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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: A.1 Geneva Meeting: Arms Control General

Date: 1/4/01

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Skinner/F00-008/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Paper	re: Arms Control Strategy for Geneva Meeting, 2 p.	n.d.	B1
2. Memo	R 2/13/02 F00-008/1 #145 Bill Wright, Bob Linhard to Robert McFarlane, re: NSPG Meeting, Thursday, November 14, Arms Control Issues, 1 p.	11/13/85	B1
3. Talking Pts	National Security Planning Group November 14, 1985, Arms Control Issues for Geneva Meeting, Draft Talking Points for Mr. McFarlane, 12 p.	n.d.	B1
4. Paper	re: Nuclear and Space Talks, 17 p.	n.d.	B1
5. Paper	re: Nuclear and Space Talks, 4 p.	n.d.	B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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Arms Control Strategy for Geneva Meeting

JP

-- Preparations for Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meetings about to accelerate. Need your guidance before we begin detailed work on substance.

-- Key issue is how we use the weeks ahead to try for progress on the main arms control issues. We should use the Shevardnadze meetings to lay the groundwork for a positive outcome with Gorbachev and to take the initiative away from Moscow on arms control. If the Soviets respond, we may be able to move toward achievement of your arms control agenda. If not, we'll be in a better position to deal with their propaganda.

-- Our leverage is probably as high now as it will ever be.

- o Gorbachev's expressions of willingness to negotiate seriously have been accompanied by private hints that Soviets are looking at ways to break negotiating log-jam; this may be simple propaganda, but...
- o His ambitious economic recovery plans would be eased by infusions of resources on which military has traditionally had first claim;
- o While he cannot afford to be seen as giving anything away, he may be willing to put his prestige behind subsequent efforts to achieve concrete agreements if he can return from Geneva with an outcome he can claim could lead to an enhancement of Soviet security and free up scarce resources.

-- We won't have time to negotiate a detailed agreement by November; but we might be able to agree on elements which could serve as guidelines for our negotiators.

-- The elements we would need:

- o Soviet commitment to strategically significant reductions in the threat to the survivability of either side's land-based deterrent;
- o Acknowledgement that the ABM Treaty permits both sides to pursue SDI-type research and arrival at an agreed interpretation of the Treaty's definitions and provisions (in so doing we would lay down markers to

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preserve the option of a cooperative transition toward greater reliance on defensive systems -- and ultimately, toward complete elimination of nuclear weapons -- should future research demonstrate the validity of such an approach);

- o Treatment of INF in a way which meets US and allied concerns;
- o Satisfaction of our most serious verification and compliance concerns (including the Krasnoyarsk radar issue).

-- The current Soviet bottom line -- that offensive reductions must follow banning of SDI -- is clearly unacceptable to us.

-- But based on Gorbachev's public statements and private Soviet hints, he might accept guidelines to our negotiations which would call for simultaneous addressal of the offensive limitations of interest to us and the defensive limitations of interest to both sides, including a "recommitment" on our part to the ABM Treaty as currently written. (Again, we would need Soviet concurrence in interpreting such a step as ensuring the permissibility of SDI research and resolution of the Krasnoyarsk and other radar issues).

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NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY GROUP MEETING
Thursday, November 14, 1985
Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00

GENEVA ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

Agenda


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|------|--|-------------------------------------|
| I. | Introduction and
Overview of Arms
Control Issues | Robert C. McFarlane
(15 minutes) |
| II. | Discussion | All Participants
(40 minutes) |
| III. | Summary | Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes) |

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY GROUP
Thursday, November 14, 1985
Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00

ARMS CONTROL ISSUES FOR GENEVA

List of Participants

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chief of Staff to the President
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Colonel Robert Linhard (NSC Staff)
Captain William H. Wright (NSC Staff)

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