

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Fortier, Donald: Files
Folder Title: [Terrorism] [Shultz Material]
Box: RAC Box 18

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Statement by

The Honorable

George P. Shultz

before the

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

June 13, 1984

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY, SCHEDULED FOR APPROXIMATELY 9:30 A.M.
EST. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY CITED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE CHALLENGES IT POSES TO OUR COUNTRY. THIS SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED THOROUGHLY AT THE RECENT MEETING IN LONDON OF HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS AND BY THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS. A DECLARATION WAS ISSUED ON JUNE 9 WHICH MY STAFF HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU. IN THAT DECLARATION, THE LEADERS "EXPRESSED THEIR RESOLVE TO COMBAT THIS THREAT BY EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS, STRENGTHENING EXISTING MEASURES AND DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE NEW ONES." ONE OF THE POINTS IN THAT DECLARATION CALLED ON EACH COUNTRY TO CLOSE GAPS IN ITS NATIONAL LEGISLATION, AND THAT IS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR MY APPEARANCE TODAY. FIRST, HOWEVER, I WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL AND WHY IT IS OF SUCH GROWING CONCERN TO THE PRESIDENT AND ME.

TERRORISM HAS BEEN A GROWING PROBLEM SINCE 1968 WHEN OUR AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA WAS ASSASSINATED. TERRORIST INCIDENTS REACHED A PLATEAU IN NUMBER IN 1979. THE NUMBER OF RECORDED ATTACKS HAS NOT VARIED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THEN. IN 1983 THERE WERE MORE THAN 500 ATTACKS BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS OF WHICH MORE THAN 200 WERE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. THIS WAS ONLY THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG BECAUSE THERE WERE AT LEAST AS MANY THREATS AND HOAXES.

THESE ARE A CHEAP WAY TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR AND THEY ALSO ABSORB A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF OUR RESOURCES AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE HOST GOVERNMENTS. BEYOND THIS ARE NATIONAL OR INDIGENOUS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WHICH PROBABLY EXCEED BY A FACTOR OF ONE HUNDRED WHAT WE DEFINE AS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

THIS PROBLEM IS NOT CONFINED TO ANY GEOGRAPHIC AREA. FORTUNATELY, INSIDE THE UNITED STATES WE EXPERIENCE RELATIVELY FEW INCIDENTS; THE PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED STATES IS PRIMARILY IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. THE LARGEST NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OVERALL AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OCCUR IN EUROPE FOLLOWED BY LATIN AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

WHY ARE WE SO CONCERNED? LET ME SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY:

--IN 1983 MORE AMERICANS WERE KILLED AND INJURED BY ACTS OF TERRORISM THAN IN THE FIFTEEN PRECEDING YEARS FOR WHICH WE HAVE RECORDS.

--THE ATTACKS IN 1983 WERE UNIQUE IN THE SHEER VIOLENCE OF THEM. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE WORST TRAGEDIES WERE THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR EMBASSY AND THE MARINE BARRACKS IN BEIRUT AND OF OUR EMBASSY ANNEX IN KUWAIT. BUT WE WERE NOT THE

ONLY VICTIMS. THERE WAS THE BOMBING AT HARRODS IN LONDON, THE BOMBING AT ORLY AIRPORT IN PARIS, THE MURDER OF FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN CABINET IN RANGOON, THE BOMBING DESTRUCTION OF A GULF AIR FLIGHT IN ONE OF THE EMIRATES AND OTHERS.

--CLOSELY TIED TO THE RISING VIOLENCE HAS BEEN THE INDISCRIMINATE TARGETING OF INNOCENTS -- PEOPLE WHO HAVE NO KNOWN ROLE IN EITHER CAUSING OR REDRESSING THE ALLEGED GRIEVANCES OF THE TERRORISTS.

--A SOURCE OF GROWING CONCERN IS THE EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF TERRORISTS OUTSIDE THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND REGIONS TO COMMIT ACTS OF TERROR ABROAD. AGAIN, INTELLIGENCE TELLS US THAT THIS OCCURS EXTENSIVELY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA BUT REPORTS ARE INCREASING OF SUCH TRAVEL TO THE US. AND WE ALSO KNOW THAT SOME AMERICANS ARE ENGAGED IN SUPPORTING THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN STATES AND GROUPS THAT ENGAGE IN TERRORISM.

--THE MOST DISTURBING TREND OF ALL IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCIES OF FOREIGN STATES ARE ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTS. SEVENTY OR MORE INCIDENTS IN 1983 PROBABLY INVOLVED SIGNIFICANT STATE SUPPORT OR PARTICIPATION. NO LONGER THE

RANDOM ACTS OF ISOLATED GROUPS OF LOCAL FANATICS, TERRORISM IS NOW A METHOD OF WARFARE, NO LESS BECAUSE IT IS UNDECLARED AND EVEN (THOUGH NOT ALWAYS) DENIED.

--SOME FORTY PERCENT OF ALL THE INCIDENTS AND A LARGE PROPORTION OF ALL THE THREATS AND HOAXES ARE AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES--OUR DIPLOMATS, MEMBERS OF OUR ARMED FORCES, OUR BUSINESSMEN, OR OTHER AMERICANS.

WE ARE NOW FACED WITH A PROBLEM WHICH IS OF MAJOR AND GROWING SIGNIFICANCE. THE PROBLEM IS NOT ONLY REPRESENTED BY THE GRIM STATISTICS BUT BY THE THREAT THAT TERRORISM REPRESENTS TO CIVILIZED LIFE. THE MAIN TARGET OF TERRORISTS IS NOT JUST INDIVIDUALS BUT THE BASIC INTERESTS AND VALUES OF THE DEMOCRACIES. IT IS A FORM OF LOW-LEVEL WARFARE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT WESTERN NATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. WE ARE THE TARGETS BECAUSE OUR BELIEF IN THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS AN OBSTACLE TO THOSE WHO WISH TO IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON OTHERS. AND IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONS RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND MAINTAIN THE MOST OPEN AND RESPONSIVE SOCIETIES THAT THEY ARE SO VULNERABLE TO TERRORISTS. THE GOAL OF THE TERRORIST IS TO CREATE ANARCHY AND DISORDER, FOR IT IS OUT OF DISORDER THAT HE HOPES TO INSTILL FEAR.

DISCREDIT GOVERNMENTS, DEMORALIZE SOCIETIES, OR ALTER NATIONAL POLICIES.

WHAT ARE WE DOING ABOUT IT?

--WE ARE WORKING WITH OUR CLOSEST ALLIES TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON HOW WE DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE SECURITY PROBLEMS IT PRESENTS FOR US. THE CONSENSUS EMBODIED IN THE DECLARATION IN LONDON ON JUNE 9 IS HEARTENING. IN EARLIER SUMMIT SEVEN MEETINGS WE HAD ADDRESSED SPECIFIC ISSUES SUCH AS AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND PROTECTION OF OUR DIPLOMATS. WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS. BUT ON THIS OCCASION WE DISCUSSED THE BASIC POLITICAL PROBLEM OF STATES ENGAGING IN TERRORISM AND WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE PROBLEM. WE NOTED THAT IN OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES WE HAVE GAPS IN LEGISLATION FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM.

THE LEGISLATION BEFORE THE CONGRESS TODAY WILL NOT FILL ALL THOSE GAPS FOR THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT WILL FILL SOME OF THEM. PART OF THE LEGISLATION WE HAVE PROPOSED IS TO IMPLEMENT TWO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS THAT THE SENATE HAS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED. THESE ARE RELATIVELY NONCONTROVERSIAL, BUT IT IS TIME TO GET THE JOB DONE. THE TWO OTHER BILLS NOW BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE DEAL WITH AREAS OF LAW WHERE WE FEEL

THAT LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS CAN HELP IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. WE WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH THE CONGRESS IN FINDING THE BEST LEGISLATIVE ANSWERS POSSIBLE TO THE COMPLEX QUESTIONS THAT TERRORISM POSES. THE DRAFT OF THE BILL ON TRAINING AND SUPPORT SERVICES HAS BEEN MODIFIED SIGNIFICANTLY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMENTS. MR. TROTT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS IN DETAIL.

WE ARE WORKING IN THIS ADMINISTRATION TO REVIEW AND APPLY THE WHOLE RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY SINGLE ANSWER THAT WE THINK WILL WORK ALL THE TIME. WHAT WE MUST DO, THEREFORE, IS ATTACK THE PROBLEM ON MANY DIFFERENT FRONTS:

--WE HAVE ORGANIZED OURSELVES BETTER WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS. WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY, PLANNING AND OPERATIONS ON THESE MATTERS HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT. THE POLICY AND PLANNING FOR THE DEPARTMENT AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL IS THE TASK OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND EMERGENCY PLANNING WHILE THE OPERATIONS ARE IN THE OFFICE OF SECURITY.

--WE HAVE ADDED MORE RESOURCES TO INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND WE HAVE STRENGTHENED COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS. WE HAVE ALSO STREAMLINED OUR PROCEDURES FOR ADVISING OUR POSTS ABROAD OF THREATS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SECURITY PROBLEMS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PROCEDURE IS NOW WORKING MUCH BETTER. WE BELIEVE THAT WE NEED TO DO MORE.

--WE HAVE STEPPED UP OUR TRAINING AND ARE ALSO CONDUCTING EXERCISES FOR OUR PERSONNEL OVERSEAS ON THE TYPES OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS THEY MIGHT HAVE TO DEAL WITH. WE HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, ADDED SEGMENTS IN EVERY APPROPRIATE COURSE AT THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH SUCH PROBLEMS.

--THE CONGRESS APPROVED LAST YEAR A PROGRAM WHICH WILL PERMIT US TO TRAIN FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTS. WE ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN IMPLEMENTING THAT PROGRAM. ALTHOUGH THIS PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO HELP OTHER GOVERNMENTS DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS AS IT AFFECTS THEM, IT SHOULD ALSO IMPROVE CONSIDERABLY THE RESPONSE FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN WE NEED HELP AT ONE OF OUR POSTS.

--WE ARE CARRYING OUT SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMS AT ALL OF OUR HIGH-THREAT POSTS. WE APPRECIATE GREATLY THE

CONSISTENT SUPPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THIS COMMITTEE IN THAT EFFORT.

--WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND WHEN INCIDENTS OCCUR OVERSEAS. WE HAVE TEAMS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT, SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER MATTERS.

--THE COOPERATION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS OFTEN DEPENDS ON HOW RESPONSIVE WE ARE ON THE SECURITY PROBLEMS THEIR DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS MAY HAVE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE CONGRESS HAS APPROVED LEGISLATION WHICH WILL ASSURE THAT WE HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO PROTECT FOREIGN OFFICIALS, NOT ONLY IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK CITY, BUT OTHER PLACES IN THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE SEEKING FUNDS FOR THAT PROGRAM IN THE CURRENT BUDGET.

--FINALLY, WE ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITY TO PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST OUR INTERESTS ABROAD. THE LONDON SUMMIT DECLARATION DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, "CLOSER COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN POLICE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER RELEVANT AUTHORITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE, AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE." AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WE ARE CONTINUING TO STUDY OTHER WAYS AND MEANS OF DETERRING OR

PREEMPTIVELY DEALING WITH A RANGE OF TERRORIST THREATS IN CONFORMITY WITH EXISTING LAW.

THE LEGISLATION BEFORE YOU REPRESENTS MODEST BUT NECESSARY STEPS. THEY ARE ESSENTIAL STEPS BECAUSE THE PROBLEM WILL NOT GO AWAY: THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT THE LAST YOU WILL HEAR ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM.

BUT WE NEED YOUR HELP. THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OWE IT TO THIS COUNTRY TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT OUR PEOPLE, OUR INTERESTS, AND OUR MOST BASIC PRINCIPLES.

THANK YOU.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 19, 1984

Draft speech on terrorism for delivery by Secretary Shultz at the Jonathan Institute Conference, June 24.

Five years have passed since the Jonathan Institute held its first conference on terrorism, and in that time the world has seen two major developments: one a cause for great distress; the other a reason for hope.

The distressing fact is that over these past five years terrorism has increased. More people were killed or injured by terrorists last year than in any year since governments began keeping records. In 1983 there were more than 500 attacks by international terrorists, of which more than 200 were against the United States. For Americans the worst tragedies were the destruction of our Embassy and the Marine barracks in Beirut and of our Embassy annex in Kuwait. But our close friends and allies were also victims. The bombing of Harrods in London, the bombing at Orly Airport in Paris, the destruction of a Gulf Air flight in one of the Emirates are just a few of the tragedies inflicted on our friends by terrorists. All told, more than 80 percent of the world's terrorist attacks occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Even more alarming has been the rise of state-sponsored terrorism. In the past five years more states have joined the ranks of what we might call the "League of Terror" as full-fledged sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate murder. Terrorist attacks supported by the Soviet Union, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have taken a heavy toll on the citizens of the free world. Seventy or more terrorist attacks in 1983 probably involved significant state support or participation.

As a result, more of the world's people must today live in fear of sudden and unprovoked violence at the hands of terrorists. After five years, the epidemic is spreading and the civilized world is still groping for remedies.

Nevertheless, these past five years have also given us cause for hope. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of concerned citizens and groups like the Jonathan Institute, the peoples of the free world have finally begun to grapple with the problem of terrorism, both intellectually and in practical terms. I say intellectually because the first step toward devising a solution to any problem is to understand that there is a problem, and then to understand its nature. In recent years, those of us who must bear the responsibility for defending free peoples against terrorism have learned a great deal, though our education has been painful and costly. We know what kind of threat terrorism poses to our free society. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their targets, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals. Armed with this knowledge we can now focus our energies on the practical means for reducing and eventually eliminating the terrorist threat.

We can all share the hope that, when the next conference of this Institute is convened, we will look back and say that 1984 was the turning point in our struggle against terrorism, that having come to grips with the problem we were able to deal with it effectively and responsibly.

The Contemporary Challenge

By now what everyone should understand about terrorism, above all, is that it is not random, undirected, purposeless violence. It is not, like an earthquake or a hurricane, an act of nature before which we are helpless. The terrorist and those who support him have definite goals; terrorist violence is the means of attaining those goals. Our response to terrorists, therefore, must be twofold: We must deny them the means, but above all we must deny them their goals.

But what are the goals of terrorism? We know that the phenomenon of terrorism is actually a matrix that combines a diverse array of weapons, methods, resources, and immediate aims. It appears in many shapes and sizes -- from the lone individual who plants a homemade explosive in a shopping center to the small clandestine group that plans kidnappings and assassinations of public figures to the well-equipped and well-financed organization that uses force to terrorize an entire population.

Its stated goals may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. We have even seen how international drug smugglers use terrorism to blackmail and intimidate government officials. It is clear that if we are to reduce the terrorist threat, the elements of our response will have to be just as diverse as terrorism itself.

But we must understand that the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: With rare exceptions, they are attempting to impose their will by force -- in violation of democratic procedures, norms of civilized behavior, and our most deeply-held moral principles.

The United States and its democratic allies are all nations morally committed to certain values and to a certain humane vision of the future. We are devoted to human progress. We need not believe that human nature can change, but we do believe that the human condition can be improved, that in the proper environment of freedom, individuals can attain their highest aspirations.

And because we believe in progress we have always sought, in our foreign policies, to foster the kind of world that makes improvement of the human condition possible.

Our vision is of a world that promotes peaceful settlement of international disputes, one that can welcome change without resort to violent conflict. We seek a world in which human rights are respected by all governments. We seek a world that is based on the rule of law. We in the United States have created such conditions within our own borders, and it is no accident that our closest allies and friends in the world are nations that share these aspirations.

We seek these goals out of a clear sense of what the philosophers once called enlightened self-interest. For we know that in a world community where all nations share these blessings, our own democracy will flourish, our own nation will prosper, and our own people will continue to enjoy freedom.

Nor has ours been a fruitless search. In our lifetime, we have seen the world progress, though perhaps too slowly, toward this goal. Civilized norms of conduct have evolved, even regarding the political and diplomatic relations between adversaries. Conflict persists, but with some notorious exceptions, even wars have been conducted subject to some restraints prescribed by elementary decency. Indiscriminate slaughter of innocents is widely condemned. The use of certain kinds of weapons has been proscribed, and most nations have heeded those proscriptions.

Yet we are all too aware that the world as it exists today is still far from our ideal vision. Even the progress that mankind has already made is endangered by those who do not share that vision, who instead seek to impose tyranny through violence.

It is all too understandable why the democracies are the primary targets of terrorism. The values upon which democracy is based -- protection of individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of religion -- all stand in the way of those who want to dominate others, who want to impose tyrannical control over the actions of others, who seek to impose their ideologies or their religious beliefs against the will of the majority. The terrorist is a zealot who has no patience and no respect for the orderly processes of democratic society and, therefore, he considers himself its enemy.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists also make them so vulnerable. Precisely because we respect the rights and freedom of our citizens and maintain the most open societies, the terrorist has unparalleled opportunity to commit atrocities. Needless to say, he has no such room to maneuver in the totalitarian societies.

Terrorism is a negligible problem in totalitarian societies because these societies are more efficient in their control -- and because the terrorists know that these countries are their allies, not their enemies.

And this fact points to another reason why the democracies are the primary targets of terrorism. It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of strategic importance to the West. For the states who sponsor and support terrorism, the murder of innocents has become yet another instrument of war. They use terrorism to gain strategic advantages where other, conventional, methods are unavailable. When Iran, Syria and their allies sent terrorists to bomb Western personnel in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the West's commitment to defending its interests in the Middle East. When North Korea sponsored the murder of South Korean government officials, it hoped to weaken the non-Communist stronghold on the mainland of East Asia. When the Soviet Union and its clients provide financial, logistic and training support for terrorists worldwide -- when the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany assault free countries in the name of Communist ideology -- they hope to shake the West's self-confidence and sap its will to resist aggression and intimidation. In a few months' time we may learn the answer to one of the great questions of our time: the allegations of Soviet-bloc involvement in the attempt to assassinate the Pope.

To the great credit of the democracies, these terrorist campaigns have ultimately failed, but the challenge is still before us.

Let us understand the Soviet connection without exaggeration or distortion: The Soviet Union officially denounces the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Yet, one does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes to see a mammoth gap between Soviet words and Soviet deeds. Violent or fanatic individuals and groups will exist in every society. But in many countries, terrorism would long since have passed away had it not been for significant support from outside.

States that sponsor terrorism need not share the immediate goals of those who receive their support. I doubt very much that the Soviet Union cares about the cause of Basque separatists, or the Irish Republican Army, or Armenian grievances, or a Palestinian homeland. They use terrorist groups for their own purposes, and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability.

But what of the terrorists themselves and the causes they claim to represent? One of the intellectual issues we face is to define terrorism and to distinguish it from legitimate forms of struggle.

Some have argued that the distinction is too blurred to be useful in making policy. We have all heard the insidious claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Let me read to you the powerful rebuttal that was stated before your 1979 conference by a great American, Senator Henry Jackson:

"The idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter' cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists."

We must recognize that terrorism is the enemy of democratic change. The terrorist seeks to spread chaos and disorder, to paralyze a society with fear of indiscriminate violence. In doing so he wins no converts to his cause. His deeds inspire hatred and fear, not allegiance.

The terrorist seeks to undermine civilized institutions, to destroy popular faith in the government and society.

In democratic nations he seeks to shake the people's faith in the very idea of democracy. In Lebanon, for instance, state-sponsored terrorism has brought that nation's democratic aspirations to the brink of collapse more than once and threatened to plunge that nation into the darkness of anarchy.

Where the terrorist cannot bring about anarchy, he may try to force the government to overreact, or impose tyrannical measures of control, and hence lose the allegiance of the people. Turkey faced such a crisis, but succeeded in overcoming it. Martial law was imposed; the terrorist threat was drastically reduced, and today we see democracy returning to that country. In Argentina, the unjustified and deplorable excesses of the 1970s were in fact a response -- a deliberately provoked response -- to the excesses of a massive campaign of terrorism. We are pleased that Argentina, too, has returned to the path of democracy. Other countries around the world face similar challenges, and they too must steer their course carefully between anarchy and tyranny. The lesson for civilized nations is that we must respond to the terrorist threat within the rule of law, lest we become unwitting accomplices in the terrorist's scheme to undermine civilized society.

Once we understand terrorism's goals and methods, it is not hard to tell, as we look around the world, who are the terrorists and who are the freedom fighters.

The resistance fighters in Afghanistan do not destroy villages or murder women and children. The Contras in Nicaragua do not blow up school buses or execute civilians.

How tragic it would be if democratic societies so lost confidence in their own moral legitimacy that they lost sight of the obvious: that violent movements directed against democratic governments are terroristic because they are fundamentally without justification. Such governments have mechanisms for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances. But resort to arms in behalf of democracy against repressive regimes or movements may indeed be a fight for freedom, since there may be no other way that freedom can be achieved.

The free nations cannot afford to let the Orwellian corruption of language hamper our efforts to defend ourselves. We know the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters and our foreign policies reflect that distinction. The United States will support those who fight for freedom and democracy. We will oppose guerrilla wars when they threaten our interests or when they threaten to spread the rule of totalitarianism. But we will oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism in any cause is the enemy of freedom.

A Counterstrategy Against Terrorism

Having identified and defined the challenge, we must now consider the best strategy to counter it. Our strategy must combine many diverse elements. No single measure will suffice. And we must keep in mind, as we devise our strategy, that our ultimate aim is to preserve what the terrorists seek to destroy: democracy, freedom, and the hope for a world at peace.

The basis of our strategy, therefore, must be greater cooperation among the democratic nations of the world and all others who share our aspirations. Since the democracies are the primary targets of terrorism, we will have to rely primarily on ourselves to form a solid line of defense. For years we have sought international cooperation to stem the tide of terrorism -- and we have achieved some successes. But, as we have learned, the Soviet Union and its client states do not share our abhorrence of terrorist violence. And too many Western countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking the bully. The time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps. The declaration on terrorism that was agreed upon at the London Economic Summit earlier this month was a welcome sign that the industrial democracies share a common view of the terrorist threat. We must build on that foundation.

Greater international cooperation offers many advantages. If, for instance, we can collectively improve our ability to gather and share intelligence, we can better detect the movements and anticipate the actions of terrorists. The element of surprise that is so important to the terrorist can be reduced if nations are willing to cooperate in this way. We can also help governments improve their ability to deal with terrorism by providing training and by sharing methods of handling terrorist tactics. To that end, the Reagan Administration has acted promptly on the program that Congress approved last year to train foreign law enforcement officers in anti-terrorist techniques.

We must also make a collective effort to address the special problem of state-sponsored terrorism. States that support terror offer safe havens, funds, training, and the logistical support that terrorists need to operate effectively. We must do some hard thinking about how to pressure members of the League of Terror to cease their support. Such pressure will have to be international. No one nation can manage the task alone. Economic sanctions and other forms of pressure impose costs on the nation that applies them. But some sacrifices will be necessary if we are to address the problem. In the long run, I believe, it will have been a small price to pay.

We must also discourage nations from paying blackmail to terrorist organizations. Although we recognize that some nations are particularly vulnerable to the terrorist threat, we must convince them that paying blackmail is counterproductive and inimical to the interests of all.

Finally, the nations of the free world must stand together against terrorism to demonstrate our enduring commitment to our shared vision. The terrorists may be looking for signs of weakness, for evidence of disunity. We must show them that we are unbending. Let the terrorists despair of ever achieving their goals. Together, we will not despair.

These international efforts are essential, but individual nations must also take steps on their own to protect their citizens both within their borders and abroad. For our part, the United States is continuing efforts to strengthen security at our embassies around the world to prevent a recurrence of the Beirut and Kuwait Embassy bombings, and our Federal Bureau of Investigation is improving our ability to detect and prevent terrorist acts within our own borders. In addition, President Reagan has submitted to the Congress four separate bills to help us combat terrorist activities.

This legislation would implement two international conventions to which the U.S. is a signatory: the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and the Montreal Convention to protect against sabotage of civilian aircraft. Other proposed legislation would enable us to obtain more information about terrorists through the payment of rewards to informants, and would also permit prosecution of those who support terrorist activities or those states that sponsor terrorism.

All the measures I have described so far, both international and domestic, are important elements in a comprehensive strategy against terrorism. If we move ahead in all those areas, we can reduce the terrorist threat.

But the question is, will the passive defense that these measures entail be enough? Can we as a country, can the community of free nations, stand in a solely defensive posture and absorb the blows dealt by terrorists?

I believe the answer is no. From a practical standpoint, a purely passive defense does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorists and the states that sponsor terrorism. Terrorism is a form of warfare, and history has taught us that to deter war, one must be able to strike back or act preemptively.

It is time to think long, hard, and seriously about means of active defense. We must be willing, when possible and prudent, to take preemptive measures against would-be terrorists. And experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against such activity.

Such a course of action is difficult for nations like our own which prefer non-violent means of solving problems. But we cannot let our vision of a better world stand in the way of taking the steps necessary to make that vision a reality.

Let me add another consideration. The democracies seek a world order that is based on the principles of justice. Justice is, in an important sense, the prerequisite of freedom. We know that in a country where there is no justice, the people feel no allegiance to their government or the institutions of society. The same is true of the world order.

When innocents are victimized and the guilty go unpunished, the terrorists have succeeded in undermining the very foundation of civilized society, for they have created a world where there is no justice. If we expect the peoples of the free world to have faith in our institutions, if we want them to hold on to their hope for a better future, we must show them that we can protect them and that the world they live in is a just world. Only thus do we deny terrorists their victory.

No matter what policies we pursue, however, we must accept the fact that the terrorist threat will not disappear overnight. This is not the last conference that will be held on this subject. Our people must understand this and be prepared to live with the fact that despite all our best efforts the world is still a dangerous place. Further sacrifices, as in the past, may be the price for preserving our freedom.

It is essential, therefore, that we not allow the actions of terrorists to affect our policies or alter our behavior in world affairs. When terrorism succeeds in changing the foreign policies of governments, it only opens the door to more terrorism. It shows that terrorism works; it encourages states that support it to continue to use terror as an instrument of foreign policy; and it encourages other nations to join their ranks.

The Future

With all that we have learned over these past years, there is good reason to have hope for the future. If we remain firm, we can look forward to a time when terrorism will cease to be an important factor in world affairs. Not so long ago we faced a rash of political kidnappings and embassy takeovers. These problems seemed insurmountable. Yet, through increased security, the willingness of governments to resist terrorist demands and to use force when appropriate, these acts of terrorism have declined. In recent years, we have also seen a decline in the number of airline hijackings -- once a problem that seemed to fill our newspapers daily. Today, tougher security measures and greater international cooperation have clearly had their effect.

We can achieve the same success in combatting all other forms of terrorism if only we have the will to come together and take decisive steps. I have great faith that we do have the will. It is up to us, the nations of the free world. We must set ourselves to the task of making terrorism a thing of the past, not of our future.

As Prepared for Delivery

POWER AND DIPLOMACY IN THE 1980's

ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON PLENARY MEETING OF THE

TRILATERAL COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 1984

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY, SCHEDULED FOR APPROXIMATELY 8:00 P.M.
EST, APRIL 3, 1984. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY CITED, QUOTED FROM,
OR USED IN ANY WAY.

Over twenty years ago, President John Kennedy pledged that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty." We know now that the scope of that commitment is too broad -- though the self-confidence and courage in those words were typically American and most admirable. More recently, another administration took the view that our fear of Communism was "inordinate" and that there were very complicated social, economic, religious and other factors at work in the world that we had little ability to affect. This, in my view, is a counsel of helplessness that substantially underestimates the United States and its ability to influence events.

Somewhere between these two poles lies the natural and sensible scope of American foreign policy. We know that we are not omnipotent and that we must set priorities. We cannot "pay any price" or "bear any burden." We must discriminate; we must be prudent and careful; we must respond in ways appropriate to the challenge and engage our power only when very important strategic stakes are involved. Not every situation can be salvaged by American exertion even when important values or interests are at stake.

At the same time, we know from history that courage and vision and determination can change reality. We can affect events, and we all know it.

The American people expect this of their leaders. And the future of the free world depends on it.

Americans, being a moral people, want their foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse as a nation. But Americans, being a practical people, also want their foreign policy to be effective. If we truly care about our values, we must be prepared to defend them, and advance them. Thus we as a nation are perpetually asking ourselves: how to reconcile our morality and our practical sense, how to pursue noble goals in a complex and imperfect world, how to relate our strength to our purposes -- in sum, how to relate power and diplomacy.

We meet this evening amid the excitement of America's quadrennial exercise of self-renewal, in which we as a country reexamine ourselves and our international objectives. It is an unending process -- almost as unending as the Presidential campaign season. But there are some constants in our policy, such as our alliance with the industrial democracies, as embodied in this distinguished gathering. This partnership -- the cornerstone of our foreign policy for 35 years -- itself reflects our ability to combine our moral commitment to democracy and our practical awareness of the crucial importance of maintaining the global balance of power. So I consider this an appropriate forum at which to share some thoughts on the relationship between power and diplomacy in the last two decades of the 20th century.

The World We Face

By the accident of history, the role of world leadership fell to the United States just at the moment when the old international order had been destroyed by two world wars but no new stable system had developed to replace it. A century ago, the international system was centered on Europe and consisted of only a few major players. Today, in terms of military strength, the dominant countries are two major powers that had been, in one sense or another, on the edge or outside of European diplomacy. But economic power is now widely dispersed. Asia is taking on increasing significance. The former colonial empires have been dismantled, and there are now more than 160 independent nations on the world scene. Much of the developing world itself is torn by a continuing struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of radicalism. Most of the major international conflicts since 1945 have taken place there -- from Korea to Vietnam to the Middle East to Central America. Moreover, the Soviet Union continues to exploit nuclear fear as a political weapon and to exploit instabilities wherever they have the opportunity to do so.

On a planet grown smaller because of global communications, grown more turbulent because of the diffusion of power -- all the while overshadowed by nuclear weapons -- the task of achieving stability, security, and progress is a profound challenge for mankind.

In an age menaced by nuclear proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism, tendencies toward anarchy are bound to be a source of real dangers. ✓

It is absurd to think that America can walk away from these problems. This is a world of great potential instability and great potential danger. There is no safety in isolationism. We have a major, direct stake in the health of the world economy; our prosperity, our security, and our alliances can be affected by threats to security in many parts of the world; and the fate of our fellow human beings will always impinge on our moral consciousness. Certainly the United States is not the world's policeman. But we are the world's strongest free nation, and therefore the preservation of our values, our principles, and our hopes for a better world rests in great measure, inevitably, on our shoulders.

Power and Diplomacy

In this environment, our principal goal is what President Reagan has called "the most basic duty that any President and any people share -- the duty to protect and strengthen the peace." History teaches, however, that peace is not achieved merely by wishing for it. Noble aspirations are not self-fulfilling. Our aim must always be to shape events, and not be the victim of events.

In this fast-moving and turbulent world, to sit in a reactive posture is to risk being overwhelmed -- or to allow others, who may not wish us well, to decide the world's future.

The Great Seal of the United States, as you know, shows the American eagle clutching arrows in one claw and olive branches in the other. Some of you may have seen the Great Seal on some of the china and other antique objects in the White House or in the ceremonial rooms on the eighth floor of the State Department. On some of the older items, the eagle looks toward the arrows; on others, toward the olive branches. It was President Truman who set it straight: He saw to it that the eagle always looked toward the olive branches -- showing that America sought peace. But the eagle still holds onto those arrows.

This is a way of saying that our forefathers understood quite well that power and diplomacy always go together. It is even clearer today that a world of peace and security will not come about without exertion, or without facing up to some tough choices. Certainly power must always be guided by purpose, but the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual. That is why, for example, the United States has succeeded many times in its mediation when many other well-intentioned mediators have failed. Leverage, as well as good will, is required.

Americans have sometimes tended to think that power and diplomacy are two distinct alternatives. To take a very recent example, the Long Commission report on the bombing of our Marine barracks in Beirut urged that we work harder to pursue what it spoke of as "diplomatic alternatives," as opposed to "military options." This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding -- not only of our intensive diplomatic efforts throughout the period, but of the relationship between power and diplomacy. Sometimes, regrettable as it may be, political conflict degenerates into a test of strength. It was precisely our military role in Lebanon that was problematical, not our diplomatic exertion. Our military role was hamstrung by legislative and other inhibitions; the Syrians were not interested in diplomatic compromise so long as the prospect of hegemony was not foreclosed. They could judge from our domestic debate that our staying power was limited.

In arms control, also, successful negotiation depends on the perception of a military balance. Only if the Soviet leaders see the West as determined to modernize its own forces will they see an incentive to negotiate agreements establishing equal, verifiable, and lower levels of armaments.

The lesson is that power and diplomacy are not alternatives. They must go together, or we will accomplish very little in this world.

The relationship between them is a complex one, and it presents us with both practical and moral issues. Let me address a few of those issues. One is the variety of the challenges we face. A second is the moral complexity of our response. A third is the problem of managing the process in a democracy.

The Range of Challenges

Perhaps because of our long isolation from the turmoil of world politics, Americans have tended to believe that war and peace, too, were two totally distinct phenomena: We were either in a blissful state of peace, or else (as in World Wars I and II) we embarked on an all-out quest for total victory, after which we wanted to retreat back into inward-looking innocence, avoiding "power politics" and all it represented. During World War II, while singlemindedly seeking the unconditional surrender of our enemies, we paid too little heed to the emerging postwar balance of power.

Similarly, since 1945 we have experienced what we saw as a period of clear-cut cold war, relieved by a period of seeming detente which raised exaggerated expectations in some quarters. Today we must see the East-West relationship as more complex, with the two sides engaging in trade and pursuing arms control even as they pursue incompatible aims.

It is not as crisis-prone or starkly confrontational as the old cold war; but neither is it a normal relationship of peace or comfortable coexistence.

Thus, in the 1980's and beyond, most likely we will never see a state of total war or a state of total peace. We face instead a spectrum of often ambiguous challenges to our interests.

We are relatively well prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on our West European allies; that's why these are the least likely contingencies. But day in and day out, we will continue to see a wide range of conflicts that fall in a grey area between major war and millennial peace. The coming years can be counted upon to generate their share of crises and local outbreaks of violence. Some of them -- not all of them -- will affect our interests. Terrorism -- particularly state-sponsored terrorism -- is already a contemporary weapon directed at America's interests, America's values, and America's allies. We must be sure we are as well prepared and organized for this intermediate range of challenges.

If we are to protect our interests, values, and allies, we must be engaged. And our power must be engaged.

It is often said that the lesson of Vietnam is that the United States should not engage in military conflict without a clear and precise military mission, solid public backing, and enough resources to finish the job. This is undeniably true. But does it mean there are no situations where a discrete assertion of power is needed or appropriate, for limited purposes? Unlikely. Whether it is crisis management or power projection or a show of force or peacekeeping or a localized military action, there will always be instances that fall short of an all-out national commitment on the scale of World War II. The need to avoid no-win situations cannot mean that we turn automatically away from hard-to-win situations that call for prudent involvement. These will always involve risks; we will not always have the luxury of being able to choose the most advantageous circumstances. And our adversaries can be expected to play rough.

The Soviets are students of Clausewitz, who taught that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is highly unlikely that we can respond to grey-area challenges without adapting power to political circumstances, or on a psychologically-satisfying, all-or-nothing basis. This is just not the kind of reality we are likely to be facing in the 1980's, or 1990's, or beyond. Few cases will be as clear or as quick as Grenada. On the contrary, most other cases will be a lot tougher.

We have no choice, moreover, but to address ourselves boldly to the challenge of terrorism. State-sponsored terrorism is really a form of warfare. Motivated by ideology and political hostility, it is a weapon of unconventional war against democratic societies, taking advantage of the openness of these societies. How do we combat this challenge? Certainly we must take security precautions to protect our people and our facilities; certainly we must strengthen our intelligence capabilities to alert ourselves to the threats. But it is increasingly doubtful that a purely passive strategy can even begin to cope with the problem. This raises a host of questions for a free society: In what circumstances -- and how -- should we respond? When -- and how -- should we take preventive or preemptive action against known terrorist groups? What evidence do we insist upon before taking such steps?

As the threat mounts, and as the involvement of such countries as Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea has become more and more evident, then it is more and more appropriate that the nations of the West face up to the need for active defense against terrorism. Once it becomes established that terrorism works -- that it achieves its political objectives -- its practitioners will be bolder, and the threat to us will be all the greater.

The Moral Issues

Of course, any use of force involves moral issues. American military power should be resorted to only if the stakes justify it, if other means are not available, and then only in a manner appropriate to the objective. But we cannot opt out of every contest. If we do, the world's future will be determined by others -- most likely by those who are the most brutal, the most unscrupulous, and the most hostile to our deeply-held principles. The New Republic stated it well a few weeks ago:

"[T]he American people know that force and the threat of force are central to the foreign policy of our adversaries, and they expect their President to be able to deter and defeat such tactics."

As we hear now in the debate over military aid to Central America, those who shrink from engagement can always find an alibi for inaction. Often it takes the form of close scrutiny of any moral defects in the friend or ally whom we are proposing to assist. Or it is argued that the conflict has deep social and economic origins which we really have to address first before we have a right to do anything else.

But rather than remain engaged in order to tackle these problems -- as we are trying to do -- some people turn these concerns into formulas for abdication, formulas that would allow the enemies of freedom to decide the outcome. To me, it is highly immoral to let friends who depend on us be subjugated by brute force if we have the capacity to prevent it.

There is, in addition, another ugly residue of our Vietnam debate: the notion, in some quarters, that America is the guilty party, that the use of our power is a source of evil and therefore the main task in foreign policy is to restrain America's freedom to act. It is inconceivable to me that the American people believe any of this. It is certainly not President Reagan's philosophy.

Without being boastful or arrogant, the American people know that their country has been a powerful force for good in the world. We helped Europe and Asia -- including defeated enemies -- rebuild after the war and we helped provide a security shield behind which they could build democracy and freedom as well as prosperity. Americans have often died and sacrificed for the freedom of others. We have provided around \$165 billion in economic assistance for the developing world. We have played a vital facilitating role in the Middle East peace process, in the unfolding diplomacy of Southern Africa, as well as in many other diplomatic efforts around the globe.

We have used our power for good and worthy ends. In Grenada, we helped restore self-determination to the people of Grenada, so that they could choose their own future. Some have tried to compare what we did in Grenada to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We welcome such comparison: Contrast, for example, the prospects for free elections in the two countries. In Grenada, they will be held this year; in Afghanistan, when? Contrast the number of American combat troops now in Grenada five months after the operation with the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan fifty-five months after their invasion. The number in Grenada is zero; the number in Afghanistan is over 100,000.

More often, the issue is not the direct use of American military power but military assistance to friends to help them defend themselves. Around the world, security support for friends is a way to prevent crises; it bolsters our friends so they can deter challenges. And it is a way of avoiding the involvement of American forces, because it is only when our friends' efforts in their own defense are being overwhelmed that we are faced with the agonizing decision whether to involve ourselves more directly. Security assistance is thus an essential tool of foreign policy. It is an instrument for deterring those who would impose their will by force, and for making political solutions possible. It gets far less support in this country than it deserves.

Central America is a good example. The real moral question in Central America is not: do we believe in military solutions, but: do we believe in ourselves? Do we believe that our security and the security of our neighbors has moral validity? Do we have faith in our own democratic values? Do we believe that Marxist-Leninist solutions are anti-democratic and that we have a moral right to try to stop those who are trying to impose them by force? Sure, economic and social problems underlie many of these conflicts -- but in El Salvador, the Communist guerrillas are waging war directly against the economy, blowing up bridges and power stations, deliberately trying to wreck the country's economy.

The conflict in Central America is not a debate between social theorists; it is one of those situations I mentioned where the outcome of political competition will depend in large measure on the balance of military strength. In El Salvador, the United States is supporting moderates who believe in democracy and who are resisting the enemies of democracy on both the extreme right and the extreme left. If we withdrew our support, the moderates, caught in the crossfire, would be the first victims -- as would be the cause of human rights and the prospects for economic development. Anyone who believes that military support for our friends isn't crucial to a just outcome is living in a dream world. And anyone who believes that military support can be effective when it's given on an uncertain installment plan is not facing reality.

Accountability without Paralysis

The third issue I want to mention is the question of how this country, as a democracy, conducts itself in the face of such challenges.

Over the last 35 years, the evolution of the international system was bound to erode the predominant position the United States enjoyed immediately after World War II. But it seems to me that in this disorderly and dangerous new world, the loss of American predominance puts an even greater premium on consistency, determination, and coherence in the conduct of our foreign policy. We have less margin for error than we used to have.

This change in our external circumstances, however, coincided historically with a kind of cultural revolution at home that has made it harder for us to achieve the consistency, determination, and coherence that we need. The last 15 years left a legacy of contention between the executive and legislative branches and a web of restrictions on executive action embedded permanently in our laws. At the same time, the diffusion of power within the Congress means that a President has a hard time when he wants to negotiate with the Congress, because Congressional leaders have lost their dominance of the process and often cannot produce a consensus, or sometimes even a decision.

The net result, as you well know, is an enormous problem for American foreign policy: a loss of coherence, and recurring uncertainty in the minds of friend and foe about the aims and constancy of the United States.

Particularly in the War Powers field, where direct use of our power is at issue, the stakes are high. Yet the War Powers Resolution sets arbitrary 60-day deadlines that practically invite an adversary to wait us out. Our Commander in Chief is locked in battle at home at the same time he is trying to act effectively abroad. Under the Resolution, even inaction by the Congress can force the President to remove American forces from an area of challenge -- which, as former President Ford has put it, undermines the President even when the Congress can't get up the courage to take a position. Such constraints on timely action may only invite greater challenges down the road. In Lebanon, our adversaries' perception that we lacked staying power undercut the prospects for successful negotiation. As the distinguished Majority Leader, Senator Howard Baker, said .. on the floor of the Senate four weeks ago:

"[W]e cannot continue to begin each military involvement abroad with a prolonged tedious and divisive negotiation between the executive and the legislative branches of Government. The world and its many challenges to our interests simply do not allow us that luxury."

I do not propose changes in our constitutional system. But some legislative changes may be called for. And I propose, at a minimum, that all of us, in both Congress and the Executive Branch, exercise our prerogatives with a due regard to the national need for an effective foreign policy. Congress has the right, indeed the duty, to debate and criticize, to authorize and appropriate funds and share in setting the broad lines of policy. But micro-management by a committee of 535 independent-minded individuals is a grossly inefficient and ineffective way to run any important enterprise. The fact is that depriving the President of flexibility weakens our country. Yet a host of restrictions on the President's ability to act are now built into our laws and our procedures. Surely there is a better way for the President and the Congress to exercise their prerogatives without hobbling this country in the face of assaults on free world interests abroad. Surely there can be accountability without paralysis. The sad truth is that many of our difficulties over the last fifteen years have been self-imposed.

The issue is fundamental. If the purpose of our power is to prevent war, or injustice, then ideally we want to discourage such occurrences rather than have to use our power in a physical sense. But this can happen only if there is assurance that our power would be used if necessary.

A reputation for reliability becomes, then, a major asset -- giving friends a sense of security and adversaries a sense of caution. A reputation for living up to our commitments can in fact make it less likely that pledges of support will have to be carried out. Crisis management is most successful when a favorable outcome is attained without firing a shot. Credibility is an intangible, but it is no less real. The same is true of a loss of credibility. A failure to support a friend always involves a price. Credibility, once lost, has to be re-earned.

Facing the Future

These dilemmas and hard choices will not go away, no matter who is President. They are not partisan problems. Anyone who claims to have simple answers is talking nonsense.

The United States faces a time of challenge ahead as great as any in recent memory. We have a diplomacy that has moved toward peace through negotiation. We have rebuilt our strength so that we can defend our interests and dissuade others from violence. We have allies whom we value and respect. Our need is to recognize both our challenge and our potential.

Americans are not a timid people. A foreign policy worthy of America must not be a policy of isolationism or guilt, but a commitment to active engagement. We can be proud of this country, of what it stands for, and what it has accomplished. Our morality should be a source of courage when we make hard decisions, not a set of excuses for self-paralysis.

President Reagan declared to the British Parliament nearly two years ago: "We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings." As long as Americans hold to this belief, we will be actively engaged in the world. We will use our power and our diplomatic skill in the service of peace, and of our ideals. We have our work cut out for us. But we will not shrink from our responsibility.

Thank you very much.