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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153910	REPORT		6	7/12/1982	B1
153911	REPORT	RE. SOVIET EMIGRATION APPLICANTS <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	5	7/21/1982	B1
153912	MEMO	RICHARD PIPES TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. PRESIDENT'S DES MOINES SPEECH <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	8/4/1982	B1
153913	REPORT	RE. SOVIET STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	10	8/6/1982	B1
153915	REPORT		1	8/24/1982	B1
153914	REPORT	RE. SOVIET TRENDS: JULY 1982	8	8/27/1982	B1

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	12 Jul 82
TO: Norman A. Bailey			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
373	EOB		
REMARKS:			
FROM: Kay Oliver, CSD/S			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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CURRENT
ANALYSES

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153911
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(U) SOVIET EMIGRATION APPLICANTS
RESORT TO HUNGER STRIKES

(LOU) Summary

Two groups of unsuccessful emigration applicants have initiated hunger strikes to dramatize their plight and force Soviet authorities to issue them exit visas. The fast by a group of "binational spouses" has partially succeeded: in this instance, regime sensitivity to unfavorable foreign publicity and the threat it posed to Soviet foreign interests overcame the constraints of domestic considerations. The new hunger strike by members of a Pentecostal family in the US Embassy and their relatives in Siberia stands little chance of success, however, primarily because the Soviets see few advantages in letting them go and do not wish to set an undesirable precedent. The Pentecostalist fast early this year failed for essentially the same reasons.

Having acceded to some hunger strikers even though it was clear that this would encourage other unsuccessful emigration applicants to resort to desperation tactics, Moscow now feels obliged to adopt an unyielding attitude to keep this trend from getting out of hand, even at the cost of short-term embarrassment.

* * * * *

Binational Spouses Fast to Force Decisions on
Emigration

(U) Soviet prisoners often resort to hunger strikes to protest prison mistreatment, and they occasionally succeed in extracting small concessions. Now, Soviet citizens are resorting to similar tactics to force authorities to allow their emigration.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 7/21/88 (Mautner, M.)

Report 432-CA
July 21, 1982

DECLASSIFIED
NLR # 14506 #153911
BY RW KAR DATE 6/21/15

(U) Moscow has issued--or promised to issue--exit visas to 4 of the 10 binational spouses who engaged in a well-publicized hunger strike that began May 10. The composition of the group changed as the strike proceeded, some dropping out and others joining. Of the 10 persons married (or engaged) to citizens of the US, FRG, or France:

- 4 abandoned the strike (3 under regime pressure) soon after it began: Matvey Finkel (US), Maria Jurgurtiene (US), Vitaliy Volovuyev (France), and Yelena Kaplan (US);
- Andrey Frolov (US) left the USSR after receiving an exit visa almost immediately and quickly completing formalities;
- 4 were promised exit visas. Of these, 3 are being processed for emigration: Iosif Kiblitkiy (FRG), Tatyana Lozanskaya (US), and Tatyana Azure (France). After stalling on the promised visa of Yuriy Balovlenkov (US), emigration authorities subsequently refused to allow his emigration on grounds of national security.
- Sergey Petrov (US) was refused a visa at the same time as Balovlenkov, also on grounds of national security.

(LOU) Moscow acceded to some of the hunger strikers even though it was clear that this would encourage other unsuccessful emigration applicants to resort to desperation tactics. The binational spouses had a strong case not only because family reunification is the only valid reason for emigration recognized by the USSR. Refusal to allow them to join their foreign spouses was also a particularly flagrant violation of USSR commitments as a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act, because it directly affected the interests of other signatory states. In this instance, it was also impairing Moscow's efforts to project the image of a responsible, acceptable partner in international affairs.

(LOU) For Soviet authorities, the hunger strike was clearly an embarrassment in bilateral relations, particularly with the three Western states directly involved. At the same time, the Soviets took care to assert the overriding priority of Soviet national interests and sought to dampen the domestic effects of a concession made for external reasons.

(LOU) In dealing with the strikers themselves, authorities attempted various divisive tactics and refused to deal with them as a group, preferring to handle the emigration applications as separate cases. The tactic of avoiding direct negotiations whenever possible with organized groups of regime opponents is a standard one and has been uniformly followed over the years in handling unofficial religious, nationalist, and human rights groups. Indeed,

Moscow's anxiety not to appear to be capitulating to organized pressure would require authorities to hand down some refusals as a matter of tactical necessity and regardless of the merits of individual cases.

(U) Nevertheless, the conflicting pressures of foreign and domestic considerations evidently proved so acute that on July 9 the Soviet Bureau for Visas and Registration (OVIR)--the office in charge of emigration--held an unprecedented press conference to clarify the Soviet position. Deputy chief of the Moscow City OVIR Sergey Fadeyev defended the decision to refuse visas to Balovlenkov and Petrov as conforming with international agreements, including the CSCE Final Act. Fadeyev also:

- reiterated the USSR's "benevolent attitude" toward the marriage of Soviet citizens and foreign nationals;
- pointed out that binational marriages need not necessarily involve emigration of the Soviet party. He cited the case of US citizen Kimberly Pilarski, who received permission to live with his Soviet wife in the USSR, and declared there would be no objection to the spouses of Balovlenkov and Petrov doing the same while their husbands waited to reapply for emigration;
- objected to the alleged interference of the US Embassy in internal Soviet affairs by encouraging Soviet spouses to pursue their emigration efforts in an organized manner and through "anti-social actions."

(LOU) Whether the Soviet position stated at the press conference is a final one remains to be seen. The decisions of Balovlenkov and Petrov to continue their fast forced authorities to keep their options open. While considering whether to reverse their earlier decision, they allowed the wives of the two strikers to come to Moscow, obviously in the hope that they would persuade their husbands to drop the strike. In the meantime, as discussions continue, Soviet doctors--sent at the initiative of the authorities--regularly visit the rapidly weakening strikers to monitor their condition.

(C) The Embassy Pentecostals Try Again

By comparison, the Pentecostals' hunger strike stands little chance of success because:

- The fact that the strikers are in the US Embassy serves to generate further pressure on the US to do more about finding a solution. Moscow does not like the negative press coverage it is getting in the West but, as long as the US is also uncomfortable, it is prepared to wait.

--The Pentecostals have no relatives abroad.

--The crucial element of timing to coincide with an event or issue, of importance to Moscow, is absent. The Pentecostals' earlier hunger strike might have succeeded had they been at death's door just before the start of the international anti-nuclear religious conference in Moscow on May 10. But their fast had ended three months earlier, and the authorities safely disregarded the quiet representations of some conference participants once they had determined that the issue did not pose a threat to the conference.

Balancing Priorities as Pressures Mount

(C) If the experience gained during these and earlier hunger strikes has taught Soviet authorities anything, it is that rigid and unresponsive handling of emigration cases can quickly escalate into major issues and inflict unnecessary damage on Soviet foreign interests. This was demonstrated in the hunger strike by Andrey Sakharov and his wife last December. Faced with the prospect of Sakharov's death and enormous damage to Soviet prestige--especially in the international scientific community--the regime backed down and issued an exit visa to his daughter-in-law.

(C) A month later, Inna Lavrova received permission to marry her French fiance after a hunger strike of 38 days. Lavrova lacked Sakharov's prestige but used impeccable timing. The Soviets reportedly acceded to the personal intervention of President Mitterrand at a moment when French participation in the gas pipeline deal hung in the balance.

(C) KGB agents candidly acknowledged Moscow's problem of balancing external and internal considerations when they tried to persuade the binational spouses to drop their hunger strike. They argued in talking with Lozanskaya, Balovlenkov, and Kiblitkiy that the strikers should not regard the Inna Lavrova case as a precedent because it was unique: her exit permission was made possible by special circumstances surrounding the signing of the gas pipeline deal. The agents added that the authorities could not possibly allow them to emigrate because it would create an unacceptable precedent and cause a wave of other hunger strikes in Moscow.

(LOU) When policy-level officials nevertheless were forced to focus on the damaging effects of the strike, they probably discovered that at least some of the original decisions to reject the emigration applications were not based on valid reasons but were rather the capricious and arbitrary implementation of the insensitive emigration procedures. This may account for the surprisingly flexible handling of the hunger strike once the cases were taken

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out of the hands of the emigration bureaucracy. Once again, the authorities tried to fuzz the issues and make a pragmatic accommodation while trying to avoid incurring a new cycle of problems.

(LOU) Moscow's reduction of the emigration flow to a bare trickle has brought many unsuccessful emigration applicants to the point of despair. Thus, from the Soviet standpoint, binational emigration cases may warrant expeditious and flexible handling not only to prevent difficulties on the bilateral level but also to prevent these cases from even reaching the stage requiring a public surrender to such extreme tactics as hunger strikes. Already, unofficial sources report an increasing number of Soviets announcing their determination to take actions ranging from fasting, to renouncing Soviet citizenship, to self-immolation. Thus Soviet authorities are under pressure to maintain an unyielding attitude, even at the cost of embarrassment in the short term.

Prepared by Igor Belousovitch
x29204

Approved by Martha Mautner
x29536

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BAILEY

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Sov P.

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(U) THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES:
THREAT TO OR CRUTCH FOR THE POLITICAL ELITE?

Key Judgments

With the approach of a change in the Soviet leadership, the General Staff's position may assume greater significance. Analysis of recent scholarly work on this subject yields some interesting conclusions.^{1/}

In one sense, the complexity of current civilian/military relationships and the weight of the military in domestic and foreign policy bespeak an enhanced role for the Staff. Moreover, should the internecine conflict of political succession turn out to favor the military, might not the Soviet General Staff be able to consolidate its position?

The record, on balance, argues against such an outcome. In spite of some superficial similarities with the Prussian General Staff of former times, the Soviet counterpart never rose to be "a State within a State." There is too much in the Soviet system that harks back to traditional patterns of personal, absolutist rule, notwithstanding the changes wrought by economic development and increasing bureaucratization. Even with the refurbishment of the General Staff under Brezhnev, the unification of military management has taken place at elite political levels, not in the Staff. Typically, also, the

^{1/} This paper draws on two monographs on the Soviet General Staff by Professors Shane E. Mahoney (Eastern Washington University) and Bruce Menning (Miami University). Their work was commissioned by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, which is supported by funds from the Departments of Defense and State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Soviet chief of staff has not been known for an inclination to become involved in political issues or for forcefulness in defense of professional convictions.

This is not to deny a future General Staff an important role in the modernization of Soviet military management. The fact that the General Staff did not arrogate to itself an autonomous function prompted the Brezhnev regime to move away from the patron-client networks of former times to a more professional relationship. But the built-in restraints on the General Staff will continue to circumscribe its ability to inject itself into the mainstream of Soviet military and foreign policymaking for the foreseeable future.

* * * * *

The Legacy

Instances in Russian military history and later during the Soviet period tempted Russian and Soviet senior officers to advocate following the Prussian example of a military leadership with decisive influence over domestic and foreign policy. But under the tsars, counter-currents always prevailed, aborting the creation of an independent General Staff in the Prussian mold. And although later-Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov argued in the 1920s that no army could exist without a general staff, he departed in significant ways from the German model. Still, his notion of a general staff as the "brain of the army" epitomized one line of approach that was sharply challenged by others who opposed any concentration of broad defense management functions in one staff. They characterized such a staff as a "general staff dictatorship."

The debate over the issue of a general staff continued uninterruptedly and inconclusively throughout the 1920s and early 1930s and pitted some of the best known Soviet military personalities against one another. Along with Shaposhnikov, Tukhachevski and Frunze regarded the institution of a general staff as a prerequisite for rational military management, while Levandovski, Dybenko, Budennyi, and Egorov sought to engage Voroshilov, then Defense Commissar, on their side by warning him of the consequences of an expanded staff that would tend to dominate all aspects of military operations and development.

The issue was not resolved with the creation of the General Staff in 1935. In fact, the change seemed to have been largely cosmetic and probably reflected Stalin's increasing influence rather than more prominence and authority for the Staff. The absence of meaningful organization was manifest in the way Stalin selected chiefs of the General Staff, including such opponents of the entire arrangement as Egorov; the bloodletting among experienced officers as the result of purges; and the unimpressive performance of the Soviet Army in Finland. It seems fair to say that on the eve of World War II, changes in the organization of the General Staff had not improved upon its role as a "technical organ."

One might assume that the role of the General Staff would gain in importance with the outbreak of World War II. But at no time during the war did the Staff acquire the slightest degree of bureaucratic autonomy. While its workload increased, basic authority for the conduct of military operations was again dispersed among different organizations and ultimately overshadowed by the

creation of a supreme command (Stavka) headed by Stalin himself. Furthermore, the frequent changes of chief of staff--there were no fewer than six incumbents between 1935 and 1942--contributed little to organizational cohesion. Finally, as the expertise of lower level staffs increased, the need for an officer corps to support the General Staff declined; the size of the corps dwindled, leading to its abolition in 1946.

Looking Into the Future

Biographic and documentary material on the General Staff's personalities, organization, and operations are available only for the first decades of its existence. But the insights derived from those years are possible guideposts for measuring the institution's current status and further evolution.

Although it can be argued that Shaposhnikov's exhortation to the General Staff to be the "brain of the army" may have its defenders among contemporary senior Soviet officers, the Staff continues to offer few, if any, parallels with the German experience. For one, the historically weak position of the chief of staff has persisted to this day. Although the evidence is fragmentary, it seems that whenever the chief has voiced judgments that have differed from those of the political leadership, he has been shunted aside. To be sure, there has been greater continuity in the office since Stalin's death--only five changes in the last quarter century compared with nine in the preceding 25 years. The available evidence indicates, however, that post-Stalin chiefs have been no more successful than their predecessors in asserting what might be regarded as a General Staff position. There is reason to believe that the tradition of a weak chief will continue for the foreseeable future.

Still, some Western experts have seen in the postwar expansion of the General Staff's involvement in the technical aspects of military management an opening that could give it broad powers and responsibilities rivaling those of the old German general staff. Additional assignments have included planning functions in connection with the Warsaw Pact and training of General Staff members from all Pact countries. Close ties also have sprung up between the General Staff and various civilian research centers, like the USA and Canada Institute and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. These ties have loosened the organization from its old confining moorings and turned it toward the role of spokesman for the Soviet armed forces to the political elite.

In light of the past, however, and reinforced by contemporary evidence, this description of the General Staff could well be challenged. First, many observers may have given formal staff

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assignments too much weight as a sign of importance: such assignments tell us very little about the officers' actual influence on the decisionmaking process. Indications are that a wide array of organizations involved in the process of weapons development fall outside the jurisdiction of the General Staff. No doubt, staff personnel are heavily involved whenever technical military information is concerned; but the final decisions, while apparently reflecting the work of many different organizations, are fused at the highest political level. What one confronts here may be a typical case of Soviet compartmentalization used by the political elite to ensure its control of the final policy product.

Second, the degree of bureaucratic solidarity in the General Staff may be exaggerated. Notwithstanding the extensive bureaucratization of the entire Soviet system, relations within it have been and probably still are highly personal at all levels. Stalin not only dealt directly with the various General Staff offices, he also controlled personnel assignments to them. Khrushchev seems to have followed a similar routine. Underlying these similarities is the long-established practice of nomenklatura, a system of assigning loyal individuals to responsible positions entailing both job security and privileges. As far as is known, General Staff and other high military assignments continue to be vetted by the Party Secretariat or the Politburo. Thus the presence, for example, of the General Staff at high-level negotiations like SALT is not necessarily a recognition of the organization's importance; quite possibly, it is a manifestation of personal ties between General Staff officers and their patrons in the political elite.

Third, there seems to be a continuing debate in Soviet literature about the respective roles of the General Staff and the Supreme Command in World War II. Although the evidence is sketchy, this debate seems to underscore an implicit complaint about the modern General Staff's lack of an equal role in the wartime management of Soviet forces--especially with respect to the determination of strategic priorities.

In spite of these restraints, the role of the General Staff in military management should not be considered inflexibly bound by tradition. Even though denied a fully collegial voice in matters of strategic policy formulation and prevented from exercising sole authority in military management, the modern General Staff has become far more important than its predecessors. Interestingly, this accretion in its role probably is more the result of a growing recognition by the political elite of the complexity of military matters, the need for greater professionalism, and a whole range of international changes than of its own institutional dynamic. This is the larger context that may have contributed to the revitalization of the General Staff under Brezhnev.

One may also speculate about the contemporary nuclear balance and how it may have redirected attention to those types of armaments and military operations in which the General Staff has undisputed expertise. The emergence of the Soviet Union as the other superpower able to assert itself in distant areas has been the vehicle for a refurbished General Staff ready to utilize military power as a way to defend, consolidate, and advance Soviet interests in the context of a revamped "correlation of forces." Whether this development has led not only to a militarization of Soviet foreign policy but also to a militarization of the Soviet regime's foreign policy decisionmaking process is debatable. At a minimum, it probably has led the Politburo to draw more heavily on the advice and expertise of the General Staff.

Prepared by E. Willenz
x22225

Approved by E. R. Platig
x21342

Bailey 19
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES

SUBJECT: President's Des Moines Speech

Because of a faulty flow of paper, I was not shown the text of the President's Des Moines speech until a few hours before it was to be delivered. (Bailey and Robinson also were not consulted.) I was very upset by the remarks on Poland which lent themselves to gross misinterpretation and, in addition, ran contrary to the agreed-upon Allied press guidance. My memorandum to this effect, sent on the morning of August 2, apparently either did not reach you or reached you too late to be of use.

We now have some responses in which the offending passages are highlighted.

At Tab I is a radio report from Warsaw in which the President's remarks on Poland were interpreted to mean that he is content with the progress toward liberalization made in Poland and expects to lift the sanctions. Unfortunately, the text lent itself to such an interpretation: this could have been easily prevented. One can imagine what this kind of information does to the morale of Solidarity about which the President cares so much.

At Tab II is an editorial in today's Wall Street Journal which criticizes another aspect of the same speech, namely allusion to the "sanctity of contracts".

Unless those of us on the NSC staff who are charged with responsibility for East-West economic relations (Bailey, Robinson and I) are given an opportunity to clear such speeches in time, the President will be made to look inconsistent and suffer grievous political harm.

Attachments:

Tab I Item from Warsaw Domestic Service (August 2)
Tab II Wall Street Journal editorial, August 4

cc: Norman Bailey
Roger Robinson

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/2/15

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It is, therefore, not accidentally that the Pax movement is yet again, in the hour of the nation's need, offering to stand as a partner to all those forces which authentically strive for a national rebirth, without waiting for the sun to shine again on our fatherland. We have been told, in the beginning as well as today: You are tainted through your participation -- albeit indirect -- in martial law governments. Our answer was then as it is now: The state of war is a result, not the cause. In acting toward eliminating the essential causes we strive -- not in word but in deed -- for its termination and for the resumption of the great and difficult work of the democratization of socialist Poland.

Our movement has always fought for a responsible democracy, that is, a democracy which realizes the principles of the equality, freedom and coparticipation of all citizens in public matters, not at the expense of the state but with the intention of strengthening the state. Of particular significance here is the common ground of a democracy of world outlooks, which is in Poland the sole way of offering effective involvement to the whole of a society on which, after all, believers are the prevailing majority. Thus, by participating as a whole in the vast process of achieving a reform of the state and its economy we will, above all, be concerned that the meaning and the political consequences of the multi-ideological structure of the Polish nation in the period of the building of socialism is not lost in that process. For there can be no strong state of Poland without the conscious, active and representative participation of lay Catholics in its affairs.

On the anniversary of the rebirth we conform our willingness to work toward a new rebirth of the nation and the state. We are conscious of the immensity of the wrongs, the inadequacies and the errors which have accompanied the lot of People's Poland. It is not, however, enough to condemn the past, nor is it worthy of a Pole or a Christian to wring his hands in despair. Rebirth means conquering. Only in such an interpretation does the burden of tension and disaster become that "felix culpa" that our great primate spoke of 2 years ago. Only such can be the way of all who love Poland in deed.

REAGAN'S REMARKS ON MARTIAL LAW, SANCTIONS NOTED

LD022048 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2000 GMT 2 Aug 82

[Text] President Ronald Reagan of the United States has said he is encouraged by the news from Warsaw of the possible alleviation of martial law. Reagan expressed the hope that the situation would develop to the point where economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union could be lifted. The agencies stress that this is Reagan's most optimistic statement on the situation in Poland. They also recall that 3 days ago Reagan said he would apply for the prolongation by a further year of the agreement on the sale of cereals to the Soviet Union.

BRIEFS

TRANSPORTATION PROTOCOL WITH USSR -- Janusz Kaminski, Polish minister of transportation, has visited Moscow where he held talks with Ivan Pavlovski, Soviet minister of railways. The implementation of the tasks in mutual freight transport during the first half of the current year was discussed. Directions for the implementation of the demanding freight plans for the second half of the year were also drawn up. The ministers also discussed the development of mutual cooperation in the sphere of freight transport. A protocol was signed defining the Polish and Soviet tasks in the field of transportation during the second half of the current year. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 23 Jul 82 LD]

'Cash on the Barrelhead'

President Reagan's speech to the National Corn Growers on Monday was a hit in Des Moines but a disaster in Europe. He promised his one-year extension of grain exports to the Soviets would bring record sales. But the speech seems designed to reinforce the Europeans' feeling that they've been put upon by Mr. Reagan's actions against the Soviet natural gas pipeline.

Mr. Reagan told U.S. farmers that the extension would have "the sanctity of a contract" and "there must be no question about our respect for contracts" and "we must restore confidence in U.S. reliability as a supplier." He went on to say that the U.S. must "restore that faith in us that if we've made a deal or a contract, it'll be a contract and we'll keep it." You could just feel the blood pressures rising in European capitals.

Imagine you're British Trade Secretary Lord Cockfield. You've just that very day told Parliament you'd decided to force British companies to defy Mr. Reagan's ban on using U.S. technology to build the pipeline. The ban, in your judgment, is an "attempt to interfere with existing contracts and is an unacceptable extension of American extraterritorial jurisdiction."

Mr. Reagan's use of buzz words like sanctity of contract to benefit Midwestern farmers will make Europeans feel justified in not going along with his legal but unpopular ban on U.S. exports. The speech amounts to two giant steps backward in trying to make the U.S. case to skeptical European public opinion.

What the President should have

pointed out instead is that there are some very good arguments against the pipeline. There's Poland, where the Soviets still enjoy the peace and quiet of martial law. There's all that natural gas Europeans could pump from the North Sea. But the kicker is that Europe is not only subsidizing the pipeline but also taking all the risk. In contrast, the Russians pay cash or gold for grain. As Mr. Reagan said on Monday, hinting that this distinction was at least at the back of his mind, "the granary door is open and the exchange will be cash on the barrelhead."

Grain is different from rotors and turbines in other ways. Europe, Argentina and Canada know how to grow wheat and happily sell it to the Russians whether or not the U.S. embargoes its grain. (At least the U.S. doesn't subsidize these sales.) But only General Electric has the know-how to build the rotors needed to make a pipeline anything like the one the Russians planned. Grain can be bought with a quick phone call but for GE technology, firms abroad must abide by U.S. export control laws. This rule is why European companies—as opposed to European governments—do not want to defy the U.S. export ban.

The danger in Mr. Reagan's losing touch with the main U.S. arguments is that the Europeans may come to think he's not serious about his pipeline policy. They've thought this before and unless the U.S. makes its case more clearly will think it again. In danger of being lost is Mr. Reagan's simple point that the West is wrong to be in the suicidal business of subsidizing Russia's military-based economy.

Asides

The Glen Cove Negotiations

The city council of Glen Cove, N.Y., rejected a State Department plea to drop a two-month-old ban against use of its beaches, tennis courts and golf courses by Soviet diplomats. The town took the action after federal officials had disclosed that a 49-room mansion used as a residence by Russian U.N. officials was crammed full of electronic eavesdrop-

town's mayor. But the State Department doesn't think Glen Cove has a right to interfere in the conduct of foreign relations in this fashion; after all, the Soviets might retaliate by limiting the rights of American diplomats to take a dip in, say, the Volga. We sympathize with the State Department point, but we're not surprised that the town fathers of Glen Cove are standing firm. That's standard procedure by much of the world in dealing with

but rejected the idea on the grounds that the people should have the right to elect whom they pleased.

In other ways too the Constitution writers refused to prejudice the needs of the future and foreclose decisions by future generations. The Constitution sets forth how moneys shall be appropriated or taxes levied, established our institutions, including the Army and Navy. It does not say what tax or spending levels shall be, nor how large the Army and Navy ought to be nor how employed. The drafters did not think themselves wise enough to foresee all possibilities.

We would be wise, I think, to continue that cautious approach to tinkering with the Constitution, especially where the proposal is to lay down *what* shall be done rather than *how* legislative decisions shall be made. It's too easy to be caught up in the emotions of the time about what needs to be done and find ourselves afterward unwisely locked into a rigid constitutional vise.

That danger is very much imbedded in this proposed balanced-budget amendment.

* * *

For one thing, it is long and involved, with language that is fuzzy in the extreme. It requires Congress to adopt a statement of receipts and outlays for the next year in which outlays shan't exceed the receipts. Right off, there's trouble. Revenue is impossible to forecast a year ahead because it depends upon the state of economic prosperity, or want of it. So are outlays, for the reason that so many already enacted spending programs, from farm subsidies to welfare payments, are open-ended. The cost of these can only be guessed at in advance.

Moreover the revenue estimated, so says the proposal, "shall not increase by a rate greater than the rate of increase in national income in the last calendar year." The statistical computations here involved boggle the mind, and the administration and the Congress may compute them differently.

Then the president, after all this, "shall insure" that the outlays in fact do not exceed the outlays estimated in the congressional statement. Question: If the president fails to "insure" this does the Supreme Court cite him for malfeasance or Congress impeach him? And who does what to Congress if it fails to conform to its statement of "receipts and outlays" and by year's end hasn't made them balance? Jail for 435 congressmen?

Mind-boggling as this is, the real danger in the amendment is that it pretends to know and control the needs of the future—i.e., that the budget must be balanced each and every year except in wartime—and to foreclose future decisions by the Congress the president or the public regardless of circumstances.

The fiscal mismanagement which has brought so many woes is indeed a disgrace. Only once in a generation has the budget been balanced and that by accident. But the fault lies with our governor and it's a bit of flimflam for them to pretend it's a deficiency in the Constitution.

If people really want a return to economic sanity, the remedy is at hand. The



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(U) SOVIET STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN:
THE CENTRAL ASIAN MODEL
Part I - Social Policies

Summary

(U) Note: This is the first of a two-part study examining current Soviet strategy in Afghanistan. Part one deals with social policies regarding ethnic minorities, religion, intellectual non-party elites, and nomads. Part two will deal with the political and economic initiatives undertaken by the Soviets since their invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

(U) While continuing to press their military effort against the Afghan mujahidin (freedom fighters), the Soviets have dusted off some of the social, political, and economic policies that proved successful in their 20-year war against their own Central Asian basmachi (raiders) in the 1920s and 1930s. Moscow hopes that such a combination might be more successful than military effort alone.

(C) At present, despite substantial concessions to the former ruling elements of Afghan society, the Soviets can claim only limited support for their reform programs, primarily because of the widespread hostility of the Afghan population and lack of access to the people in areas controlled by the mujahidin. For the Soviets, this hostility poses a seemingly insoluble dilemma, at least in the short run, because to gain popular support they must withdraw their occupying troops, which would guarantee the immediate collapse of the widely disliked Babrak Karmal regime.

(C) The Soviets therefore appear to have three alternatives in Afghanistan:

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- dramatic military escalation;
- an attempted neutralization of the country; or
- a long-range program of low-intensity military operations combined with a sustained effort in the social, political, and economic areas.

For the time being, it would appear that the Soviets have opted for the last course.

* * * * *

(U) Linkage by Moscow of Afghanistan to Its Central Asian Experience

The initial communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978 provided the USSR with an unexpected opportunity to nurture a friendly government on its southern border, a goal of both Tsarist and Soviet Russia for more than a century. But the initial passivity of the population to yet another governmental change soon became increased resistance to the radical social reforms and anti-Islamic stance of the new regime. This in turn led to overreaction and brutal repression followed by widespread antagonism from most elements of Afghan society. The growing nationwide opposition culminated in March 1979 with a violent revolt in Herat which threatened the survival of the Taraki regime.

At this point, Soviet commentators first overtly compared the Afghan resistance with the trouble in Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s. During a Studio Nine broadcast on March 29, 1979, none other than Leonid Zamyatin, the Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, stated:

"The terrorist groups which have not accepted the existence of the national democratic structure are still carrying out basmach raids on Afghan territory from territories adjoining Afghanistan. We can remember from our history how during the first years the young Soviet Republic was subject to raids from basmach bands on our young Central Asian republics, which upon contact with the Red Army immediately returned to foreign territory only after damaging the territory of the Soviet Union and the young Asian republics. About the same scene is now being repeated in Afghanistan."

The use of the pejorative term basmach (meaning thief, bandit, oppressor in Turkic) is especially ironic on two counts:

- it imputed all the evil for which the Afghan Government was responsible to those who were merely trying to defend their country; and
- many of the original Central Asian opponents (basmach) of the Soviet revolution who had fled to Afghanistan in the 1920s were now involved in defending themselves for a second time.

Since then, Soviet media in both Central Asia and other parts of the USSR have been using the word basmachi to describe the Afghan mujahidin opposition and have tried to discredit what in fact is a heroic national defense by linking it with such alleged imperialist manipulators as the US, China, and Pakistan and with the old reactionary elements of Afghanistan--the landowners, khans, Muslim clergy, and other alleged exploiters of the masses.

In returning to the use of the term basmachi, the Soviets have underlined their belief that there is a strong analogy between their experiences in Central Asia and the present situation in Afghanistan. In an article in Voprosy Istorii (no. 12, 1980), the recognized Soviet authority on civil-war period, Central Asian history, Professor A. I. Zevelev, of the Maurice Thorez Institute for Foreign Languages in Moscow, outlined the historical Marxist-Leninist framework within which current Soviet leaders view Central Asia and make decisions affecting it (including the 1979 decision to invade Afghanistan). According to Zevelev:

- the basmachi are representatives of the most reactionary aspects of society--bourgeoisie, the feudal elements, the beys, the mullahs, the kulaks--with an ideological basis in pan-Islam, pan-Turkism, and bourgeois nationalism;
- the basmachi, wherever they operate, are agents of foreign imperialism, armed and coordinated by the imperialists;
- although it may take time, it is essential that the basmachi be suppressed because of the violence and destruction they wreak.

(U) Social Policy: The Central Asian Model

In pacifying Central Asia, the Soviets early realized that they could not succeed by military means alone and developed a wider strategy of military, political, social, and economic techniques which, over some 20 years, brought around the inhabitants of the area. In effect, the USSR suppressed an entire generation until a new one could be appropriately educated to replace it. The following are some of the techniques used successfully by the Soviets in Central Asia:

- dividing the population along ethnic/linguistic lines in order to destroy the existing alliances among the opposition;
- making concessions to the clergy--including the return of their property and special tax provisions--in order to attract them to the new regime;

- regularly convening conferences of the clergy and other non-party groups to condemn the opposition and in the process legitimize the new regime;
- providing incentives for the intellectual elite to throw in their lot with the Soviets, primarily on common ideological grounds;
- forcibly settling nomadic groups in order to increase control on the ground.

There is growing evidence that the Soviets have been reexamining their Central Asian experience and attempting to implement in Afghanistan these techniques that proved successful in the 1920s.

Implementation of Central Asian Model in Afghanistan

(U) Ethnic Minorities. The Soviets resolved the Central Asian nationality problem by ethnographic manipulation: out of what could have become a unified Turkestan, separate republics were formed for each of the five primary ethnic groups. Linguistic policies tended to isolate each republic, and primary control remained in Moscow's hands.

(U) In Afghanistan, the Taraki regime--and the short-lived successor Amin regime--in its minorities policies made some overtures to the Hazaras and Uzbeks but had little success because of extreme positions regarding the Islamic religion, land reform, and treatment of elites. After the advent of Babrak, this minorities policy was further elaborated in December 1981 during the seventh plenum of the ruling People's Democratic Party in the form of two major programs:

- Areas where members of a certain tribe or ethnic group were in the majority should be taken over by members of this tribe/group, and local administration and social bodies should be organized on a proportional basis.
- The new Ministry for Tribes and Minorities in Kabul would be divided into two parts: a Department for Minorities dealing with settled peoples--like the Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Nuristanis, and Turkmen--and a Department of Tribes responsible for the more nomadic Pushtuns, who constitute the major ethnic group in Afghanistan.

(U) Although eventually the Babrak regime apparently plans to form one province for the Pushtuns (similar to provinces set up for the other ethnic minorities), it has emphasized the need to have this province broken down further into subregions for each of the Pushtu subtribes. This policy, used successfully by the

Soviets in Central Asia against the Turkic tribes, would effectively undermine whatever feelings of solidarity exist among the Pushtuns and provide the regime with a means of control by setting one tribe against another.

(U) Babrak has now recognized six official languages: Pushtu, Persian, Nuristani, Baluch, Uzbek, and Turkmen. Presumably each of these groups will be allocated its own province. In March 1982, he also initiated the teaching of Uzbek and Turkmen to beginning students from these minorities. They will not, however, be given an opportunity to learn Farsi, which in the past has been the lingua franca of Afghanistan, but instead will be given instruction in Russian as a second language. This policy will surely isolate each linguistic group in Afghanistan and lead to the integration of the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tadjik children into the Soviet educational and cultural sphere, because all textbooks in these languages and most of the instructors already come from Soviet Central Asia.

(U) The Soviets thus far have been able to establish only the framework of a nationalities policy in Afghanistan, and most of the activity is limited to what can be done in Kabul and the more accessible regional capitals. Although in late 1981 Babrak resumed the meetings which his predecessors had started with tribal and regional leaders and continued them throughout early 1982, the results remain moot, especially because the mujahidin mark for assassination those provincial leaders who give any indication of supporting Kabul. In addition, such regime initiatives as the establishment of a Turkmen Cultural Committee and the publication of three minority-language newspapers--Yulduz (Star) in Uzbek, Gorech (Struggle) in Turkmen, and Soub (Struggle) in Baluch--will probably have little practical impact on the minorities until their ethnic areas are liberated from the mujahidin. In short, the regime can do little to implement effectively its social policies until the military situation improves for the Soviets.

(U) Religion. In the 1920s, after some excesses against the clergy, the Soviets made extraordinary concessions to the "Muslim hierarchy" in order to enlist it on the Soviet side. Few such concessions were made in other parts of the Soviet Union to the Russian, Armenian, or Georgian Orthodox Churches or other religious groups. Realizing the central role of the mullahs in an Islamic society, the Soviets authorized the return to them of confiscated religious property, allowed them special tax privileges, and permitted continuation of their religious activities. The initial favorable response of the mullahs greatly contributed to the eventual pacification of the area.

(U) In Afghanistan, the opposition of Muslim leaders and institutions to the religious and social reforms of Taraki and Amin led at first to violent repression of the religious leaders. Although both men soon realized the need for support from the religious elements, the concessions they attempted were too late to make any substantive impact.

(U) Upon assuming power, Babrak quickly implemented a program of serious gestures to religious sentiment. As a first move, he replaced the hated communist red flag with a banner including the green of Islam and then personally began to attend Islamic services and to use Islamic religious terms in his speeches. With a June 30-July 1, 1980, meeting between Babrak and some 800 members of the Muslim clergy, the regime began the process of reintegrating Islam into the Afghan body politic.

(U) On July 10, 1980, Igor Savchenko in a Radio Moscow commentary introduced the startling idea of a social compact between the Afghan Government and the Muslim clergy under which the social base of Afghanistan would be the religious leaders and not the toiling masses. (By mid-1982, however, the Soviets had returned to an emphasis on workers and laborers as the basis of their new Afghan society.) Since 1980, Babrak has met and wooed members of the clergy, established a Congress of Afghan clerics, sent delegations of cooperative mullahs and laymen (primarily of the Shi'ite faith) to the Soviet Union for meetings with their religious compatriots, and put the Office of Religious Affairs directly under the Prime Minister.

(U) Here, again, the Soviets have taken a chapter out of their Central Asian experiences in order to pacify one of the primary elements of Afghan society. In spite of some backing for the regime by what is in fact a "captive" clergy in Kabul, the vast majority of the mullahs in the hinterlands vehemently oppose the Babrak regime and provide strong support for the mujahidin, education for the young, and spiritual guidance to the masses.

(U) For the Soviets, the problem of winning over the Muslim leadership is much more difficult in Afghanistan than it was in Central Asia because, in Afghanistan, primary Muslim authority is vested in not only the mullahs but, in some areas, a unique organization of several families with hereditary spiritual authority. Because many of the families' leaders were special targets of brutal massacres by the Taraki/Amin forces, the survivors have little love for the Babrak regime and have been in the forefront of opposition to communist rule in Afghanistan during the past four years. These families' ability to call upon fanatical loyalty from their followers makes it unlikely that the Soviets will succeed with any type of religious pacification in the near future.

(C) Intellectual Nonparty Elites. Whereas the Soviets were able to win over many members of the liberal and educated Central Asian elite in the 1920s (including influential thinkers of the liberal intelligentsia), Taraki and Amin eliminated the majority of the small liberal and Westernized Afghan intelligentsia through massacre, imprisonment, or forced emigration in the early stages of the Saur (April) revolution. To this day, the regime does not trust the intellectuals and instead has put its faith primarily in half-educated rural elements.

(C) In an attempt to develop broader support for the regime than can be provided by the small and faction-ridden communist party, in late December 1980 Babrak began wooing nonparty intellectuals and tribal leaders by creating a National Fatherland Front with the aim of "uniting all the nationalities and tribes of the country." A Front constituent assembly conceived in terms of the traditional Afghan Loya Jirga (assembly of tribal chiefs) was scheduled for March 1981, postponed when participants refused to be coerced, repostponed, and finally brought together in June 1981. This abortive, one-day June session failed to agree on any major policies. The only noteworthy result was that the participants became prime targets for mujahidin assassination. Since then, the regime has used the Front from time to time in an effort to provide a facade of widespread endorsement for regime policies and, thus, regime legitimacy but, as a unifying vehicle, the Front has been ineffectual.

(C/NF) The Soviet solution to the lack of a strong intellectual elite seems to be, on the one hand, shipment of thousands of young Afghans to the USSR for indoctrination and training on how to become a governing elite in true socialist manner and, on the other, a complete reshaping of the Afghan educational system. Reporting from inside the USSR indicates that not all of the students sent there are necessarily interested in being the USSR's Afghan cadre of the future: many are merely utilizing this opportunity to avoid being drafted and forced to fight the mujahidin. There are also reports of a growing opposition to these Afghan students in the USSR from Russians who see them as malingerers hiding out in the Soviet Union while Russian sons are being sent to Afghanistan to fight the Afghans' war.

(C) It is too early to judge how effective the new Afghan "intellectual elites" will be upon their return from the Soviet Union or completion of their courses in Afghanistan. The Soviets will doubtless be able to indoctrinate a certain percentage and convince many that advancement and success lies in support of Soviet policies. Nevertheless, there will still be a shortage of educated cadres to run the administrative apparatus of the government and social structure for many years to come. Furthermore, given the close family, ethnic, religious, and tribal ties

existing in Afghanistan, a substantial number of these students will undoubtedly find their way to the mujahidin or to exile abroad.

(U) Nomads. In its 1920s Central Asia experience, initial Soviet attempts to settle large numbers of Turkic nomads led to considerable violence. Gradually, many were coerced into giving up their migratory habits, while others crossed the borders into Afghanistan or Iran in order to preserve their age-old ways.

(U) Afghanistan has the nomadic Pushtu tribes and the migratory kuchis (nomadic gypsies) who have refused to become sedentary despite all efforts of previous Afghan Governments to curb their annual migrations. These kuchis have for centuries served as a social and mercantile lubricant, providing information and goods to the more isolated areas of the country. Although the war has curtailed some of the mobility of the kuchis, a great number continue their old way of life and ply their traditional trades, now including the sale of weapons and ammunition to the mujahidin. Others have remained in Pakistan (where in the past they used to spend the winters) because of the hazards of crossing the mine-infested border. To date, the Soviets have not indicated how they plan to deal with this element of Afghan society, but eventual settlement of this group in some form of agricultural commune is probably inevitable.

(C) Conclusions

While still trying, without much success, to subdue Afghanistan militarily, the Soviets are also experimenting with more peaceful modes of pacification including a variety of social, political, and economic policies. But they are caught in a vicious circle. Once their troops entered Afghanistan, the vast majority of Afghan society turned against them and continues to refuse to cooperate with the present regime until the Soviet Army withdraws. But this the Soviets cannot do without risking total, and probably almost immediate, collapse of the minuscule, faction-ridden Babrak regime and the badly shattered Afghan Army.

Future options for the Soviets therefore appear limited to three unpalatable alternatives:

- a policy of military escalation with widespread loss of life and destruction of villages and cities which might win them the country but few of its inhabitants;
- the shaping of a neutralized Afghanistan under a leader agreeable to both them and the mujahidin; or

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--a continuation of the present low-intensity military activity supplemented by increased efforts to put into effect social, political, and economic policies which would begin the pacification of the country while awaiting the cadres being trained and the industrial infrastructure under construction.

From the available evidence, it appears that the Soviets have opted for the third alternative in the hope that time is on their side and that world opinion will become increasingly inured to their aggression and will allow them the time (whether it is years or decades) to pacify Afghanistan completely.

Prepared by Alvin Kapusta
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM BAKER
ED MEESE
MIKE DEEVER
BUD McFARLANE
JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: MORT ALLIN *MAA*

SOU.P.

Last week, the President addressed a number of questions in writing from Le Figaro on U.S./European relations and, during a brief photo session, commented on the Mideast.

Attached is the complete interview. It is expected to appear in Le Figaro and several other European papers on Tuesday, August 10. We do not plan to release it unless asked to confirm reports on it or if asked for the entire "Q and A".

In addition to Le Figaro, the interview is scheduled to appear in Il Giornale in Italy, Le Soir in Belgium, Die Welt in West Germany, Volkskrant in the Netherlands, Asahi Shimbun in Japan, and an unnamed paper in Spain.

BCC: Larry Speakes
Mike Baroody
Joanna Bistany
Jim Rentschler
Geoff Kemp
Richard Pipes
Norman BAiley ✓
Henry Nau
Roger Robinson
Bob Sims

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT BY
CHARLES LAMBROSCHINI, WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
OF LE FIGARO

August 6, 1982

Q: The first question is, Mr. President, with all that's happening, how do you see the future, especially how do you see the future of the Palestinians? We know what your policy is regarding the PLO, but the Palestinian people is something else. So how do you see their future? What hopes do you have?

THE PRESIDENT: I think their problem, of course, has to be resolved. My own view is that there hasn't been any effort to really find out what are the precise desires of the Palestinian people. Was it just the PLO that wanted a nation or do the Palestinians; would they, many of them, for example, after all these years, want to remain as inhabitants and citizens of Lebanon once that situation is straightened out?

Are there others who came from other Arab countries who would like to return to those countries?

This all has to be determined; the Palestinians' own desires have got to be a part of the negotiations.

So this is the main problem that we must continue to work on and that is why I'm so impatient to get this present situation settled, to get the PLO out. We're a little more optimistic now. They are at least down to discussing the actual technical problems of the PLO moving.

Now, some of the holdup there is the willingness of Arab countries to take them. Some have indicated that they would -- there's no country that has said that it will take them all. So they would have to be separated.

Then, we need the removal of the other forces, Syrian and Israeli, from Lebanon. And there, also, the very great problem that has to be settled -- the factionalism that about eight years ago divided Lebanon. They must be brought together because each one of those factions has its own militia, which isn't exactly the way to run a country.

Q: But do you still see a chance for a general settlement at some point?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do. Both Egypt and Israel have expressed their willingness -- Egypt particularly, in spite of much of the bitterness that's been raised now in Lebanon with this problem, still determined to go forward. The next step in the Camp David process is the autonomy for the Palestinian people.

Q: Another question. The Europeans have had the feeling since the early days of the conflict that the U.S. was more or less powerless vis-a-vis Israel and there were two interpretations. One, that basically the U.S. and Israel agree as to the objectives and the aims of the Israelis and therefore there is no powerlessness there.

Or, second interpretation, that the U.S. has no leverage on Israel.

THE PRESIDENT: It's been such an ambiguous situation during the fighting. But I have sent some rather firm messages. I know that the press has emphasized the Israeli retaliation at the breaking of the cease-fires. And there's no question of their out-of-proportion retaliation.

But, on the other hand, the PLO has in many, if not most or all instances, violated the cease-fire and then has come the great response of the Israelis and, as I say, out of proportion. I wonder if the PLO has been provoking this.

MORE

One ambiguity of the situation is if Israel uses the weapons that we've provided for offensive purposes, they are violating the agreement. We have questioned them on this and have indicated to them that they may be coming close to this violation.

On the other hand, they crossed the border into Lebanon in response to the artillery and rocket attacks across their border into Israel that took human life and did damage to villages along that border.

So they claim their advance, and with some merit, is defensive.

The original purpose was to advance far enough to prevent an artillery attack from being able to reach the Israeli border. But then they found their forces under attack.

Well, do you stand there and die? And if you retreat, then they again shell over the border. So they advanced further and they advanced all the way to where they are now.

This is what I mean about whether this is a hard-and-fast case of them being on the offense or whether they've been purely defensive.

So, as I say, it is an ambiguous situation, but we have been -- with Ambassador Habib doing what I think is a magnificent job, bringing us ever closer to a solution of this problem. In recent days, particularly, I have made it plain to Israel that their over-reaction to the point that innocent people are suffering and being wounded and killed by their retaliation to the PLO attacks cannot be ignored.

Q: I hope that eventually you settle the problem in Beirut.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we're cautiously optimistic now.

Q: All along your European tour last June you insisted that, contrary to the disarray in the Atlantic Alliance at the time of the Carter Administration, the relationship between Europe and the U.S. had never been better. Then came the dispute over the gas deal. What is now your judgment on the state of the Alliance?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe the alliance is strong. The fundamental values and shared interests which have always united us are, and will remain, much more important and enduring than the issues over which we differ from time to time. Differences of view are not new within the alliance; they are the hallmark of consultations among free and sovereign states.

The issues which have bothered Europe recently are primarily economic; they do not affect directly the fundamental interests -- in security and related issues -- on which NATO is based. I don't want to underestimate the seriousness of these economic issues; but I do think we will successfully resolve them.

Let's not forget that we made real progress at Versailles and subsequently in a number of important economic areas. We initiated a new process of economic policy coordination, undertook a joint study of the effectiveness of exchange market intervention, agreed to a new OECD export credit arrangement which reduces export credit subsidies -- including those to the Soviet Union -- and narrowed our differences on important North-South issues. Meantime, the allied consensus on security, arms control, and defense is intact; in fact, that consensus was strengthened at the Bonn Summit and has been reaffirmed in our discussions since then.

Q: In this same context how do you assess the relationship between your country and France? Originally it seemed America had no partner more faithful than Socialist France. Because of the gas issue the French Government has returned to its familiar dissenting role in the Alliance. Cheysson is much blunter than his European colleagues when he warns of a looming "divorce" between Washington and Europe. What is your answer to such pessimism?

MORE

THE PRESIDENT: I don't even think we face a trial separation. To be serious, I remain optimistic, and I believe there are sound historic reasons for my optimism. France and America have close bilateral ties that go back to the times of our respective revolutions and we have always been the strongest of allies. Of course, our relations have had their ups and downs. But the U.S. highly values its alliance with France as I value my excellent relationship with President Mitterrand. We've had a number of very useful and productive meetings and just recently I received an exceptionally warm and personal message from him in response to my congratulatory note on the occasion of Bastille Day. With respect to the gas pipeline issue, I agree with Chancellor Schmidt's characterization of this as a "family quarrel". Like family issues, this one can and will be resolved. It is not "grounds for divorce". Close, constructive and private consultations are in order, but we start with the advantage that discussions of our differences build on deep bonds of common interest and values that far transcend isolated problems.

Q: What about this apparent contradiction between your diplomatic objectives? On the one hand you cancel the grain embargo ordered by your predecessor and keep on selling grain to the Soviets. On the other you object to the Europeans building the pipeline.

THE PRESIDENT: U.S. policy toward East-West economic relations seeks to bring economic ties with the East in line with our security objectives. At a time when we face a massive Soviet military buildup, it's inappropriate to encourage increased dependence on the Soviet Union by energy imports or subsidizing credits. New projects like the pipeline have both real and psychological consequences for our current security interests. The pipeline -- built with subsidized credits -- would increase Western Europe's dependence on the East and would add to the Soviet Union's capacity to earn hard currency. By contrast, U.S.-Soviet grain trade poses no security problems. The sale of grain to the Soviet Union does not contribute to Soviet technological capabilities nor does it provide them with a source of much needed hard currency as the pipeline will -- indeed grain sales deplete Soviet foreign exchange.

The main issue regarding the pipeline sanctions, however, is the Poland situation. We imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union in December 1981, not because of these specific security concerns about the pipeline, but because of our desire to advance reconciliation in Poland. These sanctions were not intended to be a sweeping all-inclusive attempt to cut off all trade. Rather, they were meant to make a clear political statement: we rejected Soviet behavior toward Poland and wanted them to reconsider the consequences of their repression in Poland. I did not embargo grain in December 1981 or suspend the existing one year extension of the U.S.-USSR grain agreement. Such an embargo would be ineffective because of grain's availability on the world market. But I did postpone the negotiation of a new long-term agreement with the Soviet Union, and that sanction remains in place. Moreover, I have always made it clear that the sanctions will be reconsidered when there is significant progress toward genuine reconciliation in Poland. Ultimate reconciliation would require an end to martial law, the release of political prisoners, including Lech Walesa, and a resumption of dialogue between Solidarity, the government, and the Church.

Q: Europeans have the impression you've launched an all out offensive against them. Not only regarding this gas contract but also on steel and agricultural exports to the U.S. How do you justify your Administration's policy in this respect?

THE PRESIDENT: All this talk of a "trade war" is simply untrue. It grossly distorts the dimensions of the problem, in much the same way that the term "economic warfare", which some people use to describe U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union, distorts the facts of our East-West policy. Of course, there are some differences of opinion on trade issues between the United States and Europe. But we are trying to resolve these problems in a mutually acceptable way, using proper legal procedures.

Steel and agriculture are certainly key areas. Our actions on steel have been carried out in strict accordance with U.S. law, and we are currently engaged in intensive discussions with EC Commission negotiators trying to reach agreement on a settlement acceptable to both sides. On agriculture,

we are utilizing the proper dispute settlement provisions of the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) to try and resolve our differences. There is certainly no intention on our part to disrupt or damage our critically important economic relationship with Europe. It would be foolhardy to do so in any event, given that Western Europe is our leading trading partner and the main buyer of our goods abroad.

Q: Another recurring complaint: You overlook the interests of the Alliance, your economic strategy has consequences (high deficits, high interest rates, high dollar) that only worsen the problems of the West as a whole. What is your reaction to this alleged selfishness on the part of the U.S? Helmut Schmidt argues: the best security for the West is a strong economy.

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with Chancellor Schmidt that strong Western economies are vital to our defense. In fact, my first priority upon entering office was to develop a program for America's economic recovery. The most important thing the U.S. can do to promote Western economic recovery is to lay the groundwork for sustainable, non-inflationary growth. And we are doing just that. But it's going to be a long and difficult process to correct the problems of twenty or more years.

On interest rates we are very sensitive to the problems these cause, both in Europe and in the United States. We don't like them any more than you do. A start has been made towards bringing them down in the U.S. and we'll continue to do so. Just this week the prime rate declined to 15 percent. That's still too high, but certainly is a considerable improvement over the 21 percent my Administration inherited. And inflation is averaging 6 percent annually compared to 12 percent when I took office.

Q: What is your concept of the Alliance? Should NATO be a partnership between true equals or is it rightly so for the U.S. to look as being more equal than the others? Isn't Schmidt contradicting himself when he says the U.S. is laudable when exercising leadership but that giving orders is not acceptable? What is your opinion on Schmidt's views?

THE PRESIDENT: Let's remember: NATO is a partnership of sovereign democratic states founded on the principles of consultation and consensus and designed to achieve one objective -- to deter and defend against Soviet aggression, a task which it has successfully fulfilled for over thirty years. In any voluntary alliance of proud, sovereign nations, whose joint decisions are reached by free consensus and not by the kind of coercion we see inside the Warsaw Pact, there are bound to be disagreements and differing viewpoints. I believe that the United States has played, and will continue to play, a useful, leading role within the Alliance framework of consultations.

My administration is committed to maintaining and improving the process of consultation among us. This is demonstrated by the success of the Bonn Summit and our continuing efforts to add breadth and depth to our allied dialogue on the broad spectrum of issues which challenge us. Naturally, we fully respect the right of our NATO partners to disagree with us, and it is through the process of consultation that we have traditionally resolved such differences. An alliance such as ours can only function on the basis of mutual respect and discussion of our differences. In that sense, I consider Chancellor Schmidt's views a positive contribution to the on-going NATO dialogue.

Q: Are you still worried by the neutralist trend in Europe, especially in Germany?

THE PRESIDENT: Your question reminds me of another and older one: "Are you still beating your wife?" No, I'm not still worried about neutralist trends in Europe -- and never have been -- because I have always had confidence in the overriding partnership which binds us in the pursuit of common security against a common adversary. That partnership is firmly rooted in Western values, a fact that is particularly true of the Federal Republic, whose commitment to our joint defense is substantial and unshakable. While I recognize that a wide range of viewpoints are current among the German public -- as they are among the American public, and indeed the publics of all genuinely democratic societies -- I have no doubt about our Alliance's commitment to defending our values and freedoms.

Q: What is your opinion of these views held in Europe: Since nuclear defense in case of a Soviet invasion is considered by the pacifists as suicide, why not build up conventional forces? Therefore, why don't you order a return to the draft? Again, doesn't it seem your allies are showing more determination and more coherence than your country by sticking (all of them except Great Britain) to a formula of compulsory military service?

THE PRESIDENT: NATO's successful strategy of nearly 4 decades has been based on the concept of deterrence -- prevention of war by maintaining a sufficiently credible defense so that the cost of any attack would far exceed any potential gain. In view of the nature and size of the Warsaw Pact military threat, this means that NATO's military posture requires both robust conventional forces and a credible nuclear posture in NATO Europe and in our strategic nuclear forces. If NATO maintains the capability to respond effectively to any level of attack, either conventional or nuclear, we can maintain the peace. If we do less, we risk war. Therefore, even as we seek effective arms reductions to equal and verifiable levels, our defense program and those of our allies must be directed toward improving the full spectrum of military capabilities.

Let me add that our program to improve the posture of our conventional force deserves a special mention. Due to past neglect, it's imperative that the United States and our NATO partners work together to repair current deficiencies in our conventional forces. That's precisely what the U.S. defense program is designed to do.

Regarding the All-Volunteer force, the fact is that it is proving itself an unqualified success. Our field commanders are delighted with the quality of their people. . . and they should be. Last year, 80 percent of all enlistees were high school graduates. This year the figures will be even better. There is no doubt that the services are recruiting high quality youth who are proud of their uniform. They're learning their skills, maintaining a good discipline record, and reenlisting in record numbers. The draft is simply not required in today's America.

Q: Is a limited nuclear war in Europe part of your military options?

THE PRESIDENT: Our strategy is oriented toward deterrence . . . period! Maintaining the peace is our strategy. We seek to preserve the security of the North Atlantic area by means of a convincing deterrent posture and through our commitment to seek militarily significant, equitable and verifiable agreements on the control and reduction of those armaments which threaten the security of everyone.

To speak of limited nuclear war as a military option misses the whole point. The Alliance believes that the most effective way to prevent war is to discourage aggression. And we do this by maintaining our joint capability to respond in an appropriate manner to any level of aggression. At the same time, as we have demonstrated through our comprehensive and realistic arms reduction proposals -- including a draft treaty on the table in Geneva for INF, the U.S., with the solid support of our allies, stands second to none in our quest for arms reductions. We are engaged in serious, good-faith talks with the Soviets on reducing strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces as well as on conventional force reductions.

Q: What is your reading of the recent release in Poland of some of the political prisoners? Under what conditions would you be ready to change your attitude toward the Warsaw government?

THE PRESIDENT: We have been consulting with our NATO Allies on the steps announced by the Polish government on July 21. While we welcome the announcement of the release of a number of political prisoners, a large number of them still remain behind bars, and we renew our appeal for their release. The continuation of martial law itself is deplorable. We deeply regret the apparent refusal of the Polish authorities to engage in a dialogue with Solidarity or indeed to acknowledge its right to exist.

MORE

We are in agreement with our allies -- the steps recently announced by the Polish leadership fall considerably short of fulfilling the three criteria set in the Allied declaration of January 11, 1982. There have been some encouraging indications of martial law easing, but by and large the recent moves have been disappointing and there's certainly no cause to celebrate in Poland. We continue to hope that the Polish authorities will realize how dangerous it is for Poland to maintain a state of war between the government and its people and that they will change their course.

Our own policies will continue to be kept under review against this background.

Q: Are you engaged in a crusade against the Soviet Union? Is your true aim the collapse of the communist regime in Moscow or do you only want to make containment work?

THE PRESIDENT: No, the United States is not engaged in a "crusade" against the Soviet Union. The U.S. Government has regularly stated its interest in a more cooperative relationship with the USSR as a means of strengthening international peace and stability. The U.S., however, cannot accept Soviet adventurism -- as seen in Afghanistan and Poland -- and Moscow's unbridled military build-up, and my administration has accordingly adopted policies designed to encourage Soviet restraint.

With regard to domestic affairs, it is our view that the Soviet people themselves must choose the form of government under which they want to live. At the same time, the United States cannot ignore the great violations of human rights which regularly occur in the Soviet Union and other communist states. This administration has made clear to Moscow that these abuses, like irresponsible Soviet behavior in the international arena, represent a serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

It's important that we in the West not assist the Soviet military buildup through subsidized credits, high technology sales, and other measures which, in effect, enable the Soviet government to defer the hard decisions it must make in allocating its scarce resources.

Q: Thank you, Mr. President.

END

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USSR CHRONOLOGY

July 1-31, 1982

July

- 1 Party Secretaries Gorbachev and Dolgikh participated in a Central Committee conference of economists.
- 1 Natalya Lazareva, Leningrad dissident writer, recanted and received a reduced sentence--4 years' imprisonment and 2 in exile under Article 70 of the RSFSR criminal code.
- 1 V. Gribachev's article in Sovetskaya Rossiya ridiculed International Communication Agency study of Soviet elites.
- 2 Gorbachev attended Komsomol plenum.
- 2 Politburo candidate and Georgian party chief Shevardnadze addressed Georgian supreme soviet session; D. L. Kartvelishvili endorsed as Georgian prime minister (vice Pataridze).
- 2 Three ethnic German dissenters demonstrated in Red Square for 30 seconds before police intervened.
- 2 Soviet cosmonauts and French astronaut received Orders of Lenin and Gold Stars after successful completion of joint Salyut-7/Soyuz-T5 flight.
- 2 Party Secretary Zimyanin spoke at Orenburg obkom plenum about May plenum; toured local farms.
- 2-5 Heavy storm damaged crops in eastern Georgia; Shevardnadze toured stricken areas.
- 3 Brezhnev flew to Crimea for holiday; seen off by all Moscow-based leaders except Solomentsev and Kapitonov.
- 3 Defense Minister Ustinov received Indian Army Chief of Staff Rao; Chief of General Staff Ogarkov present.
- 4 Wife, son, and stepmother of Soviet defector Viktor Korchnoi arrived in Vienna.
- 5 Vice-President Kuznetsov received Imelda Marcos, wife of Philippine President.

July

- 5 Gromyko received Kuwaiti and Moroccan foreign ministers and PLO representative Qaddumi.
- 5-7 Zimyanin attended RSFSR Znaniye Society's 8th Congress; N. G. Basov elected Society chairman.
- 6 IL-62 on Moscow-Dakar-Freetown run crashed at Sheremetyevo with 90 fatalities.
- 6 Party Secretary Kirilenko addressed Collegium of USSR Auto Industry Ministry.
- 6 Foreign visitor in Moscow reported witnessing self-immolation by unidentified Soviet male on Red Square at about 6:30 p.m.
- 6 Zimyanin received North Korean party delegation.
- 7 Party Secretary Ponomarev received Mozambique Ambassador.
- 8 Leninskiy Nevskiy Zavod announced that it had begun manufacture of nine 25-kw gas pumps for gas pipeline to Western Europe.
- 8 Politburo candidate and Uzbek party chief Rashidov opened exhibit of Brezhnev's published works in Tashkent.
- 9 Brezhnev sent message to President Reagan on situation in Beirut.
- 9 Premier Tikhonov spoke at Kremlin ceremony for Soviet/French space flight; presented awards.
- 9 At press conference, Sergey Fadeyev, chief of foreign section of Moscow OVIR, announced that hunger strikers Petrov and Balovlenkov were denied visas for security reasons.
- 12 Ustinov article on nuclear war issues appeared in Pravda.
- 13 RSFSR Supreme Soviet session attended by all Moscow-based leaders except Brezhnev, Grishin, Gromyko, Chernenko, Demichev, and Kapitonov.
- 15 Party Secretaries Andropov and Ponomarev received Syrian Communist Party leader Khalid Bakdash.

July

- 16 Two Soviet dissenters for peace were charged with hooliganism; received 15-day sentences.
- 16 Pravda published G. Arbatov article on US policy.
- 16 Pravda published article by USSR Minister of Gas Industry rapping President Reagan's efforts to stop USSR-Western Europe gas pipeline.
- 17 Scandinavian Women's March for Peace (July 13-29) arrived in Vyborg.
- 20 TASS published Brezhnev's interview on Middle East, Lebanon.
- 21 Kirilenko and Dolgikh attended Council of Ministers session; Tikhonov spoke on Soviet economy's 1982 growth rate.
- 21 Pravda reviewed second edition of Politburo member and Secretary Chernenko's book on political management.
- 21 Hunger striker Petrov ended fast.
- 22 Trud reported breakup of smuggling ring to Middle East trafficking in gold, silver, jewels, rubles, and car parts; 11 Soviets and 1 foreigner named.
- 23 Krasnodar Kraykom plenum released S. F. Medunov as first secretary; V. I. Vorotnikov named as replacement; CPSU Secretary Kapitonov attended plenum.
- 24 Candidate Politburo member and Azerbaydzhan party chief Aliyev denounced corruption in university matriculation at a republic Central Committee meeting.
- 26 Mongolian leader Tsedenbal arrived in USSR on holiday.
- 26 Pravda published V. Parfenov article on too many rubles chasing too few goods, noting 160 billion rubles in savings accounts.
- 26-27 Grenadian delegation visited USSR, held talks on economic collaboration, cultural and consular accords with Tikhonov, Gorbachev, and Ponomarev.

July

- 30 K. F. Katushev, former CPSU Secretary, relieved as deputy chairman, Council of Ministers, and named ambassador to Cuba, replacing V. I. Vorotnikov.
- 30 Brezhnev received Czechoslovak leader Husak in the Crimea.
- 30 Pravda summarized a decree ordering a tightening up of literary journals.
- 30 Pravda article by N. Poshatayev warned of perils in taking steps to indoctrinate the masses on proper consumption levels; blamed some social deviance on present errors and not on inherited sins of the past; and called for better use of sociologists.