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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	to Directorate of Intelligence re: Nikonov's visit to the United States (10pp)	10/-/87	P-1
2. memo	from Fritz Ermarth to Colin Powell re: US -Soviet trade (2pp)	10/1/87	P-1
3. memo	from from Am. Conslu, Frankfurt to Sec. of State re: preliminary assesment of the June Plenum (5pp)	6/-/87	P-1
4. report	re: Soviet issues foreign counterintelligence - Russia, includes copy (4pp)	6/26/87	P-1
5. vax	from Am. Embassy, London to Sec of State re: Thatcher/Gorbachev discussions - further details (6pp)	4/-/87	P-1 <i>Folder 3</i>
6. memo	from Scott Sullivan to Peter Rodman, S. Danzansky and Tyrus Cobb re: Soviets excluded from european gas markets (2pp)	6/4/86	P-1 <i>Folder 4</i>
COLLECTION:			
DANZANSKY, STEPHEN I.: Files			db
FILE FOLDER:			
<i>(3 of 6)</i> Soviet Union [2 of 3] Box 91818 <i>RAC Box 12</i>			12/5/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

October 30, 1987

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT

Building on progress in U.S.-Soviet relations, including high-level exchanges and the discussions between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz in Washington on October 30, as well as their talks in Moscow, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed to meet in the United States beginning on December 7, 1987.

The President and the General Secretary attach the highest importance to holding a substantive meeting which covers the full range of issues between the two countries -- arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations -- and which makes significant headway over the full range of these issues.

The two sides have agreed on a plan of action for further development of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, including the following.

They have agreed to complete as soon as possible the treaty on the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

At their meeting in the United States, the President and the General Secretary will, in addition to reviewing the full range of U.S.-Soviet relations, sign the treaty on the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles; set the agenda for future contacts between the leaders of the two countries; and consider thoroughly the development of instructions to delegations on a future treaty on 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms and on the observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period.

The President and the General Secretary envision a further meeting between them in the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988, where they would also seek progress across the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations. Toward this end, both sides will work towards early achievement of a treaty implementing the agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50 percent, which could be signed during the President's visit to Moscow.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz will coordinate closely to ensure thorough and expeditious preparations of the forthcoming summit in Washington.

#

Soviet Union (2 of 3)

Danzansky

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Soviet -
Union

Edward Mortimer on the latest round of the East-West debate

Giving Gorbachev a chance

HOW SHOULD the West respond to Gorbachev's challenge? Is he, in fact, challenging us, or merely responding to a Western challenge that has been on the table for some time? Should the more sophisticated and reasonable approach now adopted by Moscow in international diplomacy be regarded as an opportunity or a danger? Can the West 'help' Gorbachev? Is it in its interests to do so, and, if so, how? How much is really new in his 'new thinking'? What are his chances of success and, if he succeeds, what is the nature and extent of the change in the Soviet system we should expect to see?

All those questions were vigorously debated last weekend by a large gathering of politicians, officials and pundits from all the main Nato countries held at St Paul, Minnesota, by the Institute of East-West Security Studies. It was like a mass briefing for the expected Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

Why Minnesota? Because it is the home of Mr Whitney Macmillan, co-chairman both of the Institute itself and of the Task Force whose report on the implications of Soviet new thinking was the reason the conference was convened. Mr Macmillan is also chairman of Cargill Inc, the biggest privately-owned company in America. Cargill is an international grain trading firm, and Minnesota is the heart of North America's grain belt.

Not that grain-growers and traders are the only American businessmen with a strong interest in improved US-Soviet relations. Mr Donald Kendall, head of PepsiCo, told the conference that Moscow would be obliged to expand its opening for joint ventures with Western companies because this was the only way it could overcome its shortcomings in technology, quality control and marketing.

Within two years, Mr Kendall predicted, Gorbachev would be in 'very serious trouble' because there were no trained managers in the Soviet Union

capable of taking the decisions that would be expected of them in the newly decentralised economic system, and therefore the benefits of reform would be very slow in coming.

The Soviet leader would then need a 'Western response to help him move forward,' and Mr Kendall hoped this would be forthcoming - 'a backward Soviet Union is not in our interest.'

He gave short shrift to a proposal from Senator Bill Bradley, the New Jersey Democrat, to make Soviet economic reform and cuts in military expenditure a criterion for Western bank lending. Mr Kendall said he saw no way of imposing such political controls on Western banks and that, in any case, it was 'not free enterprise.'

The conference and the Task Force report were clearly intended to move American policy towards a more positive approach to the Soviet Union. In this, the organisers received eager support from Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, who gave the opening keynote address, and from his Icelandic and Norwegian colleagues. They seem to have had some impact on the Reagan Administration since Mr John Whitehead, the Under Secretary of State, welcomed the report as evidence of a developing 'bipartisan' approach to the Soviet Union in the US - in effect, claiming that the Administration was already doing most of the things recommended.

The main discordant note was struck by the British and especially the French governments, each represented by the head of policy planning in its Foreign Ministry. The Frenchman, Mr Philippe Coste, while conceding that some elements in the new Soviet thinking might be good for the West, stressed that these did not include any move towards self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe - in his view the essential purpose of detente - and also that the insistence on nuclear disarmament

could have very negative consequences for Western Europe, since 'the probability of conventional war is much greater than that of nuclear war.'

Mr Coste was clearly even more disturbed by Mr Genscher's speech than he was by the report of the Task Force (to which he and his British colleague had acted as 'special advisers'). He reacted strongly to Mr Genscher's remark that 'whoever takes the worst case scenario as the sole basis of his action, including his action vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, becomes a political dead weight,' and warned that Soviet efforts to remove the US nuclear presence from Western Europe might also open up 'a growing rift between France and Germany.' He urged the West 'not to play with nuclear deterrence in Europe,' and to make self-determination the main criterion in judging the 'newness' of Mr Gorbachev's thinking.

His British colleague, Mr David Gore-Booth, associated himself with these remarks, though he also endorsed the report's 'agenda for action' and said he very much hoped it would be implemented. The Europeans, he suggested, were 'both behind and in front' of the Americans, meaning that they were ahead in exploring the prospects for specific changes in Soviet policy - most notably in Eastern Europe and the Middle East - but behind in showing caution about their overall judgment. 'There is nothing in Gorbachev's shop window that we like,' he concluded bluntly, 'but a lot in ours that he likes. He must come towards us, not we towards him.'

Clearly he is coming towards us on a number of policy issues. While the French Government



Raising a glass: Mr Shultz (left) and Mr Shevardnadze in Moscow

views this with some alarm, fearing that its allies will give in too easily to his blandishments, the response of the British and American governments so far has been, in essence, 'fine - let him keep on coming.' But many influential Americans clearly share the German and Scandinavian view that the West should 'meet him halfway,' or should seek, in Mr Genscher's words, 'political dialogue and co-operation between West and East in business, science, technology and environment protection,' leading to 'ever more joint action for the future of mankind.'

One of the most thoughtful speeches to the conference came from Dr Robert Legvold, a Sovietologist from Columbia University. He felt that other speakers were too timid in judging the changes actually taking place in the Soviet Union now, and yet unrealistic in some of their expectations for the future.

The forces for change, he argued, go much deeper than the mere personality of Mikhail Gorbachev. What had happened was that the country had outgrown both the Stalinist economic order - which was unable to make the transition from 'extensive' to 'intensive' growth - and the Stalinist social order, based on a highly regimented but passive industrial working class and a bureaucratized elite. This had been replaced by an educated urban middle class which had grown very rapidly since the 1950s.

The result was a growing recognition of conflicting interests in society, a shift away from the notion of a single truth towards the recognition of diversity of opinions as necessary and useful and the death of the Utopian

belief in social engineering. All of this meant a change which would go ahead with or without Gorbachev, even if less boldly than at present.

But, said Dr Legvold, what we should not expect was a change in the basic character of the Soviet political system. The two superpowers were, and would remain, completely opposite in their fundamental aspirations. While the dominant American fear is of excessive authority at the centre, the historic Russian fear is that the centre might lose control. The Russian word for spontaneity, he said, always carries a pejorative connotation, thus it was a complete mistake to suppose that Gorbachev would try to introduce American liberal values into Russia. What he was aiming to recreate was 'efficient central direction' (Leninism) by abolishing 'intrusive central direction' (Stalinism).

From this analysis an important practical conclusion was drawn by Mr William Colby, head of the CIA under President Nixon. If it is true that we cannot expect too much in the long term, he said, it is all the more important not to miss the opportunities offered by Gorbachev in the short term. We should 'lock up agreements as fast as we can to prevent future crises.' The Soviet system had often 'changed tack in foreign policy, but had shown itself to be very reluctant to back out of formal treaty commitments.

If that is right, the west should not be too dilatory about taking Mr Gorbachev up on the various negotiations he is offering. We do not know how long he will survive, but we can at least try to reach some agreements that will be binding on his successors.

Danzansky - SOVIET UNION

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

PlanEcon, Inc.

Soviet Union

Research on the
Economies of
the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe

September 30, 1987

Dear Executive:


Over the past few weeks it has become apparent that a major arms control agreement will be concluded between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by year-end. Moreover, the Soviets continue to indicate a willingness to move forward on a number of other long unresolved issues in the areas of defense, foreign policy, economics, and even human rights. The likely significant thaw in US-Soviet relations will have important implications for East-West economic relations in general and on U.S.-Soviet trade and other forms of economic cooperation in particular. As an executive involved in trade and/or financial relations with the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, you should acquaint yourself with what these developments may mean for your business. That is why we would like to invite you to the upcoming conference in Washington on October 30, 1987 addressing:

THE IMPACT OF THE UPCOMING ARMS AGREEMENT ON US-SOVIET AND EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The sharp depreciation of the dollar over the last two-and-a-half years has at last made an increasing number of American products competitive. The U.S. no longer needs to take a back seat in trade with the Soviet Union to the Western Europeans and the Japanese. While you are not likely to hear any talk about an upcoming near-term boom in East-West trade from our speakers (we are economic consultants and forecasters, not trade promoters), the opportunity for U.S. businesses to increase their share of East-West trade has dramatically increased. Heretofore, the main barrier for U.S. firms in increasing their business in the Soviet Union has been the Soviet political barrier (Soviet "punishment" for hard-line policies of the Reagan Administration), perceived unreliability of the U.S. as a trade partner, a tough U.S. stance on exports of technology, and difficulties in securing financing because of pressures on banks from the U.S. Congress. Some of these barriers--such as the first two--are likely to be lowered, though not removed entirely. Export controls are likely to be relaxed for a number of important technologies--below the top of the line here, but still quite attractive to the Soviets. The attitude of U.S. banks on export financing to the Soviet Union is about to change as well--they will not be in a position to say no when some of their largest corporate clients come knocking on the door once again.

We have put together a group of leading U.S. experts on the Soviet economy, US-Soviet relations, and East-West trade to address the above issues in detail and to answer your questions. The aim of the conference organizers is to quickly bring you up-to-date on major issues affecting your business so that you can make a realistic assessment as to whether your company/institution needs to respond to the dramatic change in US-Soviet relations. In some cases, the answer may be yes, in others no--the aim of PlanEcon, Inc. and Data Resources, Inc. is to provide the best information and analysis available at this point. We will be looking forward to seeing you at the Grand Hotel in Washington on Friday, October 30, 1987.

Sincerely yours,


Jan Vanous
President

**THE IMPACT OF THE UPCOMING ARMS AGREEMENT
ON US-SOVIET AND EAST-WEST
ECONOMIC RELATIONS**

Friday, October 30, 1987
The Grand Hotel, 2350 M Street, NW, Washington, DC

- 9:00 a.m. Introduction
Jan Vanous, President and Research Director of PlanEcon, Inc.
Herbert S. Levine, University of Pennsylvania
- 9:15 a.m. Impact of Arms Agreement on the Soviet Union
- Impact on Soviet Economic Performance
Herbert S. Levine, University of Pennsylvania
 - Soviet Economic Reforms--Will the Arms Agreement Provide an Added Boost?
Anders Aslund, Research Scholar, Kennan Institute, Wilson Center and former First Secretary, Swedish Embassy in Moscow
 - U.S.-Soviet Arms Accord: A Result of Gorbachev's Risky Pact with the Military or Final Indication That the Civilians are Now in Charge?
Bruce Parrot, Director of Soviet Studies, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
- 10:30 a.m. Coffee Break
- 10:45 a.m. Prospects for US-Soviet Economic Relations
- Business and Financial Community Perspective
Donald W. Green, Vice President, Chase Manhattan Bank
 - U.S. Government Perspective
Official from the U.S. Department of Commerce
 - Trade Analyst's Perspective
Jan Vanous, PlanEcon, Inc.

.....
12:00 a.m. Luncheon
U.S. Commercial Policy Towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe After the Arms Agreement
Speaker: Lionel H. Olmer, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison and former Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade
.....

- 1:30 p.m. Potential for Expanding U.S. and Western Exports to the Soviet Union
- Likely Evolution of Export Controls
Jay Mitchell, Economist, PlanEcon, Inc.
 - Potential for Expanding Exports of Oil and Gas Equipment
Caron Cooper, Energy Economist, PlanEcon, Inc.
 - Potential for Expanding Exports of Computers, Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment
Charles Movit, Senior Economist, PlanEcon, Inc.
- 3:00 p.m. Coffee Break
- 3:15 p.m. Near-Term Evolution of East-West Economic Relations
- Impact of Changes in U.S. Policies on Other Western Countries
 - Case of West Germany: Donald W. Green, Chase Manhattan Bank
 - Case of Japan: Roger W. Robinson, President of RWR, Inc. and former Senior Director for International Economic Affairs at the National Security Council
 - Economic Crises in Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia -- How Will the West Respond?
Jan Vanous, PlanEcon, Inc.
- 4:00 p.m. General Discussion
- 4:30 p.m. Adjournment

The conference schedule allows time for discussion following each presentation.

Please fill in and return to:

Ms. Peggy Dunn
PlanEcon, Inc.
1111-14th Street, NW
Suite 801
Washington, DC 20005-5603

CONFERENCE REGISTRATION
(Check Appropriate Box)

- I will be attending at no charge as PlanEcon client (other than subscriptions limited to the PlanEcon Report).
- I will be attending as client of Data Resources, Inc. My conference fee of \$150 is enclosed.
- I will be attending. My conference fee of \$250 is enclosed.
- I will not be attending. However, I would like to learn more about PlanEcon products and services. Please have your representative contact the individual listed below:

Name: _____

Department: _____

Company/Institution: _____

Street Address/P.O. Box: _____

City and Zip/Postal Code: _____

Phone: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 9-22

TO: Steve Danzansky

FROM: **HANNAH BOYD**
Office of Legislative Affairs

Per our telephone conversation--
I would appreciate your contacting
me in this regard as soon as
possible.

H. Boyd
10/1/72

E (KIK) DE LA GARZA, TEXAS,
CHAIRMAN

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ED JONES, TENNESSEE
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA
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U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Agriculture
Room 1301, Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

September 14, 1987

EDWARD R. MADIGAN, ILLINOIS,
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COUNSEL
CHARLES HILTY,
MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

During the week of October 6th through the 13th, a delegation of top officials from the Soviet Union will visit the United States to view U.S. agriculture and to engage in discussions on agricultural and related issues of interest to our two countries.

The delegation will be led by Mr. Victor Petrovich Nikonov, a Member of the Politburo and Deputy Chairman of the Agroindustrial Complex of the Soviet of Nationalities. The remainder of the delegation is comprised primarily of members of the Committees on the Agroindustrial Complex of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet (see attached).

As the host for the Soviets' visit, I am pleased to invite you to meet with the delegation at any time that your schedule may allow. I would be most interested in arranging for you to greet the Soviets shortly after their arrival, or to attend one of the receptions or luncheons that we have scheduled during their time in Washington (schedule enclosed).

I believe that this visit presents a special opportunity to review firsthand a number of the agricultural and related issues that currently mark U.S.-Soviet affairs. I am hopeful that our discussions will prove particularly fruitful in light of the more frank and open dialogue that recently has characterized relations between our two countries.


The Honorable Ronald Reagan
September 14, 1987
Page 2

In view of the high-level status associated with this delegation, I am hopeful that your schedule will permit you to meet personally with the Soviets.

Mr. Mario Castillo, Chief of Staff of the Committee on Agriculture, is available to assist in making arrangements for you to meet with the delegation. He may be reached at 225-0420.

With warm personal regards, I remain

Sincerely,


E (Kika) de la Garza
Chairman

Enclosures

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL DELEGATION

October 6 - 13

NIKONOV, Victor Petrovich - Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; and Deputy Chairman, Committee on Agroindustrial Complex of the Soviet Nationalities. Born in 1929; Russian.

KHUSAINOV, Yury Minivalich - Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Agroindustrial Complex of the Soviet of the Union; First Deputy of the Council of Ministers of the Byelorussian SSR; Chairman of the State Agroindustrial Committee of the Byelorussian SSR; and Member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU. Born in 1929; Russian.

VELDI, Heyno Tynisovich - Member of the Committee on Agroindustrial Complex of the Soviet of Nationalities; First Deputy of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR; Chairman of the State Agroindustrial Committee of the Estonian SSR; and Member of the CPSU. Born in 1936; Estonian.

VOLODIN, Boris Mikhailovich - Member of the Committee on Agroindustrial Complex of the Soviet of the Union; First Secretary of Rostov Regional Committee of the CPSU; and Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Born in 1931; Russian.

YERMIN, Lev Borisovich - First Deputy of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic; Chairman of the State Agroindustrial Committee of the RSFSR; and Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Born in 1923; Russian.

OKONECHNIKOV, Boris Pavlovich - Member of the Committee on Agroindustrial Complex of the Soviet of the Union, Director of Breeding Farm after V. N. Tsvetkov, Kaluga Region, Maloyaroslavetsky district, village Kudinovo; and Member of the CPSU. Born in 1936, Russian.

OSTAPENKO, Ivan Maksimovich - Member of the Committee on Agroindustrial Complex of the Soviet of the Union; Chairman of Collective farm named after Schevchenko, Sumskaya Region, Lebedinsky, village Golubovka; and Member of the CPSU. Born in 1930; Ukrainian.

CHERNIKOV, Lev Nikolaevich - Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Head of the Division for the Standing Committees; and Member of the CPSU. Born in 1932; Russian.

OTHERS ACCOMPANYING THE DELEGATION

NIKONOVA, Ekaterina N. - Spouse of the head of the delegation.

KOLOMIETS, Petr A. - Assistant to the head of the delegation.

LISOVOLIK, Dmitri A. - Chief of Section, International Department, Central Committee of the CPSU.

KUZNETSOV, Vadim I. - Deputy Director, Department of the USA and Canada, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

LISCHENKO, Victor F. - Director, Agricultural Division, Institute of the USA and Canada, Academy of Science of the USSR.

CHISHKO, Ivan S. - Consultant, Economic and Financial Division, Presidium of Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

OSICHKIN, Nikolai P. - Member of the editorial board of the newspaper "Country Life".

KROKHALEV, Oleg A. - Counsellor, Department of USA and Canada, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (interpreter).

VOITENKOV, Alexandre N. - Third Secretary, Division of Translation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

VAKHLAKOV, Anatoli N. - Physician.

POLUNIN, Viktor I. - Physician.

VOLEV, Yuri I. - Deputy Chief of section of the Security Service.

POGORELOV Vyacheslav A. - Chief military aid.

TARASOV, Vladimir V. - Military aid.

RYBALCHENKO, Aleksei A. - Military aid.

NEROSHIN, Aleksandr P. - Military aid.

SEMIONOV, Valery O. - Security Officer.

VORONIN, Valdimir A. - Security Officer.

SHILOV, Vadim V. - Security Officer

KHROMOV, Sergei N. Khromov - Security Officer.

GNEZDYLOV, Vladimir V. - Security Officer.

Revised: 9/16/87
2:45 PM

U.S.-Soviet Agra-Mission
October 6-13, 1987

OCTOBER 6, 1987//TUESDAY

9:00 AM Soviet delegation departs Moscow

2:00 PM Soviet delegation arrives Dulles Airport

Soviet delegation checks into hotel _____

4:00 - 5:30 PM Possible business talks

6:30 - 8:00 PM Welcoming reception hosted by Chairman de la Garza
Attendees: Soviet delegation and members of the
Committee on Agriculture of the U.S. House of
Representatives -- 1300 Longworth House Office
Building

OCTOBER 7, 1987//WEDNESDAY

>Independent breakfast

10 AM - 12:00 NOON Official Roundtable Meetings -- 1302
Longworth House Office Building
Proposed meetings with:

Hon. Dante B. Fascell, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Hon. William S. Broomfield, Ranking
Minority Member, Comm. on For. Aff.
Hon. Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman
Committee on Ways and Means
Hon. John J. Duncan, Ranking Minority
Member, Comm. on Ways and Means
Hon.. Bill H. Gray, III, Chairman
Committee on the Budget
Hon. Delbert L. Latta, Ranking Minority
Member, Committee on the Budget

12:30 - 2:00 PM Hosted luncheon by Chairman de la Garza --
1300 Longworth House Office Building
Attendees: Secretary Lyng, Cong. Madigan,
Ranking Minority Member of the Comm. on
Agriculture and Subcommittee Chairmen and
Ranking Minority Members of the Committee's 8
Subcommittees

Revised: 9/16/87
2:45 PM

October 7 continued.....

2:00 - 5:00 PM Official meetings with Executive Branch --
1302 Longworth House Office Building
Proposed meetings: (a) USDA Secretary Lyng
(b) USTR Amb. Yeutter
(c) Acting Commerce
Secretary Small
(d) State Department
Secretary Shultz

6:00 - 7:00 PM Reception at the U.S.S.R. Embassy

8:00 PM Monsanto hosted cultural awareness event at
the National Theatre -- Musical "Sweet
Charity"

OCTOBER 8, 1987//THURSDAY

>Independent breakfast

8:45 - 9:15 AM Visit to the House Floor

9:15 - 10:15 AM Meetings with House Leadership -- Location in
Capitol Building To Be Announced:
Speaker of the House: Honorable Jim Wright;
Majority Leader: Hon. Thomas S. Foley;
Majority Whip: Hon. Tony Coelho;
Chief Deputy Majority Whip: Hon. David
Bonior;
Republican Leader: Hon. Robert H. Michel;
Minority Whip: Hon. Trent Lott

10:15 - 11:00 AM VIP tour of the Capitol Building

11:30 AM - 12:30 PM Meeting with Senate Leadership -- Tentatively
in Room H-137 (Ways and Means), The Capitol
Majority Leader: Hon. Robert C. Byrd
Ass't Majority Leader: Hon. Allan Cranston
Republican Leader: Robert Dole
Ass't Republican Leader: Allan K. Simpson
President Pro Tempore: John Stennis

12:30 - 2:00 PM Hosted luncheon by Chairman de la Garza
honoring the Soviet delegation -- Speaker's
Dining Room, H-122, The Capitol
Attendees: Senate Agriculture Committee
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member and
Senate Leadership invited

Revised: 9/16/87
2:45 PM

October 8, 1987 (continued).....

2:30 PM Depart Rayburn Horseshoe for Andrews AFB
3:00 PM Arrive Andrews AFB and wheels up for Chicago
(1 hour & 45 minute flight)
3:45 PM Arrive Chicago Midway Airport
4:45 PM Arrive Park Hyatt Hotel -- 800 North Michigan
Avenue
Telephone: 312/280-2222
5:00 - 7:00 PM Independent time
7:00 - 10:00 PM Hosted evening event//To Be Announced

Overnight in Chicago

OCTOBER 9, 1987//FRIDAY

8:00 - 9:00 AM Hosted working breakfast at Hotel//To Be
Announced
9:15 AM Depart Hotel
9:30 - 11:30 AM Tour of Food Processing Facility//To Be
Announced
11:30 AM Depart for Chicago Midway Airport
12:30 PM Wheels up for St. Louis with lunch served en
route (approximately 1 hour flight)
1:30 PM Arrive St. Louis -- Spirit of St. Louis
Airport
2:00 PM Arrive Monsanto Corporation
2:00 - 5:00 PM Meetings with top-level Monsanto officials
and tour of facility
5:00 PM Depart for Hotel
5:30 PM Arrive Hotel
5:30 - 7:00 PM Independent time
7:00 PM Monsanto Hosted Country Bar-B-Que

Overnight in St. Louis at DoubleTree Hotel -- 16625 Swingley
Ridge Road -- Telephone: 314/532-5000

OCTOBER 10, 1987//SATURDAY

- 7:00 AM Depart hotel for agra-field tour
- 7:00 AM - 10:30 AM Agra-field tour with country breakfast on site
- 10:30 AM Depart for airport
- 11:00 AM Wheels up for Des Moines with lunch served en route (approximately 1 hour flight)
- 12:00 NOON Arrive Des Moines
- 12:30 PM Depart airport for agra-field tour
- 12:30 - 5:00 PM Agra-field tour of area to include:
1. Kinze Manufacturing, Victor, IA
(manufacturer of smaller implements, planters & wagons)
Also, corn/soybean farms in the area
 2. John Deere Manf., Des Moines, IA
(including John Deere Combine Factory)
 3. Pioneer Hi-bred International -
Johnston, IA
(major seed producer & substantial biotech research)
- 6:00 - 7:00 PM Independent time
- 7:00 - 10:00 PM Hosted evening event//To Be Announced

>Overnight in Des Moines at Airport Regency (Ramada Inn) --6215
Fleur Drive -- Telephone: 515/285-1234

OCTOBER 11, 1987//SUNDAY

>Independent Breakfast

- 8:30 AM Depart hotel for agra-field tour
- 8:30 - 3:00 PM Agra-field tour to include:
1. Garst Seed Co. - Slater, IA
(hybrid corn & soybean seed company)
 2. Iowa State University - Ames, IA
 3. Vandiest Chemical Co. - Webster City, IA
(large fertilizer & chemical company)
 4. Large & small corn/soybean farms in the area

October 11, 1987 (continued).....

3:00 PM Depart hotel for airport
3:30 PM Wheels up for Orlando -- Meal served en route
(approximately a 3 hour flight)
7:30 PM Arrive Orlando
8:30 PM Arrive Hotel

>Independent time after arrival

>Overnight at _____.

OCTOBER 12, 1987//MONDAY

>Independent breakfast

9:00 AM Depart hotel for Epcott and Disney World
9:30 - 10:30 AM VIP tour of Kraft - "The Land" Agra-Pavillion
10:30 AM - 4:30 PM VIP Cultural awareness tour of Epcott and
Disney World
4:30 PM Depart for airport
5:30 PM Depart Orlando for Washington, D.C. with meal
served en route (approximately 2 hour flight)
7:30 PM Arrive Washington, D.C.
8:30 PM Arrive hotel

Overnight in Washington at _____.

OCTOBER 13, 1987//TUESDAY

>Independent breakfast

10:00 AM Soviet Delegation arrive Capitol Hill
10:00 - 12 NOON Concluding talks with Members of the
Committee on Agriculture and Chairman de la
Garza
12:00 - 12:30 PM News conference with Chairman de la Garza and
Mr. Victor Petrovich Nikonov -- 1306
Longworth House Office Building
12:30 - 2 PM Farewell Luncheon hosted by Chairman de la
Garza -- 1300 Longworth House Office Building
2:30 PM Soviet Delegation departs Capitol for Dulles

Soviet Union (2 of 3)

Danzansky

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FROM: Bruce Rashkow L/SFP 647-1074 5420
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Letter to the Editor - Wall Street Journal

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Steve Danzansky	395-3622	365 OEOB

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS:
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S/S Officer: *KQ*
L Tracy



DRAFT

United States Department of State

The Legal Adviser

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 29, 1987

Mr. Robert Bartley
Editorial Page Editor
The Wall Street Journal
200 Liberty Street
New York, New York 10281

*This is
secret
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Dear Mr. Bartley:

On December 31, 1986 you published an editorial entitled "The Soviets' Lawyers" that commented on the role of the Department of State in two cases in United States courts involving the Soviet Union: the Gregorian case in California involving claims by a private citizen against the Soviet Union, several agencies or instrumentalities of the Soviet Union, and several American corporations; and the Wallenberg case in the District of Columbia involving claims by the half brother and legal guardian of Raoul Wallenberg against the Soviet Union (Von Dardel v. Soviet Union). On January 28, 1987, you published an article by a private lawyer in California entitled "State Department Goes to Court For the Kremlin" commenting on the role of the Department in the Gregorian case. Both your editorial and the January 28 article contain a number of inaccurate and misleading assertions about the U.S. role in litigation involving foreign states.

Contrary to the suggestion in your editorial, the State Department is not representing the Soviet Union, or invoking sovereign immunity in its behalf either in the Gregorian case, or in the Wallenberg case. A cursory reading of the United States' submissions in both those cases would have dispelled immediately such erroneous notions. The role of the U.S. Government in these suits is strictly limited to that which the Executive has played in litigation against foreign governments in U.S. courts since Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (hereinafter referred to as "the FSIA" or "the Act"). At that time, while acknowledging that immunity decisions henceforth were to be made under the Act by the courts, the Department noted that the United States would maintain a continuing interest in the interpretation of the Act because of the foreign policy implications of its application, and would continue to comment on such issues where appropriate. See, Letter of Monroe Leigh to Attorney General Edward H. Levy, Nov. 2, 1976, LXXV St. Dept. Bull. 649 (1976). Since that time, the United States has repeatedly presented to courts in appropriate cases its views on the proper interpretation and application of the Act, and its impact upon the conduct of foreign affairs. Determinations of sovereign immunity are made exclusively by the courts, however, and not solely on the basis of U.S. Government representations.

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When it participates in litigation involving the FSIA, the United States does not appear on behalf of foreign governments. In fact, the United States actively seeks to convince foreign governments that they should appear and present any defenses they may have, including claims of sovereign immunity, directly to the courts. When we succeed in convincing them to do so, we have often asked the court involved to set aside default judgments and to hear their claims. This serves the interests of justice. Indeed, our courts have repeatedly recognized that default judgments are not favored and, whenever it is reasonably possible, cases should be decided on the merits. The courts have evidenced an even stronger presumption against default judgments in cases involving foreign states and the important principle of sovereign immunity. Courts have often vacated default judgments entered after a foreign country had initially failed to appear.

Decisions on the merits also favor the parties who sue foreign entities. Plaintiffs with meritorious cases are far more likely to recover when a foreign state has responded.

Some states refuse to appear in our courts, however, despite our best efforts. They believe they are absolutely immune from suit. In such cases, the court may be called upon to enter a default judgment. Although the FSIA prohibits the court from entering a default judgment unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court, the adversary system does not work in this situation as it normally would to ensure that the court has before it all the necessary arguments and facts. The court has before it only the arguments of one party. Under those circumstances, the United States may present its views at the request of the court involved, or because an issue being litigated is of significance to the application of the FSIA.

The United States became involved in the Gregorian case, in part, because counsel for Mr. Gregorian, Mr. Kroll, made repeated requests for assistance in getting the Soviet Union to respond to his suit. After discussion between the State Department and the Soviet Embassy, two of the Soviet state-owned commercial defendants agreed to retain private U.S. counsel to appear on their behalf and to file appropriate motions for relief. The United States has requested, in light of the appearances by these Soviet entities, that the court set aside the default judgment and consider the legal and factual

arguments of the Soviet defendants on the merits, meanwhile suspending enforcement. If the court decides to grant this relief, it may still enter a decision in favor of the plaintiff on one or more of Mr. Gregorian's claims.

Nor does the Department support the Soviet Union in dismissing the case. The U.S. Government has expressed its view that Congress did not intend in the FSIA to provide jurisdiction over libel actions. This is a general issue under the FSIA in which the United States has an independent interest. We have not submitted any views, however, on the contractual aspects of the dispute. Moreover, before the U.S. Government submitted views on the libel jurisdiction issue, I offered to meet with and try to assist Mr. Gregorian's attorney in resolving this case short of further litigation. My offer was declined.

In the Wallenberg case, the District Court entered a default judgment in November 1985 that directed the Soviet Union, among other things, to produce Wallenberg or his remains within 60 days and to pay 39 million dollars in damages. When the Soviet Union did not comply, plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the Soviet Government in contempt. Recognizing that entry of such an order would involve important foreign relations issues under the law, the Court specifically requested the views of the United States.

In response to the Court's request, the U.S. Government filed a Statement of Interest in which we informed the Court that the exercise of the contempt power in that case would be inconsistent with the purposes of the FSIA, and would be ineffective. We also advised the Court that it should not find the Soviet Union in contempt, because the Court lacked jurisdiction under the FSIA to enter its original decision. We noted in our response that the U.S. Government "abhors the Soviet Union's unjust imprisonment of Wallenberg and continues, through governmental channels, to seek a full and satisfactory accounting of his fate."

The decision of the U.S. Government to submit its views in litigation under the FSIA is based upon principled considerations of law and policy. These relate, not only to our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, but also to our relations with all other foreign countries. Interpretations of those aspects of the FSIA upon which the U.S. Government has commented in the Gregorian, Wallenberg, and other cases, have general application to litigation under the FSIA involving other countries. What we do to other countries we should expect to be done to us within their systems. (The Soviet

Union, consistent with its view of international law, provides the United States far greater immunity than we accord foreign countries under the FSIA.) And, we must certainly act even handedly in matters involving justice in our courts. This means doing no more for the Soviets than we would do for another state, but also doing no less.

Sincerely,

Abraham D. Sofaer