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File Folder SOVIET POLICY JAN-FEB 1983

FOIA

M452

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SHIFRINSON

49

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|--------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 154037 | MEMO | PAULA DOBRIANSKY TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. SOVIET LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION R 12/14/2015 M452/3 | 1 | 1/4/1983 | B1 |
| 154040 | REPORT | RE. SOVIET PERSONNEL CHANGES R 12/14/2015 M452/3 | 6 | 2/2/1983 | B1 |
| 154041 | MEMO | KENNETH DEGRAFFENREID TO CLARK RE. GEORGIY ARBATOV R 12/14/2015 M452/3 | 1 | 2/10/1983 | B1 |
| 154044 | REPORT | RE. SOVIET TRENDS: JANUARY 1983 R 12/14/2015 M452/3 | 14 | 2/28/1983 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 4, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ⁽¹⁷⁾

SUBJECT: Soviet Leadership Succession

Norman Bailey forwarded me an interesting analysis (Tab I) of the Soviet leadership succession written by John T. Jackson, Vice Chairman of the Business Council for International Understanding in Philadelphia. Some of his insightful, unique conclusions are summarized below.

1. Andropov's background and personality is not necessarily germane in predicting what domestic and foreign policies the Soviet Union will pursue. Jackson states, "Although some very interesting observations are now surfacing as to the personality of Mr. Andropov, he may not necessarily be the right object to focus upon in the search for the answer as to what to expect of the Soviet Union."
2. The most relevant issue is not who is Mr. Andropov, but rather what are the circumstances of his elevation. Specifically, Jackson cites two factors which he perceives as having contributed to Andropov's consolidation of power: a) a general dissatisfaction with Brezhnev's policy mix which in turn, has harmed Chernenko's candidacy, b) Andropov's ability to harness and exploit the resources of the military and the KGB.
3. The military and the KGB will seek to eradicate industrial and agricultural mismanagement and impose greater economic efficiency.
4. Lastly, there will be some reduction in Soviet international sabre-rattling so as to instill a greater feeling of security in the West.

I do not agree, however, with Jackson's reference to the formation of a "Solidarity" in the USSR comprised of the military and the KGB for this conception clearly overlooks the prominent role of the Party. Rather, it is those hardline elements in the party aligned with the military and the KGB that are likely to prevail.

cc: Norman Bailey

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M457/3#154037

BY LOJ NARA DATE 12/14/15

Paula 1

INFERENTIAL FOCUS
Business Inferential Scanning

December 8, 1982

*Copies for:
John H. Harrison
Bret Bostine
To WPC?*

FOCUS: RUSSIA

During World War II, German pilots were trained to use the corners of their eyes to spot enemy planes in the darkness of night. Although seemingly illogical, peripheral vision in darkness is superior to a direct look. This, however, forces the observer to look away from an object of interest, which is not the normal reflex of a day-oriented creature. Maybe this technique should now be employed in piercing the darkness enveloping the stance which the Soviet Union will adopt under the leadership of Yuri Andropov.

Although some very interesting observations are now surfacing as to the personality of Mr. Andropov, he may not necessarily be the right object to focus upon in the search for the answer as to what to expect of the Soviet Union. It could conceivably be that the personality line is fed to us to divert our attention from the real clues.

Just eight months ago, Kremlinologists followed an obvious line of succession which did not even include Yuri Andropov. On March 9th, David Satter, reporting from Moscow for the Financial Times, said that: "The conventional wisdom is that neither Mr. Ustinov nor Mr. Andropov could achieve leadership of the party, because, although the Army and the KGB are the two principal instruments of power in the country, the party has always guarded against their potential domination."

Well, so much for the "conventional wisdom," which somehow reminds us of the last weeks of the Shah of Iran when the conventional wisdom of that time, according to President Carter, held that that country was an "island of stability in the Middle East." The interesting thing is that, post factum, it was determined that the proper information was available, but it was too peripheral to consider. Likewise, in the case of Mr. Andropov, we find that, while in all our reading we saw names like Chernenko, Kirilenko, Griskin, Romanov and Gromyko, it was in personal conversations with two Eastern Europeans that we learned not only about Mr. Andropov, but also that the die had already been cast.

All of the above leads us to suspect that the question to ask is not who is Mr. Andropov, but why it is him and not Mr. Chernenko that got the job. The most obvious reason would be the identification of Mr. Chernenko with the policies of Mr. Brezhnev. Those policies must have been a bit of an embarrassment when one considers the agricultural setbacks four years in a row, the Afghanistan fiasco, Polish Solidarity, the Siberian pipeline wrangle, and the quality-of-arms question as a result of the Iraqi/Irani and Lebanese wars.

The less obvious answer, however, is that Mr. Andropov was already in power and that, during 1982, without being aware of it, we have been witnesses to an historical fade-in/fade-out. For instance, note the unprecedented action

in the early part of this year when the KGB arrested Mr. Buryetia, who was a close friend of Mr. Brezhnev's daughter.

Another hint comes from the newest edition of the official Soviet encyclopedia, which carries no mention of the mass purges of the Stalin era, originally put into the record during the Khrushchev leadership. The purges were carried out by the infamous NKVD, the predecessor of the present KGB, of which Mr. Andropov was the head until very recently. According to the November 22nd Christian Science Monitor, the new encyclopedia was prepared for publication last March, which was well before the passing of Mr. Brezhnev. The action seems clearly designed to remove an unpleasant flavor from the KGB's history, and only Mr. Andropov would have a vested interest in this.

Another decision which looks suspiciously like Mr. Andropov's is the drastic cut in telephone links between the Soviet Union and the West, which we have commented on before. The Russians finally admitted that it was not the difficulty with the equipment, but that the sophisticated Western equipment was needed for domestic uses. Shortly after, it was observed that the domestic users were the new headquarters of the KGB and the military.

A few other observations lead us to suspect that the ascendancy of Mr. Andropov is a far more significant event than is generally perceived. On the day of Mr. Andropov's election, army units were much in evidence surrounding the building in which the meeting took place. After the election, the uniformed Marshal Ustinov moved all the way up the line to stand next to the new leader in official photographs. A few days later, Geidar Aliyev, an important KGB personage, was added to the Politburo. All of this adds up to the conclusion that Mr. Andropov is the front man of the two principal instruments of power — the military and the KGB, neither of which has ever in the past dominated the party. (Remember the swift demises of Beria and General Zhukov when they grew too big for their britches?) Now, those two instruments of power have joined forces and switched from the role of servant to that of master.

The coalition gave a few hints of what to expect of it. On November 22, Mr. Andropov addressed the plenary session of the Communist party central committee, at which time he made the somewhat conflicting promise of both more guns and more butter. The butter, however, will apparently be produced domestically with the help of the carrot and stick method. Even more so, the tone was strangely menacing in comparison with the Brezhnev stance. Said Mr. Andropov: "Conditions both economic and organizational should be provided to encourage quality and productive work, initiative and enterprise....conversely, shoddy work, laziness and irresponsibility should have an immediate and unavoidable effect on the earnings, official status and moral prestige of workers." Wielding the stick of the "unavoidable effect" will most likely be left to the KGB, which for the past year has exhibited an unusual degree of eagerness to stamp out corruption in high places.

As for the guns, Russian equipment's poor showing on the Middle Eastern playground suggests that a higher level of sophistication is in the offing; but this will show up amid the framework of overall expansion. For instance, the Navy base at Liyepaya, Latvia, was so extensively enlarged that it required the relocation of the USSR's second largest fishing collective. Interestingly, this also predated Mr. Brezhnev's death by five months.

Finally, the recent appointment of Mr. Vladimir Alkhimov to the central committee may be suggestive of how the Soviets plan on paying for all this. Mr. Alkhimov is reputedly one of very few Soviet officials who understand the workings of Western capital markets. Inference: the banking industry as a "best bet" to start discovering new Russian business opportunities?


What all of this ultimately means to the West will depend upon how successful the new rulers are in transforming the country from a dictatorship of the proletariat to a dictatorship of the uniform. Comparisons could be made with Yugoslavia, Hitler's Germany and Fascist Italy. The last two are particularly good examples of the symbiotic relationship between the police and the army. We have even one more recent example, which may be the real key to the answer — Poland. With the obvious approval of the Soviets, General Jaruzelski usurped power, and, using the despised ZOMO, brought the country to heel.

With the two militaristic organizations forming their own Solidarity in Russia, mismanagement that has plagued agriculture and industry will be little tolerated in an attempt to whip the economy into shape. At the same time, international sabre-rattling will probably be kept to a minimum compared to recent years, in order to quell Western fears of the new military bloc. In fact, we would not be surprised to see their present military positions rescinded somewhat in an attempt to give the West a sense of security and to further strengthen the overextended Russian economy.

But this new coalition does appear to present an inherent real danger, as now the fox has gained control of the chicken coop. But this fox appears to have a savvy command of manipulative techniques, implying that, while a new detente may develop in order to exploit the West's resources, we should expect internal control and surveillance to be strengthened. And, of course, the ultimate result of past military control in other places and times cannot be forgotten. When the soldiers have the key to the arsenal and the governor is in accord, they have in the past ultimately been unable to resist playing with the arsenal's toys.

* * *

THE NEW KREMLIN WALLFLOWERS:



Tass via United Press International

Yuri V. Andropov, at the microphones, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party, delivering the eulogy for Leonid I. Brezhnev yesterday from the Lenin Mausoleum at the Kremlin wall. With him were, from the left: Dinmukhamed A. Kunayev, party leader of Kazakhstan; Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky, Ukrainian party chief; Marshal Dmitri F. Ustinov, Defense Minister; Prime Minister Nikolai A. Tikhonov; Konstantin U. Chernenko, a party secretary; Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko; Viktor V. Grishin, Moscow party leader, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Minister of Agriculture.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 23, 1982

TO: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

FROM: NORMAN BAILEY



420 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY 10017
212-490-0460
BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

Dr. Bailey,

The enclosed was sent to me by my
Chairman, John T. Jackson, Vice
Chairman of IU International in
Philadelphia. Thought it would
interest you.

JOHN HABBERTON

154040

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

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(U) SOVIET PERSONNEL CHANGES SINCE BREZHNEV

(U) Summary

Andropov probably has instigated most if not all of the major personnel shifts in Moscow since Brezhnev's death on November 10 (see list appended). The new Soviet leader evidently is aiming to create a patronage net of younger and reputedly more capable men who will solidify his hold on power and ensure execution of his policies once they are fully developed. The changes, while more numerous than Khrushchev's or Brezhnev's at comparable stages of their reigns, are still rather limited in scope as Andropov maneuvers within a basically unreconstructed Politburo.

So far, the personnel shifts tell us little about future policy. Some of the dismissals doubtlessly were intended to carry the message that Andropov was determined to crack down on corruption and to enforce discipline. In economic areas, some changes appear to have cleaned out deadwood and some may have been intended to put into place officials who will support Andropov in his avowed intention to improve economic performance. The changes do not, however, provide any clear indications of how far Andropov may try to go in reforming the economy.

None of the changes in the field of foreign affairs points to any major discontinuity in current lines of foreign policy. The demotion of Falin and rumored intent to abolish the Secretariat's International Information Department will not alter Soviet policy on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) but could take some of the edge off Soviet efforts to reach opinion leaders in Western Europe.

* * * * *

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR (Mautner, M.)

Report 546-CA
February 2, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/3 #154040
BY WJ NARA DATE 12/14/15

(U) Politburo: One New Member

The regular plenum in November 1982 dropped Kirilenko from the Politburo and Secretariat, officially on grounds of ill health. He was 76 years old and perhaps too rigid on such issues as resource allocation and China policy, to judge from his statements over the years and the emerging line of Andropov.

The plenum also promoted Aliyev, age 59, from candidate to full membership in the Politburo. He became the second-ranking official in the government a few days later when he was named first deputy premier by the Supreme Soviet. (Arkhipov, 75, the other first deputy, is not a Politburo member.) Aliyev worked under Andropov as KGB chairman of Azerbaijan from 1967 to 1969 and probably had Andropov's recommendation for the top party job in Baku, which he held from 1969 to 1982. Aliyev evidently is focusing initially on bottlenecks in transportation.

Party Secretariat: Realignment

(U) It can be inferred that CPSU Secretary and Brezhnev crony Chernenko was eased out of the direction of party personnel and Politburo staff work and into the monitoring of ideological and cultural matters. (Chernenko was named chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union, in effect replacing Suslov, the senior secretary for propaganda, culture, and international communism, who had been chairman of that commission from 1954 until his death in January 1982.)

(U) Ryzhkov, a 53-year-old technocrat, was named party secretary at the same plenum that formally dropped Kirilenko; Ryzhkov reportedly heads a new Economics Department in the Secretariat. (The new body reportedly is taking charge of key personnel affairs in state economic agencies and is planning changes in economic policy.)

(U) Stukalin (age 59), new head of the Secretariat's Propaganda Department, was deputy editor of Pravda from 1965 to 1970. He seems better qualified for his present post than his predecessor, Tyazhelnikov, who has gone into diplomatic exile in Romania.

(C/NF) Falin, first deputy chief of the International Information Department in the Secretariat, has become a commentator for Izvestiya. IID chief Zamyatin is rumored to be awaiting a

diplomatic assignment. Rumor also has it that the IID itself may be abolished for having served Brezhnev as a kind of public affairs bureau that usurped the function of Gromyko and his lieutenants. Falin and the IID have been effective in cultivating opinion leaders in Western Europe on such issues as INF.

(U) A Soviet official told a Western reporter that Stepan Chervonenko (67), ambassador to France since 1973, has replaced Nikolay Pegov (77) as chief of the Secretariat's Cadres Abroad department, which monitors Soviet diplomatic and foreign trade missions.

(U) Brezhnev aide Aleksandrov-Agentov remains in good standing, but others (Blatov, Golikov, Samoteykin, and Tsukanov) may have been dispersed.

(C/NF) Komsomol: Rejuvenated

The directorate of the Young Communist League has long been a virtual appendage of the Secretariat. Leader Pastukhov (49) was shifted to Stukalin's vacant post as chairman of the State Committee on Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade. Pastukhov's deputy, Mishin (39), once involved in KGB liaison, was named Komsomol first secretary.

(C/NF) Security and Police: Overhaul

Newly designated KGB chief Chebrikov reportedly has good personal relations with Andropov and evidently will keep the palace guard in safe hands for him. Fedorchuk's transfer to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) sets the stage for a more vigorous attack on domestic corruption. The removal of Shchelokov as MVD leader is clearly a setback for the Brezhnev-Chernenko clan, to which his career had been closely tied. (Rumor holds that Shchelokov is under house arrest on charges of corruption and embezzlement, while Brezhnev's son-in-law Churbanov has been fired from his post as MVD first deputy chief and will head the Murmansk Oblast militia.)

State Bureaucracy: Only Dented

(U) The top-ranking casualty so far has been Makeyev, 52, one of the 13 deputy premiers in the 15-man Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Makeyev is believed to have specialized in light industry and was named a secretary of the Trade Unions Council. No successor has been identified.

(U) Very few of the approximately 85 portfolio-holding members of the Council of Ministers have been replaced.

(U) A purge of some of the many elders in the top economic bureaucracy may have been presaged by the replacement of Railroads Minister Pavlovskiy (60) with Konarev (55), Rural Construction Minister Khitrov (71) with Danilenko (46), and Internal Trade Minister Struyev (76) with Vashchenko (63). The appointment of Vashchenko is again suggestive of preference for engineers and hints at links between Andropov and Politburo member Shcherbitskiy, who is party boss of the Ukraine, where Vashchenko was a deputy premier.

(U) Corruption in the Soviet sports world may have prompted the replacement of Pavlov (54) as chairman of the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports by Gramov (55), former deputy chief in the Propaganda Department, CPSU Central Committee.

(C/NF) Below the Council of Ministers level, rejuvenation of the Foreign Ministry's top echelon started with the appointment of Komplektov (50) and Kapitsa (61) to fill vacancies in the ranks of Gromyko's deputies. Deputy Foreign Ministers Il'ichev (76) and Firubin (74) may be due for retirement because of age.


(U) Regional Party Apparatus: Youth Served

The death of Belorussian party leader Kiselev in January left open the Politburo candidate member seat usually reserved for that official. Slyunkov, 53, the new party head in Minsk, had been deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan since 1974. His career has been in the management of farm tractor production.

Aliyev's slot as party first secretary of Azerbaijan went to his 49-year-old associate Bagirov, who is a propaganda specialist.

Prepared by Sidney I. Ploss
x29186

Approved by Martha Mautner
x29536



(C/NF) Soviet Personnel Changes Since the Death of Brezhnev

| | | |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| Politburo members | Andrey Kirilenko released "for reasons of health and at his own request" | 22 November 1982 |
| | First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Geydar Aliyev promoted from candidate to full member | 22 November 1982 |
| Party Secretariat | Kirilenko released | 22 November 1982 |
| | Nikolay Ryzhkov, former First Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commit- tee (Gosplan), "elected" | 22 November 1982 |
| | Valentin Falin dropped from the International Information Department; Leonid Zamyatin rumored to have left and the IID to be abolished | 20 January 1983 |
| | Nikolay Pegov rumored to have been replaced by Stepan Chervonenko as Cadres Abroad chief | 25 January 1983 |
| First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers | Aliyev appointed to Coun- cil of Ministers; subse- quently replaced as Azerbai- jan party chief by former Azerbaijan Party Secretary Kyamran Bagirov | 24 November 1982 3 December 1982 |
| Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers | Valentin Makeyev released and named secretary and member of the Presidium of the Trade Unions Council | 20 January 1983 |
| Minister of Railways | Ivan Pavlovskiy replaced by First Deputy Minister of Railways Nikolay Konarev | 29 November 1982 |
| Minister of Internal Trade | Aleksandr Struyev replaced by Grigoriy Vashchenko | 21 January 1983 |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- II -

| | | |
|--|--|-------------------|
| Komsomol First Secretary | Boris Pastukhov replaced by former Komsomol secretary Viktor Mishin | 6 December 1982 |
| Chairman, State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade | Boris Stukalin replaced by former Komsomol boss Pastukhov | 7 December 1982 |
| Head, Propaganda Department, CPSU Central Committee | Yevgeniy Tyazhelnikov replaced by Stukalin, former chairman of state publishing committee | 7 December 1982 |
| USSR Ambassador to Romania | Tyazhelnikov appointed | 26 December 1982 |
| Minister of Internal Affairs | Vitaliy Fedorchuk replaced Nikolay Shchelokov, "in connection with his transfer to other work" | 17 December 1982 |
| | (Yuriy Churbanov rumored to have been ousted as First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs) | (14 January 1983) |
| Chairman, Committee for State Security (KGB) | Viktor Chebrikov, former First Deputy Chairman of KGB, replaced Fedorchuk | 17 December 1982 |
| First secretary, Communist Party of Belorussia | Nikolay Slyunkov, former Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, replaced Tikhon Kiselev, whose death was announced on 11 January 1983 | 13 January 1983 |

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 8, 1983

Sov. P.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*SUBJECT: Congressional Inquiry about U.S. Posture
on Plot to Assassinate the Pope

Attached (Tab I) is an inquiry from Congressman Larry McDonald (Georgia) that, in my mind, is representative of an increasing concern among the American people that our Administration is distancing itself from the investigation or not being as cooperative as it could be with the Italian authorities. I am not presently in the loop regarding our actual activities and therefore do not know whether or not these concerns are legitimate. I do believe that it may be time to urgently reassess our public affairs posture to determine if it can better reflect the President's personal instincts about the alleged sinister role of Soviet bloc intelligence services in the assassination attempt. Is there some appropriate and qualified manner in which we can step up our expressions of outrage? Will our intelligence gathering activities in this connection eventually permit us to make some statement to the American people? It calls to mind Evan Galbraith's comment supportive of our position on Soviet attempts to dominate the European gas market in the 1990's -- "If not us -- who? -- if not now -- when?"

Attachment

Tab I Letter from McDonald

cc: Peter Sommer
Ken deGraffenreid
Norman Bailey
Dennis Blair
Mort Allin
Chuck Tyson

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
103 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-2931

COMMITTEE:
ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEES:
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SEAPOWER AND STRATEGIC
AND CRITICAL MATERIALS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

January 27, 1983

SUITE 212
MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30064
TELEPHONE: (404) 422-4480

301 FEDERAL BUILDING
ROME, GEORGIA 30161
TELEPHONE: (404) 291-7777

POST OFFICE BUILDING
ROSSVILLE, GEORGIA 30741
TELEPHONE: (404) 866-2222

121797

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Shocking evidence continues to build up that the Soviet KGB was behind the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul a year and a half ago. Initial reports of the KGB's involvement appeared first in the newsletter of one of my part-time staff members and has since been confirmed by "The Reader's Digest and NBC Television News, especially correspondent Marvin Kalb.

The initial NBC presentation of "The Man Who Shot the Pope" appeared in 1982 and an updated version appeared just prior to your State of the Union message on Tuesday, January 25th, 1983.

New information revealed by the updated program seemed to fully confirm that the KGB was responsible for the attempted assassination of the Pope, primarily due to his encouragement of the Solidarity freedom movement in Poland. The conclusion becomes even more significant when one realizes that the new Soviet dictator Yuri Andropov, was head of the KGB at that time.

Correspondent Kalb revealed that American newsmen and Italian authorities investigating the attempted assassination have been urged to suppress the Soviet KGB connection by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department. Nevertheless, Italy and Mr. Kalb have courageously pursued their investigation into links between the Soviets and the murder attempt on the Pope.

Mr. Kalb said the apparent reason for American reluctance to let Italian authorities and investigating newsmen make that connection is United States concern over the international repercussions, specifically, ongoing arms control talks and trade issues between our nation and the Soviets. In other words, he implied that a massive coverup is being attempted by not only the Soviets, but also by the United States.

Page 2

The Honorable President Reagan

In your most recent press conference, you were questioned about the KGB connection, but indicated that you had no more information on the attack against the Pope than did the newsmen in the audience. Frankly, one finds that hard to believe, given the resources of the CIA and other U. S. intelligence agencies.

One must ask whether a deliberate attempt is being made at the highest levels of our government to suppress the KGB's involvement in the assassination attempt to preserve nonexistent "detente," arms control talks and trade. I sincerely hope and pray that this is not the case.

Therefore, I would appreciate knowing what officials, agencies, departments or persons representing you have been instructed to have KGB complicity played down or muffled in statements by American officials. What guidelines, if any, have been issued on this matter by you, or persons representing you?

For officials of our government to suppress evidence of such a horrible crime would be immoral and put us into the same category of the nation that plotted the assassination. It would be detrimental to our own national security and show our allies, such as Italy, that we will not stand by them in a confrontation with our common adversary, the Soviet Union. It would be appeasement at its worst since Neville Chamberlain's time.

Therefore, I respectfully request that you order the CIA to cooperate fully with Italian authorities in their investigation of the assassination attempt of the Pope. Also, I urge that you order the State Department to exhibit the same measure of cooperation and assistance. Further, I respectfully ask that you immediately tell the American people on nationwide televisions about the evidence compiled to date, regarding the KGB connection, and what steps the Administration is taking in retaliation against the Soviets.


You have repeatedly demonstrated in the past that your instincts are sound and that your knowledge about the aims of the Soviet Union and its plans to dominate our world is complete. It is imperative that you, as leader of the Free World, must continue to chart a moral

Page 3

The Honorable Ronald Reagan

path and not allow your Administration to become bogged down in a matter that is much, much more serious than Watergate.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Larry P. McDonald". The signature is fluid and somewhat stylized, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

Larry P. McDonald, M.C.

LPM/tbaw

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1983

INFORMATION

SOV. P.

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID *Kd*

SUBJECT: Georgiy Arbatov

Attached for your information is an excellent paper which argues that Soviet Institute of the USA Director Georgiy Arbatov is a sophisticated and effective deception and disinformation agent. It was written by former KGB active measures officer Stan Levchenko who defected to the US in October 1979.

The paper provides insight on the perspective in which Arbatov's activities should be judged. It also makes clear that the Soviet term "active measures" is a different and much broader concept than what we call covert action. Active measures, as practiced by the Soviets, combines political action, both public and covert, with propaganda (i.e., aimed at publics), disinformation (i.e., aimed at leaderships), and deception.

Walt Raymond is arranging for Levchenko to brief the staff.

Attachment

Tab I The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder - "Unmasking Moscow's 'Institute of the USA'"

cc: Norm Bailey
 Dennis Blair
 Dick Boverie
 Paula Dobriansky
 Sven Kraemer
 John Lenczowski
 Cary Lord
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UNMASKING MOSCOW'S "INSTITUTE OF THE U.S.A."

INTRODUCTION

In the months following the death of Soviet ruler Leonid Brezhnev, the United States and the West will be searching for clues that reveal the thinking of the Kremlin's new leadership. A key source of such "insights" into Soviet attitudes surely will be Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov who heads a Communist Party-run organization in Moscow called The Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada.

Arbatov has become the darling of the U.S. press in the past decade. He visits America frequently, speaks English, discusses U.S. politics in a native American idiom and has managed to create the impression that he dares speak candidly, even critically, about internal Soviet matters. Is it any wonder that Arbatov is often interviewed by American journalists, meets with American editors in plush executive dining rooms and even has appeared on American television? Is it any wonder that Arbatov is given the kind of access and forums in the U.S. that absolutely are forbidden to any American in the Soviet Union? With the U.S.--particularly American journalists--starved for any contact to Moscow "insiders," Arbatov is able to dish up what looks like a feast. What he really serves, however, is a menu of deception and disinformation.

The real Georgiy Arbatov scarcely resembles the image that he carefully has created for himself. He purports, for example, to have a direct pipeline to high-level Kremlin figures and to be one of the top advisers to the Kremlin on matters relating to the United States. There is absolutely no evidence supporting this. He purports to be, and is widely treated as if he is, the head of a Soviet version of an American independent think tank. He is not. His Institute was created solely to serve Soviet intelligence organizations and needs. He is what is known in the U.S.S.R. as a "faithful soldier" of the Soviet Communist Party. He and his

Institute even have been involved in so-called Active Measures--activities that include overt and covert propaganda, manipulation of American and Canadian front organizations, forgeries and other means of deliberate deception.

The time has come, in the wake of the Brezhnev death, to view Arbatov and the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada for what they are--important international arms of Moscow's intelligence and disinformation campaigns. To regard Arbatov and his Institute as anything less dangerous will seriously impair America's ability to evaluate correctly the policies and actions of the post-Brezhnev Soviet Union.

INSTITUTE OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA -- BACKGROUND

At least seven of the social sciences institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences have very specific functions, some of which do not belong to the "conventional" institutes of the Academy of Sciences. These are the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), the Institute of the Far East, the Institute of Africa, the Institute of Latin America, the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of International Workers' Movement.

Although some researchers working for these institutes conduct studies in history, economy and cultural life of foreign countries, the research is not the main reason for their existence.

The large army of scientists and researchers, some of whom are full members of the Academy of Sciences, is working on projects designated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR (CC CPSU) and, more specifically by the International Department (ID) of the CC CPSU. This department was established in the mid-1950s. Some of its main aims are to maintain relations with and provide guidance to the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries, to promote relations between the CC CPSU and socialist and other opposition parties of the capitalist countries, to establish and maintain contacts with some individuals--members of the ruling parties of developed nations and of the Third World--and to supervise the activity of the Soviet "front" organizations. Two functions of the International Department CC CPSU are considered by the Soviet leadership as of utmost importance: 1) to work out long range tactical and strategic plans for the Soviet external policy (in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); 2) to plan and implement (in cooperation with the KGB and GRU intelligence agencies) Active Measures¹ aimed against the West.

¹ See: John Barron, "The KGB's Magical War for Peace," Reader's Digest, October 1982, p. 211. Also: Soviet Covert Action. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, February 6, 19, 1980, pp. 59-87.

It is the International Department CC CPSU which needed the assistance of Soviet scholars specializing in studies of modern history, economy and military potential of the West. With this the International Department would have the knowledge necessary to implement directives of the Soviet Politburo on foreign policy and on a variety of Active Measures.

Almost as soon as the International Department CC CPSU had been established in the mid-1950s, the Soviet Politburo issued a directive to organize or expand the activities of the Institutes of the Academy of Sciences. Most subsequently were established in the 1950s or 1960s. Since then links between these institutes and the CC CPSU have become closer every year.

The director of any of these institutes gets the post only by approval of the International Department CC CPSU. The International Department with the help of the KGB also supervises the personnel policy of the institutes. Many key positions are filled by retired officers of the International Department or former or present KGB intelligence officers. The annual plans of research projects are approved by the International Department. The Academy of Sciences in this sense plays the role of a funding organization.

The Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada plays an extremely important role in the network established by the CC CPSU. The U.S.A. and Canada Institute was organized in November 1967 as the only Soviet Institute initially designed to concentrate its research on one country. Originally known as the USA Institute, its activities were expanded to include Canada in 1974. Since then, the official name of the institute has been the USA and Canada Institute. Formally it is subordinate to the Economics Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences.² However, it actually functions under the International Department CC CPSU.

The Institute studies every aspect of U.S. and Canadian affairs, including economics, politics, management, scientific and technological developments, and military potential. The institute has a large number of specialized departments. Three of them are generally considered to be the most important. Notes Nora Beloff in an account of a Soviet defector:

The first department, under Vitaly Zhurkin, studies U.S. policies, foreign and domestic. The foreign affairs section is divided regionally into the USSR, the Far East, the Near and Middle East, Europe, Latin America and the Third World. Each specializes in relations between its area and North America. The department also has a group working on immediate issues and another on national minorities, including youth.

² "USSR Institute of the United States of America and Canada." CIA Report, April 1976. Also: Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyclopedia, 3rd edition, vol. 24(1), 1976, p. 128.

The second, which also has foreign and domestic sections, ... deals with the U.S. economy. The foreign section keeps track, among other things, of American-based multinational corporations. The domestic section deals with industry, management, and agriculture.

The third, officially listed as "ideology," is run by a KGB general, Radomir Bogdanov. It manages the libraries and secret archives. It has a special section looking after foreign visitors.... This department also includes the section on U.S. military affairs, headed by General Mikhail Milshtein, a member of the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence.

The Institute has a scientific secretary, Igor Orlenkov, who works in conjunction with all three departments.³

The Soviet defector, Galina Orionova, a former research fellow at the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, in an 1980 interview with Nora Beloff provided rare insight and knowledge of the Institute:

In addition to publishing books and a monthly magazine for general readership, the Institute is expected to furnish information on demand for the Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the KGB. Writers are never told for which of the three they are working. Their main source is Western literature: newspapers, periodicals and books. They also receive Tass dispatches, those for general as well as for limited circulation, oral information from visiting American scholars and... diplomatic material when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs chooses to make it available.⁴

When I was a KGB intelligence officer in the 1970s, I had an opportunity to learn details about the Institute through conversations with officers of the 1st (American) Department of the First Chief Directorate (FCD) of the KGB and of the 12th (Intelligence on the territory of the Soviet Union) Department of the same Directorate.

It is true, for instance, that the Institute provides the International Department CC CPSU and the KGB with comprehensive studies on virtually every aspect of life in the US and Canada. These studies are mainly used as background material for preparing the Soviet Union's positions on various issues of bilateral relations. But it not true that the Institute plays a

³ Nora Beloff, "Escape from Boredom: A Defector's Story," Atlantic, November 1980, p. 48.

⁴ Ibid, p. 44.

serious role in the Soviet Politburo's decision making mechanism. It influences Kremlin leaders only indirectly. At the same time it is the only institution outside the KGB which has detailed knowledge of the political, economic and other processes in the modern North American society.

A large number of the Institute's papers are used for purposes having little to do with scientific research. One of the many clients of the Institute is Service "A" (Active Measures) of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, which plans and implements global and regional active measures with the approval of the Soviet Politburo. Almost every product of the Institute can be utilized for this. For instance, data on the activity of multinational corporations is used by the International Department and the KGB to spread disinformation and forgeries in some of the Third World countries to plant seeds of suspicion towards their activities.

Data on U.S. military contractors are used by the Soviet propaganda inside and outside of the U.S. They are used also by Soviet front organizations (such as the World Peace Council) in their anti-American "peaceful campaigns" staged by Moscow.

I personally was told in Moscow that Radomir Bogdanov, deputy director of the Institute, is a high-ranking FCD KGB officer and a former KGB resident in New Delhi who now specializes in Active Measures. He has several subordinates in the Institute who use its name as a cover for their Active Measures activities.

Other departments of the KGB also are actively utilizing the Institute for their purposes. The officers of the 12th department (intelligence on the territory of the USSR) personally or through their conscripts in the Institute are meticulously collecting information on political backgrounds, personal profiles, and financial situations of visiting American scholars and political figures to be able to use these data in possible recruitment approaches.

The Institute has direct connections with the most active Soviet front organizations, primarily with the Soviet Peace Committee. Institute Director Arbatov is a member of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee (SPC) and a member of the World Peace Council. His deputy, V.V. Shurkin, is Chairman of Disarmament Commission of the SPC, Vice President of the SPC⁵ and a member of the WPC.

Using his credentials as an officer of the Institute, Radomir Bogdanov frequently takes part in disarmament conferences--in Washington, New York and Europe. There he strongly pushes the Soviet line and looks for Americans who can be persuaded to follow it.

⁵ World Peace Council, List of Members, 1908-1983. Published by the Information Centre of the World Peace Council, Helsinki, pp. 144, 150.

The leaders of the Institute are involved in a large scale deception game aimed at the American scholars, journalists and political consultants. They foster the myth that the Institute has access to the formulation of confidential positions of the Soviet leaders toward the US and that they are unofficially "delivering" "objective" opinions of the Kremlin to respectable American counterparts. There is no evidence to support this. In fact, in Moscow it is widely known to be untrue. Nonetheless, some American journalists and specialists in foreign policy fall for this myth. Some points outlined by the Institute's specialists on disinformation are represented to the readers and TV viewers as the position of Kremlin leaders. For instance, in its January 2, 1982, issue, the Washington Post called Arbatov, "director of the Kremlin's think tank on North American affairs." In the December 16, 1980, issue of the New York Times, Arbatov is called "a senior adviser on American affairs in the Russian hierarchy." These nonexistent titles artificially "boost" Arbatov's credibility for the American audience.

WHO IS GEORGIY ARBATOV?

Doctor of Historical Sciences Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov became the director of the Institute when it was established in November 1967. He was elected to full membership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1974. The same year he became a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In March 1981 he was elected as a member of the CC CPSU. He is also chairman of the Scientific Council on Economic, Political and Ideological Problems of the United States--a joint venture of the International Department CC CPSU and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.⁶ Arbatov belongs to the World Peace Council⁷ and to the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the chairman is Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden).

Arbatov was born in the Soviet Ukraine on May 19, 1923, and served in the Soviet Army from 1941 to 1944. In 1943 he graduated from the Institute of International Relations (which provides cadres for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Department CC CPSU and KGB). For several years he worked for the Foreign Literature Publishing House in Moscow. During the 1950s he was associated with the journals Questions of Philosophy (the organ of the CC CPSU), New Times (the organ of the International Department CC CPSU and a cover for KGB operatives) and Kommunist (the organ of the CC CPSU). From 1960 to 1962 Arbatov was a political observer for the magazine Problems of Peace and Socialism which is published in Prague (the organ of the International Department CC CPSU). Then for two years he was chief of the Ideological Section at the Institute of World Economics

⁶ CIA report, op. cit., April 1976.

⁷ World Peace Council. List of members, 1980-1983.

and International Relations. Since November 1967, he has been Director of the Institute of the USA.⁸

Arbatov has no academic background. Before he became the Director of the Institute he was a typical Party journalist, actively cooperating with the International Department CC CPSU. He was what they call in the Soviet Union "a fighter on the ideological front." And, obviously he had very good rapport with the comrades in the Central Committee. He became the Director of the Institute when he was 41 years old--very young for a director by Soviet bureaucratic standards. That he was appointed to this post despite his weak academic background strongly indicates that he was a trusted Party cadre well versed in conducting propaganda and Active Measures operations.

Arbatov proved to his superiors in the Central Committee that he is a "faithful soldier" of the Party. Immediately after the creation of the Institute, he started to provide "cover" jobs to the KGB and GRU officers and started to strictly follow the Party guidelines. He personally began traveling abroad several times a year as a member of scientific groups, delegations or Soviet "public" organizations--all of which are controlled by the CC CPSU--or by himself.

By the early 1970s Arbatov forged contacts and friendly relations with many prominent American and European scholars and political figures. With the help of the KGB's specialists in disinformation he created the myth that he is the "chief spokesman" of the Kremlin on Soviet-American relations, on problems of disarmament and so on. The Soviets also started to spread the rumor that Arbatov was very close to the Leonid Brezhnev and that the latter confided to him his views on prospects for Soviet-American relations.

On some occasions, during private conversations, Arbatov reportedly has expressed "unorthodox" views on political issues and on the situation in the Soviet Politburo. He has helped create the false impression, for instance, that there are "doves" and "hawks" in the Soviet leadership. Some of Arbatov's contacts do not realize that it is practically impossible for any Soviet academician, diplomat or journalist to travel abroad and openly express views which stray from the Party line. Like everyone else, before starting a trip abroad, Arbatov is summoned to the International Department of the CC CPSU for instructions on the political line that he is to express in his conversations and discussions. Arbatov reportedly gets these instructions from International Department chief Boris Ponomarev or from his first deputy, Vadim Zagladin.

⁸ CIA report. A large part of Dr. Arbatov's biography was published in Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (10 sozyv) (Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 10th Session) Moscow, 1979, p. 32.

Soviet leaders take part in planning and implementing the Active Measures pursued by Arbatov and his Institute.

To give Arbatov more credibility, his Party superiors in 1981 arranged his "election" to the CC CPSU. This made him a full member of the Soviet establishment. His credentials now include membership in the Academy of Sciences, Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet and member of the CC CPSU. His titles give credibility to the other high ranking officials in the Institute, such as the KGB officer Radomir Bogdanov, or GRU veteran Mikhail Milshtein.

Arbatov has visited the United States more than ten times and has greeted hundreds of American visitors in Moscow. The scope of his "interests" is enormous. On some occasions he will meet with the representatives of such reputable think tanks as Brookings Institution or the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.

On other occasions he will have discussions in his plush office in Moscow with the leaders of the Communist Party of the US. He also has had discussions with prominent American Democratic and Republican politicians. For instance, in 1980 he had a meeting in Moscow with Rep. Stephen J. Solarz, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Also present at the meeting was the First Deputy Chief of the International Department CC CPSU, Vadim Zagladin. In the same year, a month later, he met with a private American group headed by former Republican Governor of Pennsylvania, William W. Scranton.

Arbatov further has met with controversial American organizations such as the Institute for Policy Studies. In April 1981 a group of Americans visited Moscow under the auspices of the Institute for Policy Studies of Washington. One of the key members of the delegation was Marcus G. Raskin, a senior fellow of the IPS. This group had talks with anonymous "senior Soviet officials" and Arbatov and Zagladin.

Arbatov seems to try to give as many interviews to American TV stations or newspapers as is possible. During the last four years, he was interviewed or quoted by the major American television networks more than 20 times. Every article he writes in the Soviet Party organ Pravda is played and replayed by the American mass media. For instance, one of Arbatov's articles published in Pravda in April 1980 had been published by the Wall Street Journal on April 29, 1980 and by the Chicago Tribune on May 10. Some American newspapers seem to accept these articles at "face value." They forget that every article in Pravda, whoever the author is, must be approved by the International Department and the propaganda department of the CC CPSU.

At times, Arbatov appears at some meetings which have nothing in common with his position. For instance, in March 1981,

he headed the Soviet delegation to the First Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.⁸ His presence indicates that that Arbatov's mentors in Moscow consider him to be a multi-purpose asset. It also indicates that he is used to guide leftist and gullible groups, like the physicians organization, to endorse the Soviet line on critical international matters.

During his visit to Moscow in May 1982, Reverend Billy Graham had an unprecedentedly long meeting with Arbatov--3 hours and 15 minutes. Nothing was published on the contents of the meeting, but during a press conference in Moscow, Graham pointed to Arbatov and said "I have met a very wonderful official here...."⁹

For years, the U.S. government seemed blind to Arbatov's disinformation campaign. But in April 1981, the US Department of State finally decided to limit Arbatov's access to US mass media. As a retaliatory measure against Moscow's refusal to allow American representatives to appear on Soviet television, the State Department denied a visa extension to Arbatov to keep him from appearing on the "Bill Moyers' Journal" program on the Public Broadcasting Service. Arbatov apparently had been gearing up for a major propaganda effort and was to appear with his subordinates, retired GRU General Mikhail Milshtein and Vitaliy Kobysh, a journalist who reportedly has close ties with the KGB. In response to the State Department action, Arbatov became furious. He lost his temper and directly attacked the U.S. Government. "Now I will understand a bit more about the policies of the new Administration than I knew before", he stated.¹⁰

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that Georgiy Arbatov is an eloquent person who knows the United States well. It is possible that his ideas (nobody knows which) are occasionally taken into consideration by the Soviet leaders. It is possible also that some of the points he makes during his meetings with prominent Americans represent real positions of the Kremlin.

But it is absolutely clear that Arbatov is just one of the actors in a large-scale Soviet deception game which the Kremlin leaders wage against the West, primarily against the United

⁸ Summary of Proceedings of the First Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, printed by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 635 Huntington Ave., Boston, Mass. Also: Washington Post, March 24, 1981. p. A14.

⁹ The New York Times, May 9, 1982, p. 20.

¹⁰ The New York Times, April 2, 1981.

States. Whenever he has had the opportunity, Arbatov has tried to undermine the growing American consensus that Moscow's massive arms buildup endangers world peace. During the Carter Administration, for example, Arbatov "confided" to American journalists that while Carter and his Administration spoke of detente and of ending the arms race, militaristic right-wing forces in the U.S. were doing everything possible to sow mistrust and hostility.¹¹

Arbatov stressed that the U.S. had suffered a long succession of setbacks and thus sensibly concluded that the "positions of strength" and cold war policies were senseless and dangerous.¹²

During the 1980 election campaign and the first years of the Reagan Administration, Arbatov has tried to derail American attempts to restore a U.S.-Soviet military balance. Arbatov told an American reporter, for example, that it would not be easy to increase the Pentagon budget and that Washington cannot cut back severely on social appropriations.¹³ In a Pravda article cited by the New York Times, Arbatov pushed for the Soviet approach to arms limitation and the settlement of the Middle East problem.¹⁴

A Chicago Tribune article cites Arbatov's arguments dismissing the impact that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had on U.S.-Soviet relations. He also criticized the improving U.S. relations with Peking.¹⁵

And when speaking to a nationwide U.S. television audience--something no comparable American has been allowed to do in the Soviet Union--Arbatov with a straight face maintained that Moscow was not involved in the imposition of martial law in Poland. Instead, he stated that what the American government is doing regarding Poland "is very dangerous" because this is a real blow to the fundamentals of the relations of peaceful coexistence. Said Arbatov to the American audience, "I think, the Administration of the United States has used events [in Poland] to create some sort of international crisis to internationalize the events in Poland."¹⁶

That such statements comes from Moscow is hardly surprising. Too often, however, Arbatov and the Institute of the U.S.A. and

¹¹ Georgiy Arbatov, "The Dangers of a New Cold War," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1978, pp. 33-40.

¹² Chicago Tribune, May 10, 1980, p. 10.

¹³ The New York Times, October 5, 1980. Interview by Craig Whitney with Arbatov in Moscow.

¹⁴ The New York Times, May 5, 1981, review of Arbatov's article in Pravda.

¹⁵ Chicago Tribune, May 10, 1980, p. 10. Wall Street Journal, April 29, 1980.

¹⁶ The CBS television network program "Face the Nation," Sunday, January 17, 1982.

Canada are treated as some sort of independent Soviet analysts whose observations deserve greater weight and credibility than those of Pravda's editorial page. The truth is that Arbatov differs barely at all from any other Soviet employed by the International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee. He exists to fulfill the propaganda, disinformation and even espionage aims of the Kremlin.

Prepared for the Heritage Foundation
by Stanislav A. Levchenko

Stanislav Levchenko was born in Moscow in 1941, the son of a Soviet Army general. After attending special schools, he graduated with advanced degrees in Asian and Japanese affairs from the Institute of Peoples of Asia and Africa, of the USSR's Academy of Science. Between 1957 and 1971, he worked with various "front" organizations affiliated directly with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. In 1971, he joined the KGB Foreign Intelligence Service as a staff operations officer. From 1975 to 1979, he posed as a Soviet journalist in Japan. In fact, he was working for the KGB, helping direct Soviet covert operations in Japan and East Asia and helping influence and recruit Japanese officials and journalists. In 1979, he was promoted to the rank of KGB Major and appointed Acting Chief of the Active Measures (Covert Action) Group of the Tokyo Residency of the KGB. In October of that year, he requested and was granted political asylum in the U.S. so that, he explains, he could "live in peace and freedom."

Margo Howard
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
THE NEW REPUBLIC

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THE ANDROPOV HOAX

The Americanization of Yuri

BY EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN



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How a short, burly thug became a tall, dapper Chubby Checker fan.

THE ANDROPOV FILE

BY EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

WHEN Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was merely head of the K.G.B., his image was that of the stereotypic hard-line "police boss." His major accomplishment, according to C. L. Sulzberger, writing in *The New York Times* in 1974, was "a fairly successful campaign to throttle the recent wave of liberal dissidence." Nor was he viewed as much of an admirer of foreign culture. In 1980 Harrison E. Salisbury wrote in the *Times* that Andropov "has been working for three years on schemes to minimize the mingling of foreigners and natives. . . . Now Andropov's hands have been freed to embark on all kinds of repressive measures designed to enhance the 'purity' of Soviet society." Completing this picture of a tough, xenophobic, wave-throttling cop, Andropov was physically described, in another *Times* story, as a "shock-haired, burly man."

Andropov's accession to power last November was accompanied by a corresponding ennoblement of his image. Suddenly he became, in *The Wall Street Journal*, "silver-haired and dapper." His stature, previously reported in *The Washington Post* as an unimpressive "five feet, eight inches," was abruptly elevated to "tall and urbane." The *Times* noted that Andropov "stood conspicuously taller than most" Soviet leaders and that "his spectacles, intense gaze and donnish demeanor gave him the air of a scholar." *U.S. News & World Report*, on the other hand, reported that "he has notoriously bad eyesight and wears thick spectacles."

His linguistic abilities also came in for scrutiny. Harrison Salisbury wrote, "The first thing to know about Mr. Andropov is that he speaks and reads English." Another *Times* story took note of his "fluent English." *Newsweek* reported that even though he had never met a "senior" American official, "he spoke English and relaxed with American novels." Confirmation of his command of English appeared in *Time*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, and *The Washington Post*. *The Economist* credited him with "a working knowledge of German," and *U.S. News & World Report* added Hungarian to the growing list. And this quadrilingual prodigy was skilled in the use of language, too:

Edward Jay Epstein is the author of *The Rise and Fall of Diamonds: The Shattering of a Brilliant Illusion* (Simon and Schuster), and is currently completing a book on international deception.

Time described him as reportedly "a witty conversationalist," and "a bibliophile" and "connoisseur of modern art" to boot. *The Washington Post* passed along a rumor that he was partly Jewish. (Andropov was rapidly becoming That Cosmopolitan Man.)

Soon there were reports that Andropov was a man of extraordinary accomplishment, with some interests and proclivities that are unusual in a former head of the K.G.B. According to an article in *The Washington Post*, Andropov "is fond of cynical political jokes with an anti-regime twist. . . . collects abstract art, likes jazz and Gypsy music," and "has a record of stepping out of his high party official's cocoon to contact dissidents." Also, he swims, "plays tennis," and wears clothes that are "sharply tailored in a West European style." Besides the Viennese waltz and the Hungarian czarda, he "dances the tango gracefully." (At a press conference within hours of Andropov's accession, President Reagan, asked about the prospects for agreement with him, used the unfortunate metaphor, "It takes two to tango.") *The Wall Street Journal* added that Andropov "likes Glenn Miller records, good scotch whisky, Oriental rugs, and American books." To the list of his musical favorites, *Time* added "Chubby Checker, Frank Sinatra, Peggy Lee, and Bob Eberly," and, asserting that he had once worked as a Volga boatman, said that he enjoyed singing "hearty renditions of Russian songs" at after-theater parties. *The Christian Science Monitor* suggested that he has "tried his hand at writing verse—in Russian, as it happens, and of a comic variety."

The press was less successful in ferreting out more mundane details of his life. Where, for example, was he born? *The Washington Post* initially reported that he was "a native of Karelia," a Soviet province on the Finnish border. *The New York Times* gave his birthplace as the "southern Ukraine," which is hundreds of miles to the south. And *Time* said he had been born in "the village of Nagutskoye in the northern Caucasus." His birthplace was thus narrowed down to an area stretching from Finland to Iran. There was also some vagueness with respect to his education. *The Wall Street Journal* reported that he had "graduated" from an unnamed "technical college," but *U.S. News & World Report* had him "drop out" of Petrozavodsk University, while *Newsweek* awarded him a diploma from the Rybinsk Water Transportation Technicum, a vocational school


that teaches river navigation. Where had he learned music, art, poetry, Hungarian, German—and English? Harrison Salisbury suggested that he picked up English as a “young man,” but *The Christian Science Monitor* contended that he learned it from a tutor, whom he saw three times a week when he was well into his 40s. The balance of his biography consists almost entirely of official announcements of awards, promotions, and trips as part of official Soviet delegations. *Time* reported him to be a widower. There is no mention, however, of whom or when he married, or whether his wife had shared his interest in jazz, American novels, scotch, telling anti-regime jokes, dancing Viennese waltzes, and visiting liberal dissidents.

The press does, however, furnish a vivid description of his home life at 26 Kutuzov Prospekt—where, according to Hedrick Smith’s book, *The Russians*, Brezhnev himself resided. The scene there seems to have been quite lively, a combination of salon and recital hall. According to *The Washington Post*, Yuri Andropov is “a perfect host.” On some occasions, he would invite “leading dissidents to his home for well-lubricated discussions that sometimes extended to the wee hours of the morning,” after which he would send his guests home in his own chauffeured car. Alternatively, according to Harrison Salisbury in the *Times*, he invites foreign visitors to his country home. Salisbury writes, “A casual visitor to his country house . . . found him listening to an English-language Voice of America broadcast. . . . It was a long-standing habit.” Andropov assiduously reads American books, including, Salisbury notes with quiet pride, his own novel, *The Gates of Hell*. Andropov’s library, according to an earlier *Times* story, also included *Valley of the Dolls*, by Jacqueline Susann, and *How Green Was My Valley*, by Richard Llewellyn. Moreover, according to

Salisbury, Andropov regularly invited dissident musicians to his apartment for “private recitals.” His record collection included the “Glenn Miller Orchestra and other American bands,” and his bar, “scotch and French cognac.” *Time* described his apartment, with the precision of a classified ad, as “5½ rooms,” with such “outstanding features” as “a stereo system” (for jazz), a “sofa” (for dissidents), and “a cabinet of highly polished wood” (for eyes only). These items, wrote *Time*, were “gifts to Andropov from the late Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito.” *The Wall Street Journal*, on the other hand, reported just as authoritatively that Andropov’s home “was furnished with Hungarian furniture, the gift of Janos Kadar, Hungary’s Moscow-backed leader, as an apparent gesture of appreciation for Mr. Andropov’s role in suppressing the Hungarian Revolution.”

The varied descriptions of Andropov’s apartment and his Renaissance style of life come principally from a single source. His name is Vladimir Sakharov, and he is fully credited by *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New York Times*, *Time*, and others for the descriptions of Andropov’s taste in American jazz and novels, his prefer-

ence for imported liquor and furniture, and his “strange attraction for Western culture.” (Sakharov, who is usually described as a “K.G.B. defector,” is not related to Andrei Sakharov, the physicist and human rights activist.) There is, however, some question about the provenance of Vladimir Sakharov as a source. For example, *The Wall Street Journal* not only identified him as a “former K.G.B. agent,” but also said he had defected “this year” (1982) and stipulated that Andropov was “his former boss.” One might reasonably conclude from this that Sakharov had until recently been working in the K.G.B.’s office in Moscow, and that he had defected with important



DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

information about Andropov. In fact, Sakharov did not defect in 1982. He defected eleven years earlier, on July 11, 1971. Sakharov was never actually in the K.G.B., though he does recount two efforts to recruit him; at the time of his defection, he was a 26-year-old diplomat in the Foreign Ministry. And in his own two lengthy accounts of his experiences, he never claimed to know Yuri Andropov.

The first such account appeared in John Barron's *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents*, published by the Reader's Digest Press in 1974. Sakharov had been put in touch with Barron on February 1, 1972. Barron writes that in 1964, when Sakharov was 19 years old and a schoolmate of Andropov's son Igor, he attended a "sexual orgy" at the Andropov apartment, where he "wound up sleeping with a girl in the bed of the man who now heads the K.G.B." Barron now says that he still considers Sakharov's description of the apartment to be "credible," although Sakharov, at the time of his interviews with Barron, "appeared to have a minor drinking problem." It is from this single, seminal visit that the descriptions of Andropov's apartment appear to have sprouted and flourished in the press. Three years ago, Sakharov wrote his own autobiography, *High Treason*, published by Putnam, in which he fails to mention either the "sexual orgy" or any other visit to the Andropov apartment. But he does provide an illuminating, if eerily reminiscent, description of his own home life.

ECHOING his version of Andropov's apartment, Sakharov writes that he himself lived in a "spacious" apartment with furniture from Eastern Europe, a TV, and a piano. He writes: "We always had a high-quality record player and plenty of American popular music recordings . . . with a leaning to jazz stylists, including records by Benny Goodman, Perry Como, and Frank Sinatra." He personally amassed a collection of jazz and "swing music" that included Glenn Miller, Dave Brubeck, Erroll Garner, Charlie Parker, and Duke Ellington. When not listening to records on his stereo, he often "poured a glass of Black & White," "turned on [his] Grundig solid state," and "turned it to the Voice of America." He "religiously" listened to jazz. When he went to the homes of his teenage friends, he writes, "I always took recordings to parties—and usually I'd supply scotch or bourbon or rye as well." (If so, he may well have supplied the jazz records and scotch he later reported he saw in Andropov's home.) He also recalls carrying around with him a copy of *How Green Was My Valley*—one of the books that, years later, he told the *Times* he had seen on Andropov's shelf. (The other book he told the *Times* he saw in Andropov's home in 1964, Jacqueline Susann's *Valley of the Dolls*, was not published until 1966—an interesting anachronism.)

Sakharov recounts that while still a teenager in Moscow he was approached by a man from the C.I.A.,

named "George," who eventually succeeded in recruiting him as a C.I.A. agent in Yemen in 1967. In 1968 he was offered a position in the K.G.B., but he was apprehensive that this would interfere with his work for the C.I.A., and he had his father, an influential diplomatic courier, intervene. His K.G.B. application was then squelched. Later that year Sakharov went off to Egypt as a junior diplomat. It was in Cairo that he defected. More than ten years later, he re-emerged in Los Angeles as an expert on Andropov—but his expertise was based, according to his own accounts, on little more than a teenage reverie.

THE SOURCES for other Andropov details turn out to be similarly elusive. For example, the remarkable account of a fully "Westernized" Andropov sending his car to fetch dissidents to his home appeared originally in *The Washington Post's* Sunday "Outlook" section on May 30, 1982. The author, Charles Fenyvesi, explained to me that he had heard the story secondhand from émigrés in Washington, and that he was told that the person who had been entertained by Andropov was a former Russian dissident now living in Israel. Fenyvesi, under deadline pressure, was able to reach the source in Israel only at the last minute, and the source then said that he had never met Andropov in his life and that his contact had been with another K.G.B. officer. Confronted with the problem of having his source disclaim the story, Fenyvesi let the original account stand, adding that the witness "now denies having met with Andropov."

Harrison Salisbury's account of a visit to Andropov had so many fly-on-the-wall details about his dacha life that even an editor at the *Times* presumed it was based on firsthand experience. Later, Salisbury told me that his source was a "non-Soviet foreign visitor," and declined to identify him further. (By publishing his story, though, Salisbury has probably identified his source to Andropov and the K.G.B., who presumably keep records of foreign visitors to the dacha; it is only *Times* readers who are kept in the dark.) Whoever the mystery visitor was, his description of Andropov's voracious appetite for American novels, American newsmagazines, and English-language broadcasts on the Voice of America presupposes that Andropov has some fluency in English. Salisbury asserts that "Mr. Andropov is the first Russian leader since Czar Nicholas II who is comfortable in the English tongue" (which omits Lenin, who spoke both English and German).

Yet despite such flat assertions, Andropov's grasp of English turns out to be questionable. No Western journalist has yet interviewed him. Malcolm Toon, the former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, who has spoken with Andropov several times, did so in Russian, not English. Ambassador Toon says he strongly doubts that Andropov has any noteworthy ability to speak English. If it had been known in the diplomatic community in Moscow, he says, he would have been briefed on it.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, shares Toon's skepticism. The C.I.A.'s national intelligence officer for the Soviet Union, who had helped prepare the classified C.I.A. biography of Andropov, also denied to me that there had been "any evidence" that he had a "fluent command of English." John F. Burns, the Moscow correspondent of the *Times*, reported on November 20, "Mr. Andropov's English . . . is open to doubt . . . since he did not use it in his meetings with Vice President Bush on Monday, and even had his written documents in English read to him by an interpreter." The possibility remains, of course, that he is a closet English-speaker. But the columnist Joseph Kraft, who was in Moscow last month for *The New Yorker*, came to the conclusion, after countless interviews with Soviet officials and Western diplomats, that Andropov's comprehension of English, if it exists at all, has been ludicrously exaggerated. Specifically, Kraft was told by Giorgi Arbatov, the Soviet Union's most prestigious "Americanologist" and an associate of Andropov's, that Andropov, to his knowledge, does not speak English—though he had taken English lessons at one time. If this assessment is correct, the accounts of Andropov running an English-language salon in a home crammed with Americana are apocryphal.

IN THE hectic excitement following Andropov's succession, newspapers dredged up eyewitness accounts containing flaws and implausibilities that, under different circumstances, might have disqualified them even as journalistic evidence. For example, *The Wall Street Journal*, in a story headlined "Andropov's Ways: Those Who Met Him Call Soviet Boss Charming But Ruthless," featured the account of a British citizen of Russian origin called Nikolai Sharigan. Sharigan, who had been arrested for espionage in Moscow, claimed that he had been hauled before Andropov when the latter was "head of the K.G.B.," and that he heard Andropov remark, "I think the English Queen won't declare war on us just for Sharigan." Sharigan was then packed off to a Soviet labor camp, where he says he spent ten years before being released in 1976. According to this chronology, however, Sharigan's putative meeting with Andropov would have to have taken place in 1966 at the latest. Yet Andropov did not join the K.G.B. until May 1967, which means that if Sharigan did meet the head of the K.G.B., he did not meet Andropov.

Another witness cited in the same "Those Who Met Him" story is Boris Vinokur, a Russian émigré who publishes a Russian-language newspaper in Chicago. Vinokur is quoted as saying, "he could smile at you and still bite your arm off." Although Vinokur describes Andropov's speech as "articulate," his dress as "quite elegant," his manners as "polite," his home furnishings as "Hungarian," his sports as "tennis and swimming," and his smile as "The Andropov smile . . . faintly sinister though outwardly friendly," it turns out that he has

never spoken to Andropov. Vinokur, who defected in 1976, claims only to have seen Andropov at a sanatorium for high-level officials in a forest outside Moscow. Andropov was standing in a group of men some distance from him. He didn't speak with him or even shake hands with him, he says, and the best description he can give of his height is that it is the same as Brezhnev's; i.e., very short. Yet he is also quoted—this time by *The Washington Post*—as saying that Andropov "has the highest I.Q. in the Politburo."

The remaining witnesses who surfaced were Hungarians claiming to have had peripheral encounters with Andropov at diplomatic functions more than a quarter of a century ago. For example, Sandor Kopácsi, a former Budapest police chief, recalls Andropov borrowing the Police Department's gypsy band for a party (though it is not clear why such arrangements would be made personally by the Soviet Ambassador). In a book written in 1979, Kopácsi said that he met Andropov once, at a New Year's Eve party in Budapest in 1955, where he watched Andropov dance with his wife for an hour, and the next day questioned her about her conversation with him. The historical anecdote hunt flushed out a dozen or so Hungarian émigrés willing to claim a brush with Andropov, but not a single concrete detail of his life—such as the name of his wife and/or dancing partner.

WHAT EMERGES from these attempts to piece together a version of Andropov's life is a portrait worthy of "Saturday Night Live": the head of the K.G.B. as one wild and crazy guy. After a hard day at the office repressing dissent, Brezhnev's heir spends the evening at home, telling antiregime jokes in fluent English and playing jazz for dissidents. To be sure, not all the reporting joined this stampede from reality; there were a number of fine examples of more solid and careful reporting, notably the dispatches of John F. Burns and Hedrick Smith in the *Times*. But why the stampede in the first place? Some commentators have made dark references to the Soviet disinformation apparatus. It is unnecessary, however, to plumb such murky depths for an explanation. The excesses that led to the invention of a media Andropov proceed directly from a common conceit of journalism that witnesses and "color" can be found for any great event. When it turned out that the C.I.A. and the State Department had few details about Andropov—not even the name (or fate) of his wife (or mistress)—the press took whatever it could find in the goulash of defectors and émigrés desirous of becoming Andropov experts. For the press, the humbler—and more honest—alternative is to admit that virtually nothing is known about this man called Andropov: not the names of his parents, not his ethnic background, not his education, not his war service, not his preferences in music and literature, not his linguistic abilities, not his ideas. He stands at the head of Russia, but we don't even know how tall.

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(U) SOVIET TRENDS: JANUARY 1983

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Summary

CURRENT ANALYSES

(C) Andropov identified himself personally with the campaign for labor discipline by visiting a Moscow factory. He linked increased productivity to the nation's security against foreign threats and suggested that some prices might have to rise. Andropov in effect stole Chernenko's thunder; the latter has closely identified with the theme of increasing party-people contacts.

(LOU) Chernenko and party ideologues have taken a tougher stance than Andropov on the issue of Soviet aid to revolutionary movements. The subject may be generating controversy behind the facade of party unity maintained since Brezhnev's death.

(LOU) Another bone of contention within the power structure may be the relationship between state experts and party officials. Press commentaries on Lenin's final writings have contained differing signals on this recurring theme.

(C) Soviet journalists are again being goaded to enliven their writings, which nonetheless are to remain inspirational and subject to tight supervision by the political authorities.

(C) The complex and delicate relationship between the Vatican and Moscow produced cross-currents. The Vatican named a Latvian cardinal without consulting Moscow. Earlier, it had appointed two Lithuanian bishops after difficult negotiations. Though the Soviets acquiesced, they continued heavy pressure on the church in Lithuania.

(LOU) Economic indicators for 1982 showed a continuing slowdown in most key sectors. The gains

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in industrial output were well below the planners' modest targets. But gross national product did grow by about 1.6 percent in spite of agriculture's fourth poor year in a row.

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(C) Andropov Courts the Workers

Andropov used an informal visit to Moscow's Ordzhonikidze machine-tool factory on January 31 to project an image of concern for the workers but at the same time to demand discipline from ministers on down. In contrast to Brezhnev's style of relying on set speeches, Andropov struck up a dialogue with workers on the floor. The main topic, predictably, was the need for greater discipline. And everyone from ministers to plant managers to workers was reminded of his or her duty.

But Andropov put some distance between himself and some of the cruder aspects of the discipline campaign. (Many Soviets were reportedly angered by the series of police raids on public places designed to catch workers who were away from their jobs without leave.) Andropov supported a worker's remark that the most important guarantee of good worker discipline was the organization and atmosphere within the work unit rather than "laws" and "administrative sanctions."

Reformers could gain some satisfaction from Andropov's statement that "it is impossible to reduce everything to discipline." His observation that "this [discipline] is a long-term task" did not, however, exclude the possibility of future structural and managerial innovations. In addition, those favoring greater reliance on market mechanisms would have approved of Andropov's implicit support of bringing prices into line with the costs of production. He said that "in our prices there are certain distortions and incongruities, and we are compelled to remove them." (Price hikes for certain construction materials and consumer goods were later reported to have become effective February 1.)

He may have been thinking of regime hardliners when he cited the growing military danger facing the USSR and then observed: "The greater our successes, the stronger our economy, the more our economic affairs are in order, then the stronger our international position will be, the firmer will be peace on earth."

In spite of the recent stress on frankness, Soviet newspapers reporting the event censored the remarks by a worker questioned by Andropov. TASS reported the conversation verbatim on the same day, but the next day's papers printed an identical account except for M. Skripkin's reply when Andropov asked how much he earned a month. TASS quoted him as replying, "Enough. Three hundred and eighty rubles including my pension." In newspaper accounts he was

reported to have replied only, "Enough." The earnings Skripkin said he received were way beyond the legal maximum for people who stay at work beyond retirement age but also draw their pension. His answer evidently was deleted from press accounts to prevent potential complaints from other working pensioners whose incomes had been restricted by law.

Politically, the net effect of Andropov's meeting with the workers was probably to enhance his image of strict but just khozyain, or boss. As such, Andropov seems to be responding to a reportedly widespread desire in Soviet society for the restoration of order after years of laxity. The presence of Moscow party leader Grishin and a brief speech by him served as a kind of reminder of collective Politburo leadership. But the event also served to undercut the onetime pretender to Brezhnev's mantle, Chernenko, who had been out of public view from January 5 to February 4 and who in recent years had made a strong case for closer worker-leader ties. Perhaps to avoid rubbing it in, no graphics of the factory visit were included either in Pravda or on television.

(LOU) Chernenko vs. Andropov on Aid to Revolutionary Movements?

Andropov's speech of November 22, 1982, to the CPSU Central Committee contained a formulation that was far less bellicose on the subject of the party's worldwide responsibilities than commentary on the same subject by Chernenko and Soviet ideologues at that time. It is not clear if Chernenko and the militant ideologues were subtly rebuking Andropov for softness on "imperialism." In any event, the Andropov formulation has since been repeated in the editorial columns of Pravda. But the divergence suggests there is internal political resistance to a more conciliatory foreign policy toward the West.

Andropov in effect said that the USSR can best encourage anti-Western radicalism in the Third World by solving its own economic problems. The example of the Russian revolutionary experience would presumably spread if the Soviet economy grew at a healthy rate and Soviet citizens' human wants were reasonably satisfied. As Andropov put it:

"A steady rise of the economy and improvement of the welfare of the people are both our duty to the Soviet people and our internationalist duty. In posing the question in this way the party is guided by Lenin's far-sighted injunction that we are exercising our main influence on the world revolutionary process through our economic policy." (Pravda, November 23, 1982)

The same quotation was included in Pravda's lead article of January 21 keyed to the anniversary of Lenin's death. It was

based on a line in one of Lenin's post-New Economic Policy speeches in 1921 that was kept alive in party literature during the Brezhnev era, but usually with the qualification that CPSU policy was also to give political, economic, and military assistance to "the national-liberation movement" in "cutting short imperialistic aggression and attempts at the export of counter-revolution" (e.g., Rukovodyashchaya rol' KPSS v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma, Moscow, 1979, pp. 276 and 291).

Even so, although Andropov's phraseology was such that he was not directly contradicted, a somewhat different view of Soviet "internationalist duty" emerged in Chernenko's article for the 60th anniversary of the USSR and in an editorial tribute to the late Suslov on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of Suslov's birthday. Chernenko affirmed that:

"Our party has always opposed and continues to oppose the emasculation of the content of the concept of 'internationalism,' the obscuring of its militant, active and acute anti-capitalist thrust or its transformation into a plausible cover for opportunist weaving between class forces. Internationalism, in the sense in which Marx, Engels and Lenin understood it and the CPSU practices it, is a principled stance that is incompatible with the pursuit of short-term advantages or with any concessions to nationalist sentiments and presupposes a readiness to make sacrifices, if need be, in the name of the sacred solidarity with one's class brothers. 'Soviet power gave the world dictatorship of the proletariat and world revolution priority over any national sacrifices, however hard they may be,' Lenin wrote. [Footnote: V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol. 38, p. 133.] The CPSU has repeatedly proved its loyalty to that behest by Lenin. The CPSU regards itself as an integral part of the international communist movement. Soviet Communists see their international duty as being to actively help increase its ideological and political influence and moral prestige and strengthen its unity." (Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, No. 12, signed to press November 24, 1982)

Eulogists of Suslov at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism agreed that:

"No matter how important the activity of Communists within national frameworks is," M. A. Suslov noted, 'the criteria of internationalism would be narrowed unjustifiably if the entire content of a Marxist-Leninist party internationalist duty were to be reduced to such activity.' (Voprosy Istorii KPSS, No. 12, signed to press December 2, 1982, emphasis supplied)

The authors then restated the standard orthodoxy which justifies Soviet intervention in such places as Afghanistan:

"The necessity of internationalism, solidarity and rallying of world revolutionary forces is evoked too by the fact that imperialistic reactionary circles are systematically coordinating their actions in the struggle against socialism, democracy and national liberation, applying all means for the export of counter-revolution." (Ibid., emphasis supplied)

Andropov's less than iron-clad hold on authority raises the possibility that Chernenko and the Suslov eulogists were reproving him for stressing Soviet national requirements to the detriment of the Kremlin's international ideological obligations.

Chernenko has reportedly taken charge of party ideological affairs; if so, he is monitoring the work of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, which publishes the journal of party history. As someone who might still raise a challenge to Andropov, Chernenko would have an interest in creating the suspicion that Andropov was less devoted to the cause of promoting communist world rule than a CPSU General Secretary should be.

Alternatively, if Chernenko and the party ideologues merely intended to supplement Andropov's relatively mild remarks about Soviet internationalism, their warning against neglect of revolutionary movements would still show the vigor of militant thinking about world affairs in Moscow.

(LOU) Confusion Over Party-State Relations

The Soviet hierarchy appears to be far from united over whether to minimize or increase the role of the party machine vis-a-vis the state bureaucracy. A doctrinal article in Pravda broke new ground by saying that each of the two major apparatuses "leads" the USSR's development. But a subsequent item on the same topic in the republic-level press continued to claim that the state was a mere tool of the party.

Pravda on January 21 ran an article for the 60th anniversary of Lenin's "political testament," authored by A. Sovokin, chief of the sector for V. I. Lenin's works at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

On the one hand, Sovokin asserted that, "Lenin assigned a priority role in building socialism to the Soviet state and the state apparatus which was to lead the building of the new society" (emphasis supplied). On the other hand, Sovokin referred to Lenin's concern "to strengthen the Communist Party's leading role in building socialism," and preached both "the party's leading,

guiding role in building socialism and communism" and "further strengthening of the Communist Party's leading role in building the new society." (emphasis supplied)

The standard Soviet treatment of these Lenin documents gives clear-cut primacy to the party machine over the state bureaucracy. It describes the Soviet state as a mere "instrument" for "building socialism" and affirms that the party "leads the state and all organizations of the working people, guides the development of the economy and culture along the path of socialism, organizes the country's defense, formulates the principles and methods of the Soviet Government's foreign policy and inspires the working people to socialist building." (CPSU History, Moscow: 1980, pp. 324, 327, 328)

That traditional approach was taken by V. Markov in his article about the same Lenin documents in the January 26 issue of Sovetskaya Moldaviya and the February 3 issue of Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. He characterized the Soviet state as a "most powerful instrument of building socialism and communism in the hands of the working class and its political vanguard, the Communist Party." Naturally enough, Markov failed to associate Lenin with the idea of giving a "priority role" to the state and depending upon its apparatus to "lead" the movement to social progress in the USSR.

How did it happen that Pravda mixed signals on the party-state relationship? Sovokin himself appears to be a firm believer in the need for supremacy of the party machine over all other centers of power. That can be inferred from his citing "one of the delegates" at the 1923 Party Congress lauding Lenin's final writings. A check of the congress minutes reveals that the delegate was a Siberian apparatchik named Bumazhnyy, who argued against state managers who wanted equal influence in policymaking bodies with the party bosses. (Sovokin is unlikely to have cited favorably the words of someone whose speech he thought was ideologically flawed.)

But Sovokin may not have been personally responsible for the final text of his article. Others could have inserted the incongruous words about the state's "priority role" and the state bureaucracy having to "lead" the country's development. (A party decree passed in 1949 "On the journal Bolshevik" criticized Soviet editors for having "interpolated new texts which radically alter the contents of the articles" they received, but this practice is known to continue.) Thus, Pravda's editors could have been taking their cue from Andropov, whose statements are suggestive of a tendency to increase the clout of state experts.

(C) Campaign To Energize the Soviet Press

On the eve of a CPSU Secretariat seminar for journalists and propagandists, Pravda urged improvements in the Soviet press.

Ostensibly, a major aim of the authorities is to make newspapers livelier and more informative and thereby, presumably, overcome the general popular indifference toward the official press. But Pravda's editorials indicated clearly that the Soviet press was still expected to endorse the political facts of life in the USSR and be a vehicle for educating rather than entertaining the population.

The January 18 editorial on "The Reader and the Press" and one on January 27 on "Effectiveness of the Press" set the stage for the January 29 seminar keyed by Party Secretaries Ponomarev (international affairs), Zimyanin (culture), and Rusakov (communist bloc liaison). Gosplan chairman Baybakov and various deputy premiers also gave reports on the economic situation in the USSR.

Pravda's editorialists cited Andropov's call for "interesting and comprehensible" propaganda but also quoted a locomotive engineer to the effect that "some newspapers still contain much twaddle, articles which are long but aimed at nobody in particular and sermons which are general in nature and irritatingly edifying in tone." Others, according to Pravda, complained that "certain publications" were "full of 'impersonal' materials written in gray, inexpressive language. 'There is too much description of technology; articles are full of statistics and there is not enough study of man.'"

Therefore, Pravda demanded:

- "a serious, businesslike, detailed discussion of urgent topics...not only a truthful, up-to-the-minute account of the facts but an intelligent, comprehensive study of them, sensible generalizations and valuable conclusions"; and
- that "people should learn about cadre appointments and the results of the collective discussion of competition results, the distribution of bonuses and travel warrants not from conversation in the corridors or the smoking room, but from their local press."

But the predominantly educational role of the Soviet press was also reaffirmed. Its function was to reveal "the best features and traditions of the working class, high awareness, a state approach to the cause, collectivism, organization and discipline, and selflessness in fulfilling one's duties." Reporters were expected "not only to find examples of skillful economic management" but "to ensure that the best examples of labor organization, the acceleration of scientific and technical progress and thrift are passed on rapidly and disseminated everywhere."

Pravda attributed its latest press directive to the Central Committee decree "On the Work of the Newspaper Trud," adopted in

September 1982. Media workers may have recalled that Brezhnev at the 1981 Party Congress told them that:

"The Soviet citizen is an educated and intelligent person. When he is spoken to in thoughtless bureaucratic language, when general verbiage is invoked instead of concrete living reality and actual facts, he simply turns off his TV set or radio, or sets aside his newspaper.... Every article in a newspaper or journal and every TV or radio program should be regarded as an earnest talk with people, who want not only a truthful and prompt exposition of fact but also an in-depth analysis of these facts and serious generalizations."

Although Pravda did not repeat Brezhnev's remarks or print that he also had told Soviet journalists they must be guided by "the Leninist principles and traditions of party journalism," it upheld political orthodoxy by telling party committees to support "principled" articles and eliminate from newspapers "the treatment of petty themes and 'pinpricks' which only cause irritation." "We must remember," Pravda added, "that the main thing in criticism is its mobilizing importance and not superficial sharpness or sensationalism which are still encountered in some items and undoubtedly reduce their efficacy and effectiveness."

The new regime's determination to have the press in reliable hands was shown by the appointment of Lev Tolkunov to replace Pyotr Alekseyev as editor-in-chief of Izvestiya. Tolkunov, a onetime associate of Andropov in the central party machine, held the Izvestiya post from 1965 to 1976, when he was named chairman of the Novosti press agency.

Since the Stalin era, there have been periodic campaigns to enliven the Soviet media but each has foundered. The prevailing style of journalism is modeled on that of bureaucratic orders--which is what most press articles on internal themes are meant to be. The fear of spreading doubt or skepticism about basic institutions and policies has traditionally set strict limits on open discussions of social-economic ills. Those fears permeate the establishment and will keep Soviet newspapers among the world's dullest as long as the Soviet state is organized on a hierarchical basis and its leadership intolerant of ideological pluralism.

(LOU) Economic Output Slow in 1982

Last year's economic performance was another in a string of major disappointments for the Soviet leadership. Still, gross national product grew an estimated 1.6 percent despite the fourth consecutive poor year for agriculture. The USSR also markedly improved its hard-currency position.

Industry. Soviet industrial output increased 2.8 percent in 1982, according to the USSR Central Statistical Administration. This was below the planned annual rate of 4.7 percent and below the 3.4-percent rate achieved in 1981. The planned increase for 1983 (3.2 percent) clearly indicates that after two years Moscow is abandoning the industrial growth targets of the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan. After a disappointing first year, the Soviets adopted a planned growth rate for 1982 higher than that originally envisaged in the Five-Year Plan. The rate now slated for 1983, however, is below that originally projected (4.3 percent) and well below what would be needed (6.2 percent) to make up lost production and put the Five-Year Plan back on track.

Chronic difficulties in key industries (e.g., oil, coal, and metallurgy), transportation bottlenecks, and lagging construction continued to produce shortfalls that rippled throughout the economy. It is also increasingly difficult for the USSR to squeeze out gains in labor productivity, the key to meeting its economic growth targets. Labor productivity increased a mere 2.1 percent in industry, only about half the planned annual rate.

The slowdown in industrial production was felt across the board--almost without exception by all-union republics and by major industrial sectors. More than 40 percent of the 66 officially identified "most important types of output" failed to register any appreciable increase (i.e., they failed to grow by more than 1 percent). Production of 15 of the listed items--including steel and steel products, sulfuric acid, plastics, transportation equipment, and a variety of construction materials--actually dropped below 1981 levels. The absolute drop in production of such basic industrial inputs and capital equipment exacerbated shortages elsewhere in the economy. In addition, consumers continued to feel the effect of the per capita decline in the production of meat and sausage products.

In the critical energy sector, the Soviets managed to sustain a relatively high level of oil output during the fourth quarter of 1982, boosting production for the year to 613 million metric tons (mmt), only 1 mmt below plan. Coal output also increased for the first time since 1978, reaching 718 mmt. Nonetheless, it failed to meet the 1982 target (728 mmt) and was still below 1978 production (724 mmt). Natural gas continues to be the bright spot in the Soviet energy picture: at 501 billion cubic meters, natural gas output grew 8 percent, exceeding the target of 492 billion cubic meters and accounting for nearly all of the USSR's incremental energy output.

Agriculture. The hoped-for rebound did not occur as gross agricultural output increased only 4 percent compared with the planned rate of some 14 percent. For the second year in a row the

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Soviets did not release the results of the grain harvest. Unofficial Soviet estimates placed the 1981 harvest at 156 mmt; estimates for the 1982 harvest run as high as 190 mmt--well below the 238 mmt targeted for both years. To help offset the shortfall, the Soviets are expected to import some 40 mmt of grain in the marketing year ending June 1983, somewhat below the 46 mmt imported in the previous marketing year.

Despite fodder shortages, the Soviets did manage to increase livestock inventories during the course of 1982, including a substantial increase in the number of hogs. This could result in higher output of meat and other livestock products in 1983. Even so, the inability of the Soviets to meet most of their agricultural goals since at least 1976 raises questions about the future of the Brezhnev food program.

Hard-Currency Trade. Despite the poor economic performance, the USSR substantially improved its hard-currency trade and financial position in 1982 according to nine-month Soviet trade statistics and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data. The trade deficit narrowed to \$1.6 billion from the \$5.3 billion level a year earlier. (Comparable midyear deficits were \$2.2 billion in 1982 and \$6.0 billion in 1981.) Soviet deposits at Western banks, meanwhile, grew to nearly \$7.5 billion by September 1982, according to the BIS. Coupled with a reduction in its liabilities to reporting banks, down to \$13.7 billion, the USSR reduced its net debt by \$1.6 billion during the third quarter of 1982. (Compared with September 1981, the USSR reduced its net debt with reporting banks by \$4.6 billion.)

This improvement resulted from increased exports of goods (particularly oil) at the expense of domestic Soviet requirements as well as goods diverted from the USSR's allies, and from reduced imports of Western grain and capital equipment. The USSR's financial position probably continued to improve during the fourth quarter of 1982; it may soon begin to deteriorate, however, given the current downward pressure on world oil prices.

Church and State in the Baltic States

(U) The elevation of a Latvian archbishop to the rank of cardinal by Pope John Paul II occurred six months after the Vatican obtained Soviet agreement to fill two long-vacant bishoprics in Lithuania. At the same time, Soviet pressure on religious believers, clergy, and activists in the Baltic states continued unabated.

(LOU) There were significant differences in the circumstances of the Pope's choice in January of Archbishop Julijan Vaivods, the apostolic administrator of Riga, Latvia, to be the

first publicly named cardinal in the USSR, and the selection of two bishops for Lithuania in July 1982. The Vatican obtained Soviet agreement to fill two long-vacant bishoprics only after protracted negotiations and efforts by Moscow to nominate its own candidates. The Soviets finally acceded to the selection of two respected figures: Bishop Vincentas Sladkevicius, who returned from exile in Rome, and Father Antanas Vaicius.

(U) The sudden Soviet acquiescence was unexpected because a Lithuanian journal had just published an article attacking the Pope for lending support to "religious extremism" in Lithuania. The samizdat Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church (No. 54) reacted with astonishment and unease: "What advantage could [Moscow] hope for? Does this appointment mean...that the Soviet government is relaxing its oppressive stranglehold? Quite the contrary! Lately, even greater pressure is being felt by priests to conform with the Regulations for Religious Associations, the purpose of which is to strangle the Church." The journal speculated that Moscow accepted the Vatican's choice in order to push through its own candidates for vacancies in three other dioceses.

(C) According to both Vatican and authoritative Soviet sources, the Vatican did not consult Moscow before naming the 78-year-old Vaivods as cardinal. This, together with the earlier unexpected agreement on the Lithuanian bishops, suggested a delicate balance between the Vatican and Moscow reflecting the desire of both to avoid a confrontation while they sorted out the implications of charges that the USSR had been involved in the attempted assassination of the Pope.

(LOU) In selecting Vaivods, the Pope may have taken advantage of Moscow's preoccupation with its image, but without challenging important Soviet interests or disturbing the church-state relationship in the USSR. Vaivods--a respected but aging prelate--heads a small Latvian Catholic community which numbers only about 10 percent of the population (most Latvians are Lutherans); neither he nor his flock has shown an inclination to activism. The selection of a Lithuanian cardinal would have been far more provocative. Moreover, there may well be a Lithuanian cardinal already, albeit an unannounced one. The cardinal John Paul II named "in pectore" (i.e., without disclosing his identity) shortly after being elected Pope is rumored to be Julius Steponavicius, Archbishop of Vilnius, who has lived in internal exile in a small Lithuanian village since 1961.

(LOU) Instead of retaliating against the Pope directly, Moscow chose a prominent Lithuanian activist priest as a target, raising the likelihood of further punitive actions. On January 26, TASS announced the initiation of "criminal proceedings" against Alfonsas Svarinskas, a founding member in 1978 of the

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Catholic Committee in Defense of Believers' Rights and a moving spirit behind the Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church. Both the religious committee and the chronicle were criticized by party First Secretary Grishkyavicius at a Lithuanian Communist Party plenum in April 1982. In October 1982, the Soviet journal Science and Religion subjected both Vatican policy and Lithuanian church extremists to a detailed condemnation. Thus, Catholics in the USSR are likely to interpret the charges against Svarinskas not only as indicating Moscow's determination to keep tight control over the Catholic Church, but even as a direct retaliation against the Vatican's creation of a Soviet cardinal.

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The Consequences of Icon Collecting



— А все началось с коллекционирования!

Рисунок Вл. ДОБРОВОЛЬСКОГО.

"It all started when he began to collect them."

UNCLASSIFIED

- I -

USSR CHRONOLOGY
January 1-31, 1983

January

- 1 New Year's greeting to Soviet people from ruling bodies published.
- 1 Politburo meeting reported; agenda included briefings on Andropov's talks with heads of foreign delegations at USSR's 60th anniversary celebration, agro-industrial complex and spring sowing, cooperation with Third World countries.
- 3 Andropov-led delegation left Moscow for Warsaw Pact summit in Prague. (For the first time since 1976, Chernenko was not part of the Soviet delegation to a Warsaw Pact summit.)
- 4-5 Warsaw Pact summit held in Prague.
- 5 Pravda editorial called upon artists and writers to improve ideological propaganda and help the country's campaign against waste and mismanagement.
- 5 Soviet delegation to the Prague summit returned to Moscow. (Chernenko was in the welcoming party, his last public appearance until February 4.)
- 5 Izvestiya reported the dismissal of plant directors who allowed interruptions in output deliveries.
- 5 TASS attacked Latvian emigres for infiltrating subversive literature into USSR and engaging in other subversive activities.
- 6 Pravda featured Andropov's reply to a Rude Pravo interview on the Prague summit.
- 6 Vatican list of new cardinals included the Apostolic Administrator in Riga, Latvia, Julijan Vaivods.
- 7 "Political Declaration" of Warsaw Pact members published.
- 7 Dolgikh spoke at a conference on labor discipline in the CPSU Central Committee. Gorbachev and Aliyev, in that order, were listed among those present.
- 8 Statement of USSR ruling bodies approving activity of the Andropov-led Soviet delegation at the Prague summit published.

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January

- 8 New documentary film "Zionism Before the Bar of History" noted in Pravda's TV guide.
- 8 Tbilisi Zarya Vostoka described Gorbachev's December 29-30, 1982, tour of the Georgian SSR.
- 9 USSR Procurator General Rekunkov's article on law and order carried in Pravda.
- 10 Inspectors reported to be questioning shoppers in Moscow stores during working hours to identify those guilty of unauthorized absence from work.
- 10 Grishin attended meeting in the Bolshoy Theater for the 100th birthday of writer Aleksey Tolstoy; only full Politburo member present.
- 10 Pravda printed letters from readers calling for increasing the price of bread.
- 11 Andropov met the West German Social-Democrat leader Hans-Jochen Vogel. Tikhonov met separately with Vogel.
- 12 Andropov, Gromyko, and Ponomarev met with PLO chairman Arafat. (Joint communique published on January 14.)
- 12 Pravda reported demands by Moscow residents for a crackdown on crime, drunkenness, and hooliganism.
- 12 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium held a session chaired by Vice-President Kuznetsov. Discussion topics included nationality policy, campaign for discipline, and squandering of bread. Andropov attended and spoke.
- 13 Dissident writer Georgiy Vladimov, in a letter to Andropov, requested permission to emigrate.
- 13 Pravda announced the January 11 death of Politburo candidate member and Belorussian party head Tikhon Kiselev.
- 13 Nikolay Slyunkov was elected first secretary, Belorussia Communist Party Central Committee, at a Minsk plenum. Kapitonov took part.
- 14 Imprisoned Anatoliy Shcharanskiy reported to have exchanged written messages with his mother.

January

- 14 Izvestiya announced the death of ex-President Nikolay Podgornyy on January 11 at age 80. (Shelest, Voronov, and Mzhavanadze were reportedly at the funeral.)
- 15 Pravda reported Politburo meeting; agenda included recent leadership talks with Raul Castro and Vogel, retail stores, food industry, and UN activities.
- 17 Aliyev and Grishin attended the opening session of the 6th Congress of USSR Artists.
- 17 Senior truck drivers' letter in Pravda complained that many of their colleagues were drunk behind the wheel, shirkers, or involved in shady deals. The letter urged a new law preventing those fired on colleagues' recommendation from obtaining similar jobs elsewhere.
- 17 Soviet security officials arrested and removed four ethnic German Soviet citizens as they attempted to demonstrate outside the FRG embassy in Moscow, according to Deutsche Presse Agentur.
- 17 Pravda article called for better roads for linking villages with cities.
- 17-19 Gromyko visited Bonn.
- 18 USSR Council of Ministers' decree on improved retail store operations was summarized in the press.
- 18 Moscow prosecutor called in Roy Medvedev, warned him to stop "impermissible" activities.
- 18 Pravda editorial criticized Soviet media for failing to realign its treatment of the role of work forces in management.
- 18 Aliyev spoke at an enlarged meeting of the Maritime Fleet Ministry's collegium and the Fleet's trade union presidium.
- 19 Marat Gramov replaced Sergey Pavlov as chairman, State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport.
- 19-21 All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions plenum on labor discipline and working conditions improvement addressed by AUCCTU chairman Shalayev and Kapitonov.

January

- Valentin Makeyev elected a secretary and member, AUCCTU presidium. (Pravda January 21 announced Makeyev's release from his duties as USSR deputy premier.)
- 19-21 Gromyko visited East Berlin.
- 20 Minister of Culture Demichev and Zimyanin attended concluding session of USSR Artists' Congress.
- 20 Valentin Falin, first deputy head of the International Information Department, CPSU Central Committee, identified as an Izvestiya commentator.
- 21 Politburo meeting on foreign policy and agricultural issues reported in Pravda. Ustinov spoke on the meeting of Warsaw Pact defense ministers in Prague.
- 21 Grigoriy Vashchenko replaced Aleksandr Struyev as Trade Minister.
- 21 Rejuvenation of leading cadres was urged in Sovetskaya Rossiya by deputy editor Valentin Chikin.
- 21 Dolgikh spoke at and Ryzhkov attended the CPSU Central Committee conference on energy problems.
- 21 A number of tractor works heads were fired for failing to deliver new machines, according to a report on a meeting of the collegium, Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine-Building.
- 23 Economic indicators for 1982 published by the central statistics board; grain production data were omitted for second consecutive year.
- 24 Aliyev addressed a meeting of regional communications executives.
- 24 Paris L'Humanite published correspondence between Andropov and Marchais regarding the Shcharanskiy case.
- 25 Stepan Chervonenko rumored to have replaced Nikolay Pegov as chief, Cadres Abroad Department, CPSU Central Committee.
- 25 Minister of Interior Fedorchuk addressed an All-Union Conference on Leading Internal Affairs Organs.

January

- 25 Pravda Ukrainy reported that 5 members of Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted of infringing on the rights of citizens under the guise of religious observance.
- 25 Wife of Helsinki group founder Yuriy Orlov, in letter to Andropov, protested the beating of her husband in labor camp.
- 28 Viktor Nikonov replaced Leonid Florentyev as RSFSR Minister of Agriculture, according to Moscow Radio.
- 29 Published agenda of weekly Politburo meeting included Gromyko's trip to GDR and FRG, negotiations on nuclear arms reductions in Europe, agro-industrial amalgamations, and implementation of spring sowing and other agricultural measures.
- 29 CPSU Central Committee held seminar-conference of media and ideological workers; Ponomarev, Zimyanin, and Rusakov gave reports.
- 29 Press announced the publication of the second edition of Brezhnev's memoirs, including new chapters published in Novyy Mir, No. 1, 1983.
- 31 Andropov visited the Sergo Ordzhonikidze machine-tool factory in Moscow.