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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. map	re Libya <i>O 7/13/05 F95-023/1 #422 D 11/18/05</i>	1/86 <i>8/05</i>	P1 B1, B3 <i>MOZ-021 #1</i>
2. publication	National Intelligence Daily (24 pp) <i>PART. 10/31/03 NLRRMOZ-021 #1</i>	1/8/86	P1 DS
3. analysis	re Libya (page 3 only) <i>P 2/13/05 F95-023/1 #423</i>	12/22/85	P1 B1, B3
4. cable	301827Z DEC 85 (3 pp) <i>D 5/3/99 NL F95-023 #124</i>	12/30/85	P1
5. cable	282228Z DEC 85 [Section 1 of 2] (5 pp) <i>PART. 10/27/05 MOZ-021 #3</i>	12/28/85	P1
6. cable	282228Z DEC 85 [Section 2 of 2] (2 pp) <i>PART #4</i>	12/28/85	P1
7. memo	to Fortier, re Libya options (2 pp) <i>D. 10/31/03 NLRRMOZ-021 #5</i>	12/30/85	P1 DS
8. note	Elaine Morton to Fortier, re Libya <i>PART. 10/31/03 NLRRMOZ-021 #6</i>	12/31/85	P1 DS
9. paper	re Libya (2 pp) <i>PART. 10/27/05 MOZ-021 #7</i>	n.d. <i>7</i>	P1 DS
<i>4A. CABLE</i>	<i>301806Z ZP.</i>	<i>12/30/85</i>	<i>B1</i>

RESTRICTION CODES

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EO 12958
AS AMENDED
1.4(c)



National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday
8 January 1986

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MOZ-021 #1


By LDJ, NARA, Date 11/3/03

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CPAS NID 86-006JX

8 January 1986

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




LIBYA-US:

Use of US Bank Account

The Libyan Government has used accounts with US banks in New York and abroad to transfer funds to subversive and terrorist groups.




Comment: While the Libyan Government has other foreign bank accounts through which such funds have been channeled, those with US banks appear to play a substantial role in Tripoli's support for subversion and terrorism.



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8 January 1986

SOUTH KOREA:

Cabinet Reorganization

President Chun, by replacing 10 of 23 cabinet ministers yesterday, has solidified the positions of key economic policy makers, kept hardliners in control of the major political portfolios, and widened the field of his possible successors.

The reassignment of Minister of Finance Kim Mahn Je as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning highlights the shakeup. Chung In Yong, who moves into Kim's old job, has been closely involved in Seoul's international borrowing efforts since the mid-1970s and, like Kim, is a proponent of the government's liberalization efforts.

Chun retained both Prime Minister Lho Shin Yong and Foreign Minister Lee Won Kyung, but replaced his ineffectual Defense Minister with General Lee Ki Baek, a longtime associate. Chun tapped another close military colleague for the highly visible Sports Minister's portfolio.


Comment: The New Year's housecleaning suggests no major policy changes. Chun retains the hardliners who are implementing Seoul's increasingly tough response to domestic dissent.

Kim Mahn Je's elevation signals Chun's continued confidence in his economic management team and its liberalization objectives despite sluggish growth and protectionist sentiment. The choice of an international finance expert for finance minister reflects Seoul's concern about its larger-than-planned \$46.3 billion foreign debt and its commitment to internationalizing the financial sector. Although the changes should help maintain momentum in Seoul's efforts to resolve trade friction with the US, Chun will still face broadly based pressure to maintain protectionist barriers.

The decision to pass over former Army Chief of Staff Chong Ho Yong for Defense Minister—a widely rumored choice—temporarily puts him outside the first rank of potential successors to Chun. Park Se Chik's appointment to the increasingly important position of Sports Minister raises his ranking as a possible presidential successor. The new Defense Minister is widely respected, and his selection should lessen grumbling among Chong's senior military supporters.

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
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8 January 1986




EGYPT: Protests Over Prisoner's Death

The death of the Egyptian security guard sentenced to life imprisonment for killing seven Israeli tourists is likely to cause demonstrations against the government. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the guard, who was found hanged in his cell yesterday, committed suicide, but his defense attorney alleges that he was murdered. The Israeli press reports that some Arab news services are erroneously claiming an Israeli agent shot the inmate. [REDACTED]

Comment: Egyptian students will almost certainly view the security guard as a victim of foul play and probably as a "martyr" to the Egyptian Government. Students clashed with police two weeks ago over Cairo's decision to try the guard but calmed down when he was spared the death sentence. [REDACTED]






TURKEY-IRAN-IRAQ: Turkish Visit to Tehran

Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's discussions with Iranian Prime Minister Musavi during Ozal's four-day visit focused principally on trade relations but also addressed regional issues, especially the war. The two sides agreed on an annual trade target totaling \$3 billion, the same as last year. The Iranians were less receptive to Ozal's longstanding readiness to mediate between Iran and Iraq. They are maintaining their stringent preconditions for negotiations, including the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad.

Comment: The visit was Ozal's third annual meeting with the Iranian Prime Minister and reaffirms Turkey's desire to retain its profitable control of most of the foreign commerce other than oil of its second-largest trading partner. The visit also reinforces Turkey's status as the Islamic country with the closest ties to both Iran and Iraq.



USSR-VIETNAM: Aid To Increase

A Soviet Foreign Ministry official says the USSR will double its aid to Vietnam in the next five years. In July the Vietnamese press reported such an overall increase. It had been left unspecified in the joint communique issued during party Chairman Le Duan's visit to Moscow in June. In November the Vietnamese reported that oil exploration assistance would be quadrupled.

Comment: The Soviets probably calculate that this will bring some tangible economic returns as Vietnamese oil production comes on line. The aid promised in June was tied to Vietnamese undertakings to increase production and export of raw materials to the USSR, and a good part of it will apparently go to the oil sector. Soviet Foreign Ministry officials also say the increase is meant to indicate that improved Sino-Soviet ties will not affect military aid to Hanoi and that, while a negotiated settlement on Cambodia is desirable, Vietnam can well afford to continue the war if pushed too hard for concessions.

VIETNAM: Hanoi's Economic Concerns

the economic reforms Hanoi has introduced over the past year have so far failed to stem inflation or to ease the scarcity of consumer goods,


While claiming these moves—which include devaluation, monetary reform, and the elimination of subsidies for government workers—are a step in the right direction, Hanoi is unable to control prices because of a lack of public confidence in the regime's ability to manage the economy. the reforms nonetheless remain Hanoi's economic policy and are being pushed by Deputy Premier Vo Van Kiet, who has the support of Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in overcoming the opposition of some other Politburo members.

Comment: Hanoi almost certainly will persist in efforts to increase incentives, but the regime's unwillingness to permit an effective role for private traders, particularly the ethnic Chinese, will hamper its ability to boost productivity. Although Vietnam's economy probably will continue to improve somewhat over its past dismal performance, it remains beset by transportation bottlenecks and severe shortages of foreign exchange, energy, and raw materials for industry. These conditions will not be remedied soon even if Hanoi's financial reforms could become effective quickly.

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8 January 1986




BULGARIA-USSR: Double-Dealing on Technology Transfers

[REDACTED] some Bulgarians are working out ways to deceive the Soviets on technology transfer deals. A Bulgarian commercial enterprise wants to sell illegally acquired Western-origin computers and related electronics to the Soviets without indicating the shipments originated in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians plan to re-export equipment either to Budapest or a free trade zone in Austria and on to the USSR in exchange for Western currency instead of the usual payment in rubles or other trade instruments. [REDACTED]

Comment: [REDACTED] the Soviets use their East European allies to acquire COCOM-controlled technology in part as a way to save hard currency. The Soviets would be paying even more for the technology than usual because the Bulgarians probably would use middlemen and add shipment costs to the already inflated price. [REDACTED]





In Brief

Middle East

- **Tunisian** President Bourguiba yesterday dismissed influential, pro-US son as counselor . . . [redacted] move may reflect son's bad health, growing power of Prime Minister Mzali, or disagreement over opening to **USSR**. [redacted]
- [redacted] **Kuwait** to expel director of **Libyan** News Agency soon . . . believed to have planted statement in local press falsely crediting **Egyptian** group with hijacking airliner to Malta . . . will further strain relations with Tripoli. [redacted]
- [redacted] **Palestinian** Arab Revolutionary Committee may be planning attacks against US or **Israeli** targets in Rome with **Libyan** aid . . . group's only known operation aborted when Israelis intercepted members at Lebanese border. [redacted]

East Asia

- Bangkok worried US farm bill will cut **Thai** rice exports . . . setback to top export would add to trade problems with US . . . will help General Arthit exploit farmers' unrest against Prime Minister Prem. [redacted]

Africa

- **Sudan** over year in arrears on US loans . . . triggers suspension, under Brooke Amendment, of new economic, military assistance . . . Khartoum likely to scrape together \$2-million installment plus late charges when it grasps consequences of US law. [redacted]

South Asia

[redacted]

Americas

[redacted]

Europe

- Three IRA prisoners in Ulster ended hunger strike Monday . . . **UK** apparently now allowing appeals of sentences . . . **Ireland** thinks this action will calm Ulster Catholics . . . Protestants likely to charge London has surrendered. [redacted]

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8 January 1986

Special Analysis

HONDURAS-
NICARAGUA:

Resupply Problems for Insurgents

Problems with supplies are hampering the rebel strategy of forcing the Sandinistas to fight on more than one front. Honduran prohibitions against further aid flights from the US are holding up delivery of quartermaster supplies and keeping some 8,000 insurgents in base camps. In addition, the air resupply link to more than 5,000 rebel troops operating in central Nicaragua is threatened by increasing Sandinista scrutiny and by the unreliability of the chartered aircraft and pilot the rebels are using.

restrictions by Honduras are preventing quartermaster supplies, especially boots, from reaching rebel troops and have forced about half of their estimated 17,000 men to remain in their base camps. the insurgents have adequate weapons and ammunition and that problems with food supplies appear to have eased since US funding became available to buy and transport food locally.

The Honduran Angle

Tegucigalpa, initially angered about adverse publicity over past deliveries, has prevented all air shipments of supplies for the resistance from landing in Honduras since November. Although still sympathetic to the rebels' cause, Honduran officials feared further embarrassment if resumption of the flights were publicized.

The Hondurans reportedly want the US to urge the rebels to set clear military goals that would allow Tegucigalpa to monitor progress and revise assistance accordingly. In the past Honduras also has used pressure on the insurgents to seek economic concessions from the US.

President-elect Azcona, scheduled to be inaugurated on 27 January, has backed away from public opposition to the presence of the rebels in Honduras. But his attitude toward them remains lukewarm at best, and his administration appears unlikely to renew full cooperation with the insurgents in the near future. Even in the unlikely event that the conditions of the armed forces for resuming air deliveries are met, the high command will still have to convince Azcona that the benefits of more active support outweigh the drawbacks.

continued

Resupplying Units Inside Nicaragua

The insurgents have been chartering a DC-6 to airdrop supplies to operating their more than 5,000 troops in central Nicaragua. These troops, which have borne the brunt of the fighting over the past few months, [REDACTED] could not continue operations without immediate resupply. [REDACTED]

The DC-6 reportedly dropped 13,500 pounds of ammunition and other supplies to these troops Sunday. Three other flights were aborted last month, however, either for bad weather or because the Sandinistas had spotted the aircraft. Another chartered DC-6 used earlier by the rebels suffered frequent breakdowns, and several smaller transport aircraft lack night navigation equipment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The military reportedly plans to move troops equipped with SA-7s by helicopter to shoot down the rebel aircraft if they have enough warning. [REDACTED]

Outlook

The ability of the insurgents to keep about half their forces inside Nicaragua despite chronic supply difficulties has been the key to their success in widening the war over the past six months. If current problems persist, however, rebels in the north will be unable to remain in the field for more than a few weeks; those in central Nicaragua will have to curtail operations periodically. [REDACTED]

With only one unreliable aircraft for resupply deep inside Nicaragua, rebel supply lines are extremely vulnerable. Even so, the Sandinistas are not likely to be able to close this delivery route permanently because of difficulties in identifying targets and lack of air defense weapons that can engage targets flying higher than 7,000 feet. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Special Analysis

USSR-LIBYA:

Soviet Role With SA-5s

[REDACTED]

Some Soviet technicians probably will go home once the complex is operational, but others undoubtedly will remain as long as the Libyans need assistance. Even when the Libyans themselves run the complex, Soviet advisers are likely to stay indefinitely to help with maintenance and support. It is unclear how many Soviets are needed to set up the complex and to calibrate the equipment, but their number probably is measured in hundreds, far fewer than the 2,000 figure used in recent press reports.

[REDACTED]

Given Qadhafi's unpredictability and the possibility of confrontation with the US, Moscow almost certainly does not want to defend Libyan territory. To minimize the risk Qadhafi might use the SA-5s against US targets and set off a retaliation, the Soviets may have obtained his acceptance of specific rules of engagement in situations other than a direct attack on Libya.

[REDACTED]

Nonetheless, in practice Qadhafi is likely to insist on control of the SA-5s. This could create a dilemma for the Soviets should Libya attempt to fire at US aircraft outside Libyan airspace. If there were a direct attack on Libya, however, Soviet advisers probably would help in firing the missiles.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It took the Syrians some 18 months of training in the USSR and at home before they could take over their SA-5s; it probably will be at least a year or so before the Libyans are capable of independently operating the SA-5s.


[REDACTED]

Trends in Soviet-Japanese Trade, 1975-85

Japan: Value of Exports and Imports
Billion US \$



Decline in Relative Importance
Percent



^a Estimated.

307868 1-86

Special Analysis

USSR-JAPAN:

Breaking the Ice

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo from 15 to 19 January will indicate whether the new regime under General Secretary Gorbachev is ready to drop the unproductive intimidation tactics of the past decade in favor of a more flexible strategy toward Japan. Given the Soviets' penchant for browbeating the Japanese, Shevardnadze will have to do very little to suggest a softer Soviet approach. With Prime Minister Nakasone and Foreign Minister Abe competing to take credit for improving bilateral relations, Tokyo is likely to respond favorably to any positive gestures. An agreement on an exchange of state visits by Nakasone and Gorbachev is one possibility. On concrete issues, however, Japanese as well as Soviet officials are still taking a hard line, suggesting progress in relations will be less substantive than atmospheric.

Senior political leaders in both countries have sought to create the impression that a thaw in relations may not be far off. Official [redacted] exchanges have increased in the last year, and Gorbachev has been able to raise Japanese expectations simply by having his new Foreign Minister accept the Japanese invitation Gromyko had refused since 1978. Gorbachev, consistent with his policy of wooing US allies, has repeatedly expressed an interest in better relations, and Soviet media have toned down criticism of Tokyo's security policy.

Nakasone and Abe have outdone each other in expressing eagerness to make the Shevardnadze visit a success. Whichever one Gorbachev favors with an invitation to Moscow will have an opportunity to take credit for a "breakthrough" in Japanese-Soviet relations and gain a leg up in the race this year for national leadership in Japan.

Rough Going on Specifics

Tokyo has said it will not sign a joint communique unless Moscow agrees to include a reference to the statement issued after the meeting between Prime Minister Tanaka and General Secretary Brezhnev in 1973 citing "unresolved issues"—implicitly including Japanese territorial claims—as part of an agenda for peace treaty negotiations. Tokyo has also linked resuming official consultations on scientific and technical issues to Soviet permission for visits to graves on the disputed islands under a formula that would not compromise Japan's claims. Japanese officials are stressing that conclusion of the long-term economic cooperation agreement coveted by the Soviets for years requires a strong political base.

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The Soviets, while deploring these gambits and reiterating their refusal to relinquish the southern Kurile Islands, have stalled conclusion of a cultural agreement by refusing to grant reciprocal rights to Japan. In addition, by demanding increased concessions from Tokyo, they have forced suspension of Japanese fishing in Soviet waters for the first time since the 200-mile economic zone was established in 1977. A treaty on double taxation may be the only agreement signed next week.

Prospects

The well-established pattern in military, economic, and political relations virtually ensures that any changes in Soviet-Japanese relations in the short term will be marginal. Rather than make even token gestures to ease Japanese anxieties about the "Soviet threat," Moscow seems determined to press ahead with the strengthening of its military forces in the Far East. The militarization of the southern Kuriles since 1978 is particularly galling to the Japanese because it indicates that Moscow has no intention of returning any of those islands.

Tokyo could exploit the Soviets' desire for better relations by responding to Gorbachev's evident interest in a large-scale infusion of Japanese technology and capital and by reversing the long-term decline in Japan's imports from the USSR. Japan so far, however, has steadfastly refused to assume a major role in modernizing the Soviet economy.

The Japanese Government still believes improved relations with the USSR must be based on a solid alliance with the US. Abe arrives in Washington tomorrow to reaffirm that tie. Japanese movement in their relations with the USSR depends on a prior relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers.

continued

[REDACTED]


Even so, Nakasone presumably also knows that political rivals would attack him if the public believed he gave away too much to the Soviets. [REDACTED]

If the Soviets cater to Nakasone's ambitions, particularly by offering to hold summit meetings in Moscow and Tokyo, the tone of bilateral relations may become markedly warmer. But the substantive issues are of high importance to both sides, and, if neither shows flexibility, the improvement in relations now apparently in train may be delayed indefinitely. [REDACTED]

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3. LIBYA IN LEBANON: BUYING TERRORISM

Libya maintains about 100 troops in Lebanon as part of the vestigial "Arab Deterrent Force" and keeps up relations with numerous paramilitary groups. Apart from the [REDACTED] Sunni militias, however, and some Palestinians (mainly rejectionists), no Lebanese faction closely identifies with Libya. Although Qadhafi's influence largely amounts to what money can buy, his financial resources and readiness to use them in anti-US actions represent a significant threat to Americans.

* * *

Libya's ties within the Lebanese communities are strongest among Sunnis. Libya has been a staunch ally of the Murabitun and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), both Nasserite organizations declining in power. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Libya's resources in money and arms and its fight with the United States undoubtedly are attractive to renegades and the disaffected. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

X
[REDACTED]

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NLS F95-023/1 #623

By [Signature], NARA, Date 7/13/05

The Abu Nidal Group

Introduction

The Abu Nidal group is among the most dangerous of the Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. It is probably the best organized and most effective of the radical Palestinian terrorist groups, carefully planning its operations and keeping its information tightly compartmented.

The group has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to operate in any country it chooses. It has staged attacks in over 20 countries on three continents, and operates throughout the Middle East.

Abu Nidal has conducted over 60 terrorist attacks during the last eight years--at least 30 of them since the beginning of 1984. Two-thirds of the group's nearly 20 attacks this year have taken place in western Europe, as innocent bystanders increasingly have become casualties of the group's assaults:

- The simultaneous attacks on airline offices in Rome and Vienna on December 27, which have the hallmarks of Abu Nidal, left more than a dozen dead, including 5 Americans.
- The Egypt Air hijacking in late November ultimately cost the lives of 59 passengers.
- The group bombed the British Air office in Rome in September injuring 15 persons, many of them passersby.
- Abu Nidal members threw grenades at Rome's Cafe de Paris in September, injuring 38 tourists--among them Americans, Germans, Britons, Italians, Argentines, and Brazilians.
- The group bombed two hotels in Athens, one in September that injured 19, mostly British tourists, and one in August that injured 13 Britons.
- In Spain, Abu Nidal attacks in July at the British Air office and the nearby Alia ticket office killed one and wounded 24 customers and employees.
- Also in July the group was probably responsible for the bombing of two restaurants in Kuwait, killing eight and injuring almost 90.
- In April, an Abu Nidal terrorist fired a rocket at a Jordanian airliner as it was taking off from Athens airport. The rocket hit the plane but did not explode. Hundreds of casualties might have resulted had the operation been successful.

The official name of the Abu Nidal organization is "Fatah - Revolutionary Council", which it usually employs when attacking Israeli targets. But it has employed a number of cover names for its operations. Originally the group operated under the name Black June; more recently, the group has used the name Arab Revolutionary Brigades when it staged attacks against Persian Gulf targets. It also acts as Black September when it attacks Jordanian and Palestinian targets and employs the name Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM) as its signature for attacks against British targets. It added Egyptian nomenclatures when it hijacked the Egyptair plane in November.

Background

The group is headed by Sabri al-Banna (who uses the nom de guerre Abu Nidal), grew out of elements that broke away a decade ago from PLO Chairman Arafat's Fatah organization. The group is committed to the use of violence to destroy diplomatic efforts designed to reconcile Israel and the Arab states, especially those mounted earlier this year by King Hussein and Arafat's PLO.. The Abu Nidal group also calls for the destruction of ruling "reactionary" regimes such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf states and is critical of what it sees as Arafat's and the PLO's moderation and lack of revolutionary base and zeal. Consequently the group contends that both inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to force the all-embracing Arab revolution which in turn would lead to the liberation of Palestine.

The group was formed in 1974 after Arafat instituted a ban on PLO involvement with international terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories. Abu Nidal's radical views found favor at the time with the Iraqi regime, which helped him create the organization that Abu Nidal called " Fatah - the Revolutionary Council" to promote his claim that his organization, rather than the one led by Arafat, was the legitimate Fatah. He has similarly duplicated other Fatah organizational titles to suggest a parallel structure with the original.

Beginning in the early 1980s, Baghdad suppressed activities of the Abu Nidal group out of Iraq. Elements of the group then moved to Damascus. Since early 1984, Libya began to provide increased support to the group and Abu Nidal himself and many of the groups operations may have moved there within the last 12 months.

The group probably has several hundred members although an accurate count is difficult.. We believe the group has a number of cells throughout western Europe and the Middle East, and makes use of the large number of Palestinian students

studying abroad, sometimes involving them in operations after only perfunctory training. These new recruits for example, were involved in the five grenade attacks staged by the group in 1985.

Current Operations and Trends

Based on the style of Abu Nidal attacks it is evident that the group is willing to cause indiscriminate casualties. Apart from assassinations of particular individuals, Abu Nidal operations through November 1985 resulted in nearly 70 deaths and 201 wounded among innocent bystanders--and the number could have been much higher if the Jordanian airliner attack in Athens had been successful. In the previous year, 111 died in the crash of a Gulf Air jet on which an Abu Nidal bomb may have exploded.

The Abu Nidal group has concentrated on attacking Jordanian interests since 1984. These attacks were provoked by the Jordanian agreement to host the PNC meeting in November 1984, and King Hussein's February accord with Arafat to restart the stalled Middle East peace process. Abu Nidal operatives are thought to have assassinated former West Bank mayor and Palestinian moderate Fahd Qawasmeh in December 1984 shortly after his election to the PLO Executive Council. The anti-Jordanian/PLO campaign has not abated. As long as Jordanian and PLO efforts toward Middle East peace negotiations continue, attacks against both Jordanian and Palestinian targets probably will also.

Aside from the attack on Alia offices in Madrid in July and the attempt to down a Jordanian airliner over Athens in April, other incidents involving Jordanian targets in 1985 have included:

- the November 24 assassination of a Palestinian in Amman.
- the murder of a Jordanian publisher in Athens in September.
- a plot to assassinate the Jordanian Ambassador to Greece in August.
- the murder of a Jordanian diplomat in Ankara on July 24.
- a rocket attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Rome in April.

The group has also targeted British interests. ROSM claimed responsibility for the kidnapping in March 1985 of a British journalist in Lebanon and the assassination of British diplomats in India and Greece in 1984. The purpose of the attacks probably is to force the UK to release group members

imprisoned for the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London in June 1982.

Even before the recent attacks on Vienna and Rome airports, Abu Nidal had begun to concentrate his field of operations in Western Europe. Although his targets have been his usual enemies, e.g. British, Israeli, moderate Arab, he has become very indiscriminate about injuring bystanders. The relatively relaxed controls in Western European countries has been conducive to his operations there. The pattern of concentrating his efforts in Europe has coincided with the strengthening of his links with Libya. The likelihood of Libyan financing, safehaven, and logistical assistance should be very helpful to his future international terrorist operations.

10:20am: December 31, 1985

LOCATION OF NSPG PRINCIPALS

PRESIDENT	PALM SPRINGS	
JOHN POINDEXTER	PALM SPRINGS Home	
VICE PRESIDENT	NASSAU	SECURE VOICE
SECRETARY SHULTZ	PALM SPRINGS	SECURE VOICE
SECRETARY WEINBERGER	WASHINGTON	SECURE VOICE
DIRECTOR CASEY	PALM BEACH	SECURE VOICE (THRU CIA)
CHAIRMAN, JCS	WASHINGTON	SECURE VOICE
SECRETARY BAKER	HOUSTON	WITH PRE-ALERT, COULD REACH THROUGH FBI
AG MEESE	WASHINGTON	SECURE VOICE

CASEY AND BAKER WOULD REQUIRE PRE-ALERTS TO ENABLE THEM TO GO TO SECURE VOICE TERMINAL.

Sitron should proceed to test/set up
arrangements for the call today if you agree.

Yes _____ No _____

Time _____

Do you wish to include Baker _____ Meese _____?

Ax.

R.L.

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By CIS, NARA, Date 10/27/05

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PAGE 02 OF 05 JCS WASHINGTON DC// 4224 DTG: 282228Z DEC 85 PSN: 014827

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT [REDACTED] (C) SECTION 01 OF 02

1.4 ca)

POP GUN MESSAGE ~~(U)~~

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO POP GUN CONTROL OFFICER ONLY.

USNMR SHAPE FOR GEN ROGERS, USCINCEUR

NSA FOR ZKZK ZZ ZSL XAR DXR DE

CINCSAC DELIVER TO DOO, DO8, AND DOR POP GUN CONTROL OFFICERS.

SUBJ: WARNING ORDER FOR OPERATION--PRAIRIE FIRE (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. REQUEST COMMANDERS ESTIMATES FOR NCA CONSIDERATION NLT 292000Z DEC 85. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION CONCERNING EXTREMELY SENSITIVE US MILITARY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS THAT WILL BE DISCUSSED AND DISSEMINATED ONLY ON AN ABSOLUTE NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. OPSEC PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN. ALL INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS OPERATION MUST BE KEPT WITHIN POP GUN CHANNELS UNTIL RELEASED BY JCS. ADDRESSEES WILL NOT READDRESS THIS MESSAGE OR DISCUSS THIS INFORMATION WITH ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION OTHER THAN THE ACTION ADDRESSEES WITHOUT SPECIFIC JCS APPROVAL.

2. ~~(S)~~ SITUATION. AT APPROXIMATELY 0900 HOURS, 27 DEC 85, TERRORISTS THREW GRENADES AND OPENED FIRE WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS SIMULTANEOUSLY AT THE EL AL CHECK IN COUNTERS AT THE VIENNA AND ROME INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS. THE ATTACK IN ROME KILLED OR WOUNDED AT LEAST 20 AMCITS. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES HAVE LINKED THE ATTACKS TO THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION WITH LIBYAN SUPPORT. THE USG HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT ONCE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE IS MADE APPROPRIATE RETALIATORY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

3. ~~(S)~~ MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, [REDACTED]

1.4a)

4. ~~(U)~~ EXECUTION.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05 JCS WASHINGTON DC// 4224 DTG: 282228Z DEC 85 PSN: 014027

A. ~~(TS)~~ COURSES OF ACTION: PLAN FOR AND [REDACTED] 1.4(c)

~~REDACTED~~

[REDACTED] REQUEST YOU SPECIFICALLY DEVELOP OPTIONS TO EMPLOY TLAM-C IN ADDITION TO TACAIR OPTIONS.

B. ~~(TS)~~ AS THESE ANTICIPATED ACTIONS MAY LEAD TO HEIGHTENED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT YOUR AOR, REQUEST YOU BE PREPARED [REDACTED] 1.4(c)

C. ~~(TS)~~ SHOULD THE SITUATION DETERIORATE FURTHER, MORE COMPREHENSIVE ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED. REQUEST YOU DEVELOP COA'S FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF UP TO 3 CVBG'S AND 1 BB SAG SPECIFICALLY [REDACTED] 1.4(c)

D. ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

TO USCINCEUR 1.4(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05 JCS WASHINGTON DC// 4224 DTG: 282228Z DEC 85 PSN: 014027

NLT 2000Z SUNDAY, 29 DEC.

E. ~~(TS)~~ FOR USCINCLANT AND USCINCPAC REQUEST YOU PROVIDE USCINCEUR INFORMATION SOONEST ON AVAILABILITY OF CVBG'S AND BB SAG.

F. ~~(U)~~ COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) ~~(S)~~ TENTATIVE C-DAY, L-HOUR: NOTIFICATION [REDACTED]

(2) ~~(S)~~ ANTICIPATED D-DAY: NOTIFICATION [REDACTED]

(3) ~~(U)~~ ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION: TBD.

(4) ~~(TS)~~ PROPOSED ROE:

(A) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

(B) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

(C) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

(D) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

(E) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

1.4 (a)

1.4 (1)

1.4 (a)

1.4 (a)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05 JCS WASHINGTON DC// 4224 DTG: 282228Z DEC 85 PSN: 014027



1.9(a)

(5) ~~(U)~~ DIRLAUTH ALCON: KEEP THE JCS INFORMED.

5. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. ~~(U)~~ TRANSPORT:

- (1) ~~(S)~~ AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY: 1B1.
- (2) ~~(S)~~ STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES MAY BE REQUIRED. CINCMAC SHOULD APPLY LIFT AS REQUIRED AND ADVISE JCS OF ANY PROBLEMS/SHORT FALLS.
- (3) ~~(S)~~ FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY JCS. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF EMPLOYING UNIT(S) WILL FUND OPERATIONS.
- (4) ~~(S)~~ COMMANDERS SHOULD BEGIN TO CAPTURE COSTS AND EXPENDITURES UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE.

B. ~~(U)~~ REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS: CINC IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING AS REQUIRED. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JCS PUB 6. MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IAW APPROVED JCS PROCEDURES.

C. ~~(S)~~ OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE: ELEMENT OF SURPRISE IS ESSENTIAL. EVIDENCE OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR A CONDUCT OF US FORCE MOVEMENT WILL LIKELY GENERATE CONSIDERABLE OUTSIDE INTEREST. PROTECT OR CONTROL THOSE INDICATORS WHICH MAY COMPROMISE OUR CLASSIFIED INTENTIONS AND/OR CONVEY UNDESIRE SIGNALS TO OUR

BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CINCMAC SCOTT AFB IL
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCREC MACDILL AFB FL
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

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SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
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DMA WASHINGTON DC
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By CS, NARA, Date 10/27/05

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT [REDACTED] (C) FINAL SECTION OF 02

1.4 (a)

ADVERSARIES.

D. CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE.

- (1) ~~(S)~~ INFORMATION REGARDING OPERATIONS CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES IS TOP SECRET AND EXTREMELY SENSITIVE. ACCESS WILL BE LIMITED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WITH AN ABSOLUTE NEED TO KNOW.
- (2) ~~(S)~~ PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL REMAIN CLASSIFIED UNTIL DECLASSIFIED BY APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY. INFORMATION NOT SPECIFICALLY RELEASED IN THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WILL REMAIN CLASSIFIED.

6. ~~(U)~~ PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. PUBLIC RELEASE OF THIS INFORMATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA QUERIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AND REFERRED TO OASD (PA) (AUTOVON 227-5131) OR TO DJS-PA THROUGH THE NMCC.

7. ~~(U)~~ COMMAND AND CONTROL.

A. ~~(C)~~ WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED

BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, THE SUPPORTED CINC SHOULD VALIDATE AND FORWARD THOSE REQUIREMENTS IAW JCS MOP 167. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, THE SUPPORTED CINC SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES FOR ALLOCATING CIRCUITS AND CHANNELS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

B. ~~(C)~~ COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: USCINCEUR IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCLANT, CINCMAC, USCINCPAC, USCINCRD, CINCSAC, AND [REDACTED] ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

1.4 (a)

POP GUN MESSAGE ~~(U)~~

DECL OADR

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me
9/24/96

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NO. PAGES	NO. OF ATTACHMENTS (CIA T.S. # of Attachment)	BRANCH, BADGE #, OR LOCATION	LOGGED BY
2		NE/L DDO	

SUBJECT:

Libyan Options

CIA SOURCE INFORMATION ORIGINATOR		EXTERNAL SOURCE INFORMATION ORIGINATOR		
DIRECTORATE	OFFICE/BRANCH	AGENCY	CONTROL NUMBER	COPY NO.
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December 31, 1985

SENSITIVE

NOTE TO DON FORTIER

SUBJECT: Soviet Ability to Replace Western Oil Technicians in
Libya

From a technical standpoint, the Soviets would be quite able to replace whatever technical capabilities were lost if U.S. and other western oil workers were withdrawn from Libya. The Libyan oil production system is relatively unsophisticated; consequently it would not be difficult for Soviet or East Europeans to fill the gap to keep the oil flowing.


The key to reducing Libyan oil production capabilities in the short-term is the abruptness of any potential withdrawal of workers. If withdrawal had the characteristics of an evacuation, and especially if the U.K. and Canada withdrew their workers simultaneously, there would be a major decline in production (up to 400,000 bpd for a period of one to two months. If the withdrawal occurred instead in a gradual manner, over six months, for example, there would be little, if any, disruptive effect.

EO 12958,
AS AMENDED
1.4(c)
3.5(a)3
6.2(c)

Elaine Morton

~~SECRET~~

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NLS M02-021 #6
By LOT, NARA, Date 10/31/03



Base 501566 4-73

~~SECRET~~

Non-Military Alternatives

Economic.

_____ ~~REDACTED~~ _____

_____ ~~REDACTED~~ _____

_____ ~~REDACTED~~ _____

1.4(d)

-- At present, imports of Libyan crude oil and oil refined in Libya are banned from the U.S.; exports of U.S. items on the National Security List are banned for export to Libya, along with oil and gas technology which cannot be obtained elsewhere; and U.S. passports are invalid for travel to Libya.

-- Activities not captured by these sanctions include:

_____ ~~REDACTED~~ _____

_____ ~~REDACTED~~ _____

_____ ~~REDACTED~~ _____

_____ ~~REDACTED~~ _____

_____ ~~REDACTED~~ _____

1.4(d)

Both existing export trade to Libya and commerce done in Libya by U.S. oil companies can be eliminated by use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In addition, this Act can be used to make it a criminal offense for those U.S. citizens now in Libya to remain there in conscious subversion of the intent of our passport restriction. Invocation of IEEPA would be easier now than when it was first considered in 1981 and 1982 because it has successfully been invoked in the case of Nicaragua. (Before this, it had only been used when the U.S. froze Iranian financial assets during the hostage crisis.



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1.4(d)

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1.4(d)

State is currently assessing the advisability of utilizing IEEPA with respect to Libya. There are two major advantages of this approach. First, in contrast to military options, the impact of economic sanctions is easier to control and unforeseen consequences less likely to arise. Second, the language required in using IEEPA -- declaration of an emergency threatening the foreign policy or national security interests of the U.S. -- is tailor-made for making a strong point about the dangers of state-supported terrorism.

Diplomatic. Although it is difficult to obtain multilateral support for diplomatic sanctions, increasing public revulsion against specific terrorist incidents -- many of which will occur in Europe -- may make it possible to launch an initiative for closing Libyan People's Bureaus. Again, there would be concrete as well as symbolic advantages. The People's Bureaus are used as conduits in support of terrorist activities, under the cloak of diplomatic immunity. Closing them would complicate Libyan support of terrorism as well as making a strong point about Libyan failure to live up to the norms of civilized international behavior, a failure that makes it appropriate to deny the Libyans the rights (like diplomatic immunity and representation) that the international community has to bestow.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 + 17

- hospital

- share with Total

- CPPC