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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Arms Control: Interim Restraint

Date: 12/22/00

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Skinner/F00-007/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Paper	Draft Option Descriptions 1 p. <i>R 6/15/06 NLSF00-007/1 #109</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
2. Paper	Option A: Observe..., 1 p. <i>R " " #110</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
3. Paper	Option B: Continue..., 1 p. <i>R " " #111</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
4. Paper	Option C: Observance of..., 1 p. <i>R " " #112</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
5. Paper	Option D: Cease to..., 1p. <i>R " " #113</i>	nd..	P1/B1
6. Paper	Option E: Observe a..., 1 p. <i>R " " #114</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
7. Paper	Interim Restraint Gameplan, 3 p. <i>R " " #115</i>	5/26/85	P1/B1
8. Cable	Cable #101116Z Jun 85 13 p. <i>R " " #116</i>	6/10/85	P1/B1
9. Cable	Cable #121351Z Jun 85, 2 p. <i>R " " #117</i>	6/12/85	P1/B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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SENSITIVE

*File
Interim
Restraint*

DRAFT OPTIONS DESCRIPTIONS

OPTION A

Observe SALT Limits with a Programmatic Response to Soviet Violations

~~OPTION B~~

Continue Compliance with SALT I and II

OPTION C

Observe SALT I and SALT II with Exceptions

OPTION D

Cease to Observe SALT I and SALT II

OPTION E

Observe a New Policy of U.S. Independent Restraint

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOUO 7/1, #109

CU NARA, DATE 6/15/06

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Option A: Observe SALT Limits with a Programmatic Response to Soviet Violations

This approach would: 1) maintain adherence to SALT I and SALT II; 2) request a supplemental appropriation to increase U.S. deterrent capability, consistent with SALT I and SALT II, as a proportionate response to Soviet violations; 3) continue to condemn Soviet violations and seek corrective action in diplomatic channels; and 4) review periodically the new policy in light of the Soviet compliance record. The defense supplemental would accelerate and/or increase selected strategic programs as a response to Soviet actions. It reflects a judgement that, if the U.S. were to selectively or completely abandon restraints (however flawed they may be), we would offer the Soviets a pretext to substantially increase their own forces, while the U.S. would take the blame — here and with the Allies — for destroying arms control. We would find Congress legislating arms control and dictating how we could respond to the unconstrained growth in Soviet strategic capabilities. This approach would enhance deterrence, demonstrate to the Soviets that non-compliance entails real costs, put the onus on them for any unraveling of existing restraints, strengthen our position in ongoing negotiations and promote Congressional consensus on a response to the Soviet violations and the maintenance of restraints pending negotiation of a new agreement.

Presentation

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I decided that the U.S. would not undercut the expired SALT I or the unratified SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. The reasons behind my decision were clear:

- o First, this policy would not adversely affect our security, provided we and Congress took steps necessary to modernize our strategic deterrent and to offset Soviet strategic advantages obtained over the past decade.
- o Second, I believed then and continue to believe that a framework of mutual restraint was an important contribution to stability as we sought to negotiate substantial reductions in the nuclear threat.
- o Third, this policy was conditioned on Soviet exercise of equal restraint.

In adopting this policy, I hoped that the Geneva talks would by this time have produced a new and more equitable agreement providing for substantial reductions. The Soviets, however, have blocked success thus far. Moreover, as noted in my two reports to Congress, the Soviets have failed to comply with several provisions of existing commitments. They have neither taken corrective actions nor provided any information that might have alleviated our concerns.

On balance however, I have decided that, for the present, the U.S. will continue to abide by the provisions of SALT I and SALT II. At the same time I have also requested the JCS to recommend those additional steps that need to be taken, within SALT constraints, to counter Soviet violations. On the basis of their recommendations, I will submit a supplemental appropriations request to the Congress so that these steps can be taken and the danger posed by Soviet violations redressed. For now, we can take the necessary steps within the provisions of existing SALT agreements. However, this new policy will require continuous review of Soviet compliance and the status of the Geneva negotiations. We hope that the Soviet Union will take arms control and compliance as seriously as we do, so that genuine and significant reductions in nuclear weapons can begin.

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at CIA NARA, DATE 6/15/06

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Option B: Continue Compliance with SALT I and II

This option, which depends on the Strategic Modernization Program to address the strategic nuclear balance, would continue U.S. commitment to interim restraint. At the same time, it would keep open future force options to go beyond SALT limits if lack of progress at Geneva or Soviet behavior so warranted. This option is intended to maintain an arms control posture which is supportive of the President's commitment to deep reductions of strategic nuclear forces. To allow the U.S. to maintain stable deterrence with potent and sustain broad support from the U.S. public, Congress and the Allies for the Strategic Modernization Program, strong and modernized conventional forces, continuing improvements to NATO's defenses and the promise of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Finally, it proposes addressing the Soviet Union's violations of existing arms control agreements in such a way that allows the United States to exert leverage on the Soviet Union to observe its commitments to abide by the provisions of the SALT agreements. It could also create the circumstances by which we can continue to call national and international attention to these violations.

Presentation

This policy should be announced in a major Presidential speech. The speech should be made when it could best affect the Geneva negotiations, influence key defense votes in Congress, and garner support from our Allies. In it the President would stress the following points: The United States remains firmly committed to deep reductions in strategic forces and to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. We will continue to make every effort to achieve these goals in negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The U.S. has continued to abide by our political commitment not to undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the USSR shows equal restraint. It is now evident that this restraint has been increasingly one-sided as the Soviets have selectively violated provisions of SALT II as well as other arms control agreements. Such behavior, should it continue, undermines the prospects for meaningful arms control and could threaten deterrence. The U.S. believes in equal restraint and will move forward with the elements of the Strategic Modernization Program permitted to us by the SALT agreements. We also reserve the future right to test and deploy the SICBM, currently prohibited by Interim Restraint, in the absence of suitable progress in US/USSR bilateral arms control talks or successful resolution of U.S. concerns with Soviet noncompliance. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to dismantle strategic systems to meet SALT I/II limits. This show of good faith should serve to encourage the USSR to observe its arms control commitments while insuring progress toward our mutual goals of deep reductions and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

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Option C: Observance of SALT I and SALT II with Exceptions

Under this option, the US would observe SALT I and SALT II but would declare its intention to reserve for itself the discretionary right to respond, in an appropriate manner, to Soviet violations of arms control agreements. Specifically, the US would announce that Poseidon SSBNs that would otherwise have been dismantled to keep the US within SALT I and SALT II numerical limits will be placed in a stand-down mode. The US would announce that the submarines will be removed from operational patrols, their missiles removed, and their hatches kept open for inspection. No actions will be taken on these submarines that would prevent their redeployment. As the United States deploys other new strategic systems, we intend similarly to withdraw a compensating additional number of missile launchers from active service. We will decide upon the ultimate disposition of such launchers based on changes in Soviet compliance practices. Additionally, in view of Soviet deployment of the SS-25 -- a second new type of ICBM -- after the Soviets announced the SS-24 was their one new type of ICBM permitted within the constraints of SALT II, the United States would reserve the right to respond appropriately.

Presentation

The US would announce that it is undertaking this policy in response to uncertainties created by the general pattern of Soviet noncompliance with previous strategic arms control agreements. This new policy will require continuous review of Soviet compliance and of the status of the Geneva negotiations. It is our hope that in the ongoing talks the Soviets will be convinced to take arms control and compliance as seriously as we take them.

In 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified--and fatally flawed--SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint. My reasons for taking this action were threefold:

- o First, I believed then, as I continue to believe now, that constraints on nuclear weapons are important, especially as we try to move the Soviets toward our goal of greatly reducing and eventually eliminating the nuclear threat, which SALT II did not do.

- o Second, this policy of interim restraint would not adversely affect our national security interests, provided we and the Congress undertook those steps necessary in our strategic modernization program to counter the strategic advantages the Soviets have built up over the past decade-plus. We still have a way to go on this.

- o Third, the leaders of the Soviet Union provided assurances that they would show equal restraint.

With this as a basis, my Administration embarked on an effort to get an agreement that would significantly reduce nuclear weapons. This continues to be our goal, even in the face of Soviet unwillingness to negotiate seriously in Geneva. However, we cannot condone blatant Soviet cheating. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance; unilateral compliance by the United States is simply no good and does not serve our interests. I do not believe that it would be in the interest of the United States, or of its Allies, to abandon all strategic arms control constraints. Therefore, I have decided that the United States will continue our current policy, except that we reserve the right to respond to Soviet violations in an appropriate manner.

Option D: Cease to Observe SALT I and SALT II

On May 31, 1982, the President stated: "As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint." The United States has scrupulously adhered to this commitment. By contrast, the President has found and reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control obligations. Consequently, the USSR is not exercising equal restraint. The United States regards such Soviet behavior as fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of this country and that of its allies. In accordance with the President's announced policy the United States is, therefore, no longer bound to refrain from actions which might undercut the existing strategic arms agreements. Until an acceptable strategic arms reduction agreement can be negotiated, the United States will size and configure its strategic offensive forces exclusively on the basis of our longstanding national policy necessary to provide an effective deterrent to aggression.

Presentation

The United States remains committed to the goal envisioned in its proposal tabled at the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva. This proposal calls for both sides to make sharp reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals and, in particular, to eliminate large numbers of the most destabilizing weapons -- ballistic missiles -- by agreeing to a ceiling of 5,000 warheads on such missiles. We are interested in making rapid progress toward this goal with the Soviets in Geneva.

By contrast, the Soviet Union has shown little interest in achieving meaningful reductions or in making progress toward a verifiable, equitable accord which requires them. To the contrary, the Soviet Union has actually regressed from positions previously taken and instead adopted a largely intransigent posture which severely impedes progress.

In accordance with the policy I announced on May 31, 1982, the United States is, therefore, no longer bound to refrain from actions which might undercut the existing strategic arms agreements. Until an acceptable strategic arms reduction agreement can be negotiated, the United States will size and configure its strategic offensive forces exclusively on the basis of our longstanding national policy necessary to provide an effective deterrent to aggression.

In the event the USSR chooses to amass ever more threatening kinds and numbers of strategic weapons, the United States reserves the right to respond appropriately. The Administration will shortly begin consultations with the Congress regarding means of ensuring that options for this undesirable--and, we would hope, avoidable--contingency are credibly preserved.

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CAL, NARA, DATE 6/15/86

Option E: Observe a new Policy of U.S. Independent Restraint

This new concept for security and stability would allow the United States to continue to maintain adequate strategic forces for Western security while we continue to research under the Strategic Defense Initiative and independently refrain from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the 1990's the U.S. would begin the transition to a strategic defense posture with a corresponding reduction of offensive nuclear weapons. This new course is, therefore, independent of Soviet cooperation or their strategic military posture. Specifically, the U.S. would announce a commitment to Independent Restraint, that is, we would independently restrain the proliferation of further nuclear weapons in lieu of being bound by past commitments to observe the limits of the flawed SALT agreements. We will continue all elements of the President's Strategic Force Modernization Program while refraining from needless proliferation of nuclear weapons. We will independently remove older weapons from service and certify these actions to the Congress and the American public. By restraining needless proliferation, the inventory of U.S. strategic ballistic missile weapons will remain essentially constant over the next decade, then begin substantial decreases at a time when strategic defense may become a reality. However, we would reassess and be able to modify our strategic forces in the face of a Soviet strategic breakout, either offensive or defensive. We will continue our commitment to transition to strategic defense and do it in an open manner. And we will seek a renewed dialogue with the Soviets to reduce the risk of war through meaningful measures to improve stability and predictability.

Presentation

Independent Restraint should be announced in a major Presidential speech. The speech could occur following the coming round of Geneva negotiations, assuming the talks are unproductive, or following a Reagan-Gorbachev summit, assuming no agreements of substance can be extracted from the Soviets. Independent Restraint would take place on January 1, 1986. Key Administration figures should be immediately prepared to brief Congress, the press, and our Allies to explain the rationale and the implications of the new course. To demonstrate U.S. resolve not to proliferate offensive nuclear weapons, the President would state that the compromise resulting in a pause after authorizing deployment of 50 Peacekeeper missiles represents a degree of U.S. restraint. He would also state that a Poseidon ballistic missile submarine would be removed from strategic service. The President could offer the Congress and the press the opportunity to inspect inactivated submarine and ICBM systems to verify removal from strategic service. Such an inspection offer could also be made to the Soviet Union, if appropriate, as a confidence-building measure. Our public presentation should emphasize that Independent Restraint offers the choice between: (1) continuation of agreements which have not constrained the expansion of nuclear forces, which are facing increasingly difficult verification problems due to technological developments and which are subject to Soviet violations, or (2) U.S. actions that do not hinge on Soviet cooperation and, ultimately with strategic defense, will lead to greater security and true nuclear arms reductions.

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CU NARA, DATE 6/15/86

May 26, 1985

INTERIM RESTRAINT GAMEPLAN

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri
27 Memorial Day Observed	28 <u>SACG (1530)</u> 1. Interim respon letter done	29 1. 1st Draft of Cong Rpt	30 1. Draft Dipl., PA and Cong release plans Memorial Day	31 <u>SACG (1600)</u> 1. Int. Response Ltr to Cong 2. NSC Discussion paper circulate 3. IG Paper circu- late as backgrou
3 <u>NSC (TBD)</u> 1. 2nd Draft of Cong Rpt 2. Draft of all support materials	4 <u>SACG (1700)</u>	5 1. Final Draft of Cong Rpt 2. Final Draft of all support materials	6 1. Cong Rpt Approv 2. Letters & Cable Released 3. Support material in place	7 1. Cong Rpt to Congress

Tuesday, May 28

1. SACG from 15:30-16:30 focused on the following agenda:
 - a. review revised gameplan;
 - b. finalize the Interim Response Letter;
 - c. finalize plan for the delivery of the Interim Response Letter;
 - d. discuss the Options Paper;
 - e. discuss Section VI of the IG Paper (i.e., the military analysis); and
 - f. task the development (1st draft on May 30) of plans covering diplomatic, public affairs and Congressional actions associated with the delivery of the report to Congress on June 7.
2. Finalize the text of the Interim Response Letter.

Wednesday, May 29

1. 1st draft of the Congression Report is circulated for review.

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Thursday, May 30 .

1. Ensure all materials associated with the delivery of the Interim Response Letter are in place.
2. Diplomatic (e.g. allies and Soviets), public affairs and Congressional action plans for activities supporting the delivery of the Congressional Report circulated for review. These plans should consider:
 1. public affairs package (White House statement, fact sheet, Q&As);
 2. letter to Soviet leadership;
 3. letter to Allied heads of state;
 4. message to diplomatic posts;
 5. guidance cables to US NST Delegation and SCC Commissioner in Geneva;
 6. plan for background briefings to Allies;
 7. plan for background briefings to press; and
 8. plan for background briefings for Congress.

Friday, May 31

1. The Interim Response Letter delivered to the Congress.
2. SACG from 16:00-17:00 focused on the following agenda:
 - a. discuss the format of the NSC meeting on Monday, June 3;
 - b. discuss the 1st draft of the Congressional Report; and
 - c. finalize supporting diplomatic, public affairs and Congressional plans and task the development of material needed (draft by June 3).
3. NSC Meeting Discussion Paper circulated to NSC principals.
4. IG Paper circulated to NSC principals for background reading.

Monday, June 3

1. NSC Meeting. Time to be determined.
2. 2nd draft of the Congressional Report circulated for SACG review.
3. 1st draft of material needed to support the diplomatic, public affairs and Congressional support activity plans circulated for SACG review.

Tuesday, June 4

1. SACG from 17:00-18:00 focused on the following agenda:
 - a. discuss the 2nd draft of the Congressional Report and provide guidance necessary to complete final version by COB Wednesday, June 5;
 - b. discuss the draft of the material developed to support the diplomatic, public affairs and Congressional support activity plans; and
 - c. ensure all are prepared to complete required activities to support the release of the Congressional Report on Friday, June 7.

Wednesday, June 5.

1. Final draft of the Congressional Report provided for approval.
2. Final draft of the material developed to support the diplomatic, public affairs and Congressional support activity plans provided for approval.

Thursday, June 6

1. Congressional Report approved for release.
2. All guidance cables and messages to foreign governments released for delivery on Friday.
3. All other material developed to support the release and appropriate backgrounding (including White House statement, fact sheet, Q&As) is pre-positioned.
4. Any pre-release calls to key Members of Congress made.

Friday, June 7

1. Congressional Report is delivered to Congress.
2. White House Statement is issued.
3. Appropriate backgrounding/briefing on the hill, with allies, and with press is accomplished.

Congressional Report Development:

1. 1st draft by May 29
2. Discussed SACG May 31
3. 2nd draft by June 3
4. Discussed SACG June 4
5. Final draft June 5
6. Approved June 6
7. Delivered June 7

Supporting Materials:

1. Plan development tasked May 28
2. Plans drafted May 30
3. Plan discussed SACG May 31
4. 1st draft of material June 3
5. Material discussed SACG June 4
6. Final draft material June 5
7. Material approved/used June 6

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547



Matlock
✓ FYI
Steve

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June 7, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: Michael D. Schneider
Deputy Associate Director
for Programs

SUBJECT: Soviet Media Themes on Interim Restraint Decision

Here are Soviet themes on Interim Restraints, as of June 6.

Late next week we will prepare summaries of worldwide and Soviet media reaction to the President's decision.

Distribution:

The White House	Mr. Sims Ms. Green Ms. Small
NSC	Mr. Steiner ✓ Mr. Hinckley
State	Mr. Djerejian Mr. Sylvester Ms. Moore Ms. Mandel
DOD	Mr. Warren
ACDA	Mr. Lehman
USIA	Mr. Stone Mr. Burnett Mr. Kordek

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SOVIET MEDIA COMMENTARY ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS

The status of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation agreements is a constant topic in Soviet internal and external propaganda. The three treaties most often cited in this regard by the Soviets are the 1972 ABM and interim restraints agreements, and the unratified 1979 SALT II treaty.

Over the past few months, the Soviets have focussed heavily on putative violations of the ABM treaty allegedly posed by SDI. During the same period and preceding it, Soviet media have portrayed the INF deployment as a violation of SALT II because these weapons allegedly have first-strike capabilities and are capable of reaching strategic targets within the Soviet Union.

With the approach of the expiration date for the unratified SALT II agreement and the commissioning of the Alaska which -- if offsetting decommissioning of existing land-based or SLBM's does not take place -- would violate treaty limits, the Soviets have turned their attention to SALT II.

Soviet commentators make the following points:

- They are well aware of the significance of the commissioning of the Alaska for the SALT II treaty. Commissioning the submarine would result in the U.S. being 12 strategic missiles over the SALT II limit unless other U.S. missiles are scrapped.
- The attitude of the Administration toward the treaty is of great concern to the Soviet Union:
 - o The Administration has a 20-submarine program under way, with 5 at the equipping stage.
 - o High-ranking Administration figures -- Secretary Weinberger and Richard Perle in particular -- oppose abiding by SALT II limits.
 - o The Administration resorts to absurd propaganda in charging that the Soviet Union is violating SALT II limits. The U.S. uses these false charges as a pretext for its own violations.
 - o The Administration is ignoring a Joint Chiefs of Staff report from last year which declared that nuclear parity exists between the U.S. and the USSR.
- There is a major struggle within the U.S. government over interim restraints. Influential Senators have called upon the President not to violate SALT II limits. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not support Secretary Weinberger's attitude toward SALT II.

-- The U.S. is itself violating a number of interim restraints and SALT II provisions by:

- o Deploying long-range cruise missiles on submarines and ships.
- o Siting Pershing II's in Europe.
- o Using shelters to prevent surveillance when carrying out work on ICBM's and SLBM's, including MIRVing some Minuteman II's.
- o Destroying silos for Titan II's in one or two months instead of the six months called for in the treaty.
- o Developing more than one new type of ICBM (the MX plus the Midgetman).

-- The U.S. has officially declared that it will abide by the 1972 interim restraints agreement by exchanging documents at the time of their expiration. The U.S. has already officially stated its intent not to take actions which would undermine SALT II.

-- President Reagan has ignored constructive Soviet proposals to impose freezes and reduce levels of weapons.

-- SALT II benefits both sides and the entire world.

Soviet commentary has not given many clues as to what the USSR would do should SALT II limits be exceeded. A recent commentary by TASS writer Vladimir Chernyshev cites the New York Times as saying that the USSR is in a better position to expand its strategic forces if the treaty should lapse. Chernyshev then goes on to quote the Philadelphia Inquirer to the effect that renunciation of SALT II would jeopardize the Geneva talks. Statements to the effect that the USSR will never permit the U.S. to achieve strategic superiority are de rigueur.

A striking aspect of Soviet commentary on interim restraints and SALT II is that in recent weeks, coverage has become remarkably unpolemical. This suggests that the Soviets may be waiting to see what the President's decision will be before deciding how to respond.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*File's
In Restraint*

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EXDIS-GENEVA PASS USSCC, VIENNA PASS MBFR, STOCKHOLM PASS CDE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: NEW INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

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NLS F00-007/1 #116
CN NARA, DATE 6/15/06

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

EXD
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2. AT 2:00 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME ON JUNE 10, WASHINGTON WILL ANNOUNCE THE PRESIDENT'S NEW POLICY ON INTERIM RESTRAINT.

EXD
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3. AT PARAGRAPH 4 IS A FACT SHEET DESCRIBING THE DECISION. THIS FACT SHEET IS STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 2:00 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME, JUNE 10. THERE MUST BE NO DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER UNTIL THAT TIME. FOLLOWING THE WASHINGTON, ANNOUNCEMENT THE FACT SHEET BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED AND ADDRESSEES MAY DISTRIBUTE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AND MEDIA AS APPROPRIATE. ADDRESSEES ARE CAUTIONED TO KEEP THEIR COMMENTS AND REMARKS STRICTLY WITHIN THE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE FACT SHEET. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR POST'S USE WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

EXD
DIS

4. BEGIN FACT SHEET ON:
"BUILDING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUAL RESTRAINT."
INTRODUCTION. IN RESPONSE TO LEGISLATION IN THE FY 1985 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, THE PRESIDENT TODAY SUBMITTED A CLASSIFIED REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON BUILDING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT WITH REGARD TO STRATEGIC ARMS. THE FOLLOWING IS A UNCLASSIFIED FACT SHEET BASED ON THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT.

EXD
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BACKGROUND OF OUR CURRENT POLICY. IN 1982, ON THE EVE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START), THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT UNDERCUT THE EXPIRED SALT I AGREEMENT OR THE UNRATIFIED SALT II AGREEMENT AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION EXERCISED EQUAL RESTRAINT. DESPITE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE INEQUITIES OF THE SALT I AGREEMENT AND THE SERIOUS FLAWS OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES TOOK THIS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 101116Z JUN 85 PSN: 058429

EXDIS
ACTION IN ORDER TO FOSTER AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT ON STRATEGIC FORCES CONDUCTIVE TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATION AS WE ENTERED START. OUR ASSUMPTIONS IN TAKING THIS ACTION WERE THREEFOLD.

EXDIS
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-- FIRST, WE BELIEVED THEN, AND CONTINUE TO BELIEVE NOW, THAT MUTUAL, VERIFIABLE CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR ARSENALS ARE IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY AS WE TRY TO MOVE TOWARD THE GOAL OF GREATLY REDUCING AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATING THE NUCLEAR THREAT, WHICH THE SALT AGREEMENTS DID NOT DO. WE SAW THE START NEGOTIATIONS AS THE PATH TO THE EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THE SIZE OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS THAT WE SEEK. THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO, AND HAS OFFERED THE SOVIET UNION THE ELEMENTS FOR SUCH AGREEMENTS IN GENEVA. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZED THAT NEGOTIATING SOUND AGREEMENTS TAKES TIME. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES MADE THE COMMITMENT NOT TO UNDERCUT EXISTING AGREEMENTS AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION EXERCISED EQUAL RESTRAINT AS AN INTERIM POLICY TO PROVIDE WHAT WE HOPED WOULD BE A FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT AS WE PURSUED AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD PUT THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS ON A BETTER, MORE SOUND, LONG-TERM FOUNDATION AND BRING REAL REDUCTIONS.

-- SECOND, AT THE TIME, WE HOPED THAT THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD INDEED SHOW EQUAL RESTRAINT.

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-- THIRD, WE JUDGED THAT THIS POLICY OF INTERIM RESTRAINT WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, PROVIDED THAT, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS WORKING TOGETHER, THE UNITED STATES UNDERTOOK THOSE STEPS NECESSARY TO COUNTER THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN BUILDING OVER THE PREVIOUS DECADE.

UNFORTUNATELY, IN CERTAIN KEY RESPECTS, THESE ASSUMPTIONS HAVE NOT STOOD THE TEST OF TIME.

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U. S. COMPLIANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH U. S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT TAKEN ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD UNDERCUT EXISTING AGREEMENTS. IN FACT, WE HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY LIVED WITHIN THE SALT I AND II AGREEMENTS GOVERNING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE FULLY DISMANTLED EIGHT POLARIS MISSILE-CARRYING SUBMARINES AS NEW TRIDENT MISSILE-CARRYING SUBMARINES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED. IN SHORT, THE UNITED STATES HAS FULLY KEPT ITS PART OF THE BARGAIN.

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. AS DETAILED IN TWO COMPREHENSIVE PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS, IN JANUARY 1984 AND FEBRUARY 1985, THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPEATEDLY VIOLATED ITS ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS. WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE OBSERVED SOME PROVISIONS OF EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, THEY HAVE VIOLATED IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS AND ASSOCIATED POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.

-- SALT II. WITH RESPECT TO THE UNRATIFIED SALT II AGREEMENT, THESE VIOLATIONS INCLUDE THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF A SECOND NEW ICBM, THE SS-X-25, AND THE ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY DURING MISSILE TESTING WHICH IMPEDES VERIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALSO PROBABLY VIOLATED THIS AGREEMENT REGARDING THE PROHIBITION ON DEPLOYING SS-16 ICBMS. SERIOUS CONCERNS ALSO REMAIN UNRESOLVED WITH RESPECT TO OTHER ISSUES (E. G., THE RV-TO-THROWWEIGHT RATIO OF THE SS-X-25 DEMONSTRATED DURING TESTING).

-- OTHER ACCORDS. ADDITIONALLY, THE PATTERN OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS EXTENDS WELL BEYOND SALT II. THE SOVIET UNION IS ENGAGED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LARGE PHASED ARRAY RADAR IN CENTRAL SIBERIA IN VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY. WHEN ADDED TO OTHER SOVIET ABM-RELATED

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ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING CONCURRENT TESTING OF AIR DEFENSE AND ABM COMPONENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE ABM COMPONENTS, THERE IS SERIOUS CAUSE FOR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR A PROHIBITED TERRITORIAL ABM DEFENSE. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD HAVE PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE VITAL EAST-WEST BALANCE. THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALSO ENGAGED IN SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS OF BOTH THE GENEVA PROTOCOL ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION. WE ALSO JUDGE THAT IT HAS VIOLATED BOTH THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY AND THE TERMS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE VIOLATED THE NUCLEAR TESTING YIELD LIMIT OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY.

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-- SALT I. EVEN WITH RESPECT TO SALT I, WHERE WE HAVE FOUND THE SOVIETS HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE LETTER OF AGREEMENT, WE HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER DISMANTLING YANKEE CLASS NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE CARRYING SUBMARINES TO COMPLY WITH SALT I CONSTRAINTS, THEY HAVE ALREADY CONVERTED ONE SUCH SUBMARINE INTO A SUBMARINE LONGER THAN THE ORIGINAL, AND CARRYING MODERN, LONG-RANGE SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. WHILE NOT A VIOLATION OF THE LETTER OF SALT I, THE RESULTING SUBMARINE CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO U.S. AND ALLIED SECURITY SIMILAR TO THE ORIGINAL YANKEE-CLASS SUBMARINE.

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IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. THESE ARE VERY CRUCIAL ISSUES, AS EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL REQUIRES SERIOUSNESS ABOUT COMPLIANCE. THE PATTERN OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS INCREASINGLY AFFECTS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND RAISES UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FORCES THE UNITED STATES WILL REQUIRE IN THE FUTURE. JUST AS SIGNIFICANT AS THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIOLATIONS THEMSELVES, THIS PATTERN OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE RAISES FUNDAMENTAL

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CONCERNS ABOUT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, CONCERNS THAT -- IF NOT CORRECTED -- UNDERCUT THE INTEGRITY AND VIABILITY OF ARMS CONTROL AS AN INSTRUMENT TO ASSIST IN ENSURING A SECURE AND STABLE FUTURE WORLD.

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THE U.S. RESPONSE TO DATE. THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY EMPLOYED ALL APPROPRIATE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, INCLUDING THE U.S./SOVIET STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC), STRONGLY TO PRESS THE SOVIET UNION TO EXPLAIN AND/OR CEASE THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE OF CONCERN TO US. IN DOING SO, WE HAVE MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO CORRECT THEIR NONCOMPLIANCE AND TO RESOLVE OUR COMPLIANCE CONCERNS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND TO ESTABLISH THE POSITIVE ENVIRONMENT NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF

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NEW AGREEMENTS.

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UNFORTUNATELY, DESPITE LONG AND REPEATED U.S. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEITHER PROVIDED SATISFACTORY EXPLANATIONS NOR UNDERTAKEN CORRECTIVE ACTION. INSTEAD, SOVIET VIOLATIONS HAVE CONTINUED AND EXPANDED AS THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUED TO BUILD THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT BEEN, AND IS NOT NOW, EXERCISING THE EQUAL RESTRAINT UPON WHICH OUR INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY HAS BEEN CONDITIONED. SUCH SOVIET BEHAVIOR IS FUNDAMENTALLY INIMICAL TO THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL AND TO THE SECURITY OF THIS COUNTRY AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES.

U.S. PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE IN THE FUTURE. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE VIGOROUSLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION THE RESOLUTION OF OUR CONCERNS OVER SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. IN THIS EFFORT, WE CANNOT IMPOSE UPON OURSELVES A DOUBLE STANDARD THAT AMOUNTS TO UNILATERAL

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TREATY COMPLIANCE, AND IN EFFECT, UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT. AS A MINIMUM, IN THE CASE OF IRREVERSIBLE SOVIET VIOLATIONS, WE MUST MAKE APPROPRIATE AND PROPORTIONATE RESPONSES THAT DENY THE MILITARY BENEFITS OF THESE VIOLATIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE CASE OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS CAN CORRECT, WE SHOULD DEVELOP AND KEEP AVAILABLE COMPARABLE PROPORTIONATE RESPONSES THAT PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO THE SOVIETS TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO CORRECT THE SITUATION, AND WHICH PROVIDE A NEEDED HEDGE AGAINST THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION FAIL TO TAKE THE NECESSARY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

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IN THIS CONTEXT, THE UNITED STATES WILL DEVELOP AND, AS NEEDED, IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE AND PROPORTIONATE RESPONSES TO SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE AS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES AND TO PROVIDE REAL INCENTIVES TO THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE THE POSITIVE, CONCRETE STEPS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE OUR CONCERNS.

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NEED FOR THE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. TO ENSURE OUR FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL SECURITY AND AS A BASELINE FOR FURTHER U.S. ACTION, THE INTEGRITY AND CONTINUITY OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM MUST BE MAINTAINED. IF THE MODERNIZATION OF THE ICBM LEG OF OUR STRATEGIC TRIAD IS NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED, AS CALLED FOR IN OUR COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDED BY THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION, WE WILL HAVE TO REASSESS ALL ASPECTS OF OUR PLANS TO MEET OUR BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS.

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FUNDAMENTAL U.S. GOALS. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEMS CITED ABOVE, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF BASIC U.S. GOALS WHICH REMAIN UNCHANGED. DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARS, THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IS A RADICAL

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REDUCTION IN THE LEVELS AND THE POWER OF EXISTING AND PLANNED OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, AS WELL AS THE STABILIZATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS, WHETHER ON EARTH OR IN SPACE. WE ARE EVEN NOW LOOKING FORWARD TO A PERIOD OF TRANSITION OF A MORE STABLE WORLD, WITH GREATLY REDUCED LEVELS OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND AN ENHANCED ABILITY TO DETER WAR BASED UPON THE INCREASING CONTRIBUTION OF NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSES AGAINST OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS. A WORLD FREE OF THE THREAT OF MILITARY AGGRESSION AND FREE OF NUCLEAR ARMS IS AN ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE ON WHICH WE, THE SOVIET UNION, AND ALL OTHER NATIONS CAN AGREE.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. THE BEST PATH TO ACHIEVING THESE GOALS WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE FAR REACHING NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL WE HAVE TABLED AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS IN GENEVA. THE BEST APPROACH TO MOVING RAPIDLY TO A SAFER, MORE STABLE AND MORE SECURE WORLD WOULD SURELY BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO MAKE SHARP REDUCTIONS IN THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARSENALS AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO ELIMINATE LARGE NUMBERS OF THE MOST DESTABILIZING WEAPONS -- STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES -- BY AGREEING TO A VERIFIABLE AGGREGATE CEILING OF 5,000 WARHEADS ON THE LAND-BASED AND SEA-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES OF BOTH SIDES.

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UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH THE YEARS HAS SHOWN LITTLE REAL INTEREST IN RESTRAINING THE GROWTH OF ITS NUCLEAR ARMS -- LET ALONE IN ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS OR IN MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD A VERIFIABLE, EQUITABLE ACCORD WHICH REQUIRES SUCH REAL REDUCTIONS. TO THE CONTRARY, IN SPITE OF THE SERIOUSNESS AND FLEXIBILITY DEMONSTRATED BY OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA IN THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS BEGUN THIS YEAR, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ACTUALLY REGRESSED FROM NEGOTIATING POSITIONS IT HAD PREVIOUSLY TAKEN AND HAS ADOPTED A LARGELY INTRANSIGENT

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POSTURE WHICH SEVERELY IMPEDES PROGRESS. WE, NEVERTHELESS, REMAIN DETERMINED TO PURSUE A PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF MEANINGFUL MEASURES WHICH IMPROVE SECURITY, STABILITY, AND PREDICTABILITY.

ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUAL RESTRAINT. IT REMAINS IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES TO

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ESTABLISH AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WE PURSUE WITH RENEWED VIGOR OUR GOAL OF REAL REDUCTIONS IN THE SIZE OF EXISTING NUCLEAR ARSENALS THROUGH THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ESTABLISH SUCH A FRAMEWORK ALONE. IT WILL REQUIRE THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE THE POSITIVE, CONCRETE STEPS CALLED FOR ABOVE TO CORRECT THEIR NONCOMPLIANCE, RESOLVE OUR OTHER COMPLIANCE CONCERNS, AND REVERSE OR SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THEIR UNPARALLELED AND UNWARRANTED MILITARY BUILD-UP. SO FAR, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT CHOSEN TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION. HOWEVER, IN THE INTEREST OF ENSURING THAT EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH THE SECURE, STABLE FUTURE WE SEEK IS FULLY EXPLORED, THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED TO GO THE EXTRA MILE IN THE DIRECTION OF TRYING TO ESTABLISH AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRUE, MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

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CONTINUED RESTRAINT. THEREFORE, TO PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN US IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT WHICH WOULD SUPPORT ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM UNDERCUTTING EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION EXERCISES COMPARABLE RESTRAINT AND PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACTIVELY PURSUES ARMS REDUCTIONS AGREEMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS IN GENEVA. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONSTANTLY

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REVIEW THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS INTERIM POLICY ON THE LONG TERM SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. IN DOING SO, WE WILL CONSIDER SOVIET ACTIONS TO RESOLVE OUR CONCERNS WITH THE PATTERN OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE, CONTINUED GROWTH IN THE STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND SOVIET SERIOUSNESS IN THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

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PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE. AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLICY, WE MUST ALSO TAKE THOSE STEPS REQUIRED TO ASSURE THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES MADE NECESSARY BY SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. APPROPRIATE AND PROPORTIONATE RESPONSES TO SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE ARE CALLED FOR TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO MOSCOW THAT VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ENTAIL REAL COSTS. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES WILL DEVELOP APPROPRIATE AND PROPORTIONATE RESPONSES AND IT WILL TAKE THOSE ACTIONS NECESSARY IN RESPONSE TO, AND AS HEDGE AGAINST THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF, UNCORRECTED SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

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RESPONDING TO IRREVERSIBLE SOVIET VIOLATIONS. CERTAIN

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS ARE, BY THEIR VERY NATURE, IRREVERSIBLE. SUCH IS THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET UNION'S FLIGHT-TESTING AND STEPS TOWARD DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-X-25 MISSILE, A SECOND NEW TYPE OF ICBM PROHIBITED BY THE UNRATIFIED SALT II AGREEMENT. SINCE THE NONCOMPLIANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS MISSILE CANNOT, AT THIS POINT, BE CORRECTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, THEREFORE, RESERVES THE RIGHT TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY, AND THE UNITED STATES WILL DO SO IN A PROPORTIONATE MANNER AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. THE MIDGETMAN SMALL ICBM PROGRAM IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN THIS REGARD.

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RESPONDING TO REVERSIBLE SOVIET ACTIVITIES. OTHER SOVIET ACTIVITIES INVOLVING NONCOMPLIANCE MAY BE REVERSIBLE AND CAN BE CORRECTED BY SOVIET ACTION. IN THESE INSTANCES, WE WILL GO THE EXTRA MILE AND PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION ADDITIONAL TIME TO TAKE SUCH REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION. AS WE MONITOR SOVIET BEHAVIOR FOR EVIDENCE OF THE POSITIVE, CONCRETE STEPS NEEDED ON THEIR PART TO CORRECT THESE ACTIVITIES, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT AIMED AT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC ACTIONS WHICH THE UNITED STATES COULD TAKE TO ACCELERATE OR AUGMENT AS NECESSARY THE U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IN PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE TO. AND AS A HEDGE AGAINST THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF, THOSE SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF EXISTING ARMS AGREEMENTS WHICH THE SOVIETS FAIL TO CORRECT.

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IN ADDITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF APPROPRIATE AND PROPORTIONATE U.S. MILITARY RESPONSES IN THE FACE OF UNCORRECTED SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE, THIS REVIEW WILL ALSO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUED SOVIET FORCE GROWTH AS INDICATED IN THE MOST RECENT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THIS SUBJECT, THE ALTERATIONS TO THE ICBM PORTION OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WHICH HAVE RESULTED FROM RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE SECOND 50 PEACEKEEPER MISSILES SHOULD APPROPRIATELY BE BASED. SOVIET BEHAVIOR DURING ROUNDS II AND III OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS WILL ALSO BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

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CRITERIA FOR RESPONSE OPTIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, AS POTENTIAL U.S. FUTURE ACTIONS ARE ASSESSED, CERTAIN CRITERIA WILL BE USED. THE OPTIONS WILL BE DESIGNED AS PROPORTIONATE RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF UNCORRECTED SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE, HEDGING AGAINST THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY BE EQUIVALENT TYPES OF ACTIONS.

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RATHER, THESE OPTIONS WILL ATTEMPT TO DENY THE SOVIETS THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THEIR NONCOMPLIANCE, AND, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO THE SOVIETS TO CORRECT THEIR NONCOMPLIANT ACTIVITY. IN ALL CASES, THE PRIMARY FOCUS WILL REMAIN UPON OPTIONS THAT UNDERWRITE DETERRENCE, ENHANCE STABILITY, AND CAN BE DIRECTLY TIED TO THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

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IN THIS REGARD, THE U.S. GOAL IS NOT, PER SE, TO BUILD ADDITIONAL FORCES, BUT TO USE THESE OPTIONS TO ENSURE OUR SECURITY IN THE FACE OF UNCORRECTED SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE AND TO PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO THE SOVIETS TO CORRECT THEIR NONCOMPLIANCE AND JOIN US IN ESTABLISHING A MEANINGFUL INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

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TIMING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW WILL BE PROVIDED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION BY NOVEMBER 15, 1985. THIS WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONSIDER U.S.

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OPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO OUR POLICY AS WE APPROACH THE DATE AT WHICH THE UNRATIFIED SALT II TREATY WOULD HAVE EXPIRED ON DECEMBER 31, 1985, AND SUBSEQUENT MILESTONES THAT WOULD OCCUR UNDER A "NO UNDERCUT" POLICY. IT ALSO PROVIDES SUFFICIENT TIME TO CONSIDER U.S. PROGRAMMATIC OPTIONS IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO INSTANCES OF UNCORRECTED SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE, AS NEEDED, IN SUBMITTING THE FY-87 DEFENSE PROGRAM TO THE CONGRESS IN EARLY 1986.

7TH TRIDENT SSBN. TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE TIME FOR THE SOVIETS TO DEMONSTRATE BY THEIR ACTIONS A COMMITMENT TO JOIN US IN AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRUE MUTUAL RESTRAINT, THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO DIRECTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SHOULD PLAN TO DEACTIVATE AND DISASSEMBLE ACCORDING TO AGREED PROCEDURES AN EXISTING POSEIDON SSBN AS THE SEVENTH U.S. OHIO-CLASS SUBMARINE, THE USS ALASKA, PUTS TO SEA LATER THIS YEAR. HOWEVER, AS A PART OF ITS

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REPORT, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL REVIEW AND EVALUATE THE RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES FOR HANDLING SIMILAR MILESTONES (INCLUDING THE SEA TRIALS OF ADDITIONAL OHIO-CLASS SUBMARINES AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 121ST U.S. ALCM CARRYING HEAVY BOMBER) IN THE FUTURE. THE UNITED STATES WILL KEEP OPEN ALL FUTURE PROGRAMMATIC OPTIONS FOR HANDLING SUCH MILESTONES AS THEY OCCUR. AS THESE LATER MILESTONES ARE REACHED, THE PRESIDENT WILL ASSESS THE OVERALL SITUATION AND MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE U.S. COURSE OF ACTION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IN LIGHT OF THE OVERALL SITUATION AND SOVIET ACTIONS IN MEETING THE CONDITIONS CITED ABOVE.

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SUMMARY OF WHY THIS COURSE WAS CHOSEN. THE PRESIDENT

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FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT IF WE ARE TO PUT THE ARMS REDUCTION PROCESS ON A FIRM, LASTING FOUNDATION, OUR FOCUS MUST REMAIN ON MAKING BEST USE OF THE PROMISE PROVIDED BY THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE POLICY OUTLINED ABOVE, INVOLVING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND PROPORTIONATE U.S. RESPONSE TO UNCORRECTED SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE, IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO GO THE EXTRA MILE IN GIVING THE SOVIET UNION THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN US IN THIS ENDEAVOR. OUR HOPE IS THAT IF THE SOVIETS WILL DO SO, WE WILL JOINTLY BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN FRAMING EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING REAL REDUCTIONS IN THE SIZE OF EXISTING NUCLEAR ARSENALS IN THE ONGOING GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH AN ACHIEVEMENT WOULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE THE BEST AND MOST PERMANENT CONSTRAINT ON THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS, BUT IT WOULD TAKE A MAJOR STEP IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING THE SIZE OF THESE ARSENALS AND IN MOVING US TOWARD A MORE SECURE AND STABLE WORLD. SHULTZ

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SALT, START, PARM, INF, UR, US
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL SOVIET REACTION TO INTERIM
RESTRAINT DECISION

REF: MOSCOW 7729

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2. SUMMARY. THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO DETERMINE WHICH ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE OBSERVED AND WHICH IGNORED, ACCORDING TO A FORMAL TASS STATEMENT ISSUED JUNE 11 IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY. TASS PORTRAYS THE US DECISION AS MERELY THE CONTINUATION OF A POLICY AIMED AT DESTROYING THE FRAMEWORK OF ARMS LIMITATIONS. TASS MAKES NO APOLOGIES FOR THE SOVIET RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS, BUT NO COMMITMENT TO HONOR THEM IN THE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. "TASS IS AUTHORIZED TO STATE THE FOLLOWING." SO BEGINS THE OFFICIAL SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES DECISION ON INTERIM STRATEGIC ARMS RESTRAINTS.

4. THE BASIC LINE WAS FORESHADOWED IN AN UNSIGNED JUNE 9 PRAVDA ARTICLE ON THE US DECISION (REFTEL). THAT PIECE SAID THAT THE US CHOICE WAS MERELY HOW TO WITHDRAW FROM SALT II, NOT WHETHER TO DO SO. THE OPTIONS MENTIONED WERE OPEN REJECTION OR GRADUAL RETREAT, WITH THE CRITERION FOR DECISION BEING THE EFFECT ON WORLD OPINION.

US GRADUALLY CRAWLING AWAY FROM SALT II

5. TASS NOW FINDS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION CONFIRMS THAT THE UNITED STATES "CONTINUES TO WORK TOWARD DESTROYING THE TREATY SYSTEM WHICH RESTRAINING THE ARMS RACE." THE ARTICLE SAYS THE US HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF "GRADUAL CRAWLING AWAY" FROM SALT II, DILUTING ONE PROVISION AFTER ANOTHER AS THEY INTERFERE WITH US MILITARY PROGRAMS. IN THIS CONTEXT, TASS EMPHASIZES THAT THE PLANNED DISMANTLEMENT OF ONE POSEIDON SUBMARINE THIS FALL DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE US WILL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE TREATY IN THE FUTURE. "THE DECISION CONCERNING THE SUBMARINE 'POSEIDON' DOES NOT CHANGE THE OVERALL PICTURE OF THE UNDERMINING BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION...."

COMPLIANCE

6. IN KEEPING WITH THE THEME THAT THE US DECISION INVOLVED ONLY THE SEARCH FOR A PUBLICLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA WHICH WOULD DISGUISE THE REAL NATURE OF WHITE HOUSE POLICY, TASS CHARGES THAT

THE UNITED STATES INVENTS ACCUSATIONS OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THE STATEMENT SPECIFICALLY REJECTS THE ALLEGATION THAT THE SS-25 IS A NEW TYPE OF ICBM. IT CLAIMS, FURTHERMORE, THAT THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO DEVELOP THE "MIDGETMAN" WELL BEFORE MAKING AN ISSUE OF THE SS-25. TASS ARGUES THAT THIS SEQUENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE US IS MERELY TRYING TO JUSTIFY ITS OWN INTENDED VIOLATION OF THE "NEW TYPE" RULE.

7. IN TYPICAL FASHION, TASS REPLIES TO CHARGES OF SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE BY LEVYING COUNTER-CHARGES AGAINST THE U.S. AS EXAMPLES OF "A LONG TRAIL OF THE MOST FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS," TASS CITED:

-- FAILURE TO RATIFY SALT II

-- CASTING ASIDE THE SALT II PROTOCOL

-- CIRCUMVENTING THE TREATY BY DEPLOYING INF MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

FUTURE SOVIET POLICY

BT

Amelia Whitehead

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CN, NARA, DATE 6/15/00

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8. THE JUNE 9 PRAVDA ARTICLE WARNED OF DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES IF THE UNITED STATES ABANDONED SALT II. THIS STATEMENT FAILS TO SPECIFY WHAT THOSE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE, BUT IT WARNS THAT, "ONE SHOULD NOT BE DELUDED THAT THE U.S. SIDE WILL BE ALLOWED TO DETERMINE AS IT THINKS FIT WHICH OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE OBSERVED AND WHICH SHOULD NOT." TASS CLOSES WITH THE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL "DRAW APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS, DICTATED BY THE INTERESTS OF ITS SECURITY AND THE SECURITY OF ITS ALLIES."

OTHER SOVIET REACTION

9. THE TASS STATEMENT WAS RELEASED ON JUNE 11 AT A HASTILY ARRANGED EVENING PRESS BRIEFING. ACCORDING TO THE TASS REPORT OF THAT BRIEFING, MFA SPOKESMAN LOMEIKO CHARGED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE FULL RENUNCIATION OF SALT II AND TO TRY TO LAY THE BLAME ON THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS A SUPPORTER OF SALT II, BUT ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, PROCEEDING FROM THE INTERESTS OF ITS SECURITY, WILL DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES' VIOLATIONS OF THE SALT II TREATY.

10. PRAVDA ON JUNE 12 CARRIED A SIMILARLY NEGATIVE REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT FROM TASS IN WASHINGTON. IT RAN UNDER THE HEADLINE "THEY ARE CLEARING A PATH FOR THE ARMS RACE: THE USA DOES NOT INTEND TO OBSERVE THE SALT II TREATY."

COMMENT

11. THE SOVIETS HAVE CHOSEN TO ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE IN COMMENTING ON THE U.S. DECISION. THEY CAST IT AS ONE MORE STEP ON THE ROAD WHICH BEGAN WITH AMERICAN REFUSAL TO RATIFY SALT II.

12. SOVIET COMMENTS ARE ALSO NOTABLE FOR WHAT THEY DO NOT SAY. TASS MAKES NO LINK BETWEEN THE INTERIM RESTRAINT DECISION AND THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. IT IGNORES COMPLETELY THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT FUTURE DECISIONS ON U.S. COMPLIANCE WILL BE CONTINGENT ON SOVIET ACTIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION IS PORTRAYED AS HAVING ALREADY DECIDED TO DEPART FROM SALT II AND USING VARIOUS "FORMULAE" TO DISGUISE ITS INTENT.

13. TASS ALSO FAILS TO STATE ANY CLEAR SOVIET INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY. THE STATEMENT CERTAINLY HINTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT FEEL BOUND BY ALL PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH THE UNITED STATES REFUSED TO RATIFY AND IS GRADUALLY "VIOLATING." THE CLOSING EMPHASIS ON THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES SUGGESTS OPENLY THAT THOSE INTERESTS, AND NOT BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, WILL PREDOMINATE IN SOVIET FORCE PLANNING DECISIONS. HARTMAN
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