

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Bailey, Norman: Files
Folder Title: Soviet Policy (March 1983 - April 1983)
Box: RAC Box 3

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 2/12/2013

File Folder SOVIET POLICY MARCH 1983-APRIL 1983

FOIA

M452

Box Number 3

SHIFRINSON

50

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
154047	REPORT	RE. SOVIET TRENDS: FEBRUARY 1983 <i>R 12/14/2015 M452/3</i>	12	3/18/1983	B1
154049	REPORT	<i>PAR 12/21/2015 M452/3</i>	8	3/28/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

154047

Sov. P.
~~THE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS ADVANCE COPY IS PROVIDED FOR
YOUR PERSONAL USE PRIOR TO APPROVAL
FOR WIDER DISTRIBUTION. DO NOT
FURTHER REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, OR
CITE.



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

(U) SOVIET TRENDS: FEBRUARY 1983

Summary

(C) Andropov emerged as a party theorist with a major article marking the centenary of Karl Marx's death. The piece conveyed a readiness for some degree of economic reform but was hostile toward political liberalism.

(LOU) Gorbachev appears to be gaining influence within the leadership and to be promoting the careers of younger officials. In particular he is advocating fewer restrictions on the initiative of farm workers and technicians.

(LOU) Pravda reviewed the final chapters of Brezhnev's memoirs but ignored the sketches of certain Politburo members including Andropov and Chernenko, who had been given high marks.

(LOU) High-level publicity is being given an economic experiment in Georgia which aims at getting industrial firms of various ministries to cooperate to produce more consumer goods.

(LOU) Pravda, Kommunist, and Trud have called for the greater use of horses as farm draft power to economize on industrial resources and ease the acute problems caused by the lack of rural paved roads.

(C) The February price hike sprung on Soviet consumers raises questions as to how and when the next rise will come. The need to achieve a better balance between rising incomes and shortages of goods is not disputed. The regime's lack of success in controlling wages and improving market supplies suggests that the authorities now must gradually keep increasing prices, perhaps even for basic goods.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR (Mautner, M.)

Report 578-CA
March 18, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 11457/3 # 154047
BY LOI NARA DATE 12/14/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- ii -

(LOU) In sharp contrast to its flexibility on economic issues, the Andropov regime warned the cultural elite that Western concepts were unacceptable and that socialist realism must be regarded as the proper model in literature and art.

* * * * *

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) Andropov on Economics and Ideology

Andropov's article published in the Soviet party journal Kommunist was a major ideological treatise marking the centenary of Karl Marx's death. It addressed such key economic issues as low return on capital investment and slow introduction of new technology. Andropov blamed backward methods of management and urged more use of price and profit incentives rather than centralized planning orders.

Ironically, Andropov used the Marx anniversary to argue for even more organized social inequality under socialism. He attacked instances of wage-leveling and asked for still further use of higher pay differentials for more skilled employees. Stress was put on higher productivity rather than the shifting of investment priorities as the remedy for consumer goods shortages.

The article nonetheless conveyed Andropov's clear intention to keep the lid on political nonconformists inside the USSR. Andropov alluded to dissidents as people who tried to "oppose their own egotistic interests to those of society." The reeducation of such people was not a violation of human rights but "real humanism and democracy." He also derided the idea of revising Soviet theory with the aid of Western social science.

The only real surprise about Andropov's article was that he penned it, rather than letting the honor go to Party Secretary (for ideology) Chernenko. Although it was Chernenko who met recently with a top ideologue from East Berlin to prepare for the Marx centenary, Soviet elites will now likely assume that it is Andropov who is really calling the shots in this sensitive area of party politics. By flaunting his authority in Kommunist, Andropov may have hoped to lower bureaucratic resistance to the limited changes in economic management that he seems to be preparing.

(LOU) Gorbachev's Special Standing

Party Secretary for agriculture Mikhail Gorbachev is moving up in the Kremlin hierarchy and seems to be trying to create a following of fellow middle-aged officials as clients. He is also urging a reform of kolkhoz labor organization and the granting of more rights to farm specialists.

Gorbachev's special standing was indicated by Pravda on January 8 when it listed his name out of alphabetical order before that of Politburo colleague Aliyev among the top leaders attending a CPSU conference on labor discipline. During February, Gorbachev keynoted or took part in a series of meetings on agriculture-related issues:

- an enlarged session of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources (February 4);
- an expanded session of the USSR Gosplan Collegium on implementing the Food Program (February 7);
- a meeting of the Collegium of the USSR Chemicals Industry Ministry and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Chemicals and Petrochemicals Industry trade union (February 7); and
- a plenum of the Moscow Oblast party committee on rural construction and private house-building (February 15).

Gorbachev's major article in Pravda February 10 gave orders to local agricultural officials and was widely reprinted in the republic press. The article insisted that good farming standards be observed and experts be freed from bureaucratic restraints. Above all, Gorbachev argued for a more rapid shift from the large, impersonal work gangs on kolkhozes to small teams, or zvenya. He claimed that as a rule the zvenya increased the output of crops by 20-30 percent and regretted that they were being introduced too slowly. (Opponents of the zvenya have long feared that they might eventually supplant not only the large work units but also the kolkhoz itself.)

The Pravda article lauded the Belgorodskaya Oblast for using zvenya, and the CPSU daily that day announced that the oblast's party first secretary had been promoted to a job in Moscow. Mikhail Trunov, like Gorbachev aged 52, was named chairman of Tsentrosoyuz, the consumer cooperative retail system, which sells farm surplus at prices between those in kolkhoz markets and state shops.

Gorbachev assuredly monitors the Agriculture Department at party headquarters. One of its deputy chiefs, Ivan Kapustyan, attended a plenum of the Irkutsk obkom which Pravda reported on February 23. According to that report, "Obkom first secretary N. Bannikov recognized as justified the critical remarks levelled at him for failure to insure amicable and smooth work in the [obkom] bureau on a basis of principle, and deviations from the principle of collective leadership.... The opinion of plenum participants was unanimous: it is essential to arrange smooth and collective work in the obkom's bureau and apparat..."

Nikolay Bannikov is nearing 70 and has been the boss of Irkutskaya Oblast for 15 years. He worked with Mikhail Solomentsev, now the RSFSR premier, in Kazakhstan from 1959 to 1964 and got the Irkutsk post after Solomentsev joined the CPSU Secretariat in 1966. CPSU Central Committee decrees singled out Bannikov's party offices for criticism in 1969 on grounds of lagging technical progress and in 1977 for illegal economic practices in the oblast.

Thus, it can be inferred that Gorbachev is moving to undermine at least some of the older cadres who are not willing to adapt to new conditions and is replacing them with party men of his own, younger generation.

(LOU) Brezhnev Memoir Recalls Politburo Colleagues

Although Andropov did not mention Brezhnev in his Kommunist article, a massive review of the late President's final Reminiscences was carried by Pravda on February 3. The reviewer was Anatoliy Mednikov, a secretary of the Moscow Writers' Union (noted for his attacks on literary friends of Academician Sakharov). Pravda did not, however, mention Brezhnev's sketches of Andropov, Chernenko, and Ustinov, who were praised in the posthumously published essays.

The literary journal Novyy Mir presented three more chapters of Brezhnev's recollections in its issue No. 1, January 1983, signed to press December 20, 1982. The chapters were headed "Moldavian Spring," "Cosmic October," and "Talking About Communists." "Moldavian Spring" relates Brezhnev's experiences in Soviet Moldavia, where he was sent in 1950 to take charge of farm collectivization, or "the difficult situation that had taken shape there" (and met Chernenko). "Cosmic October" recounts events and personalities in the development of the Soviet space and missile programs, Ustinov foremost. The third chapter, "Talking About Communists," contains references to Shcherbitskiy, Andropov, and Gromyko.

Brezhnev allotted the encomiums to:

- Chernenko: As agitprop chief he possessed such "party qualities" as "the ability to persuade people, to find the correct organizational forms and--the main thing--to be oneself a convinced fighter, sensitive toward one's comrades and exacting toward oneself."
- Ustinov: As wartime people's commissar or minister, he "successfully handled the equipping of our Army with military hardware" and afterward "took a most active and direct part in the missile program"; "a fine engineer and a practical

expert possessing profound knowledge and great organizational capabilities"; "always pleasant and interesting to work with."

--Shcherbitskiy: "that talented organizer" who for many years headed the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

--Andropov: "a man with whom we are linked by many years of party work.... I value highly his party modesty, humanity, and outstanding professional qualities. He has traveled a great and glorious path of Komsomol and party work. I greatly value such people."

--Gromyko: headed Soviet diplomacy for many years and "devotes a great deal of effort and talent to this activity which is of exceptional importance for our people."

The reference to Andropov did not seem to fit the context of the narrative and might have been added by an editor after Brezhnev's death. In any event, the phrases "party qualities" (Chernenko) and "professional qualities" (Andropov) tend to strengthen the impression that Brezhnev favored Chernenko to succeed him as party chief.

(LOU) Some Power to Local Soviets: Poti Experiment

A pilot scheme has been initiated in the Georgian town of Poti to stimulate cooperation among firms belonging to various industrial ministries. The executive committee of other town soviets are now being asked to create similar "associations" of firms and to pull some of their profit for the output of consumer goods. Nevertheless, the scope of the scheme will hardly dent the highly centralized carapace of the Soviet industrial establishment.

Pravda on February 18 acclaimed the "Poti experiment" as an offshoot of the district agro-industrial associations (RAPOs) that were also pioneered in Georgia and won approval at the CPSU Plenum in May 1982. Other favorable references to the Poti test run were made by Pravda in the account of a plenum of the Georgia Communist Party Central Committee (February 26) and the survey of economic pilot schemes (February 28).

Poti, a port on the Black Sea, has about 70 industrial firms and organizations that are subordinate to 30 different ministries and agencies. The head offices of those ministries and agencies are in Moscow, the Georgian capital Tbilisi, or Poti--depending on their all-union, republic, or local nature. Each of the centers has relied on the town soviet to satisfy many worker needs, even if it lacks adequate resources to do so.

The year-old experiment calls for the entry of all firms into a Territorial Interbranch Association (TMO), which is attached to

the city soviet's executive committee. The ruling TMO council is led by the soviet's first deputy chairman, and the TMO's deputy leader is chief of the soviet's finance department. Local managers, state bankers, and computer-data chiefs are also members of the TMO council.

The council is supposed to collect dues from the planned or above-plan profits of participating firms, with the exception of those under all-union jurisdiction. The TMO can use the funds to build its own small firms which draw upon local raw materials and the waste products of all firms in the area. Clothing and furniture are the main items that have been produced so far by the TMO in Poti.

Only a few cautious steps have been taken toward making the TMO a genuine "regional organ of economic leadership," which the party head in Poti envisages. A number of Moscow ministries have agreed to invest in the building of a local, multi-branch plant to serve all firms in the town. And all local firms are expected to benefit from a merger of their warehouses into a single supply base controlled by the TMO.

Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Politburo candidate and Georgian party head, discussed the Poti scheme in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No. 21, May 1982. He asked for more interest in developing the initiative on the part of industrial management offices in Moscow. And he claimed that Brezhnev had approved and supported in principle the Georgians' economic quests. The scheme is in line with Andropov's emphasis on the need to tap local reserves to increase the manufacture of consumer goods, and lately no sign of serious opposition to it has emerged.

(LOU) A New Look at the Peasant's Old Ally: The Horse

Kommunist (No. 2, February 1983) favorably mentioned a letter from a biologist in Moscow Oblast complaining about the scarcity of horses on many farms. The horses were said to be "irreplaceable for intra-farm hauling, especially in the mud season, for ploughing and the cultivation of small areas, and in work in garden plots." Use of tractors in such cases was viewed as "uneconomical, leading to over-expenditure of fuel and material resources." An "optimum" number of horses was recommended for each farm.

Oats, called a "valuable, traditionally Russian crop," was promoted for animal feed and human consumption. Kommunist complained that oats currently were being planted in small areas that usually were not fertilized and therefore produced low yields. Livestock often were given raw oats instead of mixtures, and not enough food products were made from oats.

Pravda (February 16) also carried an illustrated report from the Western Ukraine titled "The Four Wheeled Peasant Cart Is Still Useful," pointing out that carts were even more durable than Zhiguli autos. Big horse farms were allegedly being created in the region to provide animals for use on farms in both mountainous and steppe areas.

An article by the writer Vladimir Sitnikov in the January 29 Trud made some of the same points in regard to private plot farming. The rarity of a personally owned horse was blamed on a law dating to the 1930s aimed at private landholders. Even today, a Soviet peasant cannot acquire a horse without the permission of an oblast soviet's executive committee. Sitnikov discounted "the fear of those who think that if the strict law is relaxed then everyone will start to buy horses." (The article also resumed a plea for mass production of mini-tractors suitable for use in garden plots; the tractors now are dribbling off assembly lines in Minsk and Ufa.)

Soviet sources offer no data on the share of horses in the total supply of farm draft power, but the total number of horses in the Soviet Union has steadily declined in recent years: 1951, 13.8 million; 1961, 9.9; 1971, 7.4; 1982, 5.6. Thus, proposals for Soviet farmers to rely more on horses for draft power are likely to be no more efficacious than earlier ones to breed rabbits to ease meat shortages. But the urgings are further suggestive of the regime's somewhat more practical tone since Brezhnev's death.

(C) The Growing Wage-Price Issue

Moscow quietly implemented a substantial increase in the retail prices of a variety of consumer goods (excluding basic foods) and services in early February. As many as 300 items were said to be affected in the partial adjustment to the inflationary pressures of the January 1982 wholesale price changes. Included were simple metal products, construction materials, cotton and paper goods, and some beverages (both alcoholic and nonalcoholic), as well as such services as telegrams and postage, dry cleaning, and restaurant meals. Known price increases ranged from roughly 10 percent for restaurant meals to 1,000 percent for some artist supplies.

Unlike the major revision of retail prices in September 1981--which also included price cuts for slow-moving goods to stimulate their sale--the February action was unannounced. As a result, the regime avoided the panic buying and long lines of September when people sought to stock up or beat the price hike.

Consumers were in fact forewarned that a price rise was likely. A spate of press articles earlier had commented on the

unrealistically low level of consumer prices, even for bread (Pravda, January 10). A Gosplan official replayed the now familiar Andropov theme criticizing the disproportionate growth rates of wages and retail prices. Focusing on developments during the 1965-80 period (during which, according to Soviet figures, state retail prices rose only 2.1 percent, 3.3 percent for food, while average monthly wages rose some 66 percent), the official pointed out that with production costs also rising, maintaining stable prices had meant increasing the burden of subsidies on the state budget. He thus argued that prices on basic food items should be raised. Finally, Andropov noted, in his now-famous visit with Moscow factory workers in late January, that raising prices was one way to restore market equilibrium.

Some Soviet journal articles have since suggested ways in which consumer prices might be raised. An authoritative article (Planovoye Khozyaystvo, February 1983) by a Gosplan official promoting "flexibility" in price policy suggests that although it would be politically infeasible now to raise prices of basic foods, the regime should consider identifying specific goods whose prices could be determined by supply and demand (i.e., raised). The Gosplan official also cited the example of Hungary where a large proportion of prices were determined by contracts between producers and distributors.

Application of the contract system to agriculture is already anticipated. Fairly high growth targets for retail sales in the cooperative system are premised on the cooperatives contracting for the surplus production of the private sector. Purchase prices are to be high enough to encourage increased production to satisfy market demands, and retail prices are to be high enough to cover all costs. By channeling a larger share of output through this system, the Soviets can achieve de facto price increases while they maintain the heavily subsidized prices in the state-owned food stores.

(LOU) Return to Socialist Realism

Judging by its initial moves, the new regime intends to follow a two-track policy toward Soviet intellectuals. The debate on economic policy broadened considerably the limits of permissible discussion in this area and raised the prospect of reforms and opportunities for upward mobility to the technical intelligentsia. But for the "creative intellectuals" in the arts and literature, prospects steadily worsened as the regime unfolded its intention to enforce tight controls and return Soviet culture to the norms of "socialist realism."

Indications of a more repressive cultural policy appeared in Andropov's speech on the 60th anniversary of the USSR in December,

and in press articles in January. Authoritative implementing details soon followed: for writers, in an article by the first secretary of the Moscow Writers' Union Feliks Kuznetsov (Pravda, February 18), and for the stage and screen, in a CPSU Central Committee directive on February 25 (described by Literaturnaya Gazeta on March 2).

Kuznetsov's harsh denunciation of alleged efforts by Western special services to penetrate Soviet culture and exploit the ideological weaknesses of writers dimmed, for the moment, hopes of a cultural "thaw" under Andropov. Indeed, it recalled the grim days of Andrey Zhdanov's persecution of cultural "cosmopolites" following World War II. Kuznetsov warned that Western "literary sovietologists" were:

- portraying the experimental period of the 1920s (Kuznetsov referred to it as a "complex period") as the high point of Soviet creativity in literature and art;
- presenting the earlier "Silver Age" of Russian culture, with its decadence and religious mysticism, as the standard for emulation by Soviet writers and artists; and
- judging Soviet literature by alien standards of literary criticism: "modernism," "structuralism," and "formalism."

Furthermore, the use of literature as an ideological battleground by enemies of socialism was only a part of a larger struggle in the cultural arena involving the interpretation of national history and the history of Soviet nationalities. The experience of Poland, noted Kuznetsov, demonstrated how effectively such themes could be exploited. Specifically, nationality relations in the USSR were being exacerbated by poisoning Soviet intellectuals with the seemingly incompatible doctrines of:

- the Russophobes (for example, Richard Pipes, Hedrick Smith, and Robert Kaiser);
- the nationalist-reactionaries (including monarchists and old emigrés and their contemporary adherents); and
- the "human rights" advocates (including emigré traitors serving enemies of socialism by masquerading as fighters for "human rights").

These efforts to subvert Soviet literature allegedly were being accompanied by moves to restrict the publication and sale of translations of Soviet writers in the West and to pass off the writings of emigré traitors as Soviet literature. In short, the goal of the Western ideological offensive was to split Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

intellectuals from the party and the masses and turn talented but immature Soviet writers into an "internal opposition." Kuznetsov's tirade against Western literary currents, emigré writings, and the categories of emigré thought was clearly intended to silence domestic sympathizers.


A CPSU Central Committee instruction of February 25 addressed to a theater in Minsk but couched in language of general applicability demanded a return to socialist realism and a more propagandistic style. It was followed in early March by a speech by Culture Minister Demichev warning against laxity in Soviet music and literary criticism and complaining that Soviet theaters were staging too many plays by Western playwrights. Perhaps reflecting his own aesthetic taste level, Demichev also praised Soviet monument sculpture, usually of mammoth size, commemorating heroes of the Revolution or World War II.

Prepared by S. Ploss, 632-9186
I. Belousovitch
J. Danylyk

Approved by M. Mautner, 632-9536

CONFIDENTIAL

As the Soviets See Themselves



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
- 10 -

— Это еще что за наглец?! А, это ты, сынок...

Рисунок Вл. ДОБРОВОЛЬСКОГО.

"What rude fellow is this? Oh, it's you, son."

UNCLASSIFIED

- I -

USSR CHRONOLOGY

February 1-28, 1983

February

- 1 Pravda featured an account of Andropov's meeting with Moscow machine-builders.
- 1 Anthology of Romanov speeches and articles published in a second, enlarged edition (Moscow Domestic Radio).
- 1 Price increases on many household and luxury goods went into effect.
- 2 Pravda published Andropov's interview on INF and a Soviet-American summit.
- 3 Pravda reviewed the final chapters of Brezhnev's Reminiscences.
- 3 Izvestiya announced that chief editor Pyotr Alekseyev had been replaced by former chief editor Lev Tolkunov.
- 4 Politburo meeting reported; agenda included steps to implement proposals of the Warsaw Pact summit in Prague, cooperation with the countries of Indochina, CEMA summit preparations, and work of the Party Control Committee in 1982.
- 4 Chernenko met with Soviet bloc media chiefs at the CPSU Central Committee.
- 4 Pravda carried Arbatov's review of Gromyko's book Foreign Expansion of Capital, History and Our Time.
- 4 Yuriy Zhdanov's neoconservative article in Pravda on social science hit at "narrow practicisim and near-sighted pragmatism."
- 5 Dnepropetrovsk Obkom plenum elected V. G. Boyko as first secretary to replace Ye. V. Kachalovskiy, newly appointed first deputy premier of the Ukraine.
- 5 B. P. Yakovlev, chief of the CPSU Central Committee Letters Department, in a program on Moscow Radio noted "quite a lot of nonparty phenomena and spiritual deafness."

UNCLASSIFIED

February

- 6 Romanov was awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor, Order of Lenin, and gold Hammer and Sickle medal for his 60th birthday.
- 7 Gorbachev spoke on the Food Program at an expanded session of the USSR Gosplan Collegium and attended meeting of the Collegium of the USSR Chemicals Industry Ministry.
- 7 M. D. Sytenko replaced Z. V. Mironova as permanent USSR representative to UN departments and other international organizations in Geneva.
- 7 Dissident novelist Georgiy Vladimov reportedly was asked by authorities to file a formal application for travel to West Germany.
- 8 M. P. Trunov, first secretary of the Belgorod Obkom, replaced A. A. Smirnov as Tsentrosoyuz Board chairman; Smirnov was named deputy minister of the RSFSR Fuel Energy Ministry.
- 8-9 Dolgikh, Rusakov, and Ryzhkov attended a working consultative meeting of CEMA party secretaries.
- 9 Sergey P. Pavlov (relieved in January as Chairman of USSR Committee for Physical Culture and Sport) was named Soviet ambassador to Ulaanbaatar.
- 10 Gorbachev article in Pravda examined the Soviet agro-industrial complex.
- 10 A. V. Vlasov, first secretary of the Checheno-Ingush Obkom, told Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya that CPSU gorkoms, raykoms, and primary organizations recently had been granted the right to use personal reports to evaluate remiss economic leaders.
- 10 World Psychiatric Association announced USSR withdrawal from membership.
- 11 Gorbachev and Dolgikh attended Moscow meeting to mark the 60th anniversary of Soviet civil aviation.
- 11 Dolgikh spoke at an enlarged meeting of the USSR Ministry of the Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing Industry.

February

- 13 Politburo meeting reported: agenda included Tikhonov's report on economics, new Victory Monument and World War II Museum with Hall of Glory, Ustinov's report on the visit of an Afghani military delegation to Moscow, and CEMA affairs.
- 14 Chernenko and Ponomarev met with SED Secretary Axen in Moscow to discuss bilateral party cooperation and Karl Marx centenary measures.
- 15 Solomentsev spoke at an awards ceremony in Rostov-na-Donu and called for strengthening of the USSR's economic and defense power.
- 16 Pravda obituary for Deputy Foreign Minister N. P. Firiyubin signed by Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Tikhonov, and Chernenko.
- 16 Pravda marked 90th birthday of Marshal Tukhachevskiy with article by Army Gen. V. I. Varennikov, first deputy chief of the General Staff.
- 16 Pravda Ukrainy ran an article by Shcherbitskiy proposing "Rules of the Labor Kollektiv" stipulating job requirements from worker to factory director.
- 17 Pravda reported a Grishin-keynoted plenum of the Moscow Gorkom stressing labor discipline, working conditions, and amenities.
- 18 Politburo meeting reported: agenda included economic cooperation with socialist countries, Estonian and Georgian Communist Party proposals on local farm management, measures to implement Law "On the State Frontier of the USSR," and preparations for Women's Day.
- 19 N. A. Bazhenov, First Deputy Procurator General, disclosed in Pravda that a deputy aviation minister had been fired in a corruption scandal.
- 19 Pravda obituary for V. F. Mitskevich, first deputy premier of Belorussia, signed by Kuznetsov, Kapitonov, and Zimyanin.
- 21 Andropov received French Foreign Minister Cheysson. Gromyko took part in the 1-1/2 hour meeting.

February

- 21-24 Tikhonov visited Greece.
- 22 "Letters of Americans to Yu. V. Andropov" discussed in Pravda.
- 23 Andropov article on Karl Marx and USSR policies, prepared for publication in Kommunist, was distributed by TASS on its foreign service.
- 23 Ustinov article in Pravda marked the 65th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Kulikov, Yepishev, and Ogarkov also provided commentaries.
- 24 Gromyko's interview with a Pravda correspondent published.
- 24 Pravda reviewed the second edition of Romanov's anthology.
- 25 Politburo meeting reported: agenda included housing construction, Caucasus railroad proposal, party structure, and Cheysson visit.
- 25 A CPSU Central Committee decision on the work of the party organization at the Belorussian Yanka Kupala academic state theater was summarized by Minsk Radio.
- 25 Chernenko received the North Korean ambassador and was given a personal message to Andropov from Kim Il Sung.
- 25 Aliyev spoke at an enlarged meeting of the Collegium of the USSR Health Ministry.
- 26 CPSU Central Committee decree on housing construction summarized in Pravda.
- 28 Ustinov and Ogarkov met with the Mongolian Defense Minister in Moscow.
- 28 Commission on Agro-industrial Complexes of the USSR Council of Ministers' Presidium held a session to discuss purchase prices, irrigation systems, and other matters.

~~SECRET~~

Sov. P.

17

□

28 MARCH 1983

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.5(c)

A USSR WITHOUT ANDROPOV?

This informal CIA contingency memorandum has been coordinated within the National Intelligence Council and discussed with the Office of Soviet Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments or queries may be directed to the author, [redacted] NIC/AG, [redacted]

NIC 2366-83

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MU 5213 #154019

By LOS NARA, Date 12/7/15

~~SECRET~~

KEY JUDGMENTS

A USSR Without Andropov?

Although Andropov has been in office only four months, [redacted] it prudent to consider what the consequences might be if he departed the political scene.

- The succession to Andropov would of course depend on political and economic conditions in the USSR at the time, and on the international environment.
- If he died suddenly now, the result would probably be a more difficult succession than the transition from Brezhnev to Andropov. There would be a sharp struggle over the direction of policy and the selection of a replacement, with secretary Chernenko and Defense Minister Ustinov the leading contenders.

Should Ustinov win out, he would probably follow the general strategy Andropov has adopted.

- Ustinov would likely advocate repressive measures to keep the labor force in line, while urging disciplinary actions against incompetent officials and some changes in the incentive structure and in economic management to stimulate economic growth.
- Like Andropov, Ustinov would probably be more inclined than was Brezhnev to challenge US interests in the Third World and less willing to make concessions to the US in pursuit of improved relations. Ustinov's military connection probably would increase the weight of military voices in foreign policy deliberation.

If Chernenko succeeded, he would probably move in the direction of restoring the domestic status quo that prevailed under Brezhnev.

- To ensure social stability, Chernenko would probably attempt to conciliate the population by relaxing performance standards for workers and by giving greater attention to the consumer sector of the economy. To placate the institutional elites who support him, he would reduce pressure on officials to improve their work, slow the pace of personnel changes, and refrain from economic reorganizations threatening entrenched bureaucratic interests.
- Since this program would offer little promise of raising GNP growth rates, Chernenko would probably be more concerned than Ustinov to place constraints on military spending and perhaps more flexible in arms control negotiations.

Whoever succeeded Andropov, his power probably would be more severely limited than in previous successions, and his policies consequently more dependent on the preferences of his Politburo colleagues. The diffusion of power and the depth of divisions within the Politburo could temporarily reduce the regime's ability to respond effectively to domestic and foreign challenges.

A USSR Without Andropov?

Although Yuriy Andropov has been in office for only four months, [redacted] it prudent to consider what impact his departure would have on Soviet politics and policy. The outcome and nature of a succession to Andropov would of course depend on political and economic conditions in the USSR at the time, and on the international environment. This contingency memo examines how Andropov's departure might affect the Soviet Union if he died suddenly tomorrow.

Andropov's sudden death very likely would result in a "deep" succession characterized by sharp conflict within the leadership. Since the late 1970s, and especially over the last year, evidence has accumulated that Soviet leaders have become more pessimistic about the domestic problems they face than they have been for the past quarter of a century. They would consequently regard the choice of a new party head at this juncture as a decision of the utmost importance for the future of the regime and the country--as was the case when Brezhnev died. The situation would be complicated this time, however, by the absence of a candidate for the top job well qualified in terms of political standing and policy views acceptable to other key leaders. The man currently best positioned to succeed by virtue of experience and overlapping membership in the Politburo and Secretariat, Chernenko, has taken positions on a number of important issues that are outside the mainstream of Politburo opinion and he lacks the confidence of several senior leaders.

For this reason, a succession taking place now probably would be more wrenching and difficult than was the succession of Andropov. Chernenko's ascendancy would by no means be assured, and the possibility exists that the process of selection itself would be irregular, with one faction or another calling on the military and KGB to block Chernenko's bid. Whoever the successor, it is likely that his power would be severely shackled, and divisions within the Politburo could temporarily reduce the regime's ability to respond effectively to challenges at home and abroad.

The Current Alignment of Forces on the Politburo

At present, Andropov probably does not command a reliable majority whose support he can count on across the board. Leaders associated with the foreign policy - military - security apparatus appear to constitute the core of his strength. These probably include Defense Minister Ustinov, First Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Gromyko, and First Deputy Premier Aliyev, a former KGB official. Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy is also reported to be a strong backer.

Apparently ranged against these leaders is a group of party and government-based leaders that includes Chernenko, Premier Tikhonov, and Kazakh party boss Kunayev. These leaders were closely associated with Brezhnev in the past, and they evidently believe the basic thrust of Andropov's policies poses a threat to the institutional and political interests they represent. The remaining four Politburo members are probably "floaters" who support some of Andropov's policy initiatives while opposing others.

These groupings in the Politburo do not necessarily constitute stable alliances that will endure. Since leadership alliances are based on each leader's perception at a given point in time of how he can best protect his institutional power base, further his political career, and advance the policies he favors, they tend to shift as circumstances change. Andropov's death would consequently create a fluid situation from which new groupings could emerge.

The issues

The fundamental question underlying policy debate following Andropov's departure would be whether to move further in the general direction he has taken or to return to the status quo that prevailed under Brezhnev. Despite elements of policy continuity, Andropov has made tentative moves to chart a new course. The measures he has effected or advocated have defined the policy options before the leadership more clearly than previously and heightened friction within the Politburo.

An important element of Andropov's strategy for revitalizing the economy has been the enforcement of higher standards of performance for Soviet officials and greater emphasis on merit than on seniority as a criterion for advancement. Brezhnev's indulgent cadres policies, which gave party workers virtual tenure, appear to be undergoing a fundamental revision.

Support for this change in personnel policy is probably strong in the military and KGB, where concern about an erosion of official discipline has been especially keen. In addition, many young and ambitious party workers, frustrated by the slow rate of promotions under Brezhnev, are probably glad to see Andropov getting rid of dead wood and opening up career opportunities for those better qualified in terms of education and technical expertise.

But the drive to curtail official corruption and incompetence has created a climate of insecurity among many elites. Many older party and government workers, especially within the regional party apparatus and the economic bureaucracy, reportedly feel threatened. Even within the Politburo, leaders such as Leningrad party boss Romanov may feel vulnerable to charges of malfeasance or impropriety.

Other leaders are probably apprehensive about the broader implications of tightening party discipline. Already uneasy about Andropov's ties to the KGB and his appointment of career KGB officers as Minister of Interior and First Deputy Premier, they may see his drive to purify the party as a move to enhance the KGB's role at the expense of the party apparatus. Chernenko, in particular, has implicitly warned against carrying the anti-corruption campaign too far.

To spur labor productivity, Andropov has relied both on harsher punishment of "laggards," and on greater incentives for high worker output. His advocacy of a more differentiated wage policy, the decision to raise retail prices on some consumer goods, and his effort to tighten control over labor mobility, represent movement away from Brezhnev's more lax and egalitarian policies--which in effect guaranteed even unproductive workers a job and an income sufficient to buy basic necessities.

Chernenko's speeches have indicated that he disagrees with Andropov about how to keep the labor force in line. He has put forth a "populist" program of his own that stresses the need to raise the standard of living for the population as a whole rather than for the most productive element. He has urged the party to be more responsive to public opinion, paid relatively little attention to the need for tightening discipline, and openly criticized the frequent use of repressive measures against workers. Chernenko probably fears, as Brezhnev evidently did, that a "wager on the strong" such as Andropov is pushing runs the risk of provoking serious popular unrest.

Andropov's advocacy of a greater decentralization of economic decisionmaking and hints that the economic bureaucracy needs reorganizing are almost certainly controversial. Such steps would reduce the power of the Council of Ministers and Premier Tikhonov.

In nationality policy, Andropov has revived theoretical formulations associated in the past with efforts to increase cultural and political restrictions on non-Russians. By doing so, he may have provoked the opposition of some party leaders in non-Russian republics, several of whom sit on the Politburo as members or candidates and some of whom have been political allies of Chernenko.

In foreign policy, although there may be a fairly high degree of consensus within the Politburo regarding broad objectives, there are apparently disagreements over tactics and priorities. Andropov's speeches, for example, by stressing more than those of Chernenko the need to support Third World "national liberation" movements, suggest that he is more inclined to challenge US interests in the Third World. Considering the suggestions in Chernenko's past speeches that he places a relatively high priority on detente, it is conceivable that he has questioned whether the introduction of SA5s in Syria, the generally more aggressive sale of advanced armaments to Third World countries, and the testing of new ICBMs possibly in violation of SALT, have created unnecessary stumbling blocks to improving relations with the US.

The question of East-West trade probably remains a bone of contention. The shift toward more autarkic policies began before Brezhnev died, as concern grew that Soviet dependence on grain and technology imports could make the USSR hostage to Western economic pressure. Leaders such as Andropov and Shcherbitskiy implied that Brezhnev had mistakenly attempted to substitute economic relations with the West for domestic solutions to economic problems. Chernenko, by contrast, staunchly supported increased trade with countries outside the bloc, and is probably still more favorably disposed toward an expansion of East-West trade.

Finally, the leadership is apparently divided over strategic issues. The somewhat higher priority Andropov's speeches have attached to providing for military needs compared to the public statements of Chernenko, the key role Ustinov reportedly played in the coalition that put Andropov in office, and reporting that some leaders are uncomfortable about Chernenko's views on national security, raise the possibility that Chernenko has clashed with Andropov and his allies over military issues. It is true that Ustinov and Andropov have publicly recognized the need for greater constraints on military

priorities than have some professional military officers. But they are apparently more concerned than Chernenko to satisfy perceived military needs.

The Candidates

All previous successors have been both Secretaries and Politburo members, but each of the two men who currently sit on both ruling bodies--Gorbachev and Chernenko--has serious handicaps as a contender. Gorbachev's limited experience at the national level and relatively narrow job responsibilities, chiefly for agriculture, would seem virtually to disqualify him.

Nor is Chernenko an ideal candidate from the point of view of other leaders. Having spent most of his career as a staff man, he lacks any significant experience in line party leadership or in supervising the economy. He has been Andropov's chief critic and key figures such as Ustinov and Gromyko are said to have misgivings about his leadership ability.

In these circumstances, the leadership could defy precedent in its selection of a successor. If this happened, Ustinov would be the most likely choice. He has had lengthy experience in the crucial defense industry sector and in foreign policy, and he earlier served in the secretariat for several years. His views on military spending are more acceptable to the military than are those of Chernenko, but he has also demonstrated sensitivity to the needs of the civilian economy. His advanced age would not necessarily be a liability, since his colleagues might prefer a "caretaker" to hold power temporarily until a younger man could be groomed for the job.

Although Ustinov has now been Minister of Defense for seven years, as a former party official he probably would not be seen by other leaders as posing a threat to the hegemony of party institutions. In fact, his military connection could give him a significant advantage. Because of the substantial congruence of outlook among many top civilian and military leaders, some civilian Politburo members lacking access to compartmented military information probably defer routinely to the military command's judgment about what is needed to protect national security interests. Ustinov, using reports prepared by the military, would consequently be in a position to challenge the viability of Chernenko's program.

Alternatively, Moscow party boss Grishin could be a compromise choice acceptable to all factions. It is even conceivable that the Politburo would reach outside the core of senior Moscow-based leaders to select a regional figure such as Shcherbitskiy.

Nevertheless, Chernenko has important political assets. The ranking Secretary with Politburo standing, by now he has had broad experience in a wide range of party work and in foreign policy, and he enjoys considerable support at the Central Committee level. It would perhaps be more difficult to deny him the top post now than when Brezhnev died. Brezhnev's gradual physical decline gave Chernenko's opponents time to prepare. By promoting Andropov to the Secretariat six months before Brezhnev died, they were able to block Chernenko's bid. This time Chernenko's detractors have not yet positioned a challenger, and Andropov's sudden death would leave them without an immediately available logical candidate.

Impact on Policy

If no candidate were able to establish a strong claim to succeed, power would be more compartmented than during previous successions. Chernenko, in particular, probably would have to make major concessions to gain the acceptance of Ustinov and his allies. Chernenko's freedom to act independently would be severely constrained, and it is conceivable that Ustinov would be made Chairman of the Defense Council. This diffusion of power could produce instances of uncertainty, inconsistency, or poor coordination in Soviet policy.

Nevertheless, all Politburo members probably share certain perceptions that would restrain the behavior of competing factions. Their authoritarian political culture has conditioned them to believe the concentration of fairly broad--if ill-defined--power in the hands of the General Secretary is needed to present a united front to the world and to maintain regime hegemony at home. Soviet leaders also see it in their collective interest to keep their deliberations secret and to confine the arena for debate to the Politburo itself. These attitudes probably would prevent the power struggle from reaching crisis proportions that could significantly impede the regime's execution of policy in the event of an international or domestic emergency.

A Chernenko succession would have the most immediate effect on cadres policy. Chernenko would probably act to bolster elite security, as Brezhnev did in 1964 following Khrushchev's disruptive reorganizational schemes and reshuffling of personnel. Chernenko would provide assurances that removals from office would be kept to a minimum, and that vacancies would be filled largely by regular promotions within institutions rather than through cross-posting or leapfrogging of lower-level officials into high posts. He would downplay the anti-corruption campaign and make clear that party control of the KGB remained a central element of regime policy.

In order to placate the government bureaucracy, Chernenko would probably oppose proposals for reorganizing economic management that involved any significant diminution of the authority of central ministries. At the same time, it is likely that he would seek the support of non-Russian leaders by advocating a more even-handed nationality policy, while appealing to consumer interests by emphasizing the primacy of the food program and by advocating a greater diversion of resources to consumer-oriented industry and an expansion of agricultural imports.

Since Chernenko's domestic program would probably offer even less promise than Andropov's of boosting GNP, he would be more concerned to place limits on military spending and consequently somewhat more flexible in INF and other arms control negotiations. It is a good bet that he would urge greater caution in supporting Third World clients and insurgencies, in order to avoid damaging the prospects for an improvement in East-West relations or risking military confrontation with the US.

Should Ustinov succeed, he probably would follow the general strategy Andropov has adopted. His military background and his past statements suggest that he would rely heavily on coercive measures to ensure social stability, while placing a high premium on the need to bolster executive discipline. He

probably would urge some changes in the incentive structure to stimulate economic growth.

Like Andropov, Ustinov probably would act more assertively than Chernenko in exploiting opportunities to expand Soviet influence in the Third World, and would be somewhat less inclined to make compromises in pursuit of improved relations with the US. His past statements suggest, however, that he might be less sanguine than Andropov about the prospects for relaxing tensions with China.

Ustinov's primary loyalty is to the party, and his succession would not constitute a military takeover. Nonetheless, his military connection probably would increase the weight of military voices in policy deliberation, especially with regard to foreign affairs. It is conceivable that Ustinov would rely more heavily than Chernenko on arms sales and military assistance programs as instruments of Soviet policy, and that he would push more strongly for a more centralized Warsaw Pact command structure. This could further enhance the role of the professional military in dealing with Eastern Europe and the Third World.

Other possible candidates have not expressed their policy preferences as clearly as have Ustinov and Chernenko. Any successor, however, probably would be motivated by political opportunism more than by any desire for consistency with past positions. To a considerable degree, his policies would reflect his need to pay close heed to the personal and institutional interests of those Politburo members on whose support he depended.