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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11678	REPORT	MOSCOW REGRETS ON THE CANCUN SUMMIT R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	3	10/15/1981	B1
11681	REPORT	THE SOVIET PRESENCE AROUND THE WORLD	16	9/23/1982	B1
11679	REPORT	MOSCOW REGRETS ON THE CANCUN SUMMIT R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	10/14/1981	B1
11680	REPORT	SOVIET SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	6	3/3/1981	B1
11677	REPORT	USSR: AID TO THE THIRD WORLD PAR 7/15/2008 F06-114/11; PAR 12/15/2010 M07-072 #11677	4	6/9/1983	B1 B3

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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

(U) MOSCOW REGRETS ON THE CANCUN SUMMIT

(C) The Soviet Union will not be represented next week at the North-South summit in Cancun, Mexico (October 22-23). Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Tikhonov made it clear to Austrian Chancellor Kreisky during a visit to Vienna in April that Moscow did not wish to attend. Thus, no invitation was formally extended--and no Soviet refusal publicly recorded.

(U) Still, the Soviet Union is extremely sensitive to Western charges that it is backing away from aid to developing nations, or that what aid it gives is too meager to produce substantive results. Furthermore, having for years castigated "imperialist" states for their alleged exploitation of the LDCs, Moscow now finds itself in the awkward position of having to refuse even the semblance of cooperation afforded by the Cancun meeting for considering the Group of 77's key demand for development of a new international economic order.

(U) In response, Moscow has attempted to belittle the Cancun initiative, reformulate old propaganda mainstays to justify its position, and, in general, has lowered its profile.

Private Explanations, Public Rebukes

(C) Soviet Foreign Ministry officials have privately ascribed Moscow's rejection of the Cancun discussions to the thesis that it is not appropriate for a limited number of states to attempt to solve a global problem. Probably to lend credence to this excuse, they have further claimed that Moscow had no intention of becoming involved in a venture which not only was doomed to failure, but also had provoked the anger of a number of countries that were excluded.

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

(U) The awkwardness of the Cancun meeting, however, paled in significance against the discomfort for Moscow created by Secretary Haig's UN address which (in contrast to Gromyko's East-West diatribe) focused on North-South issues. The Soviet response was a somewhat petulant dismissal of the entire subject in an October 1 Izvestiya commentary which asserted:

"...some delegations [wanted] to lead the United Nations away from the discussion of topical problems, to put to the foreground questions which, though being important, nevertheless do not determine the course of world events, but depend on them. Such a stand was taken by the United States...."

(U) Tinkering With the Line

The Cancun summit has grown into a veritable albatross for the Kremlin, forcing it to refuse unambiguously any role in the North-South dialogue. Recognizing that the Group of 77 would not overlook its rejection not only of Cancun but also of the implication that the Soviet Union, as a developed country, owes something to the developing world, Moscow has reworked some long-playing propositions to justify its position. The new line, which will no doubt be ladled out in heavy doses to Third World audiences by the Soviet media, states that:

--"In terms of its content, principles and aims, the USSR's economic and trade cooperation with the developing countries represents a new type of international economic relations."

--"The Soviet Union supports the developing states' justified demands for a restructuring of international economic relations...and the establishment of a new economic order."

--"The Soviet Union views...aid by the socialist states as 'the aid of a friend and ally in the struggle against the common enemy'--imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism."

--"For principled motives, the Soviet Union rejects the demands that it allocate a predetermined fixed proportion of its gross national product for aid to the developing countries on a par with the imperialist states.^{1/} The Soviet Union did not participate in the past, during the colonialist epoch, nor is it participating under present-day conditions in the imperialist exploitation of the developing countries, a consequence of which has been their economic backwardness. Similarly, the socialist states have in no way become involved in those grave consequences caused by the functioning

^{1/} (U) This is an unusually forthright statement by Moscow of its rejection of this demand.

of the capitalist economy, by crises, by the collapse of capitalist currencies, by inflation and the other upheavals of the capitalist world economic system."

--The Soviet Union will allocate "resources for economic and technical assistance to the liberated countries to the extent that it is able."

(U) Beyond Cancun

Soviet attendance at Cancun or any other similar forum would obviously negate this self-serving justification. Because Moscow could hardly expect to participate as a "developing nation," side by side with Bangladesh, for example, it would risk being identified with the rich, developed "imperialists." Furthermore, to participate would be a tacit admission that the entire developing world had a claim on Soviet resources--not just the states Moscow considers "progressive"--and not merely in the forms and amounts that Moscow deems correct. The bottom line, of course, is that participation in the North-South dialogue would imply a commitment to contribute resources from an already heavily burdened Soviet economy--a commitment Moscow adamantly rejects.

Under the circumstances, the Soviets are likely to keep as low a profile as possible until the Cancun meeting is over (when it will undoubtedly be dismissed in Moscow as a failure).

Prepared by N. Harms
x29201

Approved by M. Mautner
x29536

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS: - October 14, 1981

1. MOSCOW REGRETS ON THE CANCUN SUMMIT

The Soviet Union will not be represented at the upcoming meeting in Cancun: Premier Tikhonov made this clear to Austrian Chancellor Kreisky as early as April 1981. But Moscow is extremely sensitive to the impact its negative position on North-South issues might have on its image in the Third World, and is reworking long-standing propaganda lines to justify its non-participation.

* * *

Soviet participation in any aspect of broad North-South negotiations is highly unlikely. It would identify the USSR as a rich, developed nation and be a tacit admission that the entire developing world has a claim to Soviet aid. More importantly, it would imply a commitment to contribute resources from an already heavily burdened Soviet economy. Moscow can be expected to avoid such a commitment, even at some political cost.

Soviet propaganda has long accused the developed non-socialist states of viewing the Third World as a "pantry of raw materials, food-stuffs and semi-finished products" and depicted its own relations with developing nations as the ideal. The Cancun Summit has, however, forced Moscow to formulate a rationalization for sidestepping the G-77 demand that wealthy nations cooperate in establishing a new international economic order. Moscow's refusal to go to Mexico gives it an appearance of opposing the G-77 on this issue.

To offset the inevitable negative impression, Moscow has reworked its propaganda line to Third World audiences to justify its rejection of the North-South dialogue. The new line contends, in essence, that the Soviet Union:

- supports demands for a new international economic order;
- already has a new type of international economic relations with developing countries, free of inequality or exploitation;
- is on the side of the developing nations in a common battle against imperialism and colonialism;
- must reject demands that it set aside a fixed proportion of its GNP for aid to developing countries, since the socio-economic ills of those countries were caused solely by the colonialists and imperialists;
- will continue to give "to the extent that it is able" resources for economic and technical assistance to "liberated" countries.

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11



BUREAU OF
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(U) SOVIET SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES

(C) Summary

The USSR views support for "national liberation" and insurgent groups as an integral element of its foreign policy, as well as part of the larger East-West struggle. The Soviet commitment to support national liberation movements is incorporated in the 1977 Constitution and has been reaffirmed by Soviet leaders on countless occasions. In the present era, the strategy has special value for Moscow because it permits open competition with the West in the Third World, while at the same time it keeps open the possibility of Western aid to the Soviet economy.

The Soviets have always been vague, however, about what constitutes a legitimate liberation movement. That ambiguity allows them to pick and choose the groups that best serve overall Soviet objectives and to exploit existing or developing situations. Although various liberation groups often contain a sizable Marxist element, the Soviet track record suggests that pragmatic policy considerations and available opportunities count more than ideological concerns in Moscow's selection of candidates worthy of support.

Overt Soviet recognition and backing for liberation groups have generally followed widespread international, or at least regional, acceptance of their legitimacy. Lack of widespread international backing makes the USSR cautious. In such cases, its aid usually is channeled through third parties and at a relatively low level.

The types and levels of Soviet assistance depend on the sophistication and intensity of the liberation group's struggle and run the gamut from moral and propaganda support to military supplies.

Perhaps for Moscow the most frustrating aspect of its insurgency activities is its inability to control

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March 3, 1981

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some of the groups it supports. Often the leadership of an insurgent group has little or no direct contact with Soviet officials and may even distrust them. Thus some of Moscow's ties to liberation groups are little more than marriages of convenience.

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(U) Ideological Context

Lenin developed the thesis that anti-colonial revolutions could contribute decisively to the collapse of the capitalist order. With the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, he and his associates began to mobilize the "East" against Western "imperialism," principally through the Communist International (Comintern), which was formed in 1919 to coordinate and guide worldwide revolutionary activities.

In the early 1920s, however, Moscow officially distanced itself from the general run of colonial liberation movements lest it jeopardize access to desperately needed economic assistance from the West. Lenin viewed this shift as a temporary retreat, but Stalin, who distrusted any foreign activity he could not fully control, also downplayed support for nationalist movements.

Stalin's successors returned to Lenin's strategy and took advantage of the decolonization movement in the postwar era to identify Soviet policy with Third World nationalism.

--At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev spoke of an emerging neutralist bloc participating with the USSR and its allies against imperialism.

--The 22nd Party Congress in 1961 proclaimed that these "peace forces" included national liberation movements--a term coined by Soviet ideologists--whose chances of success had improved because of socialist assistance and encouragement.

Soviet policy was explicitly reiterated at the 1960 World Communist Party Conference in Moscow which recognized the "progressive, revolutionary" significance of national liberation wars. These conflicts were termed "just" wars, as opposed to imperialist wars of aggression, and the USSR promised "decisive" support of such struggles against the West.

(U) A Tenet of Contemporary Soviet Policy

Even after much of the colonial world had won its independence, the USSR continued to exploit anti-Western and anti-colonial sentiments. A new dimension was added in the early 1960s when the Chinese began to challenge Moscow's claim to leadership of the international communist movement.

Since then, the Soviet leadership repeatedly has gone on record in support of national liberation movements:

- At the 1971, 1976, and 1981 CPSU Congresses, Brezhnev pledged Soviet support for these movements as part of his dual policy of detente and competition with the West. "Detente," he proclaimed, "does not in the slightest way abolish or change the laws of class struggle.... In the developing countries, as everywhere, ... our Party is rendering and will render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom."
- General Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces, wrote in May 1972 that "socialism's military might objectively assists the successful development of revolutionary liberation movements...."
- Article 28 of the Soviet Constitution of October 7, 1977, gave the policy legal compulsion. It states flatly that "the foreign policy of the USSR shall be aimed at ... strengthening the position of world socialism, supporting the struggles of peoples for national liberation and social progress, ..."

(S/NF) Determining Who Receives Support

The Soviets have always been vague about what constitutes a liberation movement worthy of support. By definition, a national liberation movement is broadly based; it generally contains a sizable leftist or Marxist element, but it is not necessarily a communist movement per se. This allows the Soviets considerable freedom to pick and choose. Moreover, Moscow's tacit recognition that nationalism and anti-colonialism have greater appeal than socialism in the Third World has permitted the USSR to align its support for national liberation groups with Soviet national interests rather than along strict doctrinaire lines. It has also meant that Soviet support for such movements is more a matter of exploiting existing or developing situations than it is of fostering or creating such situations.

Although the Soviets prefer to deal with leftist elements, their track record, especially during the Brezhnev regime, suggests a strong element of opportunism in their choice of clients. At times, they have ignored self-proclaimed Marxist groups in favor of non-Marxists. The major part of Soviet aid to the Rhodesian Patriotic Front, for example, went to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), not to Robert Mugabe's Marxist-oriented Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), largely because of ZANU's links to the Chinese and Moscow's calculation that ZAPU was the better bet.

The final criterion for what constitutes a "progressive" national liberation movement is not its ideological pretensions

but whether the USSR supports it. Moscow, however, generally shuns more radical and extremist elements because they are the most difficult to control. Its support for liberation groups also is conditioned by the international milieu. For example, Moscow aided the Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia until it had established close relations with the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. Once this occurred, Soviet support for the Eritreans faded.

Overt Soviet support for liberation groups usually has followed widespread international, or at least regional, acceptance of their claim to legitimacy. Soviet support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), for example, and Moscow's recognition of it as the "sole legitimate voice of the Palestinian people" came only after the Arab states and the UN recognized the PLO. Similarly, Soviet recognition of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia followed recognition by the African states, the Organization for African Unity, and the UN.

Official recognition and Soviet aid are not necessarily linked, however. The Soviets have assisted unrecognized liberation movements. But lack of widespread international backing has tended to make the USSR cautious; its aid in such cases usually is channeled through third parties and at a relatively low level.

(S/NF) Channeling of Aid

Use of third parties to channel aid has been a matter of choice and necessity for Moscow. Many states which host liberation groups refuse to allow the Soviets direct access to these groups; they insist that aid be funneled through them so that they may keep control over both the groups and Soviet activities in their countries.

In other instances, the Soviets themselves see special advantages in keeping their distance. The extent of actual Soviet participation in, or guidance of, Cuban activity in Central America is unknown, but Moscow presumably calculates that a Cuban role will be less offensive to the regional states and harder for the US to counter. The Soviets also have turned a blind eye to Libyan and Algerian support of the Polisario, to avoid offending the Moroccans.

Although the Soviets use such third parties as Libya, Cuba, and Syria as conduits to insurgent groups, they also try to establish direct links where feasible and valuable. Their ties to the PLO, for example, give them yet another card in the Middle East, in terms of both settlement negotiations and of exerting leverage over the

regional states. Indeed, there are instances where the USSR has used its ties to liberation groups to influence host governments. (This tactic occasionally backfires, however, and leads to a local crackdown on those groups.) Nevertheless, when the Soviets have had to choose between state-to-state relations with a regional power hosting a liberation group and the group itself, they have usually chosen the former.

(C) Types of Aid

The types, and levels, of Soviet aid depend on the sophistication and intensity of a liberation group's struggle. At the least, the USSR will provide moral and propaganda support either through its media or through indigenous clandestine radios, newspapers, etc. Moscow will also provide financial support, help arrange travel and subsistence for leaders of a group, and occasionally provide safe-havens for exiled leaders in the USSR or Eastern Europe. Clandestine support in the form of forged papers, false passports, etc., is taken for granted. Military assistance ranges from a few smuggled arms to training and finally supply of large amounts of sophisticated arms.

(S/NF) Soviet Control

Perhaps for Moscow the most frustrating aspect of its insurgency activities in this area is its inherent inability to control the groups it supports. Often, the leadership of an insurgent group has little or no direct contact with the Soviets and may even harbor considerable distrust and suspicion of them. Moscow's ties with many movements are little more than marriages of convenience.

The PLO is perhaps the best demonstration of Moscow's inability to control clients. On occasion in the last decade, the PLO has embarked on actions that ran counter to and seriously damaged Soviet interests in the region.

Even more frustrating for Moscow, aid does not guarantee continued loyalty when an insurgent group comes to power. Indeed, it is precisely at this point that old animosities and suspicions about the USSR are most likely to reemerge. It is also at this point that the Soviets must decide how much they are willing to add to their original investment to maintain a client in power.

Prepared by Wayne Limberg/James Grant
x29201 x28657

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E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

FILE USSR - Arms
Transfers
Third world
~~Top Secret~~

Special Analysis

USSR: Aid to the Third World in 1982

Soviet military sales and economic aid commitments to non-Communist Third World countries rebounded strongly in 1982 from the low ebb of the year before, but they still remained below the high levels of 1979 and 1980. The USSR's aid program is vital to the preservation of its influence and strategic interests abroad. The mounting instability arising from the poor economic and financial conditions in most developing countries is creating new opportunities for penetration. Moscow, however, has to pay more to maintain its current position among its Third World clients.

Moscow changed the terms of sale for its arms in 1982 to make them more attractive in light of the worsening economic climate and increased competition from Western suppliers. It offered concessionary terms, rescheduled debts, and made some of its best armaments available. Iraq and Syria, for example, were able to buy new-model T-72 tanks and high-performance aircraft on easy terms.

The Soviets also licensed the sale of some of its more advanced military production technology to a non-Communist country—India. The license to produce MIG-27 aircraft accounted for approximately one-third of the nearly \$3 billion worth of new Soviet-Indian agreements last year. This production program is an advance in the transfer of Soviet technology to a non-Communist country, both in terms of the advanced technology in the system and in terms of production methods.

Military Sales and Deliveries

Soviet arms sales contracts reached \$9 billion in 1982, 50 percent higher than the year before, and well above the average for the last five years. Decisions to equip Iraq's and Syria's armed forces accounted for most of the increase. These two countries, plus India, accounted for nearly 90 percent of new orders.

Deliveries of military equipment also increased substantially last year, spurred by record backlogs and the strenuous efforts to resupply Iraq and Syria. Almost 50 percent of the military tonnage in 1982 went to those two recipients, with deliveries to Iraq tripling over 1981. Except for jet fighters, nearly all categories of Soviet weapons delivered showed sizable increases, especially surface-to-air missile launchers and artillery.

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
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~~Top Secret~~

9 June 1983

Soviet Military and Economic Commitments to Non-Communist LDCs, 1973-82

Billion Current US \$



~~Secret~~

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1982 Commitments	Million Current US \$	
	Military	Economic
Total	9,120	882
Middle East/North Africa	5,706	NEGL
Iran	11	
Iraq	3,003	
Kuwait	258	
Libya	386	
Syria	2,012	
Other	36	NEGL
Latin America	141	173
Nicaragua	35	163
Peru	106	
Other		10
South Asia	3,136	75
Afghanistan	169	75
India	2,959	
Other	8	
Sub-Saharan Africa	137	634
Angola	100	400
Ethiopia	10	170
Mozambique	NA	5
Other	27	59

Although Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua account for only a small part of total deliveries, they received larger shipments in 1982. Record shipments to Angola included the country's first guided-missile patrol boats and T-62 medium tanks. Two more squadrons of MIG-21 fighters also were delivered. [REDACTED]

Moscow sent Mozambique new armored personnel carriers, tanks, and tracked bridging equipment. Soviet deliveries to Nicaragua increased in value from \$6 million in 1981 to \$53 million in 1982. They included additional T-55 tanks, the country's first BM-21 mobile rocket launchers, and mobile radio direction-finding stations to locate guerrilla communications sites. [REDACTED]

Economic Aid

The USSR's commitments of almost \$900 million worth of economic aid were up 70 percent from 1981, dominated by large new pledges to three favored clients:

- Angola signed a \$400 million contract for a dam and power plant that probably are to be financed with 10-year credits.
- Ethiopia received \$170 million in credits and grants to finance oil purchases from the USSR.
- Nicaragua received commitments for \$163 million worth of development projects, technical assistance, and emergency commodity assistance. [REDACTED]

Disbursements of economic aid reached \$1.2 billion last year, a 40-percent increase over the record level reached in 1981. Commodity support to Afghanistan and Ethiopia and large deliveries to Nigeria and Pakistan for steelmaking projects were responsible for most of the increase in disbursements. About 40,000 Soviet economic technicians were employed in developing countries in 1982, with nearly one-half working on projects in the Middle East and North Africa. [REDACTED]

Outlook

In view of the priority Moscow attaches to its military aid program and the record amount of undelivered military orders, approximating some \$22 billion, Soviet arms deliveries are likely to remain at or near current levels for the next few years. Moreover, future deliveries will contain a wider array of newer and more advanced weapons to a growing list of customers. The availability of advanced weapons and an apparent increased willingness to offer concessionary terms will help discourage recent efforts by some of Moscow's largest buyers to diversify the sources of their military supplies. [REDACTED]

continued

The USSR's willingness to sell arms on concessionary terms, however, is also likely to reduce its hard currency earnings somewhat. Returns from military sales nevertheless will continue to contribute an important part of total hard currency earnings. [REDACTED]

Moscow's commitments for economic assistance probably will stay near the billion-dollar level this year. New pledges, however, are likely to be more restricted to the current group of Soviet-oriented regimes. [REDACTED]