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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. notes <i>86</i>	from NSC/EPC meeting (7pp)	n.d.	P-5 open
2. cover sheet	from John Tidj re: extension of EEP to USSR (1p)	7/16/86	P-1 B1
3. memo	from David Cohen to Danzansky re: extension of Export Enhancement Program to USSR (3pp)	7/16/86	P-1 B1
4. report	Soviet Grain Purchases from th US (5pp)	n.d.	P-1 B1
5. memo	to Danzansky re: response to your question "What can Moscow do with \$140 million?" (1p)	7/16/86	P-1 B1
6. background info	fro NSIS Working Group meeting (1p)	7/14/86	P-1 B1
7. memo <i>Folder 9</i>	from Commodity Markets Branch to Director of Golbal Issues via Chief Economics Dev. re: economic implications of possible US subsidy of Soviet wheat purchases (14pp)	7/14/86	P-1 B1
8. PROF note <i>Folder 10</i>	from S. Danzansky to J Poindexter re: EPC meeting on expanding US agricultural exports (1p, partial)	7/9/86	P-5 open <i>USS 10/26/00</i>
COLLECTION: DANZANSKY, STEPHEN I.: Files			db
FILE FOLDER: <i>(9 of 11) RAC Box 12</i> Soviet Union (Grain) {7 of 8} Box 91819			11/16/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DOLE SAYS EXPANDING EXPORT PROGRAMS TO USSR UNDER CONSIDERATION

WASHINGTON--JULY 16--KRF--SENATE MAJORITY LEADER ROBERT DOLE, R-KAN., SAID TODAY EXPANDING EXPORT PROGRAMS TO INCLUDE THE USSR AND CHINA WAS "UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION" WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION.

MORE
1052 CDT#XY

DOLE TOLD REPORTERS THIS MORNING, "IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT (EXPANDING THE EXPORT BONUS PROGRAM TO THE USSR) IS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION" WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. "MY VIEW IS YOU'RE GOING TO SEE SOME MOVEMENT BY THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE EXPORT AREA," HE SAID.

THE MARKETING LOAN IDEA FOR WHEAT AND FEED GRAINS IS PROBABLY NOT A REALISTIC OPTION AT THIS TIME, HE SAID, BUT GIVEN THE SLACK U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORT SITUATION HE HOPED THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD QUICKLY TAKE SOME ACTION TO BOOST EXPORTS.

DOLE LINKED EXTENDING EXPORT BONUS TO THE USSR TO A POTENTIAL SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN AND SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV.

"IT'S AN AREA WHERE WE CAN...INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION BY TRADING WITH THE SOVIET UNION," DOLE SAID.

MORE
1058 CDT#XY
*RTATSASGGHHTYE

DOLE SAID THE POTENTIAL OF A REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT WAS ONE OF THE REASONS THE STATE DEPARTMENT MIGHT BE RECONSIDERING ITS OPPOSITION TO EXPANDING THE EXPORT BONUS PROGRAM TO INCLUDE THE USSR.

"MAYBE THIS CAN BE ANOTHER LITTLE FUNCTION THAT MIGHT BODE WELL FOR A MEETING LATER ON WITH THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV," HE SAID.

THERE HAD BEEN RUMORS IN THE FUTURES MARKETS THAT DIRECT COMMODITY CREDIT CORP. BONUSES FOR THE USSR AND CHINA WAS AN OPTION BEING DISCUSSED BY USDA.

GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY SOURCES HERE TOLD KNIGHT-RIDDER FINANCIAL NEWS OTHER OPTIONS, INCLUDING EXPANDED EXPORT BONUS AND SOME VARIATION OF A PRODUCER OPTION PAYMENT PROGRAM, WERE BEING CONSIDERED BY THE ADMINISTRATION, DESPITE LYNG'S PREVIOUS REJECTION OF SOME OF THOSE OPTIONS.

THOSE SOURCES SAY IT IS LIKELY ANY PROGRAM WOULD USE GOVERNMENT-OWNED STOCKS OR GENERIC CERTIFICATES TO "BUY DOWN" THE PRICE OF U.S. GRAIN AND WOULD NOT PROVIDE CASH SUBSIDIES.

THIS MORNING, INDUSTRY SOURCES SAID EXPANDING THE EXPORT BONUS PROGRAM MIGHT BE THE LEADING CONTENDER BECAUSE THAT PROGRAM ALREADY WAS IN PLACE AND WOULD REQUIRE FEWER STOCKS.

ALTHOUGH RELATIVELY RAPID PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON VARIOUS OPTIONS, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE USDA WILL ADOPT ANY PROGRAM. NO ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANY NEW EXPORT INITIATIVE IS EXPECTED THIS WEEK. END
1106 CDT#XY

7/16/86

AD644 :ps -----

RU AM-US-SOVIET FARM:500

DOLE SAYS ADMINISTRATION READY TO OFFER GRAIN EXPORT SUBSIDIES TO SOVIETS

BY JIM DRINKARD

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION APPEARS WILLING TO OFFER GRAIN EXPORT SUBSIDIES TO THE SOVIET UNION TO BOLSTER SAGGING FARM SALES OVERSEAS AND TO BOOST CHANCES OF A REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT; SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BOB DOLE SAID WEDNESDAY.

SUCH A DECISION WOULD BE A SHARP POLICY REVERSAL FOR THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH HAS LONG CONTENDED IT IS WRONG TO OFFER TO SUBSIDIZE SALES TO THE SOVIETS AND TO OTHER "UNFRIENDLY" COUNTRIES.

"MY VIEW IS; YOU'RE GOING TO SEE SOME MOVEMENT BY THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE EXPORT AREA," DOLE TOLD REPORTERS. "I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY IT'S UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. I DO DETECT SOME WILLINGNESS" TO EXPAND THE CURRENT SUBSIDY PROGRAM TO INCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION.

AGRICULTURE SECRETARY RICHARD LYNG ADVANCED THE IDEA AT A CABINET-LEVEL MEETING OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL LAST WEEK AT WHICH HE ALSO DESCRIBED THE BLEAK OUTLOOK FOR U.S. FARM EXPORTS.

THERE ARE TWO LIKELY REASONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPARENT CHANGE OF HEART.

THE UNITED STATES IN MAY RECORDED ITS FIRST MONTHLY FARM TRADE DEFICIT IN THREE DECADES; AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THERE WILL BE A DEFICIT AGAIN THIS MONTH. THERE ALSO HAS BEEN LITTLE MOVEMENT TOWARD AN AGREED-UPON 1986 SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON; AND OFFICIALS BELIEVE OPENING THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM WOULD SWEETEN THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS.

FARM GROUPS AND GRAIN TRADING COMPANIES HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S EXPORT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM HAS BEEN INEFFECTIVE; AND MAY EVEN HAVE DAMAGED SALES; BECAUSE IT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION; IN MOST YEARS THE LARGEST CUSTOMER FOR U.S. GRAIN.

THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM OFFERS BONUS COMMODITIES; TAKEN FROM GOVERNMENT-OWNED SURPLUS STOCKS; TO CERTAIN TARGETED COUNTRIES WHICH AGREE TO BUY U.S. FARM GOODS. IN A YEAR OF OPERATION; THE ADMINISTRATION HAS USED \$264 MILLION WORTH OF BONUSES TO SELL 4.1 MILLION METRIC TONS OF WHEAT AND THE EQUIVALENT OF ANOTHER 1.1 MILLION TONS IN FLOUR UNDER THE PROGRAM.

THE UNITED STATES WILL EXPORT A TOTAL 26 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT IN THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR; WHICH ENDS SEPT. 30. THOSE AMOUNTS ARE DWARFED BY CURRENT U.S. WHEAT STOCKS; WHICH STAND AT 51.7 MILLION TONS.

"WE OUGHT TO STOP KIDDING OURSELVES ABOUT THE EXPORT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM," DOLE SAID. "IF WE'RE GOING TO GIVE A BONUS TO OTHER COUNTRIES; IT'S PRETTY HARD TO DENY IT TO THE SOVIET UNION."

DOLE; WHOSE HOME STATE OF KANSAS IS THE NATION'S LEADING WHEAT PRODUCER; IS UP FOR RE-ELECTION THIS YEAR AT A TIME OF BIN-BUSTING CROP SURPLUSES AND DEPRESSED GRAIN PRICES. HE AND OTHER FARM-STATE LAWMAKERS HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE WHITE HOUSE FOR MONTHS TO DO SOMETHING DECISIVE TO MOVE MORE GRAIN INTO EXPORT CHANNELS.

ALL PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM HAD BEEN REBUFFED; REPORTEDLY BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION WHO ARGUED THAT GIVING ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE SOVIETS WOULD BE A STRATEGIC MISTAKE.

BUT DOLE SAID THE POSSIBILITY OF A REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING WAS MAKING POLICYMAKERS TAKE A SECOND LOOK.

"IT'S AN AREA WHERE WE CAN ... INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION BY TRADING WITH THE SOVIET UNION," HE SAID.

"MAYBE THIS CAN BE ANOTHER LITTLE FACTOR THAT MIGHT BODE WELL FOR A MEETING LATER ON WITH THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV."

Apr. 24 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1981

Statement on Terminating United States Restrictions on
Agricultural Sales to the Soviet Union
April 24, 1981

I am today lifting the U.S. limitation on additional agricultural sales to the Soviet Union as I promised to do during last year's Presidential campaign. My administration has made a full and complete study of this sales limitation, and I reached my decision after weighing all options carefully and conferring fully with my advisers, including members of the Cabinet and the National Security Council. We have also been consulting with our allies on this matter.

As a Presidential candidate, I indicated my opposition to the curb on sales, because American farmers had been unfairly singled out to bear the burden of this ineffective national policy. I also pledged that when elected President I would "fully assess our national security, foreign policy, and agricultural needs to determine how best to terminate" the decision made by my predecessor.

This assessment began as soon as I entered office and has continued until now. In

the first few weeks of my Presidency, I decided that an immediate lifting of the sales limitation could be misinterpreted by the Soviet Union. I therefore felt that my decision should be made only when it was clear that the Soviets and other nations would not mistakenly think it indicated a weakening of our position.

I have determined that our position now cannot be mistaken: The United States, along with the vast majority of nations has condemned and remains opposed to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and other aggressive acts around the world. We will react strongly to acts of aggression wherever they take place. There will never be a weakening of this resolve.

Note: Deputy Press Secretary Larry M. Speakes read the statement at the regular press briefing in the Briefing Room at the White House.

Memorandum Directing the Termination of United States
Restrictions on Agricultural Sales to the Soviet Union
April 24, 1981

*Memorandum for the Secretary of
Commerce*

I hereby direct that you, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and other appropriate officials, immediately terminate the current restrictions on the export of agricultural commodities and products to the Soviet Union imposed under authority of the Export Administration Act pursuant to

the Presidential Memorandum to the Secretary of Commerce of January 7, 1980. I also direct that you terminate restrictions imposed on the export of phosphate rock and related commodities by virtue of the regulations of the Department of Commerce published on February 7, 1980.

RONALD REAGAN

Memorandum on Terminating United States Restrictions on Agricultural Sales to the Soviet Union

April 24, 1981

Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture

I have today directed the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with you and other appropriate officials, to immediately terminate the current restrictions on the export of agricultural commodities and products to the Soviet Union imposed under authority of the Export Administra-

tion Act pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum to the Secretary of Commerce of January 7, 1980. I have also directed that the restrictions be terminated which were imposed on the export of phosphate rock and related commodities by virtue of the regulations of the Department of Commerce published on February 7, 1980.

RONALD REAGAN

Nomination of Alan Green, Jr., To Be a Commissioner of the Federal Maritime Commission, and Designation as Chairman

April 24, 1981

The President today announced his intention to nominate Alan "Punch" Green, Jr., to be a Federal Maritime Commissioner for a term expiring June 30, 1984, vice Leslie Lazar Kanuk. Upon confirmation, the President intends to designate Mr. Green Chairman.

Mr. Green is president and commissioner, Port of Portland, Portland, Ore. He has been president since 1974 and a member since 1970.

Previously he was a member of the board of directors of Equitable Savings & Loan, Portland, Ore.; secretary-treasurer of the

Southern Oregon Battery & Supply Co., Inc.; member of the board of directors of Comprehensive Care, Inc., Newport Beach, Calif.; chairman of the board, Western Batteries, Inc., Beaverton, Ore.; and chairman of the board, Tom Benson Glass Co., Inc., Portland, Ore.

Mr. Green was graduated from Stanford University (B.A., 1949). He served in the U.S. Army in 1943-45. Mr. Green is married, has three children, and resides with his family in Portland, Ore. He was born in Portland on May 1, 1925.

Proclamation 4842—Memorial Day, May 25, 1981

April 24, 1981

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Over one hundred years ago, Memorial Day was established to commemorate those who died in the defense of our national ideals. Our ideals of freedom, justice, and equal rights for all have been challenged

many times since then, and thousands of Americans have given their lives in many parts of the world to secure those same ideals and insure for their children a lasting peace. Their sacrifice demands that we, the living, continue to promote the cause of peace and the ideals for which they so valiantly gave of themselves.

notes / NR / 2PC

Grain Sales.

Baker
Bullock

History -

4th op
3d water channels
agent other counter
4th op for
Dico - how low
chopped \$8-3 - success
cause problems w/ competition
We've not been hit
not to market
price

Strategy - deal AP
implicit - new engaged
brood implicit

Tactics vs in own

spas - They aren't
buying most current

level - If we care m.

it is a measure
our ability to stand

up.
next: Cabipillan track

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on farm / so who
are waiting.

Can South money
masses - find areas where
there is heavy staff
course us to find

(2) other countries -
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u. Ask not made
at team. we moved
to taking a shot at
Ask
same: Canada - Agm

This more will mean
to phase center.
won't be any countries

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to find Philippines - pro
in sign -

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the market - we are
creating a high low
pro of encourage a high
supply

This is unsensitized
Bad impact -

cap. - what work
after this. tech transfer

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Anzus.

(3) Newark secret
in future ~~to get out~~ 100 up

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we pay for farm
start support.

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improvement of sweet
system -

Corey - others will
match 15,000 lbs.
This called
price

all students will
same sweet
\$150 mil or about
same

have price effect.

Switch in transfer
expressly - at value
of hard currency from \$30 billion
to \$18 bil.

One might say it
gram price $\frac{1}{3}$ of
Sweet input is
very close to
today
They lack hard currency

+ Quality of
any data input
will help for
m.m.l. expansion of
spout

by (1) Sweet need
3.4 m.l. hrs
try was treated
to some.

(2) # Data #2
is trying to treat
anemia to some.
same part of stage.
held on only front
incentive paper

(3) Give appearance
are doing something. Help
app - on teeth.
acute purchase from
Sweet

(4) Appears very common.
low cost, not of
highly - giving our sample
to dealer - close out

Brexit - we should stay of
at all - why are we
getting better

Verfa - trade policy
implantation

(1) Aust. is a
real problem -

(2) If you have
general im. report
effect on Austria
Verfa has a way to deal
w/Aust (→)

(3) Canada - labeled
on open embargo -
no separate

(4) Verfa - no strictly
get treat

(5) within period of
time we will compare
and # indicator
stand still - after
we go forward

(6) however, we move
to picket - we no got to
move to picket

Present program but

Bal. word length
images in abstract

program - word-ince
see state -
James and politics
are intertwined

long range study -
may time - we have
short range problem -
we practice too well -
James caught by
word-ince default

Res H - debit up
land value down

James' "total price" is
"insurance" - US
stock game at
\$16/100
88 loan

defining period

Amity vs sell to 12
market.

experts	control			cost
press -	Dist.	\$92		
	can	\$91		
	EC	79	\$	800

how ~~are~~ going to

be sold to Syria.
at school price

Dist. size at street

14 seats at stand
in vapors from state
South Midwest

Why do you buy @
sarah?

Why can't you call
my office about work
have

Grain (70+8)
Pazansky

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Soh / K / B
Kathy, Barbara

86-87 - 500,000 - 2 mil



No way to come
into compliance left
out

1) US price is competitive
EEP =

6 mos ago our
price was \$30-40 (NOT)
Farm bill has lowered
low rates - go there.
down price held in
\$ has remained,

||
It would allow to
meet

4

Canada + EC
with lower bumper
crops.

poss. 2 mil tons

1) Canada } 10 mil tons
2) EC }
* }
Total need 15

Argentina -
Canada
Aist } have no
export entitlement
program

15 mt -
other commitments will
widen cut

4 wheat
4 corn
1 of either OA soybeans

(1) Euro -
- 15 total countries
- single currency
- complex
- other countries
competitively - market
committed to other
countries


(2) Prices are being
fixed down, currency.
1985 Farm Act.
Chase Corporation = ar.
\$ 90 wheat.

(3) Soviet Bal of
payments.
Soviet A) Argentina - buying
go that B) Canadian may
have

USIA taking about 19 mil
tons
CIA - 15 because
they trim

By Soviet bank
~~to buy other items~~
\$180 mil.

This has. quote
to buy other items -
If they buy postcards
they



Feeding

LHA - 1969 3/1m

negot 1972 - effort 1993
6 mil this month
8 can Aug.

||

~~Japan.~~

Grann (7 of 8)
Pazansky

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the end of my remarks, I urged Mr. Yakir to remain strong. We too must remain strong, strong and determined to carry on the fight for the thousands of Soviet people, Jews and Christians alike, who want to resettle in the West.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the letter to which I have made reference.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KASTEN). Without objection, it is as ordered.

The letter ordered to be printed in the RECORD, follows:

U.S. SENATE,

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER,

Washington, DC, July 15, 1986.

Mr. ALEXANDER YAKIR,

96 Profsoyusnaya, Korpus 5, Apartment 35,
Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 117485.

DEAR MR. YAKIR: I just heard the wonderful news of your release from prison and your return to Moscow.

Let us hope that gaining your freedom is only the first step toward emigration to the West for you and your family. You have good friends here, friends who will not forget your dream.

You have shown great determination and courage over the years. I hope that you will remain strong.

Sincerely,

BOB DOLE, U.S. Senate.

SUMMIT MEETING SUGGESTIONS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, it also appears there now seems to be more and more optimism about a meeting after the fall elections between Mr. Gorbachev and the President of the United States.

We are always giving advice to the President on what he ought to do to help our relationship with the Soviet Union. I might, in the appropriate spirit, indicate to Mr. Gorbachev that one way, I think, to make a lasting impression on the American people, particularly on those families of those who now would like to leave the Soviet Union, Jews or Christians alike, is perhaps to loosen up on their emigration policies. It would be a step in the right direction as we all prepare for a meeting, hopefully, some time in November or December, between our two leaders, President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

I would also indicate that as far as our Government is concerned, it would be very helpful in my view if we take a hard look at some of our agricultural export policies as they relate to the Soviet Union.

The farm bill that was passed last December, included an export enhancement program. But because of some resistance by the administration, the benefits of this program are not being made available to the Soviet Union and, therefore, they are not buying from us. Why pay \$14 more a ton if you can buy it from some other source.

It would seem to me that with the depressed state of agriculture, which is probably going to continue for some

time, we need to make every reasonable effort to increase our exports. We cannot expect to sell grain to the Soviet Union, for example, if we are going to demand a price higher than any of our competitors.

So, it would be my hope that the administration in the very near future would change that policy. It would be a step in the right direction that we might take. Again, it would be a gesture of good will that would enhance the possibilities of reaching real results when Mr. Gorbachev and the President of the United States sit down together later this year.

□ 1110

Mr. President, I reserve the balance of my time, except for 3 minutes which I yield to the distinguished President pro tempore, Senator THURMOND.

RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Democratic leader is recognized.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, anent those actions which the new General Secretary of the Soviet Union might take to stimulate interest in the President's meeting with the new General Secretary at a hoped-for summit, and more importantly what might help to pave the way for a building of confidence and faith on the part of the American people in what the Soviet leaders may say and what they may agree to, would be that the Soviets get their military forces out of Afghanistan. The world seems to have its eyes closed and its ears plugged as to what is going on in Afghanistan.

The Soviets have been in Afghanistan now for almost 7 years. Their military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is what pulled the plug on the SALT II Treaty. That invasion put the SALT II Treaty on ice. The United States immediately reacted with sanctions against the Soviet Union, a grain embargo and other actions. Later, those sanctions were lifted. But the Soviets did not lift their siege of Afghanistan.

What we have seen there is the savage murder of men, women, and children, the dropping of booby-trapped toys from helicopters and airplanes, the result being that thousands of Afghanistan children who have had their arms blown off, legs blown off, and their eyes blinded; and millions of Afghans who love liberty have left the country.

The world goes on. Out of sight, out of mind. That appears to me to be the situation in Afghanistan. I know the difficulties are almost insurmountable, but the world press has the responsibility to reveal to the world as best it can, what is going on in Afghanistan—out of sight of the world.

So I hope that the free world will press the Soviets to get out of Afghanistan, as we hope for a summit between the two leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, and as we hope for progress in arms control negotiations in Geneva and later at a summit.

LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in closing, may I say that we on our side will do whatever we possibly can to cooperate with the distinguished majority leader in getting legislation up throughout the day. And we will be discussing with him the various pieces of legislation which he identified.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may reserve the balance of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECOGNITION OF SENATOR THURMOND

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

TEXTILE AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to voice strong concern over recently concluded textile bilateral trade agreements between the United States and Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Earlier this year, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that he would attempt to negotiate a "freeze" on textile/apparel imports to the United States from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and our other major suppliers. On the surface a freeze may seem appealing to some. However, closer examination proves the weakness of this strategy since textile/apparel imports from these and other nations reached record proportions last year. From Hong Kong alone, the United States absorbed over 1 billion square yards of textile/apparel imports in 1985. A freeze at those massive levels would not have been a bargain.

Yet, Mr. President, the recently completed agreements with Hong Kong and Taiwan do not even accomplish the freeze that Trade Representative Yeutter had announced that he would seek. To the contrary, the Hong Kong agreement guarantees 6 years of substantial growth from our largest value supplier of textile/apparel products. Over the life of this agreement, Hong Kong will be able to ship 7 billion square yards of textiles to this country. Much of this increase will be in sensitive apparel categories that already have high import penetration levels.

Mr. President, as always, the bottom line is jobs. Unfortunately, it is estimated that the increases allowed

Grawn (70f8)
Danzansky

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NSIS MEETING

July 14, 1986

Not to See Impact of "Subsidizing" Grain
Sales to the USSR

A. Economic Issues

1. Likely response of the Soviets.
2. Likely response of other suppliers. *Aust Canada - Argentina*
3. Impact on world prices.
4. Impact on U.S. receipts from farm exports.
5. Impact on USSR hard currency requirements.
6. Impact on EC budget. *- how long they are like*
7. *Debt service* Impact on Argentina's foreign exchange earnings.
8. Impact as a precedent -- extension into other agricultural products and to non-farm sectors.

B. Political Issues

1. Impact on bilateral U.S. relations with:
 - USSR
 - EC
 - Canada
 - Argentina
 - Australia
2. Impact of lower grain prices on Third World countries.
3. Impact on export credit agreement to avoid subsidizing the USSR.
4. Impact upon Economic Summit and Post-Summit Presidential leadership.

Grain (7 of 8)
Danzansky

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Grara (7048)
Panzunsky

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