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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Henkel to Guests and Staff, re: Updated Information for the Trip of the President to Geneva...., (pag 2 only, partial), 1 p.	11/14/85	B7

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CLASSIFIED FOR JACK F. MATLOCK  
&  
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GENEVA FILES

VISITS OF USSR OFFICIALS TO THE U.S.

9/25-28/85 - SHEVARDNADZE VISIT TO US.

MEETINGS WITH USSR OFFICIALS

REAGAN & GORBACHEV MEETING IN GENEVA NOV. 19-20

MISC. ARRANGEMENTS - LOGISTICS ETC.  
MISC. CABLES  
WORKING FILE: BRIEFING PAPERS FOR THE PRESIDENT ON USSR  
THEMSES FOR TALKING POINTS

COORDINATING GROUPS FOR GENEVA MEETING

COORDINATING COMMITTEE

NSDD 183  
AGENDAS  
ATTENDEES  
CALENDAR/SCHEDULE  
HANDOUTS  
SUMMARIES/HIGHLIGHTS  
TASKERS

U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS  
ARMS CONTROL  
REGIONAL, ETC.  
BILATERALS  
HUMAN RIGHTS

CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES

COORDINATING GROUP: CONGRESSIONAL  
(CODELS TO USSR -BRIEFINGS/DEBRIEFINGS)

COORDINATING COMMITTEE: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

ADVANCE TEAM - SEPTEMBER 12-18, 1985

SCHEDULE OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITIES  
SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES FOR MRS. REAGAN  
SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES FOR MRS. GORBACHEV

SCHEDULE OF CABINET LEVEL ACTIVITIES  
(SHULTZ, ETC.)

SPEECHES/PUBLIC STATEMENTS

REAGAN - SPEECHES/PUBLIC STATEMENTS  
GORBACHEV - SPEECHES/PUBLIC STATEMENTS

GORBACHEV - (INTELLIGENCE REPORTS & BIO ANALYSES)  
SOVIET PROPAGANDA PAPERS

EUR REACTION TO GENEVA MEETING

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GORBACHEV - (INTELLIGENCE REPORTS & BIO ANALYSES)  
SOVIET PROPAGANDA PAPERS

EUR REACTION TO GENEVA MEETING

FILES TO TAKE TO GENEVA

I. AGENDA

II. NSDD - 194 - THEMES AND PERCEPTIONS FOR NOVEMBER MTG WITH GORBACHEV

A. ARMS CONTROL

1. ARMS CONTROL GENERAL
  - 1.1 NST
  - 1.2. NPT;CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
SALT II;CDE;MBFR;  
RISK REDUCTION; NAVAL VISITS ETC.

2. HUMAN RIGHTS

3. REGIONAL ISSUES

4. BILATERAL ISSUES

5. POSSIBLE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

- A. CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK
- B. NORTHERN AIR SAFETY
- C. CIVIL AVIATION
- D. EXCHANGE INITIATIVES
- E. JOINT FUSION REACTOR PROJECT
- F. ENVIROMENTAL COOPERATION
- G. EXCHANGES AGREEMENT
- H. MARITIME BOUNDARY DISCUSSIONS

6. TALKING POINTS

B. SESSIONS & LIST OF PARTICIPANTS  
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS & CALENDAR

TUESDAY , NOVEMBER 19, 1985

1. 10:00AM-12:15PM TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19 MORNING PLENARY SESSION

MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT FLEUR D'EAU  
GENERAL, U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

2. 2:30PM-4:35PM TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19 AFTERNOON PLENARY  
SESSION

MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT FLEUR D'EAU  
GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

3. 8:00PM-10:05PM FUNCTION AT SOVIET MISSION

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1985

4. 9:55AM-12:15PM MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT SOVIET MISSION  
REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES
5. 2:15PM-4:30pPM MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT SOVIET MISSION  
FINAL SESSION
6. 5:30PM PRESS BRIEFING
7. 8:15PM-10:15 FUNCTION AT THE RESIDENCE

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

8. 4:15PM-6:00PM BRUSSELS TALKS

NATO

C. BRIEFING BOOKS

D. BIOS & OTHER INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

- . 1. MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
2. BIOS

E. PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE &

1. PRES/GORBACHEV CORRESPONDENCE
2. PRES/SHEVARDNADZE CORRESPONDENCE
3. PRES/CHERNENKO CORRESPONDENCE
4. PRES/ANDROPOV CORRESPONDENCE
  
5. MEMCONS - PRES W/GROMYKO
6. MEMCONS - PRES W/SHCHERBITSKY
7. MEMCONS - PRES W/SHEVARDNADZE

F. MEMCONS - SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE HELSINKI MTG

1. MEMCON - SHULTZ/GROMYKO -JAN 85 GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT
2. MEMCON - SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE HELSINKI MTG
3. MEMCON - SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE NEW YORK MTG

G. PRESS KIT - ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE STATEMENTS

1. COPIES OF TOASTS
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3. BACKGROUND POINTS FOR SPEECHES
  
4. EUROPEAN PRESS REACTION

H. COMMUNIQUE

1. MATERIAL FOR COMMUNIQUE
2. U.S.-USSR SUMMIT MEETINGS 1955-1979

I. JOINT STATEMENT

1. MATERIAL FOR JOINT STATEMENT

J. CHRONS

MISCELLANEOUS CHRONS

K. ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

SCHEDULE

MISCELLANEOUS ADMIN/TRAVEL INFO

L. SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES



# Those Who Have Gorbachev's Ear

*Despite power shifts, the Old Guard still guides the boss*



When Mikhail Gorbachev sits across from Ronald Reagan in Geneva, he will be flanked by many of the same men who have guided the Soviet Union's relations with the U.S. since Leonid Brezhnev's time. Unlike Brezhnev and some of Gorbachev's other predecessors, however, the General Secretary is unlikely to consult his advisers in public. During meetings with foreign dignitaries, in his August interview with the editors of *TIME*, and in October's visit to France, the new Soviet boss has allowed the men at his side only an occasional whispered suggestion.

Apparently well prepared in advance, Gorbachev speaks at length without looking at notes, but takes advantage of translation time to glance down at a tidy stack of briefing papers, underlined with red, blue, yellow and green felt-tip markers. As Gorbachev was answering a question on Israel during his Paris press conference, one adviser half rose, cupped a hand to his ear to hear what was said, then sat down with a satisfied look when the boss had finished. The Soviet leader will presumably use his staff in a similar way at the summit, referring to their briefing papers for guidance but summarizing the Soviet position succinctly and accurately on his own.

Although he has not appreciably altered basic Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev has made a key change at the top. A notable absence at the summit is apt to be Andrei Gromyko, a fixture of U.S.-Soviet negotiations for four decades, who has been eased out of the Foreign Minister's job into the largely ceremonial position of President of the U.S.S.R. Although other veterans are likely to follow Gromyko out the door, many have survived previous shifts in Soviet leadership by developing expertise that successive leaders have found invaluable.

The new look in Soviet diplomacy is personified by Gromyko's replacement, the genial and soft-spoken Eduard Shevardnadze, 57. A novice at foreign policy, he speaks with much less knowledge and authority than his predecessor and seems to be mainly a pleasant and able messenger for his boss. While Gromyko tended to deliver harsh lectures to Western diplomats, Shevardnadze offers competent, but far from exhaustive, position summaries. A Communist apparatchik in his home republic of Georgia, Shevardnadze rarely traveled abroad until he was tapped by the party leadership for his present post last July 2. But he has gained visible confidence in recent visits to Helsinki, Paris and twice to the U.S. Says one senior Western diplomat: "The guiding hand of Gorbachev can be seen behind him."

One of Gorbachev's most important foreign policy advisers is Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, 67. So self-effacing that visitors sometimes mistake him for a secretary, he advised Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko on foreign affairs, probably wielding more influence in this role than anyone other than Gromyko. Largely out of sight in Gorbachev's early tenure, Alexandrov has since emerged at his leader's side in important diplomatic meetings. Alexandrov is a talented linguist, fluent in six languages, including English. A stickler for detail and a master of phrasing, he has been a top speechwriter for the recent Soviet leaders.

Western TV viewers are

politics is Leonid Zamyatin, 63, a representative to the press who has served five Soviet leaders dating back to Nikita Khrushchev in 1961. He has headed the Communist Party's International Information Department since 1978, a job that makes him the General Secretary's top spokesman. After Gorbachev ascended to power, Zamyatin was rumored to be out of favor, but he has reappeared on the job in a dramatic way, managing the spectacular presummit public relations blitz that has put the Soviets in good position for the Geneva meeting.

The Moscow insiders will be joined in Geneva by two of the Soviet Union's arms-control negotiators, Viktor Karpov, 57, and Yuli Kvitsinsky, 49. K. & K. have been a team at super-power arms talks since 1982, but U.S. observers have recently spotted below-the-surface tension between the two. Karpov, the chief negotiator at the Geneva arms talks, is a bluff, methodical



**Top Soviet aides at the Kremlin meeting: Arbatov, Alexandrov and Zamyatin; top, Shevardnadze. They can whisper, but the boss does all the talking in public.**

already familiar with Georgi Arbatov, 62, in his role as a Kremlin analyst of U.S.-Soviet relations. As the longtime head of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, an arm of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Arbatov has turned the institute, as well as himself, into an active formulator of policy as well as an academic source of information. Although his writings reflect a yearning to return to the détente of the early 1970s, he rarely deviates from the official Soviet line. His stiff criticism in 1981 of U.S. policy led the Administration to refuse to extend his visa so he could appear on a U.S. television program. In a typical laconic response, he told a TV interviewer, "What the Soviet Union is doing is explaining its position to the world. Somehow, your people don't like it."

Another hardy survivor of Kremlin

diplomacy, a protégé of Gromyko's with ties to the military and the Kremlin Old Guard, Kvitsinsky, who runs the subordinate space-weapons talks, is closer to the upwardly mobile Soviet technocrats who are being promoted by Gorbachev. While Karpov played a prominent role in hammering out both the SALT I and SALT II arms agreements, Kvitsinsky is now regarded by some Western diplomats as the most able Soviet arms negotiator. In a decision that may be indicative of the impending changes in the Kremlin foreign policy team, Kvitsinsky and not Karpov was summoned to Moscow to prepare for last week's visit by Secretary of State George Shultz. Kvitsinsky was also chosen to accompany Gorbachev on his outing to Paris, and he may be on hand when the General Secretary comes face to face with Ronald Reagan. —By Ed Magnuson.

Reported by James O. Jackson/Moscow



Big Three for Geneva: Advisers Shultz, McFarlane and Regan discuss strategy with the President in the Oval Office

## Mixed Signals from America's Team

*Behind a unified façade, there are deep divisions among the President's men*



When Ronald Reagan goes to Geneva next week, he will not sally forth alone to meet his Kremlin rival like some ancient warrior king seeking to settle the disputes of nation states in single combat. By his side as he spars and reasons with Mikhail Gorbachev will be three top aides: Secretary of State George Shultz, National Security Adviser Robert ("Bud") McFarlane and White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan. The President will depend heavily on the wisdom and counsel of this small coterie of advisers and a larger supporting cast both in Geneva and in Washington. Any deal the U.S. might conceivably work out with the Soviets will be as much their product as the President's.

At the table, America's team in Geneva will present a united front. Like their leader, Reagan's men want to reach some kind of accommodation on arms control, one that could ultimately serve as the foundation for a nuts-and-bolts agreement but not one that would sacrifice the President's dream of a foolproof space shield against nuclear missiles.

Yet behind this façade, the President's larger team is badly divided. Ever since Reagan took office in 1981, the

search for a realistic arms-control package has been seriously hampered by incessant bureaucratic infighting. Philosophical disputes have also muddied the Administration's broader Soviet policy. The President, airily detached from the daily power struggles within his Administration, has been unwilling to step in to resolve the arguments. His advisers, fiercely turf conscious and suspicious of each other, have been unable to settle their differences among themselves.

In Geneva, any deal between the U.S. and the Soviets will be shaped by geopolitical factors, from the arcane abacus of nuclear armaments to the broader themes of superpower rivalry and coexistence. But inevitably policies are made by people, whose force of character and personalities can count for as much as their policy views. The zero-sum qualities of Reagan's top advisers have nearly paralyzed the tortuous process of hammering out an arms-control proposal that is acceptable to both Reagan and the Soviet Union. The man charged with shaping a consensus, National Security Adviser McFarlane, has great expertise in arms control and the will to move quarreling partisans, but he has failed to sway his chief client. Chief of Staff Regan has his boss's ear, but little substantive experi-

ence in geopolitics. No-nonsense Secretary of State Shultz is the workhorse of U.S. diplomacy, but he does not always seem entirely sure to what end. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger knows precisely what he wants—a massive military buildup—and making deals with the Kremlin is not his idea of the way to achieve it. McFarlane, Regan and Shultz have ganged up to keep Weinberger back in Washington next week and away from the summit. But even in absentia, Weinberger may have more influence on Reagan than the other three combined.

If a deal is to be made, McFarlane will be the one charged with pulling it together. He is an unlikely choice for such a daunting task. In 1979 he was still a lieutenant colonel in the Marines; he retired because the corps, having little use for a budding national security strategist, shipped him off to a Marine base in Okinawa. As a National Security staffer in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, however, and later as counselor of the State Department, McFarlane won over some heavyweight mentors, including former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig. When Reagan's National Security Adviser William Clark



Hawk: Richard Perle at the Pentagon

succumbed to burnout and stepped down in 1983. McFarlane, by then Clark's deputy at the White House, became the compromise choice to replace him.

He was viewed as the least self-aggrandizing and most efficient candidate for the delicate job of coordinating national security. At first he brought modesty to a position that in the past has been filled by outsize egos. To friends, McFarlane jokes edgily, sometimes in Kissingeresque dialect, about how his old boss used to say that he liked Marines because they never presumed to know too much.

McFarlane soon found the Administration lacking in foreign policymakers with a coherent world view. He has moved with growing confidence to fill the vacuum. Indeed, at times he views himself as the only Reaganaut able to think in geopolitical terms. "He gets up to a big one like the summit, and he looks in the mirror and sees Henry Kissinger," snipes a White House staffer. McFarlane favors arms control, not because he is, as he has been called, an accommodationist toward the Kremlin but because he believes the U.S. will benefit in military terms if it can reduce the Soviet advantage in big "silo buster" ICBMs. He also believes that the Soviets will want a deal to hold down deployment of new U.S. weapons. Says an Administration aide: "He is a closet hawk who nonetheless knows what must be done and how to get things done."

Ironically, it was McFarlane who did more than anyone to sell Reagan on the Strategic Defense Initiative, the biggest

stumbling block to an arms-control deal. Back in 1983, no one at the top levels of the Pentagon or State Department was eager to shift from offensive to defensive weapons. Reagan had begun to toy with the idea after talking to Scientist Edward Teller, a leading conceptualist of a space-based nuclear shield. But it fell to McFarlane to make the President a true believer by arranging for a briefing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who told Reagan that a space-based defense system was technologically feasible. McFarlane felt that Star Wars would help break a negotiating stalemate and make the Soviets more willing to strike a deal.

Nonetheless, McFarlane soon found himself in the awkward position of trying to persuade Reagan to show some flexibility on SDI for the sake of bargaining with the Soviets. His briefings are precise and carefully reasoned, but the President finds his National Security Adviser somewhat pedantic, bogged down in mind-numbing minutiae. McFarlane is simply not the sort to indulge in sweeping generalities as his boss does, nor is he an easygoing yarn spinner like Reagan's closest cronies. Reagan, 74, still regards McFarlane, 48, as a young staffer who lacks the clout of a Cabinet-level adviser.

The National Security Adviser has had an equally arduous task formulating an arms-control package that Reagan's advisers can agree on. Starting last year, he tried bringing Shultz, Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey together at informal lunches twice a week in the Family Dining Room of the White House, but the so-called Family Group eventually tired of togetherness, and the lunches have become sporadic.

Though praised for his common sense and ability to think three or four moves ahead in plotting diplomatic strategy, McFarlane is faulted by some Reaganauts for holding his cards too close. In part his circumspection is a necessary survival tactic in the warfare of bureaucratic leaks, but some feel that McFarlane is a bit standoffish by nature. "No one really knows what he feels deep down," says one National Security staffer. "He's the most secretive person I've ever met."

McFarlane's maneuvering and generally good press have aroused the jealousy of Chief of Staff Regan, who in ten months on the job has moved to consolidate his power at the White House but has so far failed to subjugate the National Security Adviser. Economics, not foreign policy, is the former Treasury Secretary's expertise. On national security questions Regan sees his role as doing whatever the President wants. He will be the last adviser to tell Reagan that his twin goals of negotiating arms reductions and forging ahead with SDI are irreconcilable.

If the chief of staff listens to anyone besides the President on foreign policy, it is Secretary of State Shultz. A self-effacing public servant, Shultz has managed to stabilize the State Department after the rocky reign of his predecessor, Haig. But Shultz is



Arms Controller: Paul Nitze at State

an incrementalist, not a global visionary. He sees his job as chipping away at the ice encrusting U.S.-Soviet relations, not ushering in a new age of East-West understanding. As an Atlanticist, he views the summit as a way to defuse tensions in NATO by reassuring U.S. allies that the U.S. is serious about arms control. He is a moderate only in comparison with the Pentagon hard-liners. By ordinary standards, he is conservative and leery of the Soviets. "Shultz has never been one to lead the charge to change Ronald Reagan's mind," says one State Department official.

Defense Secretary Weinberger claims to support verifiable arms control. But his pronouncements have served to slow down the negotiating process and threaten to derail it altogether. Weinberger's *idée fixe* is the need to rearm America. He seems almost obsessed with preventing the Soviets from gaining any further strategic edge. His ally and instructor in this crusade is Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, a veteran nuclear expert who has repeatedly used well-crafted arguments and detailed knowledge of the superpowers' doomsday stockpiles to block the Administration from making any offer the Soviets might actually accept. Together, Weinberger and Perle managed to slip some barbs into the U.S. counterproposal tabled in Geneva a fortnight ago. These include proposing a ban on mobile missiles that would require scrapping the Soviets' SS-24s and new SS-25s in exchange for canceling development of the U.S. Midgetman. At the same

## Nation

time, they have framed support for SDI as a test of loyalty to the Administration, skillfully chilling whatever desire McFarlane or Shultz might have to press Reagan on arms control.

Fearful that Weinberger's presence in Geneva would doom any chance of a deal, Shultz, Regan and MacFarlane managed to keep him off the summit team, despite the Defense Secretary's fervent pleas to the President. The White House is trying to muzzle Perle as well, last week vetoing his appearance on West European TV lest he make some impolitic remarks. Nonetheless, either Perle or his equally hard-line superior at the Pentagon, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle, is likely to go to Geneva in a backup role. Even from a remote perch, the Defense Department hawks are sure to be vigilant.

Despite Weinberger's absence, Reagan no longer needs to listen to his Defense Secretary to know what is on his

mind. He has great respect for Weinberger's opinions. Both men share a simplicity of vision untroubled by confusing nuance. That is not to say their vision is identical, however. Reagan persists in believing that the U.S. can have both arms reductions and SDI; Weinberger apparently cares less about a superpower deal than about Star Wars. Says Paul Warnke, Jimmy Carter's chief arms-control negotiator: "Essentially what Weinberger is urging is that we go it alone."

A variety of Soviet experts and State Department bureaucrats will accompany Reagan's principal advisers to the summit sessions, mostly to act as functionaries. "Deciding who is going to sit at the table is like deciding who is going to meet Princess Di," says one diplomat.

Arms-control Adviser Paul Nitze is the most intriguing member of the summit bullpen. Nitze, 78, a white-haired, spry

member of the old postwar foreign policy establishment, has been dubbed "the Silver Fox" for his wily bureaucratic skills. If anyone can find a way to bridge the chasm between the U.S. and the Soviet arms proposals, it is Nitze. The arms-control veteran, however, has been tagged by many Reaganians as an accommodationist for his willingness to work out a deal.

On the eve of the summit, the President and his men seem caught in an awkward minuet. Unlike earlier Presidents, Reagan is oblivious to the essential details of arms control. His advisers are either unwilling or unable to make him confront the difficult practical choices. Until they do, it is hard to see how they can offer the President much more than moral support when he faces off against Gorbachev in Geneva, or begin the hard business of translating superpower proposals into progress.

—By Evan Thomas. Reported by Laurence L. Barrett/Washington



Reagan gets some coaching in the Cabinet Room.

### Studying the Cue Cards

The events are deliberately casual. An expert on Soviet culture, steered by Presidential aides, approaches Ronald Reagan at a reception and gently converses with him on the Russian mind. Only later is the conversation buttressed by background papers. Relaxing in the the White House, the President turns on a video recorder and watches images of Eduard Shevardnadze in action, with a voice-over describing his negotiating style. White House aides order in a print of *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears*, the 1981 Oscar-winning romantic comedy about three young Soviet workingwomen who move with their dreams to the big city.

The vignettes are all part of a tutorial designed by his aides to coach Ronald Reagan for his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. It is clearly a delicate operation. His advisers are busily pulling together as broad a curriculum on the Soviet Union as they can, in part to prevent Reagan from making foolish or unintentionally provocative remarks. At the same time, they realize that if he is stuffed full of facts and figures, he risks becoming bogged down in confused detail, as he was in his first debate last year with Walter Mondale.

Thus Reagan's preparations have been calculatedly low-keyed. His master briefing book is augmented by two dozen

concise background memos, each bound in black vinyl and covering a specific aspect of U.S.S.R. affairs ("Russia's Place in the World: the View from Moscow," "Soviet and Russian Psychology: Some Common Traits"). Aides under Chief White House Kremlinologist John Matlock Jr. are preparing several videotapes, mostly profiling key Soviet participants, including a lengthy one of Gorbachev in public appearances. Although Soviet Defector Arkady Shevchenko was invited to a presidential lunch recently, one-on-one sit-downs between Reagan and pedagogic experts have largely been avoided. Says one aide: "We wanted him to have a solid base of information before we bring in outsiders."

In his first group session with experts last week, Reagan listened attentively as six top academics took turns giving minilectures. The President mainly seemed curious about Gorbachev as a person and his place in Soviet society.

It has long been Reagan's style to avoid cluttering his mind with the complexities of a subject. In many ways this contributes to the boldness of his vision, but his blurry collection of ideas and hearsay details can also present problems. In a presummit interview with the BBC, for example, Reagan remarked there was no Russian word for freedom. There is: *svoboda*. Similarly, Reagan seemed to tell five Soviet journalists that his nuclear defense project would not be deployed before all offensive nuclear missiles on both sides were dismantled. Spokesman Larry Speakes gently categorized the statement to the *Washington Post* as "presidential imprecision." Asked later whether he would give the Soviets veto power over Star Wars, Reagan declared, "Hell, no."

Publicly, Reaganites express confidence that the President will successfully blend his procapitalist ideological toughness with an informed shrewdness about Soviet stratagems. "He's been preparing for this for 25 years," says ex-Aide Michael Deaver, who is helping with summit public relations. One prepper goes so far as to label Reagan's elaborately prepared briefing materials as mere "refresher reading." Still, sighs one Sovietologist, "let's face it. He's starting from such a low base that any knowledge would be an improvement." Reagan is so supremely confident of his ability to persuade the Soviets of the virtues of the American way that he is not troubling himself to cram for the summit. His aides know, however, that he will need a lot more than charm and amiability when he faces the tough-minded Soviets at the higher-stakes show in Geneva. —By David Beckwith. Reported by Barrett Seaman/Washington

TIME/NOVEMBER 18, 1985



COVER STORIES

## The Whole World Will Be Watching

*For the first time in six frosty years, the superpower leaders get set to meet in Geneva*



*"A lot is at stake. The whole direction of U.S.-Soviet relations is going to be significantly marked by the outcome of the first summit meeting in six years."*

—A White House aide, paraphrasing the speech Ronald Reagan will deliver Thursday before departing for Geneva

*"There is a strong possibility of a boilerplate summit reaching one or two milestones but never getting down to basics."*

—A senior adviser to Reagan

The odd thing is that the final rounds of presummit briefings, speeches, meetings and (as always) propaganda in Washington and Moscow lend support to both these forecasts. Admittedly, the long-awaited talks next week between the leaders of the world's two nuclear superpowers may never get beyond the boilerplate of Soviet-American relations. If any concrete agreements emerge (cultural exchanges? new consulates?), it might be stretching a point to call them milestones. Indeed, it seems increasingly obvious that the 74-year-old President of the U.S. and the 54-year-old General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party are going to Geneva not just to haggle over missiles but to articulate strongly opposed views of the world and of each other's behavior. Yet that exchange, paradoxically, might indeed mark a new direction for superpower relations. Even though the opportunity of a bold stroke for peace may be squandered, the summit is likely to start a continuing dialogue that, no matter how spirited, would be better than the frozen silence in which the White House and Kremlin have eyed each other since Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev met in Vienna in 1979.

Discussions preceding the summit have often seemed to highlight rather than narrow differences. On arms control, inevitably the main issue in a world living under a perpetual threat of nuclear extinction, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have exchanged proposals that call for cutting to 6,000 the number of "nuclear charges" in their arsenals, but they differ deeply on what warheads and bombs to put in that category. Progress, if any is possible, awaits a decision by Reagan to agree to some limits on his Star Wars defensive shield, or by Gorbachev to shoot for a deal without any such limits. On regional issues (such as Afghanistan and Central America) and human rights, the discussions amount largely to mutual accusations of meddling, subversion, repression

It would be naive to expect the leaders of two nations with sharply contrasting political and social systems and deeply differing values even to begin to solve these impacted problems in eight hours of talks on Tuesday and Wednesday. But their meeting could at least set the tone for whatever combination of shouting and serious negotiation (it is unlikely to be either/or) will succeed the silence. A whole world will be anxiously watching every eyelid they lift or lower.

As Reagan pored over briefing books and prepared for his first eyeball-to-eyeball summit with a leader of a nation he has made a career of denouncing, Secretary of State George Shultz flew to Moscow with National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and a dozen-odd other U.S. officials last week to lay the final groundwork for the meeting. The American team was whisked to Osobnyak, the czarist-era mansion where Soviet diplomats often conduct business. "We always expect good results from meetings," said Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze before escorting his visitors into the white

opening to two days of inconclusive argument about fundamental differences.

For eight hours, broken only by a brief working lunch, Shevardnadze and Shultz, along with their advisers, reviewed thick documents that laid out the rival positions of each country. No new common ground emerged. "The positions are like black and white," said one American present, "and it is hard to see a shade of gray." It was a disconcerting prelude to Shultz's meeting the next day with Gorbachev.

The spirit looming over the first business session the Soviet leader has ever held with top American officials was that of Lenin, whose brooding fervor seemed to pervade the exchange. Huge portraits of him decorated Red Square in anticipation of last week's anniversary parade of the Bolshevik Revolution: a portrait of Lenin even peered over Shultz's shoulder in the austere Kremlin conference room where the talks were held. Gorbachev opened with a comment that "most often misunderstandings come from a lack of knowledge." Shultz replied: "That's right, although sometimes I know cases where I wish I didn't know as much as I do."

In the four hours of private talks that followed, neither side budged an inch. On the American side were Shultz, McFarlane and U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hartman. Sitting with Gorbachev were Shevardnadze and Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoli Dobrynin. The meeting got straight to business, but it quickly became apparent that no one was ready to modify set positions. Shultz had come to Moscow largely to probe for possible Soviet concessions, but found Gorbachev unyielding on almost every point. Human rights? That subject was "discussed rather fully," Shultz told reporters later, "but I have nothing to report as to what possible constructive outcome there may be." Regional problems? Replying to Reagan's accusations that Moscow and its



**U.S. team portrait: Chief of Staff Regan, Secretary Shultz and Adviser McFarlane behind the President in White House Cabinet Room**


force on such Third World countries as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Nicaragua. Gorbachev reaffirmed "an enduring Soviet policy to support wars of liberation as a national responsibility."

Not only did Gorbachev repeat Moscow's line that there could be no agreement on reducing offensive nuclear weapons without an accompanying ban on Star Wars development, but he appeared to retreat from what leniency he had previously displayed. In an August interview with TIME, Gorbachev had hinted that he might accept some SDI research, since laboratory activities cannot be verified anyway. But last week, said one American, Gorbachev seemed to be insisting on a "complete ban on every activity in any way related to strategic defense."

More disconcerting even than Gorbachev's substantive positions was his tone. The Soviet leader who met Shultz last week was not at all the affable crowd pleaser who toured London, Paris and Soviet farms and factories; he was a tough executive used to dominating a discussion. One American described the Soviet chief's demeanor as "intellectually curious, vigorous, active, articulate, argumentative, self-assured, occasionally impulsive," suspicious too. According to Shultz, Gorbachev "suggested all that happens results from a conspiracy of the [U.S.] military and Big Business." Another American official reported Gorbachev seemed convinced that U.S. policy "was heavily influenced by a small circle of extremist people who are ideologically anti-Soviet" and who have "an ulterior motive, a hidden agenda," presumably a desire to destroy Communism, in their policy recommendations. At another point Gorbachev accused Washington of thinking it could "break us" by forcing a costly missile-defense race.

Gorbachev did not always even hear out the Americans. More than once he listened to just enough of the Russian translation to get the gist, then cut off the translator and launched into a rebuttal. Commented Shultz: "He is accustomed to interrupting and expressing a view. So, when in Moscow, do as those in Moscow do. We interrupted too." It seemed to be "a shouting match," suggested one reporter. Not quite, said Shultz, just a "frank argument." But he left Moscow with no agreement even over whether the President and Gorbachev should issue a joint communiqué at the end of the summit meeting. The Soviets have proposed one, but Shultz's team answered in effect: Let's wait and see how the talks go.

On that subject, Shultz ventured a prediction of sorts: If




Maison de Saussure, Reagan's residence during the meeting

Gorbachev takes the same combative line in Geneva that he did in Moscow, the summit could become "something of a spectator sport. The President is an old hand at this." Said the Secretary, with a weary grin: "I'm looking forward to it."

**A**part from his meeting with the Shultz team, Gorbachev has been keeping a low presummit profile. He made only obligatory public appearances at last week's celebrations of the 68th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, reviewing the traditional parade of Soviet military might from atop the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square on Thursday and delivering a brief address at a Kremlin reception expressing hope for a "fruitful" summit. But the Revolution Day symbolism was every bit as unyielding as any of Gorbachev's remarks to his American visitors. NO TO STAR WARS proclaimed many of the posters tacked up around Moscow.

Reagan's presummit activity has been far more public. All last week the President stepped up a publicity campaign, capped on Saturday by a speech billed by the White House as a "message to the Soviet people." The President expanded his regular weekly radio speech from five minutes to ten and had it beamed worldwide over the Voice of America network.



Geneva children mailing letters to the summiteers  
Anxiety over every lifted or lowered eyelid.

It was a highly personal talk stressing Americans' political and moral values and yearning for peace, and it alluded only briefly to the summit. Said the President: "I hope my discussions with Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva will be fruitful and will lead to future meetings. We seek peace not only for ourselves but for all those who inhabit this small planet." Translators rendered the speech into 42 languages, including Russian, Ukrainian and other tongues spoken in the U.S.S.R., where Washington estimated the potential shortwave-radio audience at 23.6 million.


Reagan, like Gorbachev, had little new to say on substantive issues—with one misleading and embarrassing exception. In a long interview with five Soviet reporters that was published at the start of last week, Reagan astonishingly declared that the U.S. would not only negotiate with the Soviets before deploying a Star Wars system and offer to share the technology but that it would not deploy an SDI system "until we [the U.S. and U.S.S.R.] do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles." In fact, he repeated the thought in only slightly different language three times, which raised an obvious question: Why bother with an extremely costly defensive system if there were no longer any nuclear missiles to intercept? His answer: "In case someplace in the world a madman someday tries to create these weapons again." White House aides hastened to correct the President, who later backtracked to say that if the Soviets would not do away with offensive systems, the U.S. would deploy SDI anyway. All the same, the original gaffe was an unnerving example of the tendency toward impulsive misstatement that Reagan will have to guard against when talking to Gorbachev at the summit.

Otherwise, Reagan has been sketching a cool and consistent line toward the summit. While Gorbachev wants to focus on arms control, the President will insist on reviewing the full spectrum of U.S.-Soviet differences. What he plans to tell Gorbachev, advisers say, is roughly this: The U.S. does not and will not threaten the Soviet Union militarily or politically. It is the U.S.S.R. that killed détente by its military buildup and its aggressive efforts to spread Communism through the Third World. The U.S. is eager for a fresh start, but that will require modification of the behavior that causes Americans to view the Soviet Union as an expansionist totalitarianism.

The White House is well aware that Gorbachev is likely to respond, as he did to Shultz in Moscow, by reciting a catalog of American sins and Soviet suspicions. But Reagan feels under no







Taking a salute: Astrakhan-capped Gorbachev reviewing Revolution Day parade from the Lenin Mausoleum on Red Square in Moscow

on Tuesday at Fleur d'Eau, an unoccupied chateau made available by the Swiss government. Advancemen have arranged for Gorbachev to be driven to the back of the house just before 10 a.m. Reagan will be waiting on a flight of gray stone steps leading to the rear portico, hand outstretched for a historic shake. After a brief get-acquainted session, the President and General Secretary, each accompanied by seven aides and a translator, will confer until noon, return to their residences for lunch, and meet again from 2:30 to 4:30 p.m. To accommodate the parties, the U.S. has shipped to Geneva a 16-ft.-long stretch oval table from the New York City building housing the American mission to the U.N. Should the leaders decide to take a walk while talking, Fleur d'Eau was chosen in part to make a stroll pleasant; its huge garden stretches to the lake.

Gorbachev turns host Tuesday night for a dinner at the Soviet mission, and for Wednesday's working sessions at another building on the grounds. When U.S. advancemen first saw that building, it was so dilapidated they irreverently christened it "the urinal." But the Soviets have completely renovated it, painted it bright yellow and furnished it in 19th century French décor. Wednesday night Reagan will give a dinner. At present no parting ceremonies are scheduled, but American advancemen have staked out a theater the leaders can use Thursday morning if they reach any understanding they want to formalize with a flourish.

Subject to change, the talks are supposed to begin with arms control Tuesday morning, proceed to bilateral issues that afternoon, turn to regional relations Wednesday morning and conclude with human rights. Working parties are painstakingly reviewing 26 topics grouped under the four main headings.

Nuclear arms reductions and space-based defenses are, of course, the biggest issues, but there are many other important ones that are hardly less contentious. For example: chemical weapons, which the U.S. has proposed banning, while the Soviets want to retain existing stockpiles; and nuclear testing, which the Soviets have offered to suspend totally, while the U.S. insists that such a moratorium would be unverifiable. However, should the two sides wish to demonstrate that they can agree on something, there are a few possibilities. They could, for example, issue a strong statement on nuclear nonproliferation, a topic on which they are in rare complete accord. Neither Washington nor Moscow wants to see nuclear weapons developed by any additional nations.

**O**n regional issues, the White House will attack Soviet activities in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and a now familiar list of other countries; the Kremlin will raise American backing of the embattled governments of El Salvador and, allegedly, South Africa, among others. The two might agree, however, to set up regular meetings between their regional experts.

The easiest area may be what is called bilateral relations, which could include a new consular agreement and one to increase what Shultz calls "people-to-people" exchanges. Nonetheless, these have been literally up in the air because the Soviets have linked both to resumption of U.S.-U.S.S.R. airline service. That presents difficulties involving landing fees and ticketing arrangements, which cause the American carrier involved, Pan Am, to fear that flights to the Soviet Union would be unprofitable.

Human rights have always been a touchy topic for Soviet leaders, and for

Gorbachev more than most. Reagan plans an appeal to Soviet self-interest, arguing that it is abuses of human rights that make the U.S. public most suspicious of Moscow, and most unwilling to conclude agreements. Gorbachev has developed a counterargument that the U.S.S.R. values such "human rights" as full employment and free medical care, which the U.S. ignores. In addition, the Soviet press has lately been playing up such alleged U.S. violations of human rights as the MOVE bombing in Philadelphia. Sample fulmination: according to *Pravda*, "the United States is going through a 'prison boom.' Camps for dissidents are hastily being built there." The Soviets may even try to counter American allegations of human rights abuse with propagandistic bombast about the purported torture of fickle Soviet Defector Vitaly Yurchenko.

In sum, the most cursory review of the Soviet-American agenda is sobering: with few exceptions, the more important and potentially dangerous the issue, the deeper are the divergences. The spirit in which they are discussed, however, can make a lasting difference in the long run, and only the heads of government can set the tone for their subordinates. Barring some spectacular blowup or equally improbable major agreement, the success or failure of the summit will eventually be judged less by what Reagan and Gorbachev do in Geneva than by what happens in what is likely to be a long and difficult series of follow-up negotiations. Says one senior American official: "Both sides have moved to the recognition that the real importance of the summit will rest on what comes after it." Or, as Shultz put the point, "Life doesn't end in November." —By George J. Church. Reported by Laurence L. Barrett and Johanna McGeary/Washington and James O. Jackson/Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 14 1985

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FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1985

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

5-8:00 p.m      BAGGAGE CALL for passholders in West  
FRIDAY            Basement. Leave baggage unlocked and  
                     hand carry all film.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1985

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THOSE MANIFESTED ON PRESS PLANE

- 6:00 a.m.      Press Plane check-in at Andrews Air Force Base.
- 6:45 a.m.      Vans depart West Basement en route Andrews Air Force Base for those manifested on Press Plane.
- 7:30 a.m.      Press Plane departs Andrews Air Force Base en route Geneva, Switzerland.

FOR THOSE MANIFESTED ON AIR FORCE ONE

- 6:00 a.m.      BAGGAGE CALL for passholders in West Basement. Leave baggage unlocked and hand carry all film.
- 7:45 a.m.      Vans depart West Basement en route Andrews Air Force Base for those manifested on Air Force One.
- 7:45 a.m.      Those with own transportation carrying baggage should be at Andrews Air Force Base, Distinguished Visitors' Lounge, Base Operations Building.
- 8:15 a.m.      Those with own transportation not carrying baggage should be at Andrews Air Force Base, Distinguished Visitors' Lounge, Base Operations Building.

AIR FORCE ONE MANIFEST

THE PRESIDENT  
Mrs. Reagan  
Secretary Shultz  
D. Regan


SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1985

AIR FORCE ONE MANIFEST - (con't)

R. McFarlane  
P. Buchanan  
L. Speakes  
D. Thomas  
F. Ikle  
P. Nitze  
T. Dawson  
W. Henkel  
J. Kuhn  
J. Matlock  
K. Osborne  
C. Hill  
W. Hall  
B. Hayward  
Dr. Hutton  
Mil. Aide  
Ofcl. Photographer  
C. Jennings  
J. Bengtsson  
A. Castello

8:15 a.m. Those manifested on Marine One proceed to South Lawn for boarding.

MARINE ONE MANIFEST

THE PRESIDENT  
Mrs. Reagan  
Secretary Shultz  
D. Regan  
R. McFarlane  
J. Kuhn  
Mil. Aide  
Dr. Hutton  


FOR THOSE MANIFESTED ON 26000

6:00 a.m. BAGGAGE CALL for passholders in West Basement. Leave baggage unlocked and hand carry all film.

8:15 a.m. Vans departs West Basement for those manifested on 26000.

8:15 a.m. Those with own transportation carrying baggage should be at Andrews Air Force Base, Distinguished Visitors' Lounge, Base Operations Building.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1985

8:45 a.m. Those with own transportation not carrying baggage should be at Andrews Air Force Base, Distinguished Visitors' Lounge, Base Operations Building.

26000 MANIFEST

K. Adelman  
E. Rowny  
D. Chew  
B. Elliott  
J. Rosebush  
K. Small  
R. Perle  
R. Ridgway  
B. Kalb  
W. Martin  
P. Noonan  
R. Riley  
M. Palmer  
L. Verstandig  
J. Benton  
P. Berania  
S. Brackman  
J. Bull  
C. Cleveland  
T. Cobb  
E. Crispen  
S. Emery  
J. Erkenbeck  
D. Graze  
S. Harrison  
K. Hart  
C. Hathaway  
T. Huggins  
R. Linhard  
B. McKinley  
G. Miller  
J. Miller  
E. Morris  
M. Paris  
M. Riccobene  
N. Roberts  
P. Rodman  
R. Sanvictores  
C. Sapanghila  
L. Simkus  
S. Sestanovich  
J. Stein

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1985

26000 MANIFEST - (con't)

S. Steiner  
C. Thompson  
P. Thompson  
K. Timmons  
P. Young  
K. Zerwick

8:15 a.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan proceed to Marine One for boarding.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE

8:20 a.m. MARINE ONE departs The South Lawn en route Andrews Air Force Base.

Flight Time: 10 mins.

8:30 a.m. MARINE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE  
CLOSED ARRIVAL

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan deplane and proceed to Air Force One for boarding.

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

Those manifested on Marine One deplane and proceed to Air Force One for boarding

8:35 a.m. AIR FORCE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en route  
EST Geneva, Switzerland.

Flight Time: 7 hrs. 50 mins.  
Time Change: + 6 hrs.  
Food Service: TBD

9:05 a.m. 26000 departs Andrews Air Force Base en route Geneva, Switzerland.

9:25 a.m. Press Plane arrives Cointrin Airport, Gate 17, Geneva, Switzerland.

10:25 p.m. AIR FORCE ONE arrives Cointrin Airport, Geneva,  
(4:25 p.m. Switzerland.  
EST)

10:55 p.m. 26000 arrives Cointrin Airport, Geneva  
(4:55 p.m. Switzerland.  
EST)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR TRAVELING STAFF ON THE  
PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO EUROPE

FROM: T. BURTON SMITH, M.D. *TBS*  
WHITE HOUSE MEDICAL UNIT

SUBJECT: Medical Information

Be sure to have an adequate supply of personal medications... check to see that they are labeled and the dosage is indicated. Extra glasses, in the event of loss or breakage, may be helpful.

No public health problems are anticipated and no special immunizations are required.

Since this trip will prove to be exhaustive, it is worthwhile to try to arrive in Switzerland in as good condition as possible. Eastbound you face a +6 hour time change and homeward bound a -6 hour zone change which can produce unpleasant side effects for most people. The "jet lag" plan is offered for your voluntary use.

The things that influence our "body clock" are:

1. Light and dark
2. Foods (high protein or high carbohydrate)
3. Physical activity
4. Mental activity
5. Caffeine (if you use it)

The plan is to produce a body clock shift prior to departure and prior to returning.

The following suggestions are presented for your guidance and, hopefully, benefit.

EASTWARD BOUND - +6 HOURS

PRE-FLIGHT

Wednesday, November 13 -

FEAST DAY - Generous servings

Breakfast - generous servings of high protein food (meat, eggs, fish, poultry, cheese, milk, etc.)

Lunch - generous serving of high protein food

Dinner - generous serving of high carbohydrate (spaghetti, bread, pasta (no meat), starchy foods, sweet desserts, etc.)

coffee, tea and cola (caffeinated) allowed only between 3-5 PM

no evening snacks

Thursday, November 14 -

FAST DAY - Limited portions

Breakfast - high protein

Lunch - high protein

Dinner - high carbohydrate

coffee, tea and cola - 3-5 PM

no evening snacks

Friday, November 15 -

FEAST DAY - Same plan as Wednesday, November 13

Avoid a stressful day, i.e., packing, shopping, last-minute hassle.



FLIGHT DAY

Saturday, November 16 -

FAST DAY - same plan as Thursday, November 14

Arise on flight day 1-2 hours earlier than usual.

Increase water intake to compensate for in-flight dehydration.

Now reset your watch to destination time. (+6 hours)

Sunday, November 17 (Geneva)

Do not oversleep.

30 minutes before breakfast become active, both mentally and physically (talk, read, work, walk, stretch, etc.).

FEAST DAY - hearty high protein breakfast and lunch,  
large high carbohydrate supper

No caffeinated drinks.

Keep active; do not nap.

Go to bed early on new destination time.

FILES TO TAKE TO GENEVA

I. AGENDA

II. NSDD - 194 - THEMES AND PERCEPTIONS FOR NOVEMBER MTG WITH GORBACHEV

A. ARMS CONTROL

1. ARMS CONTROL GENERAL
  - 1.1 NST
  - 1.2. NPT;CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
SALT II;CDE;MBFR;  
RISK REDUCTION; NAVAL VISITS ETC.

2. HUMAN RIGHTS

3. REGIONAL ISSUES

4. BILATERAL ISSUES

5. POSSIBLE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

- A. CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK
- B. NORTHERN AIR SAFETY
- C. CIVIL AVIATION
- D. EXCHANGE INITIATIVES
- E. JOINT FUSION REACTOR PROJECT
- F. ENVIROMENTAL COOPERATION
- G. EXCHANGES AGREEMENT
- H. MARITIME BOUNDARY DISCUSSIONS

6. TALKING POINTS

B. SESSIONS & LIST OF PARTICIPANTS  
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS & CALENDAR

TUESDAY , NOVEMBER 19, 1985

1. 10:00AM-12:15PM TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19 MORNING PLENARY SESSION

MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT FLEUR D'EAU  
GENERAL, U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

2. 2:30PM-4:35PM TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19 AFTERNOON PLENARY  
SESSION

MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT FLEUR D'EAU  
GENERAL ARMS CONTROL

3. 8:00PM-10:05PM FUNCTION AT SOVIET MISSION

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1985

4. 9:55AM-12:15PM MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT SOVIET MISSION  
REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES
5. 2:15PM-4:30pPM MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT SOVIET MISSION  
FINAL SESSION
6. 5:30PM PRESS BRIEFING
7. 8:15PM-10:15 FUNCTION AT THE RESIDENCE

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

8. 4:15PM-6:00PM BRUSSELS TALKS

NATO

C. BRIEFING BOOKS

D. BIOS & OTHER INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

1. MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
2. BIOS

E. PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE &

1. PRES/GORBACHEV CORRESPONDENCE
2. PRES/SHEVARDNADZE CORRESPONDENCE
3. PRES/CHERNENKO CORRESPONDENCE
4. PRES/ANDROPOV CORRESPONDENCE
  
5. MEMCONS - PRES W/GROMYKO
6. MEMCONS - PRES W/SHCHERBITSKY
7. MEMCONS - PRES W/SHEVARDNADZE

F. MEMCONS - SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE HELSINKI MTG

1. MEMCON - SHULTZ/GROMYKO -JAN 85 GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT
2. MEMCON - SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE HELSINKI MTG
3. MEMCON - SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE NEW YORK MTG

G. PRESS KIT - ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE STATEMENTS

1. COPIES OF TOASTS
2. PUBLIC STATEMENTS & SPEECHES
3. BACKGROUND POINTS FOR SPEECHES
  
4. EUROPEAN PRESS REACTION

H. COMMUNIQUE

1. MATERIAL FOR COMMUNIQUE
2. U.S.-USSR SUMMIT MEETINGS 1955-1979

I. JOINT STATEMENT

1. MATERIAL FOR JOINT STATEMENT

J. CHRONS

MISCELLANEOUS CHRONS

K. ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

SCHEDULE

MISCELLANEOUS ADMIN/TRAVEL INFO

L. SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES