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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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**File Folder:** A.1.1 Geneva Meeting: NST

**Date:** 1/4/01

Box ~~2128~~ 45

Skinner/F00-008/1

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE   | DATE             | RESTRICTION   |
|-----------------------|---|------------------|---------------|
| 1. Form               | Transmittal Cover Sheet, (partial), 1 p.<br>P 6/15/01 NLSF00-008/1 #150   | n.d.             | B3            |
| <del>2. Chart</del>   | <del>re: US/Soviet Proposals, 4 p.</del>  | <del>11/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| 3. Report             | R 2/13/02 F00-008/1 #151<br>re: Impact of New US NST Proposal on Soviet Military..., 13 p.<br>D 6/15/01 NLSF00-008/1 #152 | 11/1/85          | B1, B3        |
| 4. Email              | Robert McFarlane to WRP (Pearson), re: Implementing the NSDD, 1 p.  | 10/30/85         | B1            |
| 5. Memo               | re: the U.S. Position: Nuclear and Space Talks, 5 p.  | n.d.             | B1            |
| 6. Draft Letter       | Reagan to Allied Heads of State, 5 p.   | n.d.             | B1            |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

CLASSIFICATION

*Shueva file -  
NST*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
CROSSMATCH ACTION SHEET

MESSAGE # 2816  
DATE TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE  
DEP EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

ACTION OFFICER

COMMENT OFFICER

INFO

PLAPSON

LINHARD  
WRIGHT  
KRAEMER  
STEINER  
MATLOCK  
COBB

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ACTION: CONCUR TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCARRY  
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: NOV 14

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

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CLEARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

CLEARED TO: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFICATION

WABIFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**B**

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *01/14/01*



DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS F00-008/1#150

By LoI, NARA, Date 7/11/01

MESSAGE NO. 002916 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 5


FROM: Wm. B. Staples ACDA/D/EX 632-4767 5933  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Comparison of US/Soviet NST Proposals

| TO: (Agency)          | DELIVER TO:                       | Extension             | Room No.                 |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| <del>TOP SECRET</del> | <del>Colonel David R. Brown</del> | <del>697-8388</del>   | <del>3E880</del>         |
| CIA                   | J. H. Rixse                       | <del>██████████</del> | <del>██████████</del> B3 |
| NSC                   | Capt. W. Wright                   | 395-5632              | 386 OEOB                 |
|                       | <u>MARTIN</u>                     |                       |                          |
|                       | <u>NSC</u>                        |                       |                          |

FOR CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS:



Copy to  
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CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

November 14, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

William F. Martin  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary, Department of State


Colonel David R. Brown  
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

J. W. Rixse  
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Chart for Public Use

The attached chart comparing past and present U.S. NST proposals and the Soviet counter-proposal has been prepared to serve as an unclassified primer for use with Congress and foreign governments and for other public affairs purposes. U.S. proposals are from unclassified official sources. The Soviet proposal is largely drawn from White House backgrounders and Qs and As.

14, 1985. Please contact Dennis McDowell at 632-7439 (5423 Secure) in ACDA/SP/SA, Room 4494, New State Building.

  
William B. Staples  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
as stated

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By dl NARA, Date 1/19/01

CONFIDENTIAL

| <u>ISSUE</u>             | <u>Earlier US Proposals</u>   | <u>Soviet Counterproposal</u>  | <u>New US Proposal</u>  |
|--------------------------|---|--|---|
| <u>START</u>             |   |  |   |
| <u>Delivery Vehicles</u> | 1250 ballistic missiles, 400 bombers (20 ALCV/ bomber).   | 50% reduction (for US: 1600 SNVs and medium-range missiles and aircraft includes i.e. FBF. USSR: 1250 SNVs.)   | 1250-1450 ballistic missiles; 1600-1800 SNVs; 350 bombers                                   |
| <u>Warheads</u>          | 5000 ballistic missile warheads   | 6000 total weapons (missile warheads and all weapons on delivery aircraft) 1600 warhead limit on any SNV type (i.e., 600 limit)  | 4500 ballistic missile warheads; 3000 ICBM warheads   |
| <u>ALCVs</u>             | Limited by Platform   | Ban  | 1500 aggregate limit  |
| <u>Forward System</u>    | No direct limits  | No direct limits   | No direct limits  |
| <u>Throw-weight</u>      | Indirect: 2500 warheads on ICBMs, 210 heavies & medium/110 heavies. Direct: equal limit. All appropriate avenues  | Statement that ballistic missile throw-weight would likely be reduced by 50%   | 50% reduction from current Soviet total.  |
| <u>Modernization</u>     | Fractionation limits: ICBM & ALCV - 10 RVs; FLEK - 14 RVs. RV weight limit of 225 KG per RV on new ICBM ballistic missiles, _____ kg on new single RV missiles          | Ban new types and kinds of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers not flight tested before an agreed date, or strictly limit them. Limit existing systems to maximum extent possible to prevent development of new type. | Fractionation limit same as earlier proposal  |
|                          | New heavy missiles, ship-based ballistic missiles, free floating launchers, seabed or ocean floor ballistic or cruise missile launchers, fractional bombardment systems | Long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes   | Same as earlier proposal. In addition, no new heavy ICBMs including FS-18 modernization ban |

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-008/1 #157

BY CA NARA, DATE 2/13/02

| <u>US</u>                      | <u>Earlier US Proposals</u>  | <u>Soviet Counterproposal</u>  | <u>New US Proposal</u>  |
|--------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Mobiles                        | -(If permitted, must be verifiable)  | Permit mobiles   | Ban mobiles   |
| Non-deployed missiles          | Limits on non-deployed missiles, test and training launchers, storage facilities, and ground support equipment; Ban rapid reload   |  | Same as earlier proposal  |
| Prowess                        | No   | Halt all work on space-strike arms concurrently terminate development, testing and development of new kinds/types of nuclear arms, and freeze existing nuclear arms at current quantitative levels                     | No  |
| CSPs                           | Advance notice of all ICBM & PLW missile launches & major exercises  |  | Same as earlier proposal  |
| Verification                   | Go beyond NTH when necessary. Agreed measures to supplement NTH, ban on impeding verification by agreed measures or NTH, ban encrypted telemetry, and guaranteed access. | NTH + some cooperative measures, if needed, to assist NTH:   | Same as earlier proposal  |
| <u>DF</u><br>Delivery vehicles | Ban all LRINF missiles world-wide or as an intermediate step equal levels on US and Soviet LRINF warheads  | Ultimately no US systems in Europe. As interim step freeze as of Sept., 1985 (209 US LRINF 243 USSR SS-20s) and then US reduce to 100-120 GLOs, Soviet SS-20's to match USSR (530 warheads) & US GLOs (120 warheads)=) | Ultimate Zero-Zero; freeze at 15 December 1985 level: 140 launchers, freedom-to-mix & locate; USSR: reduce to 140 SS-20s in Europe and proportional reduction in Asia systems |

| <u>ISSUE</u>                 | <u>Earlier US Proposal</u>  | <u>Soviet Counterproposal</u>  | <u>New US Proposal</u>   |
|------------------------------|---|--|--|
| <b>Warheads</b>              | Zero or equal levels world-wide; interim global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads (Nov. 83)   | US: 120 GLCM warheads.<br>USSR: 650 SS-20 warheads.<br>Equal reductions: US all 209 P-II's, GLCM. USSR: SS-4, SS-N-5 and SS-20 down to UK, FR 530 warheads | Could result in 420-450 warheads for each side in Europe, parallel reductions in Asia; US right to equal global level. |
| <b>Geographical</b>          | Global; US would not offset entire Soviet global deployment through US deployments in Europe; US would apportion reductions in deployments between PII and GLCM - (Sept 83) | European levels; freeze of SS-20s in Asia if no change in strategic situation  | European levels, right of global equality, proportional reduction of USSR Asian systems.                               |
| <b>Range:</b>                | LRINF missile systems (zero option); systems with a range between SS-12 & PII (currently none)  | No US medium range missile systems in Europe (ultimate).   | Zero-Zero (ultimate)   |
| <b>Systems Limited</b>       | LRINF land-based missiles (SS-20, -4, -5; PII and GLCM)   | US P-II's, GLCM; USSR SS-4, some SS-20 although elastic; aircraft later stage  | US P-II's and GLCM, USSR SS-4 and SS-20  |
| <b>US/French Systems</b>     | No compensation   | Soviet residual SS-20 warheads in Europe equal FR/UK (530) and can grow with UK/FR   | No compensation  |
| <b>Modernisation Limits</b>  | 3 RVs and range constraints   | not dealt with   | Same as earlier proposal   |
| <b>Inclusion of aircraft</b> | Focus initially on LRINF missiles; prepared to consider aircraft (Sept 83)  | no specific proposal, US INF aircraft included in START  | Same as earlier proposal   |

| <u>ISSUE</u>                  | <u>Earlier US Proposal</u>   | <u>Soviet Counterproposal</u>   | <u>New US Proposal</u>  |
|-------------------------------|--|---|---|
| <u>FRINF Limits</u>           | Global freeze on numbers of SS-12/22, -73 and DF PI  | halt measures taken in response to US 1983 deployments                                    | Appropriate constraints on FRINF missiles. US right to equal SRINF orally   |
| <u>CMS</u>                    | notification of all LUNF ballistic missile launches  | not dealt with  | Same as earlier proposal  |
| <u>Verification</u>           | Cooperative measures to supplement NDM, including on-site inspection                       |   | Cooperative measures, if needed, to assist NDM  |
| <u>Defense &amp; Security</u> |  |   |   |
| <u>Defense</u>                | Increased reliance. Discuss Cooperative Transition.  | Ban wide-spread territorial defenses (ground or spaced based) as called for in ABM Treaty | Increased reliance. Seek Soviet agreement to explore cooperative transition. "Open Labs Initiative" (regular reciprocal technical exchanges and visits to facilities) |
| <u>SDI Research</u>           | SDI research is and will continue to be consistent with ABM Treaty and therefore permitted | Ban SDI; undercuts ABM Treaty and part of first-strike strategy                           | Professional SDI research is and will continue to be consistent with ABM Treaty and therefore permitted.  |
| <u>ABM Treaty</u>             | Reverse the erosion; correct Soviet non-compliance; discuss offense-defense relationship.  | Continuation of Treaty limits; prerequisite for offensive reductions                      | Same as earlier proposal  |
| <u>Space Arms</u>             | Consider strictest, verifiable ABM limits on deployed missiles                             | Immediate moratorium, and ban all space-strike arms and comprehensive ABM ban             | Same as earlier proposal  |



~~Next to~~

For Geneva files

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

For release at 4 p.m. today.

Please let me know right away if  
any problems.

Steve

Steve



State Department Bulletin  
March 1985

**JOINT STATEMENT,  
GENEVA,  
JAN. 8, 1985**

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between George P. Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms. The sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.

The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side, divided into three groups. The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the new negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

**JOINT STATEMENT,  
GENEVA,  
JAN. 8, 1985**


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Правда  
Январь 9, 1985



Во время встречи.

Телефото Г. Надеждина (ТАСС).

# СОВМЕСТНОЕ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЕ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ

В соответствии с ранее достигнутой договоренностью 7—8 января 1985 г. в Женеве состоялась встреча между членом Политбюро ЦК КПСС, первым заместителем Председателя Совета Министров СССР, министром иностранных дел СССР А. А. Громыко и государственным секретарем США Дж. П. Шульцем.

В ходе встречи был рассмотрен вопрос о предмете и целях предстоящих советско-американских переговоров по ядерным и космическим вооружениям.

Стороны согласны в том, что предметом переговоров будет комплекс вопросов, касающихся космических и ядерных вооружений — стратегических и средней дальности, — причем все эти вопросы будут рассматриваться и решаться во взаимосвязи.

Целью переговоров будет выработка эффективных договоренностей, направленных на предотвращение гонки вооружений в космосе и ее прекращение на Земле, на ограничение и сокращение ядерных вооружений, на укрепление

стратегической стабильности. Переговоры будут вестись одной делегацией с каждой стороны, разделенной на три группы.

В конечном итоге, по мнению сторон, предстоящие переговоры, как и вообще усилия в области ограничения и сокращения вооружений, должны привести к ликвидации ядерного оружия полностью и повсюду.

Дата начала переговоров и место их проведения будут согласованы по дипломатическим каналам в течение месяца.

## Для участия в торжествах

КАБУЛ, 8. (ТАСС). По приглашению ЦК Народно-демократической партии Афганистана...

в ДРА Ф. А. Табеев, член ЦК КПСС В. Г. Ломоносов.

## Развивая связи

ГАВАНА, 8. (ТАСС). Первый

## Прием посла

8 января кандидат в члены Политбюро ЦК КПСС, первый заместитель Председателя Президиума Верховного Совета СССР В. В. Кузнецов принял в Кремле посла КНР в СССР Ян Шоучжи на по его просьбе в связи с окончательным отъездом из Советского Союза.

(ТАСС)

## Прибытие делегации

МАНАГУА, 8. (ТАСС). В парагуанскую столицу прибыла делегация СССР во главе с заместителем Председателя Президиума Верховного Совета СССР А. С. Барнаукасом. Она примет участие в мероприятиях, связанных со вступлением на пост президента Республики Николас Д. Ортеги.

01

## Возвращение в Москву

8 января из Пномпеня в Москву возвратился заместитель Председателя Совета Министров СССР И. И. Бодюл, принимавший участие в похоронах члена Политбюро ЦК НРПК, Председателя Совета Министров НРК Ч...

(ТАСС)

## Празднику посвящают

ПНОМПЕНЬ, 8. (ТАСС). Здесь состоялось торжественное собрание общественности кампучийской столицы, посвященное национальному празднику страны — шестой годовщине освобождения Кампучии от полпотовского режима геноцида. Выступивший на нем Генеральный секретарь ЦК НРПК, Председатель Государственного совета НРК Хенг Самрия отметил, что народная Кампучия уверенно идет по пути строительства новой жизни. Положение в стране полностью контролируется правительством НРК, которое является единственным законным представителем кампучийского народа, избранным им путем свободных демократических выборов.

November 13, 1985

FACT SHEET  
New U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions

On November 1, at President Reagan's instruction, U.S. negotiators at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva, presented a new set of proposals for significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. This followed the presentation by the Soviet Union in late September of a counterproposal which was in response to the concrete reduction offers which the U.S. had put forward at the outset of the negotiations.

President Reagan has stressed that the U.S. has four main objectives in seeking an effective nuclear arms reduction agreement:

- deep cuts;
- no first-strike advantage;
- defensive research, because defense is much safer than offense; and
- no cheating.

This fact sheet summarizes these latest developments in the negotiations.

Soviet Counterproposal

U.S. officials previously described a number of elements in the Soviet counterproposal of late September which would be unacceptable to the U.S. and its Allies, and explained how the effects of that counterproposal would be inequitable and destabilizing.

For example, Soviet definition of strategic delivery vehicles would cover U.S. LRINF missiles and "medium-range" nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, in Asia, and on all of our aircraft carriers, while about 2000 comparable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as 300 Backfire bombers, would not be limited. In addition, the Soviets propose limits on "nuclear charges," defined to include gravity bombs and short-range bomber weapons, which must face unconstrained defenses. Given sizeable and unconstrained Soviet defenses against U.S. retaliatory bomber forces, and the fundamental

differences between bomber and missile forces, as well as other U.S.-Soviet asymmetries, the U.S. cannot accept a direct limit on gravity bombs and SRAMs carried by heavy bombers (as we do for missile warheads).

Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviets have accepted the principle of deep reductions is a welcome development if equitably applied. It underscores the strength of basic U.S. negotiating position, value of united Alliance, and soundness of strategy of pursuing this position in patient and determined manner.

The President is committed to exploring every opportunity to achieve equitable and verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Accordingly, President directed that additional U.S. proposals be advanced, building on concrete reductions proposals made earlier by the U.S., and on positive elements of Soviet counterproposal. We thereby seek to establish genuine process of give-and-take.

#### Strategic Offensive Forces

Over three years ago, in May 1982, we proposed a cut of about one-half in the strategic ballistic missiles (both land- and sea-based) of the U.S. and USSR, and a cut of about one-third in the warheads on such missiles.

-- In response to the Soviet counterproposal, we could accept concept of 50% reduction in strategic offensive forces, but we:

- cannot apply this concept in unequal and destabilizing ways;
- cannot abandon support for Allies; and
- cannot renounce right to conduct SDI research, which is in full conformity with ABM Treaty.

-- Thus the new U.S. proposal builds on the 50% reduction concept in constructive and equitable way.

- Reductions to limit of 4500 on reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs and SLBMs, about 50% below current levels
- Reduction to limit of 3000 on RVs carried by ICBMs, about 50% below the current Soviet level and roughly halfway between our earlier proposal for a limit of 2500 and their proposed limit of 3600

- 50% reduction in highest overall strategic ballistic missile throwweight of either side; in this case, from Soviet level of 11.9 million pounds (U.S. has 4.4 million pounds)

- Contingent upon acceptance of RV and throwweight limits, we would accept equal limit of 1500 on number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers, about 50% below planned U.S. deployment levels.

-- U.S. cannot agree to one common limit on ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. It is inequitable to place in a single category ballistic missile warheads, which arrive at their targets in minutes and face few defenses, and bomber weapons, which take hours to arrive on target and also face sizeable defenses.

-- But if Soviets were to accept proposed 4500 RVs limit along with proposed 1500 ALCMs limit, it would result in reduction to a total of 6000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs on each side.

-- With respect to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), U.S. has proposed:

- reduction in strategic ballistic missiles to limit of 1250-1450, about 40-45% below the current higher Soviet level

- in this context, U.S. could accept further reduction of heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared to our earlier proposal of 400), about 40% below the current U.S. SALT-accountable level.

-- For reasons similar to those stated for RVs and ALCMs, U.S. cannot agree to Soviet proposal to include in a single aggregate strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

-- However, if agreement reached on range of 1250-1450 for ICBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy bomber limits of 350, would result in reduction to a total of strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers of between 1600 and 1800.

-- U.S. proposal also contains following elements:

- ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and the modernization of existing heavy missiles, due to their destabilizing character



- ban on all mobile ICBMs, because of inherent verification difficulties
- "build-down" as suggested means of implementing agreed reductions

#### Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

-- Previous U.S. proposals remain on table. U.S. continues to prefer total elimination of entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles.

-- We also have made following new proposal as interim step toward this goal:

- U.S. would cap LRINF missile launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed on December 31, 1985 (140 PII and GLCM) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to same number

- There would be freedom to mix between systems deployed as of December 31, 1985, but mix would be subject for discussion. (Could agree on mix giving U.S. approximately equal number at around 420 to 450 LRINF missile warheads in NATO Europe, based on 4 warheads/GLCM launcher, 1 warhead/Pershing II launcher, and 3 warheads/SS-20 launcher)

- Soviets required to reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (outside range of NATO Europe) by same proportion as reduction of launchers within range of NATO Europe

- End result would be equal global LRINF warhead limits

- Appropriate constraints also applied to SRINF missiles

#### Defense and Space

-- U.S. is making clear once again that we are committed to SDI research program as permitted by, and in compliance with ABM Treaty.

-- We seek Soviet commitment to explore with us now how cooperative transition could be accomplished, should new defensive technologies prove feasible.

-- Also proposing now that Soviets join us in "open laboratories" arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other's strategic defense research programs, and provide opportunities for visiting associated research facilities and laboratories.

#### Verification and Compliance

-- U.S. continues to stress critical importance of agreeing on effective verification means so as to be able to assess with confidence compliance with provisions of all agreements resulting from the negotiations. Verification is more important now than it ever was before, given Soviet conduct related to arms control over the last six years.

-- U.S. continues to stress a need for the Soviets to take necessary steps to correct current instances of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements. Non-compliance is politically corrosive and militarily real.

-- Soviet actions since the signing of SALT II have impeded U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and politically damaged the foundations of strategic arms control. Restoring compliance is a critical step.

-- Soviet Union must alter current practices which obstruct U.S. verification of compliance.

-- One initial step is for Soviets to alter current encryption of telemetry and revert to practices with regard to telemetry in use at time of signing of SALT II. This is militarily important in its own right, but its political significance is even greater.

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES *aka 1/4/01*

From: NSREL --CPUA Date and time 10/30/85 11:59:27  
To: NSWFM --CPUA ROBERT MCFARLANE NSWRP --CPUA ROBERT MCFARLANE  
NOTE FROM: ROBERT E. LINHARD  
SUBJECT: ~~REDACTED~~  
Mr. McFarlane,

Assuming that we soon will have a signed NSDD, we have provided to Wilma a distribution letter (standard) for your signature. The soonest we get this out the better we will be. This done, suggest the following additional actions.

-- Once we have a signed NSDD, we will call in Jim Timbie (Arms Control Support Group representative from STATE) and provide to him a copy of the NSDD and a first cut of a Presidential letter to allied heads-of-state. We would task him to work this within STATE and provide a version of such a letter in cable form for White House review/approval by 6 pm for release this evening.

~~REDACTED~~  
~~REDACTED~~  
~~REDACTED~~

-- We would also have Nozenzo (ACDA backstopping committee chairman) come in and get our cut at instructions for the US NST del and ask him to prepare in message form for White House review/release also by 6 pm this evening.

-- We would inform Nitze's office that an NSDD is forthcoming and that he should get it from SecState and prepare to brief the Congressional observers on a confidential basis tomorrow.

-- Finally, we would call Ron in Geneva, tell him to tell Max, John and Mike to expect instructions in the morning and ask Max to seek an extension as soon as possible.

To execute the above, all I need is an OK on the approach and a signed NSDD.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
*aka* 1/19/01

*Jack -*

*See the above and Bud's response next under.*

*I have attached:*

- 1) NSDD (PLEASE HOLD CLOSELY)*
- 2) our draft instructions*
- 3) our cut a letter to allies.*

*Timbie will work with selected people at State on a close hold basis to polish letter to allied leaders. State already has their own draft.*

*Timbie says State also has a draft letter to Corbachev. Will you press on this? Give me a call. Corbachev letter should go out tomorrow COB so after allied letter but before (same day) tabling in Geneva*  
*Bob*

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SYSTEM II  
91126

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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Upon Removal of Attachment

October 30, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-195)  
The U.S. Position: Nuclear and Space Talks (S)

The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the NST negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-195). (S)

In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD-195 document be held by the addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

  
Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment  
NSDD-195 (S)

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1987  
By du NARA, Date 1/4/01

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 30, 1985

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 195

The U.S. Position: Nuclear and Space Talks (U)

Four weeks ago, at the Nuclear and Space arms control talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a counterproposal in response to the detailed proposal for offensive arms reductions introduced by the United States last March. The fact that the Soviets have finally put forward a counterproposal that seems to accept the principle of deep reductions is certainly a welcome development. It underscores the soundness of the basic U.S. negotiating position. It also demonstrates that our strategy of pursuing this principled position in a patient and determined manner, complemented by the solidarity demonstrated by the NATO Alliance over the last five years, has paid off. (U)

My upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev provides a rare opportunity to take a fresh start at improving the overall U.S./Soviet relationship. In this context, the presentation of a positive Soviet arms reduction counterproposal could not have come at a better time. Unfortunately, the Soviet counterproposal that was presented is both flawed and largely self-serving. It contains a number of elements which are clearly unacceptable both to the United States and to our Allies, and which limit the utility of this counterproposal in moving both the U.S. and the Soviet Union towards an equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreement. The Soviet offer is designed to present the promise of significant, equitable reductions, but that promise is left unfulfilled. Their counterproposal is carefully crafted to result in unbalanced reductions which would permit the Soviet Union to retain major advantages in weapons, ballistic missile throw-weight, and nuclear delivery systems. (U)

For example, the Soviet counterproposal would limit U.S. systems that are critical to the defense of our allies in NATO and Asia, without limiting comparable Soviet systems that threaten these same allies and friends. The Soviet offer also would block needed U.S. strategic force modernization critical to maintaining the credibility of our deterrent, while allowing ongoing Soviet modernization programs to proceed. Finally, it continues to demand a halt to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research in spite of the fact that the Soviets themselves have been deeply involved for years in strategic defense programs, including advanced research in many of the very same areas now being explored by our SDI program. (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority E.O. 12958, J. Saunders, NSC 12/13/96  
BY [signature], NARA, Date 1/10/01

Nevertheless, I am determined to ensure that every opportunity to achieve equitable and verifiable reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals is exploited fully and to the best of our ability. Our challenge is to attempt to find, within this flawed Soviet counterproposal, seeds that we can nourish in the hope of promptly adding needed momentum to serious give-and-take on the critical issues facing us in the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I have decided that the U.S. delegation should present the following U.S. proposals to the Soviet delegation prior to the end of the current round of the Nuclear and Space Talks. (U)

Strategic Arms Reductions (U)

In the area of strategic arms, Ambassador Tower should make it clear that while the previous U.S. negotiating position remains on the table, the United States agrees with the objective of a fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive forces. However, the United States cannot agree to a Soviet approach which would have the U.S. abandon its allies and our legitimate right to SDI research. Also, the U.S. cannot agree to apply the principle of fifty percent reductions in ways that are destabilizing. Therefore, the U.S. proposes the following approach which appropriately builds upon the fifty percent reduction principle contained in the Soviet counterproposal. (U)

Strategic Weapons. With regard to strategic ballistic missile warheads, ballistic missile throwweight, and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), the U.S. is prepared to propose the following: (U)

-- Reductions to an equal limit of 4,500 on the number of warheads carried on U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, which would result in roughly a fifty percent reduction in this category of weapons. (U)

-- Reductions to an equal limit of 3,000 on the number of warheads carried by U.S. and Soviet ICBMs. While higher than the current U.S. proposed limit of 2,500 on such warheads, which the U.S. continues to prefer, this would represent roughly a fifty percent reduction from the current level of warheads on Soviet ICBM forces. (U)

-- A fifty percent reduction in the maximum overall strategic ballistic missile throwweight possessed by either side (in this case by Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs). (U)

-- Contingent upon the fifty percent reductions in the warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs represented by the 4,500 warhead limit, and upon a fifty percent reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight, the U.S. would accept an equal limit of 1,500 on the number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and

Soviet heavy bombers. This would represent roughly a fifty percent reduction in the number of ALCMs currently planned by the United States. (C)

Given the sizeable and unconstrained Soviet defenses against the U.S. retaliatory bomber force, the United States cannot accept any direct limit on the number of gravity bombs and Short Range Attack Missiles (SRAM) carried by heavy bombers. The U.S. also cannot agree to a proposal which aggregates under one common limit ballistic missile warheads, which arrive on their targets in minutes largely unhampered by defenses, and ALCMs, which take hours to arrive at their targets and face sizeable defenses enroute. However, if the Soviet Union were to accept the U.S. proposed 4,500 limit on the warheads carried on U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs and the U.S. proposed 1,500 limit on long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers, this would result in a reduction in the overall number of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs to an equal total of 6,000. (C)

Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. With respect to the numbers of U.S. and Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, the U.S. would propose the following: (U)

-- While still preferring the lower level associated with our previous position, the U.S. could accept reductions to an equal limit on the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) of between 1250 to 1450 on both sides. This would result in a forty to fifty percent reduction from current, higher Soviet ballistic missile levels. (C)

-- In the context of an appropriate agreement, the U.S. could accept a further reduction from the previous U.S. proposed equal limits on U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers of 400 to an equal limit of 350 heavy bombers on each side. This 350 limit would result in roughly a forty percent reduction from U.S. SALT accountable heavy bomber levels. (C)

As with the case with strategic ballistic missile warhead and ALCM limits, and for the same basic reasons, the U.S. cannot agree to a proposal which aggregates under one common limit ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. However, if agreement were reached in the 1,250 to 1,450 range on U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs and on a 350 limit on U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers, this would result in a reduction in the number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to an equal total between 1,600 and 1,800. (C)

Other Elements. In addition to the above, the following additional elements should also be placed on the negotiating table: (U)

-- Given their especially destabilizing character, the U.S. proposes a ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles. The U.S. would intend this ban to include a ban on all

modernization of the existing Soviet SS-18 ICBM force. (e)

-- Given the increasing difficulty posed in verifying the number and status of mobile ICBMs, and in determining with certainty that any type of mobile ICBM carries only one warhead, the U.S. also proposes a ban on all mobile ICBMs. (e)

-- To ensure that the reductions proposed above promptly take effect, the U.S. delegation should reiterate the U.S. "build-down" proposal. In doing so, the delegation is authorized to adjust the level of ballistic missile warheads to which the build-down would proceed to 4,500 to synchronize this element of the build-down mechanism with the approach towards strategic ballistic missile warheads outlined in this decision. (e)

Having presented the above approach, Ambassador Tower should inform the Soviet delegation that we are prepared to consider Soviet counterproposals based either upon the new elements which we will have just presented or on our previous position, which remains on the table for consideration by the Soviet Union. (e)

#### Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (U)

In the area of intermediate nuclear forces, Ambassador Glitman should make it clear that the previous U.S. negotiating position remains on the table. He should also restate the U.S. preference for a U.S./Soviet zero-zero outcome and the U.S. continued commitment to ultimately achieving the total elimination of the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles. At the same time, as one potential interim step towards this goal, he should propose an approach containing the following elements: (e)

-- The United States would be prepared to cap U.S. LRINF missile deployments in Europe at their December 31, 1985, level (140 Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) launchers) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce Soviet SS-20 missile launchers within range of Europe to that same launcher number. (e)

-- Under this approach, there would be freedom to mix systems of the types deployed by December 31, 1985 (for the U.S., Pershing II and GLCM; for the U.S.S.R., the SS-20) with the exact mix, which could result in an equal warhead level on U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe and SS-20s within range of Europe of 420-450, a subject for discussion. (e)

-- The Soviet Union would also be required to reduce the number of SS-20 launchers in Asia (outside range of Europe) from December 31, 1985, levels in a manner proportional to Soviet SS-20 launcher reductions within range of Europe. (e)



-- The end result would be that both sides would be limited to an equal global LRINF missile warhead number. (C)

-- Appropriate constraints should also be applied to Shorter-range INF (SRINF) missiles. (C)

-- Should the Soviet Union raise the issue of limitations on LRINF aircraft, the U.S. delegation is authorized to respond that the U.S. would be prepared to discuss constraints on comparable LRINF aircraft on both sides in the context of an appropriate agreement. (S)

In presenting the above approach, the U.S. delegation should protect the following:

-- the U.S. right to relocate U.S. LRINF missiles permitted under the agreement within Europe as decided by the U.S. and its NATO allies;

-- the U.S. right to equal global LRINF missile warhead numbers, whether or not this right is immediately exercised;

-- the U.S. right to convert Pershing II missiles reduced under the terms of the agreement to Pershing IB missiles; and,

-- the U.S. right to match Soviet Shorter-range INF (SRINF) missiles in range of Europe and on a global basis, as appropriate. (TS)

Having presented the above approach, Ambassador Glitman should inform the Soviet delegation that we are prepared to consider Soviet counterproposals based upon the new elements presented or on our previous position which remains on the table for consideration by the Soviet Union. (C)

#### Defense and Space (U)

In the Defense and Space area, Ambassador Kampelman should once again make it clear that the U.S. is committed to pursue the U.S. SDI program as permitted by, and in full compliance with, the ABM Treaty. In addition, the following elements should be added to the U.S. position in the Defense and Space area: (U)

-- Propose and seek Soviet commitment to explore with the U.S. how a cooperative transition to more reliance on defenses could be accomplished. (C)

-- Propose that the Soviet Union join the U.S. in an "open laboratories" initiative. Under this initiative, both sides would commit to provide, on a regular and reciprocal basis, briefings on each others strategic defense research programs and

opportunities to visit associated research facilities and laboratories. (S)

Compliance and Verification (U)

In addition to the above proposals in the individual negotiating areas, Ambassador Kampelman should stress the criticality of the related issues of verification and compliance with existing agreements to progress in reaching any future agreements. In this context, he should note that the U.S. continues to insist that Soviet Union take the necessary steps to correct their current instances of non-compliance with existing agreements. He should also suggest that the Soviet Union alter certain of their current practices which hamper U.S. verification of their compliance. One such step which the Soviet Union could take would be to alter its current telemetry encryption and revert to practices with regard to telemetry in use at the time of the signing of SALT II. (C)

Presenting the U.S. Proposals (U)

The U.S. proposals outlined above should be initially tabled at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva by Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and Glitman before the end of the current round. The U.S. delegation should seek Soviet agreement to extend the current round sufficiently to permit a full presentation of the new U.S. proposals and to permit the Soviet delegation to seek additional information as needed to ensure that the Soviet Union fully understands these new U.S. proposals prior to the U.S. and Soviet delegations departing Geneva. (S)

Ronald Reagan



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