIL IVI

SECRET

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø3 SECSTATE WASHDC 5524 DTG: 252143Z MAY 84 PSN: Ø72841

EX D I S

EX D I S

EXDIS

Ś

3. WE WELCOME MARTIN'S INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM AND WISH TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND POSITIVELY. YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM THAT THE US ACCEPTS THE FRENCH INVITATION. WE AGREE THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE LIMITED INITIALLY TO THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE SUPPORTED TERRORISM. WHILE WE DO NOT WISH TO LIMIT OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH TO "DIPLOMATIC TERRORISM," WE CONSIDER IT USEFUL TO DISCUSS THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITY. AND PREMISES FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES AS A SUB-SET OF THE LARGER PROBLEM OF STATE SUPPORTED TERRORISM. WE PREFER THE CONSULTATIONS TO BE AS INFORMAL AS POSSIBLE AND WOULD NOT PROPOSE ANY SET AGENDA. HOWEVER, IN ADDITION TO THE SPECIFIC TOPICS MARTIN SUGGESTED, WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO INCLUDE AN EXCHANGE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN RULES ON DIPLOMATIC POUCHES AND COURRIERS.

4. US SIDE IN CONSULTATIONS WILL BE LED BY DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER DAN MCGOVERN AND WILL INCLUDE ONE OR TWO OTHERS FROM L AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF MC/T. EUR WOULD LIKE FUTURE OIC FOR FRENCH AFFAIRS DEAN CURRAN TO BE ITS REPRESENTATIVE IF EMBASSY PERCEIVES NO OBJECTION.

WE WANT TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO THIS INVITATION IN 5. THE HOPES WE CAN FOLLOW-UP WITH THE ORIGINAL IDEA OF A HIGH LEVEL VISIT IN THE FALL. YOU SHOULD SUGGEST JUNE 25 - 26 FOR THE CONSULTATIONS. IF QUAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE FONTAINEBLEAU SUMMIT MAKES THOSE DATES IMPOSSIBLE. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO SCHEDULE THE TALKS ON THE FOLLOWING TWO DAYS BUT THERE IS A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR JUNE 25 - 26.

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø3 SECSTATE WASHDC 5524 DTG: 252143Z MAY 84 PSN: Ø72841

6. WE AGREE TO FRENCH SUGGESTION TO KEEP TALKS AS DISCREET AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT. WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY THAT FRENCH ARE NOT OFFERING THE KIND OF DIALOGUE WE DESIRE. IN FACT, ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE FOCUS OF OUR BILATERAL TERRORISM EXCHANGES TO "DIPLOMATIC TERRORISM" UNDERCUTS MUCH OF THE THRUST OF OUR PUSH TO GET THE FRENCH TO COME TO GRIPS MORE FULLY WITH THE LARGER PROBLEM OF STATE SUPPORTED TERRORISM. NONETHELESS, WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY THAT THIS RARE FRENCH OFFER SHOULD BE SEIZED. IT IS IMPORTANT THE FRENCH REALIZE THESE CONSULTATIONS ONLY DEAL WITH A SMALL PART OF THE PROBLEM AND THAT STILL DESIRE FURTHER BROADER DISCUSSIONS. SHULTZ BT


EX D S

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS





53272

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 10, 1984

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Dialogue with the French on Terrorism

Bob Sayre has proposed that after your November meeting with the British in London, that you continue on to Paris for a similar bilateral discussion with the French. Bob suggests this as a response to Ambassador Galbraith's recommendation for a bilateral dialogue with the French. A multilateral meeting is scheduled in London for September 19 on implementation of the London Declaration. Secretary Shultz is expected to meet with the Summit Seven Foreign Ministers during the UNGA about two weeks after the multilateral meeting in London.

Bob has discussed the matter with EUR and with AMEMB Paris. All agree that we need periodic meetings with the French to compare notes on state-sponsored terrorism, intelligence exchanges, and cooperative responses. The key difficulty in the bilateral context is that in the USG our principal actor is the State Department, whereas in Europe the problem is internal and the principal actor is the Interior or Home Ministry. We have a bureaucratic problem for State and our Embassies moving the discussion in the proper venue without "heartburn" in the Foreign Ministries.

A solution to this problem is an approach to the French similar to what we have started with the British. We could move in this direction in November, if you would agree to visit Paris after London. A U.S. group, which you would lead, could meet with a French delegation headed by someone from Elysee. The French would undoubtedly include representatives from the Foreign Ministry, the Interior, Defense, and probably Security. If you agree to this approach, Mike Armacost can take this up with the French when he visits Paris at the end of the month. Bob Sayre will arrange once you concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Bob Sayre and indicate your concurrence in principal to a meeting with the French in Paris after your November meeting with the British in London.

Approve _____

Disapprove

SECRET Declassify: OADR



DECLASSIFIED , <u>NI. R.R. MOT-081</u> # 53272 BY_RU__NARA DATE 1/26/17 Ollie North:

The attached paper provides more detail out the idea we explored briefly on the telephone. A visit by John should help break the impasse on trying to get some kind of structure for a realistic dialogue. The French are reluctant because they have doubts that we can really be discreet. Our embassy has problems with anything bilateral that they do not run--the idea of bilateral discussions to develop a multilateral consensus seems a little difficult to grasp'

532.73

DECLASSIFIED 2-10450 NLRR M07-081 #53273 BY 11 NARA DATE 4/9/10

RMS

8/6/84



Paris 29634

Ambassador Galbraith has recommended /bilateral discussions with the French at least at the Deputy Secretary level. The proposal really appears to propose bilateral discussions by the Secretary with French counterparts in the Foreign Ministry, Interior, and Defense.

Sayre and McGovern had bilateral discussions with the French in Paris in late June. These discussions were only with the Foreign Ministry.

A multilateral meeting is scheduled in London for September 19 on implementation of the London Declaration. The key item will probably be controlling abuse by states of diplomatic privileges and immunities that amount to state sponsored terrorism. Other items will probably be the sanctions against Afghanistan's Ariana Airlines and the hijacking of the Air France plane to Teheran. We should probably seek to develop a consensus document# on state terrorism.

The Secretary is expected to meet with the Summit Seven Foreign Ministers in New York during the UNGA about two weeks after the multilateral meeting in London.

Undersecretary Armacost is going to Paris soon but to talk primarily at the Foreign Ministry. A request for appointments at other ministries could raise questions and issues, but the key actors in the French Government on terrorism are in Interior and probably Defense, and the Second

What we need is a periodic meeting with the French on international terrorism to compare notes on state sponsored terrorism, other terrorist issues, etc. To be most useful this should be at the assistant secretary level. Neither the Secretary nor the Deputy Secretary have the time to be engaged with the French on a regular basis on this subject. They can of course address the subject in the context of other meetings as the Secretary did at the London Summit and as he expects to do at the UNGA.

A key difficulty in the bilateral context is that within the USG the key actor is the State Department whereas in France as in other European countries the problem is internal and the key actor is the Interior (Home) ministry. There is a bureaucratic problem for State and our embassies to move the discussion into the proper ministries without some "heartburn" on the part of Foreign Relations.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MUZOEI #53274 BY_____ NARA DATE 4/9/10



The French more than most European countries insist on dealing with the key issues on international terrorism only on a bilateral basis. Our Paris embassy has some problem with Washington based officials regularly conducting bilateral discussions with the French on these issues.

Key Questions

1. Should we recommend to the Deputy Secretary and/or the Secretary that they undertake bilateral discussions in depth with the French on this subject?

2. Should we recommend to Undersecretary Armacost that he take this up with the French in Paris?

3. Should be we seek some other alternative to have a periodic discussion and review of international terrorism with the French?

Discussion

The French are willing to have a serious bilateral discussion on terrorism issues as evidenced by the Sayre/McGovern discussions with them and the interchange with Embassy Paris. They have also been willing to talk about the issues at the Secretary/Foreign Minister level as well as with the Defense Minister. They have listened at multilateral gatherings but have not really contributed.

The real problem is to get and ongoing bilateral discourse among the key officials in both governments responsible for the issues such as we have with the UK, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Sayre/McGovern exchange was a first step. It in fact occurred at French initiative. It would be useful to build on that. The next step could be the Armacost visit as which he reviews the general situation. He could propose a more extensive bilateral exchange later in the year to include officials from the French ministries of Interior and Admiral Poindexter (No. 2 in NSC) plans a trip to Defense. London in November for that purpose and he could include a visit to Paris. A US group led by Poindexter should have the natural effect of a French group headed by someone from the Elysee plus the Foreign Ministry, Interior and Defense. We could then seek to have following meetings with essentially the same composition on both sides.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 10, 1984

SYSTEM II 90871

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Dialogue with the French on Terrorism

Bob Sayre has proposed that after your November meeting with the British in London, that you continue on to Paris for a similar bilateral discussion with the French. Bob suggests this as a response to Ambassador Galbraith's recommendation for a bilateral dialogue with the French. A multilateral meeting is scheduled in London for September 19 on implementation of the London Declaration. Secretary Shultz is expected to meet with the Summit Seven Foreign Ministers during the UNGA about two weeks after the multilateral meeting in London.

Bob has discussed the matter with EUR and with AMEMB Paris. All agree that we need periodic meetings with the French to compare notes on state-sponsored terrorism, intelligence exchanges, and cooperative responses. The key difficulty in the bilateral context is that in the USG our principal actor is the State Department, whereas in Europe the problem is internal and the principal actor is the Interior or Home Ministry. We have a bureaucratic problem for State and our Embassies moving the discussion in the proper venue without "heartburn" in the Foreign Ministries.

A solution to this problem is an approach to the French similar to what we have started with the British. We could move in this direction in November, if you would agree to visit Paris after London. A U.S. group, which you would lead, could meet with a French delegation headed by someone from Elysee. The French would undoubtedly include representatives from the Foreign Ministry, the Interior, Defense, and probably Security. If you agree to this approach, Mike Armacost can take this up with the Fifrench when he visits Paris at the end of the month. Bob Sayre will arrange once you concur.

RECOMMENDATION

NARA

That you call Bob Sayre and indicate your concurrence in principal to a meeting with the French in Paris after your November meeting with the British in London.

Approve

then only on a specific Case.

Disapprove

Niste of

Chance of success would be dealing secretly with Clyses and

<u>SECRET</u> Declassify: OADR

Abardh

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: Ollie North To: Ollie North

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

0

+08/21/84 17:29:43

-- SECRET SUBJECT: France and Combatting Terrorism

Bob Sayre finally talked me into agreeing to go to Paris as well as London in Nov. if everything can be worked out. I am not very sanguine about Paris but I am willing to try. State has it for action to try to set up.

copy to: Peter Sommer, Ty Cobb, Jack Matlock

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

DECLASSIFIED NLRR <u>MO7-081 #53</u>276 []_____ NARA DATE<u>4/G /</u>10

N O D I S

N D J S

N D J S

N D D S د ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø4 SIT917		DTG:Ø11051Z DEC 84 PSN:Ø19410 TOR: 336/1218Z
DISTRIBUTION: N WHSR COMMENT:	ICF JP KIMM VP <u>N</u> NODIS/FYI	DRT SIT EOB /Ø1Ø
PRIORITY STU3440 DE RUFHFR #5741 PØ11051Z DEC 8 FM AMEMBASSY PA	4	DECLADSIFIED NLAR <u>M07-081 #53</u> 277 BY_ <u>CII</u> MARA DATE <u>46</u> /10
a start to many many many many	HDC PRIORITY 2746 TION Ø1 OF Ø4 PARIS	4 5 7 4 1
NODIS		
DEPT PASS NSC F	OR POINDEXTER	
E.O. 12356: DEC TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDE TERRORISM	L: OADR XTER/OAKLEY TALKS W	ITH FRENCH ON
REF: STATE 30/9	658	
1. (SECRET - E	NTIRE TEXT.)	
RADM POINDEXTER	HE CONSTRUCTIVE NOV AND AMBASSADOR OAK VED THE TWO SIDES TO	

SECRET

TERRORIST THREATS AND ENHANCE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø4 PARIS 5741

N D D S

N

N

0 D I

Ś

N

0 D I S DTG: Ø11Ø51Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø1941Ø

GOVERNMENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROBLEM. FRENCH OFFICIALS WERE, HOWEVER, MORE WILLING TO EXPLAIN THAN TO DEBATE THEIR GOVERNMENT'S CONCEPTION OF TERRORISM. ALTHOUGH THEY REGARD THE LEVEL OF TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST FRENCH INTERESTS AS SERIOUS, THEY GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THEY VIEWED THE PROBLEM AS SEVERE ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A NEW POLICY LINE. NOR DID THEY GIVE GROUND IN THEIR CONCEPTION OF TERRORISM AS A SET OF DISTINCT -- AND ULTIMATELY POLITICAL -- PROBLEMS. DESPITE STATISTICAL DATA CITED BY POINDEXTER, GOF OFFICIALS APPEARED UNSWAYED IN THEIR BELIEF THAT FRANCE IS LESS THREATENED THAN THE US BY TERRORISM.

3. EMBASSY NEVERTHELESS BELIEVES SUCH DIALOGUE WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS ON TERRORISM IS USEFUL AND NECESSARY BOTH TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES OVER THE LONGER TERM AND TO ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVERGENT VIEWS IN SPECIFIC CRISIS SITUATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, GOF OFFICIALS DID NOT RULE OUT PRE-EMPTIVE OR PUNITIVE ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS IN CONCERT WITH THE USG IN SPECIFIC CASES. ALTHOUGH UNDOUBTEDLY THEIR STANDARDS OF PROOF AND SENSITIVITY TO POLITICAL CRITICISM WOULD BE HIGH. THE GOF ALSO WELCOMED COOPERATION AMONG COUNTER-TERRORISM EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES. PARTICULARLY ON TECHNOLOGY TO COUNTER TERRORIST THREATS. WE WOULD WELCOME FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL USG DELEGATIONS IN PARIS TO DISCUSS THE TERRORISM PROBLEM WITH THE FRENCH. AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOF OFFICIALS TO VISIT THE US FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARAS 16, 17 AND 18. (NOTE: DELEGATIONS DISCUSSION ON TERRORISM WITH GEN. SAULNIER OF THE ELYSEE WAS RECORDED SEPARATELY BY OLIVER NORTH OF THE NSC). END SUMMARY.

4. MEETING WITH QUAL SECGEN FRANCOLS GUTMANN

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø4 PARIS 5741

N

0 D I S

N D D I S

N D D S

N D D I S DTG: Ø11Ø51Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø1941Ø

POINDEXTER THANKED GUTMANN AND HIS DEPUTY JACQUES MARTIN FOR RECEIVING THE DELEGATION TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM, WHICH HE SAID POSES A GROWING PROBLEM. HE THOUGHT THAT DISCREET EXCHANGES OF IDEAS ON THE ISSUE WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES WERE USEFUL AND INDEED NECESSARY. THE USG WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE IT WAS BEING USED PURPOSELY AND WITH SOME EFFECTIVENESS TO DESTABILIZE CERTAIN COUNTRIES. UNFORTUNATELY, IT WAS CLEAR THAT OUR LEVERAGE AGAINST TERRORISM WAS EXTREMELY LIMITED. THE GROUPS INVOLVED IN TERRORISM WERE CONSTANTLY CHANGING THEIR PROFILES. THEY WERE HARD TO CONTROL. POINDEXTER SAID HE HOPED CONTACTS SUCH AS PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S IMMINENT TRIP TO DAMASCUS MIGHT HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE.

5. GUTMANN SAID ON THE TERRORISM ISSUE WE ALWAYS SEEM TO BE COUNTERING THE PREVIOUS ATTACK. IF TERRORISTS ARE WILLING TO SACRIFICE THEIR LIVES, THERE IS NO GOOD DEFENSE. HOWEVER, HE NOTED, A FEW ELEMENTARY PRECAUTIONS IN BEIRUT IN 1983 COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE TRAGIC BOMBINGS AGAINST THE US AND FRENCH BARR8CKS. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CONCEPT OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM WAS NOT ALWAYS ACCURATE. SOME TERRORISTS WORK FOR A STATE, OTHERS FOR AN ORGANIZATION WITHIN

A STATE, SOME SIMPLY FOR A CAUSE. ALIGNMENTS OFTEN CHANGE, AND THERE ARE SOME GROUPS THAT ARE BASICALLY FOR HIRE. FRANCE ENDEAVORS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DIVERSITY OF THE GROUPS AT TIMES TO PLAY THEM AGAINST ONE ANOTHER. -" 'HHM AGAINST

6. POINDEXTER COMMENTED THAT IT IS USEFUL FOR BOTH THE

SECRET

PAGE Ø4 OF Ø4 PARIS 5741

DTG: Ø11051Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø1941Ø

US AND THE FRENCH TO KNOW HOW THE OTHER IS DEALING WITH THE TERRORISM PROBLEM. HE WONDERED WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS WE COULD TAKE TO TRACK TERRORIST GROUPS AS THEY MOVE FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP BETTER TRACK OF TERRORISTS' IDENTITIES. BT

N D D S

N O D I S

N D I S

N D D S

N D D I S

N O D I S

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø4 SIT918		DTG:Ø11051Z DEC TOR: 336/1222Z	84 PSN:Ø19419
DISTRIBUTION: 1	<u>P</u> /ØØ1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
PRIORITY			
STU3443			
DE RUFHFR #5741 PØ11Ø51Z DEC 8			
FM AMEMBASSY PA			
TO SECSTATE WAS	HDC PRIORITY 2747		
SETRET SEC	TION Ø2 OF Ø4 PARIS	45/41	
NODIS			
DEPT PASS NSC F	OR POINDEXTER		
E.O. 12356: DEC	CI- OADR		
TAGS: PTER, FR			
SUBJECT: POINDE	XTER/OAKLEY TALKS WI	TH FRENCH ON	
	D NOTED THAT OUR CONS S ABOUT TERRORISM HAV		
		HE CITED DISAGREEMENT	
		SUE AT THE LONDON SUM	WIT.
	ED THAT FRANCE IS SOM		
	SUCH ISSUES ON A MULT AMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE		
	EAST WHICH FRANCE HAD		
	ATER, DIFFERENT REPOR		
SUBJECT REACHEI	D THE FRENCH FROM THE	ITALIAN AND	

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø4 PARIS 5741

N

N O D I

Ś

N

0 D

S

N D D DTG: Ø11051Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø19419

TURKISH GOVERNMENTS. THE SOURCE OF THIS "NEW" INFORMATION TURNED OUT TO HAVE BEEN THE ORIGINAL FRENCH REPORT, BY NOW MUCH DISTORTED. BUT IT TOOK THE FRENCH SEVERAL DAYS OF DIGGING -- PLUS MUCH TIME AND ENERGY -- TO DISCOVER THIS. GUTMANN SAID THAT IT WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE TO HAVE COORDINATION IN THE FIELD BETWEEN OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (ON A BILATERAL BASIS) TO AVOID SUCH PROBLEMS. BUT FRANCE WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT MEETINGS ON A POLITICAL LEVEL INVOLVING SEVERAL COUNTRIES TRYING TO COORDINATE THEIR ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES.

POINDEXTER ASKED IF GUTMANN AND MARTIN HAD ANY 8. ITS SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. GUTMANN REMARKED THAT FRANCE WAS PERHAPS THE ONLY COUNTRY AS BADLY PLACED AS THE US TO INFLUENCE IRAN. CERTAINLY LITTLE COULD BE DONE TO PREVENT IRAN'S PROSELYTIZING FOR AN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. HE SAID HE WAS 90 PERCENT CONVINCED THAT THE RELIGIOUS REGIME WOULD ENDURE IN IRAN EVEN AFTER KHOMEINI WAS GONE. GUTMANN QUOTED A REMARK BY SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO TO THE EFFECT THAT OUTSIDE COUNTRIES WOULD JUST HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AN IRANIAN LEADER EMERGED WHO WAS CAPABLE OF COHERENT THOUGHT. THERE MAY BE OCCASIONAL CHANCES FOR PREVENTION OR DETERRENCE OF SPECIFIC TERRORIST ACTS, BUT THIS SHOULD BE DONE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS RATHER THAN THROUGH A GENERALIZED PUBLIC POLICY. GUTMANN THEN MENTIONED TERRORIST TRAINING SITES IN IRAN AS THE KIND OF IDENTIFIABLE TARGET AGAINST WHICH WESTERN NATIONS MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACT. POINDEXTER WONDERED WHAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE OF AN AIR STRIKE AGAINST THESE CAMPS. BACKTRACKING A BIT, GUTMANN SAID THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER SUCH A STRIKE WOULD ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE THE EMERGENCE OF COHERENT THOUGHT IN TEHERAN. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT GIVE A DEFINITIVE REACTION AT THIS TIME TO A HYPOTHESIS WITH

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø4 PARIS 5741

N O D I S

N O D I S

N O D I S

N O D

Ś

DTG: Ø11051Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø19419

SUCH SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS. IN SUMMARY, HE THOUGHT THE WEST SHOULD BE PRUDENT NOW. WE NEED A POLICY FOR WHEN THE IRANIAN REGIME EVENTUALLY DOES CHANGE.

9. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTIONING BY POINDEXTER AND OAKLEY ABOUT POSSIBLE PRESSURE AGAINST IRAN, GUTMANN NOTED THAT FRANCE WAS TRYING TO ENCOURAGE A BALANCE OF POWER IN THE AREA AND A REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE BY AIDING IRAQ. FRANCE HAD MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH IRAN DESPITE MANY IRANIAN PROVOCATIONS, INCLUDING BOMBS, HIGHJACKINGS, ETC. THE FRENCH REGULARLY TOLD TEHERAN THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS WERE UNACCEPTABLE, BUT WITHOUT DISCERNIBLE EFFECT. ONLY THE THREAT OF GREATER FRENCH AID TO IRAQ SEEMED TO INFLUENCE THE IRANIANS AT ALL. FRENCH POLICY TOWARD IRAN WAS ONE OF CONTAINMENT WHICH COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO PAY DIVIDENDS IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT IT WAS ALL THAT WAS PRACTICABLE.

10. POINDEXTER SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE WEST APPLY ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE AGAINST COUNTRIES THAT EXPORT TERRORISM. IT MAY BE THAT THE ANSWER LIES IN TAKING A NUMBER OF SMALL STEPS RATHER THAN A FEW BIG ONES, BUT WE SHOULD LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED

IN LOOKING FOR SOLUTIONS. GUTMANN REPLIED THAT FRANCE WAS AS CONCERNED AS THE US ABOUT THE NEED TO FIGHT TERRORISM EFFICIENTLY. THIS HAD TO BE PRACTICAL AND PRAGMATIC WORK, BASED ON THE REALITIES OF VARIOUS SITUATIONS RATHER THAN GENERAL PRINCIPLES. POINDEXTER REPLIED THAT THE US AGREED IT WAS PRODUCTIVE TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS.

11. US-FRANCE EXTRADITION TREATY:

27 %												
	PAGE	Ø4			5741	DT	G:Ø	11051	Z DEC	84	PSN:Ø	19419
N D S	BT											
N O D I S			:									
N D I S												
N D I S												

.

N O D I S

N D D I S

N D D I S

N O D I S

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø4 SIT919		DTG: Ø11Ø51Z DEC 84 TOR: 336/1224Z	PSN: Ø1942(
DISTRIBUTION:	<u>1P</u> /ØØ1		
PRIORITY STU3446 DE RUFHFR #574 PØ11Ø51Z DEC FM AMEMBASSY PA	84 ZFF 4		
TO SECSTATE WA	SHDC PRIORITY 2748		
SECRETSE	CTION Ø3 OF Ø4 PARIS 4574	1	
NODIS			
DEPT PASS NSC	FOR POINDEXTER		
E.O. 12356: DE TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POIND		FRENCH ON	
FOR A NEW EXTR HE THOUGHT IT ASPECTS OF THE KINDS OF CRIME THAT THOSE WHO JUSTICE. THE MOVE FORWARD A RESPONDED THAT POLITICALLY IN	N RAISED THE QUESTION OF ADITION TREATY BETWEEN TH WOULD HELP US DEAL BETTEN TERRORISM PROBLEM, AS WI S. WHEN COMPLETED, IT SI COMMIT VIOLENT ACTS ARE USG BELIEVED THAT THE NE S QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE SUBJECT WAS A DIFFI FRANCE. THE MINISTRY O ON THIS MATTER.	HE US AND FRANCE. R WITH SOME ELL AS OTHER HOULD ENSURE BROUGHT TO GOTIATIONS SHOULD GUTMANN CULT ONE	

-SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø4 PARIS 5741

N

0 D

Ś

N

Q

D

Ś

N

0 D

Š

N

0 D

S

DTG: Ø11051Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø19420

12. MEETINGS WITH DST AND DGSE

THE DELEGATION ALSO MET WITH YVES BONNET OF THE DST (DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE) AND ROBERT LACOSTE OF THE DGSE (FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE). IN THESE MEETINGS POINDEXTER AND OAKLEY STRESSED USG SATISFACTION WITH THE CORDIAL AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FRENCH SERVICES AND OUR OWN. MUCH USEFUL INFORMATION IS EXCHANGED BY THESE METHODS ON THE TERRORISM ISSUE. THEY OUTLINED THE PURPOSE OF THEIR VISIT TO PARIS. NOTING THAT INTERNATIONAL, STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM WAS A GROWING PROBLEM. INDEED, STUDIES PRODUCED WITHIN THE USG SHOWED THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST FRENCH INTERESTS HAD INCREASED DRAMATICALLY OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, TO THE POINT THAT THEY EVEN EXCEEDED ACTIONS AGAINST US INTERESTS. POINDEXTER STRESSED THAT THE US WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, ITS LINKS TO TERRORISM. AND THE TENDENCY OF BOTH TO DESTABILIZE FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. TERRORISM, INDEED, WAS BEING UTILIZED SPECIFICALLY TO ACCOMPLISH SUCH DESTABILIZATION. HE SOLICITED FRENCH VIEWS ON HOW TOGETHER WE MIGHT BETTER COMBAT THESE THREATS.

13. BOTH BONNET AND LACOSTE EMPHASIZED THAT ALTHOUGH BOTH FRANCE AND THE US HAD BEEN TARGETS OF TERRORISM AT VARIOUS TIMES, THEIR POSITIONS IN THIS REGARD WERE FAR FROM IDENTICAL. ESPECIALLY NOW THAT FRANCE HAD WITHDRAWN ITS MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON, IT WAS NOT NEARLY AS MUCH OF A TARGET FOR TERRORIST ACTION AS THE US. THE FRENCH OFFICIALS OUTLINED THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO FRENCH

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø4 PARIS 5741

N O D I S

N

N

0 D

Ś

N D D

Ś

DTG: Ø11Ø51Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø1942Ø

INTERESTS, INCLUDING FRENCH EXTREME LEFTISTS, SEPARATISTS SUCH AS THE CORSICANS, AND MIDDLE EASTERN GROUPS. THEY WARNED AGAINST LUMPING THESE GROUPS TOGETHER IN OUR ANALYSIS, BECAUSE THEIR AIMS WERE DIFFERENT.

14. BONNET AND LACOSTE CONTENDED THAT THE US. BECAUSE OF ITS STATUS AS A WORLD POWER, AND ESPECIALLY ITS STRONG TIES TO ISRAEL, FACED A MUCH GREATER THREAT FROM TERRORISM THAN DID FRANCE. THEY SHOWED SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE STATISTICS ON ANTI-FRENCH TERRORISM. AND ASKED TO SEE DOCUMENTATION ON THIS QUESTION. BONNET AND LACOSTE ALSO WARNED AGAINST LINKING THE TERRORISM QUESTION MAINLY TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. IN LEBANON, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY CONTENDED THAT THE MOST VIOLENT TERRORIST GROUPS WERE NOT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. THEY WERE EXTREME LEFTISTS, OFTEN CHRISTIANS, BONNET OF THE DST WAS UNEQUIVOCAL IN ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY TO DAMASCUS FOR MUCH OF THE TERRORIST THREAT. HE NOTED THAT A SYRIAN AIR FORCE GENERAL CONTROLLED SEVERAL OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS THAT POSED THE GREATEST DANGERS TO THE US AND FRANCE. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS WORK CLOSELY WITH, AND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR, THE MOST DANGEROUS MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORIST GROUPS.

15. ASKED HOW FRANCE AND THE US COULD COOPERATE MORE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, DST AND DGSE OFFICIALS OUTLINED THE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THEY WORKED, INCLUDING THE PERMEABILITY OF WEST EUROPEAN BORDERS TO EXTREMIST GROUPS. THEY GAVE NO HINT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY BELIEVED THIS SITUATION COULD BE CHANNED THROUGH POLITICAL ACTION. FOR US-FRENCH COOPERATION, THEY STRESSED PRACTICAL SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø4 OF Ø4 PARIS 5741

N D D I S

N O D I S

NODIS

NODIS

DTG: Ø11051Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø1942Ø

INNOVATIONS SUCH AS WAYS OF TRACKING SUSPECTS FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE WORKING BT

N O D I S

N D J S

N D J S

N D J S !

STU3448 DE RUFHFR #5741/Ø4 336111Ø P Ø11Ø51Z DEC 84 ZFF 4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2749 S E C R E T SECTION Ø4 OF Ø4 PARIS 45741	PAGE Ø1 OF Ø3 SIT92Ø			: Ø11Ø51Z DEC : 336/1226Z	84 PSN:Ø19424
STU3448 DE RUFHFR *5741/Ø4 336111Ø P Ø11Ø51Z DEC 84 ZFF 4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2749 S E C R E T SECTION Ø4 OF Ø4 PARIS 45741 NODIS DEPT PASS NSC FOR POÌNDEXTER E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 	DISTRIBUTION:				
STU3448 DE RUFHFR =5741/#4 336111# P #11#51Z DEC 84 ZFF 4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2749 S E C R E T SECTION #4 OF #4 PARIS 45741 NODIS DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 					
DE RUFHFR *5741/04 3361110 P 011051Z DEC 84 ZFF 4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2749 S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 45741 NODIS DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 	PRIORITY				
P Ø11051Z DEC 84 ZFF 4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2749 S E C R E T SECTION Ø4 OF Ø4 PARIS 45741 NODIS DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 	STU3448				
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2749 S E C R E T SECTION Ø4 OF Ø4 PARIS 45741 NODIS DEPT PASS NSC FOR POÌNDEXTER E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 		-			
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2749 S E C R E T SECTION Ø4 OF Ø4 PARIS 45741 NODIS DEPT PASS NSC FOR POÌNDEXTER E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 					
S E C R E T SECTION #4 OF #4 PARIS 45741 NODIS DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL	rm Amembasst P	AKIS			
NODIS DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 	TO SECSTATE WA	SHDC PRIORITY 2749			
DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 	S E C R E T SE	CTION Ø4 OF Ø4 PARI	S 45741		
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 	NODIS				
TAGS: PTER, FR SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: 	DEPT PASS NSC	FOR POÌNDEXTER			
SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL	E.O. 12356: DE	CL: OADR			
ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL	•				
USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL	SUBJECT: POIND	EXTER/OAKLEY TALKS	WITH FRENCH	ON	
USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL		ZEN INENTITY CADN S	VSTEM WHICH	WILL	
WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL					
NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS. 16. FOR THE FUTURE: EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL					
EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL					
EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL	16 FOD THE F	11 T 11 D F .			
		010KL:			
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON TERRORISM. IN	EMBASSY STRONG	LY RECOMMENDS PERIO	DIC HIGH-LEV	VEL	
	DISCUSSIONS WI	TH THE FRENCH ON TE	RRORISM. I	N	
OUR VIEW, SUCH MEETINGS HAVE A CUMULATIVE EFFECT IN					
NARROWING GENERAL DIFFERENCES, WHILE ENHANCING THE	NARROWING GENE	RAL DIFFERENCES, WH	ILE ENHANCII	NG THE	

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø3 PARIS 5741

0 D I S

N D D

S

N

S

N D D

Ś


DTG: Ø11051Z DEC 84 PSN: Ø19424

POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS, ESPECIALLY CRISES. A FURTHER TOOL, IN OUR VIEW, MIGHT BE THE ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ATA) OUTLINED IN REFTEL. ALTHOUGH PARIS WAS NOT AN ACTION ADDRESSEE ON THIS CABLE, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PROGRAM, IF PRESENTED TACTFULLY AS A MEANS OF ENHANCED CONSUL-TATION AND LIAIION, MIGHT STIMULATE INTEREST AMONG GOF OFFICIALS. THE PROGRAM WOULD BE A MUCH MORE POTENT INSTRUMENT, HOWEVER, IF FUNDING WERE PROVIDED FOR TRAVEL TO THE US AND PER DIEM FOR THESE OFFICIALS. ACTION REQUESTED: THAT FRANCE BE INCLUDED AS A COUNTRY ELIGIBLE FOR

THE PROGRAM, AND THAT FUNDING FOR TRAVEL AND PER DIEM BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED.

17. EMBASSY ALSO BELIEVES THAT USG STUDIES ON TERRORISM AGAINST FRENCH INTERESTS CAN HAVE AN IMPACT ON GOF THINKING. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO SHARE SUCH STUDIES AND DISCUSS ANY DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE GOF. STUDIES SHOULD BE DONE PERIODICALLY AND TRANSMITTED BOTH TO SIRO AND EMBASSY FOR USE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTACTS.

18. FINALLY, WE REITERATE EMPHATICALLY OUR LONG-STANDING RECOMMENDATION THAT CONCLUSION OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON REVISION OF OUR BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY BE GIVEN A HIGH PRIORITY, AND BE MENTIONED IN EVERY REPEAT EVERY SENIOR LEVEL MEETING WITH THE FRENCH. ONLY THROUGH SUCH STEADY POLITICAL PRESSURE ARE WE LIKELY TO DISLODGE THIS MATTER AND REACH A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION. UNTIL THE TREATY IS REVISED WE RISK HAVING ADDITIONAL TERRORISTS SLIP THROUGH OUR FINGERS. GALBRAITH



ROUTING

То	Name and Ad	Date	Initials				
1	0. North			1/8			
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
	ACTION		FILE	*****			
,	APPROVAL	x	INFO	ORMATIC	N		
(COMMENT		PREF	PARE REP	νLY		
(CONCURRENCE		REC				
[DIRECT REPLY	RETI	JRN				
. (DISPATCH		SIGN	ATURE			
REN	MARKS:						

SECRET

OF CLASSIFIER ENCLOSED BLIP 3/25/08

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO.

COPY NO. _1___OF__1___

HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions



WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

	Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES		Withdrawer SMF 3/25/2008			
<i>File Folder</i> TERRORISM: FRENCH COOPERATION (1)			<i>FOIA</i> S2007-081 NOUZILLE			
Box Number 14		218			ety mark	
ID	Document Type Document Description		lo of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions	
53278	MEMO TO ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, ET AL		4	1/7/1986	B1 B3	

and the second sec

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

ROUTING

То	Name and Address		Date	Initials			
1	O. North		1/8				
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
	ACTION		FILE				
	APPROVAL	X	INFORMATION				
(COMMENT		PREI	EPARE REPLY			
(CONCURRENCE		RECOMMENDATION				
(DIRECT REPLY	X	RETURN				
• [DISPATCH		SIGNATURE				
REN	MARKS:						



OF CLASSIFIED UPON KEMOVA OF CLASSIFIET ENCLOSURE(S) Or CLASSIFIET ENCLOSURE(S) Or CLASSIFIET ENCLOSURE(S) Or CLASSIFIED UPON KEMOVA

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO._

COPY NO. _____ OF ____

HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

	-	21 子学氏1				
Collection Name		١.	Withdrawer	,		
NOR	ΓH, OLIVER: FILES		SMF 3/25/2008			
File F	Folder	<i>FOIA</i> S2007-081				
TERR	ORISM: FRENCH COOPERATION (1)					
			NOUZILLE			
Box N	lumber					
14		218				
ID	Document Type	, No of	Doc Date	Restric-		
	Document Description	, pages		tions		
		a sanga Mashiran sa				
5327	9 MEMO	3	1/7/1986	B1		
	TO ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR			B3		
	NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, ET AL					
٩						
-				•		
		-7999L 🚭 🛶				

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

angementer 3. 4.

TAP984

OAKLEY BOWK 69559474 BOWK 69559474 (2818) SECRET ******* IN ROUTINE UTS0861 DE RUEHCR #0325 0842015 3/27, 1445 Duly (S/cT) workig it 1800 Ocally - proceeding R 241958Z MAR 86 FM AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE TO SECSTATE WASHD27844 S E CR E T MARTINIQUE 0325 53280 NODIS

FROM CONSUL GENERAL

E.O. 12356: DECL: CADR TÄGSMS ASEC, MCAP, PHSA, PTER, FR, XL, FW SUBJECT: TERRORISM:

1. (SEGRET-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE PREFET (GOVERNOR) OF MARTINIQUE HAS TOLD MOXSHAT, IN HIS CAPACITY AS FRENCH DELEGATE FOR THE SEAS (I.e. PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR MARITIME SECURITY FOR THE FRENCH CARIBBEAN. HE IS PLANNING WITH LOCAL FRENCH MILITARY COMMANDERS TO STAGE AN EXERCISE DESIGNED TO TEST THE ABILITY OF FRENCH FORCES IN THE REGION TO ASSAULT A HIJACKED SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS AND WREST CONTROL BY FORCE FROM HIJACKERS/TERRORISTS. INITIAL PLANNING ENVISAGES HELIBORNE OR SEABORNE ACTION BY ONE OR BOTH OF TWO SPECIALIZED INTERVENTION UNITS PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN MARTINIQUE, SUPPORTED BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES AS NECESSARY. THE T O UNITS ARE A SWAT-TYPE TEAM OF GENDARMES AND A DELTA FÖRCE-TYPE ARMY/MARINE CORPS UNIT. (COMMENT: THE PRESENCE OF A GENDARME SWAT TEAM HAS NOT BEEN KEPT OVERLY CONFIDENTIAL. BUT THE PRESENCE OF A FRENCH MILITARY DELTA FORCE IS ONE OF THE MOST CLOSELY HELD SECRETS ON THE ISLAND.) THE PREFECT INDICATED THAT THE EXERCISE WILL BE RUN AGAINST A FRENCH FLAG SHIP BUT THAT AUTHORITIES ARE FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT DEPLOYMENT AGAINST A THIRD FLAG VESSEL OUTSIDE FRENCH TERRITORIAL WATERS WOULD BE LEGALLY ACCEPTABLE. HE ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. HAS EXPERIENCE IN SUCH PATTERS AND WHETHER WE WOULD BE PREPARED INITIALLY TO OFFER ADVICE AND EVENTUALLY PERHAPS TO COORDINATE CONTINGENCY

NARA DATE

SIT: SIT NORT = 0B : WHSR COMMENT:

PAGE J1

AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE 3325 DTG:2419582 MAR 86 PSN:019908 TOR: 085/1516Z

> ECRET ******S COPY

SECPET

*****S COPY

LANNING ON SUCH MATTERS WITH THE FRENCH IN THE CARIBBEAN,

3. IT AS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE PREFECT IS PROCEEDING WITH THE APPROVAL OF PARIS AND THAT HE WAS DESCRIBING A SERIOUS I ITIATIVE, I RESPONDED THAT I HAVE HEARD RUMORS THAT THE U.S. HAS I FACT STUDIED THL PROBLEM AND MADE SOME PROGRESS TO DS CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS; THAT ON THE MATTER OF LEGAL AUTHORITY, LITHER PERMISSION OF THE FLAG COUNTRY OR A D.TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL PIRACY LAW CA EXPLORED IN A GIVEN CASE ON THE ENORMOUSLY MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF HOW TO ASSAULT A SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS WITHOUT EXCESSIVE DANGER TO PASSENG RS AND CREW, I OFFERED TO INQUIRE FURTHER I DID NOT TELL THE PREFECT SO, BUT IT IS MY U DER STANDING THAT E HAVE IN FACT RUN EXERCISE ASSAULTS AGAINST A CRUISE SHIP, AND THAT THL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION A AINST A HIJACKED C UISE LINE IN THE CARIBBEAN HAS BLEN A SIGNED T) FBI MIAMI,

4. TH UNITED ST TES HAS A PAJO INTE EST IN THE SAFETY OF IPS: I CLUDING CUIS. SHIPS IN THE CARIBBEAN IN PA TICULAR, E' LOST ALL P SENGE S AR AML ICANS, I ASSUME THAT: SI C E IGHT A LY ELCOME FE CH COOPE ATION IN CASE OF I CIDE T: HMAY PREPARE TO COCRDINATE PRE-INCIDENT C NTI (E CY PLANNIN A D OTHER P EPA ATION.

ACTIO REQUESTED: PLLASE ADVIS HOW TO P OC ED IN THIS ATT . MY ON SUGGETION, IF E ARE EPARED TO DISCUSS TI E C *LAINI ITH FRINCH HE E, IS THAT AN ARE ICAN FFICIAL COMPETENT TO ADD ESS THE P CIFIC SUBJECT OF ANTI-IP-HIJ CKI G MEA TS ESENT TO MARTINIQUE TO DISCUSS ITH THE F T OUR EXPERIE C TO DATE, TO ASCE TAIN MOR PRECISELY JUST HAT HE MAY HAVE IN MIND, AND TO EXPLO E POSSIBLE COOP ATINE

C. D FAITL T P SS TO _MUSY PAIS AND OTH RS AT ITS IC _TIO . T

 F J2
 C N UL M RTINIQUE J325
 DTG:241958
 MA
 86
 PSN:019908

 TOR:
 J25/1516Z

 S
 E
 R
 S
 COPY

A ment marker where the second of the second the second the second the second the second the second second to the

23

SECRET

5? 2.2

RBO

R 0

RH CT

S/CT:RPORTER:04830 03/28/86 EXT. 77796 S/CT:RBOAKLEY

EUR:CHTHOMAS

ARA:RNHOLWILL S/S-0:

S/S-0 ONLY, FOR PRIZE MONEY OFFICER

PRIORITY PARIS, MARTINIQUE PRIORITY

EXDIS SPECAT

FROM OAKLEY TO ROGERS AND BROWN

DECL: OADR

PTER

MARTINIQUE - CT COOPERATION WITH FRENCH

ADDITIONAL CAPTION: PRIZE MONEY MESSAGE.

REF: A} MARTINIQUE 0325 {NOTAL}. B} STATE

L. ENTIRE TEXT IS SECRET/SENSITIVE.

FOR PARIS

2. REFTEL A RELAYED TO DEPARTMENT PREFECT OF MARTINIQUE'S INTEREST IN COOPERATING WITH THE USG REGARDING MARITIME COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE CARIBBEAN. PREFECT APPARENTLY WANTS TO PLAN AN EXERCISE WITH LOCAL FRENCH MILITARY COMMANDERS DESIGNED TO TEST THE CAPABILITY OF LOCAL FRENCH FORCES TO ASSAULT A HIJACKED SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS. HE WAS INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE USG HAD EXPERIENCE IN SUCH OPERATIONS AND WOULD BE PREPARED INITIALLY TO OFFER ADVICE AND EVENTUALLY PERHAPS TO COORDINATE JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE CARIBBEAN WITH THE FRENCH.

DECLASSIFIED SECRET RPM07-081 #53707 NODP - 4/9/10

SECRET

2

FOR MARTINIQUE

3. DEPARTMENT WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR CABLE AND IS INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE PREFECT'S PROPOSAL FURTHER. WE BELIEVE COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH IN HANDLING MARITIME TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN COULD BE VERY BENEFICIAL TO BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. WE SUGGEST YOU INFORM PREFECT THAT IN THE COURSE OF ANY TERRORIST INCIDENT, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT INVOLVES AMERICAN CITIZENS, THE USG WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE HELPFUL SHOULD HIS GOVERNMENT REQUEST OUR ASSISTANCE. WE WELCOME HIS SUGGESTION THAT IT IS BEST TO GET TOGETHER BEFORE THE CRISIS THAN AFTER IT BEGINS.

4. REFTEL CLEARLY SHOWS THAT CONGEN FULLY APPRECIATES THE SENSITIVITY OF COUNTERTERRORISM MATTERS, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT CONCERNS BI-LATERAL COOPERATION OR A NATION'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES. WE CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE WAY YOU HANDLED THE PREFECT'S QUESTIONS. BEFORE MOVING FORWARD, HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BRING EMBASSY PARIS ON BOARD {AS YOU SUGGESTED} AND ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THE PREFECT'S INITIATIVE.

5. THE PREFECT SHOULD ASK HIS GOVERNMENT TO APPROACH OUR EMBASSY IN PARIS WITH THIS PROPOSAL. HE SHOULD KNOW THAT UNLIKE MOST GOVERNMENTS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS THE LEAD USG AGENCY FOR OVERSEAS TERRORISM MATTERS AND COORDINATES THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER AGENCIES INCLUDING THE MILITARY. BY CONTACTING THE AMBASSADOR OR OTHER PRINCIPAL, THE FRENCH COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD NOT ONLY BE WELL RECEIVED, BUT ALSO WOULD BE PROPERLY HANDLED FROM THE POLICY DOWN TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL. AFTER TALKING TO THE PREFECT, PLEASE ADVISE US.YYY