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**FOIA**

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11789	REPORT	SOVIET-THIRD WORLD TREATIES SINCE 1971: SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	19	8/8/1981	B1
11784	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE PROMOTING POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE USSR <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	3/29/1983	B1
11785	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE A PROPOSED U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENT <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	3	ND	B1
11790	MEMO	WICK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PROMOTING POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE USSR <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	5	3/16/1983	B1
11786	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	5/21/1983	B1
11787	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	2	5/21/1983	B1
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USSR Treaties

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SOVIET-THIRD WORLD TREATIES SINCE 1971:  
SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS

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190-AR. Please destroy all copies you may have  
received of the August 7, 1981, version.

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SOVIET-THIRD WORLD TREATIES SINCE 1971:  
SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS



BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE  
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS  
AND  
RESEARCH

Summary

The USSR has signed "friendship and cooperation" treaties with 12 Third World countries since mid-1971:

- |                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| Egypt (May 1971)        | Ethiopia (November 1978)                                 |
| India (August 1971)     | Afghanistan (December 1978)                              |
| Iraq (April 1972)       | People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (Oct. 1979) |
| Somalia (July 1974)     | Syria (October 1980)                                     |
| Angola (October 1976)   | Congo (Brazzaville) (May 1981)                           |
| Mozambique (March 1977) |  |
| Vietnam (November 1978) |  |

The treaties serve both the symbolic function of formalizing Soviet ties with "friendly" Third World states and the concrete function of delineating the terms of those relationships.

As a result, the treaties' basic similarity in form is combined with important differences in substance, reflecting the specific circumstances and motives prevailing at the time of signature. These variations not only provide insight into the two sides' perceptions of their bilateral relationship, but often illuminate areas of apparent controversy.

By and large, the treaties fall into four distinct groups:

1) The Egyptian, Iraqi, Somali, Angolan, and Mozambican treaties are broadly similar, despite nuances hinting that:

- Angola and Iraq took particular care to safeguard control of their economic assets; and
- Egypt and Somalia were intent on avoiding unconditional support for the USSR in the international arena.

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All of these treaties imply more of a Soviet than a Third World interest in codifying the existing relationship as a legal basis for the further development of ties.

2) The Vietnamese treaty reflects a far more intimate relationship with the USSR than does the preceding group. It incorporates certain features of the Soviet Union's treaties with Warsaw Pact countries (but no military commitments).

3) The Congolese and Indian treaties, in contrast, reflect the least intimate relationships of all.

--The Congolese treaty, unlike all the others, does not pledge greater military cooperation.

--The Indian treaty's political-military provisions, however, are nearly identical to those in the Vietnamese.

4) The treaties with Ethiopia, Afghanistan, the PDRY, and Syria resemble the first group, albeit with more significant variations:

--The Ethiopian treaty's provisions on economic, military, and political cooperation are more generalized than those in the first group.

--The Afghan treaty's emphasis on assistance and safeguarding of security conveys the impression of a client-patron relationship.

--The PDRY treaty includes a formal endorsement, the first after Afghanistan's, of Moscow's longstanding Asian regional security initiative. But the PDRY also set limits on Soviet involvement in its internal affairs, as the USSR did to its military support for the PDRY.

--The Syrian accord places somewhat greater emphasis than any other treaty on strengthened military ties and consultations and coordination of Soviet-Syrian policy in the Middle East.

This paper discusses the individual treaties in chronological order of signature, isolating the provisions and themes distinguishing each and comparing their similarities.<sup>1/</sup> Some quotations within the paper are slightly paraphrased; full texts of the treaties are appended.

\* \* \* \* \*

<sup>1/</sup> Relevant provisions from the draft Soviet-Japanese Treaty of Goodneighborhood and Cooperation (proposed by the USSR in February 1978, but never signed) are also cited for purposes of comparison.

USSR-UAR Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation  
(signed May 27, 1971; abrogated March 15, 1976)

The USSR's treaty with Egypt was the first of the Third World series to be signed. In many ways, it established the pattern for the others. In Article 2, however, Egypt sets for itself the aim of "reconstructing society along socialist lines"--a formula not repeated in any treaty since. Nasser may have had such intentions at times, but whether Sadat ever expected to abide by this provision to Moscow's satisfaction is questionable.

Although the treaty includes all the standard provisions for bilateral economic and technical cooperation, its emphasis is definitely on international rather than internal affairs.<sup>2/</sup> The theme of struggling against imperialism and colonialism is prominent, both in the introduction and in the text--a feature characteristic of most of the later treaties.<sup>3/</sup>

The UAR treaty's most interesting provision is Article 8, on military cooperation. With minor variations, all of the treaties except the Indian, Japanese, and Vietnamese note that the two parties "...will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements between them." Only the Somali and Egyptian have an additional provision, which declares that: "Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the U.A.R. [Somali] military personnel, in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied...."

<sup>2/</sup> In this respect, the treaties can be divided into two groups: Somalia, Mozambique, and Afghanistan, in which the initial provisions deal with economic and technical cooperation; and Egypt, India, Iraq, Angola, Japan (draft), Vietnam, and Ethiopia, wherein international questions take first place.

<sup>3/</sup> Not surprisingly, the draft treaty with Japan does not mention this theme, while the Indian treaty treats it in relatively pro forma terms. Among the other treaties (Iraq, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam), the theme tends to grow sharper, in roughly chronological order, up through the Vietnamese treaty; the subsequent Ethiopian and Afghan texts revert to a milder formulation.

In the Somali case, the purpose of this equipment is ostensibly defensive ("for the purposes of enhancing its defense potential"). But in the Egyptian treaty, the language is considerably more bellicose--"with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression in general." None of the other treaties employs such categorical language.

The Egyptian and Somali treaties share another characteristic--the absence of a concluding provision (to be found in every other treaty except Vietnam's and the Japanese draft) stating: "Any differences that may arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation of some provision of the present treaty will be resolved bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding." As it turned out, these are precisely the cases wherein differences were not resolved, and the treaties were abrogated.

Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation  
(signed August 9, 1971)

The Indian treaty is unique in including the word "peace" in its title. Its provisions seem to emphasize non-aggression more than cooperation. In most respects, the Indian and Vietnamese treaties occupy opposite poles of the treaty spectrum, with India less closely--and Vietnam more closely--tied to the USSR than is any other signatory. But in one respect, the two treaties show a striking similarity: neither includes a provision on military cooperation (present in all other treaties except the Japanese draft), but they both are directed specifically against an external attack.

Whereas all of the other treaties except Afghanistan's<sup>4/</sup> call for mutual consultations in case of a generalized "situation creating a threat to peace or violation of peace," the Indian and Vietnamese provisions on mutual consultations are operative in case of "attack or threat of attack."<sup>5/</sup> The other treaties promise "consultations" (Egypt, Somalia, and Japan), with Iraq, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia pledging in addition to "concert their positions." The Indian and Vietnamese treaties, however, promise to "take

<sup>4/</sup> See pgs. 13-14.

<sup>5/</sup> Emphases here, and in quotations in the rest of this report, are supplied by the authors.



appropriate effective methods," a noteworthy similarity as both countries entered war soon after signature.

In its treatment of economic, political, and non-aggression issues, the Indo-Soviet treaty provides for less close ties than the others. The articles on bilateral economic relations sound almost pro forma--they are considerably less detailed and extensive than in any other treaty. India's policy of non-alignment is pointedly stressed in a separate provision (which reappears in all subsequent treaties except Iraq's, Vietnam's, and the Japanese draft).

The Indian treaty also devotes an unusual amount of space to detailing the rules of conduct between the two states. In the other treaties the two sides generally content themselves with pledging not to join a military alliance against each other and not to enter into obligations incompatible with the treaty. But India's is far more specific, stipulating in addition that each signatory will:

- abstain from aggression against the other party;
- prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act that might inflict military damage on the other party;
- abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party; and
- not enter into any obligation that might cause military damage to the other party.

USSR-Iraq Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation  
(signed April 9, 1972)

While the Iraqi treaty parallels the Egyptian in many respects, there are notable differences as well. The Egyptian treaty's introduction notes only the aim "to consolidate and strengthen...relations" with the USSR whereas the Iraqi treaty adds the goal of "striving to raise these relations to a new, even higher level." The treaty was signed at a relatively early stage in the two countries' relationship; Moscow probably then hoped to increase its influence over Iraqi policies through ties at all levels. In any event, references to the importance of "political cooperation"

between the two states are inserted into an article otherwise analogous to one in the Egyptian text.<sup>6/</sup>

The Iraqi treaty also uses stronger language to condemn the evils of imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism than does the Egyptian. Moreover, the two states pledge (in Article 4) that they will "cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples...." Egypt made no such commitment, while India agreed to cooperate "with other states" but not specifically "with each other." Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan follow the Iraqi example but Ethiopia does not.

The provision on military cooperation in the Iraqi treaty is confined to a generalized statement that the two parties will "continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of their defense capabilities." There is no mention of any specific military agreements between the two countries. Among the treaties calling for military cooperation (i.e., all except India, Japan, and Vietnam), only the Iraqi and Ethiopian ones omit reference to "appropriate agreements"--despite the fact that in both of these instances such agreements predated signature of the treaty.

The Iraqi treaty follows the Indian lead in pledging "not to permit the use of its territory for any act capable of inflicting military damage on the other side." The Japanese draft is the only other "friendship treaty" to include such a provision, which presumably is directed against foreign base rights.

Friendship and Cooperation Treaty Between USSR and Somali Democratic Republic (signed July 11, 1974; abrogated November 13, 1977)

The Somali treaty differs from its predecessors in that the articles on bilateral cooperation and assistance appear at the beginning, giving them a special emphasis.

<sup>6/</sup> Article 7 reads: "Attaching much importance to concerted actions on the international scene in the interests of ensuring peace and security and also to the development of political cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the high contracting parties will regularly consult each other at various levels on all important international questions concerning the interests of both states, as well as on questions of further developing bilateral relations." No other treaty follows the Iraqi example in this respect.

The provisions themselves (Articles 2 and 3) are identical to the standard ones in the Egyptian and Iraqi treaties (Articles 5 and 6) except that the Somali treaty omits the general introductory paragraph calling for "all-around cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields" that is found in all other treaties save the Indian, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Afghan.

In the international arena, Somalia stresses its "nonalignment" (Article 6) in a formula copied from the Indian treaty: "The USSR respects the policy of nonalignment pursued by the SDR, which constitutes a factor in maintaining international peace and security." This phrase appears with only minor variations in all of the subsequent treaties except the Vietnamese and Japanese. (It was absent from the Iraqi and Egyptian treaties.)

In providing for bilateral consultations (Article 8), the Somali treaty is the first chronologically to specify in great detail the circumstances and methods for such consultations.<sup>7/</sup> The language suggests that the Somalis may have been attempting to concretize--and limit--their obligations to support the USSR in the international arena.

Less obviously, but perhaps more significantly, the Somalis promised to "consult" with the USSR in case of a "threat to or a violation of peace" (Article 9) but not to

<sup>7/</sup> To the Egyptian formula, i.e., that the two sides will "regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states" (Article 7), it adds the following statement: "Such consultations and exchanges of view will encompass: International issues, including situations causing tension in various parts of the world, with a view to contributing to the relaxation of tension, developing cooperation, and strengthening security; Issues which are the subject of multilateral negotiations, including those being examined by international organizations and at international conferences; Issues of a political, economic, and cultural nature and other issues affecting relations between the two countries. Such consultations and exchanges of view will be effected through meetings between leading statesmen from the sides and visits by official delegations and special representatives and also through diplomatic channels." This last sentence is identical to a provision in the Indian treaty (Article 5) which is not included in the Egyptian or Iraqi treaties. The Somali treaty does not, however, pick up the statements in the Iraqi treaty that emphasize the importance of political cooperation.

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"concert positions" with it--as did all of the other countries except India, Japan, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.<sup>8/</sup>

As already noted, the Somali treaty shares two characteristics with the Egyptian one--similar military cooperation provisions (albeit less bellicose in the Somali case) and the absence of a concluding provision calling for joint settlement of differences in interpretation.

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the People's Republic of Angola (signed October 8, 1976)

Unlike the Somali case, the Angolan treaty contains no provision that did not appear in earlier treaties. However, the language characterizing the "struggle against imperialism" is sharper, presumably because of the ongoing civil war at the time of signature. And the frequency of references to "equality" and "sovereignty over natural resources" suggests an Angolan concern for safeguarding its economic interests vis-a-vis both the Soviet Union and its former colonial overlords.

International affairs take precedence over bilateral assistance provisions in the treaty, and Angola--like Egypt, Iraq, Mozambique, and Ethiopia--promises to "concert its position" with the USSR in case of a "threat to peace." There is special stress in the treaty on cooperation in the international arena between "the countries of socialism" and "the developing states." There also are more emphatic references to the common "unflinching struggle against the forces of imperialism" than in earlier treaties.

This increased emphasis on cooperation with the USSR in the international arena is, however, coupled with Angolan assertiveness on bilateral relations. In addition to the standard provisions for economic and technical cooperation, there are prominent references in the treaty

<sup>8/</sup> The discrepancy is noteworthy because Article 9 does not deviate in any other way from similar provisions in the treaties with Egypt, Iraq, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. The provision in the Japanese draft treaty (Article 5) is similar to the Somali one, specifying that the two sides will "contact each other with the aim of exchanging views" in case of a situation "dangerous for maintaining peace."

to "equality" in relations and "respect for the sovereignty of each over all their natural resources."<sup>9/</sup>

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the People's Republic of Mozambique (signed March 31, 1977)

The Mozambican treaty--like the Somali and Afghan ones--begins with an enumeration of provisions for bilateral economic cooperation. The one unusual note here is the characterization of Mozambique's "social and economic gains" as "revolutionary"--an adjective that does not appear in any other treaty.

The priority of economic development over international affairs is also evident in the provisions dealing with political consultations and the struggle against imperialism, which are less extensive than in the Angolan treaty. Article 8 calls for the exchange of "opinions on important international questions in the spirit of mutual understanding"--a formula suggestive of strong convergence of views which does not appear in this context in the other treaties. But as a whole, the treaty implies that Mozambique does not envisage for itself as active a role in the international arena as do some of the other signatories.<sup>10/</sup>

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<sup>9/</sup> There is no reference to "sovereignty over natural resources" in the Egyptian, Indian, Somali, Mozambican, Japanese, or Afghan treaties, but it is present in the treaties with Iraq, Vietnam ("mastery"), and Ethiopia. The Angolan puts the heaviest emphasis on "equality in relations."

<sup>10/</sup> Compare the introduction to the Mozambican treaty:

"Inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racialism: Prompted by the striving to give support to the struggle for world peace and security in the interests of progress...."

With Angola's:

"Inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism in all its forms and manifestations, and by the immutable desire to render all possible support to peoples struggling for freedom, independence and social progress...."

In addition, Article 8 of the Mozambican treaty, calling for "consultations and exchange of opinions," omits the provisions in the analogous articles of the Angolan (Article 6) and Somali (Article 8) (footnote continued)

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (signed November 3, 1978)

The Vietnamese treaty is significantly different from its predecessors, in both the tone and the substance of its provisions. Like the Indian treaty, it is more sharply directed against a military threat than the norm, and it calls for action rather than consultations (see pgs. 2-3). But in its adherence to "socialist foreign policy" and its provisions on bilateral economic cooperation, the Vietnamese treaty comes closer to Soviet-Warsaw Pact agreements than it does to the other treaties under discussion.

The incorporation of elements similar to those in, for example, the 1975 GDR-USSR Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is most noticeable in the early parts of the treaty (introduction and Articles 1-3). Both treaties' introductions are replete with references to "Marxism-Leninism," "socialist internationalism," "fraternal relations," "the building of socialism and communism," and "socialist foreign policy"--which are not found in the other Third World treaties. Still, the Vietnamese treaty omits several important themes that appear in the GDR treaty's introduction--i.e., calls for "ideological cooperation," "socialist economic integration," and an affirmation of the "identity of social systems and ultimate goals."

The Vietnamese introduction includes a somewhat obscure new note--also in the GDR treaty--calling for "the consolidation of the juridical basis of the bilateral relations." This phrase reappears in the Afghan--but not the Ethiopian--treaty.<sup>11/</sup>

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treaties, which cover: "International questions, including situations causing tension in various regions of the world, with a view to assisting in the relaxation of tension, the development of cooperation and the strengthening of international security; Questions which are the subject of multilateral negotiations, including those under consideration in international organizations and at international conferences...." (See footnote 7 for complete text of Angolan/Somali variant.)

<sup>11/</sup> A similar provision in the introduction to the Japanese draft treaty calls for expressing "in contractual form their resolve to create a...foundation for...cooperation...."

The first article of the Vietnamese treaty, basing the countries' relations on "socialist internationalism" and "fraternal mutual assistance," also adheres to the GDR pattern rather than the standard of the other treaties. But the obligation to "render each other every assistance and support" (in the GDR treaty) is weakened to "endeavour to assist each other."

In the next two provisions, dealing with bilateral economic cooperation, the Vietnamese treaty more or less follows the GDR pattern, albeit with significant reservations. The Vietnamese treaty omits the references to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) and "socialist economic integration" in the GDR treaty. But it includes provisions for "coordination of long-term national economic plans" and "exchanges of experiences in the building of socialism and communism" which are not found in any other Third World treaties.

Article 4 of the Vietnamese treaty provides for the signatories to "do their utmost to consolidate the world socialist system and actively contribute to the development and defence of the socialist gains." In its remaining provisions, dealing mainly with foreign policy, the treaty comes closer to the other Third World treaties, although its condemnation of imperialism, colonialism, and racism (Article 5) is longer, harsher, and more concrete. A special point is made of calling for "the establishment of a new world economic relationship."

The general slogan calling for "freedom, independence and social progress" which appears in the introduction and text of earlier treaties is modified in the Vietnamese to a call for "peace, national independence, democracy and social progress."<sup>12/</sup> The Afghans adopt this revised slogan as well, but the Ethiopians do not.

Not surprisingly, the Vietnamese treaty omits the reference to non-alignment found in every other treaty except the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Japanese. Other, more or less standard, provisions missing from the Vietnamese treaty include:

--a promise not to enter any alliance formed against the other signatory;

<sup>12/</sup> In Article 5, "social progress" is replaced by "socialism."

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- an undertaking not to conclude any agreements incompatible with the treaty;<sup>13/</sup>
- a commitment to settle differences of opinion amicably "in a spirit of mutual understanding";<sup>14/</sup>
- a provision on military cooperation.<sup>15/</sup>

These omissions remain unexplained.

The Vietnamese treaty's provision concerning consultation on international affairs (Article 6, paragraph 1) is short and generalized. It establishes a pattern for subsequent treaties: "The two parties signatory to the treaty shall exchange views on all important international questions relating to the interests of the two countries."<sup>16/</sup>

A further distinction of the Vietnamese treaty is the length of its validity. Like the USSR-GDR treaty, it is valid for 25 years with automatic 10-year extensions,

<sup>13/</sup> The standard Soviet friendship treaty provision reads: "The high contracting parties declare that the provisions of the present treaty are not inconsistent with their commitments under international treaties in force and undertake not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with this treaty." The closest equivalent provision in the Vietnamese treaty (Article 7) says: "The present treaty does not concern the two parties' rights and obligations stemming from the bilateral or multilateral agreements to which they are signatories and is not intended to oppose any third country." The Japanese draft treaty is the only other one to include the latter point.

<sup>14/</sup> This provision is also absent from the Egyptian and Somali treaties (as noted earlier) and the Japanese draft treaty.

<sup>15/</sup> Present in all others, except the Indian treaty and the Japanese draft.

<sup>16/</sup> This provision is much less strong than the analogous provision in the USSR-GDR treaty (Article 9): "The high contracting parties will keep each other informed, consult each other, and act in all important international matters, proceeding from the common stand agreed upon in line with the interests of both states."



while the others run for 15 or 20 years with 5-year extensions.<sup>17/</sup>

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and Socialist Ethiopia (signed November 20, 1978)

While the Vietnamese treaty obviously represents a higher degree of alignment with the Soviet Union than did the earlier friendship accords, the Ethiopian treaty, in contrast, reflects ties which are less close. The provisions for economic, political, and military cooperation are all more general and seemingly weaker than in the other treaties. And the Ethiopian treaty adopts fewer of the innovations from the Vietnamese treaty than the Afghan treaty does.

This is most obvious in the area of bilateral economic cooperation, where the Ethiopian treaty resembles the Indian more than it does any of the others. In particular, the Ethiopian treaty omits the provisions common to all other treaties (except India, Japan, and Vietnam) which call for "promoting widening of cooperation...and direct links between political and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions...expanding and deepening cooperation in training national cadres." In Article 8, the treaty uses the catchall "expand cooperation in all areas" rather than the standard enumeration of industry, transportation, communications, fisheries, energy, etc. Ethiopia, along with Iraq, Angola, and Vietnam, has a provision calling for "sovereignty over natural resources."

The Ethiopian treaty emphasizes international affairs rather than bilateral cooperation, but even here, the level of commitment seems low. This is most obvious in Article 5, concerning the struggle against "colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid," which omits the standard commitment to "cooperate with each other and other

<sup>17/</sup> Egypt--15 years; India--20 years; Iraq--15 years; Somalia--20 years; Angola--20 years; Mozambique--20 years; Ethiopia--20 years; Afghanistan--20 years.

peace-loving states" to oppose them.<sup>18/</sup> In an apparent effort to soothe African concerns, the non-alignment provision of the Ethiopian treaty (Article 3) is formulated somewhat differently than in the other treaties, with references to the "purposes and principles laid down in the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned movement."

At the same time, there is oblique reference to Ethiopia's domestic situation in Article 4, where the standard provision on the need to "settle international controversial issues by peaceful means" is followed by the phrase: "without prejudice to the legitimate rights of states to defend themselves, individually or collectively, against aggression in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

Finally, it might be noted that the provision on military cooperation is slightly less specific than in other treaties. The Ethiopian and Iraqi military cooperation provisions are the only ones that do not refer to specific agreements. And the Ethiopian treaty is alone in promising to "continue cooperation" rather than "continue to develop cooperation."<sup>19/</sup>

Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighborliness, and Cooperation Between the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (signed December 5, 1978)

The Afghan and Ethiopian treaties follow the general pattern of Soviet-Third World friendship and cooperation

<sup>18/</sup> Present in the treaties with Iraq, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan. Other evidence to this end is the insertion of the word 1) "directly" in Article 6 (...parties shall consult each other on important international questions directly involving the interests of the two countries" and 2) "endeavour" in Article 7 (In the event of situations which constitute a threat to peace...parties shall endeavour to immediately establish contact...with a view to coordinating their positions....")

<sup>19/</sup> Compare Article 10 in the Ethiopian treaty "In the interests of ensuring the defense capability of the high contracting parties, they shall continue to cooperate in the military field" with Afghanistan's "In the interests...they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them." The Iraqi treaty does not refer to specific agreements, and the Angolan one refers to "agreements being concluded." In other respects, the Iraqi, Angolan, and Mozambican treaties all follow the Afghan pattern.

treaties far more closely than does the Vietnamese one. But there are significant differences between the two. The Ethiopian treaty hints at caution--probably more Ethiopian than Soviet--at becoming too closely tied, while the Afghan treaty reflects a more unequal relationship than any of its predecessors. An unusual formulation in the Afghan introduction adds to the standard "development of social and economic achievements" the goal of "safeguarding their security and independence."

This impression--of an almost patron-client relationship--is most evident in the provisions on bilateral consultations and economic assistance, but there are hints of it in other areas as well.<sup>20/</sup> It is reinforced by repeated references to "traditional relations" between the two countries and by the word "assistance" which replaces the standard "cooperation" in some provisions.

The provisions on economic and technical cooperation--which take first place in the Afghan treaty--show several deviations from the norm (i.e., the treaties with Egypt, Iraq, Angola, Somalia, and Mozambique). Article 2 adds "assistance...in planning the development of the national economy" to the list of concrete areas of cooperation. Economic planning does not appear in other treaties--except Vietnam's--and the use of "assistance" instead of "cooperation" is unprecedented.

This patronage relationship is even more apparent in Article 4, which reads: "The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and goodneighbourliness, as well as the U.N. Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement of the two sides appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries." This is a significant departure from the other treaties, all of which call for consultations only under specific circumstances (i.e., "threat to peace"--Egypt, Iraq, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia; or "threat of attack"--India, Vietnam). Afghanistan follows India and Vietnam in calling on the signatories

<sup>20/</sup> In this connection, it should also be noted that Afghanistan--unlike Ethiopia--adopted several themes from the Vietnamese treaty, although their significance is unclear (e.g., a reference to the "further consolidation of the contractual-legal basis of their relations" in the introduction, and the slogan "peace, national independence, democracy and social progress" to replace "freedom, independence and social progress").

to "take appropriate measures" rather than merely "consult" and/or "coordinate positions" (Vietnam and India specify in addition that these measures be "effective"). The expressed purpose of the provision--"to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries"--could be interpreted to permit intervention under a variety of circumstances.

Also unique in the Afghan treaty is the language of Article 8, which calls for "development of cooperation among Asian states...and creation of an effective security system in Asia" (the USSR has long promoted an Asian collective security initiative).

The Afghan treaty was the first to have a quick escape clause. All previous treaties provided that they could be ended unilaterally at the completion of their term, if either party gave a year's notice. But the Afghan treaty includes an additional provision, which states specifically that: "If one of the high contracting parties expresses the wish in the course of the twenty-year term of the treaty to terminate it before its expiration date, it shall notify in writing the other high contracting party, six months before the suggested date of expiration of the treaty, about its desire to terminate the treaty before the expiration of the term and may consider the treaty terminated as of the date thus set." (Article 14.) This same clause was included in each of the succeeding treaties.

Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (signed October 25, 1979)

The USSR-PDRY friendship and cooperation treaty formalized already existing ties between the two countries. It differs mainly from the other treaties with "friendly" Third World countries in that it includes a formal endorsement--the first after Afghanistan's--of the Soviets' longstanding Asian regional security initiative.

The document contains standard commitments for developing cooperation "in the sphere of science, culture, art, literature... and contacts and cooperation between organs of state power and professional and other public organizations."

Article 5 calls for military cooperation "on the basis of the relevant agreements" (of which none has been published). And Article 11, regarding response to threats to "peace," is

markedly ambiguous: the parties have agreed merely to "seek to make immediate contact with a view to coordinating their positions in the interests of eliminating the threat."

Soviet endorsement of the PDRY position in the non-aligned camp is balanced off by Aden's general endorsement of the USSR's "peace-loving foreign policy." The PDRY evidently set limits for Soviet involvement in its internal affairs, while the USSR placed constraints on military support to be extended to the PDRY.

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the Syrian Arab Republic (signed October 8, 1980)

The Syrian-Soviet treaty, the first concluded by Moscow since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, is perhaps more important for its symbolism than its substance. It calls for:

- strengthening friendship and cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural fields;
- mutual consultation on bilateral and international issues;
- expansion of contacts between state and scientific, cultural, technical, labor, and economic organizations;
- a joint anti-imperialist stance; and
- "complete disarmament," including nuclear weapons.

Like the Iraqi, Angolan, Ethiopian, and Mozambican treaties, the Syrian treaty pledges military cooperation "in the interests of strengthening...defense capacity." It also provides for consultation "with a view to coordination of...positions and to cooperation in order to remove the threat" when the peace or security of either party or world order is in jeopardy. And, as is the case with all Soviet Third World treaties except those with Egypt and Vietnam, the text stresses Syrian non-alignment; as in the Iraqi treaty, both parties pledge continued opposition to Zionism, which is equated with racism.

The Syrian treaty has three unique features, however:

- Article 1 calls for strengthened military cooperation, in addition to the usual links.
- Article 5 insists on regular consultations "on the problems of the Middle East."

--Article 6 calls for consultations when the peace of the "whole world" is threatened, not just when the security of the USSR or Syria is in jeopardy; in addition, it calls for coordination of positions--as do several of the other treaties--and "cooperation in order to remove the threat."

Brezhnev observed that the new treaty binds both Syria and the USSR to seeking a "just peace" in the Middle East. He also stressed that it was not directed at any third party, a routine disclaimer by the Soviets when signing friendship treaties with the Third World.

During the Lebanese missile crisis, the Soviets, while pledging support for Syria, have been careful to note that the treaty does not bind them to any specific action and have even argued that it has no real relevance in this type of situation, despite Syrian efforts to portray it as proof of great-power backing.

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the People's Republic of the Congo (signed May 13, 1981)

The friendship treaty signed during Congolese President Sassou's May 12-17, 1981, visit to Moscow reflects Soviet desire to improve the USSR's position along Africa's western coast and Brazzaville's recognition of its continued dependence on Soviet military aid. The treaty is, however, the softest the Soviets have ever signed with a Third World country, and Moscow has done little to publicize it since its signature.

The text of the Congolese treaty resembles Moscow's other treaties with African countries in that both parties pledge closer cooperation on "political, economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technical" matters. Unlike the other three African treaties, however, the Congolese does not call for greater military cooperation. Nor does it commit either party as firmly to "consult" or "coordinate" their positions in the event of a threat to peace as do the Angolan, Mozambican, or Ethiopian treaties. It specifies neither the issues on which each party must consult nor the level of consultation.

Finally, the Congolese treaty is more vague on the issue of either party joining alliances directed against the other. It does not specifically prohibit either party from joining such alliances or groupings; instead, it merely pledges that each of the signatories will refrain from "actions or measures" aimed against the other. These differences probably stem from Congolese concern that the treaty might appear to tie the Congo too closely to the USSR or limit its freedom of action.

Despite the treaty, the differences which have plagued bilateral relations since Sassou took office in 1979 remain. Indeed, on May 12 TASS admitted that there had been a "frank exchange of opinions" during the visit, a sure indication that the two sides did not see eye to eye on all matters. The Soviets and Congolese have differed over Chad and Afghanistan. In the communique released on Sassou's departure from Moscow on May 17, however, both sides expressed their "full solidarity" with the Kabul regime. Sassou is also apparently unhappy with Moscow's meager economic aid; without a significant Soviet economic commitment, he is likely to avoid closer ties and will remain interested in improving ties with the West, especially France.

Prepared by Wayne Limberg, Karen Puschel  
x29212

Approved by R. Baraz  
x29192

USSR-UAR TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION  
(signed May 27, 1971; abrogated March 15, 1976)\*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic,

Being firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-around cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic meets the interests of the peoples of both states and helps strengthen world peace,

Being inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and for the freedom, independence and social progress of the peoples,

Being determined to wage persistently the struggle for stronger international peace and security in accordance with the invariable course of their peaceable foreign policy,

Reaffirming their allegiance to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Being driven by a desire to consolidate and strengthen the traditional relations of sincere friendship between the two states and peoples through concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation and thus creating a basis for their further development,

Agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare that unbreakable friendship will always exist between the two countries and their peoples. They will continue to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and all-around cooperation between them in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit.

\* Unofficial translation.



Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a socialist state and the United Arab Republic, which has set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines, will cooperate closely and in all fields in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples.

Article 3

Being guided by a desire to contribute in every way toward maintaining international peace and the security of the peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic will continue with all determination to make efforts toward achieving and ensuring a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

In pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy, the high contracting parties will come out for peace, relaxation of international tension, achievement of general and complete disarmament and prohibition of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Article 4

Being guided by the ideals of freedom and equality of all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to come out against imperialism, for the full and final elimination of colonialism in pursuance of the U.N. declaration on the granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples, and wage unswervingly the struggle against racialism and apartheid.

Article 5

The high contracting parties will continue to expand and deepen all-around cooperation and exchange of experience in the economic and scientific-technological fields -- industry, agriculture, water conservancy, irrigation, development of natural resources, development of power engineering, the training of national personnel and other fields of economy.

The two sides will expand trade and sea shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and most-favored nation treatment.

Article 6

The high contracting parties will further promote cooperation between them in the fields of science, arts, literature, education,

health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, physical culture and other fields.

The two sides will promote wider cooperation and direct connections between political and public organizations of working people, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, work and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 7

Being deeply interested in ensuring peace and the security of the peoples, and attaching great importance to concertedness of their actions in the international area in the struggle for peace, the high contracting parties will, for this purpose, regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states.

In the event of development of situations creating, in the opinion of both sides, a danger to peace or violation of peace, they will contact each other without delay in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace.

Article 8

In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the United Arab Republic, the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the U.A.R. military personnel, in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression in general.

Article 9

Proceeding from the aims and principles of this treaty.

Each of the high contracting parties states that it will not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states, in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties declares that its commitments under the existing international treaties are not in contradiction

with the provisions of this treaty and it undertakes not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 11

The present treaty will be operative within 15 years since the day it enters into force.

If neither of the high contracting parties declares a year before the expiry of this term its desire to terminate the treaty, it will remain in force for the next five years and so henceforth until one of the high contracting parties makes a year before the expiry of the current five-year period a written warning on its intention to terminate it.

Article 12

The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Moscow in the nearest future.

The present treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, with both texts being equally authentic.

Done in the city of Cairo on May 27, 1971, which corresponds to 3 Rabia as Sani, 1391, Hejira.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

N. PODGORNYY

For the United Arab Republic.

ANWAR SADAT

INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP, AND  
COOPERATION (signed August 9, 1971)\*

Desirous of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

Believing that further development of friendship and co-operation meets the basic national interests of both States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the World,

Determined to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and final elimination of the remnants of colonialism,

Upholding their firm faith in the principles of peaceful coexistence and co-operation between States with different political and social systems,

Convinced that in the world today international problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by conflict,

Reaffirming their determination to abide by the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter,

The Republic of India on one side and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side, have decided to conclude the present Treaty, for which purpose the following plenipotentiaries have been appointed:

On behalf of the Republic of India:

Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister of External Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

who having each presented their credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order, have agreed as follows.

Article 1: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries

\* Text as published by the Information Service of India, Embassy of India, August 9, 1971.

and their peoples. Each Party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other Party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and consolidate relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive co-operation existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.

Article 2: Guided by a desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure an enduring peace and security of their people, the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve a general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

Article 3: Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate with other States to achieve these aims and to support just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

Article 4: The Republic of India respects the peace-loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in lessening of tensions in the world.

Article 5: Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual co-operation in international field for achieving these aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both States by means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments and through diplomatic channels.

Article 6: Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured nation treatment subject to the existing

agreements and special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement of December 26, 1970.

Article 7: The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

Article 8: In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other Party.

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against other Party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High Contracting Party.

Article 9: Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such a threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries.

Article 10: Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation secret or public with one or more States which is incompatible with this treaty. Each High Contracting Party further declares that no obligation exists nor shall any obligation be entered into between itself and any other State or States which might cause military damage to the other Party.

Article 11: This Treaty is concluded for a duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by giving a notice to the other High Contracting Party twelve months prior to expiration of Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

Article 12: Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty, which may arise between the High Contracting Parties, will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in New Delhi on 9th Day of August in the year 1971.

On behalf of the Republic of India signed Swaran Singh,  
Minister of External Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
signed A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

USSR-IRAQ TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION  
(signed April 9, 1972)\*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic:

Firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-round cooperation between them accords with the national interests of both states, serves the cause of peace in the whole world and in the area of Arab countries, the interests of the freedom of the peoples, their security and respect of sovereignty.

Believing that the strengthening of the cohesion of all forces of peace and progress, including the consolidation of the unity of Arab states, on an anti-imperialist basis is an important means of struggle for lasting peace and international security.

Inspired by ideals of struggle against imperialism, colonialism, zionism and reaction, for the freedom, independence and social progress of the peoples.

Convinced that the present-day world international problems should be solved by way of cooperation and the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

Confirming their peace-loving foreign policy and loyalty to the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations organizations.

Wishing to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship, cooperation and mutual trust, striving to raise these relations to a new, even higher level, have decided to conclude the present treaty and agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties declare that inviolable friendship will exist between the two countries and their peoples and all-round cooperation will develop in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each others internal affairs.

\* Unofficial translation.



Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic declare that they will closely and comprehensively cooperate in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the socio-economic gains of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.

Article 3

The high contracting parties, consistently pursuing the policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, in accordance with their peace-loving foreign policy will further come out for peace in the whole world, for easing of international tensions, for the attainment of general and complete disarmament, encompassing both nuclear and conventional arms under effective international control.

Article 4

Proceeding from the ideals of freedom and the equality of all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

They will further conduct an undeviating struggle against imperialism and Zionism, for a full, final and unconditional liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid, come out for the speediest full implementation of the United Nations declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The sides will cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

Article 5

Attaching much importance to economic, technical and scientific cooperation between them, the high contracting parties will further expand and deepen this cooperation and exchange of experience in industry, agriculture, irrigation and water conservancy, in the working of oil and other natural resources, in the field of communications and in other branches of the economy as well as in the training of national cadres. The sides will expand trade and shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most favoured nation treatment.

Article 6

The high contracting parties will facilitate a further development of ties and contacts between them in the field of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, cinematography, television, tourism, sport and in other fields.

With the aim of securing a fuller mutual acquaintance with the life, labour and achievements of the peoples of both countries in various fields the sides will facilitate an expansion of cooperation and direct ties between state bodies and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions of both states.

Article 7

Attaching much importance to concerted actions on the international scene in the interests of ensuring peace and security and also to the development of political cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the high contracting parties will regularly consult each other at various levels on all important international questions concerning the interests of both states, as well as on questions of further developing bilateral relations.

Article 8

In the event of the origination of situations threatening the peace of any of the sides or creating a threat to peace or violating peace, the high contracting parties will immediately contact each other with the aim of coordinating their positions in the interests of removing the threat or restoring peace.

Article 9

In the interests of the security of both countries the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of their defense capabilities.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties declares that it will not enter alliances or take part in any groupings of states, as well as in actions or undertakings directed against the other high contracting party.

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to permit the use of its territory for any act capable of inflicting military damage to the other side.

Article 11

The two high contracting parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of the present treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 12

The present treaty is concluded for a period of 15 years and will be automatically prolonged for each subsequent five-year period if any of the high contracting parties does not express its desire to terminate twelve months before the expiration of the treaty.

Article 13

Any differences that may arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation of some provision of the present treaty will be resolved bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Article 14

The present treaty is subject to ratification and will enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which will be effected in Moscow in the shortest possible period of time.

The present treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, both texts being of equal authenticity.

Done in Baghdad on April 9, 1972, this according with the 25th Safar, the 1392 year of the hegira.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A. KOSYGIN

For the Iraqi Republic.

A. H. AL-BAKR

FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION TREATY BETWEEN USSR AND  
SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
(signed October 30, 1974; abrogated November 13, 1977)\*

The USSR and the Somali Democratic Republic [SDR],

Considering that the further development of friendship and all-round cooperation between them accords with the fundamental national interests of the peoples of both states and serves the cause of strengthening peace throughout the world;

Inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism and colonialism and the invariable desire to give every possible support to the peoples struggling for the freedom, independence, and social progress of the peoples and to strive for the final liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;

Fully resolved to promote the consolidation of international peace and security in the interests of peoples of all countries;

Convinced that in the modern world international problems should be resolved only by peaceful means;

Confirming their fidelity to the goals and principles of the UN Charter;

Motivated by the desire to strengthen and consolidate the relations of friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation which have taken shape between both states and peoples and to create the basis for their further development;

Have resolved to conclude the present friendship and cooperation treaty and have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly state that stable peace and friendship will exist between both countries and their peoples. The sides will continue to develop and strengthen their relations on the basis of the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and equality. They will cooperate in every way in insuring conditions for

\* Text as published by the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), November 1, 1974.

the preservation and deepening of their peoples' socioeconomic achievements.

#### Article 2

The USSR and the SDR will continue to expand and deepen all-round cooperation and exchange of experience in the economic and scientific-technical spheres--in industry, farming and livestock raising, irrigation and water resources, the development of natural resources, the development of power engineering, the training of national cadres, and in other corresponding spheres of the economy.

The sides will expand trade and maritime navigation between them on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and most-favored-nation status in accordance with the provisions of the trade and payments agreement between both countries concluded in Moscow on 2 June 1961.

#### Article 3

The high contracting parties will contribute to the further development of cooperation between them in the sphere of science, art, literature, education, health, the press, radio, the cinema, television, tourism, sport, and in other spheres.

The sides will contribute to the expansion of cooperation and direct ties between the political and public organizations of the working people, enterprises, and cultural and scientific establishments with the aim of deeper mutual familiarization with the life, labor and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

#### Article 4

In the interests of strengthening the SDR's defense capability the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of the corresponding agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide for, in particular, cooperation in the training of Somali military personnel and in the mastery of the arms and equipment supplied to the SDR for the purposes of enhancing its defense potential.

#### Article 5

Pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy, the USSR and the SDR will continue to contribute in every way to the preservation of peace and to advocate the easing of international tension, the settlement of international problems by peaceful means, and the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, primarily, nuclear disarmament.

Article 6

The USSR respects the policy of nonalignment pursued by the SDR, which constitutes a factor in maintaining international peace and security.

The SDR respects the peace-loving policy pursued by the USSR aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all peoples.

Article 7

Guided by the ideals of the freedom and equality of all peoples, the high contracting parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. They will continue to oppose the forces of imperialism and colonialism and to cooperate with each other and with other states in supporting the struggle of the peoples for freedom, independence, and social progress on the basis of the principle of equality and self-determination of the peoples, as expressed in the UN Charter.

Article 8

Expressing profound interest in safeguarding universal peace and security and attaching great significance to cooperation between themselves in the international arena for the purpose of achieving these objectives, the high contracting parties will consult regularly and exchange views with each other on important international issues.

Such consultations and exchanges of view will encompass:

International issues, including situations causing tension in various parts of the world, with a view to contributing to the relaxation of tension, developing cooperation, and strengthening security;

Issues which are the subject of multilateral negotiations, including those being examined by international organizations and at international conferences and

Issues of a political, economic, and cultural nature and other issues affecting relations between the two countries.

Such consultations and exchanges of view will be effected through meetings between leading statesmen from the sides and visits by official delegations and special representatives and also through diplomatic channels.

Article 9

In the event of the emergence of situations creating a threat to or a violation of peace the high contracting parties will make contact

without delay and consult with each other with a view to eliminating the threat which has arisen or restoring peace.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties states that it will not be party to military alliances or any groupings of states or to actions or undertakings directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 11

Each of the high contracting parties states that its commitments under existing international treaties are not at variance with the provisions of the current treaty and undertake not to become party to any international agreements incompatible with them.

Article 12

This treaty will be in force for a term of 20 years from the date of its validation.

Unless either of the high contracting parties expresses its desire to terminate the treaty within 1 year prior to the expiration of this term, it will remain in force for the next 5 years and until such time as one of the high contracting parties gives written notice 1 year prior to the expiration of the 5-year period of its intention to terminate the validity of the treaty.

Article 13

This treaty is subject to ratification and will come into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which will take place as soon as possible in Moscow.

This treaty is made in two copies, one in Russian and one in Somali, both texts being of equal validity.

Done in Mogadiscio this 11 July 1974.

For the USSR, N. V. Podgorny.

For the SDR, Mohamed Siad Barre.

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA (signed October 8, 1976)\*

The USSR and the People's Republic of Angola:

Considering that the further development and strengthening of the relations of friendship and comprehensive cooperation which have taken shape between them as a result of Angola's struggle for freedom and independence correspond to the fundamental national interests of both countries' peoples and serve the cause of peace throughout the world;

Inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism in all its forms and manifestations, and by the immutable desire to render all possible support to peoples struggling for freedom, independence and social progress;

Firmly resolved to facilitate the consolidation of international peace and security in the interests of the peoples of all countries;

Confirming their fidelity to the aims and principles of the UN Charter;

Coming out in favor of the unity of all progressive forces in the struggle for peace, freedom, independence and social progress, and believing that the development of friendly relations and broad cooperation among the countries of socialism and the developing states meets their common interests;

Taking into account the 26 May 1976 declaration on the bases of friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of Angola and moved by the desire to consolidate the existing relations of friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation between both states and peoples.

Have decided to conclude the present treaty of friendship and cooperation and have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The high contracting parties state that indissoluble friendship will exist and comprehensive cooperation in political, economic, trade,

\* Text as published by FBIS, October 12, 1976.



scientific and technical, cultural and other spheres will develop on the basis of the respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs and of equality between both countries and their peoples.

#### Article 2

The high contracting parties state that they will cooperate closely and comprehensively in guaranteeing efforts to preserve and further develop the socioeconomic gains of their peoples and to respect the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.

#### Article 3

The USSR respects the People's Republic of Angola's policy of nonalignment, which is an important factor in maintaining international peace and security.

The People's Republic of Angola respects the peace-loving foreign policy pursued by the USSR as a socialist state.

#### Article 4

The high contracting parties will continue to come out in favor of peace throughout the world, the deepening of the relaxation of international tension and its embodiment in concrete forms of mutually advantageous cooperation among states, the settlement of international problems by peaceful means and the conclusion of a universal treaty on the nonuse of force in international relations and the achievement of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

#### Article 5

The high contracting parties will continue to wage an unflinching struggle against the forces of imperialism and for the final elimination of colonialism and neocolonialism, racism and apartheid, and advocate implementation of the UN declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The parties will cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

#### Article 6

The high contracting parties, expressing a profound interest in insuring universal peace and security and attaching much significance

to cooperation between them in the international arena in order to achieve these aims, will regularly exchange opinions with each other on important international questions and also on questions of bilateral relations.

These consultations and exchanges of opinions will cover:

- International questions, including situations causing tension in various regions of the world, with a view to assisting in the relaxation of tension, the development of cooperation and the strengthening of international security;
- Questions which are the subject of multilateral negotiations, including those under consideration in international organizations and at international conferences;
- Questions of a political, economic and cultural nature and other questions concerning relations between the two countries.

These consultations and exchanges of opinion will take place at various levels, including meetings between the sides' leading statesmen, during official visits by delegations and special representatives and also via diplomatic channels.

Article 7

In the event of situations arising which create a threat to peace or a breach of the peace, the high contracting parties will immediately contact each other with a view to coordinating their positions in the interests of eliminating the threat that has arisen or restoring peace.

Article 8

In attaching much significance to economic, technical and scientific cooperation between themselves, the high contracting parties shall further broaden and deepen this cooperation and exchange of experience in industry, transportation, farming, livestock raising, fishing, the exploiting of natural resources, the development of power, communications and lines of communication, in training national cadres and also in other spheres of the economy.

The parties will broaden trade and navigation between themselves on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most-favored-nation status.

Article 9

The high contracting parties will assist the further development of ties and cooperation between themselves in the spheres of science, art, literature, education, public health, the press, radio, the motion-picture industry, television, tourism, sport and other spheres.

The parties will assist the broadening of cooperation and direct links between political and social organizations, enterprises and cultural and scientific institutions with a view to deeper mutual familiarization with the life, labor and achievements of both countries' peoples.

Article 10

In the interests of strengthening the high contracting parties' defense capability they will continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of corresponding agreements which are being concluded between them.

Article 11

Each of the high contracting parties states that it will not enter into alliances or take part in any grouping of states, or also in actions or measures, directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 12

The high contracting parties state that their commitments under existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of the present treaty and pledge not to conclude any international agreements which are incompatible with it.

Article 13

Any questions which may arise between the high contracting parties regarding the interpretation or application of any provision of the present treaty will be resolved bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Article 14

The present treaty will remain in force for 20 years from the day it enters into force.

If neither of the high contracting parties shall state its desire, a year prior to the expiration of the term indicated, to terminate the treaty, it will remain in force for successive 5 year periods and until such time as one of the high contracting parties shall provide, a year prior to the expiration of the current 5-year period, written notice of its intention to terminate the treaty's validity.

Article 15

The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day that instruments of ratification are exchanged in the city of Luanda.

The present treaty is done in duplicate, in the Russian and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done at Moscow, 8 October 1976

For the USSR: L. Brezhnev

For the People's Republic of Angola: A. Neto

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND  
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE (signed March 31, 1977)\*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's  
Republic of Mozambique:

Holding the relations of friendship and cooperation that formed  
between the Soviet and Mozambique peoples in the difficult years of the  
people's war for the liberation of Mozambique and that consolidated  
after the formation of the People's Republic of Mozambique are in keep-  
ing with the vital interests of both sides and serve the cause of world  
peace;

Determined to support each other in the creation of a more favour-  
able condition for the consolidation of the revolutionary social and  
economic gains of both peoples;

Inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism,  
colonialism and racialism;

Prompted by the striving to give support to the struggle for world  
peace and security in the interests of progress;

Confirming their loyalty to the goals and principles of the United  
Nations Charter;

Striving to consolidate the existing relations of friendship and  
mutually advantageous cooperation between both states and peoples who  
are natural allies;

Have decided to conclude this treaty of friendship and  
cooperation:

Article 1

The high contracting parties proclaim their resolve to strengthen  
and deepen the unbreakable friendship between both countries and peoples  
and to develop all-round cooperation. On the basis of respect for  
sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's  
internal affairs and equality, the two parties will be cooperating in  
every way in creating ever more favourable conditions for preserving  
and deepening social and economic gains of the peoples of the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Mozambique.

\* Text as published by FBIS, April 4, 1977.

Article 2

The high contracting parties attach great importance to all-round cooperation between them and to the exchange of experience in the economic, technical and scientific spheres. For these purposes, they will be expanding and deepening cooperation in industry, transport and communications, agriculture, fisheries, development of natural resources, development of energetics and other spheres of economy, as well as in training national cadres.

Both sides will be expanding trade and shipping on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and the most-favoured nation treatment.

Article 3

The high contracting parties will be promoting the development of cooperation, mutual assistance and exchange of experience in science, culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, cinema, tourism, sports and other spheres.

The sides will promote widening of cooperation and direct links between their political and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions to deepen mutual knowledge of the life, work, experience and achievements of the peoples of both countries.

Article 4

In the interests of reinforcing defence potentials of the high contracting parties, they will continue developing cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of appropriate agreements.

Article 5

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of non-alignment conducted by the People's Republic of Mozambique, the policy that is an important factor of maintaining world peace and security.

The People's Republic of Mozambique respects the policy of peace aimed at strengthening of friendship and cooperation with all peoples that is conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 6

The high contracting parties will continue the struggle for world peace, will continue exerting every effort for deepening the

relaxation of international tensions. They will be coming out for implementing it in specific forms of mutually advantageous cooperation between states. Both sides will be exerting every effort to achieve general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control, for settling international disputes by peaceful means, for concluding a world treaty on non-use of force in international relations.

Article 7

The high contracting parties will continue the consistent struggle against the forces of imperialism, for final liquidation of colonialism, neocolonialism, racialism and apartheid. They declare for complete implementation of the United Nations declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The sides will be cooperating with each other and with other peaceful states in supporting the just struggle of peoples for freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.

Article 8

The high contracting parties, expressing profound interest in ensuring peace and international security and attaching great importance to their cooperation on the international arena for achieving these goals will be regularly exchanging opinions on important international questions in the spirit of mutual understanding. Such consultations and exchange of opinions will also include questions of political, economic and cultural nature and other questions of bilateral relations.

Consultations and exchange of opinions will be held at various levels, specifically through meetings between leading statesmen of both countries, during visits of official delegations and special representatives and through diplomatic channels.

Article 9

If situations arise that threaten peace or break peace, the high contracting parties will immediately get into contact with each other to coordinate their positions in the interests of eliminating the arising threat or restoring peace.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties declares that it will not enter any military or other alliances, nor take part in any groupings of states, in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 11

The high contracting parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not at variance with the provisions of this treaty and pledge themselves not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 12

Questions that might arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of any provision of this treaty [words indistinct] settled in a bilateral way, in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.

Article 13

The present treaty will operate for twenty years since the day it comes into effect.

If neither of the high contracting parties expresses its wish to terminate the treaty one year before the expiration of the aforementioned term, the treaty will remain in force for the next five years and so on, until one of the high contracting parties makes a written statement about its intention to terminate the treaty one year before the expiration of the current five-year period.

Article 14

This treaty is to be ratified and will go into effect on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification to take place in Moscow.

This treaty is drawn up in two copies, each one in Russian and Portuguese, both texts being authentic.

[Words indistinct] the city of Maputo on March 31, 1977.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Nikolay Podgornyy.

For the People's Republic of Mozambique: President of the People's Republic of Mozambique Samora M. Machel.



DRAFT SOVIET-JAPANESE TREATY OF GOODNEIGHBORHOOD AND COOPERATION  
(proposed February 1978)\*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, seeking to promote the consolidation of peace and security in the Far East, in the Pacific basin and throughout the world;

Convinced that peaceful cooperation between both states on the basis of the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter accord with the aspirations of the Soviet and Japanese peoples, the broad interests of international peace;

Guided by the desire fully to overcome the elements of estrangement and distrust in their mutual relations, engendered in the past;

Prompted by solicitude for creating an atmosphere of goodneighbourhood and goodwill between both countries;

Reaffirming their intention to continue talks on the conclusion of a peace treaty;

Desiring to express in contractual form their resolve to create a firm and long-term foundation for the development of all-round cooperation between them, above all, in the political sphere, and also in the sphere of the economy, science, technology and culture;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan regard the maintenance of peace, extension and strengthening of relaxation of tension and strengthening of international security as one of the main aims of their policy.

They express a desire to exert efforts for the consolidation of universal peace on the Asian Continent, in the Pacific basin and throughout the world.

\* As published by FBIS, February 23, 1978.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake in their mutual relations to refrain from the threat of force or its use.

The high contracting parties shall develop and strengthen relations of goodneighbourhood and mutually-advantageous cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

Article 3

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan undertake not to allow the use of their territories for any actions, which could prejudice the security of the other party.

Article 4

The high contracting parties undertake to refrain from any actions encouraging any third party to take aggressive actions against either of them.

Article 5

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall maintain and widen regular contacts and consultations on important international issues concerning the interests of both states through meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen and through diplomatic channels.

Should a situation arise, which, in the opinion of both sides is dangerous for maintaining peace, or if peace is violated, the sides shall immediately contact each other with the aim of exchanging views on the question of what can be done for improving the situation.

Article 6

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan declare their determination to continue efforts for ending the arms race, of both nuclear and conventional weapons, and attaining general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Article 7

Considering trade relations to be an important and necessary element of strengthening bilateral relations and attaching great significance to economic cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and Japan, the parties shall actively promote the growth of such relations, contribute to cooperation between the appropriate organisations and enterprises of both countries and to concluding appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

Article 8

Attaching great significance to scientific and technical cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the parties will promote in every way possible an expansion of mutually beneficial and all-round cooperation in these fields on the basis of the treaties and agreements, which exist or will be concluded between them.

Article 9

Being interested in the preservation and rational use of biological resources of the world ocean, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall continue broadening cooperation in this field on the basis of the appropriate agreements and with due regard for the legislation of the parties.

Article 10

The high contracting parties shall encourage the development of relations between government institutions and public organisations in the field of science, arts, education, television, radio and sports, contributing to a mutual enrichment of achievements in these fields, to strengthening the feeling of respect and friendliness of the peoples of those countries for each other.

Article 11

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall strive that the relations and cooperation between them in all the above listed fields and any other fields of mutual interest be built on a durable and long-term basis. With this aim in view, the parties shall establish, where it is deemed advisable, joint commissions, or other joint bodies.

Article 12

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan do not claim and do not recognize anyone's claims to any special rights to advantages in world affairs, including claims to domination in Asia and in the area of the Far East.

Article 13

This treaty shall not affect the bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements concluded earlier by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, and is not directed against any third country.

Article 14

This treaty shall be subject to ratification and enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification to be done in the city of.....done at.....on.....in two copies, each in the Russian and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

For Japan

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE  
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE USSR\*

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Proceeding from the close cooperation in all fields in a fraternal spirit, from the unshakable friendship and solidarity between the two countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism,

Firmly convinced that the endeavour to consolidate the solidarity and friendship between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is in conformity with the basic interests of the two peoples and in the interests of the consolidation of the fraternal friendship and one-mindedness among the countries in the socialist community,

In keeping with the principles and objectives of the socialist foreign policy and the desire to ensure the most favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism,

Confirming that the signatories to the treaty acknowledge their international obligation to assist each other in the consolidation and preservation of the socialist achievements recorded by the two people through their heroic efforts and selfless labour,

Determined to work for the unity of all forces struggling for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress,

Expressing their iron-like determination to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Asia and throughout the world, and to the development of good relations and mutually beneficial cooperation among countries with different social systems,

Hoping to further develop and perfect the all-round cooperation between the two countries,

Attaching importance to the continued development and consolidation of the juridical basis of the bilateral relations,

In keeping with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter,

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\* Text as published by FBIS, November 6, 1978.

Have resolved to sign this Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and have agreed as follows:

Article 1

In keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism, the two parties signatory to the present treaty shall continue to consolidate the unshakable friendship and solidarity and assist each other in a fraternal spirit. The two parties shall unceasingly develop political relations and cooperation in all fields and endeavour to assist each other on the basis of respect for each other's national independence and sovereignty, equality and non-interference in each other's international affairs.

Article 2

The two parties signatory to the present treaty shall join efforts to consolidate and broaden the mutually beneficial cooperation in the economic and scientific-technological fields in order to push forward the building of socialism and communism and to constantly raise the material and cultural standards of the two peoples. The two parties shall continue to coordinate their long-term national economic plans, agree upon long-term measures aimed at developing the most important sectors of the economy, science and technology and exchange knowledge and experience accumulated in the building of socialism and communism.

Article 3

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall promote cooperation between their state bodies and mass organizations, and develop broad relations in the fields of science and culture, education, literature and art, press, broadcasting and television, health service, environmental protection, tourism, sports and physical training and others. The two parties shall encourage the development of contacts between the working people of the two countries.

Article 4

The two parties signatory to the treaty consistently strive to further consolidate their fraternal relations, and to strengthen the solidarity and one-mindedness among the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

The two parties shall do their utmost to consolidate the world socialist system and actively contribute to the development and defence of the socialist gains.

## Article 5

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall continue doing their utmost to contribute to defending world peace and the security of all nations; they shall actively oppose all schemes and manouvres of imperialism and reactionary forces, support the just struggle for the complete eradication of all forms and colours of colonialism and racism, support the struggle waged by non-aligned countries and the peoples of Asian, African and Latin American countries against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism; for the consolidation of independence and the defence of sovereignty, for mastery over their natural resources and for the establishment of a new world economic relationship with no inequality, oppression and exploitation, and support the aspirations of the Southeast Asian peoples for peace, independence and cooperation among countries in this region.

The two parties shall strive to develop the relations between countries with different social systems on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, for the purpose of broadening and consolidating the process of easing tension in international relations and radically eliminating aggressions and wars of aggression from the life of all nations, for the sake of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

## Article 6

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall exchange views on all important international questions relating to the interests of the two countries.

In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries.

## Article 7

The present treaty does not concern the two parties rights and obligations stemming from the bilateral or multilateral agreements to which they are signatories and is not intended to oppose any third country.

## Article 8

The present treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Hanoi as early as possible.

Article 9

The present treaty shall remain in force for 25 years and thereafter shall automatically extended for periods of ten years if neither signatory party declares its desire to terminate the present treaty by informing the other twelve months before the treaty expires.

Done in duplicate in the Vietnamese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic, in Moscow, this third day of November 1978

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam:

Le Duan  
Pham Van Dong

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. Brezhnev  
A. N. Kosygin



TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND  
SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA  
(signed November 20, 1978)\*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and socialist Ethiopia believing that the further development and strengthening of the relations of friendship and all-round cooperation which have come into being between them meet the basic national interests of the peoples of the two countries and serve the cause of strengthening peace and security throughout the world;

Desirous of making their corresponding contribution to the development of peaceful relations between states and fruitful international cooperation;

Determined to advance social and economic achievements of the Soviet and Ethiopian peoples;

Inspired by the ideals of consistent struggle against imperialism and expansionism as well as against colonialism, racism, apartheid in all their forms and manifestations and being guided by the desire to render support to the peoples fighting for their freedom, independence and social progress;

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, including the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other;

Bearing in mind the declaration on basic principles of friendly relations and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and socialist Ethiopia of May 6, 1977 and motivated by the desire to consolidate still further these relations of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two states and peoples, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The high contracting parties shall develop and deepen the relations of unbreakable friendship and comprehensive cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific and technical, cultural and other fields on the basis of equality, non-interference in each other's

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\* Text as published by FBIS, November 21, 1978.

internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity [?and inviolability] of borders.

Article 2

The high contracting parties declare that they shall closely cooperate in every way in ensuring the conditions for preserving and further developing socio-economic achievements of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.

Article 3

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy pursued by socialist Ethiopia based on the purposes and principles laid down in the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned movement which constitutes an important factor in the development of international cooperation and peaceful co-existence.

Socialist Ethiopia respects the peace-loving foreign policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all countries and peoples.

Article 4

The high contracting parties shall continue to make every effort to safeguard international peace and the security of peoples, deepen the process of international detente, extend it to all areas of the world, lend it concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation between states and settle international controversial issues by peaceful means without prejudice to the legitimate rights of states to defend themselves, individually or collectively, against aggression in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. They shall actively contribute to the cause of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 5

The high contracting parties shall continue actively to work for the complete elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid and the full implementation of the United Nations declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

Article 6

The high contracting parties shall consult each other on important international questions directly involving the interests of the two countries.

Article 7

In the event of situations which constitute a threat to or a breach of international peace, the high contracting parties shall endeavour to immediately establish contact with each other with a view to coordinating their positions in the interests of removing the threat that has arisen or restoring peace.

Article 8

The high contracting parties shall, attaching great importance to economic, trade and scientific cooperation between them, expand and deepen cooperation and the exchange of experiences in these fields. The parties shall expand all-round cooperation between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment.

Article 9

The high contracting parties shall promote the further development of ties and co-operation between them in the fields of science, culture, art, literature, education, health, press, radio, cinema, television, tourism, sports and in other fields for the purpose of more profound mutual acquaintance with the life, work, experience and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 10

In the interests of ensuring the defense capability of the high contracting parties, they shall continue to co-operate in the military field.

Article 11

Each of the high contracting parties declares that it shall not enter into any alliance or participate in any alignment of states or in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 12

The high contracting parties declare that the provisions of the present treaty are not inconsistent with their commitments under international treaties in force and undertake not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with this treaty.

Article 13

Any questions that may arise between the high contracting parties with regard to the interpretation or application of any provision of this treaty shall be resolved on a bilateral basis in the spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Article 14

This treaty shall remain in force for twenty years after its entry into force. Unless either high contracting party declares, one year prior to the expiration of the said period, its desire to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force for the successive periods of five years until one of the high contracting parties gives, one year prior to the expiration of the current five year period, a written notice of its intention to terminate it.

Article 15

This treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Addis Ababa as early as possible. This treaty is made in two copies, each in the Russian, Amharic and English languages, the texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on November 20, 1978.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

L. I. Brezhnev

For socialist Ethiopia

Mengistu Haile Mariam

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, GOODNEIGHBOURLINESS, AND COOPERATION  
BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN  
(signed December 5, 1978)\*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,

Reaffirming their commitment to the aims and principles of the Soviet-Afghan treaties of 1921 and 1931, which laid the basis for friendly and goodneighbour relations between the Soviet and Afghan peoples and which meet their basic national interests,

Willing to strengthen in every way friendship and all-round cooperation between the two countries,

Being determined to develop social and economic achievements of the Soviet and Afghan peoples, to safeguard their security and independence, to come out resolutely for the cohesion of all the forces fighting for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress,

Expressing their firm determination to facilitate the strengthening of peace and security in Asia and the whole world, to make their contribution toward developing relations among states and strengthening fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation in Asia, attaching great importance to the further consolidation of the contractual-legal basis of their relations,

Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighbourliness and Cooperation and agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare their determination to strengthen and deepen the inviolable friendship between the two countries and to develop all-round cooperation on the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

\* Text as published by FBIS, December 6, 1978.

Article 2

The high contracting parties shall make efforts to strengthen and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them. With these aims in view, they shall develop and deepen cooperation in the fields of industry, transport and communications, agriculture, the use of national resources, development of the power-generating industry and other branches of economy, and give assistance in the training of national personnel and in planning the development of the national economy. The two sides shall expand trade on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favoured nation treatment.

Article 3

The high contracting parties shall promote the development of cooperation and exchange of experience in the fields of science, culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sport, and other fields.

The two sides shall facilitate the expansion of cooperation between organs of state power and public organisations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions with a view to making a deeper acquaintance of the life, work experience and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 4

The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and goodneighbourliness, as well as the U.N. Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement of the two sides appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries.

In the interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the high contracting parties they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

Article 5

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of nonalignment which is pursued by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and which is an important factor for maintaining international peace and security.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan respects the policy of peace pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

Article 6

Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not join military or other alliances or take part in any groupings of states, as well as in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 7

The high contracting parties shall continue to make every effort to defend international peace and the security of the peoples, to deepen the process of relaxation of international tension, to spread it to all areas of the world, including Asia, to translate it into concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation among states and to settle international disputed issues by peaceful means.

The two sides shall actively contribute toward general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 8

The high contracting parties shall facilitate the development of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of relations of peace, goodneighbourliness and mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent.

Article 9

The high contracting parties shall continue their consistent struggle against machinations by the forces of aggression, for the final elimination of colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations.

The two sides shall cooperate with each other and with other peaceloving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.

Article 10

The high contracting parties shall consult each other on all major international issues affecting the interests of the two countries.

Article 11

The high contracting parties state that their commitments under the existing international treaties do not contradict the provisions of the present treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 12

Questions which may arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of any provision of the present treaty, shall be settled bilaterally, in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.

Article 13

The present treaty shall remain in force within twenty years of the day it becomes effective. Unless one of the high contracting parties declares six months before the expiration of this term of its desire to terminate the treaty it shall remain in force for the next five years and so on until one of the high contracting parties warns in writing six months before the expiration of current five-year term, about its intention to terminate the treaty.

Article 14

If one of the high contracting parties expresses the wish in the course of the twenty-year term of the treaty to terminate it before its expiration date, it shall notify in writing the other high contracting party, six months before its suggested date of expiration of the treaty, about its desire to terminate the treaty before the expiration of the term and may consider the treaty terminated as of the date thus set.

Article 15

The present treaty shall be ratified and take effect on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to take place in Kabul.

The present treaty is done in duplicate, each in the Russian and Dari languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on December 5, 1978.

For the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics

L. Brezhnev

For the Democratic  
Republic of Afghanistan

N. Mohammad Taraki



TREATY ON FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE  
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
(signed October 25, 1979)\*

Considering that the further development and strengthening of the relations of friendship and all-round cooperation which have become established between them accord with the vital national interests of the two countries' peoples and serve the cause of consolidating peace and security throughout the world,

Motivated by the desire to promote in every way the development of peaceful relations between states and fruitful international cooperation,

Fully determined to develop the socioeconomic achievements of the peoples of the USSR and the PDRY and to come out for the unity and cooperation of all forces fighting for peace and national independence, democracy and social progress,

Inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations,

Attaching great significance to the two countries' cooperation in the cause of the struggle for a just and lasting peace in the Near East,

Reasserting their loyalty to the aims and principles of the UN charter, including the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs,

Wishing to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare their determination to strengthen the indestructible friendship between the two countries and to steadily develop political relations and all-round cooperation on the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2

The high contracting parties will cooperate closely and in every way to insure the conditions for preserving and further developing their peoples' socioeconomic gains and respect for the sovereignty of each party over all their natural resources.

\* Text as published by FBIS, October 29, 1979.

Article 3

The high contracting parties will make efforts to strengthen and expand mutually advantageous economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them. To this end the parties will develop and deepen cooperation in the sphere of industry, agriculture, fisheries, the utilization of natural resources and the planning of national economic development and in other spheres of the economy, and also in training national cadres. The parties will expand trade and navigation on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most-favored-nation status.

Article 4

The high contracting parties will promote the development of cooperation and exchange of experience in the sphere of science, culture, art, literature, education, health care, the press, radio, television, the cinema, tourism, sport and other spheres.

The parties will promote the development of contacts and cooperation between organs of state power and professional and other public organizations, and also the expansion of direct ties between enterprises and cultural and scientific institutions with a view to more profound familiarization with the life, labor, experience and achievements of the two countries' peoples. The parties will stimulate the development of contacts between the two countries' working people.

Article 5

The high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of the relevant agreements concluded between them in the interests of strengthening their defense capability.

Article 6

The USSR respects the PDRY's policy of nonalignment, which is an important factor in the development of international cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

The PDRY respects the USSR's peace-loving foreign policy, which is aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

Article 7

The high contracting parties will continue to make every effort to defend international peace and the peoples' security, to deepen the relaxation of international tension, to extend it to all regions of the world, to embody it in concrete forms of mutually advantageous cooperation between states, to settle international disputes by peaceful means, to transform the principle of the nonuse of force into an effective law of international life and to eliminate all manifestations of the policy of hegemonism and

expansionism from the practice of international relations. The parties will actively promote the cause of universal and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 8

The high contracting parties will continue the active struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and for the final eradication of colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations.

The parties will cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in support of the peoples' just struggle for their freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.

Article 9

The high contracting parties will help in every way to insure a lasting and just peace in the Near East and, to that end, to achieve an all-embracing Near East settlement.

Article 10

The high contracting parties will promote the development of cooperation between Asian states, the establishment of relations of peace, good-neighborliness and mutual trust between them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all states of that continent.

Article 11

The high contracting parties will consult with one another on important international questions directly affecting the two countries' interests.

In the event of situations arising which create a threat to peace, the parties will seek to make immediate contact with a view to coordinating their positions in the interests of eliminating the threat which has arisen or restoring peace.

Article 12

Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it will not enter into military or other alliances or take part in any groupings of states, or actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 13

The high contracting parties declare that the provisions of the present treaty do not run counter to their commitments under existing international treaties, and pledge not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with this treaty.

Article 14

Any questions which may arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of any provision of the present treaty will be resolved bilaterally, in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and mutual understanding.

Article 15

The present treaty will operate for 20 years from the day of its coming into force.

If neither of the high contracting parties declares its wish to end the treaty's operation 6 months before the expiration of the said term, it will remain in force for the ensuing 5 years, and so forth, until such time as one of the high contracting parties gives warning in writing of its intention to end its operation 6 months before the expiration of the current 5-year period.

Article 16

The present treaty is subject to ratification and will come into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which will take place in Aden.

The present treaty is composed in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, and the two texts have equal force.

Done in Moscow, 25 October 1979.

[Signed] for the USSR: L. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

For the PDRY: 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, general secretary of the Yemen Socialist Party Central Committee and chairman of the PDRY Supreme People's Council Presidium

THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF  
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC  
(signed October 8, 1980)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Syrian Arab Republic, inspired by the wish to develop and strengthen relations of friendship and all-round cooperation, that have formed between them in the interests of the peoples of both states, of the cause of peace and security all over the world, of consolidation of international detente, and development of peaceful cooperation among states,

Determined to give a firm rebuff to the policy of aggression conducted by imperialism and its accomplices, to continue the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations, including Zionism, to come out for national independence and social progress,

Attaching great significance to the continuation of cooperation of both countries in establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East,

Confirming allegiance to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, including the principles of respect for sovereignty, national independence, territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs,

Decided to conclude the present treaty and agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties proclaim their resolve to develop steadily and strengthen friendship and cooperation between both states and peoples in the political, economic, military, scientific, technological, cultural and other spheres on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage, respect for sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity, noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2

The high contracting parties shall promote in every way the strengthening of universal peace and security of peoples, the relaxation of international tensions and its implementation in concrete forms of cooperation among states, the settlement of disputable questions by peaceful means, removing any manifestations of the policy of hegemonism and aggression from the practice of international relations.

The sides shall be cooperating intensively with each other in solving the tasks of ending the arms race, of achieving general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament under the effective international control.

Article 3

The high contracting parties guided by their belief in the equality of all peoples and states, regardless of race and religious beliefs, condemn colonialism, racism and Zionism as one of the forms and manifestations of racism, and reaffirm their resolve to wage tireless struggle against them. The sides will be cooperating with other states in supporting just aspirations of peoples in their struggle against imperialism for ultimate and complete elimination of colonialism and racial domination, for freedom and social progress.

Article 4

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall respect the policy of nonalignment pursued by the Syrian Arab Republic, which constitutes a major factor contributing to the preservation and consolidation of the international peace and security and to a lessening of international tensions.

The Syrian Arab Republic shall respect the peaceful foreign policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, aimed at consolidating the friendship and cooperation with all the countries and peoples.

Article 5

The high contracting parties shall develop and broaden the practice of mutual exchange of opinions and regular consultations on questions of bilateral relations and international problems of interest to both sides, and above all on the problems of the Middle East. Consultations and exchanges of opinion shall be held at different levels, above all through meetings of the leading state figures of both sides.

Article 6

In cases of the emergence of situations jeopardizing peace or security of one of the parties or posing a threat to peace or violating peace and security in the whole world, the high contracting parties shall enter without delay into contact with each other with a view to coordinating their positions and to cooperation in order to remove the threat that has arisen and to restore the peace.

Article 7

The high contracting parties shall carry out close and comprehensive cooperation in assuring conditions for the preservation and development of the social and economic accomplishments of their peoples, for respecting the sovereignty of each of the two parties over their natural resources.

## Article 8

The high contracting parties shall contribute to a steady consolidation and broadening of the mutually advantageous economic as well as scientific-technological cooperation and exchange of experience between them in the field of industry, agriculture, irrigation and water resources, utilization of oil and other natural resources, in the field of communications, transport and other economic sectors as well as in the training of national cadres. The sides undertake to broaden trade and maritime navigation between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and the most favoured nation treatment.

## Article 9

The high contracting parties shall continue to develop their cooperation and exchange of experience in the field of science, art, literature, education, health, information, cinematography, tourism, sports, and other fields.

The sides undertake to contribute to the expansion of contacts and cooperation between the organs of state power and mass-affiliation organization, including the trade union and other public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific establishments with a view to an increasingly more profound familiarization of the peoples of both countries with the life, work, experience and achievements of each other.

## Article 10

The high contracting parties shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them in the interests of strengthening their defense capacity.

## Article 11

Each of the high contracting parties states that it shall not enter into alliances or participate in any groupings of states as well as in actions or activities directed against the other high contracting party.

## Article 12

Each of the high contracting parties states that its obligations under the current international agreements do not contradict the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to conclude any international agreements which are incompatible with it.

## Article 13

Any differences that may arise between the high contracting parties in the interpretation or application of any provision of this treaty shall be resolved on a bilateral basis, in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.

Article 14

This treaty shall be effective for twenty years as of the day it enters into force.

If neither of the high contracting parties states six months prior to the expiry of the above mentioned period its desire to terminate the treaty, it shall remain effective for the next five years until one of the high contracting parties notifies in writing six months prior to the expiry of the current five-year period its intention to terminate it.

Article 15

This treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of the ratification instruments, which shall be done in Damascus.

Done in Moscow on October 8, 1980, in duplicate, each in Russian and Arabic languages, with both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
LEONID BREZHNEV

FOR THE SYRIAN ARAB  
REPUBLIC  
HAFIZ AL-ASAD



## Annex M-1

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF  
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO  
(signed May 13, 1981)\*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of the Congo, hereinafter referred to as "the high contracting parties,"

Considering that the further development and strengthening of relations of friendship and cooperation between them is in the vital national interests of the peoples of both countries and serves the cause of world peace,

Inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations and by a constant desire to give every support to peoples struggling for freedom, independence and social progress,

Filled with determination to promote the consolidation of international peace and security in the interests of the peoples of all countries,

Advocating the unity of all progressive forces in the struggle for peace, freedom, independence and social progress and considering that the developing of friendly relations and cooperation between the socialist and developing countries is in their mutual interests,

Prompted by a desire to strengthen and consolidate the existing relations of friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation between the two states and peoples and to create a foundation for their further development,

And reaffirming their loyalty to the aims and principles of the UN Charter,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The high contracting parties will develop and deepen relations of indissoluble friendship and all-round cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technical and cultural spheres on the basis of equality, noninterference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers.

---

\* Unofficial translation.

Article 2

The high contracting parties will cooperate closely in ensuring conditions for the preservation and further development of their people's socioeconomic gains and for the respect of each side's sovereignty over all its natural resources.

Article 3

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of nonalignment pursued by the People's Republic of the Congo, which is an important factor in the development of international cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

The People's Republic of the Congo respects the policy of defending peace pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

Article 4

The high contracting parties will continue to make every effort to defend world peace and the people's security, to deepen the process of relaxing international tension, extend it to all parts of the world and embody it in specific forms of mutually advantageous cooperation between states, and to settle contentious international issues by peaceful means. They will actively promote the cause of universal and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 5

The high contracting parties will continue to wage a steadfast struggle against the forces of imperialism and for the final eradication of colonialism and neocolonialism, racism and apartheid and to call for the full implementation of the UN declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The high contracting parties will cooperate with one another and with other peace-loving countries in supporting the peoples' just struggle for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

Article 6

The high contracting parties will consult with one another on all important international questions affecting both countries' interests.

Article 7

In the event of situations arising which threaten or violate peace, the high contracting parties will immediately contact one another in order to coordinate their positions with a view to eliminating such a threat or restoring peace.

Article 8

The high contracting parties will make every effort to strengthen and broaden mutually advantageous political, economic, social, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation between them. For these purposes they will develop and deepen cooperation in spheres covered by special agreements.

The high contracting parties will develop trade and commercial shipping between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most-favored nation status.

Article 9

The high contracting parties will promote the development of relations of friendship and cooperation between sociopolitical and cultural organizations in their countries in order that each may deepen its acquaintance with their peoples' lives, labor, experience and achievements.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties declares that it will not take part in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 11

The high contracting parties declare that the present treaty does not affect their rights and obligations under existing international treaties concluded with their participation and pledge not to conclude any international treaties incompatible with them.

Article 12

Any questions which may arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of any of the present treaty's provisions will be resolved bilaterally in a spirit of friendship and mutual respect and understanding.

Article 13

The present treaty is concluded for a period of 20 years.

If neither of the high contracting parties declares 60 months before the expiration of this period its desire to allow the treaty to lapse it will remain in force for a further 5 years and will continue thus until one of the high contracting parties serves written notice of its desire to allow it to lapse 6 months before the expiration of the current 5-year period.

Article 14

The present treaty is subject to ratification and will enter into force on the day of the exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Brazzaville.

Article 15

The high contracting parties will convey a copy of the present treaty to the UN Secretariat for registration.

The present treaty is executed in two copies, each in the Russian and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on 13 May, 1981.

[Signed] For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. Brezhnev;

For the People's Republic of the Congo: D. Sassou-Nguesso.

Treates/ag.??

SYSTEM II  
90320

11784

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Promoting Political Changes in the USSR

Attached at Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum from you to the President forwarding a memo from Secretary Shultz and USIA Director Wick (Tab A). It contains an NSC Staff Comment pointing out some of the risks associated with the Shultz-Wick proposal. Finally, it recommends that an NSC meeting be convened to discuss the issues.

DeGraffenreid, Dobriansky, Lord and Raymond concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Memorandum to the President from Secretary of State Shultz and USIA Director Wick, March 16, 1983

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Eo 6-114/11 # 11784

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED

ACTION

NLRR E06-114/11 #11785

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: A Proposed U.S.-Soviet Exchange Agreement

Issue

Whether or not to convene an NSC meeting to discuss the negotiation of a new U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement, and utilization of a law that would ensure reciprocity in exchanges while helping to control the hostile intelligence presence.

Discussion

Secretary Shultz and USIA Director Wick have sent you a memorandum (Tab A) requesting that you authorize the Department of State and USIA to develop a draft exchanges agreement and a negotiating strategy for such an agreement with the Soviets. They argue that their recommendation stems from your directive in NSDD 75 to use educational, cultural, scientific and other cooperative exchanges to help promote positive political change within the USSR. Specifically they cite the NSDD's requirement that "an effective official framework for handling exchanges" be established and they interpret this to mean that we should negotiate a new exchange agreement.

An exchange agreement, if properly fashioned, may indeed help us promote change in the USSR. It may permit us to present exhibits, publications and films in the USSR as well as gain greater access to the Soviet media. The spark of Western ideas and of the products of Western culture may ignite a greater independence of mind among the Soviet citizens exposed to these things, and this, in turn, may help the process of political change.

State and USIA acknowledge that the current situation of no reciprocity is unacceptable. In the absence of an exchange agreement, the Soviets are making private arrangements and in this context are sending large numbers of KGB agents and other agents of influence into our country. To deal with this, State is working on getting a change in the visa law through Congress so that we can restrict the entry of such agents. In the meantime, State and USIA propose to use our anticipated ability to refuse visas as leverage in getting a satisfactory and reciprocal agreement with the Soviets.

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Declassify on: OADR

NSC Staff Comment: There are a variety of risks involved in this proposal. First of all, negotiating a new exchange agreement would represent a repudiation of one of our Afghanistan sanctions against the Soviets. Lifting such a sanction would have the symbolic political effect of either recognizing the Soviet occupation as a fait accompli or signalling to the Afghan freedom fighters a decrease in our moral support. Secondly, negotiating new expanded ties with the Soviets risks raising false public expectations about increased detente and accommodation with the USSR.

Finally, if such an agreement is signed, there is a likelihood that it will not contain the kinds of controls that will truly ensure reciprocity on all counts -- including ideological reciprocity. The Soviets are very sensitive to subversion, much more than we are. So it is problematical as to whether they will accept terms that are truly reciprocal. Thus the question arises, should we conclude an agreement that may not be entirely reciprocal in the interest of gaining some kind of limited penetration of Soviet society? To look at this question another way, it helps to examine an analagous situation: should we censor ourselves over the Voice of America so that the Soviets will find it acceptable and then stop jamming it?

Perhaps the advantages of some ideological penetration indeed do outweigh the disadvantages of such an agreement. However, State and USIA do not fully address what is perhaps the most serious problem here: that of the hostile intelligence and disinformation presence in our country. Although this memo alludes to passing a future law that would permit greater visa control, it ignores a law that is already on the books -- the Baker Amendment, a law that State has probably never told you about. Only recently did Charles Wick inform us about it.

The Baker Amendment would permit us to deny visas to all Soviet communists if we find that the USSR is "not in substantial compliance" with the Helsinki Final Act. Then the only Soviets permitted entry into the U.S. would be those specially granted visas. Today, our charges of Soviet Helsinki violations are all talk and no action. By invoking the Baker Amendment, we would impose one of the most effective measures at our disposal in controlling the KGB presence. Rather than waiting months for a new visa law to pass the Congress (if it ever passes), we could invoke the Baker Amendment now and get to work on these issues immediately.

We recommend, in any case, that some form of visa control be implemented before any agreement is negotiated with the Soviets. Otherwise, we will have little guarantee that we can effectively enforce real reciprocity.

#### RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	That before you approve the State-USIA request, you convene an NSC meeting to discuss the negotiation of an exchange agreement and the issue of invoking the Baker Amendment as a prerequisite to such an agreement.
—	—	

Attachment:

Tab A      Memorandum from Secretary Shultz and USIA  
Director Wick, March 16, 1983



43  
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE  
SYSTEM II  
90320

March 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Secretary *WAS*  
Director, U.S. Information Agency *STANTON*

SUBJECT: Promoting Political Change  
in the USSR

NSDD-75 set as a basic task of U.S. policy the promotion of political change within the USSR. It noted that, along with radio broadcasting, our most important means for ideological penetration and promotion of democratization in the USSR are exchanges activities and the exhibits program. The NSDD stated that we should reverse a pattern of dismantling those programs, instead expanding those which can serve our objective of promoting change in the Soviet Union. It called for an official framework for handling exchanges and obtaining reciprocity to prevent the Soviets from gaining unilateral advantage from their activities in the U.S. and their control of our access to the Soviet people.

This paper recommends an approach to negotiating an official framework which would achieve a significantly higher level of reciprocity and ideological penetration of the Soviet Union by the United States.

#### Problem and Opportunity

Vladimir Bukovsky has written that he became a dissident when he visited the US National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959 -- the one at which Khrushchev and Nixon debated in a model US kitchen. But, we have had no US exhibits in the Soviet Union since 1979. We have allowed other ideologically effective aspects of the exchanges agreements to lapse as well. Thus, in the past three years we have dismantled much of what we had created.

One of the main advantages of those agreements was that they opened great fields of operation to us, such as exhibits, where we had a clear advantage over the Soviets. They also provided the means to obtain reciprocity. We now face a growing Soviet effort to work around us with private US institutions and individuals.

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NLRR F06-114/11 #11790

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DECL: OADR

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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Armand Hammer in partnership with Jerry Weintraub recently established an organization to bring Soviet cultural and other attractions to the US, with no known guarantee of reciprocity. We are also aware the Soviets are working with some other impresarios or individuals on possible performing arts tours, including a visit by the Moscow Circus this fall. The ready access that Soviet propagandists have to US media without reciprocity is well known. The Soviets arranged a series of Soviet film weeks at the prestigious Smithsonian Institution last fall.

Under current circumstances we have no ready means of enforcing reciprocity in such endeavors. The present visa law does not permit us to refuse visas for that purpose. The result is that, according to the FBI, there is an increasing percentage of KGB agents in the groups the Soviets are unilaterally sending to the U.S. We can better control this problem with a better handle on visa issuance. We are seeking changes to visa procedures that would permit us greater latitude in refusing visas for policy reasons. That could facilitate control over visits by obvious propagandists, but it would still be a clumsy weapon, poorly suited to dealing with highly visible cultural visits. We should, nevertheless, use our anticipated new ability to refuse visas as leverage to get a more satisfactory overall official exchanges framework permitting us to compete more effectively in the ideological conflict in which we are engaged.

Our previous exchanges agreements with the Soviet Union basically repeated the form and content of the first, concluded in 1958, and were never altogether satisfactory. In approaching a new official agreement we would review the old agreements and our current interests to determine what our negotiating targets should be without regard for what we may perceive as Soviet negotiating requirements. (We would, of course, prepare an estimate of Soviet positions as part of the preparations for negotiations.)

In developing our negotiating targets, our aim will be to improve our penetration of Soviet society. During the negotiations on a new overall framework for exchanges, we would concentrate on the following specific areas in which the U.S. has the clear advantage or in which, through enforcement of strict reciprocity, we need to offset a current advantage held by the Soviets:

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-3-

USIA Thematic Exhibits -- Our exhibits, when in the USSR, provide the U.S. Government its best opportunity to acquaint millions of people in all walks of life throughout the Soviet Union with the many aspects of American life: our democratic system, our foreign and domestic policies and our hopes and aspirations for peace and prosperity for all peoples of the world. As a communication medium, in contrast to radio broadcasting, our exhibits bring the Soviet people into a two-way face-to-face dialogue with our American Russian-speaking guides who staff the exhibits. The Agency's exhibits had such overwhelming ideological impact that the exchange of thematic exhibits under the previous official exchanges agreements became anathema to the Soviet authorities. Thus, it is clear that if the U.S. Government once again is to take advantage of this most effective ideological weapon against the Soviet Union, it will be able to do so only by adopting the same negotiating position we used during previous negotiations -- no USIA thematic exhibits, no official exchanges agreement.

Radio and TV -- Currently, Soviet propagandists have easy access to US media without reciprocity. We will insist on greatly improved access to Soviet nation-wide electronic media to reach the largest possible audience with our message. For example, we have in mind setting an annual minimum for US and Soviet appearances on political discussion programs on each other's television.

Publications -- The US has always enjoyed a clear advantage in the popularity and appeal of our Russian-language America Illustrated magazine in the Soviet Union compared with its Soviet counterpart in the U.S., Soviet Life. In fact, the note you sent Charlie with the "special introductory offer" for Soviet Life (mailer attached at tab A) illustrates how they have to push their product. Our magazine goes like hot cakes in the Soviet Union. Under a new agreement we would seek to negotiate a higher level of distribution of our magazine inside the USSR.

Educational and Academic Exchanges -- With these exchanges we reach elite audiences, build long-term contacts inside institutions producing future Soviet leaders and help build and maintain the base of US expertise on the Soviet Union.

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-4-

Performing Arts -- Performing groups presenting the finest of American theater, dance and music in modern, classical and popular genre can provide large numbers of Soviet citizens with a view of the exciting possibilities of free cultural development, a process denied by their system.

American and Soviet Films -- The Soviets have been able to put on film weeks in a number of major American cities, but we have received no reciprocity for this. Under a new exchanges agreement we would insist on reciprocal film weeks in the Soviet Union.

Access to Soviet Elites -- Soviet officials, propagandists and academics have almost unlimited access to our institutions, for which we will insist on reciprocity under the framework of a new agreement.

Should you decide to seek to negotiate a new framework for exchanges along the above lines, we will find the Soviets receptive in certain respects, although there will be a long fight on specifics. Soviet authorities believe that they derive political benefits from agreements with us. Ironically, they also know that official agreements serve a very practical purpose -- in their rigidly planned bureaucratic society official agreements make it easier to obtain the necessary budgets to finance the concrete expenditures encountered by the Soviet ministries and organizations engaged in exchanges-type activities in the US and the USSR.

A decision to move toward a new bilateral exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union will encounter some opposition as well as considerable support domestically. We will want to make the point to our public and the Congress that a new agreement enforcing reciprocity is to our great advantage (there is a strong constituency on the Hill for the exchanges.) In general, we believe that our Allies will welcome such a decision as further evidence of our willingness to deal seriously with the Soviet leadership. We will, of course, want to consult with the Allies before announcing any decision, to ensure that they fully understand our reasons and that they understand it is not a move to initiate a rapprochement with the USSR.

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If you agree with our view of the importance of building a new framework for conducting exchanges and enforcing reciprocity, USIA will develop, in cooperation with the Department of State and other interested agencies, a draft agreement and negotiating strategy. When that process is completed, we would then propose to you appropriate timing for an approach to the Soviets on opening negotiations.

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to develop a draft exchanges agreement and negotiating strategy.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 17 MAR 83 13

TO PRESIDENT FROM SHULTZ, G  
WICK, C

DOCDATE 16 MAR 83

16 MAR 83

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 8/8/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: PROMOTING POLITICAL CHANGES IN USSR

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENCZOWSKI

DOBRIANSKY

RAYMOND

LORD

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8291001 NSCIFID NSDD0075 ( B / )

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SENSITIVE

ACTION

May 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>AD</sup>

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Next Steps

At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President outlining State's recommendations as to how to proceed with US-Soviet relations. Specifically, the Secretary recommends that he be permitted to meet with Ambassador Dobrynin next week to discuss the negotiation of a cultural agreement and the establishment of new consulates in New York and Kiev. Your memorandum to the President (Tab I) recommends against this idea for the following reasons:

-- The current international environment (Soviet obstinacy in Geneva, sabotage of US peace efforts in the Middle East, new round of pressures on Polish regime to intensify repression of workers, etc.) makes the raising of these symbolic issues untimely.

-- Second, the impending June 10 Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party might change or clarify the Soviet internal power balance, thus enabling us to judge Soviet moves better.

-- Third, before these issues can be addressed, there is a need to develop an overall operational strategy as to how to implement the goals set forth in NSDD-75 (US Policy Toward the Soviet Union).

-- Fourth, a June 10 NSC meeting is scheduled already to discuss the pros and cons of a cultural agreement and new consulates.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for The President
- Tab A Incoming memorandum from State

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Fo 6-114/11 #11786

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SENSITIVE

ACTION

May 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>AD</sup>

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Next Steps

At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President outlining State's recommendations as to how to proceed with US-Soviet relations. Specifically, the Secretary recommends that he be permitted to meet with Ambassador Dobrynin next week to discuss the negotiation of a cultural agreement and the establishment of new consulates in New York and Kiev. Your memorandum to the President (Tab I) recommends against this idea for the following reasons:

-- The current international environment (Soviet obstinacy in Geneva, sabotage of US peace efforts in the Middle East, new round of pressures on Polish regime to intensify repression of workers, etc.) makes the raising of these symbolic issues untimely.

-- Second, the impending June 10 Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party might change or clarify the Soviet internal power balance, thus enabling us to judge Soviet moves better.

-- Third, before these issues can be addressed, there is a need to develop an overall operational strategy as to how to implement the goals set forth in NSDD-75 (US Policy Toward the Soviet Union).

-- Fourth, a June 10 NSC meeting is scheduled already to discuss the pros and cons of a cultural agreement and new consulates.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for The President
- Tab A Incoming memorandum from State

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An additional reason for not raising these issues next week, is the prospect that the Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party to be held in June might shed some light on Andropov's power within the Politburo. In fact, if Andropov's authority is reinforced by his appointment as a titular head of state, in addition to being General Secretary, we might expect some additional movement shortly thereafter on arms control. This environment would be clearly more propitious for discussions on a cultural agreement and consulates.

Before these issues can be addressed, there is also a clear need to develop an overall operational strategy with your national security advisors as to how to implement the goals set forth in NSDD-75 (U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union). That is, a clear and comprehensive, short-term/long-term approach must be developed to achieve NSDD-75 objectives. Specifically, with regard to a new cultural agreement, terms of reference must be drafted to address what kind of cultural agreement is being sought, how can we best ensure equal access to Soviet audiences, etc. Answers to such critical questions should be obtained before we approach the Soviets.

Finally, I have already requested that State produce an inter-agency approved paper on the pros and cons of a new U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange agreement and the establishment of new consulates for discussion at an NSC meeting scheduled for June 10.

On Monday, May 23, at our 9:45 a.m. meeting, George Shultz may bring up this matter. For the above reasons, I recommend that you disapprove his raising these topics with Ambassador Dobrynin next week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Secretary Shultz not meet with Ambassador Dobrynin next week to discuss the negotiation of a new cultural agreement and the establishment of new consulates.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve                      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

Prepared by:  
Paula Dobriansky

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK  
SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Next Steps

Issue: Should George Shultz meet with Ambassador Dobrynin next week to discuss the negotiation of a cultural agreement and the establishment of new consulates in New York and Kiev?

Facts: In several memos in the past month and in previous discussions with you, George Shultz has recommended the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural exchange agreement. At the last meeting you had with Secretary Shultz on these and other bilateral issues, you agreed that these two issues be presented again with more elaboration of the pros and cons. At Tab A is such a memorandum from George Shultz to you.

Based on George's meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, the memorandum identifies four broad topics for continued discussions with the Soviets: human rights, arms control, bilateral relations and regional issues. It asserts that some signs of flexibility by the Soviets in the human rights and bilateral areas have been detected. The memo also notes that we have to explore the prospect of moving forward in overall U.S.-Soviet relations and consider a potential trip to Moscow by the Secretary and/or inviting Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington. With these aims in mind, State proposes that George Shultz meet with Dobrynin next week to discuss a new cultural agreement and the establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York. State's memorandum does not reflect other agency views.

Discussion: I have serious reservations about the wisdom of State's specific recommendations to commence discussions on a cultural agreement and consulates with the Soviets at this time. The costs of undertaking these steps in the current international setting (Soviet intransigence on arms control talks, sabotage of U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East, new round of pressures on the Polish regime to repress the workers, etc.) are prohibitively high. In its present form and with its timing, these steps would especially manifest the Administration's engagement in a "creeping return to detente." If this impression was to set in, new pressures by the Soviets to modify our policies would follow.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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May 21, 1983 MAY 21 9:12

TO: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz  
SUBJECT: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

SECRETARIAT

At your direction, I have embarked on a process of intensive dialogue with Dobrynin on the full range of US-Soviet issues; Max Kampelman has been engaged on sensitive Madrid issues; and Art Hartman has also had a role in Moscow. We have identified four necessary topic areas for discussion:

A. Human Rights: In this area there has been some movement. It began with your initiative to break the impasse in the Pentecostalist case, but in recent weeks the Soviets, in the context of reaching a CSCE agreement in Madrid, appear to have been moving toward us on other human rights issues of special concern.

B. Bilateral Relations: Dobrynin and I have reviewed outstanding issues in our bilateral relations to see where we might move to mutual advantage. In this area, our principal move was your proposal to begin negotiations for a new Long Term Agreement on grains. They knew we wanted an agreement, and they have now accepted the proposal.

C. Arms Control: Here the results of our discussions have been mixed. We have covered virtually every topic in your arms control negotiating program, and the Soviet responses have ranged from some modest movement on START, MBFR, and your recent CBMs proposals; through a serious but still unsatisfactory reply to our démarches on their tests of the PL-5 ICBM; to a blank wall on INF. At the same time, there is some momentum in our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on nuclear non-proliferation (Ambassador Richard Kennedy will hold a second round of these consultations in Moscow in mid-June). As you know we are now reviewing our positions on some of the central arms control issues and, depending on what we decide, we may have more to say to the Soviets on these subjects.

D. Regional Issues: We have had a fair amount of dialogue with the Soviets on issues such as Afghanistan, but positive results have been meager. Our task remains to drive home to the Soviets the importance of progress on these issues if there is to be a meaningful and lasting improvement in our relations.

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Against this background, we are now in a position where we need to take further steps if we want to see whether a visit this summer to Moscow for meetings with Andropov and Gromyko, an invitation to Gromyko to Washington for a meeting with you at the time of the UNGA this fall, and ultimately a meeting between you and Andropov would be in our interest. I believe the next step on our part should be to propose the negotiation of a new US-Soviet cultural agreement and the opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York, as I suggested some months ago. Both of these proposals will sound good to the Soviets, but are unambiguously in our interest when examined from a hardheaded American viewpoint. I am enclosing copies of the options papers on these issues the Department earlier sent to Bill Clark.

In NSSD 75 on US-Soviet relations, you endorsed the idea that getting an adequate formal framework for exchanges is the only way to ensure reciprocity in cultural, academic and media contacts with the Soviets, and to penetrate the Soviet Union with our own ideology. To get it we need to negotiate a new US-Soviet cultural agreement with the Soviets, and that is what Charlie Wick and I have proposed for your decision.

The opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York would have the advantage of getting us onto new Soviet terrain while increasing the Soviet presence here only marginally. The Soviets already have a big UN Mission in New York, while our consulate in Kiev would be the first Western mission in the capital of the Ukraine. There is growing interest in a Kiev consulate in Congress and among American Jewish and Ukranian groups. A U.S. presence in Kiev would also help us broaden our access to and ideological penetration of Soviet society.

In order to continue the dialogue process you have authorized me to pursue, I would like to propose to Dobrynin next week that we move forward with the cultural agreement and the consulates. So far it is the Soviets who have made most of the moves in the process, particularly on the LTA and human rights. It is now time for us to take some modest steps of our own. These steps are necessary (but obviously far from sufficient) ingredients to development of the possibility of a substantive meeting with real results between you and Andropov during your first term.

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Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options

As matters now stand, the Soviets have almost unlimited access to American media and other forums. And we have only limited means to penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology. Our open society and the legal restraints on our ability to refuse visas to Soviet citizens except on national security grounds make this possible. We are fortunate that the Soviets since 1979 have chosen not to send performing artists here; otherwise, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moscow Circus and similar major groups could be touring the US annually without any reciprocity for American groups in the USSR. There are indications that the Soviets are rethinking this policy and may start sending performers again. We currently have no means of ensuring reciprocity in this area, nor do we have leverage to gain Soviet agreement for us to conduct thematic exhibits in the USSR. Such exhibits, with American guides speaking Russian or other local language, have proven to be one of the most effective means of reaching thousands of Soviet citizens with the American message. For example, Vladimir Bukovsky has stated that he became a dissident when he visited the US Exposition in Moscow in 1959.

To increase our penetration of Soviet society through cultural exchanges, we need to consider the most effective means. We see three basic options:

- 1. Negotiate a new exchanges agreement, replacing the one that expired in 1979, that ensures reciprocity.

PROS: The exact form of an agreement would have to be worked out in interagency discussions to ensure that all USG interests would be considered. At a minimum, it would define the areas in which reciprocity must be provided, including the performing arts. We should be able to improve our access to influential Soviet circles by putting continued access to US audiences on a reciprocal basis. Exhibits would be an important part of an agreement, as would all other legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society. We would also require access to Soviet television.

CONS: This would involve negotiating a highly visible agreement and raise questions about how it conforms to our sanctions policy. It would cause speculation whether we are returning to a policy of detente.

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2. Combine negotiation of an exchanges agreement with a stricter visa regime, through legislation restoring our ability to refuse visas for foreign policy reasons or by invoking the "Baker Amendment." Such draft legislation is now at OMB for review and decision. Invoking the existing Baker Amendment involves an official determination, which can be made by the Secretary of State, that the USSR is not in substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

PROS: Either of these routes would permit us to generate greater leverage to get the kind of truly reciprocal exchanges agreement we want. Each has the additional virtue of allowing us to refuse visas for policy reasons and not have to justify refusals on national security grounds. We could choose which Soviets we would admit or exclude.

CONS: This has the same problems as Option 1, somewhat mitigated by combining it with instituting tougher visa controls. In addition, visa refusals are a crude tool, subject to easy retaliation not necessarily confined to the visa field. American sponsors of Soviet visits would criticize arbitrary refusals, and those who invested money in long-term planning to bring Soviet performers here might have a legal claim. Invoking the Baker Amendment raises issues of foreign policy and long-term US-USSR relations that require careful study; it would also tend to make every visa for a prominent Soviet a contentious political issue within the USG.

3. Continue current practice.

PROS: This involves no change and is easy to administer, with few decisions having to be referred to senior levels for political decision.

CONS: This does nothing to ensure reciprocity and leaves the Soviets with easy access to US society.

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ISSUE: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City: Options

Option 1. Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to establish Consulates General in Kiev and New York City and propose a public announcement and the resumption of technical discussions toward this end.

Pros and Cons

Since the Soviets specifically asked for this when we raised the possibility in February, this option would represent a visible and real sign of movement in our relations. In terms of assets, we would gain substantially from the opening of a Consulate in Kiev; by comparison, the Soviet presence in New York City would increase only marginally. As matters stand, because of the UN presence, the Soviets have free run of New York and we have nothing comparable in the USSR. A reporting presence in the heart of the Ukraine, expanded contacts with important minority nationality and religious groups, and consular access for our citizens would prove most advantageous to the U.S. Government. It would also respond to the wishes of the U.S. Ukrainian community and many in the U.S. Jewish community who have long stressed the need for a consulate in the area.

On the down side, this option will be the most difficult to explain to the American public. The lifting of an Afghan sanction may evoke some Congressional opposition, and strong arguments will be required to convince Congress of the need to fund this project. While this move may effectively show the Soviets and others that confrontation is not the only arrow in our quiver, it may at the same time raise unrealistic expectations both here and abroad about overall improvements in our relations.

Practical Steps

Even if we were to agree in principle to open Consulates General, the timing and cost of our actions would be determined by decisions on several subsidiary issues. The first decision involves the type of establishment we wish to open in Kiev. We have the choice of a simple, unclassified operation which would constitute an American presence and give some consular protection to American visitors, or a full-scale post, with important advantages in a key non-Russian area. Devolving from this decision will be the question of timing. An unclassified establishment in Kiev could be organized fairly easily and quickly in terms of personnel and money, whereas full-scale establishment would take years. In either case, however, we would have to start with an unclassified advance party, which could be in place within six months.

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Establishing a full-scale post would entail a great deal of effort to secure the necessary personnel and funding, and to resolve numerous technical and logistical difficulties. However, depending upon how rapidly we would wish to implement this, several approaches are available. If quick results are crucial, we could immediately start the process of securing preliminary funding, TDY personnel for an advance team, and logistical support in order to have the consulates operational (though with a skeleton staff) within approximately a year. At the other end of the spectrum, we could do a limited amount of initial planning until Congressional support was assured and all funding requirements approved. A third approach would involve sending a temporary advance team as soon as possible and then developing an overall strategy for the selection of long-term personnel, the briefing of Congressional committees, the acquisition of funding, and the fulfillment of all the technical requirements of the facility. The implementation of this strategy would follow as soon afterwards as considered desirable or feasible.

Option 2: Propose to the Soviets that we resume discussions on the possibility of establishing Consulates in Kiev and New York, and have in mind sending an Advance Party to Kiev this year.

#### Pros and Cons

This approach would enable us to do the preliminary work with the Soviets and within the U.S. Government necessary for the opening of the Consulates General. At the same time, it does not obligate us to take the more visible steps of actually putting an Advance Team in place or allowing the Soviets to resume construction work on the building that will eventually house our Consulate General. The decision on whether or when to undertake these steps could depend on progress in the technical discussions and the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the discussions would be technical, no formal announcement would be required at this time. Similarly, no final decision would have to be made regarding the lifting of an Afghanistan sanction. On the other hand, the Soviets would regard this as a position decision and it would allow us to begin allocating personnel and resources and setting up a logistical support system.

However, if Congress or the public becomes aware that we are identifying positions and earmarking funds for Kiev, we would probably be asked what this meant for our sanctions policy. Other disadvantages of this option are limited. It might raise unwarranted Soviet expectations and open us to pressure for the full establishment of Consulates in Kiev and New York.

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Option 3. Tell the Soviets that we are actively considering the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates General.

Pros and Cons

The main advantage of this option is that it simply allows us to await a more favorable moment. It also enables us to avoid explanations or possible confrontations with Congress and the public. Its primary drawback is that it accomplishes little. In terms of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is devoid of benefits, since the Soviets would see it as a do-nothing statement. Domestically, it would simply create disagreements within the bureaucracy. After the suspension of our agreement to establish these Consulates General in 1980, a weak consensus emerged on the policy level that on balance the suspension was an ill-advised move. Reviving the discussions on this issue is more likely to fan dissensions than to lead to agreement.

Option 4. Say nothing to the Soviets and adhere to the status quo.

Pros and Cons

The one advantage inherent in this position is that we are spared from justifying the lifting of an Afghan sanction. The costs of our current practices are high. Financially, we bear the burden of three apartments in Kiev for which we pay rent but have no use. (We have kept the apartments because we previously spent substantial money on reconfiguring them for U.S. use, and because if we gave them up, we would have a lot of trouble obtaining other adequate apartments later.) We also risk the loss of the office building which the Soviets have, to date, kept open for us. The cost of reconstructing an alternate building will be considerably higher in the future. Finally, we face criticism from U.S. visitors to Kiev, especially Jewish groups, whom we are unable to assist.

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for President today.  
Call me. *[Signature]*

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: TY COBB *TUC*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Robert Anderson

Robert Anderson of Atlantic-Richfield called (8 August, 1610 hours) as a follow-up to your discussion with him last Thursday. He had tried to get in contact with Judge Clark to discuss his company's promising natural gas finds off-shore near the PRC and forthcoming talks he will have in Moscow on environmental issues (in addition to company business).

Prior to the conversation I talked with Byron Morton (DOS/SOV) and got up to speed on the state of the environmental agreements between the U.S. and the USSR. In contrast to many of the other agreements that were signed in the early 1970's reasonable progress seems to have been made here. Morton saw no problem in Anderson raising environmental issues related to the Bering Straits as long as he made it clear that he was speaking as a private citizen.

Anderson indicated that he would be going to Moscow in September but was unsure just who he would meet there. He clearly understood that any discussions he would conduct would be private in nature and exploratory. I asked that he keep in contact with me regarding the substance of his meetings if they took place.

Anderson indicated that he had also wanted to mention to Judge Clark that his company had made an impressive gas discovery in the South China Sea about 30 miles off the PRC coast. The wells were sunk at a depth of about 290 feet. He estimated the potential sufficient to warrant a 30" line with up to a billion cubic feet a day throughput (in a line that would go to Canton (Guangzhou). However, he felt that the find would better support a major fertilizer industry on Hainan Island and serve as a major boost to the PRC economy.

Anderson also requested that I pass on to the Judge that he is well-acquainted with the new President of China, General Li, whom he characterizes as very "pro-American" and anti-Soviet. Anderson views Li's ascendency to the Presidency as positive for the U.S.