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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION Ø1 OF Ø5 MOSCOW Ø9349

E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/25/89
TAGS: ECON, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE JANUARY THROUGH JUNE
REF: MOSCOW 8975

1. (C) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: EXTRAPOLATING FROM THE SIX-MONTH FIGURES JUST PUBLISHED, WE SEE THAT THE GROWTH IN JUNE INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE PICKED UP SOMEWHAT AFTER A STEADY DECLINE FROM JANUARY. MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF THE PRODUCT CATEGORIES SAW INCREASES IN OUTPUT, WHILE LESS THAN ONE FOURTH DECLINED IN COMPARISON WITH MAY 1983. ALTHOUGH THE LARGE STATISTICAL IMPROVEMENT OVER 1982 IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY (REFLECTING MILD WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS) STILL AFFECTS THE SIX-MONTH NUMBERS, JUNE 1983 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A BETTER MONTH THAN OUR INITIAL PRESUMPTION (REFTEL). NEITHER OIL NOR GAS DAILY PRODUCTION IN JUNE INCREASED OVER MAY, 1983, AND COAL PRODUCTION INCREASED ONLY TO THE LEVEL OF LAST JUNE. SALARY GAINS WERE HIGHER FOR COLLECTIVE FARMERS THAN INDUSTRIAL WORKERS. END SUMMARY.
-
INDUSTRY
---

2. (C) FULL STATISTICS ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1983 WERE PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS ON JULY 23 (IN IZVESTIA ON JULY 22). THE FIGURE GIVEN FOR OVERALL GROWTH IN INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT FOR JANUARY-JUNE, 1983, OVER THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD IN 1982 (4.1 PERCENT AS REPORTED REFTEL) SUGGESTS A LEVEL OF PRODUCTION 4.1 PERCENT HIGHER FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1983, THAN JUNE, 1982. MODEST INCREASES OVER MAY WERE REGISTERED IN OVER HALF THE PRODUCT CATEGORIES LISTED, AND ONLY ABOUT ONE FOURTH OF THE CATEGORIES POSTED DECLINES IN OUTPUT. THIS IMPROVEMENT MIGHT BE ACCOUNTED FOR IN PART BY THE PRIORITY GIVEN TO COMPLETION OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT PROJECTS: THE VALUE OF NEW CAPITAL ACTUALLY PUT INTO OPERATION WAS UP 9 PERCENT OVER JANUARY-JUNE 1983, WHILE STATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT INCREASED 6 PERCENT. NOTE: THIS SECOND LOOK AT THE NUMBERS -- INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC INDUSTRIAL SECTORS -- REPLACES OUR COMMENT PARA 5 REFTEL.
-
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
---

3. (U) THE COMMENTARY ACCOMPANYING THE STATISTICS ASCRIBED 83 PERCENT OF THE GROWTH IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1983, OVER SAME PERIOD IN 1982, TO A 3.3 PERCENT INCREASE IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY. IN CONSTRUCTION, LABOR PRODUCTIVITY WENT UP 2.8 PERCENT, AND IN RAILROAD TRANSPORT, 3.8 PERCENT.
-
WAGES AND STANDARD OF LIVING
---

4. (C) WHILE SALARIES IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR WERE REPORTED TO HAVE INCREASED 2.2 PERCENT, TO AN AVERAGE OF 181 RUBLES PER MONTH, THE WAGES OF COLLECTIVE FARMERS WENT UP 7 PERCENT. RETAIL SALES INCREASED ONLY 1.6 PERCENT, HOWEVER. THE NUMBER OF NON-AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IS NOW 114.8 MILLION, REFLECTING AN INCREASE IN THE WORKFORCE OF ONE MILLION OVER LAST YEAR. COMMENT: WHILE WE STILL DO NOT KNOW THE INFLATIONARY EFFECTS OF RETAIL PRICE INCREASES DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS, OR WHETHER THEY ARE DISCOUNTED IN THESE STATISTICS, AT FIRST SIGHT IT WOULD APPEAR THAT EFFORTS TO HOLD SALARY INCREASES TO THE RATE OF PRODUCTION INCREASES WORKED FOR INDUSTIRAL WORKERS AND OUTPUT AS A WHOLE -- BUT THAT THE RETAIL GOODS WERE STILL NOT THERE FOR THEM TO BUY. WHATEVER THE PRICE FACTORS, COLLECTIVE FARMERS DID BETTER. END COMMENT.
-
ENERGY
BT

Sov. Eco

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5. (LOU) OIL PRODUCTION WAS ABOUT THE SAME THIS JUNE AS IN JUNE OF LAST YEAR, AND THERE WAS NO IMPROVEMENT IN OUTPUT OVER MAY, 1983, THAT SHOWED UP IN THE STATISTICS. DAILY GAS OUTPUT DID NOT IMPROVE NOTICEABLY OVER LAST MONTH. COAL PRODUCTION, HOWEVER, DID POST AN INCREASE THIS MONTH AFTER DECLINING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. COAL PRODUCTION IN JUNE, 1983, AT 59 MILLION METRIC TONS WAS EQUAL TO LAST JUNE'S OUTPUT.

6. (U) THE ABOVE ANALYSIS WAS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PUBLISHED STATISTICS.

ENERGY OUTPUT DATA

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
ELECTRICITY (BILLION KWH)	106	3.53	710	103	100.6	102	99.6
OIL (MILLION METRIC TONS)	51	1.7	307	101	102	102	99.1
GAS (BILLION CUBIC METERS)	43	1.43	265	107	102	106	105
COAL (MILLION METRIC TONS)	59	1.97	363	99.9	100.7	101	99.1

COLUMN HEADINGS:
(1) PRODUCTION IN JUNE 1983.
(2) DAILY PRODUCTION RATE IN JUNE 1983.
(3) CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION, JANUARY-JUNE 1983.
(4) OVERALL PRODUCTION JANUARY-JUNE 1983 AS A RATIO OF
- PRODUCTION IN JANUARY-JUNE 1982.
(5) PERCENT OF PLAN FULFILLMENT FOR JANUARY-JUNE 1983
- BY VOLUME OF PRODUCTION BY MINISTRY.
(6) VOLUME OF PRODUCTION BY MINISTRY AS A RATIO OF
- THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1983 OVER THE SAME PERIOD
- IN 1982.
(7) LABOR PRODUCTIVITY BY MINISTRY AS A RATIO OF THE FIRST
- SIX MONTHS OF 2983 OVER THE SAME PERIOD IN 1982.

SOVIET INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT AND HISTORICAL COMPARISON:

MINISTRY OF NONFERROUS METALLURGY

JANUARY-JUNE 1983 PLAN FULFILLMENT FOR OUTPUT: 101
JANUARY-JUNE 1983 OUTPUT AS PERCENT OF JAN-JUNE 1982 LEVEL: 104
JANUARY-JUNE 1983 PRODUCTIVITY AS PERCENT OF JANUARY-JUNE 1982 LEVEL: 103
PRODUCT CATEGORIES

NOTES:
(1) JUNE 1983 OUTPUT
(2) JANUARY - JUNE 1983 OUTPUT
(3) PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM JANUARY-JUNE 1982 TO
- JANUARY-JUNE 1983
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-	(1)	(2)	(3)
(A) FERROUS METALLURGY			
STEEL (MILLION TONS)	12.5	76.2	1Ø2
ROLLED STEEL (MILLION TONS)	8.7	52.9	1Ø2
STEEL PIPE (MILLION TONS)	1.6	9.3	1Ø5
IRON ORE (MILLION TONS)	2Ø.7	122	1Ø1

-	(1)	(2)	(3)
(B) CHEMICAL INDUSTRY			
MINERAL FERTILIZER (MILLION TONS)	2.4	15.Ø	1Ø9
HERBICIDES/PESTICIDES (THOUSAND TONS)	48	288	1Ø4
SULFURIC ACID (MILLION (TONS)	1.9	12.2	1Ø4
PLASTICS (MILLION TONS)	Ø.4	2.2	1Ø7
SYNTHETIC FIBERS (THOUSAND TONS)	114	662	1Ø5
TIRES (MILLION)	5.1	31.1	1ØØ.4
(C) CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS			
TIMBER (MILLION CUBIC METERS)	3Ø	156	1Ø1
CEMENT (MILLION TONS)	1Ø.9	63.7	1Ø5
REINFORCED CONCRETE (MILLION CUBIC METERS)	19.1	63	1Ø3
(D) TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT			
DIESEL LOCOMOTIVES (MILLION HORSEPOWER)	Ø.4	2.Ø	1Ø7
ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES (MILLION HORSEPOWER)	Ø.3	1.9	1ØØ.9
FREIGHT CARS (THOUSANDS)	4.8	29.6	98
LIGHT AUTOMOBILES (THOUSAND)	111	655	1ØØ.8

-	(1)	(2)	(3)
(E) MACHINES FOR INDUSTRY AND ENERGY			
ELECTRIC MOTORS (MILLION KILOWATTS)	4.4	26.7	1ØØ.7
MACHINE TOOLS (MILLION RUBLES)	192	1,Ø95	1Ø4
(OF WHICH HAVING NUMERICALLY PROGRAMMED DIRECTION)	58	297	12Ø

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PRESSES (MILLION RUBLES)	58	333	1Ø6
OIL EQUIPMENT (MILLION	17.9	1Ø7	1ØØ.5
CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT (MILLION RUBLES)	7Ø	4Ø8	1Ø5
EXCAVATORS (THOUSANDS)	3.6	21.1	98
EQUIPMENT FOR LIGHT INDUSTRY/FOOD PRODUCTION (MILLION RUBLES)	13Ø	782	1Ø6
(F) HIGH-TECH. MACHINES			
-			
AUTOMATED PROGRAMMABLE MANIPULATORS (THOUSANDS)	1.2	4.3	182
INSTRUMENTS (BILLION RUBLES)	Ø.4	2.2	1Ø6
COMPUTERS (BILLION RUBLES)	Ø.2	1.5	113
-			
-	(1)	(2)	(3)
(G) AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY			
-			
TRACTORS (MILLIONS OF HORSE POWER)	N.A.	24.7	1Ø2
AGRIC. MACHINERY (MILLION RUBLES)	Ø.3	1.7	1Ø6
MACHINERY FOR LIVESTOCK AND FODDER PRODUCTION (BILLION RUBLES)	Ø.2	1.2	1Ø6
GRAIN COMBINES (THOUSANDS)	9.7	58.3	1Ø7
(H) LIGHT INDUSTRY			
-			
PAPER (MILLION TONS)	Ø.4	2.8	1Ø5
OF WHICH FOR NEWSPAPERS	2.6	15.5	1Ø3
(BILLION SQUARE METERS)			
TEXTILES (BILLION SQUARE METERS)	1.Ø	5.8	1Ø3
KNITWEAR (MILLION PIECES)	136	826	1Ø1
LEATHER FOOTWEAR (MILLION PAIRS)	61	382	1Ø1
WATCHES (MILLIONS)	5.9	35.Ø	1ØØ.9
RADIOS (MILLIONS)	Ø.8	4.6	1Ø5
TELEVISIONS (MILLIONS)	Ø.7	4.2	1Ø3
OF WHICH COLOR (MILLIONS)	Ø.3	1.7	111
-	(1)	(2)	(3)
REFRIGERATORS (MILLIONS)	Ø.4	2.9	98
WASHING MACHINES	Ø.3	2.1	1Ø8

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(MILLIONS)			
MOTORCYCLES (THOUSANDS)	94	566	1Ø1
FURNITURE (BILLION RUBLES)	Ø.6	3.5	1Ø5
PORCELAIN/MAJOLICA WARE (MILLION RUBLES)	73	436	1Ø4
(I) FOODS			
- -----			
MEAT FROM STATE SOURCES (MILLION TONS)	1.3	4.7	1Ø9
SAUSAGE FROM STAFF SOURCES (MILLION TONS)	Ø.4	1.6	1Ø2
EDIBLE FISH PRODUCTS (BILLION RUBLES)	Ø.5	3.Ø	1Ø8
ANIMAL FATS/OILS FROM STATE SOURCES (THOUSAND TONS)	213	7Ø5	119
WHOLEMILK PRODUCTS FROM STATE SOURCES (MILLION TONS)	2.6	13.9	1Ø7
MARGARINE FROM STATE SOURCES (THOUSAND TONS)	13Ø	797	1Ø5
VEGETABLE OILS FROM STATE SOURCES (THOUSAND TONS)	Ø.3	1.4	1Ø8

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ASSESSMENTS AND RESEARCH

(U) SOVIET NATIONALITIES SURVEY, No. 2: April 1-June 30, 1983

Highlights

The first book-length assessment of Soviet Islam to appear since Andropov's accession suggests that Islamic-based nationalism is experiencing a revival in Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus. According to the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Scientific Atheism, this development reflects the ability of Soviet Islam to take on a national coloration by adapting to local circumstances. Moreover, the institute points out that Soviet Muslims living in multiethnic environments are much more likely to view religious traditions as an integral part of their national identities than are Soviet Muslims living in monoethnic regions.

Unexpectedly low levels of competence in the Russian language among non-Slavic youth--a group that forms a growing percentage of the work force and draft-age population--have prompted Moscow's latest drive for increased Russian bilingualism in the non-Russian republics. The fact that in several republics "young people know Russian less well than people of middle age" reverses a longstanding trend and calls into question Moscow's ability to fulfill its future economic and military plans.

The June Central Committee plenum provided no additional details on the shape of Andropov's nationalities policy. In the major address, Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko simply repeated Andropov's December 1982 call for "a well-thought-out, scientifically based" policy in this area and suggested that many problems require further study.

Among other developments during the second quarter of 1983:

--In April the Soviets established an "Anti-Zionist Committee," the latest step in a new upsurge of official anti-Semitism in the USSR.

--In an effort to "neutralize" the effects of foreign broadcasts to the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, Moscow expanded its counterpropaganda activities there.

--At a Baku conference of Soviet orientalists in May the Muslim republics were asked to play an expanded role in Soviet research on the "Islamic factor" in Middle Eastern politics and on the impact of Soviet trade and aid policies in that region.

* * * * * *

8

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I. Major Trends

Revival of Islamic-Based Nationalism in USSR Conceded

Local nationalism based on Islamic traditions is experiencing a revival in the Soviet Union's southern tier, according to the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Scientific Atheism. In the first book-length assessment of Soviet Islam to appear since Andropov's accession, Moscow's leading Islamic specialists concede that local nationalisms and Islamic practices are reinforcing one another in many areas of the Soviet Union but argue that this phenomenon is both temporary and limited in scope. The evidence they present, however, suggests that the development is intense and widespread and that it represents not merely a "survival of the past" but, rather, the unintended consequence of current Soviet policies and the unique adaptive qualities of Soviet Islam.

The institute scholars explored the "intertwining" of religious and national elements among Soviet Muslims in explicit response to events in Afghanistan and Iran. Their findings are reported in Islam in the USSR (Particular Features of the Secularization Process in the Republics of the Soviet East) (in Russian, signed to press March 2, 1983; for information on translation, see "New Research," p. X).

Although the authors--most of whom are themselves representatives of Soviet Muslim nationalities--characterize the religious-nationality linkage in standard terms as a survival of the past, they do not limit their explanations to the usual ones: tsarist policies, ideological mistakes, and bourgeois propaganda. Instead, they focus on the capacity of Soviet Islam to take on a national coloration by adapting to local circumstances and on the processes by which Islamic traditions have come to be viewed as national characteristics for those undergoing officially sponsored but ethnically sensitizing socioeconomic change.

Soviet Islam, the authors argue, is marked by four "unique" characteristics, each of which has contributed to the confluence of the religious and the national in the minds of Soviet Muslims:

--"a common opinion among believers which identifies Islam with a national affiliation and Muslim holidays and rites with national customs and traditions";

--a remarkable ability to adapt to existing traditions and social relationships;

--an emphasis on rites and rituals rather than on theology; and

--support by believers who, because the Muslim nationalities have "bypassed" the capitalist stage of development, maintain "notions, moral standards, habits and traditions which date back to patriarchal-kinship and feudal relationships."

These characteristics affect both official and unofficial Islam, albeit in different ways. In the former case, they are reflected in doctrinal modifications designed to bring Islam more in line with contemporary community values--including national ones. In the latter case, they are found in the rich variety of adaptation to and absorption of local national practices and values, many of which are described in detail in this Soviet publication.

The study notes that these features by themselves cannot explain the current linkage of religion and nationality. The authors suggest that the phenomenon often has been the unintended consequence of state policy and they provide three examples: two from Soviet experience, and one from Imperial Russia but having an obvious corollary in Soviet practice:

--According to the findings of Soviet sociological research, Soviet Muslims living in multiethnic environments--a stated goal of some Soviet policies and the result of many others--are two times more likely than Soviet Muslims living in mono-ethnic environments to view religious rites as national customs. This, in turn, "can lead to a rebirth of certain Islamic traditions" among such groups.

--In the North Caucasus at least, local Muslims have rejected the introduction of new Soviet burial rituals not because these rites are Soviet but because they are thought to represent "an introduction of elements of Christian worship."

--Tsarist government pressure in the 19th century on the mystical Sufi brotherhoods changed their very nature. It drove them underground where they "acquired sectarian features and the corresponding forms and methods of work in the masses."

The authors conclude that "the intermingling of the religious and the national in the traditionally Islamic regions is so strong that at times the concept of 'Muslim' loses its traditional religious significance and becomes a symbol for belonging to the indigenous nationality." Such a development does not constitute any general threat to Soviet power, but it does represent both a failure of past Soviet policies and a severe limit on future ones. Clearly, Moscow will now be able to achieve its goals in the Islamic regions only by adopting a more sophisticated approach or by expending additional resources.

Unexpectedly Low Knowledge of Russian Among Non-Russian Youth Prompts New Language Policy

Although no age-specific language data have yet been published from the 1979 census, the Soviet Union's leading ethnographer recently called attention to the "strange" fact that in several republics "young people know Russian less well than people of middle age." This development reverses a longstanding trend, and its potential consequences for both the economy and the military appear to have precipitated Moscow's latest drive for increased Russian bilingualism in the non-Russian republics.

For reasons of political integration and economic rationality, Moscow has attempted for a long time to promote Russian bilingualism among its non-Russian populations. The crude figures on bilingualism from the 1979 census suggested that Moscow had made major progress in this area; but Western scholars have described these figures as implausibly high--especially in the rapidly growing Central Asian republics. Yulian Bromley, director of the Moscow Institute of Ethnography and chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council for Nationality Problems, has provided additional evidence that the critics are right and that the bilingualism picture is far less rosy than Moscow had claimed.

Writing in the March-April 1983 issue of Sovetskaya etnografiya, Bromley repeats the 1979 figures but pointedly notes that "in certain republics" young people know Russian less well than their parents and that this will limit their ability to enter the urban work force. Bromley does not specify the republics in which this is the case; but given the high birthrates in the largely monoethnic rural areas of Central Asia and the consequent lower probability of exposure to Russian-language institutions there, it seems likely that he is referring to that region.

To counter this development and to limit its impact on both the economy and the military, Moscow has decided to increase its already large investment in the promotion of Russian bilingualism. According to Pravda's summary of the May 26 Politburo meeting, the Soviet leadership has concluded that current economic requirements make a knowledge of Russian "an objective necessity and requirement of every citizen."

That the leadership's concern extended to the military was highlighted at a May 20-21 Samarkand conference attended by senior party officials and military officers. The conference was devoted to the improvement of Russian-language training in academic institutions and for those subject to the military draft. Sharif Rashidov, Politburo candidate member and Uzbek First Secretary, argued that "the better the youth of various nationalities master

the Russian language, the greater the contribution they can make to the strengthening of the economy and to increasing the defense capability of our Motherland." Another speaker made the point even more directly: A knowledge of Russian, he said, was "an extraordinarily important factor" for "successful service" in the increasingly high-technology Soviet military.

The published Politburo meeting summary mentions a joint CPSU Central Committee-USSR Council of Ministers resolution that provides for "a complex of measures directed at the establishment of conditions which will make it easier for the population of the national republics to study Russian, the broadening and improvement of preparation of teachers, and the raising of their qualifications." The decision itself has not been released, but its probable contents were perhaps signaled in a recent Uzbek Ministry of Education directive on the question. Published in the March-April 1983 issue of the journal devoted to Russian-language instruction in Uzbek schools, Russkiy yazyk i literatura v Uzbekskoy shkole, this directive suggests that the Uzbek educational system has largely met its quantitative goals in Russian-language instruction but has failed in many qualitative ones.

Among the directive's specific orders are:

--a rapid expansion of preschool Russian-language instruction because young children can more easily assimilate a second language;

--a rapid expansion of language laboratories to encourage development of oral skills;

--improvement in teacher training and an emphasis on teacher retraining;

--improvements in textbook quality and quantity; and

--an expansion of methodological research and the rapid communication of its findings to teachers.

June Plenum Continues Studied Approach to Nationality Problems

No departures were made in nationalities policy at the June Central Committee plenum on ideology. Andropov did not discuss the issue--and in the major address, Politburo member Chernenko simply repeated Andropov's December 1982 appeal for "a well-thought-out, scientifically based" nationalities policy. Chernenko argued that nationality problems must be approached "with the greatest delicacy" and suggested that ideological work in the multinational Soviet Union was unthinkable "without careful study" of ethnic differences.

On the two most pressing and apparently intractable nationality problems--improving Russian-language skills among non-Russians and moving Central Asian labor to the RSFSR--Chernenko said only that the first can be achieved by "actively" implementing current policy and that the second is something "we all must think about."

Competing Terminologies Mark Soviet Discussions of Nationality Problems

Soviet discussions of nationality problems are being conducted in two different vocabularies--one ideological and the other academic--which reflect radically divergent understandings of ethnic identity and its salience. The first and more familiar vocabulary is based on Stalin's 1913 definition of a nation; has a relatively small number of often ambiguous, politically charged, and difficult-to-apply terms; and stresses the objective roots and transient quality of ethnic identifications. The second is based on a long Russian tradition of ethnographic research; possesses a rich and precisely defined terminology; and, unlike the first, emphasizes the relative stability of ethnic identities.

Until recently, the first set of terms completely dominated Soviet discussions on nationality issues while the second was confined to academic discourse. Now, under the impact of Soviet sociological research and Andropov's theoretical innovations, ethnographic terminology has been injected into the political sphere, both enriching and complicating Soviet debates.

A clear example of the new political use of ethnographic terms is contained in Yulian Bromley's March 1983 Kommunist article. Drawing on recent sociological findings and quoting Andropov's December 1982 conclusion that national differences would survive "far longer" than class distinctions, Bromley argues that national differences in the USSR are primarily ethnic rather than socioeconomic, that these ethnic differences are important precisely because they exercise a powerful limiting effect on socioeconomic change, and that they can best be understood in ethnographic terms.

Bromley employs three ethnographic terms to discuss current nationality developments in the Soviet Union:

--Ethnic consolidation ("etnicheskaya konsolidatsiya"): "the merging of several linguistically and culturally related ethnic units, most often of so-called ethnographic (sub-ethnic) groups within an existing nation or nationality."

--Ethnic assimilation ("etnicheskaya assimilatsiya"): the set of processes by which members of one ethnic group lose their own ethnic characteristics and identity and adopt those of another ethnic group.

--Interethnic integration ("mezhetnicheskaya integratsiya"): the processes by which a common culture and self-consciousness come to be shared by a set of ethnically dissimilar groups.

Bromley concludes that the third term describes the present "main line" of Soviet ethnic development, the process "most closely" related to the processes involved in the formation of the Soviet people.

Bromley takes these three terms from an ethnographic vocabulary he has elaborated over the last decade, a system of terminology based on his definition of the "ethnos" as the proper object of ethnographic study. The implications of his terminology go beyond those suggested in the Kommunist article. According to Bromley, an "ethnos" is:

> "A stable aggregate of people historically evolved on a definite territory who possess common, relatively stable cultural characteristics (including language) and psychology and who also have a consciousness of their own unity and distinctiveness from all other such formations (self-consciousness) as fixed in a self-designation (ethnonym).

In many respects, this description recalls Stalin's definition of the nation--"a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture"--on which Soviet nationality theory has been based. But Bromley's term differs on two major points: First, Bromley makes self-consciousness central to his definition, thus recurring to a tradition which Stalin had explicitly rejected. Second, he does not restrict its existence to a particular historical stage of development.

According to Bromley, "ethnos" is a general term that can be used to describe certain human groups throughout history, whereas standard Soviet nationality terms--the tribe, the nationality, the bourgeois nation, and the socialist nation--are linked to definite stages of historical development. Bromley suggests that these four groups arise at the intersection of an ethnos and a cultural group defined by the relations of production and that they are "distinguished from each other above all by their social-economic (formation) parameters" rather than their ethnic characteristics. This proposition implies that ethnicity is quite stable and unlikely to wither away even in the communist future.

At present, Bromley's conceptions and ethnographic vocabulary are more likely to inform than to supplant the standard ones. But their use outside a narrowly academic context suggests that at least some Soviet leaders have a growing appreciation of the limits of ethnic engineering and of the stability of ethnic identity and

that they will display an increasing sensitivity to the impact of ethnicity on all social policies. Furthermore and perhaps most important for Bromley and his colleagues, this use may mean a greater role for ethnographers in the formulation and implementation of Soviet social and nationalities policies.

Muslim Republics Assume Expanded Role in Soviet Studies of the Middle East

In the wake of events in Afghanistan and Iran, orientalist centers in the USSR's neighboring Muslim republics are playing an increasing role in Soviet studies of the contemporary Middle East. Their current prominence, particularly that of the Azerbaijan Institute of Peoples of the Near and Middle East, was highlighted at the All-Union Conference of Orientalists held May 25-27 in Baku. At the meeting, which was organized by the Soviet Orientalist Association to discuss future tasks in the study of Asian and African countries, it was announced that the Azerbaijan Institute had been asked to investigate the role of the "Islamic factor" in Middle Eastern politics and to provide background analyses in support of Soviet aid programs to that region.

Speaking to the opening session, First Secretary K. M. Bagirov reported that the Azerbaijan party's Central Committee had directed the institute to: generalize Soviet experience in the social and political transformation of the USSR's Muslim republics; analyze current developments--especially the "Islamic factor"--in "bordering countries of the East"; and study the impact of Soviet trade and aid policies in those countries.

The institute, established as an oriental studies center in 1958 and given its current name and purpose in 1967, was also an object of the attention of Bagirov's predecessor, Geydar Aliyev. In October 1981, for example, Aliyev participated in the formation of the Azerbaijan branch of the All-Union Society of Orientalists and called on the institute to devote "particular attention" to the training of specialists on the contemporary Middle East.

In the only other major speech reported from the conference, academician Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies and founder-president of the All-Union Society of Orientalists, expanded Bagirov's position. A longtime advocate of a more contemporary focus for Soviet orientalist studies and of a more sophisticated and sensitive approach to the study of Islam in politics, Primakov called on all Soviet specialists to tie their research to current requirements. He further asked them to avoid "unproductive" debates on whether development in the East is taking place according to general laws or is chiefly a response to specific conditions. The task, Primakov suggested, consists "rather in the clarification of the

concrete forms in which general laws manifest themselves in the specific conditions of the East."

Soviet Counterpropaganda Activities Increased in Non-Russian Areas

To "neutralize" the effects of foreign broadcasts to the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, Moscow has stepped up its counterpropaganda effort in these regions. During the past year, it has convened three major conferences devoted to the issue, taken steps to improve the quality and effectiveness of its antireligious and antinationalistic propaganda, and encouraged the development of a variety of new organizational structures at the republic, oblast, and rayon levels. There has been no indication that this program has achieved any remarkable success. But Moscow's continuing efforts suggest that it views such broadcasts and other channels for the influx of anti-Soviet materials as a serious threat to its authority in the southern and western republics.

Counterpropaganda has been an integral part of Soviet ideological work since the 1917 revolution, but the current upsurge in such activity dates to the November 1981 Central Committee plenum. The plenum described counterpropaganda as "one of the important spheres" of party work and called on party committees to devote more attention to it. Since then, Moscow has organized three major conferences to discuss ways and means of improving counterpropaganda effectiveness--at Riga in June 1982, Tallinn in October 1982, and Kishinev in April 1983. (The proceedings of the first two have been published and are listed under "New Research," p. X.) In contrast to earlier conferences on this subject, numerous high-level party, government, and military officials participated in these meetings and made specific policy recommendations.

Among the most important conference suggestions for improved counterpropaganda were the following:

--Analyze more carefully the various forms of foreign propaganda which seek to exploit nationality and religious differences in the USSR and prepare specific materials to "neutralize" them.

--Acknowledge and deal with current problems in Soviet society rather than rehash old successes.

--Improve counterpropaganda publications to make them more readable and convincing and tighten control over materials selected for translation lest the Soviet state itself spread the very ideas it is trying to fight.

--Improve the quality of Soviet media reporting on domestic affairs so that citizens will not turn to Western radio broadcasts.

--Target audiences precisely and meet the specific requirements of each--just as foreign propaganda does--for instance, Jews thinking about emigration as the result of American broadcasts, Ukrainian Uniates involved in illegal religious activities because of Vatican broadcasts, and Muslims who have responded to pan-Islamic broadcasts from Iran.

According to the conference speakers, concrete steps have been taken on each of these points.

Perhaps the most remarkable development has been the profusion of organizational forms at the republic level and below designed to improve counterpropaganda work in particular regions. In the L'vov Oblast of western Ukraine, for example, a "special commission for the struggle against bourgeois ideology" has been established to coordinate the counterpropaganda activities of the party, media, government, and various public organizations. According to the local obkom secretary, such work is especially necessary in L'vov, a region whose history, location, and population make it especially vulnerable to "bourgeois ideological influences." Elsewhere in the non-Russian periphery, other organizational forms are being tried.

Taken together, these developments in Soviet counterpropaganda work suggest that at the present time descriptions by Soviet officials of what they are fighting against provide accurate measures of what they fear most and what forms of Western propaganda are most effective among Soviet nationalities.

II. Current Developments

All-Union

Orientalists Conference in Baku. The Second All-Union Scientific Conference on Oriental Studies met in Baku on May 25-27. Under the direction of Yevgeniy M. Primakov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies and head of the All-Union Society of Orientalists, participants discussed current Soviet research on Asian and African societies.

Crimean Tatar Activist Sentenced. Nurfet Murakhas, a Crimean Tatar activist in Uzbekistan, was sentenced to two and one-half years in a strict-regime corrective labor camp for slandering Soviet society. According to the April 3 Pravda Vostoka report, Murakhas had been sentenced in 1970 to a six-month term for a similar crime but after his release continued to distribute illegal literature and maintain contacts with other Crimean Tatar activists.

Formation of Anti-Zionist Committee. The Soviet Government at a Moscow press conference on April 21 announced the formation of an Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public. The aim of the committee was to "expose the reactionary ideology and policy of international Zionism." Named as committee chief was Col. Gen. David Dragunskiy, former commander of the Vystrel military school, which trains foreign students including members of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Other members included Samuil Zivs, doctor of law; Genrikas Zimanis, a publicist and a deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet; Viktor Pushkhanov, computer plant worker and Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet; academician Martin Kabachnik; writer Yuriy Kolesnikov; and lawyer Mark Krupkin.

Western Republics

Moldavia: Writers, KGB Hold Joint Conference. The Fourth All-Union Conference on Artistic Literature Concerning Border Guards met in Kishinev on April 4-9. Participants discussed how best to develop the border-guard theme in Soviet literature.

Moldavia: Food Industry Plagued by Poor Labor Discipline. An April 15 Moscow radio broadcast severely criticized the Moldavian food industry for failing to control idleness, absenteeism, and alcoholism. It reported that the food industry minister, Arkhip Il'ich Chekoy, had been punished and that various enterprise officials had been fired.

Ukraine: New Literary-Political Journal Appears. The first issues of Kiev, a literary-artistic and social-political journal of the Ukrainian Union of Writers, are in circulation. The monthly journal was established to promote Ukrainian writers.

Ukraine: Renewed Attack on Emigré Uniate Clerics. A new wave of articles denigrating the Uniate Church and its historical role in the Ukraine has appeared in the Ukrainian press. One of the most vitriolic of these articles appeared in the June 10 Pravda Ukrainy. It attacked emigré Uniate clergy for distorting the current situation of religion in the USSR, overemphasizing the religiosity of Ukrainians, and attempting to take over the planned jubilee (1987) of 1,000 years of Christianity in the Ukraine.

Baltic Republics

Estonia: Emigré Involvement in Nationalist Dissent Scored. Estonian Communist Party First Secretary Karl Vayno has denounced attempts by Estonian emigrés to capitalize on discontent in the republic by organizing a series of monthly half-hour strikes. In the April 1983 Kommunist, Vayno claimed that the emigrés' effort was unsuccessful, but used the occasion to attack Western "instigators" of such activities. He warned his readers to be alert for further Western attempts to subvert socialist Estonia.

Estonia: Vayno Receives Order of Lenin. On his 60th birthday, May 28, First Secretary Vayno was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Estonia: New Wave of Arrests. The Estonian KGB in March initiated a series of house searches, arrests, and interrogations of Estonian dissidents in an attempt to locate the authors of the underground newspaper Kroonika. Despite numerous efforts to close it down, this paper has circulated clandestinely since 1978.

Lithuania: Dissident Publications Continue Despite Arrests. New arrests and other pressure on dissidents in Lithuania have failed to stop the Lithuanian samizdat publications Ausra and Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church. Recent issues reaching the West detail the arrests of priests for conducting religious training.

Caucasus

Armenia: Top Officials Dismissed in Yerevan. As part of a continuing effort to increase government efficiency in Armenia, First Secretary Karen Demirchyan has severely criticized a variety of officials for a catalogue of failings. Among those dismissed this spring were Procurement Minister Onik Ovakimyan, several industrial construction officials, the head of the Armenian Sports Committee, and the chief of the foreign tourism office.

Armenia: Academician Accused of Nationalism. The former director of the Armenian Institute of Party History was accused of a nationalistic approach to Armenian history at the June 7 meeting

of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. Criticism of Gevorg Garibdzhanyan appeared to have been prompted by his emphasis on the national characteristics of the Armenian struggle for independence and his attempt to rehabilitate several Armenian party workers on Moscow's list of nonpersons.

Armenia: Patriarch Visits Europe. Vazken II, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of all Armenians, traveled to England on May 6 for talks with the Archbishop of Canterbury. He then spent two weeks in France. Armenian emigré church leaders hoped to arrange a meeting there between Vazken II and Karekin II, Catholicos of the See of Alicia in Lebanon, the center of the Armenian church outside the USSR, but their efforts failed.

Georgia: Capital Punishment Imposed for Economic Crimes. At the May 24 Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum, First Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze announced that several Georgians had recently been executed for speculation and theft of state property. Others guilty of lesser offenses, he reported, were sentenced to long jail terms. Shevardnadze noted that more than 300 Georgian officials had been fired for nepotism or economic crimes during the last seven years and that many additional cases were still under investigation.

Georgia: Republic First Secretary Visits Portugal. First Secretary Shevardnadze led a delegation of Georgian party officials who participated in the congress of the Portuguese Communist Party on June 23-27.

Central Asia

Tajikistan: Campaign for Tajik Migration to Soviet Far East Continues. An intense media campaign to encourage Tajiks to move to the labor-short Soviet Far East is continuing. Recent newspaper articles have described the happy life of Tajiks already there and the special economic incentives given those who agree to go. Special coverage has been given to Tajiks who have gone as a group.

Tajikistan: Two Rayons Created. On April 27 the Tajik Supreme Soviet announced the formation of two new rayons. The first--Khovaling Rayon--was established in Kulyab Oblast with Khovaling as its capital; the second--Ilichev Rayon--is located in the Kurgan-Tube Oblast with Obiklik as its administrative center.

Kazakhstan: Chinese Version of Kazakh History Rejected. A Chinese historian's claim that Central Asia was once under Chinese rule and that Russia forcibly conquered the area was strongly rejected in a June 7 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin to the People's Republic of China. The broadcast was

based on a long study by two Kazakh historians who stressed the ruthlessness of the Chinese toward the Dzhungarian khanate and the voluntary nature of the merger of the Kazakhs with the Russian state.

Kazakhstan: Baptist Activities Point Up Failure of Atheistic Work. An article in the April 28 Sovetskaya kul'tura criticized Kazakh youth organizations for failing to attract young people and contrasted this with the ability of various Baptist groups to draw youth into religious groups. The article called on Kazakh atheists to improve their work and to stop the spread of religious ideas.

Kirghizia: China Border Reopened for Goods Traffic. For the first time in 20 years, goods began moving freely on June 27 between Soviet Kirghizia and the People's Republic of China. No personal travel has been allowed. The relaxation is the result of the October 1982 and March 1983 trade discussions between Moscow and Beijing.

Kirghizia: Nationalist Errors Scored, Russian-Language Gains Praised. At a May 19 Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee plenum, First Secretary Turdakun Usabaliyev denounced local historians and writers for excessive glorification of the pre-Russian Kirghiz past. But he went out of his way to claim that "almost all the young people in Kirghizia drafted into the Soviet armed forces have a good knowledge of Russian."

Uzbekistan: Muslim Leader Attends Moscow Religious Preparatory Conference. Shaykh Yusufkhan Shakirov, deputy head of the Muslim Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, on March 14 traveled to Moscow to participate in a meeting of USSR religious groups preparing for the Sixth World Conference of the World Council of Churches (Vancouver, Canada, July 24-August 10, 1983). The Soviets planned to send a large delegation of clerics from various religious denominations to Vancouver in support of their continuing campaign for world peace and nuclear disarmament.

Uzbekistan: Conference on Draftees' Russian-Language Skills. Republic party officials and high-level military officers met in Samarkand on May 20-21 to discuss ways to improve Russian-language instruction for Uzbek youths subject to military draft. Uzbek First Secretary Sharif Rashidov gave the major address. Earlier republic conferences on this subject took place in 1975 and 1979.

Uzbekistan: Mufti Chairs Conference of Muslims and Christians. Shamsutdinkhan Babakhan, chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Administration for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, on May 13 hosted a conference of representatives of Soviet Muslim and Christian communities. The religious leaders assembled in Tashkent to discuss the Soviet peace campaign.

Uzbekistan: Uzbek Theater Repetoire Criticized as Too Small, Too Concerned With Past. An article in the May Kommunist Uzbekistana complains that Uzbek theaters are failing to produce a sufficient number of Uzbek plays and that Uzbek dramatists too often write on historical topics or explore contemporary problems that concern only a small number of people.

RSFSR and Siberia

New Russian Republic Head. Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov was named Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on June 24 to replace Mikhail Solomentsev, who was appointed Chairman of the CPSU Central Committee's Party Control Committee. Vorotnikov, most recently First Secretary of the Krasnodar Kray party organization, was Ambassador to Cuba from 1979 to 1982.

New Northern Economic Region. A new economic region encompassing the Arkhangel, Vologda, and Murmansk Oblasts and the Karelian and Komi ASSRs has been formed--the 20th such region in the USSR.

New Rayons in Yakut ASSR. Two new rayons were created in the Yakut ASSR on April 29. According to a published report, the change reflects the rapid economic development of Yakutia.

Prepared by Alvin Kapusta and Paul Goble
632-3230

Approved by Robert Baraz
632-9194

III. Chronology: Personnel Changes

Caucasus

1983

Armenia

Apr. 29 — Vartanyan, V. and Barsegyan, E. fired as Deputy Ministers of Industrial Construction because of work shortcomings.

Apr. 29 — Khachikyan, A., Chief of Foreign Tourism Administration, penalized and fired for party indiscipline and work shortcomings.

May 12 — Sukhudyan, R. A. appointed Minister of Fruit and Vegetable Industry vice Sokrat V. Arakelyan.

Azerbaijan

Apr. 12 — Mamedov, Aydin Yusub ogli appointed Minister of Consumer Services vice Zuleykha M. Gasanoza.

Apr. 14 — Dzhamilov, R. D. appointed Chief of Agriculture Department, Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, vice Zakir G. Abdullayev.

Georgia

Apr. 2 — Ordzhonokidze, Iosif Nikolayevich, First Secretary of Georgian Komsomol, elected as a secretary of the Moscow-based All-Union Komsomol Central Committee.

Apr. 2 — Lordkipanidze, Valeriy Georgiyevich elected First Secretary, Georgian Komsomol, vice Iosif Ordzhonokidze, reassigned.

Apr. 5 — Loladze, Guram Ivanovich appointed Chairman, State Committee of Wine Making Industry.

Apr. 5 — Malazoniya, Enver Sever'yanovich appointed Chairman, State Committee of Sea Industry.

Apr. 10 — Kharebava, L. M. appointed First Deputy Chairman, State Committee of Sea Industry.

Georgia
(cont'd)

Apr. 10 — Mekhuzla, N. A. appointed First Deputy Chairman, State Committee of Wine Making Industry.

Apr. 16 — Kadzhaya, Merab Musayevich appointed Minister of Trade vice Guram L. Koblianidze.

Baltic

Estonia

Apr. 8 — Ryuytel', Arnol'd Fedorovich elected Chairman of Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet vice Ivan G. Kebin, retired.

Apr. 8 — Kyao, Vladimir Aleksandrovich appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of Estonian Council of Ministers vice Arnol'd F. Ryuytel', reassigned.

Apr. 8 — Veldi, Kheyno Tynisovich, Deputy Chairman of Estonian Council of Ministers, appointed First Deputy Chairman of that body.*

Apr. 9 — Saul, Bruno Eduardovich elected a secretary of Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and member of Estonian Politburo and released from his former position as Deputy Chairman, Estonian Council of Ministers.

Apr. 9 — Tammistu, Khalev Lokhanovich appointed Chief, Culture Department, Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, vice Olaf-Knut Uh.

May 17 — Palu, Peeter Karlovich appointed Deputy Chairman, Estonian Council of Ministers, vice Bruno E. Saul.

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* On March 25, 1983, Veldi also was appointed Chairman of the Estonian SSR Agrarian-Industrial Association with rank of Minister; on April 9, 1983, the Estonian Constitution was amended to allow more than one First Deputy Chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers.

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Central Asia

Kazakhstan

Mar. 11 — Sarzhanov, Kudaybergen appointed Minister of Fish Industry vice Makhtay R. Sagdiyev.

Mar. 11 — Koychumanov, A. D. elected First Secretary, Alma Ata City Party Committee, vice Anuar K. Zhapukov.

Mar. 28 — Tymbayev, Beksultan Bekosovich appointed Minister of Food Industry vice Nikolay Tantsyura.

Mar. 28 — Tantsyura, Nikolay Dmitriyevich appointed Minister of Trade vice Mikhail S. Ivanov.

Apr. 12 — Kulibayev, Askar Allynbekovich elected Chairman, Alma Ata City Soviet Executive Committee.

Apr. 27 — Mukhambetov, Aysagaliy Abylkasymovich elected Second Secretary, Akyubinsk Oblast Party Committee, vice Temirgali Bekenov.

Kirghizia

Feb. 6 — Chilebayev, Toktogul Bekbolotovich appointed Chairman of Union of Consumers' Societies.

Feb. 24 — Zheleznov, Aleksandr Nikitovich appointed Minister of Trade vice Toktogul B. Chilebayev.

Mar. 9 — Dryazhak, Pavel Nikolayevich appointed Procurator vice Mikhail L. Demichev.

Tajikistan

Mar. 26 — Lafizov, Dzhanobidin L. and Nasriddinov, Khikmatullo N. elected full members, Tajik Communist Party Central Committee.

Mar. 26 — Gafarov, T. appointed Chief, Planning and Finance Organs, Tajik Communist Party Central Committee.

May 10 — Ponosov, Yu. F. elected First Secretary, Kulyab City Party Committee, vice Nikolay V. Lunev.

May 24 — Medvedev, Viktor Ivanovich appointed Minister, Construction Materials Industry, vice Ivan Shevchenko.

Tajikistan
(cont'd)

May 26 — Sukhov, Yuriy Yevgen'gevich elected Second Secretary, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast Party Committee vice Viktor I. Medvedev.

June 3 — Semenov, Yuriy Alekseyevich elected Chairman, Energy Commission, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

Turkmenistan

Mar. 14 — Bagramov, Sergey Georgiyevich appointed Chairman, State Committee for Material and Technical Supply.

Uzbekistan

Feb. 18 — Shagazatov, Khabibulla Abdumazhitovich elected First Secretary, Dzhizak Oblast Party Committee, vice Tukhtamy B. Baymirov.

Apr. 7 — Karimov, Islam Abdugan'yevich appointed Minister of Finance vice Vali M. Muratkhodzhayev.

May 19 — Sokhatov To elected Chairman, Kashka Darya Oblast Soviet Executive Committee.

May 30 — Mikhaylov, Viktor Konstantinovich appointed First Deputy Chairman, Presidium of Uzbek Council of Ministers, vice Timofey N. Osetrov.

May 30 — Osetrov, Timofey Nikolayevich elected Second Secretary, Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat, vice Leonid I. Grekov.

Western Republics

Belorussia

Feb. 22 — Reut, Anatoliy Antonovich appointed Chairman, Belorussian State Planning Committee, vice Viktor A. Gvozdev.

Mar. 10 — Bysenko, Viktor Dmitriyevich appointed Chief, Machine Building Department, Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, vice Vadim I. Kritskiy.

Belorussia
(cont'd)

Mar. 10 — Kebich, Vyacheslav Frantsevich appointed Chief, Heavy Industry Department, Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, vice Viktor D. Bysenko.

Apr. 2 — Kovalev, Mikhail Vasilevich elected First Deputy Chairman of Belorussian Council of Ministers and member of Politburo of Belorussian Central Committee.

May 29 — Lepeshkin, V. A. elected a secretary of the Belorussian Central Committee and member of the Politburo.

May 29 — Firisanov, Leonid Semenovich appointed Deputy Chairman of Belorussian Council of Ministers.

Ukraine

Mar. 9 — Maselskiy, A. S. elected Chairman, Kharkov Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, vice Andrey P. Bezdetko.

Mar. 12 — Babich, Yuriy Petrovich elected Chairman, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, vice Viktor G. Boyko.

Apr. 21 — Sergeyev, N. N. elected secretary, Kiev City Party Committee, vice Tamara V. Glavak.

Apr. 26 — Kachalovskiy, Yevgeniy Viktorovich elected member, Politburo, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

Apr. 26 — Mironov, Vasiliy Petrovich elected candidate member, Politburo, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

RSFSR
(only Autonomous Republics, Oblasts, or Krays)

Dagestan

May 24 — Usupov, M. elected First Secretary, Dagestan Oblast Party Committee, vice Magomed-Salam I. Umakhanov.

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Major Official and Traditional Holidays and Anniversaries
(August 1-October 31, 1983)

August

2	(1940) Establishment of Moldavian SSR
3	(1940) Establishment of Lithuanian SSR
5	(1940) Establishment of Latvian SSR
6	(1940) Establishment of Estonian SSR

September

5	(1967) USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issuance of decree on official rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars
17	(1912) Birthday of Maksim Tank, Belorussian poet
17	Qurban Bayram--Muslim Holiday of Sacrifice, 70 days after the end of Ramadan/Ramazan
30	Simhath Torah (rejoicing of the Law) (Jewish)

October

5	(1930) Birthday of Rakhman N. Nabiyev, First Secretary of Tajik SSR
10	(1920) Installation of Soviet power in Armenia and formation of Armenian Communist Party
14	(1925) Establishment of Tajik Autonomous SSR; (1940) changed to Tajik SSR
14	(1926) Establishment of Kara Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast; (1926) changed to Kirghiz SSR
26	(1920) Establishment of Kazakh Autonomous SSR; (1936) changed to Kazakh SSR
27	(1924) Establishment of Uzbek SSR
30	Day of Political Prisoners (unofficial observance among dissidents in USSR)

Conferences and Symposia

Soviet Union

Conferences, Second Quarter 1983

Apr. 21	Tashkent: Conference of Central Asian procurators and Ministry of Internal Affairs officials on "Measures To Strengthen Soviet Legality in Light of November Plenum of CPSU Central Committee."
Apr. 27	Tbilisi: World Health Organization international conference on occupational health hazards.
Apr. 28	Kishinev: Scientific-practical conference, "Tasks of Strengthening the Counterpropaganda Activity of the Press, Television, and Radio Broadcasting."
May 16	Kishinev: All-Union Conference on Socialist Culture and the Media.
May 20-21	Samarkand: Republic scientific-practical conference, "Improvement of the Russian Language in Academic Institutions of the Republic and the Improvement of This Work With Youths Who are Subject To Being Called Into the Soviet Army."
May 25-27	Baku: Second All-Union Conference of Soviet Orientalists.
June 1	Tallinn: 24th Working Conference of Baltic Countries, Norway, and Iceland. (From information available it appears that the primary purpose of this conference was to involve the trade unions of the non-Soviet participants in a propaganda action against nuclear catastrophe and in support of a Baltic Seas zone of peace.

Future Conferences

Sept. 7-14	Kiev: Ninth International Congress of Slavists, Tsentral'naya Nauchnaya Biblioteka Akademii Nauk UkSSR, Vladimirskaya 62, Kiev 17, SSSR 252017.
Sept. 26-Oct. 3	Tashkent: Seventh Afro-Asian Writers Conference, honoring the 25th anniversary of the Association of Afro-Asian Writers.

Western Countries

Conferences, Second Quarter 1983

Apr. 14-16	Palo Alto: Hoover Institution conference, "The Last Empire - Nationality and the Soviet Future."
Apr. 19	New York: Lehrman Institute Seminar No. 2 - "The Management of Nationality Problems."
May 12	Berkeley: Working conference, "Siberia and Russians in the Far East: Sources, Historiography, and the Present State of Study."
May 19-22	Bloomington: University of Indiana, "The First International Conference of Turkic Studies."
May 24-27	Paris: Centre d'Etudes sur l'URSS and the Laboratoire de Slavistique, "International Colloquium on Siberia." Contact: Boris Chichlo, 9 Rue Michelet, 75006 Paris. Telephone: (1) 326 50 89 or 329 76 38.
May 25	New York: Lehrman Institute Seminar No. 3 - "The Rise of Ethnonationalism in the USSR."
June 10-13	Stockholm: Baltic Institute and Center for Baltic Studies Seventh Conference on Baltic Studies, "National Moments in the Baltic Countries During the Latter Half of the 19th Century." Contact: Prof. A. Loit, Baltiska Institutet ox 16273, S-103, 25 Stockholm, Sweden.
June 15-17	Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois conference, "History of Ukraine: Contemporary Perspectives and Analyses." Contact: Dmytro M. Shtohryn, Russian and East European Center, 1208 West California Ave., Urbana, Illinois 61801. Telephone: 217 333-1244.
June 21-July 6	Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago will sponsor Second Lithuanian World Festival.

Future Conferences

Aug. 20-25	Vancouver: University of British Colombia will host Eleventh International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (ICAES). Contact: Executive Secretary, ICAES,

Western
(cont'd)

Dept. of Anthropology, University of British Colombia, 6303 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver, B.C., V6T2B2. (Soviet delegation will consist of about 40 scientists.)

Oct. 17-20 — Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster University conference, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective." Contact: Dr. Peter Potichniy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, L9H3SI. Telephone: 416 525 9140.

Oct. 22-25 — Kansas City, Mo.: Fifteenth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

Fall 1983 — New York: Lehrman Institute Seminar No. 4 - "Ethnonationalism and Soviet Political Stability."

Dec. 3-6 — Toronto: Conference on "The D.P. Experience: Ukrainian Refugees After World War II." Contact: Paula Groenberg, Administrative Director, Multicultural History Society of Toronto, 43 Queen's Park Crescent E., Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S2C3. Co-sponsor: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

New Research

Soviet Union

Conference Publications:

Riga - Note: Of the 12 volumes of conference proceedings, 8 were listed in "Soviet Nationalities Survey, No. 1" (INR Report 627-AR, May 26, 1983) as having been received by INR/SEE, 632-3230. Three of the four remaining volumes have now arrived:

Neprimirimost' k burzhuaznoy ideologii, perezhitkam natsionalizma (Irreconcilability to Bourgeois Ideology, Survival of Nationalism). Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1982. 190 pp.

Surveys Western ideological and propaganda efforts against the USSR (including those by religious groups, Ukrainian emigrés, Zionists, pan-Islamists, clerical anti-communists, and others) and Soviet efforts to counter them.

Patrioticheskoye i internatsional'noye vospitaniye molodezhi (Patriotic and Internationalist Education of Youth). Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1982. 240 pp.

Material'naya osnova druzhby i bratstva (The Material Basis for Friendship and Brotherhood). Moscow: Ekonomika, 1982. 230 pp.

Discusses regional differences in economic development and Moscow's efforts to overcome them. The 23 papers in this volume reflect a variety of institutional and territorial concerns.

The as-yet unreceived volume of the 12-volume set is:

Kul'tura yedinogo sovetskogo naroda (The Culture of a Unified Soviet People). Moscow: Sovetskiy Pisatel'.

Alma Ata - Vechno vmeste (Forever Together). Moscow: Nauka, 1983.

Includes the papers presented at the September 1981 all-Union scientific-theoretical conference, "Progressive Role of Russia in the Historical Destiny of the Peoples of Kazakhstan."

Tallinn - Obostreniye ideologicheskoy bor'by na mirovoy arene i politicheskoye vospitaniye trudyashchikhsya (The Exacerbation of Ideological Conflict in the World Arena and the Political Education of Workers). Moscow: Politizdat, 1983. 128 pp.

Includes the papers presented at the plenary session of the October 1982 all-Union scientific-practical conference, "The Exacerbation of Ideological Conflict in the World Arena and the Political Education of Workers." The last paper outlines Western propaganda techniques and suggests methods to counter them. Included is detail on the work of the US Information Agency and its worldwide network; the development of nationality studies in the US in the late 1970s under the "Committee for the Study of Nationalities in the USSR and East Europe" (sic); the nationality broadcasts of the Voice of America, British Broadcasting Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio Liberty, and Voice of Israel; and the US Government support for publication of a 15-volume set of books devoted to each of the Soviet republics.

Frunze - Internatsional'noye i natsional'noye v sotsialisticheskom obraze zhizni sovetskogo naroda (The International and the National in the Socialist Way of Life of the Soviet People). Frunze: Kyrgyzstan, 1982. 635 pp.

Summarizes collectively the principal papers given at the second all-Union conference of branches of the Soviet social science establishment. Additional information on the conference appears in Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, September 29, 1981, and in an article in Voprosy filosofii, No. 12, 1981, by P. N. Fedoseyev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

General Research (information from Soviet bibliographic sources):

Belayev, A. A. Ideologicheskaya bor'ba i literatura. Kriticheskiy analiz amerikanskoy sovetologii (Ideological Struggle and Literature. Critical Study of American Sovietology), 3d expanded ed. Moscow: Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1982. 462 pp.

Chernova, E. P. Teoretiko-metodologicheskiye problemy narodonaseleniya i trudovykh resursov (Theoretical-Methodological Problems of Population and Labor Resources). Frunze: Ylym, 1982.

Discusses the impact of high birth rates in Central Asia on distribution of labor resources in the USSR. Provides extensive discussion of Soviet demographic terminology and methods.

Gililov, S. The Nationalities Question: Lenin's Approach (Theory and Practice in the USSR). Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983. 189 pp.

Khanazarov, Kuchkar Khanazarovich. Resheniye natsional'no-yazykovoy problemy v SSSR (The Resolution of the National-Linguistic Problem in the USSR), 2d ed., with additional material. Moscow: Politizdat, 1982.

Koval, V. I., Korshunov, V. I., and Osipov, V. P. Sila pravdy i bezsiliye lzhi (The Strength of Truth and the Impotence of Lies). Alma Ata: 1982. 264 pp.

According to a Soviet review, this is the first systematized critique of the "bourgeois falsification" of Kazakhstan's history. Among the "falsifications" examined are the theses that Soviet policies in Central Asia and Kazakhstan are a continuation of tsarist colonial policies; that all the Union republics are merely sources of raw material for the Soviet Union, just as they were for the tsarist governments; and that the Eastern Soviet Republics lack sovereignty.

Kozlov, V. I. Natsional'nosti SSSR etnodemograficheskiy obzor (The Nationalities of the USSR. Ethnodemographic Survey), 2d ed. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1982.

Revised edition of Kozlov's 1975 work on Soviet nationalities using previously published data from the 1979 Soviet census.

Lenin, V. I. Lenin o Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane (Lenin on Central Asia and Kazakhstan), 2d ed. Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1982. 744 pp.

First edition published in 1960.

Pisateli Kazakhstana: Spravochnik (Writers of Kazakhstan: A Handbook). Alma Ata: Zhazushy, 1982. 280 pp.

Nikolskiy, N. M. Istoriya russkoy tserkvi (History of the Russian Church). Moscow: Biblioteka Ateisticheskoy Literatury, 1983.

Reprint of the first Marxist study of the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, first published in 1920s.

Radzhapova, R. Ya. Ideologicheskaya rabota Kompartii Uzbekistana v period stroitel'stva sotsializma (1925-1937 gg.) (Ideological Work of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in the Period of the Building of Socialism (1925-1937). Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1982. 232 pp.

Historical work on the struggle against pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic, and other deviations.

Shest'desyat' let obrazovaniya Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (Sixty Years of the Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Moscow: Politizdat, 1983. 365 pp.

Stenographic record of the December 21-22, 1982, meeting of the Central Committee USSR, Supreme Soviet USSR, and Supreme Soviet RSFSR.

Sibirskiye ogni (Siberian Fires), No. 5 (May 1983).

Special issue devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Buryat Autonomous Republic.

Stepanyants, M. T. Musul'manskiye kontsepsii v filosofii i politike XIX-XX v. (Muslim Conceptions in Philosophy and Politics of the 19th and 20th Centuries). Moscow: Nauka, 1982. 248 pp.

Second edition of Stepanyants' 1974 volume, Islam in the Philosophical and Social Thought of the Foreign East. Examines a variety of ideological currents in the Muslim world, many of which have affected Soviet Muslim peoples.

Ten, V. Rukovodstvo KPSS protsessom sblizheniya natsiy v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma (1959-1975) (CPSU Leadership of the Process of the Coming Together of Nations Under Developed Socialism (1959-1975). Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1981. 207 pp.

First Soviet study of party efforts to coordinate and direct the "coming together" of nations and nationalities in the Central Asian republics.

Slovar' ateista (The Atheist Dictionary). Moscow: Nauka, 1983. 280 pp.

Replaces the previous two-volume Athiest Dictionary and will include many new entries on religion and philosophy.

TsRU protiv SSSR (The CIA Against the USSR). Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1983. 320 pp.

Recounts Soviet views of US "psychological warfare" against the USSR since 1945. Includes an examination of National Security Council directives, Central Intelligence Agency activities using such emigré groups as the Russian NTS and other nationalities, the "subversive" activities of Radio Liberty, and the abortive use of such dissidents as Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, Ginzburg, Sinyavskiy.

Yusupov, E. Yu. Stanovleniye i razvitiye velikogo bratstva narodov SSSR (The Formation and Development of the Great Fraternity of the Peoples of the USSR). Tashkent: Fan Publishers, 1982. 256 pp.

Yusupov, an Uzbek academician and doctor of political sciences, examines the formation and development of national relations in the USSR. This is another of a series of recent Soviet studies specifically directed against Western criticisms of Soviet nationality policies.

Soviet Research Translated by Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS):

Islam v SSSR (Islam in the USSR). Moscow: Mysl', 1983. 174 pp. JPRS No. L/11450, July 11, 1983 (Official Use Only).

See Current Developments, p. 10, for detailed resumé of this volume.

Matyushkin, Nikolay Ivanovich. Armiya druzhby narodov i proletarskogo internatsionalizma (Army of Friendship of Peoples and Proletarian Internationalism). Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982. 167 pp. JPRS No. L/11404, June 23, 1983 (Official Use Only).

Describes the role of the various Soviet nationality groups in building of the Soviet state and the measures taken by the Soviet Army to cope with the multiethnic aspects of the Soviet population.

Western

Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman. Memuary (Memoirs). Frankfurt: Posev, 1983. 761 pp.

Dr. Avtorkhanov, born in Chechnia, studied at the University of Red Professors and served in high positions in the Communist Party until World War II, when he left the USSR for the West. In this book, he recounts his education and party work in the Soviet Caucasus.

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Broxup, Marie. The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 170 pp.

A brief restatement for the lay reader of Bennigsen's earlier works. Contains an historical survey of Russia and Islam, a projection of Soviet-Islamic relations to the year 2000, a bibliography, a glossary, and demographic tables.

Bernstam, Mikhail S., "Demography of Soviet Ethnic Groups in World Perspective." As-yet unpublished paper presented to the April 1983 Hoover Institution conference, "The Last Empire--Nationality and the Soviet Future."

Discusses the impact--intended and otherwise--of Soviet social policies on the demographic behavior of various national groups and provides projections of differential nationality growth rates into the next century.

Braker, Hans. The Implications of the Islam Question for Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy. Cologne: Bundesinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1983. 34 pp.

A brief survey of Western ideas on this subject.

Chiama, Jean, and Soulet, Jean-Francois. Histoire de la Dissidence, Oppositions et Revoltes en U.R.S.S. et dans les democratier populaires de la mort de Staline a nos jours (History of Dissidence, Oppositions and Revolts in the USSR and in People's

Democracies From the Death of Stalin to the Present). Paris: Le Sevil, 1982.

A comprehensive history of dissidence in the USSR, this work has an interesting chapter on the renewal of nationalism in the USSR in the 1970s.

Cockburn, Andrew. After Brezhnev. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Based on emigré debriefings on internal problems in the USSR; includes data on powerful ethnic and religious tensions in Soviet military forces.

Donald, James. The Fall of the Russian Empire. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982. 367 pp.

Set in the near future, this novel describes the disintegration of the USSR. The revolution begins in European Russia but is soon supported by non-Russian groups.

Oschlies, Wolf. Die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion: Versuch einer Bestandsaufnahme (Germans in the Soviet Union: An Attempt at a Present-Day Survey). Cologne: Bundesinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1983. 45 pp.

Surveys the history, problems, cultural situation, and social standing of this sizable Soviet minority.

Volkoff, Vladimir. Le Montage. Paris: Julliard/ L'Age d'Homme, 1982. 354 pp.

Novel about Soviet disinformation efforts in the West written by son of post-revolutionary Russian emigré parents. Describes activities of a Soviet "agent of influence" in the French publishing world. One of the books he pushes is a study based on statistical sources showing the demographic crisis in the USSR. The agent and his Soviet handlers feel that such a study will lull the West into a false sense of security based on the belief that demographic change in the Soviet Union will somehow end the Soviet challenge.

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TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: (C) SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER ON KREMLIN POLITICS
REF: (A) BELGRADE 6405 (B) MOSCOW 10553 (C) 82 BELGRADE 9170
(D) MOSCOW 106880

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ON AUGUST 23 (PRIOR TO RETURNING TO MOSCOW ON LEAVE), A MID-LEVEL SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER (STRICTLY PROTECT) AGAIN AFFIRMED GORBACHEV'S STAR IS RISING FAST, STATED FLATLY THAT ROMANOV HAS ASSUMED USTINOV'S OLD PORTFOLIO IN THE SECRETARIAT, HINTED THAT SHCHERBITSK WILL REMAIN ON THE MARGINS AND WAS STRANGELY QUIET ABOUT ALIYEV. SOVEMBOFF UNDERSCORED CHERNENKO'S CONTINUED ABSENCE, BROADLY HINTING TAT THE LATTER IS FAST LOSING POLITICAL GROUND. THE SOVIET OFFICER POINTEDLY CALLED ATTENTION TO FOUR "MAJOR" SOVIET INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AUGUST: ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT IN FIVE BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY, PUBLICATION OF THE LABOR COLLECTIVES LAW AND THE LABOR DISCIPLINE DECREE, A CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC) DECISION CALLING FOR RENEWAL OF PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THIS FALL'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND ANDROPOV'S RECENT MEETING WITH VETERAN. COLLECTIVELY THEY MARK IMPORTANT MOVEMENT FORWARD FOR "A DROPOV'S LINE" AND SIGNAL THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S GROWING POLITICAL STRENGTH. THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT ALSO PROVIDED AN INTERPRETATION OF RECENT HIGH-LEVEL CADRE CHANGES, CONTENDING THAT THEY UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF BREZHNEV'S CRONIES, AND SOVEMBOFF REPORED THE OUSTER ON CORRUPTION CHARGES OF V.G. MOROZOV, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND SOME TWENTY OF HIS COLLEAGUES. FINALLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME SOVEMBOFF EXPRESSED A STRONG INTEREST IN REPORTING OFFICER'S AND USG'S ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ANDROPOV'S PERSONAL POLITICAL POSITION. END SUMMARY.

3. GORBACHEV NUMBER TWO. AS HE STATED EARLIER THIS MONTH (REF A), SOVEMBOF CALLED ATTENTION TO GORBACHEV'S COTINUED HIGH PROFILE, CONTENDING THAT IT REFLECTED GORBACHEV'S GROWING RESPONSIBILITY AND POLITICAL STRENGTH. ON THIS OCCASION, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT VOLUNTEERED THAT ANDROPOV "WANTS" GORBACHEV TO BE ANNOINTED FORMALLY AS "NUMBER TWO IN THE PARTY." THIS ACCOUNTS, OUR SOURCE SAID, FOR GORBACHEV'S INCREASING INVOLVEMENT IN A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES; THAT IS NOT/NOT ACCIDENTAL. ASKED ABOUT GORBACHEV'S FORMAL RESPONSIBILITIES, THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT SAID THEY INCLUDE ECONOMIC MATTERS, AGRICULTURE, CADRE POLICY (GORBACHEV IS KSAID TO SUPERVISE KAPITONOV) AND, INCREASINGLY, IDEOLOGY.

4. ROMANOV THE ENGINEER AND PROBLEM SOLVER. TURNING TO ROMANOV, SOVEMBOFF RELATED THAT HE NOW KNEW FOR CERTAIN WHAT ARE THE FORMER LENINGRAD PARTY BOSS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE CPSU CC SECRETARIAT. OUR SOURCE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT ROMANOV "ONLY" HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE (INCLUDING HEAVY INDUSTRY). MORE SPECIFICALLY, ROMANOV IS SAID TO HAVE ASSUMED THE PORTFOLIO USTINOV ONCE HELD IN THE SECRETARIAT WHICH, ACCORDING TO SOVEMBOFF, WAS LEFT VACANT FOLLOWING USTINOV'S ELEVATION TO FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE POITBURO IN 1976. IN THE INTERIM, SAID THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT, AN OFFICIAL OF THE COUNSIL OF MINISTERS NAMED "SMIRNOV" (PROBABLY DEPUTY CHAIRMAN L.V. SMIRNOV) GENERALLY OVERSAW THIS SECTOR IN CCOPERATIION WITH SOME CC APPARATCHIKI. ASKED ABOUT ROMANOV'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ANDROPOV, SOVEMBOFF COMMENTED WITH SOME CONFIDENCE THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAS A HIGH REGARD FOR ROMANOV'S TECHNICAL ANDORGNIZATIONAL SKILLS, ADDING THAT THEY IN LARGE MEASURE ACCOUNT FOR HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT. HOWEVER, SOVEMBOFF CLAIMED, ADNROPOV CONSIDERS ROMANOV TO BE LIMITED AS A "POLITCIAN."

5. SHCHERBITSKY AND ALIYEV. ASKED KABTUT THE UKRAINIAN PARTY CIEF'S STATUS, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF HIS RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS (REF B), THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT HINTED

THAT SHCHERBITSKY DOES NOT/NOT FIGURE LARGE IN ANDROPOV'S FUTURE PLANS AND THAT THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAN IS NOT/NOT EXPECTED TO ASSUME A POST IN MOSCOW. SOVEMBOFFSPECIFIALLY VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAD EARLIER (REF C) BEEN MISTAKEN IN STATING THAT SHCHERBITSKY WAS CLOSE TO ANDROPOV. TURNING TO CHERNENKO, THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT POINTEDLY NOTED THAT BREZHNEV'S PROTEGE HAD NOT/NOT APPEARED IN PUBLIC SINCE THE LAST CC PLENUM, SUGGESTING THAT CHERNENKO IS WANING BOTH PHYSCIALLY AND POLITICALLY. (COMMENT: CURIOUSLY, THOUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION OF KEY KREMLIN POLITICAL FIGURES AND ISSUES, OUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTOR FAILED EVEN TO RAISEALIYEV'S NAME. END COMMENT.)
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6. RECENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT OUTLINED FOUR STVIET DOMESTIC POLITICAL DVELOPMENTS THAT HE CHARACTERIZE AS SIGNFICANT BECAUSE THEY MARK A CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE INITIATED BY ANDROPOV AND THE GROWING STRENGTH OF ANDROPOV'S "LINE" AS WELL AS HIS PERSONAL POLITICAL POSITION. AMONG THESE DEVELOPMENTS, OUR SOURCE INCLUDED:
-- THE DECISION TO LAUNCH ECONOMIC EXPERIEMTNS IN FIVE BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY;
-- THE PUBLICATION OF THE LABOR COLLECTIVES LAW ND THE LABOR DISCIPLINE DECREE (SOVEMBOFF EMPHASIZED THAT BOTHT THE COUNCIL OF MINITERS AND THE CPSU CC ENDORSED THESE TWO "DOCUMENTS" AND THE ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT);
-- A RECENT CC DECISION CALLING FOR "RENEWAL" OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP "AT ALL LEVELS" DURING THE UPCOMING (SEPTEMBER-JANUARY 1984) ELECTION CAMPAIGN. NOTING THAT OFFICIALS ON ALL OBLAST COMMITTEES WILL FACE THE "PARTY MASSES," HE CHARACTERIZED THE CC DECISION AS AN "INVITATION" TO THE RANK AND FILE TO IMPLEMENT A "DECISION" TO RENEW THE PARTY LEADERSHIP SPECIFICALLY AT THE OBLAST LEVEL. SOVEMBOFF SAID THE ELECTIONS DESERVED THE CLOSE ATTENTION OF SOVIET SPECIALISTS AND HE PREDICTED THAT MANY NEW FACES WILL APPEAR; AND
-- ANDROPOV'S RECENT MEETING WITH VETERANS. SOMEMBOFF DESCRIBED THIS AS AN IMPORTANT EVENT BECAUSE IT PROVIDED THE GENERAL SECRETARY THE OP ORTUNITY TO ELABORATE ON THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ABOVE THREE DECISIONS AND BECAUSE THE VETERANS LENT THEIR "FULL SUPPORT" TO THE "ENTIRE ANDROPOV LINE," IDENTIFYING IT WITH THE "BOLSHEVIK-LENINIST LINE."THIS IS OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE, THE SOVIET OFFICER ARGUED, CONCEDING THAT THERE IS UNSPECIFIED OPPOSITION IN THE CPSU TO ANDROPOV'S COURSE. CONCLUING, OUR SOURCE EMPHASIZED THAT ANDROPOV'S PROMISE TO PURSUE HIS POLITICIES VIGOROUSLY,"PRINCIPALLY," AND TO THE END DREW "LONG, STORMY APPLAUSE" FROM THE VETERANS.

7. THE MEANING OF RECENT CADRE CHANGES. THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT CALLED ATTENTION TO THE PATTERN OF RECENT HIGH-LEVEL CADRE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND PARTY. IN THIS RESPECT, HE POINTED TO THE VERY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF APPOINTMENTS OF OFFICIALS WITH STRONG LINKS WITH LENINGRAD, SIBERIA AND THE URALS, CITINGAS RECENT EXAMPLES LIGACHEV, ARISTOV, VOROTNIKOV, ROMANOV AND VADIM MEDVEDEV (REF D). (IN N ASIDE, HE ASSERTED THAT ARISTOV WILL BE NAMED IN THE NEAR FUTURE A FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, REPLACING V.F. MALTSEV WHOSE STOCK, SOVEMBOFF CLAIMED, IS DECLINING. ARISTOV, SOVEMBOFF CLAIMED, HAS CLOSE TIES WITH, AND IS HIGHLY REGARDED BY, ANDROPOV. MALTSEV, SAID OUR SOURCE, NO/NO LONGER HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELATIONS WITH THE SKOCIALIST COUNTRIES BUT RATHER ONLY FOR "INDIA AND PAKISTAN.") RETURNING TO HIS THEME, THE SOVIET OFFICER CONTENDED THAT THESE AND OTHER RECENT APPOINTMENTS HAD COME LARGELY AT THE EXPENSE OF "BREZHNEV'S FORMER ASSOCIATES" FROM MOLDAVIA AND UKRAINE, CITING AS EXAMPLES TRAPEZNIKOV AND NOVIKOV. FINALLY, OVEMBOFF PEDICTED THAT MORE CADRE CHANGES AT THE TOP LEVELS OF THE CPSU AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE PLACE AND WOULD FOLLOW A SIMILAR PATTERN.

8. MORE HIGH-LEVEL REMOVALS ON THE GROUNDS OF CORRUPTION. IN A CONFIDENTIAL TONE, THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT RELATED THAT V.G. MOROZOV, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FO FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS (GKES) HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM HIS POSITION AND EXPELLED FROM THE CPSU ON AGUSUT 18 ON CORRUPTION CHARGES. MOROZOV AND TWENTY OR SO OF HIS COLEAGUES ON GKES HAD, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET OFFICER, ABUSED THEIR POSITIONS FOR PERSONAL FINANCIAL GAIN.

9. THE NEXT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM. TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER, THE PLENUM WILL "PROBABLY" DEAL WITH ECONOMIC MATTERS, SAID OUR SOURCE.

1Ø. THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A RELATIONSHIP SPANNING SOME EIGHTEEN MONTHS, THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT SHTWED A KEEN INTEREST IN REPORTING OFFICER'S AND SPECIFICALL USG ASSESSMENT OF THE SOIVET DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION AND ANDROPOV'S PERSONAL POLITICAL POSITION AND POLICIES. THE SOVIET OFFICER APHEARED PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WASHINGTON'S ASSESSMENT OF ANDROPOV'S HEALTH AND TH PROSPECTS FOR HIS EFFORTS TO RENEW AND REVITALIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY. ANDERSON
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CURRENT NEWS
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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST IN THE 1980s: DETENTE, CONTAINMENT, OR CONFRONTATION?

by Seweryn Bialer

The long period of anxious watching and waiting in the West for the outcome of the Soviet Union's leadership succession ended with the emergence of Yuri Andropov as the new general secretary. The main outlines of the new leader's policies, however, can only be dimly perceived at this point. What I propose to do in this article, therefore, is to analyze the kind of Soviet Union that Western policymakers are facing now and will face during the 1980s.

The prospects and prospective policies of the new Kremlin leadership are, or should be, key elements in the Western democracies' deliberations concerning their own policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. For Western statesmen, the trends and changes in Soviet foreign policy are of central importance. The domestic situation and Soviet politics are of importance only to the extent that they influence the international structure and the foreign policies of the Soviet Union.

For this reason alone I have structured this article in such a way that even when I deal with Soviet domestic, social, economic, and political developments, I will address questions that are most pertinent and important for Western policymakers. The questions I will discuss are: (1) How do the internal problems and situation of the Soviet Union influence its international goals and policies? (2) What are the domestic sources of, and pressures on, Soviet foreign policy as it enters the 1980s under a new leadership? (3) What are the most important dilemmas for Soviet foreign policy to try to resolve in the 1980s? (4) To what extent and by what means can we influence the conduct of Soviet international behavior in the 1980s?

Domestic Policies and Soviet International Behavior

As has sometimes been the case in the past, the Soviet Union today must make a number of crucial decisions, primarily in the domestic

Seweryn Bialer is the Ruggles Professor of Political Science and Director of the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University.

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but also in the foreign policy field. Whether these decisions will result in a radical departure from the past is anybody's guess. Past Soviet history argues against entertaining hopes that the Soviet leadership will be willing to engage in dangerous internal systemic changes and drastic departures from their foreign policy line. What is incontrovertible, however, is that the social and political pressures on Soviet leaders for reform in the Soviet system and its policies are widespread.

The decision to face the reality of Soviet difficulties was delayed for many years by the paralysis of the Brezhnev leadership. The confluence of Soviet problems with the succession in the Kremlin puts Soviet dilemmas in an even starker frame than before. If the ruler of the Kremlin and his loyal associates continue to follow the course of their predecessors because of inertia and political commitments, the likelihood of Soviet decline and decay will increase significantly.

The Soviet domestic situation is, from a number of points of view, worse than it ever was in the post-Stalin era, with no prospects for a rapid improvement, regardless of what the new leadership in the Kremlin decides to do. The key to the whole unhealthy situation is of course economic. The decline in the rate of growth to about 2 per cent per year, the exhaustion of sources of massive new labor inputs, the lack of cheap raw materials, and the dramatically increased pressures on Soviet investment resources spell the end of extensive growth, the only kind of growth known to the Soviets from Stalin's first five-year plan to today.

The Soviet economy has always been beset by problems and troubles, but the ones that it faces today are qualitatively different from those of the past. Today the only steps Soviet leaders can take to improve economic performance require intensive growth factors—higher labor productivity, better diffusion of modern technology, and rapid improvement of the economic infrastructure, which has been chronically neglected in the past. The Soviet system of planning, management, and incentives is utterly unprepared and unwilling to switch from methods that were adequate in the past to methods that offer the only escape from economic stagnation or even decline. In the past chronic economic troubles could be handled with partial success by providing ever-larger quantities of labor, capital, material resources, and land, which secured high growth ratios, an improvement in the standard of living, and a systematic increase in military expenditures. As recent studies have concluded, the technological gap between the Soviet industrial establishment and that of the United States is as wide today as it was in 1953, the year Stalin died. The Soviet leadership's failure to feed its people well and to provide them with sufficient industrial goods is not only an embarrassment but also a barrier to the achievement of higher productivity by labor and management.

Soviet economic problems are reflected in social problems that are potentially unsettling and that might become more virulent in the 1980s. What, for instance, will the workers' response be to the decline or stagnation of their real wages, which began in the late 1970s and will continue through the 1980s? The current situation contrasts with the period from the 1960s to the late 1970s, when real income was increasing. I do not predict a repetition of the Polish Solidarity explosion in the Soviet Union, which is highly unlikely, but rather a decline in the industrial labor peace that prevailed for so long.

In addition to the wage problem, Soviet workers may respond to changes in one of the most important stabilizing factors in their relations with the regime—intergenerational social mobility. The decline of Soviet industrial growth, the stagnation in Soviet expenditures on higher education, the growth of the Soviet middle and upper-middle classes—all these factors make it more difficult for working-class children to enter the Soviet higher education system, which is an essential step for gaining social mobility.

Finally, the non-Russian people of the Soviet Union, about half of the entire population, may push for greater political and economic autonomy from Moscow, and their intelligentsia may seek greater cultural autonomy as well. Using a dual policy of coercion, on the one hand, and of bribery and co-optation on the other, the Moscow leadership under Brezhnev successfully managed its "internal empire." This will be much more difficult to achieve now, given the economic conditions of the 1980s.

In the political system, all the signs since Andropov's assumption of power indicate that he is increasing his authority much more quickly than his two predecessors. He seems to be a leader who will have a high degree of autonomy in initiating and pushing through a plan to improve Soviet performance. His main power base is not the party apparatus but the KGB. Yet the odds overwhelmingly favor his effectively controlling the Soviet political elite (the professional party apparatus), and rather than being restrained by it, he will impose his will on it. Finally, with regard to the question of the military's relationship to the new leadership, I believe that its role in formulating Soviet domestic and foreign policy has been greatly exaggerated by the West in the past, and that Andropov can formulate his political policies and make economic decisions without being restrained by the military.

The most important question is whether Andropov will initiate and implement major economic reforms. Even considering what we know about the Soviet system, about Andropov, and about his performance thus far, all we can state is that some of his policies are already certain, some are very likely, and some are very unlikely.

What is certain is that Andropov's short- and intermediate-term policy will be geared to achieving greater social, political, and economic discipline in all levels of Soviet society. The campaign for achieving this first-priority goal is already under way. The elements of this campaign are (1) increased candor in the dialogue between the leadership and the population, as a result of which the leadership is drawing a quite realistic, if pessimistic, picture of the economic difficulties and the austerity that the population will face in the 1980s; (2) making the leadership's activities and deliberations more visible, which is intended to project the image of a very active and concerned new leadership, as compared with the paralysis of the old one; (3) a forceful campaign for radically improving the discipline of both all levels of the bureaucracy and of the workers, which includes a whole array of coercive measures, inspections, demands for accountability, and so forth. One may expect that this campaign, if continued, will have some marginal effects on the Soviet work ethic.

It is very likely that in the years to come the new leadership will initiate and implement major reforms in Soviet agriculture—the most ailing and the most important sector of the economy from the point of view of Soviet political and social stability. Such a reform effort may involve either greater privatization, as it does in China, or greater managerial freedom and flexibility, as it does in Hungary. The peasants long ago ceased to present a danger to the Soviet system, and giving them and their managers additional rights in exchange for greater production is not a risky political step. The difficulty that Andropov will face in such a reform effort will be the opposition of the lower-ranking segment of the party apparatus whose way of life and reason for existence it will call into question.

That Andropov will try to reform the entire Soviet industrial, financial, and managerial system is almost certain. Experts and bureaucrats are already discussing the direction such reforms will take, and their efforts will certainly increase immensely in the months to come. It is, however, almost as certain that Andropov will be either unwilling or unable to effect a radical structural change in the Soviet economic system and will have to be satisfied with marginal, though important, structural changes and with revisions in budgetary allocations. The idea that somehow found its way to the Western press that Andropov will try to impose the Hungarian economic model on the Soviet system is simply preposterous. I have yet to meet a Soviet official or economist who would consider it possible to apply the Hungarian model to the entirely different conditions that exist in the Soviet Union.

The impact of the Andropov leadership on the Soviet domestic situation will probably result from, in the political arena, the pursuit of a law-and-order policy, a higher level of domestic authoritarianism, and an effort, in the economic arena, to improve the performance of the Soviet economy through a series of reforms. One may venture that the economic picture may improve marginally without halting the trend of Soviet economic decline.

Decline is also visible in Soviet culture, where behind the façade of official optimism there are previously unthinkable signs of pessimism. It is visible in the social arena where alcoholism, bribery, corruption, and the absence of work ethics have reached alarming proportions, even by Soviet standards. The decline therefore affects both the spirit and the effectiveness of the Soviet system.

The secular decline of the Soviet domestic system does not mean, however, that current Western predictions about the Soviet Union in the 1980s, especially those of the Reagan administration, realistically assess Soviet prospects when they posit a catastrophic systemic crisis. Such expectations are based on a worst-case interpretation of the abundant evidence that in the 1980s the political and social stability of the Soviet Union will be severely tried; that the Soviet economic situation will be more critical than at any time since Stalin's death; and that the Soviet empire has probably already entered the period of its decline.

Severe economic stress may provoke political collapse in the next decade, but that is highly unlikely. What generations have wrought with so much sacrifice, cruelty, and conviction will not change radically despite the pressures of economic decline or leadership instability. The Soviet Union is not now, nor will it be during the next decade, in the throes of a true systemic crisis, for it boasts enormous unused reserves of political and social stability that will suffice for enduring severe difficulties. The Soviet economy, like any gigantic economy administered by intelligent and trained professionals, will not go bankrupt. It may become less effective, it may stagnate, it may even experience an actual decline for a year or two; but, as is the case with the political system, it will not collapse.

It is also unrealistic to expect to inhibit Soviet military growth by ensuring that the drastic escalation of cost in a new arms race will exert intolerable pressures on the Soviet economy. The United States does not have sufficient leverage to impose such costs on the Soviet Union without the committed cooperation of Western Europe and Japan. It cannot, therefore, influence in any significant way the decision of Soviet leaders to engage in a military build-up should they deem doing so essential for maintaining the security of their country, their empire, and their global influence. If threatened by the prospect of a radical shift in the present balance of military power, especially strategic nuclear power, Soviet leaders will certainly undertake to redeploy their economic resources, to restrict civilian consumption, to enforce harsh internal discipline, and to

make use of an artificially stimulated seige mentality and unbridled nationalism for a military build-up, regardless of the cost.

Will the domestic decline (which in my opinion the Soviet leadership will be unable to reverse), the spiritual pessimism, the social corruption, and the "muddling down" Soviet economic growth impair Soviet effectiveness in the international arena and shift the attention of the Soviet leadership to domestic preoccupations? I believe it will not. The Soviet political system is a gigantic operation involving management, coercion, persuasion, and bribery. The Soviet economy has reached a level of production that, even in conditions of declining growth, is able to support an active Soviet foreign policy. Using unbridled Russian nationalism remains an effective device for mobilizing support. The Soviet system is like a jeep that can travel over very rough roads with very little support.

The apathy of the Soviet population with regard to high politics produces, in what seems to be the most politicized society in the world, a measure of political stability. Political dissent, which the Soviets were able to reduce drastically or neutralize, will not recur in the 1980s on a broader scale. The educated and professional classes have little in common with the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia — they are an "in-system" professional group oriented toward advancing their own careers, improving their material circumstances, and gaining greater professional, not political, autonomy.

The growth of the Soviet military will be affected by the decrease in Soviet resources. Nevertheless, the Soviet military machine is so enormous and advanced that, even with a much lower growth rate in the 1980s, it will still constitute a sufficient, even formidable, foreign policy resource. The two major though far from catastrophic problems the Soviet military will face in the 1980s are economic and demographic in nature. The economic problem consists not of the frequently mentioned competition between guns and butter, but rather between investment in industry and direct expenditures for guns — that is to say between the need to develop and modernize the Soviet industrial plant, which provides the backbone of future military strength, and the growth in the production of weapons and direct expenditures necessary for the upkeep of the armed forces. The demographic problem is that draftees into the armed forces in the 1980s will be primarily non-Russian and non-Slavic. That problem may create tensions within the armed forces and impair Soviet military proficiency. Yet both problems are far from producing a substantial decline in Soviet defense capability or in the offensive strength of the military as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

It is also unrealistic to believe that U.S. policies can achieve a fundamental reorientation that would shift the attention of the Soviet leadership to domestic priorities. The entire direction of Soviet military and foreign policy during the Brezhnev decades militates against such an eventuality, and the bleak prospects for internal development could well compel Soviet leaders to seek more attainable and durable successes in the international arena. Moreover, during the next few years, foreign policy will certainly become more significant as a legitimizing element of Soviet rule in general and of party rule within the establishment in particular.

Domestic difficulties may place pressure on the Soviet leaders to engage in serious arms-limitation and arms-reduction talks with the West. They also make Soviet requirements for importing foreign technology more imperative, and they may limit the range and scale of Soviet foreign adventures, although in all probability they will not deflect the Soviet Union from pursuing an activist, global foreign policy. The roots of Soviet activism on a global scale and of their growing ambitions and appetites are deeply embedded in the Soviet domestic system.

Soviet International Ambitions

The preoccupation of Western powers, particularly the United States, with Soviet international policies and their belief that the Soviet Union poses a danger to both their existence and their foreign policy goals has two dominant sources. The first is the continuous build-up over the past two decades in almost every category of Soviet military power far beyond their defensive needs; the second is the pattern of increased Soviet expansionism in the 1970s and the Soviet quest for greater global power and influence.

It is not difficult to identify the sources of Soviet expansionism. At most, Western analysts may disagree about the weight of one or another factor affecting the pattern and growth of Soviet expansionism. As has been the case with many other states in the past, the Soviet Union has only recently acquired capacities that are more or less congruous with its ambitions. A second explanation for Soviet international behavior is the ideology of Soviet elites. Soviet ideology should be understood not as a set of doctrinal dogmas that directly dictates Soviet actions, but as tendencies and patterns of thought and belief that shape the mind-set of Soviet policymakers, and are a product of the fusion of the most general doctrinal precepts with Soviet and Russian historical experience.

Soviet ambition and ideology are rarely in conflict, but rather reinforce each other, adding virulence to Soviet international ambitions and expectations. The direction of Soviet military and foreign policy is determined by these forces and the Soviet capacity to pursue them, *independent of any behavior of the Western powers*. Soviet international

strategic behavior may be fixed for prolonged periods of time (which, incidentally, does not mean it cannot be changed), while their tactical behavior in the service of strategy is quite flexible.

Soviet military and foreign policy is primarily determined by the extreme Soviet preoccupation with the security of their homeland and their empire. Of only secondary importance is the projection of Soviet power abroad to gain the international influence and power that they feel their military might has earned them. Soviet military expenditures are never sufficient to make the Soviet leaders secure. What they are actually pursuing, therefore, is total security, which in reality is unattainable, first because in the nuclear age such security is not possible, and secondly because an internal contradiction exists: the Soviets can feel secure only if their adversaries feel insecure, but insecurity leads their adversaries to undertake military build-ups of their own.

With regard to Soviet expansion, and particularly to such steps as the invasion of Afghanistan, the discussion in the West about whether the Soviet action was defensive or offensive in nature is basically irrelevant. While the invasion of Afghanistan was a defensive move by the Soviets from the point of view of its causes, judged by its consequences, it had the clearly offensive result of changing the geopolitical strategic situation in the Persian Gulf.

Soviet expansion in the Third World is based on the idea that the achievement of strategic parity with the United States should be translated into visible gains in Soviet influence and power in the Third World. The key term in the Soviet vocabulary of political goals is "political equality" with the United States. It is not always clear what the term "equality" means in terms of foreign policy or whether the model is the optimistic and dramatically active United States of the 1950s and 1960s or the sober United States of the late 1970s and the early 1980s. I believe, however, that it is the earlier model on which the Soviet goal of equality in the 1970s and 1980s is based.

Soviet foreign policy is thus directed toward achieving two goals: to gain an international stature that, in the words of Brezhnev and Gromyko, will "make impossible the solution of any international problem without Soviet participation"; and to pursue a policy with regard to regional conflicts and civil wars that will extend Soviet power to control or influence decisively the policies and internal development of the growing number of states that are not members of the Warsaw Pact or NATO.

The only resource the Soviets can use to achieve these goals is their military might, and this fact makes Soviet participation in regional conflicts and civil wars a serious threat to the goals of stability and evolutionary change pursued by most Western powers. The danger is heightened by the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States are at different

stages in their international development, and also differ in their foreign policy ambitions and in the desires of their leaders and elites for foreign conquests. The character of U.S. policies is as clearly defensive as Soviet foreign policy is offensive.

The general line of Soviet foreign policy began to unravel in the last years under Brezhnev. In the past three years, Soviet foreign policy has displayed a passivity, a retrenchment, a low profile, and a tendency to exploit the peace issue, that is, to use the "carrot" rather than the "stick." The reasons for the passivity of Soviet foreign policy are not difficult to fathom.

The first, though not the central reason for such a policy, was the major change in the U.S. policy line in the last year of Carter's administration and during the first two years of Reagan's. The scope and intensity of Reagan's rhetoric, and of the direction of his political, economic, and military policy was not expected by the Soviets. The result of this is a mood of caution and a desire to avoid testing Reagan until it becomes clear what lies behind his rhetoric and behind the resurgence of radical conservatism in the United States.

The second reason involves, on the one hand, the near paralysis of Soviet foreign policymaking in the last two years of Brezhnev's leadership and, on the other hand, the onset of the succession struggle long before the old leader died. As I will discuss below, both past and the present successions influence the direction and form Soviet foreign policy will take in the early 1980s.

The third reason for the passivity of Soviet foreign policy was brought about by its temporary overextension. The adventures in Africa, the invasion of Afghanistan and the stalemate that resulted, the burden of subsidizing the Soviet "alliance," and, above all, the Polish situation created a mood favoring retrenchment among Soviet leaders.

The fourth reason for the Soviet predilection to use "carrots," that is, peace overtures, rather than "sticks" is connected with the fate of the détente policy. The more Soviet-U.S. détente began to unravel, the more it became important for the Soviets, economically, politically, and militarily to preserve and expand its détente with Western Europe and particularly Germany. The worrisome prospect of a deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe added impetus to the Soviet desire to keep a low profile in their foreign policy, which will convince the Europeans, who are under public pressure, that the deployment of the INF is unnecessary and should be postponed at least until Soviet peaceful overtures have been tested.

It is of course also true that in the past three years Soviet foreign policymakers lacked tempting targets for expansion with low risk, but it is my opinion that even if such targets had been available, maintaining the

low profile of Soviet foreign policy would still be the choice of the Soviet leaders.

After the passivity, lack of cohesiveness, and absence of a central idea in the Soviet foreign policy of the past three years, Andropov's goal must be the reintegration of foreign policy objectives, decisions about the general line of Soviet foreign policy, and the establishment of a clear order of priorities in Soviet foreign policies and clear relations among the various parts and objectives of these policies.

Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s

We must recognize that what we may expect from Andropov in the foreign policy field in the 1980s will be significantly affected by the policies of the United States and the democratic powers of Europe, by relations between the United States and its European allies, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, and by our ability to defuse and localize the regional conflicts and civil wars that will inevitably occur in the 1980s, or to put a prohibitive cost on Soviet intervention in these conflicts, which offer a temptation and opportunity that the Soviet leaders find very difficult to resist. Despite the unpredictable variables that will influence the direction of Soviet foreign policy and the degree of its activism and risk-taking, one can project some tendencies and trends in the Soviet foreign policy of the near and intermediate future.

In the short run the leadership succession will have an influence on Soviet foreign policy. The prime goal of the Soviet leadership during the succession process is to insulate the domestic situation, with its as yet unstabilized leadership and its preoccupation with a plethora of unsolved and pressing domestic problems, from challenges from the outside. To prevent such challenges and to put his mark on Soviet foreign policy, the new leader is likely to be more open to new initiatives for regulating and improving his country's relations with its primary adversaries. On the central axis of Soviet foreign policy, that is, in its relation with the United States and NATO, the tendency to use peace issues rather than threats will probably be dominant.

Another tendency during the succession process, which signifies new opportunities and new evaluations, will be an attempt to counter the bureaucratic inertia of the new leader's predecessor and to cut as much as possible the losses resulting from some previous policies. At present, a new approach is clearly visible in the Soviet effort to normalize its relations with the People's Republic of China, which, perhaps, may be followed by efforts to improve relations with Japan. If we try to exploit the present opportunity, there is a possibility, however faint, of starting negotiations on the Afghanistan problem that, while preserving Soviet security interests, could result in a face-saving means for effecting the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Another tendency of the new leadership is to preserve its major gains and to protect its vital interests. The most important Soviet gains, to be preserved at any cost, is Soviet domination of Poland and maintaining its political stability. The other vital Soviet interests that Andropov will try to preserve at almost any cost are: a favorable balance of military power on all levels and détente with Western Europe, particularly Germany, which represents the cornerstone of current Soviet foreign policy.

With regard to the military balance of power, one should remember that we are now witnessing the first Soviet succession under conditions of strategic parity and Soviet theater-nuclear and conventional superiority. *It is the first time in Soviet and Russian history that the Soviet Union is as strong as its key adversaries and therefore should feel safe.* Accumulated Soviet military strength gives the new leader control over an awesome power that neither of his predecessors enjoyed at the beginning of their tenures. Whether this enormous military potential, which the Soviets are determined shall not decline, will be used for blackmail and offensive purposes, or whether it will make Soviet leaders more amenable to new and drastic arms-control and -reduction steps is a key question. One can only wish that the United States would more seriously and more diligently test the Soviet attitude toward such goals in the present transitional period in the Soviet Union.

Beyond the trends and tendencies in the succession's impact on Soviet foreign policy, there are three sets of foreign policy problems about which the new Soviet leadership, after its consolidation or perhaps even now, has to adopt a central policy line absent in the last years of Brezhnev's rule: the East European situation, relations with the NATO alliance, a general approach toward Third World targets of opportunity.

As for the first issue, Poland is of course the symbol of Soviet problems with its "allies." Every month that passes reinforces one's belief that the imposition of martial law and military rule in Poland was not an act of long-range planning for the future of this country, but an act of desperation on the part of Soviet and Polish leaders whose chief aim was to arrest the political evolution of Poland and the disintegration of its political system without the Soviets' having to intervene directly. The situation in Poland is clearly at a stalemate. The Polish economy could achieve its 1979 level of production only by the mid 1980s; chances for Hungarian-style reform in Poland are nonexistent; the alienation of the Polish people from its government is incontrovertible; and the disintegration and paralysis of the party is clearly visible. The only thing that holds Poland together is the strength of its security forces and the political apathy of its population.

The Polish events constitute a turning point for the Soviet empire, not because other countries of Eastern Europe will repeat the Polish pattern in the immediate future, which is unlikely, but because the Polish events, the first full-fledged revolution from below in a communist country, disclosed the weakness of political stability in those "inauthentic" regimes that lack legitimacy. It therefore represents, for the Soviets themselves, a systemic crisis, which they have no idea how to solve or counteract.

What we are witnessing now is the beginning or the decline of the Soviet "external empire." Economically, the Soviet bloc is already a burden on the Soviet Union. Militarily, the size of the Soviet forces that, in case of war, would have to keep Eastern Europe subjugated is probably already larger than the size of the elite units of the Warsaw Pact countries, which would be trusted to participate effectively and offensively in a Soviet strike against Western Europe. Incidentally, one of the most important and overlooked consequences of the Polish events was the creation, for the forseeable future, of a power vacuum in the central link of the Warsaw Pact forces confronting NATO. Politically, the situation in Eastern Europe is more and more an embarrassment to the Soviet Union, costing them much of whatever influence they have left over Communist parties abroad and potentially endangering their détente with Western Europe.

In the 1980s the economies of Eastern Europe will undergo a harsh test, their growth will be drastically cut, and they will require austerity programs. Economic difficulties in Eastern Europe have a way of being translated into socio-political unrest. At the same time, Soviet resources will be stretched even more thinly than they are today. The Soviet Union is already cutting its subsidies to its allies (especially Poland), and it is warning that in the near future they (including Cuba) will have to rely more and more on their own resources. It seems that economically this will be the Soviet policy toward its allies in the 1980s. Politically, it seems very likely that the Soviet Union will monitor very closely the situation in Eastern Europe and the policies of the governments (more closely than it monitored the Polish situation in the 1970–79 period). It will force client governments to react more quickly and decisively to any signs of the "Polish disease."

This Soviet approach will not solve the East European crisis that, in the coming decade, will very likely produce unrest and protest in one or more countries. Yet the Soviet Union cannot and will not abandon its basic approach to Eastern Europe. The Soviet hold on its "external empire" is made necessary by their security needs. But just as important, the communist and dependent nature of these countries, the major Soviet spoils of World War II, is a basic element of the legitimacy of the Soviet party and its leadership within the Soviet Union and within the Soviet

elites. After the disaster of Poland, Soviet leaders will be even more worried than before about changing their approach to Eastern Europe or condoning liberalizing measures in their clients' system (with the exception, perhaps, of some slow-moving economic reforms). The decisive preoccupation of Soviet leaders with regard to Eastern Europe will be to preserve at any price the political stability of this region without at the same time having to contribute significantly, from the economic point of view, to such stability.

The legitimacy of the East European regimes rests primarily and decisively on their economic performance. They can otherwise strengthen their legitimacy only if they pursue anti-Soviet, nationalistic policies. The East European situation in the 1980s will therefore be a stalemate in which the Soviets cannot and do not want to add anything new to their policies, and will promise only more and more of the same; the economic conditions under which such policies will be pursued will be significantly worse than in the 1970s. As a result, the East European stalemate will be full of dangers for the Soviet Union.

In the last years of Brezhnev's leadership, the general concepts underlying Soviet global political strategy began to crumble. The general Soviet strategy for the 1970s consisted of the following elements:

(1) détente with the United States, with all of its major economic, political, and military benefits, as the fundamental cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy.

(2) the decline of tensions and building good relations with Western Europe on the Central Front, where the Warsaw Pact confronts NATO; and the exploitation of West European fears that a developing détente with the United States would evolve in the direction of a U.S.-Soviet condominium that would lead to a decline of U.S. guarantees for the defense of Western Europe and to U.S. deals with the Soviet Union over which the Western allies will have little influence.

(3) the consolidation or even improvement of the U.S.-Soviet military balance and of the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

(4) the exploitation by the Soviet Union and their auxiliaries of targets of opportunity in the Third World, which, at relatively low cost and low risk, would enhance the Soviet position of power and its international influence.

(5) the pursuit of the elusive goal of attaining political equality with the United States, as a concomitant of U.S.-Soviet military parity; and expectation of negotiations and consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union on every major international issue of regional conflict regulation, conflict resolution, or damage limitations.

When Andropov took office the key elements of the strategic line were already unraveled:

(1) Détente with the United States had been all but rejected in the last year of Carter's administration and by the new Reagan administration.

(2) The Reagan administration committed itself to a change in the strategic, theater, and conventional-regional balance of power; it shifted the potential direction of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, and, by its agreement with the West European governments to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe starting in 1983, it posed the possibility of a drastic change in the balance of power in the European theater.

(3) Soviet steps to increase directly its power and influence in the Third World, particularly the Afghanistan invasion, contributed to the demise of Soviet-U.S. détente and promised higher risk and higher costs for the Soviets if they were to continue this kind of expansionistic and militaristic policy in the Third World.

(4) Contrary to its hopes, the Soviet Union gained few economic benefits from the United States and was excluded from such central regional negotiations as those concerning the Middle East.

The major questions for the Andropov leadership are: whether they can restore even a pale semblance of détente with the United States during the tenure of the Reagan administration, and at what price; whether the 1984 elections in the United States will offer, realistically, an opportunity for a change in U.S. leadership and a new chance for détente, despite the fact that it would be a détente without the exaggerated illusions of 1972; if détente with the United States is not an alternative for the 1980s, some substitute for it and a new general line will have to be adopted.

The dilemma Andropov is facing in the intermediate run is that there does not in fact exist a substitute for a U.S.-Soviet détente to regulate their competition, keep their conflict within nonconfrontational limits, and engender a degree of cooperation so that the interests of the two superpowers converge or overlap. The United States alone has the resources and the will to change the Soviet-Western military balance, with or without the Europeans, and it has also the ability and the unilateral capacity to accept the balance that is in existence and engage in serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control or reduction. (Incidentally, the dominance of U.S. policy with regard to the Soviet-Western military balance concerns also the INF; even if the European powers, particularly Germany, refuse to accept the U.S. deployment of Pershing II and Tomahawk missiles on their soil, the option of a substitute deployment of INFs in naval launchers around the perimeters of Europe is still possible or even probable.) It is the United States alone that is committed to political and military globalism, to the creation of barriers against Soviet globalistic expansionism — Europe is for all practical purposes concerned with Europe.

It is often asserted in the United States that two distinct orientations regarding Soviet policy toward the West divide the Soviet foreign policy establishment. The first group is said to maintain the absolute centrality of Soviet-U.S. relations and to hope for major improvement in these relations. The second group is thought to see great opportunities in Soviet relations with Western Europe and to promote such relations as the main axis of Soviet policy toward the West. Such a distinction exaggerates the differences within the Soviet foreign policy establishment. That establishment as a whole, it would seem, attaches central importance to Soviet-U.S. relations — even more so today, if that is possible, than in the immediate past. It believes that the United States alone stands between the Soviet Union and the satisfaction of its international ambitions.

The Soviet foreign policy elite does tend to disagree about strategic and tactical objectives for Western Europe, especially in periods like the present when relations with the United States are not likely to improve. In such a situation the entire Soviet foreign policy establishment advocates a very active policy toward Western Europe as the most promising alternative, as the second-best policy. Only here can one discern two schools of thought among the Soviets. The first school of thought would court Western Europe mainly in order to realize the potential for influencing, through European pressure, U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union. The second would advocate improving relations with Western Europe primarily to weaken the Western alliance and to increase the costs for the United States of confrontational policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Despite these differences, it would seem that neither group in the Soviet foreign policy establishment has any illusions about how much can be gained from the West Europeans and how far differences between the United States and its West European allies can be exploited.

Andropov has clearly not yet made up his "collective" mind about what can possibly be achieved with the Reagan administration, how much change in the U.S. posture he can expect from the 1984 elections, and how central, long-range goals can be attachd to détente and the relations with West Europeans, particularly the Germans.

At present writing (February 1983), the short-range issue of the INF is central. It is an issue that has enormous long-range implications, and from which, depending on the outcome, the general line of Andropov's policies with regard to the West may emerge. Andropov's strategy with regard to the INF is quite clear. Obviously, the primary goal is to prevent the deployment of the INF at the lowest cost. At the same time,

however, Andropov's secondary goal is to exploit anti-U.S. and antinuclear dissent in Western Europe with regard to the INF to its utmost limits.

Maximally, Soviet strategy seeks to prevent the deployment of the INF through their rejection by Europe, that is, Germany. The Soviets, in my opinion, hope, but do not count on the success of this strategy. If this strategy succeeds, however, the blow to West European-U.S. relations will be devastating. It will be the greatest crisis in the history of the Atlantic alliance, with unpredictable political, economic, and military consequences in Europe, but particularly in the United States. This is why the question of the INF, although marginal militarily, must be looked upon primarily from the political point of view, which reveals it as far from marginal.

Minimally, Soviet strategy hopes to use the INF issue for the purpose of weakening the Western alliance and the internal political stability of some West European countries. If it becomes clear to the Soviets that the deployment of the INF cannot be stopped by a German rejection, at some point before the deployment starts, the Soviet Union will present new proposals for a more equitable balance of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. These proposals will be sufficiently attractive to create great West European pressure on President Reagan to accept them, and to improve his image as a statesman and peacemaker. Under such circumstances the proposals will be sufficiently attractive to serve as a way out for President Reagan and may lead to his agreement to postpone the INF deployment in favor of further negotiations with the Soviets on this issue and the interconnected one of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

Regardless of the outcome of the INF issue, Andropov's policy with regard to the West will probably be to continue the "peace offensive" and pursue a low profile in Soviet foreign policy while waiting for the outcome and possible changes resulting from the 1984 U.S. elections. In the meantime he will seek to preserve and continue a policy of détente with Western Europe. Only after the 1984 elections, when Andropov's own power will be much more consolidated, will he make important decisions on arms control and reduction. In his dealings with a new U.S. president he will try to reach compromise solutions to the issues that foster conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

If Reagan wins re-election and his basic policies toward the Soviet Union remain unchanged, Andropov will have to face his current dilemmas once again. At this point "the tensions without danger" of today will give way to increased U.S.-Soviet tensions, to the danger of confrontations, and to a fluid and unpredictable situation that, in my opinion, will result in the triumph of Soviet tactics over strategy, that is, in the pursuit

of tangible gains in the Third World regardless of how this will influence U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S. foreign policy.

During the rule of Stalin, the Soviets perceived the outside world as full of dangers and enemies that threatened to destroy the Soviet Union and that had to be avoided. After Stalin's death, but particularly in the Brezhnev era, the outside world remained a dangerous place, but it also presented opportunities to be exploited. During the Brezhnev era, particularly in the 1970s, Soviet efforts to increase their influence and hegemony in places both near and far from their borders reached previously unknown heights. The Soviets did not believe that by pursuing this course they were destroying détente with the United States. West European countries were, for the most part, unconcerned by Soviet expansion outside of Europe. The U.S. government, although very concerned, did not possess either the internal will nor sufficient external force to negotiate with the Soviets or to frighten them away from their adventures.

The major question today is what the pattern of the Soviet Union's activities in the Third World will be under Andropov. It would be foolish to expect the Soviets to turn their attention to domestic difficulties or to withdraw from the Third World. What one must ask, therefore, is what form Soviet activities will take, at what level of risk, and at what costs. It seems to me that we should not regard the pattern of Soviet activities in the Third World in the 1975-79 period as either the only possible pattern or as a momentary fluke that will not be repeated. One can expect that under Andropov indirect military aid to the Third World and direct military involvement will occur often, their scope and intensity determined by the opportunities and temptations provided by the conflicts and instabilities that will surely present themselves in the 1980s.

To use Professor Ulam's phrase, the Soviet role in the Third World can be defined as either that of a "speculator" or that of a "rentier." The speculator accepts high visibility, a potentially higher risk, and a major investment—to be rewarded by dramatic results in his favor. The rentier maintains a low visibility, encounters relatively low risk, minimizes his costs, and expects more dependable but lesser rewards.

I would suggest that in the short run the Andropov leadership's engagement in Third World conflicts and civil wars will be as a rentier, for reasons already discussed. Yet in the intermediate range, unless the West, particularly the United States, is willing to increase the risks and costs of Soviet or Soviet-controlled direct military involvement in the Third World, let alone the delivery of weapons and instructors, the temptation to play the speculator's role, when the opportunity arises, will be probably as irresistible to the new leader as it was to the old. Andropov's predilections in this regard might be particularly influenced by two fac-

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tors: the insensitivity and disinterest of the West European powers, with the possible exception of France, in responding to Soviet Third World adventures, and the inability (and the lack of resources) of the United States to commit itself to bringing about the type of change in the Third World that would defuse the regional conflicts and civil wars that create temptations and opportunities for Soviet involvement.

Yet, if the change in U.S. military posture is real, if the Vietnam and Watergate syndromes are really behind us (about which I am not at all sure), then aside from the limitations of Soviet foreign policy resources, Andropov will have to make difficult decisions concerning the temptations and opportunities in the Third World. First, the risk of Soviet actions similar to those of 1975-79 may be quite higher in the 1980s, and the fear of a confrontation with the United States, which Soviet leaders do not want, will urge restraint and partcipation at the lower level of intensity. Second, although this was not true in the 1970s, by now the Soviet leadership has learned that their foreign adventures are not cost free, and, more important, that they endanger the central relation in their foreign policy, that with the United States. As long as Soviet relations with the United States remain paralyzed, the second reason may not make much difference. But when negotiations on key military issues begin in earnest and prospects for improving relations with the United States seem more plausible than they do today, the need to restraint Soviet expansionist activities in the Third World will produce a dilemma for the Soviet policy-makers.

In planning his intermediate- and long-range foreign policy, Andropov has to overcome two central dilemmas. One is the contradiction involved in pushing Soviet expansion in the Third World while at the same time trying to reduce Soviet-U.S. tensions and to move the Soviet-U.S. conflict away from confrontations. The second is the contradiction between the insatiable Soviet appetite for more and more weapons and greater military strength and their desire to prevent a new and costly arms spiral, to negotiate arms-control measures, and to detach the question of the military balance and arms control from their political and economic relations with the United States.

Western Policies Toward the Soviet Union

In the nuclear era neither the United States nor Western Europe has any other choice than to negotiate on a broad range of issues with the Soviet Union and strive to regulate and manage the inevitable conflicts and competition with the Soviet Union. The question, therefore, is whether the Western alliance can influence the policies of the Soviet Union, and, more particularly, whether it can influence which of the available options the new Soviet leadership will select. My answer would be a qualified yes. Of course anything important we do influences Soviet policies. The question, however, is whether such an influence will be the by-product of actions that have a different aim, and whether our efforts to influence the Soviets can be precisely calibrated in the democratic conditions in which our policies evolve.

Whether we can influence Soviet policies depends partly on what we want to influence and partly on our strength, unity, steadfastness, and flexibility. In my opinion, we cannot influence in any major way Soviet policies whose goal would be to change the Soviet system, and we cannot significantly influence the overall ambitious direction of Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, it is illusory to think that we may have a strong impact on the Soviet leadership's policies and on the alleged balance of power between the so-called Soviet hawks and doves. What we could and should try to influence are *specific* Soviet military and foreign policies, like Soviet resistance to tempting opportunities abroad and, perhaps, the degree of moderation or extremism in Soviet international behavior. This does not seem much, but it is the most for which we can hope, and, moreover, in the dangerous conditions of expanding nuclear arsenals and increasing world turmoil, the extent to which we influence the Soviets may prove to be one factor affecting our survival.

The questions most often asked about Western-Soviet relations are whether Soviet-U.S. détente can be restored in any form and whether West European détente with the Soviet Union is the right policy, considering that it harms the unity of the Western alliance and therefore provides opportunities for Soviet policies to split the alliance. It would be useful to remember that the primary goal of Western policies toward the Soviet Union is not détente, but to prevent gains for Soviet expansionism and to achieve an equitable balance of military power. The bundle of policies, ideas, and expectations that we call détente is neither good nor bad in itself; the real question is how effective it is for the achievement of our two main goals in relations with the Soviet Union.

On this score, the détente of the 1970s, at least from the U.S. point of view, did not pass the test of effectiveness. In the United States détente became a symbol for lack of U.S. will, for ineffectively influencing Soviet international behavior, and for conflicts within the Western alliance. Détente acquired a negative emotive meaning that went far beyond the actual suppositions and assumptions on which it rested. I will, therefore, avoid this term and speak instead about the substance, forms, and instruments of policies that have as their goals the preservation or restoration of the West-East military balance, prevention of Soviet expansionism, and regulation of the East-West conflict.

The lessons that we have learned or should have learned from the experience of the 1970s and the early 1980s are many. First, the internal strength of the United States and of the West European countries is as important in the formulation and implementation of effective policies as their external strength. The Kissinger policy toward the Soviet Union during the early and mid 1970s was not wrong in itself. The expectations about what it could achieve, at what price, and how quickly, were, however, grossly exaggerated. Its collapse was not the fault of Kissinger or his policy but of the conditions that prevailed in the United States at that time and that to some extent are present today—the post-Vietnam syndrome, the low level of military spending, the Watergate affair and the consequent paralysis of the U.S. political system, particularly of its executive branch.

Second, the unity of the Western alliance is critical for formulating policies, particularly with regard to the effectiveness of policy instruments that can be used to influence Soviet international behavior. From the U.S. point of view, one of the most frustrating experiences in the quest for unity is the fact that when the United States moves closer to the Soviet Union, its European allies fear that a Soviet-U.S. deal is being prepared and a U.S.-Soviet condominium is being established; when the United States moves away from the Soviet Union and pursues tough policies, its allies fear that the United States will force Europe into confrontations with the Soviet Union and that the risk of a war fought in Europe will escalate.

Third, U.S. policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union tend to swing from one extreme to another, creating for both the Soviet Union and the West European countries an image of unpredictability that is in many respects quite accurate. The U.S. political system and national character make it very difficult to pursue a steady and steadfast policy toward the Soviet Union beyond the four-year tenure of its presidents. Such a steady line, and a precisely calibrated policy toward the Soviet Union, is especially difficult given the United States' sensationalist media, its greatly weakened party system and the tradition of a bipartisan foreign policy, and the tendency of its public to view the Soviet Union in stark terms of either-or rather than as an adversary against whom the country has both to compete and with whom it has to enter into cooperative arrangements.

Fourth, the nature and range of instruments that could be used to influence Soviet foreign policies is quite broad as conceived by Kissinger and others during the early and mid 1970s. No amount of thought and imagination could design any miraculous instruments and policies that would solve our conflict with the Soviet Union. The road to regulation of this conflict lies in the flexibility and steadfastness of our use of the instruments we employ as incentives and disincentives. These instruments include raising the cost and risk to the Soviets of expansionist policies, using the Soviet fear of confrontation with the United States, the preservation of a just balance of military power, rewards in the economic, political, and status fields, and so forth. But, in turn, our flexibility and effectiveness when using these instruments depends crucially on the internal situation of the democracies and on agreements reached by them. *The key lesson of the 1970s and early 1980s is that only when disincentives are credible, strong, and continuous can incentives have any effect. But only when incentives are offered will disincentives have major effects*. Another key lesson is that no quick solutions are available in Soviet-Western relations, that the conflict will be with us for the forseeable future, and that changes in the Soviet system and its foreign policies will be very slow to come.

Political opinion in the West is divided, and détente, containment, or confrontation are viewed as the three possible forms East-West relations may take. Taking into consideration the nature and goals of Soviet-Western relations, it is my judgment that all three of these forms of relations will be operative in the 1980s. Moreover, it is my view that all three should be used as deliberate and coordinated policies of the Western alliance.

In an era of increasingly powerful and accurate nuclear weapons and a continuous arms race, the danger to both the East and West has increased dramatically, and so has their need for managing and regulating both their conflict and their cooperation. For the first time in history, as a direct result of the nuclear revolution and despite the fact that the differences and the conflicts between alliances are so great, a relatively high level of conflict management and cooperation exists. *Under conditions of nuclear revolution, strategic parity, and mutual assured destruction, détente between West and East in one form or another is simply unavoidable*. The scope, intensity, and forms of détente relations between East and West might differ in particular periods, but if both the Soviet Union and the Western alliance want to avoid a highly dangerous runaway arms race, unstable and unpredictable conflict, and to promote cooperation where their interests overlap—détente, as a relatively stable and many-sided relation between East and West, which includes both conflict and cooperation, is necessary in the remaining decades of the twentieth century.

The needs and goals of the Western alliance are not limited, however, to the avoidance of nuclear war, which of course has the highest priority both for the Soviet Union and the Western allies. Key goals of the Western alliance, and particularly of the United States, are the prevention of Soviet global expansionism, the survival of independent and democratic systems in the West, and orderly and evolutionary change in the Third World countries. A major dilemma for the Western alliance is how

to prevent multidirectional Soviet expansionism from promoting its goals, while at the same time minimizing the chances for a nuclear escalation. The policy of détente makes the conflict with the Soviet Union more stable and therefore less dangerous. But it is the policy of containment that is a necessary and central element of the Western alliance's policies toward the Soviet Union. Détente makes sense, primarily if it contains the expansion of Soviet power. The limitations, scope, and central regional focus of the policy of containment are of course subject to various interpretations and deliberations within the Western alliance. But without a determined and successful policy of containment, the world and the values to which we subscribe will not survive.

Containment of Soviet power can be successful only if the costs and risks to the Soviets of such international behavior as we observed in 1975 to 1979 increases substantially. The achievement of strategic nuclear parity with the United States has enabled the Soviet Union to exploit the fear of nuclear escalation. As a consequence, the Soviet Union is determined to pursue emerging opportunities in the Third World. We may be certain that, given the disorder and turmoil that will persist in the Third World in the 1980s, the Soviet Union will be exposed to strong temptations to aggrandize its global power position through direct and indirect military means. The Western alliance, particularly the United States, has no choice but to declare its vital interests outside Europe and to prepare a credible response to Soviet expansion whenever it threatens those interests. For this response to be credible and therefore effective, the United States and Western Europe have to be ready for a political, economic, and military confrontation with the Soviet Union or its satellites. *The global, although selective, containment of the expansion of Soviet power can be achieved only if the threat of West-East confrontation is credible.*

Détente, containment, and confrontation are not mutually exclusive policies. Their particular mix depends as much on the agreement within the alliance, or on the differing attitudes of separate Western countries, particularly the United States, as it depends on Soviet international behavior.

In the 1980s, after Andropov has taken control of the Kremlin, the key question is not what his foreign policy will be, but rather what the policies of the Western alliance will be. Other important questions will be what goals will be pursued with regard to the Soviet Union and whether these are impossible to achieve or whether they are too timid. Until the end of this century and probably even beyond, democratic nations have no alternative to conflict with the Soviet Union, but at the same time they must strive for cooperation with the Soviets. Let us hope that this conflict

can be directed away from the dangerous threshold of nuclear escalation and confrontation, and that a united Western alliance will be able to wait out the expansionist stage of Soviet development. Until this occurs, however, the United States and the Western alliance have no choice but to pursue a policy of détente, containment, *and* confrontation with the Soviet Union.

ECONOMIC TARGETING IN NUCLEAR WAR: U.S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES*

by Benjamin S. Lambeth and Kevin N. Lewis

The public's contemplation of strategic issues is often dominated by the fear that the United States or the Soviet Union may launch an all-out attack against the other's economic target system, even though this scenario is probably the least likely military contingency for which either country prepares. Such strikes, generically termed countervalue attacks, would direct thousands of nuclear weapons against cities and other facilities so as to destroy the adversary nation as an organized entity. Because both sides maintain enough survivable warheads to inflict what would seem to be mortal damage upon the other, the mutual ability to unleash such a blow is presumed, at least by many analysts in the West, to shape all other aspects of strategy. Thus, the relationship of this capability to other possible roles for nuclear forces is a central policy issue. Some commentators, fearful that even a limited use of nuclear weapons would lead inexorably to catastrophe, maintain that any consideration of nuclear use is madness. Others contend that a strategic concept that postulates *only* the alternatives of total or no nuclear war is improvident. Despite years of debate, however, we seem no closer to answering the basic question of how, if at all, massive attacks relate to other kinds of nuclear employment.

Much of the confusion about this question stems from a widespread misunderstanding about the nature and purpose of economic attack planning. In particular, the popular "hail of doom" image is a poor representation of the economic targeting problem. The usual lurid imagery aside, a general attack would, like any other use of nuclear force, be designed to satisfy specific requirements. Current U.S. planning remains tied to the tradition of strategic economic bombing that originated before the nuclear age, when planners tried to design precise theoretical rationales for the application of air power. Thus, while some view an economic attack as an indiscriminate brute-force blow, a full-scale nuclear strike must serve specific goals, at least in principle.

It is worth thinking through economic targeting issues to understand the nature and purpose of such attacks and, more important, to determine how attacks aimed against an enemy's economy relate to other possible applications of military force. This article treats both questions from the perspective of U.S. and Soviet strategy. The goals of an economic attack may be stated in many ways, although in practice technical constraints and other factors may obscure some of the distinctions between attacks based on different theories. Further, there exists in the popular forum a tendency to oversimplify, as though there were just one sort of economic attack with only one purpose at any given time. In fact, economic targeting, like other war planning, has undergone intensive efforts to rationalize the underlying strategy. Moreover, each superpower maintains its own distinctive image of its security predicament. Since there have been considerable differences in each side's deterrence concepts over time, U.S. and Soviet approaches to economic targeting remain very dissimilar.

Economic Targeting in U.S. Strategy

Since 1945, the declaratory and theoretical bases of U.S. economic targeting policy have undergone many revisions. In practice, however, the technical nature of this attack problem has remained stable, as most Soviet economic resources have been concentrated in only a few locations. It has long been fairly easy to severely damage the enemy's economy with relatively few properly delivered weapons. Since the Soviet Urban/Industrial (U/I) target base changes at a glacial pace, the raw requirements for destruction of a given percentage of Soviet economic capability remain roughly the same, even over decades. (By contrast, Soviet *military* target systems tend to change at a faster pace, necessitating a constant offensive response.)

We can—and do—sandpaper our fingertips and run economic damage models to many decimal places. But despite doctrinal gyrations, technical innovation, threat evolution, and so on, the essential economic attack problem has not changed much over time. Accordingly, this section tracks two subordinate kinds of change in U. S. economic targeting policy over three decades. The first concerns the role of economic attacks within the body of U.S. nuclear strategy. The second involves the analytic means we use to weigh and plan economic attacks.

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Benjamin S. Lambeth is a senior staff member of The Rand Corporation specializing in U.S. and Soviet military affairs. He has also served in the Office of National Estimates and Office of Political Research, Central Intelligence Agency.
Kevin N. Lewis is a staff member of The Rand Corporation concentrating on strategic force issues. He completed his doctoral degree at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and has written extensively on U.S. nuclear weapons policy.

Economic Attacks as a Component of the Total U.S. Nuclear Plan

Between 1945 and 1950, U.S. planning for nuclear war was casual, to say the least. Neither force structure nor employment planning was done in a systematic way.[1] Similarly, only marginal provisions were made to acquire effective bombing forces. From a targeting policy perspective, nuclear operations were simply cast in the image of the attempted precision-bombing campaigns of World War II. But awesome operational and technical deficiencies virtually ensured that the U.S. Air Force could not accomplish the ambitious goal of "knocking out the USSR" in this way.[2] Despite the problems that bedeviled the design of a decisive precision countereconomic campaign, that strategy was retained, at least as a basis for force sizing.

An important milestone in the evolution of economic targeting came in 1949-50. At that time, a bureaucratic struggle to determine which service would be the "first line of national defense" was resolved in favor of the air force, or more precisely, strategic air power. Strategic bombing advocates won the debate by convincing political leaders that precision nuclear bombing could promptly and single-handedly defeat any major instance of communist aggression. The key point to recall here relates to the timing of the onset of bombing effects. Prompt results would not be terribly relevant if a future U.S.-Soviet war were to be a replay of World War II, featuring an eventual invasion of Europe. No one was very enthusiastic about another protracted conventional war. Accordingly, preventing the Soviet Union from overrunning the continent in the first place was a top priority. The alternative to quick atomic results was the maintenance of a large and expensive conventional posture first to check and then to defeat Soviet armies, in conjunction with more slowly maturing bombing effects. Given other budgetary priorities, the appeal of fast bombing payoffs proved decisive in our strategy debate.

As nuclear weapons entered the U.S. inventory in increasing numbers, they were assigned to targets other than economic ones.[3] Economic objectives, however, remained the highest targeting priority,

[1] It has been noted that "early target lists and intelligence estimates were tentative and the military role of the atomic bomb was not yet clear." See David Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," *The Journal of American History*, June 1979, p. 66.

[2] For a more detailed discussion of early U.S. offensive nuclear deficiencies, see Kevin N. Lewis, *Strategic Bombing and the Thermonuclear Breakthrough: An Example of Disconnected Defense Planning* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, April 1981).

[3] The target base in 1949 was broken into three distinct classes: DELTA (essentially countervalue); BRAVO (counterforce); and ROMEO (targets to be destroyed to retard the advance of the Red Army into territory along the periphery of the Soviet bloc). Taking into account all target sets, General Vandenberg speculated that as many as 6,000 Soviet targets of all types would have to be hit to destroy the Soviet Union. See "Memo for the President," from General H. S. Vandenberg, January 17, 1952, p. 3 (National Archives).

and the precision strategy was retained. The development of high-yield thermonuclear weapons obviously undercut the need for very careful targeting. Yet relaxed targeting criteria (and a corresponding reduction in force requirements) did not appear. Rather, as new weapons became available, they were simply applied to longer and longer target lists.

Operational doctrine emphasizing prompt and total force commitment, historic targeting practices, technological shortcomings, and high bomb yields combined to assure that any U.S. nuclear attack would include an indiscriminate blow against Soviet cities. Indeed, "the mass killing of noncombatants came to be viewed as a 'bonus' effect. ... Our knock-out blow would paralyze the Red Army not only by demolishing railroad yards, factories and party headquarters, but also by decimating the urban population and thus (perhaps) crushing Russia's morale."[4]

Although the Eisenhower administration saw the Strategic Air Command (SAC) as a relatively inexpensive counterbalance to seemingly invincible "Red hordes," some analysts began in the mid 1950s to question the wisdom of committing all U.S. forces against a full range of Soviet targets immediately upon the initiation of hostilities. The Soviets were slowly but surely accumulating nuclear forces capable of striking back. The decaying credibility of the "massive retaliation" strategy gave rise to a search for new concepts. In particular, some analysts cited the benefits of separating military from economic targets in U.S. plans by creating separate employment options.

To resolve simmering arguments about strategy, targeting priorities, and force levels, President Eisenhower ordered a National Security Council panel (known as the Hickey Panel) to weigh the relative importance of Soviet economic and military targets. The panel maintained that attacks on military targets alone would not defeat the Soviet Union, because an undamaged Soviet economy could eventually make good those losses. But a purely economic attack would also be inadequate, since the Soviet Union could not only retaliate against the United States but could also use its military power to seize the resources necessary for quick recovery. The Hickey study concluded that an "optimum mix" of both target types was best. As a result, a single-shot, massive war plan continued in force, first as the "mix" and then, in 1961, as the first SIOP (single integrated operational plan). Had those plans been executed, as one commentator has alleged, the results would have included 325 million immediate Communist bloc fatalities.[5]

[4] Fred C. Ikle, *Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?* (Santa Monica: California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, June 1974), p. 12.

[5] "Ellsberg's A-Weapons Plant Vigil Recalls One 1958 Option: Holocaust," *Indianapolis Star*, July 9, 1978.

The picture changed dramatically, however, after 1961 as the Kennedy administration's strategic reforms were implemented. This second strategic epoch witnessed two departures from previous custom that continue to shape planning to this day. The first change was a redesign of war plans to incorporate multiple options. Provision for such options—along with force changes to support them—was motivated by the maturation of Soviet capabilities, by the recognition that massive threats were not credible in many scenarios, and by changing alliance requirements. Because the fundamental purpose of options was to provide an opportunity to stop a war before catastrophe resulted, economic attacks were accorded a new status, that of a withheld "reserve" force that would not be executed unless deemed necessary *in extremis*. The second change was occasioned by the development of new technologies that not only made withholding feasible, but also made possible comparatively discriminating nuclear attacks. With lower yield, more accurate weapons, new intelligence, and better command-and-control systems, one could begin to think about a separate "campaign" against military targets.

Thus, the role of economic attacks in U.S. nuclear doctrine has not changed appreciably over the past twenty years. A countervalue attack has been, and remains, a "final sanction" designed to deter Soviet escalation if a nuclear war starts (and implicitly to back up, by posing that ultimate escalatory threat, less destructive U.S. options). The key U.S. strategy developments of the past two decades have concerned military options. By contrast, the economic targeting problem has not been so interesting.

Evolution of U.S. Economic Attack Planning Concepts

The second major trend in U.S. targeting policy has concerned the concepts used to plan economic attacks. Very little information has been made publicly available about U.S. attack options in the 1950s, except that many World War II conventions were retained. Since the early 1960s, on the other hand, two frameworks for evaluating U.S. attack effectiveness have been widely aired. First, through the early 1970s, the U.S. aim in an all-out economic retaliatory attack would be, as Secretary McNamara said, to "destroy the attacker as a viable 20th century nation." This capability to inflict "assured destruction" on the Soviet Union was to be guaranteed under all scenarios. What did this doctrine require in an operational sense? For a nation's economy to be "viable" essentially means that sufficient production can be restored before essential stockpiles are exhausted. If viability has been destroyed, according to the theory, one cannot get started on the road to recovery, and total collapse ensues. This in turn raises the questions of how to compute force requirements for achieving this aim and how damage should be measured. Though improved means for making such calculations have been devised, they remain less than ideal.

A more difficult question is: Within the context of any measuring system, how much overall damage must be done to destroy viability? Although we are obliged to devise rationales to define "sufficient" damage, such determinations ultimately revert to fiat. The well-known rationalization for "assured destruction" given by Secretary McNamara was said to be based on rapidly diminishing marginal returns in both fatalities inflicted and economic destruction caused after 400 "equivalent megatons" (EMT) had been exploded over Soviet cities.[6] It was not McNamara's purpose, however, to specify the size of the force required for the destruction of the Soviet Union as a viable nation, at least in this way. Rather, his statement of an assured-destruction criterion was intended to suppress what seemed to him at the time to be excessive service requests for strategic systems. Actual operational planning and force requirements probably were based on other standards.[7]

No available reference indicates that such broad criteria have been amended over time. But in public statements, the declared aims of retaliatory attacks have often seemed to change for reasons having little to do with economic targeting requirements. In particular, by pointing to increasing threats, Soviet civil defenses, a more diverse target base, and so on, some critics contested the adequacy of the alleged 400 EMT force size. Rather than give in on the point and acknowledge a case for new procurement, McNamara modified the apparent requirements of assured destruction. (McNamara also qualified the manner in which the attack was to be evaluated.) This step, duplicated in successive years, was undertaken solely as an extension of assured destruction's intended constraint on procurement.

Similarly, official commentators have often articulated new aims (and, in particular, abandoned nearly all quantitative references to the requirements of an economic attack) for a number of reasons, usually relating to procurement pressures. For example, Clark Clifford said that the effectiveness of the strategic forces was gauged by "their ability . . . to inflict unacceptable damage."[8] Melvin Laird suggested that U.S. forces should threaten potential aggressors with "unacceptable risks,"[9] and James Schlesinger said that deterrence demanded the ability to inflict

[6] McNamara's analysts produced a chart which showed that 400 delivered EMT would destroy about half of the Soviet Union's population and about two-thirds of its industrial capacity.

[7] For example, destruction of 70 per cent of Soviet manufacturing is said to have been the U.S. economic-damage objective since 1961, according to a statement in *Hearings of the House Appropriations Committee on DoD Appropriations for 1978* (Washington: GPO, 1977), part II, p. 212.

[8] Clark Clifford, *Annual Defense Report for FY 1969* (Washington: GPO, 1968).

[9] Melvin Laird, *Annual Defense Report for FY 1971* (Washington: GPO, 1970).

"irreparable damage" on the Soviet Union.[10] But despite such declaratory peregrinations, no significant change in basic economic targeting policy was implemented in the 1960s and early 1970s. One author cites an official who said in 1971 that "the SIOP has remained essentially unchanged since [1962]. The targeting philosophy, the options, and the order of choice remain unchanged from the early 1960s."[11]

Only recently, it seems, have some aspects of U.S. economic targeting policy changed. The early and mid 1970s saw two major shifts. These were made possible by new technologies, chiefly MIRV (multiple independent targeted reentry vehicle), and were also encouraged by the steady trend toward U.S.-Soviet strategic parity. The first shift featured more employment options. The idea was to tailor U.S. nuclear use to specific wartime requirements and to provide a greater opportunity for stopping a war at a relatively low level of fighting. The second shift, beginning in about 1974, was from "assured destruction" to "assured retaliation." The new policy differed from the earlier one in not requiring that the Soviet Union's viability be destroyed. Rather, said Secretary Rumsfeld, the new strategy sought to retard "the ability of the USSR to recover from a nuclear exchange and regain the status of a 20th century military and industrial power."[12]

This antirecovery targeting objective supposedly marked a significant departure from previous theory.[13] Despite much debate, however, the reasons for the change were less significant than most explanations suggested. Among other things, the new aims owed their creation to the steady equalization of the strategic balance, to a desire by Presidents Nixon and Ford to depart, at least in appearance, from the strategy of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and to U.S. concern about the Soviet interest in civil and strategic defenses.[14] In any case, the test of the new strategy was as follows: "If the Soviet Union could emerge from [general war] with superior military power, and could recuperate from the effects more rapidly than the United States, the U.S. capability for assured retaliation would be considered inadequate."[15]

Excluding political twists, the strategies of the 1960s and the 1970s did not differ to any appreciable degree. Both sought to deprive

[10] James Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Report for FY 1975*. In his FY 1979 defense report, Harold Brown referred to a "200 city" standard, but this figure was deleted from subsequent reports.

[11] Desmond Ball, *Déjà Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration* (Santa Monica: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, December 1974), pp. 16-17. That account goes on to report that "an Air Force planner was quite emphatic (in 1973) that the SIOP was never reworked under [President] Johnson. It is still basically the same as 1962."

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some Soviet economic sectors of necessary inputs to cause bottlenecks in the economy and prevent surviving resources from being used effectively. In effect, an attack to destroy viability simply ensures that the enemy nation is unable to reconstitute far enough to worry about recovery in the first place.[16]

Methodological Problems

A key planning task is to design an adequate offensive posture for the economic attack mission. Several difficulties, however, are involved in determining how much is enough. First, the data problems are staggering. Furthermore, the methodologies used to assess the consequences of economic attacks pose serious problems. Because of the historic emphasis on "bottlenecking," input/output (I/O) analysis has been a popular approach. According to theory, destruction of an input into an I/O tableau (analogous to the annihilation of a particular sector of the economy) will undercut associated sectors and the economy will be "brought down." However, the difficulties inherent in assessing the effects of attacks (even given excellent target intelligence) are obvious.

Given the corollary assumption that the United States will be unable to destroy the viability of the Soviet economy, we are left with the problem of computing recovery paths and times, a task for which I/O analysis—in the absence of assumptions about the enemy's postattack policy choices, among other things—is not particularly applicable. Analysis of the postwar utilization of surviving resources also relies on usually dubious assumptions about the surviving government's ability to coordinate residual capacity, the ability of transportation systems to move people and supplies between imbalanced regions, the dedication of workers and others to postattack reconstitution, and so on.

Treatment of specific capabilities also becomes vitally important, because unless these can be introduced directly into the damage model, we cannot assess the consequences of destroying supposedly pivotal targets. But in an I/O model, inputs may be infinitely substitutable within sectors, and there may be no substitution between sectors. Failure to take into account substitution and the changed nature of demand can lead to absurd results.[17] The usual solution proposed for such problems is

[16] It is worth noting that the Carter administration's PD-59 strategy revision apparently did not change the economic targeting components of U.S. war plans. See "Slocombe Clarifies PD-59 Policy: Industrial Targets Still Important," *Defense Week*, November 17, 1980, and *Secretary of Defense's Annual Report for FY 1983*, submitted by C. Weinberger (Washington: GPO, February 1982).

[17] The classic case in point is the apparent significance of the Soviet paint industry in an I/O tableau. Most finished products in the Soviet economy are painted, and it is said that there are few paint plants in the Soviet Union. Paint plants are hard to harden and they take a long time to rebuild. Hence, a small attack on the Soviet paint industry should bring the entire Soviet economy grinding to a halt. Obviously that result is nonsense, because destruction of paint plants simply would mean that Soviet finished goods would not be painted.

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to increase the number of sectors modeled in the economy. But data requirements can quickly get out of hand as more sectors are added.[18]

Thus, it is hard to translate destroyed capability into estimates about recovery times. Recently, some studies of Soviet civil defense have referred to its ability to reduce recovery times,[19] but those findings enjoy less than universal acceptance. Although some recovery-pathway analysis has been undertaken, most work has focused on estimating the time it would take to eliminate bottlenecks in critical sectors. Yet as Sobin and Bull observe, "It is not easy to conclude [from a survey of the literature] that any particular kinds of capacities are the critical ones in the sense of providing absolute limits to objective achievement."[20] In other words, some economic activities are more essential than others, but it is hard to say which are truly critical.

New Possibilities For Economic Targeting?

Related to political and other rationalizations for "assured retaliation" was the U.S. MIRV program begun in 1970. In particular, the net sea-based deterrent force grew from a total of about 650 warheads in 1969 to approximately 5,000 by 1975. With MIRV, many opportunities for increasingly articulated U.S. economic targeting emerged. In addition, more sophisticated targeting systems, improved accuracy, the lower yields of Poseidon, and better target intelligence have created new possibilities for discriminating economic attacks.

Such attacks might be designed to intimidate the Soviet leadership by threatening further damage, or they might seek to exploit specific vulnerabilities in the Soviet economy in order to gain some advantage in an ongoing theater war.[21] Much attention has also been paid to the ostensible advantages of confining U.S. economic targeting to the specific elements of Soviet power that pose the most immediate threat to U.S. interests. It has been pointed out that the United States has no quarrel with a Soviet civilian population that, for the most part, cares little for its own

[18] R. U. Ayers has pointed out several additional faults with I/O research. See his *Models of the Post-Attack Economy*, report HI-648-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, August 1966).

[19] For some leading examples, see T. K. Jones and W. Scott Thompson, "Central War and Civil Defense," *Orbis*, Fall 1978, and J. Pettee, et al., PONAST briefing charts (no date). For a critique of these models, see Michael Kennedy and Kevin Lewis, "On Keeping Them Down, or Why Do Recovery Models Recover So Fast?" in Desmond Ball, ed., *Strategic Nuclear Targeting*, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1983).

[20] Bernard Sobin and B. Bull, *Measurement of Critical Production Capacities for Models for the Post-Attack Economy*, (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, February 1970), and also Sobin, *Post-Attack Recovery*, (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, June 1970).

[21] A number of obvious Soviet economic vulnerabilities come to mind. Recent Soviet industrial layout has stressed economies of scale, and so some Soviet industries are heavily concentrated in a few very high-value clusters. It would be possible, under the circumstances, to knock out significant segments of certain kinds of production with relatively few weapons. An example of such a limited economic attack is the counterrefinery one presented in the Office of Technology Assessment report, *The Effects of Nuclear War* (Washington: GPO, May 1979).

leadership. Accordingly, some commentators have begun to speak in terms of such objectives as enemy leadership, "ethnic fracture points," and the like. Naturally, a precise data base and very sophisticated damage models are necessary for such targeting—as are techniques for holding down collateral damage.

Finally, many analysts have become increasingly aware of the fact that a blanket targeting doctrine may not adequately take into account outside aid, whether coerced, purchased, or volunteered. Historical experience suggests the importance of resources available outside of war zones. Target planners might be mindful of the fact that such aid may be obtainable from territory the Soviets might capture.

In short, although the context of overall U.S. strategic targeting and the U.S.-Soviet balance have shifted dramatically since the early postwar years, the current economic targeting problem does not differ fundamentally from the one we faced in the 1950s, although some refinements have been effected and others are *en train*. This is true despite the occasional gyrations that mark apparently new strategic rationales. Changes relating to the role of economic attacks within overall U.S. nuclear planning, however, have been very important. While it will be interesting to see how new weapons technologies—more accurate sea-based systems, cruise missiles, and improved command, control, and reconnaissance capabilities—will influence the evolution of economic targeting policy, it is likely that major changes in U.S. nuclear policy over the near term, if there are any, will relate to military options.

Patterns in the Evolution of U.S. Economic Targeting

In light of the preceding review, we can discern a few consistent threads in the evolution of U.S. economic targeting policy. First, U.S. target planning has been strongly influenced by the U.S. independent strategic-bombing tradition. Initially, this meant that a massive blow against a wide range of targets was supposed to thwart a Soviet invasion. As the Soviet ability to return this favor came to be widely recognized, economic attack was transformed into a withholdable option. Yet while U.S. strategy has been tending toward increased flexibility, the basic dogma of an "assured destruction" blow continues to influence U.S. strategic deliberations in other areas and continues to shape force and employment planning generally.

Second, in many respects we seem to have become prisoners of our economic targeting methodologies. It is clearly essential to be very specific about the technical aims of an economic attack, if for no other reason than that explicit guidance must be given to our target staff. Exces-

sive adjustments of attack criteria, however, as well as expansion and complication of damage models and data bases, seem to have made our planning more sensitive to the perturbations and uncertainties that pervade all calculations about nuclear war, although they may not be very important. Since nuclear planners are very conservative, apparent shifts in capabilities give rise to large and unnecessary compensatory responses. This may lead to the artificial inflation of U.S. economic targeting requirements, possibly to the detriment of other needs.

Third, the economic targeting problem has been strongly influenced by technological developments. Ideally, we should expect our nuclear policy to identify prospective requirements to be served by available and evolving technology. In many cases—the development of the hydrogen bomb and the fractionation of U.S. missile payloads come to mind—targeting adjustments have instead conformed to fit the new force capabilities. In turn, our national wartime strategy has been affected by new technologies.

Fourth, the relegation of economic sanctions in the U.S. war plan to a "reserve" status has important force-structure and employment ramifications and may require refinements in technical capabilities and operational procedures. Although it is conceivable that we may develop some relatively limited economic options, the heavy collocation of leadership, population, and industrial and transportation targets will probably militate against too much emphasis on these kinds of attacks. An interesting development may result from an apparently inevitable conflict between the reserve status of economic options and the traditional U.S. concept of escalation linkage. Even when we have developed limited options, we have generally tried to deter Soviet nuclear employment of all types by maintaining a full spectrum of U.S. response options. Moreover, we have disavowed reliable control over escalation once a nuclear war begins. The greater emphasis on reserve capabilities, therefore, forces a new look at these old issues.

Fifth, whatever else is decided in the economic targeting policy debate, we can expect continued complication in the design of these attacks. Considering current popular discussion, more attention may be paid to specialized components of the Soviet urban-industrial target base, primarily political leadership and administration, internal security capabilities, energy production, and communications. Despite continuing rhetorical emphasis on "policy shifts," the major options will probably not differ significantly in their aggregate effect from massive economic options based on more simple guidance. Indeed, even if some salient new guidance were devised, such attacks, like any others, could be subject to Soviet counteraction.

Soviet Perspectives on Targeting

Two explanations account for the dissimilarity in U.S. and Soviet approaches to economic targeting. One lies in the Soviet Union's lack of a strategic bombing tradition comparable to that developed by the United States during World War II. The other is the long-standing preference of Soviet leaders for basing key elements of their nuclear strategy on premises different from the assured-destruction model that has so heavily influenced U.S. strategic planning.

To some degree, Soviet disdain for the urban-industrial bombing policies of the Western allies against Nazi Germany has been a classic case of making a virtue of necessity, since the Soviet air force almost completely lacked the strategic reach needed to carry the air war to the German heartland.[22] Soviet military writings openly concede that, of all the wartime bombing sorties of long-range aviation, only about 4 per cent were targeted against the Nazi economic and military-industrial base.[23] Instead, Soviet planners were driven by military-technical and operational necessity to concentrate their combat efforts almost exclusively against the German military formations that were directly threatening the Soviet heartland.[24] In Marshal Sokolovskii's words, the principal criteria that governed the Stavka's deliberations prior to mounting an offensive were "the composition of Soviet forces, the configuration of the front lines, the composition of enemy forces, weak and strong points in the enemy's defenses, and the character of the theater of military operations."[25]

Conspicuously absent from this formulation was anything like the Western notion that the defeat of the enemy could be brought about by attacking his rear-area infrastructure. The Soviet tendency was to argue that economic attacks could not, short of near-total devastation, guarantee crippling the enemy's war-making potential. This was particularly true because of the difficulties that attended a correct determination of the enemy's key industrial vulnerabilities. For example, one Soviet writer singled out the case of the German chemical industry:

During the past war, the U.S. staff section for the study of strategic bombing calculated that the Allied Air Command made a serious error by not selecting as a first-priority target the sole and very vulnerable plant for the production of diboromethane. This plant produced the ethyl compound required for high-grade gasoline, and which is so necessary that not one modern airplane can fly without

[22] Interestingly, the Soviet Union built the world's first full strategic bombing force in the early 1920s. In the 1930s, however, it reversed course and redesigned its air forces around tactical missions.

[23] Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, trans., The Rand Corporation, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 260.

[24] As Marshal Sokolovskii observed years later, the principal goal of Soviet military operations was "to destroy the main enemy forces in one or two most important sectors," with particular concentration on "the largest enemy formations threatening Moscow." (Ibid., pp. 235, 241.)

[25] Ibid., p. 239.

it. Specialists maintain that the bombing of this single target could have caused greater damage to the German air forces than was caused by all the saturation bombings against aircraft plants throughout the war.[26]

Given the unavailability of high-confidence intelligence regarding where critical vulnerabilities lay, the preferred Soviet approach was to concentrate available military resources directly on the most tangible instruments of enemy military capability. To the extent that economic-strategic aims entered their war planning, the Soviets seemed less interested in destroying the nonmilitary assets of the adversary than in "liberating economically and politically important areas" that might, in turn, be exploited to support the Soviet war effort and subsequent postwar reconstruction.[27]

All in all, the Soviets maintain—with considerable justification—that they prevailed on the Eastern Front primarily by engaging German forces in a head-on confrontation of countervailing firepower, and that the Wehrmacht was ultimately ground down by the superior weight of Soviet numbers and their capacity for sustained operation. By the same token, Soviet commentators hold that the countereconomic bombing by the U.S. Eighth and Fifteenth air forces and by the RAF Bomber Command contributed only marginally to the defeat of Germany and thus entailed an expenditure of manpower and materiel far out of proportion to their combat significance. Not surprisingly, these painful antecedents have carried over into Soviet thinking on rear-area attacks in the postwar period.

Transition to the Nuclear Age

With the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Soviet arsenal, the formerly derided strategy of comprehensive rear-area targeting quickly attained a level of major importance. During the prenuclear era, the standard Soviet formula held that victory could only come at the end of a lengthy process of cumulative successes at the operational and tactical levels. In light of the destructiveness of nuclear weaponry, however, this traditional view became replaced by one which held that, under the right circumstances, effective employment of intercontinental strikes could achieve fundamental strategic objectives at the very outset of a war, eliminating the need for the painstaking and methodical sequence of steady force application over time. As Marshal Sokolovskii described the change, the emergence of nuclear weapons had rendered war aims achievable "not only by the defeat of the enemy's armed forces,

[26] Colonel M. Shirokov, "The Question of Influences on the Military and Economic Potential of Warring States," *Voennaia mysl*, no. 4, April 1968, translated in *Selected Readings in Soviet "Military Thought,"* SPC report 584, (Arlington, Va.: System Planning Corporation, April 1980), p. 321.

[27] Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, p. 235.

but also by the complete disruption of the enemy economy and demoralization of his population."[28]

This new refrain was echoed in subsequent years by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Zakharov, who reaffirmed that "whereas in past wars the armed forces as a whole were . . . a target, now one should add the economy of the warring countries."[29] A similar formulation was put forward by Major General M. I. Cherednichenko: "In light of the revolutionary changes that have taken place in the weapons used, the economy has now become a target for . . . nuclear missiles."[30] The point of all this was to underscore that the difficulties that once attended effective economic targeting through precision conventional bombing had been virtually eliminated by the comprehensive destructive coverage of nuclear warheads. Given this new-found capability to bring major sectors of the adversary's rear area under attack, a Soviet writer was able to proclaim by 1961 that the "necessity to weaken the economic potential of an aggressor" had become "one of the most important rules governing modern warfare." Accordingly, he went on to note, it had become important for Soviet planners to study carefully the enemy's economic and military-industrial nexus so as "to discover strong and weak points" that might help inform purposeful target planning.[31]

Despite these dramatic changes, however, Soviet military doctrine in its conceptual fundamentals remained sharply divergent from the premises regarding the value of economic targeting that came to dominate U.S. strategic thinking and planning during the same period. Although through the early 1960s the Soviet armed forces possessed meager intercontinental attack forces that offered few options besides destroying selected U.S. urban-industrial centers, Soviet doctrine retained the countermilitary orientation that was forged and case-hardened during the trials of World War II. Even in the earliest years of the nuclear era, a major distinction between Soviet and U.S. approaches to deterrence began to crystallize, and, despite the increasing technical comparability of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, it has persisted to this day. This distinction, in the now-familiar idiom of Western strategic theory, was between a growing U.S. intellectual preference for deterrence by the threat of punishment and a persistent Soviet commitment to the more classical notion of deterrence by denial.

[28] Ibid., p. 235.

[29] Marshal M. V. Zakharov, "Leninism and Soviet Military Science," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 5, 1970.

[30] Major General M. I. Cherednichenko, "Modern War and the Economy," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil*, no. 9, September 1971, p. 20.

[31] Colonel A. Lagovskii, *Strategiia i ekonomika* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961), p. 32.

The Current Soviet Image of Nuclear War

Aside from periodic refinements in allowed mission support and a gradual shift in Soviet thinking during the mid 1960s regarding whether a conventional war in Europe would "inevitably" escalate to the nuclear level, Soviet strategic doctrine has remained remarkably constant over the past two decades, particularly in its characterization of a future global war.[32] In this conception of warfare, there seems to be no place for the sort of incremental and measured application of nuclear firepower aimed at intrawar bargaining and "crisis management" that has for so long figured prominently in U.S. strategic theory. Instead, as Sokolovskii has asserted, the imperatives of such a war will call for a "strategy of missile and nuclear strikes in depth, along with the simultaneous use of all branches of the armed forces, in order to achieve complete defeat of the enemy and the destruction of his economic potential and armed forces throughout his entire territory.[33]

Despite the surface bravado of their doctrine, Soviet planners do not approach the specter of nuclear war with equanimity or indicate a lack of appreciation for the profound uncertainties that would attend the Soviet Union's prospect of emerging from such a war with a victory worthy of the name. As one senior Soviet officer noted: "There is too great a risk of the destruction of one's own government, and the responsibility to humanity for fatal consequences of nuclear war is too heavy, for an aggressor to make an easy decision on the immediate employment of nuclear weapons from the very beginning of a war without having used all other means for the attainment of its objectives.[34] The pervasive tendency toward risk aversion that has long characterized Soviet crisis comportment would be likely to disincline Soviet planners strongly from any course of escalatory action that did not promise fairly certain prospects of success.[35]

At the same time, Soviet leaders have powerful countervailing urges to nip undesirable trains of events in the bud, before they have a chance to burgeon and become totally uncontrollable. This blend of caution and impulsiveness in Soviet style would probably exert a major

[32] Soviet commentators routinely stress that any major superpower confrontation would constitute a "decisive clash between the two opposing world socioeconomic systems," in which Soviet combat operations would be uncompromisingly directed toward achieving total victory in the shortest possible time. See Colonel General N. Lomov, ed., *Scientific-Technical progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973), translated by the U.S. Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series no. 3, p. 137.

[33] Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, p. 93.

[34] General S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Voennaia mysl*, no. 5, May 1969, in *Selected Readings*, p. 412.

[35] For elaboration on this point, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner," *International Security*, Winter 1982-83, pp. 139-66.

restraining influence on their nuclear employment in most crisis conditions. Yet it could also place irresistible pressures on the leadership to pre-empt massively in circumstances where it seemed apparent that war was definitely coming sooner or later and that continued Soviet inaction would carry greater risks than proceeding with forceful military initiatives. As one Soviet commentator has observed in this regard, "The principle to attack the enemy only when one is sure of success does not exclude but presupposes the need of taking risks, even big risks, when this is required by the situation."[36]

In view of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the unbearable costs that could attend a failure to land the first punch, Soviet doctrine strongly endorses the notion of "striking first in the last resort," in Malcolm Mackintosh's apt formulation. It further maintains that the initial strike will determine the subsequent course and outcome of the war:

> The decisive act of a nuclear war in all conditions is the infliction of a strike by strategic nuclear means, in the course of which both sides will obviously use the main portion of the most powerful nuclear ammunition. The moment of infliction of this strike will be the culminating point of the strategic effort, which can virtually be combined with the beginning of a war. This was not the case in any of the past wars.[37]

Soviet rhetoric only rarely gives express endorsement to preemption as a preferred strategy. Its frequent usage of suggestive euphemisms for the idea, however, provides good reason to believe that Soviet planners appreciate the operational advantages that could accrue from timely exploitation of a surprise attack at the brink of major war.[38] Whether the Soviet warning capability, alert posture, command-and-control network, and decisionmaking system possess the combined responsiveness needed to support a pre-emptive attack under the actual stresses of a crisis remains a separate question. But there seems little doubt that Soviet commanders attach great importance to beating the enemy to the draw—at least as an ideal goal to be striven for in peacetime contingency planning.

In the characteristic Soviet hierarchy of strategic attack missions, the first priority is to destroy the enemy's strategic nuclear forces. In this primary target set, as a Soviet general has noted, "strategic rockets

[36] Cited in Jacquelyn K. Davis et al., *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1979), p. 26.

[37] Major General V. Zemskov, "Characteristic Features of Modern Wars and Possible Methods of Conducting Them," *Voennaia mysl*, no. 7, July 1969, in *Selected Readings*, p. 438.

[38] Consider, for example, the assertion that "a correct estimate of the elements of supremacy over the opponent and the ability *to use them before the opponent does* are the key to victory." (Emphasis in original.) Colonel B. Byely, ed., *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 217.

are regarded as the most important strategic objectives."[39] Also included are enemy alert bomber bases, ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), both at sea and in their home ports, nuclear weapons storage facilities, and strategic command-and-control nodes. Second-priority Soviet targets in general war encompass theater-based nuclear forces and their associated support and command-and-control networks. In the third priority are other military targets, such as major troop formations and marshaling areas, aerial ports of debarkation in the forward land theater, reserve forces, conventional weapons stocks, and the like. The fourth category includes political leadership and administrative centers that the enemy would require to maintain social cohesion during a war. *Only last* in this array of target priorities is the broad category of economic-industrial facilities, such as power stations, refineries, production plants, and so on.[40]

Economic Targeting in Soviet Strategy

Beyond the absence of "assured destruction" inclinations in mainstream Soviet strategic thought, the subordinate status assigned to economic targeting stems from the stress Soviet planners place on attending first to those enemy assets that would most directly serve his ability to damage the Soviet Union and permit him to continue fighting in regional theaters afterwards. It is also affected by the general Soviet tendency to dismiss the utility of either side's defense-industrial base as a reliable source of support to its war effort during the cataclysmic throes of a nuclear exchange. As Marshal Sokolovskii and Major General Cherednichenko once expressed this point, a future nuclear war will most likely be conducted "only with those means existing at its beginning, since it will not be possible to count on the mobilizational development of the economy in these conditions. The possibilities of production continuing to function in a period when nuclear strikes are being exchanged and during a lengthy period thereafter are wholly problematic."[41]

The most basic explanation for the subordinate status economic targeting commands in Soviet strategy, however, lies in the fundamentally countermilitary orientation of Soviet doctrine and operational planning. This emphasis calls for concentrating Soviet nuclear strikes primarily against the U.S. military posture and command-and-control

[39] Major General Kh. Dzhelaukov, cited in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 75.

[40] This hierarchy of target priorities has been extracted from pertinent Soviet military writings and developed by Desmond Ball, *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?*, Adelphi Paper no. 169 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp. 31-32.

[41] Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii and Major General M. Cherednichenko, "Military Strategy and Its Problems," *Voennaia mysl*, no. 10, 1968, in *Selected Readings*, p. 388.

infrastructure. Of course, in the process of attempting to eradicate the U.S. leadership's "will to resist," Soviet planners will not exclude from their target list the major U.S. urban-industrial centers. These targets, however, will probably be attacked with a studied economy of force, since there will always be more theoretically interesting aim points than the Soviet Union will have forces to use against them.[42] One repeatedly finds comments throughout the Soviet military literature to the effect that nuclear strikes should only be made against the "most important" targets affecting the enemy's war-making potential. As Colonel Sidorenko has remarked, from a cost-effectiveness viewpoint "nuclear strikes are best delivered [only] against the most important objectives and the main enemy grouping. The use of nuclear weapons against insignificant, secondary objectives contradicts the very nature of this weapon."[43] In a similar vein, Colonel Shirokov noted in a recent article that "the quantity of objectives, especially military-economic, located on the territory of warring states . . . is very great. Therefore, the belligerents will strive to select from the objectives those which have the greatest influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle."[44] In other words, those economic and industrial targets will be included in Soviet operational plans not so much because of whatever postwar significance they might have for the adversary as because of their tangible relevance to more immediate Soviet combat objectives.

In working toward victory, the Soviet high command will not flinch from employing all force deemed necessary to break the enemy's combat capability. This could involve collateral damage to enemy economic assets on a very large scale. Although there is ample evidence of tendencies toward selectivity in Soviet war planning, nothing in Soviet thinking remotely approximates the Western idea of sparing enemy cities for "intrawar bargaining" or purposely avoiding attacks on the enemy National Command Authority. By the same token, while Soviet writings reveal many indications of target discrimination motivated by a desire to maximize economy of force, the Soviet conception of the initial period of war envisages rapid, intense, and simultaneous nuclear strikes against very large numbers of countermilitary and countervalue aim points in combination.

[42] This is not to suggest that the Soviet National Command Authority would feel constrained from attacking any and all enemy U/I targets deemed important by Soviet war planners. It is only to note that the Soviets will probably not be much inclined to waste re-entry vehicles needed for critical countermilitary tasks by reflexively using them against large numbers of highly exotic U/I targets in a pointless effort to destroy some arbitrary percentage of U.S. economic capacity.

[43] Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970), translated by the U.S. Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series no. 2, p. 88.

[44] Cited in Leon Goure and Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Strategic View," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1980, p. 81.

In short, the operational objective of any economic damage that might be inflicted on the adversary is, in Soviet thinking, quite different from that which has hitherto informed U.S. planning. Rather than merely assure the comprehensive wrecking of the enemy's economic base to prolong his postwar recuperation, Soviet targeting is principally intended to serve the more proximate wartime goal of disrupting the enemy's capability to fight. Soviet planners apparently have little interest in striving to influence the geopolitical contours of a postnuclear world in any circumstances in which their own military victory cannot be satisfactorily vouchsafed. Undoubtedly, there is a place in Soviet planning for destroying elements of the enemy's economic system that might enhance his strategic stature in postwar global affairs (the war is, after all, plainly envisaged by Soviet doctrine as being decisive). Yet the most immediate and paramount Soviet operational concern is targeting that will bring about a favorable military resolution to the conflict in the shortest possible time.

The Enduring Countermilitary Emphasis of Soviet Doctrine

Since the beginnings of the Soviet build-up inaugurated by the Brezhnev regime in 1965, almost every feature of Soviet strategic force deployment has been aimed at providing a high-confidence attack capability against the strategic offensive posture of the United States. There is a strong presumptive argument that the Soviet SS-9 inventory was expressly targeted against the U.S. Minuteman launch-control network.[45] In addition, periodic Soviet SSBN patrolling patterns have indicated a possible Soviet interest in attacking with surprise from close-in launch points so as to bring SAC's bomber bases and command, control, and communications facilities under prompt fire. With the advent of their fourth-generation SS-18s and SS-19s, the Soviets have now acquired both the warhead numbers and accuracy needed to engage all U.S. fixed land-based forces and other hardened capabilities directly.

To be sure, with their submarine-launched ballistic missile force and the ICBMs that would be withheld from any initial hard-target counterforce attack, the Soviets would have more than enough remaining offensive assets to cover all interesting U.S. economic, administrative, and urban-industrial targets comfortably, whether in simultaneous laydowns or in sequential strikes. The point, however, is that neither Soviet doctrine nor Soviet force development has ever reflected any special concern over

[45] In this regard, former Defense Secretary Harold Brown expressed the view that "more than 200 SS-9 ICBMs were almost surely targeted against the 100 Minuteman launch control complexes, two missiles to a complex." Text of address to the U.S. Naval Academy, May 31, 1979, pp. 6-7.

meeting the requirements of countervalue targeting. While the importance of enemy economic power is duly recognized in Soviet strategic policy, the overwhelming impression radiated by the Soviet military literature is that acquiring and maintaining the wherewithal for that mission constitute among the least demanding tasks of Soviet force development. One Soviet officer almost casually dismissed the economic targeting problem by noting that although enemy economic assets would certainly constitute a "primary objective" of Soviet operations in a nuclear war, these can be attended to "literally in a matter of hours and days" through the appropriate application of nuclear firepower.[46]

Far more pressing, in the view of Soviet doctrine, is the timely reduction of the enemy's capacity to wage war, an objective which in no way requires either comprehensive economic targeting for its own sake or the retardation of enemy economic "recovery potential" to any prespecified level. As Colonel Shirokov expressed this point in 1966:

> The objective is not to turn large economic and industrial regions into a heap of rubble (although great destruction apparently will be unavoidable), but to deliver strikes that will destroy strategic combat means, paralyze enemy production, making it incapable of satisfying the priority needs of the front and rear lines, and sharply reduce the enemy capability to conduct strikes.[47]

This observation, one might add, was ventured well over a decade before Soviet forces acquired a plausible capacity to underwrite such an objective. Aside from accentuating the counterforce emphasis of Soviet military thought, it dramatically underscores the crucial role of doctrine in shaping Soviet strategic developments more generally.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that a nuclear war fought according to any strategy would be destructive beyond previous human experience. The differing views of nuclear strategy held by the United States and the Soviet Union, however, have important implications for U.S. defense planners.

The two sides' views of the role of economic targeting in nuclear war are so deeply embedded in their respective planning traditions that they reflect what are essentially two very different strategic cultures. The origins of this divergence considerably predate the advent of nuclear weapons and can be traced back to the earliest years of World

[46] Major General V. Zemskov, "Wars of the Modern Era," *Voennaia mysl*, no. 5, May 1969, in *Selected Readings*, p. 420.

[47] Cited in Ball, *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?*, p. 39.

War II. The United States, by virtue of its pioneering efforts in strategic air power, became attracted to the idea that the most vulnerable dimension of enemy power was his comparatively "soft" rear-echelon infrastructure and that the enemy's war effort could be most effectively crippled by destroying the economic and industrial assets required to support it—particularly at critical "choke points." The Soviet Union, with different defense requirements and lacking comparable air-power capabilities, adhered to a wartime strategy of engaging enemy military potential directly on the battlefield. With due allowance for the subsequent impact of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems on the strategic policies of the superpowers, this divergence in the targeting orientations of the two countries has persisted to the present day. It is thus appropriate to consider the effect of this divergence on current U.S. security interests and its implications for future U.S. nuclear planning.

Whatever merits it may command as a fairly certain means of destroying any adversary as a functioning social entity, economic targeting should not become the focus of all strategic employment planning. Although the United States has developed a variety of selective employment options over the years, the principal deterrent effect intended remains the threat of escalation to overarching general war. In light of this, development of selective options has not removed a number of difficulties with a strategy based on a final, massive economic attack.

Foremost among these is the questionable relevance of such a strategy to the determination of immediate war outcomes. Comprehensive destruction of an enemy's economic infrastructure and industrial base would profoundly affect the complexion of the postwar world and the enemy's place in it, but it cannot by itself resolve the strategic issues at stake. For this, the enemy's forces and supporting battle-management instruments must be neutralized. It is highly unlikely that any country's economic and industrial infrastructure could weather the stresses of general nuclear war and continue functioning with even a modicum of effectiveness. It is hard to see how efforts to impair that capability, however successful, would contribute significantly to the outcome of a war that would necessarily be fought almost entirely by weapons and forces already deployed.

Such efforts could prove suicidal, furthermore, in the absence of accompanying capabilities for massive countermilitary and counterpolitical targeting intended to eliminate the enemy's ability to continue the campaign in the first place. It would do little to support our basic national survival interests to obliterate an enemy (even in flawless conformity with the most recondite economic targeting criteria) if, in the process, he were allowed to retain sufficient elements of counteroffen-

sive nuclear power to inflict comparable damage in punitive reprisal.[48] The Soviets, unfortunately to their credit, appear to appreciate this far more than we do.

To be sure, *threatening* to demolish an enemy's economic livelihood may be highly appropriate as a peacetime deterrent. Yet however impressive general attack capabilities may be in the abstract, reliance on them after deterrence has failed begs the question of insurance. Even if neither side sees any advantage in nuclear use, the possibilities of accident, miscalculation, and madness exist. The question thus remains: Would we deliberately execute our final deterrent threat, knowing that retaliation in kind would certainly follow?

For such a threat to prevent enemy initiatives that might otherwise appear attractive, it must be capable of being invoked with relative impunity to enemy countermeasures. This, in turn, requires either comprehensive counterforce capabilities linked to a surprise first-strike strategy or reliable active and passive damage-limitation capabilities, neither of which the United States possesses. It is more than a little ironic that despite its vocal disdain for "assured destruction" notions and related economic targeting concepts, the Soviet Union either now has or is vigorously striving to acquire precisely the wherewithal to lend credible support to such concepts. The United States, by contrast, has at best registered only the most desultory progress toward acquiring significant hard-target capabilities and other damage-limiting assets during the past decade, when it has also been so fervently adjusting the sort of economic targeting strategies for whose support such capabilities would be absolutely essential.

In light of these considerations, the idea of making the use of nuclear weapons against economic targets the principal focus of strategic planning warrants skepticism, particularly since the United States lacks the capabilities that would be required both to enforce the deterrent credibility of these strategies in peacetime and to contribute to a successful outcome in the event of war. Certainly, more narrow efforts to destroy an enemy's military-industrial and other war-support infrastructure would make operational sense in a general war, especially one that appeared likely to take on protracted dimensions of a sort that would allow those assets to be exploited to the enemy's advantage. But more undifferentiated economic targeting aimed at creating intrawar bottlenecks, imposing "unacceptable damage," shattering the "will to continue fighting," or impeding enemy postwar recovery is unlikely to be a sound basis for U.S. strategic planning in the decade ahead. Not only would continued em-

[48] This argument is developed in considerable further detail in Colin S. Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War," *Naval War College Review*, January-February 1980, pp. 3-21.

phasis on economic targeting be of questionable utility on either deterrent or war-fighting grounds in the absence of effective damage-limiting capabilities, it could actually be counterproductive were it allowed to divert attention from systematic development of those forces and concepts that would be needed to fight to a favorable settlement should deterrence fail and events leave no better alternative.

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