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JET 6/9/2005

File Folder BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING 11/27/85 (1/3)

FOIA

F06-114/14

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YARHI-MILO

4701

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
14160	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ADELMAN MEMO ON LESSONS FROM U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/1/1</i>	2	7/8/1985	B1
14164	MEMO	US-SOVIET LEADERSHIP MEETING: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE <i>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</i>	7	ND	B1
14161	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE YOUR SEPTEMBER 27 MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</i>	5	9/16/1985	B1
14162	MEMO	PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</i>	8	ND	B1
14163	MEMO	KRAEMER TO MATLOCK RE SHEVARDNADZE BRIEFING PACKAGE <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/1/1</i>	9	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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MEMORANDUM

3
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Paper on Lessons of U.S.-Soviet Summitry

Ken Adelman has sent over the attached paper on lessons derived from past meetings of U.S. and Soviet leaders. Although I would probably draw slightly different conclusions on some of the points, I believe you will find it interesting reading. It points out some of the potential pitfalls we must guard against as we prepare the way for your meeting with Gorbachev in September.

Attachment:

Tab A Paper entitled "US-Soviet Leadership Meetings:
Lessons from Experience"

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 8/29/02

CAS 8/29/85 RECEIVED 05 JUL 85 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM ADELMAN, K

DOCDATE 03 JUL 85

KEYWORDS. USSR

SUMMIT

SUBJECT: US - USSR LEADERSHIP MTGS RE LESSONS FM EXPERIENCE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 09 JUL 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

FORTIER

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COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Matlock
Summit

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jem*

SUBJECT: Adelman Memo on Lessons from U.S.-Soviet Summits

RCM HAS SEEN

Ken Adelman has sent you the memo at Tab A which discusses "lessons" learned from previous meetings of the U.S. and Soviet leaders and which he suggests might be appropriate for the President's weekend reading.

The paper contains a number of useful observations, though I feel that it is slanted a bit toward the negative. I disagree with a couple of Ken's conclusions, but must admit that they represent arguable positions. Specifically, I believe that some high-level meetings did in fact moderate Soviet behavior temporarily, and had the potential to do so for more extended periods if we had used the "understandings" properly thereafter. Second, regarding Ken's comments on the Vladivostok agreements, the problem here -- in procedural terms -- was that the Soviets sensed that Ford would probably lose the 1976 election and therefore held off negotiating seriously that year in the hope of getting a better deal from Ford's successor. Finally, in concentrating on arms control almost exclusively, Ken misses some of the benefits derived from agreements in other areas which were made possible in the context of the meetings in the early 1970's.

✓
✓

Nevertheless, the paper may well be useful in alerting the President early on to some of the possible pitfalls on the way to Geneva. I leave it to your judgment whether it would be useful in the President's weekend reading at this time.

DF
Fortier and Linhard concur. *RL*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FO6-114/14 #14160
BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/19/13

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the President the attached memorandum, if in your judgment the Adelman paper would be useful to him at this time.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A "US-Soviet Leadership Meetings: Lessons from
Experience," by Kenneth Adelman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CS 8/29/82

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451


OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

July 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Leadership Meetings: Lessons from Experience

A paper on this topic -- which has been updated from a May 1984 version -- is attached for the President's weekend reading. It is especially timely given the scheduled November 19 - 21 meetings in Geneva.


Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment:
As stated

U

US-SOVIET LEADERSHIP MEETINGS: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE

Now that a meeting has been set between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev, speculation will be rife about what such a meeting can and cannot produce. What does history show?

Lessons can be gleaned from the 11 summits held since WWII. Of these, two were four-power meetings (US, USSR, UK and France) held in 1955 and 1960. The other nine were bilateral US-USSR meetings.

Arms control has been a topic at all the meetings. Strategic arms control in particular has been a key topic -- if not the key topic -- for the US in the 1967 Johnson/Kosygin summit and the subsequent six summits: Nixon/Brezhnev in 1972, 1973, 1974; Ford/Brezhnev in 1974, 1975 and Carter/Brezhnev in 1979.

A look at the benefits and risks of summits yields several lessons:

1. Direct and personal communications between the two leaders, "sizing up" each other, can be important but not always helpful (for example, depending on how the US President is "sized up").
2. Summits can spur on the generally slow-moving government machinery to get things done -- nothing energizes like a deadline -- but whether this is helpful depends on what is done.
3. The US image in Western Europe generally improves with summits, especially beforehand.
4. Presidential popularity at home may increase, although that has not always been the case and the duration of that rise can be fleeting.
5. "Working summits" may be a good idea in theory, but it is extremely difficult in reality to avoid generating false hopes and expectations, and to properly manage the drive for "products" to be announced and/or concluded at summits. In the US there is more pressure for concrete results.
6. Presidential-level negotiations at summits are risky business at best and consequently should be avoided, if at all possible.
7. Summits have clearly not helped moderate Soviet behavior around the globe.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRB 66-114/4 #19164

Why Summits Occurred

The impetus for holding summits since WWII has varied. Lobbying by US Allies (the UK and France) was a principal factor leading to the 1955 Geneva summit, the first of its kind since Potsdam in 1945. The Soviets originated the proposal that led to the 1960 Paris summit. The hastily-arranged Johnson/Kosygin summit in 1967, to take advantage of Kosygin's visit for an emergency UN session on the Middle East War, was also initiated by the Soviets. The initiative has sometimes been shared by the US and USSR, as in the case of the 1961 Kennedy/Khrushchev summit and all the subsequent Nixon, Ford and Carter summits.

Who pushes for a summit is important to its results and effects. In 1946 George Kennan offered a relevant lesson on this point:

Do not encourage high-level exchanges of views with the Russians unless the initiative comes at least fifty per cent from their side...Russians can be dealt with satisfactorily only when they themselves want something and feel themselves in a dependent position.

This wisdom was reflected in Kissinger's experience in 1970 when he first indicated to Ambassador Dobrynin US interest in a summit:

...obviously Moscow wanted to be paid for the summit in advance; the more eager we appeared, the higher would be the price.

Preconditions. In some instances, the US set preconditions for holding a summit. Eisenhower, for example, repeated several times in 1959 that he would not participate in a summit without, among other things, some demonstration of Soviet flexibility on the Berlin crisis. The conditions were sufficiently met by the end of the year to invite Khrushchev to a summit in 1960. (That summit fell apart when Khrushchev walked out because of, or at least using as a pretext, the U-2 incident.)

Expectations. Official expectations have also varied. In 1955 the US expected only generalities to come out of the summit, with negotiations on specifics to be left to subsequent foreign ministers' meetings. By the 1970s, the US generally insisted on concrete agreements or achievements completed by the time of or at the summits. This increased pressure on us to produce agreements, especially arms control agreements.

Format. Summits have varied greatly in procedural format. The 1955 four-power meeting involved elaborate preparations and highly formal presentations by the leaders. At the other end was the informal, intimate setting of the Nixon/Brezhnev discussions in the Crimea in July 1974 with only a Soviet interpreter present.

Backdrop. The international setting surrounding summits has also differed greatly. One of the most auspicious settings was in July 1955. That summit occurred after (1) the momentous decisions to rearm and integrate West Germany into NATO (a prior achievement Eisenhower required for there to be a summit), and (2) the sudden Soviet agreement in May, after more than a decade of stalled negotiations, to withdraw its occupation forces from and allow establishment of a neutral, democratic Austria. (This was one of the only two examples where the Soviets subsequently withdrew the Red Army from countries it occupied at the end of WWII, Iran in 1946 being the other case.)

Much less auspicious backdrops have been more frequent throughout the history of summits. These include (1) the U-2 incident shortly before the Paris summit in May 1960 (which broke up bitterly after only one day), (2) the defeat of US-supported forces at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, only a few weeks before the Kennedy/Khrushchev summit in Vienna, and (3) the impending impeachment of Nixon as he traveled to Moscow in July 1974, a month before his resignation.

What And Who Benefits?

Sizing Up Leaders. In what may be the most important contributions they offer, summits provide a unique opportunity for a President to appraise the nature of Soviet leaders and, in turn, provide the Soviets with a chance to take their measure of the President. Seeing Khrushchev's manner and discerning clearly that he was the "real boss" of the ostensibly collective leadership were regarded by Eisenhower and other Western leaders as a positive benefit of the 1955 Geneva conference. This insight can be valuable in making subsequent decisions on US-Soviet relations, particularly if the leaders are adept at sizing up each other.

A major purpose of Kennedy's informal Vienna meeting with Khrushchev in 1961 was evidently to demonstrate to the Soviet leader the new President's competence and determination in foreign affairs, especially in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Kennedy also hoped to reduce the chances of miscalculation by the Soviets regarding Allied resolve to stay in Berlin and the US willingness to defend its vital interests wherever and whenever challenged. Ironically, that summit backfired in this central purpose. Despite or perhaps even because of this personal encounter, Khrushchev underestimated US determination. The Berlin Wall went up within two months and the Cuban missile crisis came the next year. (Kennedy himself indicated he was shaken by the meeting and shocked by Khrushchev's bullying tactics. Within seven weeks he called up ready reserves and accelerated and expanded his defense buildup requests to Congress.)

Reassuring Soviet Leaders About US Intentions. Such reassurance at the summit can be beneficial, if conveyed convincingly. For example, when Eisenhower made his surprise "open skies" proposal in 1955 he pledged that "the United States will never take part in an aggressive war." This personal declaration was reportedly reassuring to Khrushchev and his colleagues.

Improved US Image In Europe. Summits have generally been heralded in Western Europe. They counter the widespread opinion that the US is opposed to dialogue and disinterested in opportunities for relaxing East-West tensions and for advancing arms control. Eisenhower steadfastly opposed a summit but changed his mind in mid-1955, among other reasons, so as not to be portrayed as obstructing the "peace process". Presidents generally seek to be at the forefront of any "peace effort", and summits -- especially decorated by arms control -- have unfortunately come to symbolize such an effort.

Increased Domestic Popularity. Johnson cited his 1967 summit with Kosygin as an example of his willingness, in the midst of the Vietnam War, to go "any place, anywhere, if, in my judgment, it can possibly, conceivably serve the cause of peace". Kosygin downplayed the summit's results but Johnson asserted that "great progress" was made in some areas. In truth, the two leaders largely talked past each other. Nonetheless, Johnson's popularity increased very briefly, for only about two weeks, after the summit. Nixon's popularity, in the same Gallup Poll series, rose substantially after his May 1972 summit in Moscow with Brezhnev, on top of his popularity rise when he travelled to China shortly before.

This popularity gain for a President, however, has not always occurred. Ford's summit with Brezhnev in Vladivostok did not generate any greater popularity in the public opinion polls than he had before. Inflation and growing unemployment were dominant concerns at that time, and neither could be helped by a summit. Carter's popularity was also not increased at all by his summit with Brezhnev in June 1979 during which they signed SALT II.

What Risks?

Generating False Hopes. Summits can and probably unavoidably do generate the illusion of fundamentally improved US-Soviet relations, even when no significant agreement has been reached, or when deadlock in fact characterized the closed sessions.

Concern that such unrealistic expectations and impressions would weaken the defense and foreign policy resolve of the West was an important reason for Eisenhower and Dulles' reluctance to move toward the summit which finally occurred in July 1955. Before that summit, Dulles wisely sought to disabuse public opinion from any expectation that it would in fact relax world tensions.

The Soviet leadership, of course, encouraged just the opposite view. As it turned out, the so-called "spirit of Geneva" atmosphere was brief. Kennedy was also concerned that his summit might generate another "Spirit of Camp David" -- the media event and afterglow of the informal summit with Eisenhower and Khrushchev in September 1959.

The 1972 Nixon/Brezhnev summit, with the signing of SALT I, has been criticized as having had a "tranquilizing effect" on US resolve to maintain the military balance in the years following. For example, the Harris Survey in June 1972 reported that 58 percent of the public agreed with the statement that a "whole new period of more peaceful relations between the United States and Russia was opened up" as a result of that visit. Of course, no "whole new period" of such relations had come about.

Clearly, summits do not moderate Soviet conduct around the world. Within a few months of the June 1973 Nixon/Brezhnev summit, the Soviets conspicuously failed to notify the United States of the October 1973 war they knew was imminent, and then provocatively widened risks of that war. (The Soviets threatened to intervene unilaterally, a move which prompted the US to go on higher strategic alert.) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was launched only a few months after the Carter/Brezhnev summit in Vienna signing SALT II.

Negotiating Arms Control. The concrete achievements actually negotiated at summits have fortunately been remarkably few. The difficulties of engaging personal, Presidential diplomacy at summits to negotiate agreements or even general principles were demonstrated at the 1972 Nixon/Brezhnev summit.

In October 1971, when it was agreed to have a Nixon/Brezhnev summit in May 1972, many of the important issues in SALT I were yet to be resolved. During Kissinger's secret visit to Moscow, shortly before the summit, the Soviets agreed with the US that SLBMs would be included in the Interim Offensive Agreement, but the terms of the inclusion remained to be negotiated.

When Nixon arrived in Moscow, some key issues on the ABM Treaty were still being negotiated in Helsinki (and finally resolved there during the first two days of the summit), and a number of key issues with respect to the Interim Agreement remained: (1) the number of Soviet SLBMs and SLBM submarines that would be included and the counting rules for dismantling older missiles in trade for new SLBMs; (2) the definition of a heavy missile; and (3) what increases in size or volume of existing ICBMs and silos would be permitted. With the summit scheduled to end in three days, the bargaining was long and intense and, at times, somewhat frantic.

The resolutions of these key issues at the summit was, of course, subject to later debate as to their meaning and their value to the United States. The Soviets agreed to a mutual statement defining -- in an ambiguous way -- significant increases in ICBM silo dimensions and to freezing new Soviet SLBM starts. The Soviets refused to agree with the US unilateral statement which gave the US definition of a heavy missile. This "loophole" permitted a massive subsequent buildup in the throwweight of the Soviet ICBM force which, to a considerable degree, vitiated the effectiveness of the Interim Agreement.

That intense process in Moscow and other experiences on other issues, demonstrated that detailed negotiations at summits have inherent limitations and high risks:

- o Summits are enormously time-consuming before and during, even without arms control negotiations. Negotiations on important issues like arms control involve either greatly increased demands on the President's time or the risk of inadequate preparation.
- o Summit negotiations are exceedingly high stakes with the President out front. That can mobilize forces for action within the bureaucracy, but also increase pressures to compromise to avoid failure ("not achieving agreement").

Dean Rusk summarizes a lesson here: "The direct confrontation of the chiefs of government of the great powers involves an extra tension because the court of last resort is in session. The costs of error or misunderstanding are multiplied by the seriousness of the issues and the power of those present." John Kennedy concurred when he said that a summit "injected considerations of personal prestige, face-saving and politics into grave international conflicts."

The risk of a confrontational deadlock or unfavorable results on arms control agreements at summits can be avoided in two ways: (1) assure that agreement has already been reached on all major details before a summit is agreed to, or (2) lower expectations for the summit leaders to agree on specifics by having them agree on a broad framework or a few easily understood principles, leaving the detailed negotiations to others to work out after the summit.

The first approach risks not overcoming differences and thus of not having an arms control agreement "concluded" at the summit, or even not having a summit because of the absence of even the prospect of an agreement.

The second approach risks leaving important issues unresolved for the sake of being able to announce an "agreement". This approach was taken at the 1974 Ford/Brezhnev summit. The Vladivostok Accord's broad parameters included a ceiling on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and a subceiling for MIRVed missile launchers. Unfortunately, this proved to be too general and lacked guidance in some critical areas to transform easily into substantive agreement. (For example, although heavy bombers were included as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, they were not defined.) Protracted negotiations were subsequently required to resolve conflicting US and Soviet interpretations of Vladivostok, especially whether it included US air-launched cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber.

At first glance, one might expect that "agreements in principle" represent another possible approach. The problem here was summarized in George C. Marshall's comment to a colleague: "Don't ask me to agree in principle, that just means that we haven't agreed yet."

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary ^{S/S}
FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway
SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for the President's Meeting
with Shevardnadze, September 27, 1985

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to approve the attached memorandum to the President on his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The attached memorandum will serve as a scope paper for the President's briefing book and contains talking points for his use in the meeting with Shevardnadze. We are providing separately, under cover of a Platt - McFarlane Memorandum, a package of briefing materials consisting of various back-up papers, including one-page summaries on major issues in all four areas of our agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations. The recommended list of participants for the President's pre-brief, meeting and luncheon have been forwarded under a separate memo.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 8/29/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Drafted: EUR/SOV/MULTI:EEdelman
9/17/85 x9806 0388P

Cleared: EUR: JWilkinson
EUR/SOV: MRParris;
EUR/SOV: BBurton

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

15

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Your September 27 Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

This memorandum provides some thoughts on how we can best exploit your meeting with Shevardnadze, along with my separate sessions September 25 and 27, with a view toward your Geneva meeting.

The Soviet Approach

The Soviet game plan is becoming increasingly clear. They are seeking to create the impression that they have left no stone unturned to achieve an arms control breakthrough in Geneva. Dobrynin confirmed to me September 16 that Shevardnadze will present concrete proposals to you next week on the nuclear and space talks. Our guess is that they will be an elaboration of Gorbachev's recent expressions of willingness to accept deep cuts in exchange for constraints on strategic defense beyond the "fundamental research" stage. Shevardnadze will presumably also be pushing previous Soviet initiatives (Gorbachev's July nuclear testing moratorium, the non-militarization of space proposal Shevardnadze will present to the UNGA, perhaps a new twist on the Soviet chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe concept), while seeking to capitalize on our ASAT test.

Our Objectives

- Our task will be three-fold. We will want to:
- Probe to determine the seriousness of any new Soviet proposals;
- Give Shevardnadze as much information as possible and appropriate to set the stage for a productive November meeting and progress at the Geneva talks;
- Lay the basis for further steps in our regional dialogue and on the range of bilateral and human rights issues.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

NLRR FO6-114/14 #14161

BY CL NARA DATE 7/28/08

Your Meeting, Friday, September 27

Given the constraints on your time, you might most usefully concentrate on laying the groundwork for an in-depth exchange with Gorbachev on the most pressing issues in the relationship. I recommend that you:

-- Respond to Shevardnadze's proposals with a strong statement of your own commitment to meaningful arms control, explaining to Shevardnadze your views on the need for deep reductions and the potential promise of SDI research. (As Shevardnadze will not be accompanied by his own arms control specialists, he will not expect a detailed reply to his message, which I hope he will preview with me in New York).

-- Outline your plans for a wide-ranging discussion of perceived intentions and motivations. (You might suggest to Shevardnadze that you and Gorbachev be prepared to describe your respective domestic agendas as a means of getting beyond stereotypes to the roots of policy).

-- Express your concerns about Soviet regional policies, focusing on Afghanistan, where we have recently seen some hints of a greater Soviet willingness to consider a negotiated withdrawal.

-- Reemphasize to Shevardnadze the importance you attach to movement on human rights and emigration (perhaps in your tete-a-tete at the conclusion of the meeting).

As with Gromyko last year, lunch could be given over to an elaboration of views on regional issues, providing an opportunity to rehearse points you will later make to Gorbachev on the impact of Soviet international behavior on our perceptions. You could also use the occasion to get some sense from Shevardnadze of current political dynamics in the Kremlin.

My Meetings: Wednesday and Friday afternoon, September 25 and 27

Dobrynin has indicated I may get a first look at Shevardnadze's arms control message during our initial session Wednesday. While I will press him to be as specific as possible, we may not have a complete picture of what Moscow has to offer until your meeting. I will also put some ideas of our own on the table.

-- On the Geneva talks, I will try to engage Shevardnadze in a comprehensive discussion of the offense/defense relationship. This will serve the purpose of smoking out details of his private message and giving him some direct exposure to our thinking on the subject.

-- On nuclear testing, I will stress the importance we attach to verification, reaffirming our willingness to ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties if the Soviets will cooperate in satisfying our concerns. I will propose that special representatives from both sides explore this possibility this fall.

-- On ASAT, we are not in a position to take the initiative, but I will need to address any proposals Shevardnadze may make.

-- On chemical weapons, we are working interagency a proposal that we exchange lists of CW precursors as a first step toward collaboration in preventing the spread of CW possession and use; and

-- On nuclear nonproliferation, I will confirm our willingness to make a joint statement on cooperation at your Geneva meeting.

As arms control issues will dominate the New York session, regional and bilateral matters will probably slip to my Friday afternoon meeting. I will follow up in greater detail on regional points you make and formally propose that we regularize the expert-level talks we have had over the past year on the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Asia. (We are proposing Central American/Caribbean talks be held in October.)

I will raise human rights and emigration initially in a brief tete-a-tete on the margins of our New York meeting, broaching an idea discussed with Mac Baldrige: that concrete steps by the Soviets to meet our concerns might be met with some liberalization of our non-strategic trade controls. I will return to human rights and emigration in my final session, reinforcing the points you would make in your meeting, and presenting an up-dated list of cases in which we are interested.

There is a good chance that at some point in our meetings Shevardnadze will raise two additional issues: whether there should be a formal communiqué in Geneva and whether there should be follow-up meetings between you and Gorbachev. I will inform him that we remain open as to how the meeting should be documented, and that our final decision will depend on what substantive results can be expected. On follow-up meetings, I will indicate that we are willing in principle, but feel that future meetings should be in capitals. I will reiterate our view that it is the Soviets' turn to come to Washington.

Media Arrangements

As with Gromyko last year, I will plan to make two statements in connection with Shevardnadze's visit: the first, a short, informal comment following our New York meeting; the second, a longer review of where we stand following your meeting and lunch. We plan backgrounders by Roz Ridgway, Jack Matlock and Art Hartman after both my exchanges with Shevardnadze to shape public perceptions of the visit and of its implications for the Geneva meeting. You might want to consider a radio address focusing on US - Soviet relations, perhaps the following Saturday. We will also plan to do the usual talk shows after the meetings are over.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-5-

Drafted: EUR/SOV:MRParris (#0324P)
09/16/85, 632-3738
Cleared: EUR:RLRidgway
PM:JHawes
S/ARN: MStafford

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

20

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE

INTRODUCTION

-- IN PREPARING FOR THIS MEETING I HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK AT HOW THE US AND I PERSONALLY ARE ROUTINELY PORTRAYED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. AS YOU KNOW, THE PICTURE IS LESS THAN FLATTERING.

-- I RAISE THIS NOT TO MAKE YOU UNCOMFORTABLE, BUT TO MAKE A POINT. THIS MEETING, AND THE MEETING I WILL HAVE WITH MR. GORBACHEV IN NOVEMBER, ARE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITIES.

-- I WANT YOU TO BEGIN TO GET A TRUE PICTURE OF WHO RONALD REAGAN IS, WHAT HE STANDS FOR, WHAT HE WANTS TO ACCOMPLISH.

--I WOULD LIKE TO GET THE SAME FROM YOU AND MR. GORBACHEV.

--I WANT, IN A WORD, FOR US TO GET BEYOND STEREOTYPES; TO TALK FRANKLY ABOUT OUR DIFFERENCES; TO EXPLORE CONSTRUCTIVELY WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE TOGETHER BETWEEN NOW AND NOVEMBER 19 -- AND AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING AS WELL.

-- WHEN I MET LAST YEAR WITH MR. GROMYKO, I DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL MY VIEW OF THE WORLD, AND OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES' PLACE IN IT. I KNOW YOU WILL HAVE READ THE RECORDS OF THAT CONVERSATION, SO I WILL NOT REPEAT MYSELF.

-- I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE SOMETHING I SAID THEN, HOWEVER:

- o I BELIEVE OUR RELATIONSHIP IS AND WILL REMAIN AN ESSENTIALLY COMPETITIVE ONE. BUT WE LIVE IN ONE WORLD AND MUST HANDLE OUR COMPETITION IN PEACE.
- o NEITHER OF US WILL EVER ALLOW THE OTHER A MILITARY EDGE. BUT IF WE ARE EVER GOING TO CLEAR THE AIR, REDUCE SUSPICIONS, AND REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, THERE WILL NEVER BE A BETTER TIME.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRN F06-114/14 #14162
BY CW NARADATE 2/28/08

ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES

-- I KNOW YOU AND GEORGE HAD A FULL DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES ON WEDNESDAY.

-- I HOPE YOU CAME AWAY FROM THAT DISCUSSION WITH A SENSE OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE APPROACH THIS CRITICAL AREA.

-- OUR SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN CONCRETE AND DESIGNED TO ADDRESS REAL PROBLEMS. AS I HAVE STATED MANY TIMES, I HAVE GIVEN OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA GREAT FLEXIBILITY TO EXPLORE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS -- BUT YOU HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE YOUR OWN IDEAS.

-- WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS WORK WITH YOU TO RESTORE AND MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE THE REGIME FOR RELIABLE MUTUAL DETERRENCE WHICH, IN 1972, WAS THOUGHT BY BOTH SIDES TO BE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE.

-- THAT MEANS WE SHOULD BRING ABOUT THE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS THAT THE 1972 ABM TREATY SAID WE BOTH WOULD SEEK. I KNOW MR. GORBACHEV HAS SAID THE SOVIET UNION, TOO, WOULD LIKE DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR ARMS. IT IS TIME TO GET DOWN TO WORK AND FIGURE OUT HOW WE ARE GOING TO ACHIEVE THEM, IN A WAY THAT ENHANCES STABILITY.

-- IT ALSO MEANS THAT WE SHOULD EXAMINE THE POTENTIAL OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS TO STRENGTHEN STABILITY BETWEEN US. WE THINK THERE ARE PROMISING NEW TECHNOLOGIES; SO, APPARENTLY, DOES THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE YOU HAVE A VIGOROUS RESEARCH PROGRAM ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE. I BELIEVE THAT IF THERE IS A BETTER WAY TO ASSURE THE PEACE BETWEEN US THAN THREATENING TO DESTROY EACH OTHER'S SOCIETIES, THE LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE NOT ONLY THE OPPORTUNITY BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO EXPLORE IT.

-- BUT I ALSO WANT TO EMPHASIZE TO YOU THAT OUR SDI PROGRAM IS ONLY FOR RESEARCH. I HAVE NOT MADE ANY DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS -- ONLY SOME FUTURE PRESIDENT COULD DO THAT. I HAVE ORDERED THAT ALL SDI RESEARCH COMPLY COMPLETELY WITH THE ABM AND OTHER RELEVANT TREATIES. AND I HAVE TOLD MY NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO EXPLORE WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES THAT WOULD ARISE IF IT DOES APPEAR POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE TO MOVE TO GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSE.

-- FINALLY, IF WE ARE TO MOVE AHEAD, WE HAVE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF COMPLIANCE. YOU HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN AGREEMENTS; WE HAVE EITHER ANSWERED THEM IN DETAIL OR PROPOSED MUTUAL WAYS TO RESOLVE THEM. WE HAVEN'T SEEM THE SAME FORTHCOMINGNESS ON YOUR SIDE. CONTINUING QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE VERY DAMAGING IN THEIR OWN RIGHT. THEY ARE DOUBLY SO WHEN WE GET NO SATISFACTION IN CLEARING THEM UP.

-- I ALSO HAVE TO SAY THAT WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN RECENT MONTHS OVER THE HANDLING OF SOVIET IDEAS. WE SEE THEM ADVANCED IN THE NEWSPAPERS BUT NOT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MAKES US WONDER HOW SERIOUS YOU ARE.

-- IF WE ARE TO BE REALISTIC, WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT LITTLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN GENEVA. THE TALKS HAVEN'T REALLY GONE BEYOND WHERE THEY ENDED IN 1983. WE DON'T NEED TODAY TO GET INTO THE REASONS FOR THAT: YOU HAVE YOUR ANALYSIS; WE HAVE OURS.

-- BUT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED SOME COMMON GROUND: THAT ANY AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY; THAT THEY SHOULD ENVISAGE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN WARHEADS; THAT THEY SHOULD ENHANCE STABILITY; THAT THEY SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE; THAT FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, WILL CONTINUE.

-- THE TIME HAS COME, IT SEEMS TO US, TO BUILD ON THESE GENERAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT TO SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC -- SOMETHING WHICH WOULD GIVE OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA THE STIMULUS AND DIRECTION THEY NEED TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS.

-- I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE BRINGING SPECIFIC IDEAS ON HOW TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING THEM AND WANT YOU TO EMPHASIZE TO MR. GORBACHEV THAT I WILL STUDY THEM VERY CLOSELY. I HOPE THEY WILL MARK THE OUTSET OF THE KIND OF SERIOUS GIVE-AND-TAKE THAT WILL LEAD TO PROGRESS AT GENEVA. WE MUST NOT LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US.

-- I ALSO HOPE YOU WILL GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSALS GEORGE HAS MADE ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- WE SEEM TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE ON A NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT IN GENEVA, AND THERE APPEARS TO BE A BETTER CHANCE OF PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING HOW TO MOVE THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

-- LET ME JUST EMPHASIZE HERE THAT WE ARE PREPARED FOR AS MUCH PROGRESS IN ANY OF THESE FORUMS AS YOUR SIDE WILL ALLOW. BUT YOU CAN NOT REASONABLY EXPECT THAT WE WILL MAKE ALL THE CONCESSIONS.

PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

-- AS I SAID, I HOPE TO HAVE A WIDE-RANGING AND FRANK CONVERSATION WITH MR. GORBACHEV WHEN WE MEET IN NOVEMBER.

-- THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF POINTS I INTEND TO RAISE WITH HIM.

o I WANT TO EXPLORE WITH HIM WHY THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD FEEL THREATENED BY US, WHEN WE HAVE NEVER STARTED A WAR, NEVER WILL, AND INDEED SOUGHT TO USE OUR PREPONDERANT STRENGTH AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

o I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO HIM HOW YOUR MILITARY BUILD-UP, YOUR SELF-PROCLAIMED DEDICATION TO REVOLUTION AND OUR DESTRUCTION, AND YOUR ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND YOUR INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AT OUR EXPENSE IS THREATENING TO US.

o I HOPE THAT THIS WILL GIVE YOU SOME UNDERSTANDING OF WHY WE ARE REBUILDING OUR OWN STRENGTH AND ABOUT SOME OF THE THINGS I HAVE SAID ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I HOPE THAT THIS CAN CLEAR THE AIR BETWEEN US AND BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING SUSPICIONS.

-- BUT I HOPE WE CAN GO BEYOND A DISCUSSION OF OUR RIVALRY AND THE REASONS FOR IT TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MOTIVATIONS.

-- ONE WAY TO DO THIS MIGHT BE FOR MR. GORBACHEV AND MYSELF TO SHARE WITH ONE ANOTHER SOME SENSE OF OUR DOMESTIC PRIORITIES AND CONCERNS.

-- IN OUR COUNTRY, WE HAVE MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS IN GETTING OUR ECONOMY BACK ON TRACK. WE HAVE CREATED MILLIONS OF NEW JOBS; NEW TECHNOLOGIES WE ARE PIONEERING ARE OPENING UP NEW POSSIBILITIES THROUGHOUT THE ECONOMY; WE ARE SEEKING WAYS TO REDISTRIBUTE THE BURDEN OF TAXATION IN OUR COUNTRY TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ALL AMERICANS.

-- I KNOW INTERESTING CHANGES ARE OCCURRING IN YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL. WE HAVE WATCHED WITH INTEREST THE STEPS TAKEN BY MR. GORBACHEV SINCE HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING FROM HIM -- AND FROM YOU IF TIME PERMITS -- WHAT YOU HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE MONTHS BETWEEN NOW AND THE FEBRUARY PARTY CONGRESS AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

-- I BELIEVE THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION COULD GO FAR TOWARD GETTING BEHIND THE STEREOTYPES WHICH INEVITABLY DEVELOP IN A RELATIONSHIP SUCH AS OURS. DO YOU THINK MR. GORBACHEV WOULD AGREE?

REGIONAL ISSUES

-- WHILE PUBLIC ATTENTION HAS OFTEN FOCUSED ON THE ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, REGIONAL QUESTIONS HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN THE CAUSE OF THE MOST SERIOUS STRAINS BETWEEN US.

-- WHAT HAS TRADITIONALLY CONCERNED US MOST HAS BEEN YOUR TENDENCY TO USE MILITARY FORCE AS A MEANS OF ADVANCING YOUR INTERESTS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH SURROGATES.

-- EFFORTS DURING THE SEVENTIES TO DEVELOP UNDERSTANDINGS ON PERMISSIBLE ACTIONS IN THIRD AREAS CAME APART PRIMARILY, IN OUR VIEW, BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S UNWILLINGNESS TO FORESWEAR PURSUIT OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

-- THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT WE HAVE HAD TO LOOK TO OUR OWN STRENGTH AND TO CLOSER COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE SUCH A POLICY FOR AS LONG AS IS NECESSARY -- WHETHER IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA OR ELSEWHERE.

-- NOR WILL WE FORESWEAR THE RIGHT TO LEND ASSISTANCE TO DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS WHEN THEY APPEAL TO US TO RESIST AGGRESSION.

-- IN ADDITION TO TEACHING US THAT WE HAVE TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS, HOWEVER, THE SEVENTIES ALSO TAUGHT US THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING CLEARLY THE REGIONAL MOTIVATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

-- WE HAVE THUS SOUGHT TO EXPAND OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON REGIONAL ISSUES OVER THE YEARS. THIS YEAR, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN AND ASIA. WE HAVE PROPOSED TALKS ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

-- WE HAVE FOUND THE EXCHANGES USEFUL AND WORTH CONTINUING. AND WE WILL HAVE A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO MAKE ON REGULARIZING THESE TYPES OF DISCUSSIONS.

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-- SUCH DISCUSSIONS, OF COURSE, ARE NOT DESIGNED TO REPLACE EXCHANGES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR HIGHER LEVELS. IF I MAY TOUCH BRIEFLY ON SOME OF THE MORE SALIENT ISSUES:

o TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AN AREA OF INTEREST TO BOTH OF US. YOUR LACK OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND SUPPORT FOR ELEMENTS OPPOSING DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED CONTINUES TO BLOCK THE MOST PROMISING AVENUES OF A SETTLEMENT AND CALLS INTO QUESTION YOUR WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE REGION. WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THERE IS NO RENEWAL OF FIGHTING IN THE REGION.

o I WANT TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. WE WANT STABLE, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES IN THE REGION AND WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE FORCIBLE ALTERATION OF THE LOCAL BALANCE. SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE INTERVENTIONIST ACTIVITIES OF CUBA AND NICARAGUA IS AND WILL REMAIN A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN OUR RELATIONS AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION.

o SOUTHERN AFRICA IS IN THE PROCESS OF CATAclySMIC CHANGE. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF IS NOT AN EAST-WEST ISSUE AND IT IS IN NEITHER OF OUR INTERESTS THAT IT BECOME ONE. WE EXPECT MOSCOW TO SHOW THE NECESSARY RESTRAINT. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO HELPING THE NATIONS OF THE REGION REACH A PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES, INCLUDING ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA.

o IN ASIA, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO MORE TOGETHER TO HELP ALONG A SETTLEMENT OF THE KAMPUCHEA QUESTION. WE REGRET THAT MOSCOW HAS THUS FAR REFUSED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE IN HANOI TO ENCOURAGE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA. BOTH OF US SHOULD ALSO PLAY A ROLE IN LOWERING TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, BY ENCOURAGING AN EXPANSION OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

o WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND, WHICH AS YOU KNOW HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN US MANY TIMES IN THE PAST. IN OUR VIEW, STABILITY IN POLAND CAN ONLY RESULT FROM A TRUE POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND DIALOGUE AMONG THE GOVERNMENT, THE CHURCH AND THE WORKERS.

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THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SEEMS HEADED IN A DIFFERENT DIRECTION. THIS IS SOMETHING OVER WHICH YOU HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE. WE HOPE YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THE POLISH REGIME TO TURN TOWARD RECONCILIATION RATHER THAN INCREASED REPRESSION.

-- FINALLY, LET ME RAISE THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN. THERE IS NO OTHER REGIONAL ISSUE ON WHICH PROGRESS COULD HAVE AS DRAMATIC AN IMPACT ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONS AS AFGHANISTAN.

o I AM AWARE OF SOVIET ACCUSATIONS THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO "BLEED" THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

o I WANT TO REASSURE YOU, AS I WILL REASSURE MR. GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, THAT THAT IS NOT THE CASE.

o WE WANT THE WAR TO END. WE WANT THE AFGHAN REFUGEES TO BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY HONORABLY AND IN PEACE. WE WANT THE SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN TO GO HOME SO THAT THE SUFFERING AND LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES CAN END. WE BELIEVE THAT ONLY A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT CAN LEAD TO SUCH A RESULT.

o WE HAVE HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN THE PAST. LET ME ADD ONE THING TODAY: IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO EXPLORE MEANS OF ENDING THE WAR ON TERMS WHICH ALLOW THE AFGHANS TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THEY WOULD FIND IN US NO OBSTACLE. WE ACCEPT THAT SUCH A SOLUTION MUST ALSO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF YOUR SOUTHERN BORDER.

-- I HOPE YOU WILL CONVEY THAT MESSAGE FORCEFULLY FROM ME TO MR. GORBACHEV.

BILATERAL ISSUES

-- I KNOW THAT YOU AND GEORGE WILL BE DISCUSSING IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES ON THE AGENDA.

-- AS IN THE OTHER AREAS I HAVE TOUCHED ON, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO CLEAN UP AS MANY OF THESE AS POSSIBLE UP IN TIME FOR OUR NOVEMBER MEETING.

-- OBVIOUSLY, IF THIS IS GOING TO HAPPEN, BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE TO BE WILLING TO MEET THE OTHER HALF-WAY. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO OUR PART.

-- BUT IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO WRAP THESE ISSUES UP BEFORE NOVEMBER 19, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON THEM AFTER THE MEETING. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO GET AGREEMENTS WHICH CAN STAND UP TO THE TEST OF TIME AND ARE FIRMLY GROUNDED IN EACH SIDE'S INTERESTS.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMIGRATION (for tete-a-tete)

-- I WANTED TO RAISE THIS IN PRIVATE BECAUSE I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. I HAVE IN MIND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS, AN AREA I KNOW YOU DO NOT RECOGNIZE AS PART OF OUR AGENDA. THEY ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER.

-- THERE ARE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED HERE ON BOTH SIDES: YOU VIEW IT AS AN INTERNAL MATTER; AS A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS WE CAN NOT ACCEPT SUCH A VIEW.

-- BUT THERE SHOULD BE WAYS FOR US TO DEAL WITH THESE CONCERNS WITHOUT COMPROMISING OUR PRINCIPLES.

-- I KNOW GEORGE HAS SHARED WITH YOU SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS ON HOW WE MIGHT DO SO. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONSIDER THEM CAREFULLY AND THAT WE WILL SEE SOME PROGRESS BEFORE THE NOVEMBER MEETING.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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September 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT: Shevardnaze Briefing Package

Arms control sections of attached State Department briefing package for President's meeting with Shevardnaze generally track with established current policy. However, the real management/policy issues involve the actual Talking Points to be used by the President, and for the Shevardnaze-Shultz meeting, by the Secretary of State. Both sets of Talking Points will bear careful review and will, as you know, be the subject of SACG discussion this Friday. FYI: In two negotiations (CDE and CW), we are still experiencing bad interagency vibrations about apparent policy shifts undertaken through Helsinki meeting Talking Points unvetted by IG or SACG. The Scope paper noted in State's cover memo will also bear careful review; when is it expected?

Attachment

cc: *Rm* Ron Lehman, Bob *Richard* *Richard*

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR File-114/14 #14163

BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

Bill Martin 79

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III. Annotated Agenda

Saturday, November 16th

- 8:30 AM Departure from White House
- 8:45 AM Departure from Andrews
Note: No departure remarks because Saturday morning not good news time. Could do pre-departure, scene-setting remarks to nation on Friday or earlier.
- 10:25PM Arrival Geneva. Met by Swiss President Furgler, minimal arrival ceremony (formal arrival ceremony on Monday, November 18th). Brief arrival remarks by President to begin to achieve objectives vis-a-vis Western solidarity as Soviets set forth above. Two themes: (1) US-Swiss shared Western values: democracy, free enterprise, home for political refugees, (2) President's constructive approach to meetings with Gorbachev but takes two to make relationship work. Open press coverage by White House press corps and international press.
- 10:35 PM President and Mrs. Reagan proceed directly to their residence -- Chateau de Saussure. No press coverage. 15 minutes' drive time.

Sunday, November 17th

- AM Private time for President to read briefing materials and relax.
- 1:30 PM President travels to Fleur d'Eau (five minute drive)
Purpose: familiarity with site for US-hosted meetings with Soviets. Also to meet with his key advisors. Press coverage showing President and advisors engaged in substantive preparation for meetings with Gorbachev. Traveling press pool (13 people).

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

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2:30-

3:30 PM

Possible horseback ride. Good location ten minutes drive from Fleur d'Eau. Riding partners could include Swiss Los Angeles Olympics medal winner Heidi Robranny and/or other Swiss champion riders. Three purposes: Swiss proud of riders so would be popular event in Switzerland. Would show to world a vigorous American President and offset press coverage of Gorbachev as "vigorous, younger" leader (Gorbachev likely to go for his usual 45 minute daily walk). Finally a ride would help President clear his head and refresh his system after plane trip.

(Another possibility in same time frame could be attendance at service in the American Church. Drive time from Fleur d'Eau ten minutes).

3:30 PM President returns to residence. Private time for reading briefing materials and relaxing.

Monday, November 18th

Morning Private time

12:00-

1:30 PM

Meeting and working lunch with senior advisors to prepare for Gorbachev meetings.

1:55 PM

Depart residence en route for Swiss arrival ceremony

2:00 PM

Formal arrival ceremony at Le Reposoir. Military honors. National anthem. No public remarks by President. Press pool coverage.

2:15 PM

Proceed inside Le Reposoir to meet with President Furgler. To dramatize special quality of US-Swiss relations in contrast to Soviet-Swiss relations, President Reagan presents President Furgler with Joint Congressional Resolution (photo op) expressing US appreciation to Switzerland for its contributions to United States and world (ICRC, political refugees, democracy, religion, center for negotiators). General discussion of US-Swiss relations and upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.

Note: Mrs. Reagan will have tea with Mrs. Furgler in adjacent room. Secretary Shultz will have meeting with Swiss Foreign Minister Aubert in another room.

3:00 PM

Return to residence.

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Or to possible event to demonstrate dynamism, strength of U.S., Swiss and Western values. One possibility would be a speech at Geneva University -- "shining city on the hill" type speech about our vision of the future; not US-Soviet relations. Excellent hall (Aula). Students could be invited from Graduate Institute for International Relations (Bud McFarlane attended), Geneva's Management Institute and University itself. No Q&A's, but following speech President could mix with students in reception hall. Press pool coverage.

Other possibilities for same timeframe being developed. For example, the President could visit a Swiss entrepreneur who started with nothing 20 years ago and now has thriving technology business.

4:00 PM Return to residence
Private time to read and relax

Tuesday, November 19th

- 9:15 AM Depart residence for Fleur d'Eau.
- 9:20 AM Meet with senior advisors to prepare for Gorbachev
- 10:00 AM Gorbachev arrives. President descends front steps for first handshake and photo op (40 US/40 Soviet/40 International)
- 10:05 AM President escorts Gorbachev to petite salon for brief tete-a-tete. President could set the tone for two days' meetings, reiterate willingness to get down to concrete work, and reaffirm understanding on order in which issues will be addressed. At end photo op by restricted press pool (13 US/ 13 Soviet)

Note: During this period remaining members of the two delegations will be together and getting to know one another in salle de manger.

- 10:20 AM Two leaders move from petite salon to plenary room, each introduces the other to members of his delegation and get seated.
- 10:25 AM Photo opportunity for somewhat expanded press pool (30 US/30 Soviet/30 International)

- 10:35 AM Plenary meeting of two delegations. Seven on each side including notetaker. As host, President will chair. We will want to discuss broad nature of relationship. Might begin with what each wants and is trying to accomplish at home. Then move to international conditions which will permit kind of domestic developments and overall future our peoples want. Need for greater Soviet restraint in arms buildup and use of force in Third World. In his initial presentation, Gorbachev also likely to begin to get into nuclear arms control issues, particularly attack on SDI.
- 12:15 PM First plenary concludes, President sees off Gorbachev (no press coverage of departures from plenaries), and returns to residence.
- 12:20 PM Private time at residence.
- 12:30 PM Working lunch with senior advisors at residence to prepare for afternoon plenary.
- 1:15 PM Private time
- 2:20 PM Return to Fleur d'Eau
- 2:30 PM Gorbachev arrives and President greets him again. Outside press pool.
- 2:35 PM Second plenary begins (no press coverage inside). President and Gorbachev turn to arms control issues in detail for first time. Discussion of strategic offense and defense. Possibly other arms control issues as well. (It's quite possible that some of the lesser arms control and other issues will get very brief treatment by the leaders in plenary during these two days. For this and other reasons Shultz/McFarlane/others may want to have some side conversations over dinner or elsewhere with Shevardnadze or other Soviets if we are trying to shape up language for a communique or trying to reach some agreement)

Note: At about 4:15 PM if weather permits, the President might take Gorbachev for a walk down to the lake. Cabana on the shore with a large fireplace and splendid view; ideal for coffee/drinks. Restricted press pool coverage. This would be a good time to broach human rights and trade.

4:30 PM President sees off Gorbachev. No press coverage

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4:30 PM President meets with senior advisors to agree on guidelines for their briefing of press and agree on approach/work needed for dinner and next day's meetings with Gorbachev.

5:00 PM President returns to his residence.

Note: Around 5:30 PM there would be press briefing at Hotel Intercontinental by Speakes and some participants in plenaries. If we want to sustain some confidentiality and/or some news for end of second day, we might want participants to be at Hartman/Ridgway/Matlock level. If we want to combat Soviets' propoganda and/or make more major news, Shultz/McFarlane level might be better. In any case, our themes would include President's leadership of talks, our constructive proposals, etc.

5:00-

7:55 PM Private time

7:55 PM President and Mrs. Reagan depart for Soviet Mission

8:00 PM Gorbachevs greet President and Mrs. Reagan and US delegation at Soviet Mission. Photo op of arrival outside. Unclear what Soviets will permit inside. President and Mrs. Reagan could use this dinner inter alia to press for our peace and people-to-people proposals, i.e., deep reductions in nuclear arms, greater exchange of young people, appearances on each other's television. This could be theme of our toast -- desire for next generation to move away from fear of nuclear war and closer together.

10:00 PM President and Mrs. Reagan depart Soviet Mission and return to residence (5 minute drive)

Note: No in-depth press briefing after dinner but provide atmospherics like duration of dinner, food served and themes of President's toast.

Wednesday, November 20th

9:15 AM Meet with senior advisors at residence to prepare for talks with Gorbachev.

9:45 AM Complete meeting with advisors

9:55 AM Depart for Soviet Mission

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10:00 AM Arrive Soviet Mission. Gorbachev meets President at bottom of steps and escorts him up stairs to Soviet meeting facility. Outside photo op.

10:05 AM Delegations get seated and inside photo op takes place.

Note: Soviets raised possibility that they might want to begin this Soviet-hosted day also with a tete-a-tete.

10:15 AM Plenary session begin. President may want to use this plenary to review geopolitical issues. These could include both effort to reach agreement in some general standards and discussion of specific regions like Afghanistan, Central America, Middle East, Cambodia, etc. President can make the point that two can play at support for national peoples liberation struggles but that we are also ready for diplomatic/political solutions.

12:15 PM Plenary concludes, Gorbachev sees off President (no photo) and President returns to his residence.

12:20 PM President arrives at residence.

12:30 - Working lunch with senior advisors to prepare
1:15 PM for final plenary with Soviets

1:15 - Private time
2:15 PM

2:25 PM Depart for Soviet Mission

2:30 PM Arrive at Soviet Mission, met by Gorbachev. Outside press coverage.

2:35 PM Final plenary begins. Likely to be very brief discussion of bilateral issues (hopefully agreement already reached on cultural exchanges, consulates, civil air). Then turn back to major issues for the bulk of this meeting in effort to draw together elements of "Charter for future" of US-Soviet relations. Inter alia this would cover overall relationship, guidance to arms control negotiations, non-proliferation statement, regularizing regional experts meetings, new bilateral agreements, something on human rights even if it is just a disagreed statement (U.S. believes..., Soviet Union believes...), and possible agreement on summits in 1986 and 1987 in Washington and Moscow. All of this could be

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incorporated in a communique or handled individually by each side. Alternatively quite possible that this last session will be primarily a listing by both sides of its dissatisfaction with the other's positions and an effort to do damage limitation while putting Soviets clearly on notice that we can protect our interests regardless of the outcome of these meetings.

4:30 PM Conclude plenary and return to residence.

4:35 - Meet with senior advisors at residence to agree

5:00 PM on approach for press briefing; possibly still some work to do with Soviets, i.e. finalizing language on communique.

5:00 - Private Time

7:25 PM

Note: Around 5:30 pm press briefing by speakers and meeting participants: likely to require Shultz - McFarlane level as this may be our major briefing on substance of both days meetings.

7:25 PM President and Mrs Reagan depart for Swiss reception at La Gondale

7:30 PM Arrive at La Gondale. Photo op outside and more restricted pool at outset inside. Further opportunity to talk with Gorbachev and other members of the Soviet delegation, as well as showing to Soviets and Swiss whatever posture we want at this stage. If a bad outcome; quiet confidence and make our case. If a more positive outcome; care not to generate euphoria.

8:30 PM President and Mrs Reagan depart La Gondale before Gorbachevs to be on hand at residence to greet them.

8:35 PM Arrive at residence.

8:45 PM President and Mrs Reagan greet Gorbachevs. Reagans and Gorbachevs may be seated at one table together; this likely would be the first and only opportunity for the two couple to talk together (photo op of them at table after dessert). President's toast will depend in part on how talks have gone. Again if they have gone well, we should still be realistic about difficulties ahead but also outline our hopes. If talks have gone badly, the President should stress that this has been the norm for decades, we regret it but can manage and will not

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stop both protecting our interests and seeking ways to reach balanced agreements. If there is a break, it will clearly be because the Soviets were not willing to persevere.

10:45 PM President and Mrs. Reagan see off Gorbachevs.

Note: To get our message out in most immediate and powerful way, we might consider televised Presidential remarks to the American people and the world from fireside in residence between 11:00 pm and midnight. This would avoid one-day delay in personal presentation by the President if we were to wait until he arrives in Washington for his own statement.

Thursday, November 21st

11:45 AM Depart residence for airport.

12:00 PM Depart Geneva for Washington.

Note: Current plans call for no activity this morning in Geneva. It may be that we will have completed all work November 20th and have nothing further to do. However, it is possible that we will need or want to do some sort of activity, possibly a joint activity with Gorbachev or other members of the Soviet delegation. For example, if there is work on a (possible) communique which has to be done overnight November 20-21, and/or we want to highlight something special like mutual agreement to reciprocal summits in 1986 and 1987, and/or modest agreements we decided to have signed in Geneva, this could be done on the morning of November 21st. The President and Gorbachev could be present, or we could decide to have the two foreign ministers or others carry out these tasks. Or we could simply have press spokesmen release the news/documents.

3:00 PM (est.) Arrive Andrews

3:15 PM Arrive South Lawn. Possible statement.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

I. Objectives:

~~Your objectives for~~
 The primary objectives of your trip to Geneva are those set for your meetings with Gorbachev: to get to know him, to discuss the key issues that confront us, making clear our determination to defend our values, interests and Allies, and - if possible - to chart a course for the next few years which will bridge some of our differences and thus give an impetus to the various negotiations under way and perhaps establish additional fora for negotiation. A parallel objective will be to conduct the meeting in such a way to ~~strengthen~~ bolster your leadership at home and among the Allies. Both sets of objectives will be served by entering the meeting ~~with~~ with a clear and ambitious program for more stable and peaceful interaction with the Soviet Union on the basis of ~~our~~ Western democratic values. ~~What~~ The public

should ~~then~~ ^{clearly} understand, that your objectives
 you will be making every responsible effort
 to achieve a more stable and cooperative
 relationship, and if Garbaker is unable
~~to~~ or unwilling to reciprocate, then the
 fault lies with him and not with you.

If it is possible ~~to do so~~ ~~with~~
 before or during the meeting to
 conclude ~~modest~~ ~~or even~~ agreements
 or elements of agreement,
 which are in our interest, ~~and~~
~~announce~~ that of course ^{it} would ~~be~~
 be a constructive dimension.

II. Setting:

The meeting's location in Switzerland, one of the world's oldest democracies, ~~provides~~ gives you the opportunity to stress ~~the~~ the Western democratic heritage without seeming to challenge Gorbachev directly. ~~gratuitously provocative.~~ The fact is that we share values with the Swiss and other West Europeans which are not shared by the ^{Soviets.} Russians. Therefore, ~~by stressing~~ in your arrival ~~at~~ activities before the meeting ~~to~~ with Gorbachev you will have two days ~~before~~ in Geneva before the meetings with Gorbachev begin, and we have ^{suggested} scheduled some activities which will implicitly ~~make~~ highlight our common heritage of individual freedom, free enterprise, ^{democracy} and free enterprise. ~~In selecting~~ a chateau with a stunning view, ~~and~~ extensive grounds ~~and~~

a comfortable and elegant interior to receive
 Herbacher for your initial meetings. This will
 provide ~~an atmosphere~~ ideal surroundings to
 put Herbacher personally at ease when you
~~first meet him~~ during your first two
 meetings, and will be seen as a positive
 contrast to the ~~rather~~ formal ~~and~~ setting of

the Soviet
 hosted
 meetings in
 their mission.

A Dinner that evening will be at the
 Soviet mission in Geneva and is likely to
 be ~~a more formal affair~~ rather ~~formal~~ heavy on formality,
~~although we~~ though small (14 or 16 total).

The meeting the second day will also be
 at the Soviet mission, but you and
 Mrs. Reagan will have the opportunity to
 host the Herbachers at your villa that
 evening. ~~Arrangement~~ 7 rooms in the
 villa would ~~allow you to arrange a private~~ permit a private dinner for
 you, Mrs. Reagan and the Herbachers (with
 interpreter) in one room, and a separate table
 for the other guests in an adjoining one.

The morning of November 21 prior to your departure has been left open in case ~~it~~ you should decide to have a ~~few~~ some sort of concluding event, such as issuance of a joint communique or signing of a document.

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II. SETTING

The meeting's location in Switzerland, one of the world's oldest democracies, gives you the opportunity to stress the Western democratic heritage without seeming to challenge Gorbachev directly. The fact is that we share values with the Swiss and other West Europeans which are not shared by the Soviets. You will have two days in Geneva before the meetings with Gorbachev begin, and we have suggested some activities which will implicitly highlight our common heritage of individual freedom, democracy and free enterprise. You will have a chateau with a stunning view, extensive grounds and a comfortable and elegant interior to

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Dinner that evening will ^{be held} be at the Soviet mission in Geneva and is likely to be heavy on formality, though small (14 or 16 total). The meetings the second day will also be at the Soviet mission, but you and Mrs. Reagan will have the opportunity to host the Gorbachevs at your villa that evening. Arrangement of rooms in the villa would permit a private dinner for you, Mrs. Reagan and the Gorbachevs (with interpreters) in one room, and a separate table for the other guests in an adjoining one. The morning of November 21 prior to your departure has been left open in case you should decide to have some sort of concluding event, such as issuance of a joint communique or signing of a document.

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*Ø Geneva -
brief papers*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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