

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: "Tagants" (Tracking Agents) Issue
[Also see Exposure of US Personnel to NPPD]
Box: 36

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/25/2005

File Folder "TAGANTS" ISSUE

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 36

YARHI-MILO

3614

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11640	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE USG STUDY ON EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL TRACKING SUBSTANCES USE AGAINST EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW	1	ND	B1
11650	CABLE	PRESS GUIDANCE: KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING SUBSTANCE	2	8/17/1985	B1
11651	CABLE	KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING SUBSTANCE	2	8/17/1985	B1
11652	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11650	2	8/17/1985	B1
11653	MEMO	CHEMISTRY	2	ND	B1
11654	CABLE	190236Z AUG 85 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	3	8/19/1985	B1
11641	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS TO TRACK U.S. OFFICIALS PAR 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	2	8/19/1985	B1
11642	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11641 PAR 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/25/2005

File Folder "TAGANTS" ISSUE

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 36

YARHI-MILO

3614

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11655	MEMO	DRAFT ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV TO BE DELIVERED BY POINDEXTER TO SOVIET CHARGE <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	ND	B1
11643	CABLE	KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING CHEMICALS: CHARGE BRIEF, STATEMENT, Q & A'S <i>P</i> 1/4/2010 F06-114/11	8	8/20/1985	B1
11644	REPORT	BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON KGB USE OF CHEMICAL TRACKING SUBSTANCES <i>P</i> 1/4/2010 F06-114/11	2	ND	B1
11645	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11643 <i>P</i> 1/4/2010 F06-114/11	8	8/20/1985	B1
11646	REPORT	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11644 <i>P</i> 1/4/2010 F06-114/11	2	ND	B1
11656	CABLE	200258Z AUG 85 <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	2	8/20/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/25/2005

File Folder "TAGANTS" ISSUE

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 36

YARHI-MILO

3614

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11647	FAX	PEARSON RE DRAFT OFFICIAL STATEMENT, CHARGE BRIEFING IN EMBASSY MOSCOW ON THE KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL CHEMICAL TRACKING SUBSTANCE PAR 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11	1	ND	B3
11648	MEMO	BRIEFING IN EMBASSY MOSCOW ON THE KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL CHEMICAL TRACKING SUBSTANCE TO US EMPLOYEES P 1/4/2010 F06-114/11	3	ND	B3
11649	MEMO	DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION LIST PAR 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11	1	8/19/1985	B3
11657	MEMO	ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	ND	B1
11658	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11655 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	ND	B1
11659	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11655 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	ND	B1
11660	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11655 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/25/2005

File Folder "TAGANTS" ISSUE

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 36

YARHI-MILO

3614

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11661	MEMO	ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CROSSHATCH ACTION SHEET

372
370

MESSAGE # 377
DATE TIME: 0745

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE
DEP EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

EXPEDITE

ACTION OFFICER

COMMENT OFFICER

INFO

PEARSON

Matlock
Kraemer
Mahley

North

ACTION: CONCUR TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCARRY
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: 10.00 19AM 6

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

.....
CLEARED BY: _____ DATE: _____ TIME: _____

CLEARED TO: _____ DATE: _____ TIME: _____

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By: C/S NARA, Date: 8/7/02

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

18 AUG 18 P8:20

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

URGENT

18 205/Aug
Charlie

MESSAGE NO. 00037 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NODIS No. Pages 2

FROM: KEN M. QUINN S/S 632-8448 7224NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM TO MOSCOW ON KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING SUBSTANCES

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>ROBERT PEARSON</u>	<u>395-3044</u>	
<u>NSC</u>	<u>SECRETARIAT</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: RETRANSMISSION FOR RE-CLEARANCE WITH CHANGES SUGGESTED BY CIA
REQUEST CLEARANCE BY 10:00 AM, MONDAY, 8/19/85

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 8/7/02

S/S Officer: SLM

CROSSHATCH

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

15 AUG 17 P5:57

URGENT

B TG

B

S/S #

URGENT

17 Aug 85

URGENT

1759
D

MESSAGE NO. 000370 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 2
FROM: Ken M. Quinn S/S 632-8448 7224NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Telegram to Moscow, subj: KGB Use of Potentially Harmful Tracking Substance

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	ROBERT PEARSON	395-3044	
NSC	SECRETARIAT		
	MARTIN		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: Request clearance by: 12:00 noon Sunday, August 18, 1985

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 8/7/02

S/S Officer: CB of Russ H. van Housen

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

171842 Aug

URGENT

Charlie

URGENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

15 AUG 17 P6:42

URGENT

B

S/S #

BTG

MESSAGE NO. 000372 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 2
FROM: Ken M. Quinn S/S 632-8448 7224NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Telegram to Moscow, subj: Press Guidance: KGB Use
of Potentially Harmful Tracking Substance

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	ROBERT PEARSON	395-3044	
NSC	SECRETARIAT		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: Request clearance by 12:00 NOON, SUNDAY, AUGUST 18, 1985

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By AS NARA, Date 8/7/02

S/S Officer: AS e/ Russ H van Hous

CROSSHATCH

Jim: I am going ¹²
to get some lunch

Helen is answering
the phones

SB
2:30

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

метка

timely demarche

brief staff

press guide

test program

MUTAGENICITY RESULTS IN THE AMES TEST

The Ames test has been widely used throughout the world as a rapid and inexpensive test to screen chemicals for potential health hazards. Compounds that cause mutations in Ames bacterial strains show a high probability of causing cancer and other chronic health effects, such as birth defects and reproductive impairment.

The Ames test is designed to detect two types of mutation. One mimics the effects of radiation, point mutation. The other generally demonstrates a "frameshift" effect on genetic material. Several different strains are required to assess accurately both types of mutation. Chemicals usually cause mutations of one type or the other; only a small number of chemicals cause mutagenic activity of both types; only the most potent cause all the strains to mutate. Chemical mutagens are often "activated" in Ames tests by extracts of liver. This process mimics the human body's normal metabolism and subsequent excretion of a compound. Compounds that are mutagenic even without being "activated" are not as common and are usually reactive. Some of these are actually deactivated when they interact with liver extracts. The rare compounds that are active both before and after exposure to liver extracts are generally very reactive and are not rapidly broken down in the body to a non-toxic form. They can potentially cause mutations in any target organ for as long as they remain in the body.

Compounds that are mutagenic with or without "activation" in multiple Ames strains were examined in detail. The following table is a compilation of the major sources of mutagenic data on literally thousands of compounds subjected to the Ames test. These results have

17

been carefully scrutinized by expert scientific panels for accuracy and consistency. The U.S. EPA's Gene-Tox Program's data base is a primary source of highly reliable chemical mutagenicity data. Additional mutagenicity information comes from the National Cancer Institute's Mutagenicity Data Base, which is part of the Chemical Carcinogenesis Research Information Systems. This data source, like Gene-Tox, is also subjected to careful scrutiny and only information meeting strict criteria are placed in the data base. The Ames test results from the International Study for the Evaluation of Potential Carcinogens have also been included in the table. This study was funded through England's Medical Research Council, the U.S. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the EPA, and Japan's National Cancer Center Research Institute. The actual mutagenicity assays were done by laboratories in Australia, England, Italy, Japan, and the United States.

The following table presents the selected compounds, some background on health effects, results in the Ames test in Salmonella strains TA-1535, TA-1537, TA-1538, TA-98 and TA-100. Results for each strain tested are indicated and whether the analysis was made with (w) or without (w/o) liver extracts. The source of information the human carcinogenic potential for each compound is the 1984-1985 "Threshold Limit Values" of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, as well as EPA, FDA and OSHA regulatory actions.

COMPOUNDS DEMONSTRATING STRONG POSITIVE RESULTS IN AMES TESTING

COMPOUND	TA Mutagenicity in Salmonella Strains - *									
	1535		1537		1538		98		100	
	w	w/o	w	w/o	w	w/o	w	w/o	w	w/o
* <u>2-Acetylaminofluorene (2-AAF)</u> - Experimental carcinogen			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
<u>Aflatoxin B1</u> - Extremely potent carcinogen - Found in moldy grains			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
<u>2-Aminoanthracene</u> - Positive control in the Ames test	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
* <u>4-Aminobiphenyl</u> - Recognized human carcinogen - Industrial chemical			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
* <u>Benzidine</u> - Recognized human carcinogen - Industrial chemical	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
<u>Benzo(a)pyrene</u> - Suspect human carcinogen - Found in cigarette smoke			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
<u>Benzo(a)pyrene-4,5-oxide</u> - Carcinogenic principle of benzo(a)pyrene metabolism			-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
* <u>beta-Naphthylamine</u> - Recognized human carcinogen - Industrial chemical	+	-	?	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
* <u>beta-Propiolactone</u> - Suspect human carcinogen - Chemical intermediate	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
<u>Captan</u> - Causes birth defects - Pesticide	+	-	+	-			+	-	+	-
<u>Cyclophosphamide</u> - Carcinogen - Anticancer drug	+	+	-	-	?	-	-	-	+	?
<u>D and C Orange 17</u> - Recognized carcinogen - Dye			-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
<u>9,10-Dimethylbenzanthracene</u> - Experimental carcinogen			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
* <u>Dimethylnitrosamine</u> - Suspect human carcinogen - Food contaminant	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
<u>Dimethylcarbamoyl chloride</u> - Suspect human carcinogen	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+
<u>Epichlorohydrin</u> - Carcinogen - Industrial chemical	+	+	-	-	?	?	-	-	+	+
<u>Ethylene dibromide (EDB)</u> - Suspect human carcinogen - Pesticide	+	+							-	+
<u>Ethyl methane sulfonate (EMS)</u> - Carcinogen - Positive control in the Ames test	+	+					+	-	+	+
<u>ICR 191</u> - Carcinogen - Anticancer drug			-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+

<u>3-Methylcholanthrene (3-MC)</u> - Experimental carcinogen	+	-	+	-	+	-			+	-
<u>Melthylenebis-2-choloraniline (MOCA)</u> - Suspect human carcinogen	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-
<u>4-Nitro-o-phenylenediamine</u> - Carcinogen - Hair dye component	+	+	+	+	NT	NT	+	+	+	+
<u>4-Nitroquinoline-N-oxide</u> - Carcinogen	+	+	?	?	+	+	+	+	+	+
<u>Tris-(2,3-dibromo propyl)phosphate (TRIS)</u> - Carcinogen - Flame retardant	+	-							+	-
* <u>Vinyl chloride</u> - Recognized human carcinogen - Industrial chemical	+	-							+	-
<u>1-Vinyl-3-cyclohexene diepoxide</u> - Carcinogen	+	+	+	+	NT	NT	+	+	+	+

* OSHA Carcinogen

- ** + positive results
 - negative results
 ? borderline positive result
 NT Not tested
 W With activation
 W/O Without activation



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

Reason
✓ Matlock S/S-O
RCM OUTGOING

11654

PAGE 02 OF 04 STATE 255009 TOSEC 180116
ORIGIN NODS-00

C04/05 001582 NOD555

INFO LOG-00 /000 R

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 #11654

DRAFTED BY: EUR/SOV: BLPASCOE;
APPROVED BY: THE ACTING SECRETARY
EUR/SOV: MPARRIS
M/MED: CBRODINE
EUR/SOV: JKELLY
S/S-O: SMOATS

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

NSC: JPOINDEXTER
CIA: JOLSON
S/S: KQUINN

-----177270 190240Z /60

O 190236Z AUG 85 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE
USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 255009 TOSEC 180116

NODIS

E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING
- SUBSTANCE

1. *s* - ENTIRE TEXT

2. CHARGE SHOULD BE READY TO SEEK APPOINTMENT AT HIGHEST AVAILABLE LEVEL LATE MONDAY AUGUST 19 OR EARLY TUESDAY AUGUST 20 TO MAKE POINTS BELOW ON SOVIET USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL CHEMICAL TRACKING AGENT AGAINST AMERICAN PERSONNEL. PLAN IS FOR ACTING SECRETARY WHITEHEAD TO MAKE DEMARCHE TO SOVIET CHARGE MONDAY. THE DEPARTMENT WILL INFORM YOU OF TIME OF THE WASHINGTON MEETING WHEN IT IS SET SO DEMARCHES CAN BE MADE AS NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. BACKGROUND AND CONTINGENCY

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

S/S-0
OUTGOING

~~SECRET~~

Department of State



PAGE 03 OF 04 STATE 255009 TOSEC 180116

C04/05 001582 NOD555

PRESS GUIDANCE FOLLOW SEPTELS.

3. BEGIN DEMARCHE:

-- I AM INSTRUCTED BY MY HIGHEST AUTHORITIES TO RAISE WITH YOU A MATTER OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS PROBLEM FALLS INTO THAT CATEGORY OF ACTIONS BY THE SOVIET SECURITY SERVICES OR MILITARY THAT DO NOT SEEM WELL CONTROLLED OR THOUGHT THROUGH BY THE SOVIET POLITICAL AUTHORITIES BUT WHICH CAN CAUSE SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.

-- US AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN CONCERNED FOR SOME TIME ABOUT A SUBSTANCE THE KGB APPARENTLY USES TO TRACK OUR PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE AND THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY COME INTO CONTACT. THIS PRACTICE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN STEPPED UP IN RECENT MONTHS. THE TRACKING SUBSTANCE IS A POWDERY CHEMICAL APPLIED TO OUR PEOPLE, THEIR CARS, AND ELSEWHERE.

-- ONE OF THE AGENTS USED FOR THESE OPERATIONS IS A SYNTHETIC CHEMICAL CALLED NPPD. OUR TESTS HAVE NOW CONFIRMED THAT THIS SUBSTANCE IS POTENTIALLY QUITE HARMFUL. TEST SAMPLES HAVE SHOWN THE SUBSTANCE TO BE STRONGLY MUTAGENIC. THEY SUGGEST THAT IT MAY WELL BE CARCINOGENIC (CANCER-CAUSING) AS WELL.

-- THUS OUR GOVERNMENT IS FORCED TO CONFRONT THE REALITY THAT THE KGB HAS BEEN EMPLOYING A SUBSTANCE ON OUR PEOPLE FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME THAT ENDANGERS THE HEALTH OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS, THEIR FAMILIES, AND ALL THOSE SOVIETS WHO HAVE COME INTO CONTACT WITH THEM.

-- I AM INSTRUCTED TO PROTEST THIS ACTIVITY IN THE STRONGEST OF TERMS AND TO DEMAND THAT USE OF DANGEROUS

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

22



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

S/S-0
OUTGOING

PAGE 04 OF 04 STATE 255009 TOSEC 180116 C04/05 001582 NOD555

CHEMICAL AGENTS ON OUR PEOPLE STOP IMMEDIATELY. IT HARDLY NEEDS TO BE SAID THAT THIS ACTION VIOLATES THE MOST BASIC CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY -- SPECIFICALLY ARTICLE 29 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION -- ON THE INVIOABILITY OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL.

-- IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THE SOVIET UNION IMMEDIATELY CEASE USING CHEMICAL AGENTS OF ANY FORM AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL. THE CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR NOT DOING SO WOULD BE INCALCULABLE.

WHITEHEAD

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

NCS/ICS SYSTEM IV
400938 add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

August 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Use of Chemical Agents to Track U.S. Officials

Bill Casey has sent the President a letter describing the intensive Soviet effort to "tag" U.S. officials in Moscow with a chemical substance which, when transferred to persons with whom the tagged officials are in physical contact, would permit tracking of contacts.

We have planned the following actions:

-- John Whitehead will deliver a strong protest to the Soviet Charge d'Affaires this afternoon, and demand that the practice cease forthwith. Dick Combs, our Charge in Moscow, will follow up with a parallel demarche there tomorrow morning.

FOIA(b)(1)

-- A team of specialists will be sent to Moscow Wednesday to brief Embassy personnel -- assuming they are issued Soviet visas promptly.

-- We intend to task NIH and EPA to study the potential effects of the substance and to advise on precautions which should be taken.

Since we are under an obligation to brief our own personnel regarding the possible risks they and their families are running, and probably should also brief Allied Governments and other resident Americans in Moscow (e.g., resident journalists), we must assume that this matter will soon become public knowledge. We are, therefore, considering the advisability of making a public statement as soon as our personnel are briefed. One of our problems, both in briefing and in the public handling of the issue, is that we do not now know what procedures will be effective in removing the substance from personnel and their belongings. The object of the NIH/EPA study mentioned above would be to seek such procedures.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR-06-114/11 #11641

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

It is self-evident that a big public issue over this reprehensible KGB practice will not contribute to a constructive atmosphere at the President's upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. The Soviets may even claim that it has been introduced as an "artificial issue" in order to doom the meeting. Nevertheless, I believe we have no alternative but to go ahead with the procedures described above. It is an issue we cannot sweep under the rug, even if we desired to do so -- and we should not do so, since the Soviets should be forced to face the consequences of their own actions when these are totally irresponsible as regards health and safety.

In addition to our diplomatic demarches, I would recommend that the President send a personal message to Gorbachev, drawing his attention to this matter and making clear that he expects Gorbachev to see to it that the practice of contaminating American personnel with chemical compounds is terminated forthwith. Such a message might be more effective if delivered orally, since a message in writing will almost certainly simply result in a written denial of the facts (though the practice could, nevertheless, be stopped).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Ken deGraffenreid concurs.

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Recommended Oral Message to Gorbachev
- Tab B Casey-President letter of August 17

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Soviet Use of Chemical Agents to Track U.S. Officials

Bill Casey has sent you a letter describing an intensive Soviet effort to "tag" U.S. officials in Moscow with a chemical substance which, when transferred to persons with whom the tagged officials are in physical contact, would permit tracking of contacts.

The fact that the KGB has occasionally used chemical agents as "tagants" has been known for some time. But Casey's letter contains the very disturbing news that laboratory analysis has indicated that one compound used by the Soviets is strongly mutagenic (and thus potentially carcinogenic), and also that the practice is much more widespread than we had earlier assumed.

We have planned the following actions:

-- John Whitehead will deliver a strong protest to the Soviet Charge d'Affaires this afternoon, and demand that the practice cease forthwith. Dick Combs, our Charge in Moscow, will follow up with a parallel demarche there tomorrow morning.

FOIA(b)(1) -- A team of specialists will be sent to Moscow Wednesday to brief Embassy personnel. [REDACTED]

-- We intend to task NIH and EPA to study the potential effects of the substance and to advise on precautions which should be taken.

Since we are under an obligation to brief our own personnel regarding the possible risks they and their families are running, and probably should also brief Allied Governments and other resident Americans in Moscow (e.g., resident journalists), we must assume that this matter will soon become public knowledge. We are, therefore, considering the advisability of making a public statement as soon as our personnel are briefed. One of our problems, both in briefing and in the public handling of the issue, is that we do not now know what procedures will be effective in removing the substance from personnel and their

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR E06-114/11 #11642
BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

belongings. The object of the NIH/EPA study mentioned above would be to seek such procedures.

It is self-evident that a big public issue over this reprehensible KGB practice will not contribute to a constructive atmosphere at your upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. The Soviets may even claim that it has been introduced as an "artificial issue" in order to doom your meeting. Nevertheless, I believe we have no alternative but to go ahead with the procedures described above. It is an issue we cannot sweep under the rug, even if we desired to do so +- and we should not do so, since the Soviets should be forced to face the consequences of their own actions when these are totally irresponsible as regards health and safety.

In addition to our diplomatic demarches, I would recommend that you send a personal message to Gorbachev, drawing his attention to this matter and making clear that you expect him to see to it that the practice of contaminating American personnel with chemical compounds be terminated forthwith. Such a message might be more effective if delivered orally, since a message in writing will almost certainly simply result in a written denial of the facts (though the practice could, nevertheless, be stopped).

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	
---	---	That you authorize John Poindexter to deliver to the Soviet Charge tomorrow morning the oral message at Tab A from you personally to Gorbachev.

Attachments:

Tab A Draft oral message

Tab B Letter of August 17, 1985, from DCI Casey

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

DRAFT ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

[To be delivered by Adm. Poindexter to Soviet Charge, for transmittal to Gen. Sec. Gorbachev]

I have just learned about the evidence that your security organs have for some time been engaged in the practice of contaminating U.S. officials and their dependents with chemical substances -- substances not occurring in nature, which are deliberately placed in vehicles belonging to American officials, on their clothing, and even in hotel rooms and train compartments which they utilize. Recently, American personnel serving in the Soviet Union have reported serious skin rashes on themselves and their children, some very young, which apparently are caused by this chemical.

Our scientists have analyzed the compound which has been used very extensively, particularly in recent months, and have found that it can cause genetic mutations, and therefore is highly suspect of being carcinogenetic. I am genuinely shocked that any government would authorize the use of such a chemical under any circumstances.

I realize that this practice may have been carried out without your knowledge. Therefore, I would request that you insist upon a full report and that you give instructions to cease this abhorrent practice immediately. If the practice should be continued, it can have a seriously negative impact on our ability to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/11 # 11655

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1985

*Matlock, deLoach, Casper, Callahan,
Sachs.*

Please provide comments on the
attached Congressional talkers
by 9:00AM, Wednesday, August 21,
to Bob Pearson, X2224.

*(Already
cl'd by WRP)*

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By GS NARA, Date 8/7/02

~~TOP SECRET~~

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED AT 10:12 AM

85 AUG 20 1997

B

201947L
C

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 23, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 8/7/98

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 000-420 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SENSITIVE No. Pages 30

FROM: MMBOVA S/S 632-3326 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING CHEMICALS:
CHARGE BRIEF, STATEMENT, Q & A'S

TO: (Agency) DELIVER TO Extension Room No.

NSC

ROBERT PEARSON Eyes only

NSC

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

JP

OK WRP 8/20 2045

Pearson

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS PLEASE CLEAR BY: TONIGHT TUESDAY, AUGUST 20.

de WRP de WRP
Cleared Matlock, deGrafenst, Sjerezian, Sachs
WRP 8/21

S.S. Officer

AWA for MMB

All except Confidential letters
to be cleared 8/21 CJS

CROSSHATCH

Cleared to State 8/20 9 '0
CARYN

~~SECRET~~

FOIA(b) (1) EUR/SOV:BLPASCOE/MRPARRIS:BLP
8/20/85 632-9559 WANG 422M

FOIA(b) (3) ACTING SECRETARY

EUR:RLRIDGWAY
CIA: [REDACTED]
NSC:JHATLOCK

M/MED:CBRODINE
P:WCOURTNEY
D:MEGAN

B. P. M. S/S. EUR ONLY

MIACT IMMEDIATE ROSCOM

IMMEDIATE SECRETARY

NOBIS

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

SUBJECT: KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING
- CHEMICALS: CHARGE BRIEF, STATEMENT, Q & A'S

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CHARGE IS AUTHORIZED TO ORGANIZE A BRIEFING OF EMBASSY STAFF MEMBERS -- WITH SPOUSES IF YOU DEEM IT APPROPRIATE -- ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 21, AFTER THE SUPPORT TEAM HEADED BY DR. BRODINE ARRIVES, USING THE MATERIAL SUPPLIED AT PARAS 4, 5, AND 6. THE DEPARTMENT INTENDS TO READ THE STATEMENT IN PARA 5 AT THE NOON PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WILL ANSWER QUESTIONS AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING USING Q & A'S AT PARA 6. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOLLOWING FORMAL BRIEFING. CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS WILL BEGIN AT 9:00 AM.

3. SHOULD THERE BE A PRESS LEAK BEFORE TEAM ARRIVES OR TEAM IS DELAYED, CHARGE SHOULD BRIEF WITHOUT THEM TO MINIMIZE STAFF CONCERNS. CHARGE IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON MATERIAL BELOW TO BRIEF OTHER EMBASSIES AS HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE, AS WELL AS NON-OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY, AFTER WASHINGTON ANNOUNCEMENT.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR FD6-114/11 #11643

BY [REDACTED] NARA DATE 1/4/10

~~SECRET~~

JW
BSP
RKR
JH

~~SECRET~~

1 2

4. TEXT OF CHARGE'S BRIEF TO STAFF:

-- I HAVE CALLED YOU TOGETHER TODAY TO GIVE YOU SOME INFORMATION WE HAVE OBTAINED THAT POTENTIALLY COULD AFFECT THE HEALTH OF OUR PEOPLE SERVING IN MOSCOW. COMING TO MOSCOW THIS AFTERNOON TO ANSWER QUESTIONS WHICH WILL INEVITABLY ARISE ARE DR. CHARLES BRODINE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S MEDICAL OFFICE, MARY RYAN, AND OTHERS.

-- I WAS ALERTED TO THIS PROBLEM OVER THE WEEKEND. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF ACTIVITY IN WASHINGTON AT VERY HIGH LEVELS THE PAST FEW DAYS DESIGNED TO GET A ACCURATE READING ON THIS PROBLEM AND TO MAKE SURE THAT ALL OF US HERE ARE FULLY INFORMED. ONCE WASHINGTON WAS CONFIDENT OF ITS INFORMATION, ACTION WAS TAKEN TO PRESSURE THE SOVIETS TO CHANGE THEIR PROCEDURES AND TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A FULL BRIEFING.

-- YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT ACTING SECRETARY WHITEHEAD MADE A STRONG PROTEST TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON MONDAY AFTERNOON AND I MADE A SIMILAR ONE HERE TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY TUESDAY MORNING. WE SCHEDULED THE EMBASSY BRIEFING TODAY SO WE COULD HAVE EXPERTS HERE FROM WASHINGTON.

-- NOW TO TELL YOU WHAT WE KNOW.

-- OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE KGB HAS OCCASIONALLY USED SOME CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES ON EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE TO TRACK THEM AND THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY HAVE COME INTO CONTACT. THEY USED CHEMICALS THAT DO NOT APPEAR IN NATURE AND THEREFORE CAN BE TRACED EFFECTIVELY. THE SUBSTANCES IN QUESTION, WHICH HAVE BEEN APPLIED INDIRECTLY TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL, LEAVE DEPOSITS ON THE PERSON OR POSSESSIONS OF PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY HAVE HAD CONTACT.

-- FOR THE MOST PART, THIS HAS BEEN VIEWED AS A NUISANCE. IN THE PAST, THE PRACTICE SEEMED SUFFICIENTLY ERRATIC AND INFREQUENT THAT IT DID NOT APPEAR TO CAUSE A HEALTH HAZARD TO OUR PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, WE RECENTLY DEVELOPED EVIDENCE THAT THE KGB PROGRAM IS MORE WIDESPREAD THAN WE HAD THOUGHT. SIMILARLY, THE SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY THIS SPRING AND SUMMER.

-- WE FELT THAT OUR FIRST DUTY -- ONCE WE WERE FAIRLY CERTAIN OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE -- WAS TO INFORM OUR PERSONNEL HERE CANDIDLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS WE COULD OF

~~SECRET~~

WHAT WE KNOW. ALL OF US RECOGNIZE THAT LIFE IN MOSCOW IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH WITHOUT HAVING TO CONTEND WITH RUMORS AND HALF-TRUTHS ABOUT HEALTH HAZARDS.

-- THE MOST FREQUENTLY USED OF THESE TRACKING CHEMICALS THAT WE HAVE FOUND IS A SYNTHETIC CHEMICAL CALLED NPPD. TESTING OF THE SUBSTANCE IN WASHINGTON HAS CONFIRMED THAT IT IS POTENTIALLY -- I EMPHASIZE POTENTIALLY -- HARMFUL TO PEOPLE. A BIOLOGICAL SCREENING TEST CALLED THE AMES TEST HAS SHOWN NPPD TO BE A MUTAGEN. MUTAGENS CAN BE, BUT ARE NOT ALWAYS, CARCINOGENS IN HUMAN BEINGS. INTENSIVE AND LENGTHY TESTS CONDUCTED IN SEVERAL SPECIES OF ANIMALS WILL BE REQUIRED TO SEE IF NPPD IS REALLY A CARCINOGENIC SUBSTANCE.

-- NPPD IS A CHEMICAL THAT DOES NOT OCCUR NATURALLY NOR IS IT COMMONLY MANUFACTURED. IT IS A WHITE-TO-YELLOW COLORED POWDER WHICH IS NOT VOLATILE, I.E. IT DOES NOT EVAPORATE OR FORM VAPORS. THE LABORATORY INSTRUMENT USED TO IDENTIFY NPPD IS THE MASS SPECTROGRAPH. THIS INSTRUMENT IS CAPABLE OF DETECTING NPPD AT LEVELS OF 100 NANOGRAMS (A NANOGRAM IS 1/ONE BILLIONTH GRAM).

-- THE POSSIBLE ROUTES OF EXPOSURE TO NPPD ARE BY INGESTION, INHALATION AND SKIN PENETRATION. INGESTION WOULD BE BY HAND TO MOUTH ACTIVITY AND WOULD PROBABLY BE IN NANOGRAM QUANTITIES AND UNLIKELY TO BE A SIGNIFICANT EXPOSURE RISK. WASHING WITH SOAP AND WATER MAY HELP. IN ADDITION, USE OF CLEANSING PREPARATIONS CONTAINING ALCOHOL MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE.

-- INHALATION IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE POWDER BECOMES SUSPENDED IN THE AIR. HEAVY APPLICATIONS OF POWDER WHICH ARE VISIBLE MIGHT BECOME SUSPENDED IN THE AIR IF DISTURBED. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT QUANTITIES THAT ARE NOT VISIBLE WOULD PRESENT A RISK OF INHALATION EXPOSURE. SKIN PENETRATION IS THE MOST LIKELY POTENTIAL ROUTE OF EXPOSURE. PLANNED STUDIES WILL SEEK TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH NPPD CAN PENETRATE THE SKIN.

-- I KNOW THE FIRST QUESTION WILL BE HOW DANGEROUS THE CHEMICAL REALLY IS. WE WANT TO BE ABSOLUTELY HONEST WITH YOU AND SAY WE DO NOT KNOW. OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT IS THAT ANY DANGER FROM THE CHEMICAL, OR OTHERS LIKE IT, IS FAR FROM PROVED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CHEMICAL APPEARS IN TESTING TO HAVE RELATIVELY LOW ACUTE TOXICITY. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE MINIMAL AMOUNTS APPARENTLY INVOLVED, ITS SLOW RATE OF ABSORPTION, AND THE ABILITY OF THE BODY'S METABOLISM TO BREAK DOWN THE COMPOUND, ALL ARGUE THAT THE

SECRET

1 4

RISK IS FAIRLY LOW.

-- WE HAVE, HOWEVER, SET UP A GROUP UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NIH AND EPA TO STUDY ALL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL TRACKING SUBSTANCES ON OUR PERSONNEL. THESE AGENCIES HAVE ALREADY BEGUN WORK ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED. CURRENT PLANS ARE FOR A TEAM TO VISIT HERE IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AT THE EMBASSY.

-- THERE WILL, OF COURSE, NEED TO BE FURTHER AND LENGTHY STUDIES IN ANIMALS BEFORE WE CAN SPEAK CONFIDENTLY ABOUT WHETHER NPPD AND OTHER COMPOUNDS USED BY THE SOVIETS POSE A THREAT TO HEALTH. OUR HOPE IS TO GET SOME SENSE OF HOW CONCERNED WE SHOULD BE, WHAT COUNTER-MEASURES ARE NEEDED, AND HOW WIDESPREAD THE PROBLEM IS THROUGH THIS STUDY.

-- AT THIS POINT, WE CAN ONLY SAY THAT PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT THE LEVELS OF THESE CHEMICALS TO WHICH INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED IS VERY LOW. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT ANY EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAVE SUFFERED ILL EFFECTS DUE TO EXPOSURE TO TRACKING AGENTS. THERE IS CERTAINLY NO IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR ALARM.

5. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT THAT WILL BE RELEASED SHORTLY AFTER EMBASSY PERSONNEL ARE BRIEFED:

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY DETERMINED THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS HAVE USED CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES OF THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE. THE SUBSTANCES IN QUESTION, WHICH HAVE BEEN APPLIED INDIRECTLY TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL, LEAVE DEPOSITS ON THE PERSON OR POSSESSIONS OF PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY HAVE HAD CONTACT.

*and
"some"
deleted*

THE MOST EXTENSIVELY USED OF SUCH TRACKING AGENTS, NPPD, HAS BEEN DETERMINED THROUGH BIOLOGICAL SCREENING TESTS TO BE A MUTAGEN. MUTAGENS CAN BE, BUT ARE NOT ALWAYS, CARCINOGENS IN HUMAN BEINGS. EXTENSIVE TESTING WILL BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER NPPD AND OTHER COMPOUNDS USED BY THE SOVIETS POSE A THREAT TO HEALTH, AS WELL AS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE EMBASSY COMMUNITY'S EXPOSURE TO THESE CHEMICALS. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT THE LEVELS OF NPPD AND OTHER SUBSTANCES TO WHICH INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED IS VERY LOW. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT ANY EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAVE SUFFERED ILL EFFECTS DUE TO EXPOSURE TO TRACKING AGENTS.

EMBASSY MOSCOW'S STAFF WAS BRIEFED EARLIER THIS MORNING

SECRET

ON WHAT IS CURRENTLY KNOWN OF THE HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S USE OF TRACKING AGENTS. UNOFFICIAL AMERICANS RESIDENT IN THE USSR, AS WELL AS OTHER EMBASSIES WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN TARGETED, ARE ALSO BEING INFORMED. A SPECIAL TASK FORCE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION INTO THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF EXPOSURE TO NPPD AND OTHER TRACKING AGENTS.

THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THE SOVIET UNION'S USE OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AGAINST ITS DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN THE USSR. WE HAVE PROTESTED THE PRACTICE IN THE STRONGEST TERMS AND DEMANDED THAT IT BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY. THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE MEASURE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND TO DETERMINE THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISKS TO WHICH THEY MAY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED. {3-(4-NITRO PHENYL)-2,4-PENTADIEN-1-AL}

B. Q AND A'S:

Q: CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE KGB HAS BEEN USING A CANCER-CAUSING AGENT TO TRACK OUR EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND THEIR CONTACTS AROUND IN MOSCOW?

A: THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN USING POWDERY CHEMICALS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS APPARENTLY TO TRACE THE CONTACTS OF SOME OF OUR OFFICIALS. OUR TESTS OF ONE OF THE CHEMICALS USED CONFIRMS THAT IT IS POTENTIALLY -- I EMPHASIZE POTENTIALLY -- HARMFUL TO PEOPLE. RESULTS OF BIOLOGICAL SCREENING TESTS INDICATE THAT THE CHEMICAL MAY BE CARCINOGENIC. FURTHER AND LENGTHY STUDIES IN ANIMALS WILL BE REQUIRED TO CONFIRM OR DISPROVE THIS POSSIBILITY.

Q: HOW LONG HAVE WE KNOWN ABOUT THIS?

A: "TRACKING" CHEMICALS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED ON OCCASION BY THE KGB FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. ONLY LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, DID LABORATORY TESTS REVEAL THAT THE SUBSTANCES USED MIGHT BE HARMFUL. AT THAT TIME, IT WAS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE USE OF THE SUBSTANCES WAS SUFFICIENTLY SYSTEMATIC OR FREQUENT TO POSE A HEALTH HAZARD TO U.S. PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NOW EVIDENCE THAT THE KGB PROGRAM IS MORE WIDESPREAD THAN HAD BEEN THOUGHT. THE USE OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES WAS STEPPED UP SIGNIFICANTLY THIS SPRING AND SUMMER.

SECRET

1 6

this word added

Q: WHY DIDN'T YOU FOLLOW UP WITH FURTHER TESTING TO DETERMINE POTENTIAL HARMFULNESS TO HUMANS IMMEDIATELY AFTER INITIAL LABORATORY TESTS REVEALED IT MIGHT BE?

A: IT WAS ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT THE USE OF THE CHEMICALS WAS INFREQUENT AND THE QUANTITIES INVOLVED WERE SUFFICIENTLY MINUTE THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO DO FURTHER EXTENSIVE STUDIES.

please added

Q: HOW MANY PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY HAVE BEEN AFFECTED?

A: SEVERAL EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN EXPOSED BUT MORE TESTING IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE EXACTLY HOW WIDESPREAD THE PROBLEM IS. WE PLAN TO SEND A NIH/EPA TEAM TO MOSCOW TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION.

slight rephrasing of Q & A

Q: WHAT ABOUT OTHER AMERICANS IN MOSCOW? OTHER POSTS ABROAD? PEOPLE WHO SERVED THERE IN PAST YEARS? WERE THEY ALSO CONTAMINATED?

A: WE HOPE TO FIND ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS IN THE STUDY BEING CARRIED OUT BY NIH AND EPA. WE HAVE THESE SAME QUESTIONS, BUT FOR NOW THERE ARE MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS.

new Q/A

Q: HAVE YOU PROTESTED TO THE SOVIETS AND DEMANDED THAT THEY STOP?

A: YES. WE HAVE PROTESTED STRONGLY BOTH HERE AND IN MOSCOW AND DEMANDED THAT THE USE OF CHEMICALS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE CEASE IMMEDIATELY.

Q: WHY ARE YOU MAKING THIS PUBLIC NOW?

A: ONCE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND INFORMED OF THE WEIGHT OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, WE FELT DUTY-BOUND TO INFORM OUR PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW OF THE FINDINGS OPENLY AND ACCURATELY. THE DIPLOMATIC LIFE IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF UNFOUNDED MEDICAL RUMORS. WE, THEREFORE, HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO BE AS CANDID AS POSSIBLE WITH OUR PEOPLE ON THE RISKS INVOLVED WHEREVER AND WHATEVER THEY MAY BE.

Q: ARE THE SOVIETS GIVING OUR PEOPLE CANCER ON PURPOSE? ISN'T THIS CHEMICAL WARFARE AGAINST CIVILIANS?

A: WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CONSCIOUSLY SOUGHT TO IMPAIR THE HEALTH OF OUR EMPLOYEES. OUR ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT TEST THESE

new Q/A

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

1 7

CHEMICALS THOROUGHLY BEFORE USING THEM: IF THEY DID TEST THEM, THEY CANNOT HAVE PUT THEM THROUGH THE AMES TEST. THIS, OF COURSE, DOES NOT IN ANY WAY ABSOLVE THEM OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR USING CHEMICALS OF ANY KIND AGAINST OUR PEOPLE. THIS IS A TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ACTION BY THE KGB. WE HAVE DEMANDED THEY STOP IMMEDIATELY.

Q: WILL THIS AFFECT THE SHEVARDNADZE MEETINGS HERE OR THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV IN GENEVA IN NOVEMBER?

A: WE HAVE RAISED BEFORE AND WILL NO DOUBT AGAIN DISCUSS THE SERIOUS DANGERS TO THE RELATIONSHIP CAUSED BY ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES WHICH SEEM TO ACT AS IF THEY ARE UNDER NO CONTROL BY THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER AND WE WILL TREAT IT AS SUCH IN OUR MEETINGS.

Q: A SOVIET TOLD ME THIS IS ALL A FANTASY COOKED UP TO WORSEN RELATIONS. IS THAT TRUE?

A: WE WISH THAT IT WERE A FANTASY. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE DEALING WITH SOME VERY UNSAVORY FACTS. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR, WE DO NOT WANT TO WORSEN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, WE WANT TO IMPROVE THEM. BUT WE MUST BE REALISTIC. IT IS THE KGB WHICH IS CARRYING OUT THESE OPERATIONS. THE QUESTION SHOULD BE ASKED IF THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO SABOTAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH SUCH RECKLESS ACTIONS AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL.

Q: ARE YOU GOING TO LET PEOPLE LEAVE MOSCOW BECAUSE OF THE DANGER?

A: AS OUR STATEMENT INDICATES, WE ARE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF OUR EMPLOYEES AND THEIR FAMILIES. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS TIME TO SPECULATE ON SPECIFIC STEPS WHICH MAY BE TAKEN. AT THIS POINT, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A NEED FOR EVACUATION.

Q: WHEN WAS THIS NIH/EPA TASK FORCE SET UP? ARE THEY GOING TO MOSCOW?

A: IT WAS ESTABLISHED EARLY THIS WEEK AS PART OF OUR EFFORT TO GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM WE FACE. SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WILL TRAVEL TO MOSCOW IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE PROBLEM ON THE SPOT.

new
Q/A.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

| 8

Q: WHATEVER HAPPENED ON THE MICROWAVES ISSUE? HAVE THE SOVIETS STOPPED BEAMING THEM AT OUR PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW?

A: WE HAVE ON OCCASION DETECTED MICROWAVE SIGNALS BEAMED AT THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. AS LATE AS 1983, WE PROTESTED STRONGLY TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT A BEAM WHICH OPERATED FOR A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF A MAJOR STUDY ON THIS ISSUE BY THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY IN THE SEVENTIES, WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE LEVEL OF SIGNALS DID NOT PRESENT A HEALTH HAZARD. WE HAVE TAKEN PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN THE CHANCERY BUILDING, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE MICROWAVES OR OTHER MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST OUR PEOPLE IN MOSCOW REMAIN STOPPED.

*new
Q/A*

Q: CAN YOU GIVE US SOME MORE DETAILS ON WHAT THE SOVIETS WERE DOING WITH THE POWDER?

A: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER FOR YOU ON THIS AT THIS TIME.

Q: (IF ASKED ONLY) IS NPPD BEING USED BY THE SOVIETS IN THE US?

A: WE ARE LOOKING INTO THAT POSSIBILITY.44

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Briefing For Congressional Leaders on
KGB Use of Chemical Tracking Substances

all
new
material

FOIA(b)(1)

FOIA(b)(3)

-- We want you to know that we are briefing our staff in Moscow today about a potential health problem arising from the KGB's use of chemical tracking substances against some of our people there and elsewhere. Since this will inevitably generate publicity, we will release a statement at the Department on the problem at the noon press briefing. We wanted you to be informed before it becomes public.

-- The CIA recently developed additional information on KGB use for a number of years of chemical substances to monitor the activities [redacted] at the US Embassy in Moscow. The chemicals, which have been applied indirectly to Embassy personnel, leave deposits on the person or possessions of people with whom they have had contact.

-- The most extensively used tracking agent, dubbed NPPD, has been determined through biological screening tests to be a mutagen. Mutagens can be, but are not always, carcinogens in human beings. Frankly, it is not clear at this point how dangerous the material is. We have NIH and EPA experts looking at the substance. Further testing will be necessary to determine if it or other compounds used pose a threat to health, as well as to determine the extent of the Embassy community's exposure to these chemicals.

-- A special task force under the leadership of the National Institutes of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency has been established to conduct a thorough investigation into the long-term implications of exposure to NPPD and other tracking agents. Preliminary indications suggest that the levels of NPPD and other substances to which individuals may have been exposed is very low. There is no evidence to date that any Embassy personnel have suffered ill effects.

-- However, given our earlier problems with microwaves in Moscow, we want to be sure our employees there know about the potential problem. Unofficial Americans resident in the USSR, as well as other Embassies which may have been targeted, will also be informed. A team of specialists has been sent to Moscow to support our charge when he briefs our employees.

-- John Whitehead protested these actions to the Soviet charge on Monday and we followed up with a second demarche at the same level in Moscow on Tuesday. As expected, they've denied the charges, but we've made clear we expect the use of chemicals will stop.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR FD6-114/11 #11644

BY FW NARA DATE 1/4/10

99
Drafted: EUR/SOV:MRParr ^Q/BLPascoe ^{bl}
8/20/85:Ext 23738/29559

Cleared: P:WCourtne
D:WEgan
NSC:JMatlock
CIA: [REDACTED]
MED:CBrodin
EUR:RRidg ^Y



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1985

Ambassador Matlock:

Please provide comments on the
attached Congressional talkers
by 9:00AM, Wednesday, August 21,
to Bob Pearson, X2224.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED AT 10:12 AM

20 AUG 20 1997

B

S/S #

201947 L
C

MESSAGE NO. 000426 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SENSITIVE No. Pages 10

FROM: MMBOVA S/S 632-3126 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING CHEMICALS:
CHARGE BRIEF, STATEMENT, Q & A'S

TO: (Agency) DELIVER TO Extension Room No.

NSC

ROBERT PEARSON Eyes only

NSC

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

JP

OK WRP 8/20 2045

Pearson

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS PLEASE CLEAR BY: TONIGHT TUESDAY, AUGUST 20.

de WRP *de WRP*
Cleared Matlock, de Goffens, Sjerejan, Sachs
WRP 8/21

S.S. Officer MMB for MMB

All except Confidential talker
to be cleared 8/21 CWR

CROSSHATCH

~~SECRET~~

FOIA(b)(1) EUR/SOV:BLPASCOE/MRPARRIS:BLP
8/20/85 632-9559 WANG 4222M

FOIA(b)(3) ACTING SECRETARY

EUR:RLRIDGWAY
CIA: [REDACTED]
NSC:JHATLOCK

M/MED:CBRODINE
P:WCOURTNEY
D:WEGAN

D. P. M. S/S. EUR ONLY

MIACT IMMEDIATE ROSCOM

IMMEDIATE SECRETARY

NOBIS

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

SUBJECT: KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING
- CHEMICALS: CHARGE BRIEF, STATEMENT, Q & A'S

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CHARGE IS AUTHORIZED TO ORGANIZE A BRIEFING OF EMBASSY STAFF MEMBERS -- WITH SPOUSES IF YOU DEEM IT APPROPRIATE -- ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 21, AFTER THE SUPPORT TEAM HEADED BY DR. BRODINE ARRIVES, USING THE MATERIAL SUPPLIED AT PARAS 4, 5, AND 6. THE DEPARTMENT INTENDS TO READ THE STATEMENT IN PARA 5 AT THE NOON PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WILL ANSWER QUESTIONS AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING USING Q & A'S AT PARA 6. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOLLOWING FORMAL BRIEFING. CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS WILL BEGIN AT 9:00 AM.

3. SHOULD THERE BE A PRESS LEAK BEFORE TEAM ARRIVES OR TEAM IS DELAYED, CHARGE SHOULD BRIEF WITHOUT THEM TO MINIMIZE STAFF CONCERNS. CHARGE IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON MATERIAL BELOW TO BRIEF OTHER EMBASSIES AS HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE, AS WELL AS NON-OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY, AFTER WASHINGTON ANNOUNCEMENT.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR EDb-114/11 #11645

BY [REDACTED] NARA DATE 1/4/10

~~SECRET~~

JW
RER
JH



~~SECRET~~

1 2

4. TEXT OF CHARGE'S BRIEF TO STAFF:

-- I HAVE CALLED YOU TOGETHER TODAY TO GIVE YOU SOME INFORMATION WE HAVE OBTAINED THAT POTENTIALLY COULD AFFECT THE HEALTH OF OUR PEOPLE SERVING IN MOSCOW. COMING TO MOSCOW THIS AFTERNOON TO ANSWER QUESTIONS WHICH WILL INEVITABLY ARISE ARE DR. CHARLES BRODINE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S MEDICAL OFFICE, MARY RYAN, AND OTHERS.

-- I WAS ALERTED TO THIS PROBLEM OVER THE WEEKEND. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF ACTIVITY IN WASHINGTON AT VERY HIGH LEVELS THE PAST FEW DAYS DESIGNED TO GET A ACCURATE READING ON THIS PROBLEM AND TO MAKE SURE THAT ALL OF US HERE ARE FULLY INFORMED. ONCE WASHINGTON WAS CONFIDENT OF ITS INFORMATION, ACTION WAS TAKEN TO PRESSURE THE SOVIETS TO CHANGE THEIR PROCEDURES AND TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A FULL BRIEFING.

-- YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT ACTING SECRETARY WHITEHEAD MADE A STRONG PROTEST TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON MONDAY AFTERNOON AND I MADE A SIMILAR ONE HERE TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY TUESDAY MORNING. WE SCHEDULED THE EMBASSY BRIEFING TODAY SO WE COULD HAVE EXPERTS HERE FROM WASHINGTON.

-- NOW TO TELL YOU WHAT WE KNOW.

-- OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE KGB HAS OCCASIONALLY USED SOME CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES ON EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE TO TRACK THEM AND THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY HAVE COME INTO CONTACT. THEY USED CHEMICALS THAT DO NOT APPEAR IN NATURE AND THEREFORE CAN BE TRACED EFFECTIVELY. THE SUBSTANCES IN QUESTION, WHICH HAVE BEEN APPLIED INDIRECTLY TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL, LEAVE DEPOSITS ON THE PERSON OR POSSESSIONS OF PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY HAVE HAD CONTACT.

-- FOR THE MOST PART, THIS HAS BEEN VIEWED AS A NUISANCE. IN THE PAST, THE PRACTICE SEEMED SUFFICIENTLY ERRATIC AND INFREQUENT THAT IT DID NOT APPEAR TO CAUSE A HEALTH HAZARD TO OUR PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, WE RECENTLY DEVELOPED EVIDENCE THAT THE KGB PROGRAM IS MORE WIDESPREAD THAN WE HAD THOUGHT. SIMILARLY, THE SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY THIS SPRING AND SUMMER.

-- WE FELT THAT OUR FIRST DUTY -- ONCE WE WERE FAIRLY CERTAIN OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE -- WAS TO INFORM OUR PERSONNEL HERE CANDIDLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS WE COULD OF

~~SECRET~~

WHAT WE KNOW. ALL OF US RECOGNIZE THAT LIFE IN MOSCOW IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH WITHOUT HAVING TO CONTEND WITH RUMORS AND HALF-TRUTHS ABOUT HEALTH HAZARDS.

-- THE MOST FREQUENTLY USED OF THESE TRACKING CHEMICALS THAT WE HAVE FOUND IS A SYNTHETIC CHEMICAL CALLED NPPD. TESTING OF THE SUBSTANCE IN WASHINGTON HAS CONFIRMED THAT IT IS POTENTIALLY -- I EMPHASIZE POTENTIALLY -- HARMFUL TO PEOPLE. A BIOLOGICAL SCREENING TEST CALLED THE AMES TEST HAS SHOWN NPPD TO BE A MUTAGEN. MUTAGENS CAN BE, BUT ARE NOT ALWAYS, CARCINOGENS IN HUMAN BEINGS. INTENSIVE AND LENGTHY TESTS CONDUCTED IN SEVERAL SPECIES OF ANIMALS WILL BE REQUIRED TO SEE IF NPPD IS REALLY A CARCINOGENIC SUBSTANCE.

-- NPPD IS A CHEMICAL THAT DOES NOT OCCUR NATURALLY NOR IS IT COMMONLY MANUFACTURED. IT IS A WHITE-TO-YELLOW COLORED POWDER WHICH IS NOT VOLATILE, I.E. IT DOES NOT EVAPORATE OR FORM VAPORS. THE LABORATORY INSTRUMENT USED TO IDENTIFY NPPD IS THE MASS SPECTROGRAPH. THIS INSTRUMENT IS CAPABLE OF DETECTING NPPD AT LEVELS OF 100 NANOGRAMS (A NANOGRAM IS 1/ONE BILLIONTH GRAM).

-- THE POSSIBLE ROUTES OF EXPOSURE TO NPPD ARE BY INGESTION, INHALATION AND SKIN PENETRATION. INGESTION WOULD BE BY HAND TO MOUTH ACTIVITY AND WOULD PROBABLY BE IN NANOGRAM QUANTITIES AND UNLIKELY TO BE A SIGNIFICANT EXPOSURE RISK. WASHING WITH SOAP AND WATER MAY HELP. IN ADDITION, USE OF CLEANSING PREPARATIONS CONTAINING ALCOHOL MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE.

-- INHALATION IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE POWDER BECOMES SUSPENDED IN THE AIR. HEAVY APPLICATIONS OF POWDER WHICH ARE VISIBLE MIGHT BECOME SUSPENDED IN THE AIR IF DISTURBED. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT QUANTITIES THAT ARE NOT VISIBLE WOULD PRESENT A RISK OF INHALATION EXPOSURE. SKIN PENETRATION IS THE MOST LIKELY POTENTIAL ROUTE OF EXPOSURE. PLANNED STUDIES WILL SEEK TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH NPPD CAN PENETRATE THE SKIN.

-- I KNOW THE FIRST QUESTION WILL BE HOW DANGEROUS THE CHEMICAL REALLY IS. WE WANT TO BE ABSOLUTELY HONEST WITH YOU AND SAY WE DO NOT KNOW. OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT IS THAT ANY DANGER FROM THE CHEMICAL, OR OTHERS LIKE IT, IS FAR FROM PROVED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CHEMICAL APPEARS IN TESTING TO HAVE RELATIVELY LOW ACUTE TOXICITY. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE MINIMAL AMOUNTS APPARENTLY INVOLVED, ITS SLOW RATE OF ABSORPTION, AND THE ABILITY OF THE BODY'S METABOLISM TO BREAK DOWN THE COMPOUND, ALL ARGUE THAT THE

SECRET

1 4

RISK IS FAIRLY LOW.

-- WE HAVE, HOWEVER, SET UP A GROUP UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NIH AND EPA TO STUDY ALL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL TRACKING SUBSTANCES ON OUR PERSONNEL. THESE AGENCIES HAVE ALREADY BEGUN WORK ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED. CURRENT PLANS ARE FOR A TEAM TO VISIT HERE IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AT THE EMBASSY.

-- THERE WILL, OF COURSE, NEED TO BE FURTHER AND LENGTHY STUDIES IN ANIMALS BEFORE WE CAN SPEAK CONFIDENTLY ABOUT WHETHER NPPD AND OTHER COMPOUNDS USED BY THE SOVIETS POSE A THREAT TO HEALTH. OUR HOPE IS TO GET SOME SENSE OF HOW CONCERNED WE SHOULD BE, WHAT COUNTER-MEASURES ARE NEEDED, AND HOW WIDESPREAD THE PROBLEM IS THROUGH THIS STUDY.

-- AT THIS POINT, WE CAN ONLY SAY THAT PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT THE LEVELS OF THESE CHEMICALS TO WHICH INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED IS VERY LOW. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT ANY EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAVE SUFFERED ILL EFFECTS DUE TO EXPOSURE TO TRACKING AGENTS. THERE IS CERTAINLY NO IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR ALARM.

5. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT THAT WILL BE RELEASED SHORTLY AFTER EMBASSY PERSONNEL ARE BRIEFED:

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY DETERMINED THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS HAVE USED CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES OF THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE. THE SUBSTANCES IN QUESTION, WHICH HAVE BEEN APPLIED INDIRECTLY TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL, LEAVE DEPOSITS ON THE PERSON OR POSSESSIONS OF PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY HAVE HAD CONTACT.

*Word
"Some"
deleted*

THE MOST EXTENSIVELY USED OF SUCH TRACKING AGENTS, NPPD, HAS BEEN DETERMINED THROUGH BIOLOGICAL SCREENING TESTS TO BE A MUTAGEN. MUTAGENS CAN BE, BUT ARE NOT ALWAYS, CARCINOGENS IN HUMAN BEINGS. EXTENSIVE TESTING WILL BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER NPPD AND OTHER COMPOUNDS USED BY THE SOVIETS POSE A THREAT TO HEALTH, AS WELL AS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE EMBASSY COMMUNITY'S EXPOSURE TO THESE CHEMICALS. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT THE LEVELS OF NPPD AND OTHER SUBSTANCES TO WHICH INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED IS VERY LOW. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT ANY EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAVE SUFFERED ILL EFFECTS DUE TO EXPOSURE TO TRACKING AGENTS.

EMBASSY MOSCOW'S STAFF WAS BRIEFED EARLIER THIS MORNING

SECRET

ON WHAT IS CURRENTLY KNOWN OF THE HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S USE OF TRACKING AGENTS. UNOFFICIAL AMERICANS RESIDENT IN THE USSR, AS WELL AS OTHER EMBASSIES WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN TARGETED, ARE ALSO BEING INFORMED. A SPECIAL TASK FORCE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION INTO THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF EXPOSURE TO NPPD AND OTHER TRACKING AGENTS.

THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THE SOVIET UNION'S USE OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AGAINST ITS DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN THE USSR. WE HAVE PROTESTED THE PRACTICE IN THE STRONGEST TERMS AND DEMANDED THAT IT BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY. THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE MEASURE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND TO DETERMINE THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISKS TO WHICH THEY MAY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED. {3-(4-NITRO PHENYL)-2,4-PENTADIEN-1-AL}

6. Q AND A'S:

Q: CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE KGB HAS BEEN USING A CANCER-CAUSING AGENT TO TRACK OUR EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND THEIR CONTACTS AROUND IN MOSCOW?

A: THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN USING POWDERY CHEMICALS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS APPARENTLY TO TRACE THE CONTACTS OF SOME OF OUR OFFICIALS. OUR TESTS OF ONE OF THE CHEMICALS USED CONFIRMS THAT IT IS POTENTIALLY -- I EMPHASIZE POTENTIALLY -- HARMFUL TO PEOPLE. RESULTS OF BIOLOGICAL SCREENING TESTS INDICATE THAT THE CHEMICAL MAY BE CARCINOGENIC. FURTHER AND LENGTHY STUDIES IN ANIMALS WILL BE REQUIRED TO CONFIRM OR DISPROVE THIS POSSIBILITY.

Q: HOW LONG HAVE WE KNOWN ABOUT THIS?

A: "TRACKING" CHEMICALS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED ON OCCASION BY THE KGB FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. ONLY LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, DID LABORATORY TESTS REVEAL THAT THE SUBSTANCES USED MIGHT BE HARMFUL. AT THAT TIME, IT WAS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE USE OF THE SUBSTANCES WAS SUFFICIENTLY SYSTEMATIC OR FREQUENT TO POSE A HEALTH HAZARD TO U.S. PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NOW EVIDENCE THAT THE KGB PROGRAM IS MORE WIDESPREAD THAN HAD BEEN THOUGHT. THE USE OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES WAS STEPPED UP SIGNIFICANTLY THIS SPRING AND SUMMER.

SECRET

this word added

Q: WHY DIDN'T YOU FOLLOW UP WITH FURTHER TESTING TO DETERMINE POTENTIAL HARMFULNESS TO HUMANS IMMEDIATELY AFTER INITIAL LABORATORY TESTS REVEALED IT MIGHT BE?

A: IT WAS ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT THE USE OF THE CHEMICALS WAS INFREQUENT AND THE QUANTITIES INVOLVED WERE SUFFICIENTLY MINUTE THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO DO FURTHER EXTENSIVE STUDIES.

please added

Q: HOW MANY PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY HAVE BEEN AFFECTED?

A: SEVERAL EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN EXPOSED BUT MORE TESTING IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE EXACTLY HOW WIDESPREAD THE PROBLEM IS. WE PLAN TO SEND A NIH/EPA TEAM TO MOSCOW TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION.

slight rephrasing of Q & A

Q: WHAT ABOUT OTHER AMERICANS IN MOSCOW? OTHER POSTS ABROAD? PEOPLE WHO SERVED THERE IN PAST YEARS? WERE THEY ALSO CONTAMINATED?

A: WE HOPE TO FIND ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS IN THE STUDY BEING CARRIED OUT BY NIH AND EPA. WE HAVE THESE SAME QUESTIONS, BUT FOR NOW THERE ARE MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS.

new Q/A

Q: HAVE YOU PROTESTED TO THE SOVIETS AND DEMANDED THAT THEY STOP?

A: YES. WE HAVE PROTESTED STRONGLY BOTH HERE AND IN MOSCOW AND DEMANDED THAT THE USE OF CHEMICALS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE CEASE IMMEDIATELY.

Q: WHY ARE YOU MAKING THIS PUBLIC NOW?

A: ONCE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND INFORMED OF THE WEIGHT OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, WE FELT DUTY-BOUND TO INFORM OUR PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW OF THE FINDINGS OPENLY AND ACCURATELY. THE DIPLOMATIC LIFE IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF UNFOUNDED MEDICAL RUMORS. WE, THEREFORE, HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO BE AS CANDID AS POSSIBLE WITH OUR PEOPLE ON THE RISKS INVOLVED WHEREVER AND WHATEVER THEY MAY BE.

Q: ARE THE SOVIETS GIVING OUR PEOPLE CANCER ON PURPOSE? ISN'T THIS CHEMICAL WARFARE AGAINST CIVILIANS?

A: WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CONSCIOUSLY SOUGHT TO IMPAIR THE HEALTH OF OUR EMPLOYEES. OUR ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT TEST THESE

new Q/A

SECRET

CHEMICALS THOROUGHLY BEFORE USING THEM: IF THEY DID TEST THEM, THEY CANNOT HAVE PUT THEM THROUGH THE AMES TEST. THIS, OF COURSE, DOES NOT IN ANY WAY ABSOLVE THEM OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR USING CHEMICALS OF ANY KIND AGAINST OUR PEOPLE. THIS IS A TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ACTION BY THE KGB. WE HAVE DEMANDED THEY STOP IMMEDIATELY.

Q: WILL THIS AFFECT THE SHEVARDNADZE MEETINGS HERE OR THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV IN GENEVA IN NOVEMBER?

A: WE HAVE RAISED BEFORE AND WILL NO DOUBT AGAIN DISCUSS THE SERIOUS DANGERS TO THE RELATIONSHIP CAUSED BY ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES WHICH SEEM TO ACT AS IF THEY ARE UNDER NO CONTROL BY THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER AND WE WILL TREAT IT AS SUCH IN OUR MEETINGS.

Q: A SOVIET TOLD ME THIS IS ALL A FANTASY COOKED UP TO WORSEN RELATIONS. IS THAT TRUE?

A: WE WISH THAT IT WERE A FANTASY. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE DEALING WITH SOME VERY UNSAVORY FACTS. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR, WE DO NOT WANT TO WORSEN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, WE WANT TO IMPROVE THEM. BUT WE MUST BE REALISTIC. IT IS THE KGB WHICH IS CARRYING OUT THESE OPERATIONS. THE QUESTION SHOULD BE ASKED IF THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO SABOTAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH SUCH RECKLESS ACTIONS AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL.

Q: ARE YOU GOING TO LET PEOPLE LEAVE MOSCOW BECAUSE OF THE DANGER?

A: AS OUR STATEMENT INDICATES, WE ARE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF OUR EMPLOYEES AND THEIR FAMILIES. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS TIME TO SPECULATE ON SPECIFIC STEPS WHICH MAY BE TAKEN. AT THIS POINT, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A NEED FOR EVACUATION.

Q: WHEN WAS THIS NIH/EPA TASK FORCE SET UP? ARE THEY GOING TO MOSCOW?

A: IT WAS ESTABLISHED EARLY THIS WEEK AS PART OF OUR EFFORT TO GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM WE FACE. SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WILL TRAVEL TO MOSCOW IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE PROBLEM ON THE SPOT.

new Q/A

~~SECRET~~

Q: WHATEVER HAPPENED ON THE MICROWAVES ISSUE? HAVE THE SOVIETS STOPPED BEAMING THEM AT OUR PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW?

A: WE HAVE ON OCCASION DETECTED MICROWAVE SIGNALS BEAMED AT THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. AS LATE AS 1983, WE PROTESTED STRONGLY TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT A BEAM WHICH OPERATED FOR A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF A MAJOR STUDY ON THIS ISSUE BY THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY IN THE SEVENTIES, WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE LEVEL OF SIGNALS DID NOT PRESENT A HEALTH HAZARD. WE HAVE TAKEN PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN THE CHANCERY BUILDING, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE MICROWAVES OR OTHER MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST OUR PEOPLE IN MOSCOW REMAIN STOPPED.

new Q/A

Q: CAN YOU GIVE US SOME MORE DETAILS ON WHAT THE SOVIETS WERE DOING WITH THE POWDER?

A: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER FOR YOU ON THIS AT THIS TIME.

Q: (IF ASKED ONLY) IS NPPD BEING USED BY THE SOVIETS IN THE US?

A: WE ARE LOOKING INTO THAT POSSIBILITY.YY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Briefing for Congressional Leaders on
KGB Use of Chemical Tracking Substances

all
new
material

FOIA(b)(1)

FOIA(b)(3)

-- We want you to know that we are briefing our staff in Moscow today about a potential health problem arising from the KGB's use of chemical tracking substances against some of our people there and elsewhere. Since this will inevitably generate publicity, we will release a statement at the Department on the problem at the noon press briefing. We wanted you to be informed before it becomes public.

-- The CIA recently developed additional information on KGB use for a number of years of chemical substances to monitor the activities [REDACTED] at the US Embassy in Moscow. The chemicals, which have been applied indirectly to Embassy personnel, leave deposits on the person or possessions of people with whom they have had contact.

-- The most extensively used tracking agent, dubbed NPPD, has been determined through biological screening tests to be a mutagen. Mutagens can be, but are not always, carcinogens in human beings. Frankly, it is not clear at this point how dangerous the material is. We have NIH and EPA experts looking at the substance. Further testing will be necessary to determine if it or other compounds used pose a threat to health, as well as to determine the extent of the Embassy community's exposure to these chemicals.

-- A special task force under the leadership of the National Institutes of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency has been established to conduct a thorough investigation into the long-term implications of exposure to NPPD and other tracking agents. Preliminary indications suggest that the levels of NPPD and other substances to which individuals may have been exposed is very low. There is no evidence to date that any Embassy personnel have suffered ill effects.

-- However, given our earlier problems with microwaves in Moscow, we want to be sure our employees there know about the potential problem. Unofficial Americans resident in the USSR, as well as other Embassies which may have been targeted, will also be informed. A team of specialists has been sent to Moscow to support our charge when he briefs our employees.

-- John Whitehead protested these actions to the Soviet charge on Monday and we followed up with a second demarche at the same level in Moscow on Tuesday. As expected, they've denied the charges, but we've made clear we expect the use of chemicals will stop.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR FDG-114/11 #11646

BY FW NARA DATE 1/4/10

90
Drafted: EUR/SOV:MRParr^Q/BLPascoe^{BP}
8/20/85:Ext 23738/29559

Cleared: P:WCourtne
D:WEgan
NSC:JMatlock
CIA: [REDACTED]
MED:CBrodip
EUR:RRidg^Y



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

S/S-0
OUTGOING

PAGE 01 OF 03 STATE 256046

C08/15 002323 NOD568

-----20/0319Z

ORIGIN OFFICE EUR-01

INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 M-01

CATB-01 /015 A5 SLM

M EYES ONLY SPIERS

Copies to:

MCF

Pearson

Matlock

De Graffenheid

DIST AUTH BY

READ BY

DISTRIBUTED BY

EXSEC _____

(S/S-1) _____

DEPEXSEC _____

DATE/TIME _____

REPEATED TO _____

BY _____

DATE/TIME _____

SENSITIVE

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND, IF NOT EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED, BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED, GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION, OR DISCUSSED WITH NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS.

WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED, THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-1, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

CSS

NARA, Date

8/7/02

~~SECRET~~

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

NODIS
S
NODIS
S



~~SECRET~~

11656

53

Department of State

S/S-0
OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 03 STATE 256046
ORIGIN NODS-00

C08/15 002323 NOD568

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTED BY: EUR/SOV: MRPARRIS

NLRR FOI-114/11 #11656

APPROVED BY: EUR: RLRIDGWAY

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

D: WEGAN

P: CROSS

S/S: KMOUINN

S/S-0: SMOATS

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

EUR P. D. M

-----247054 * 200310Z /72

O 200258Z AUG 85 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 256046

NODIS

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

SUBJECT: AUGUST 19 WHITEHEAD - ISAKOV MEETING

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTING SECRETARY WHITEHEAD CALLED IN SOVIET CHARGE ISAKOV AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 19 TO PROTEST SOVIET AUTHORITIES' USE OF POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES TO TRACK EMBASSY MOSCOW PERSONNEL. USING TALKING POINTS IDENTICAL TO THOSE PROVIDED THE EMBASSY FOR ITS PARALLEL DEMARCHE ON THE SUBJECT, WHITEHEAD STRESSED THAT OUR TESTS HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE PRIMARY AGENT USED, NPPD RPT NPPD, WAS A POTENT MUTAGEN AND POSSIBLE CARCINOGEN. HE DEMANDED THAT USE OF TRACKING AGENTS BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY, WARNING THAT FAILURE TO DO SO COULD HAVE "INCALCULABLE" CONSEQUENCES. WHITEHEAD ADVISED ISAKOV IN CONCLUSION THAT WE WOULD BE INFORMING

~~SECRET~~

Department of State



PAGE 03 OF 03 STATE 256046

C08/15 002323 NOD568

OUR STAFF IN MOSCOW ON WHAT WE KNEW OF THE PROBLEM.

3. ISAKOV REPLIED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON THE ISSUE RAISED BY THE ACTING SECRETARY, HE COULD "NOT ACCEPT" THE US PROTEST. HE RECALLED PREVIOUS EPISODES (MENTIONING THE MICROWAVE AND WATER CONTAMINATION SCARES) IN WHICH HE ALLEGED, SIMILAR US CHARGES HAD PROVED UNFOUNDED. HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE US HAD CHOSEN TO RAISE THIS PROBLEM IN THE RUN-UP TO THE GENEVA MEETING, WHEN BOTH SIDES WERE SEEKING TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY ON ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

4. WHITEHEAD RESPONDED THAT ISAKOV'S REACTION WAS ITSELF REGRETTABLE. WE HAD RAISED THE TRACKING CHEMICAL ISSUE NOT BECAUSE WE WANTED TO, BUT BECAUSE OF THE KGB'S DECISION TO ADOPT SUCH PRACTICES. ONCE WE HAD DETERMINED THE EXTENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM, WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO INFORM OUR STAFF. IN A RATHER LAME ASIDE, ISAKOV WONDERED HOW THE USG COULD BE SO CERTAIN OF KGB INVOLVEMENT; THERE WERE MANY, HE OBSERVED, WHO DID NOT WISH TO SEE US - SOVIET RELATIONS IMPROVE. WHITEHEAD ENDED THE DISCUSSION BY INDICATING HE HOPED THE OFFICIAL SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCHE WOULD BE THAT THEY HAD BEEN UNAWARE OF THE POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS OF TRACKING CHEMICALS AND WOULD TERMINATE THEIR USE. ISAKOV PROMISED ONLY TO REPORT THE US APPROACH.

6. UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ARMACOST AND EUR ASST SEC RIDGWAY ALSO ATTENDED THE MEETING WITH ISAKOV, WHO WAS UNACCOMPANIED. WHITEHEAD

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

SECRET

Official Draft Statement

The U.S. government has recently determined that Soviet authorities over a period of several years have used chemical substances to monitor the activities of employees of the US Embassy in Moscow. The substances in question, which have been applied indirectly to Embassy personnel, leave deposits on the person or possessions of ~~Soviet citizens~~ with whom they have had contact.

Some
persons people

The most extensively used of such tracking agents, NPPD*, has been determined through biological screening tests to be a mutagen. Mutagens can be, but are not always, carcinogens in human beings. Extensive testing will be necessary to determine whether NPPD and other compounds used by the Soviets pose a threat to health, as well as to determine the extent of the Embassy community's exposure to these chemicals. Preliminary indications suggest that the levels of NPPD and other substances to which individuals may have been exposed is very low. There is no evidence to date that any Embassy personnel have suffered ill effects due to exposure to tracking agents.

Embassy Moscow's staff was briefed earlier this morning on what is currently known of the health implications of the Soviet Union's use of tracking agents. Unofficial Americans resident in the USSR, as well as other Embassies which may have been targeted, are also being informed. A special task force under the leadership of the National Institute of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency has been established to conduct a thorough investigation into the long-term impact of exposure to NPPD and other tracking agents.

implications

The United States deplores the Soviet Union's use of chemical substances against its diplomatic representatives in the USSR. We have protested the practice in ^{the} strongest terms and demanded that it be terminated immediately. The United States will take every possible measure to ensure the safety and well-being of all American citizens in the Soviet Union and to determine the full implications of the risks to which they have been exposed.

may

*5-(4-Nitro Phenyl)-2, 4-Pentadien-1-AL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 8/7/02

SECRET

Official Draft Statement

The U.S. government has recently determined that Soviet authorities over a period of several years have used chemical substances to monitor the activities of ^{some} employees of the US Embassy in Moscow. The substances in question, which have been applied indirectly to Embassy personnel, leave deposits on the person or possessions of ~~Soviet citizens~~ ^{persons people} with whom they have ~~contact~~ contact.

The most extensively used of such tracking agents, NPPD*, has been determined through biological screening tests to be a mutagen. Mutagens can be, but are not always, carcinogens in human beings. Extensive testing will be necessary to determine whether NPPD and other compounds used by the Soviets pose a threat to health, as well as to determine the extent of the Embassy community's exposure to these chemicals. Preliminary indications suggest that the levels of NPPD and other substances to which individuals may have been exposed is very low. There is no evidence to date that any Embassy personnel have suffered ill effects due to exposure to tracking agents.

Embassy Moscow's staff was briefed earlier this morning on what is currently known of the health implications of the Soviet Union's use of tracking agents. Unofficial Americans resident in the USSR, as well as other Embassies which may have been targeted, are also being informed. A special task force under the leadership of the National Institute^s of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency has been established to conduct a thorough investigation into the long-term ^{implication} impact of exposure to NPPD and other tracking agents.

The United States deplores the Soviet Union's use of chemical substances against its diplomatic ^{the} representatives in the USSR. We have protested the practice in ^{the} strongest terms and demanded that it be terminated immediately. The United States will take every possible measure to ensure the safety and well-being of all American citizens in the Soviet Union and to determine the full implications of the risks to which they ^{may} have been exposed.

*5-(4-Nitro Phenyl)-2, 4-Pentadien-1-AL

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

NARA, Date

8/7/02

SECRET

~~Secret/Sensitive~~
CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CROSSMATCH ACTION SHEET

MESSAGE #: 400
DATE TIME: 10/1/03

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE
DEP EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

ACTION OFFICER

COMMENT OFFICER

INFO

PEARSON

MATLOCK
D. G. Gaffney
P. J. ...

ACTION: CONCUR TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCARRY
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: ASAP

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

CLEARED BY: _____ DATE: _____ TIME: _____

CLEARED TO: _____ DATE: _____ TIME: _____

~~Secret/Sensitive~~
CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 22, 1997
NARA, Date 8/7/02

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR Feb-14/11 #11647
BY CW NARA DATE 7/15/08

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B3

172012L
C

URGENT

B

URGENT

S/S #

03:000

MESSAGE NO _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ No. Pages 9
FROM: MICHELLE Bova S/S 632-3126 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Draft Official Statement, Charge Briefing in Embassy Moscow on the KGB Use of Potentially Harmful Chemical Tracking Substance, Draft Press Guidance

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
CIA	[REDACTED]	EYES ONLY	[REDACTED]
CIA	[REDACTED]	EYES ONLY	[REDACTED]
NSC	Robert Pearson	EYES ONLY	456-2224
NSC	Jack Matlock	EYES ONLY	395-5112

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: TREAT AS CROSSMATCH ASAP

Clearance Ponderates

S/S Officer: _____

Comment: Matlock
de fropenseit
Sjerezian

S [Signature]

[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT PRESS
STATEMENT

↓ Official Draft Statement

The U.S. government has recently determined that Soviet authorities over a period of several years have used chemical substances to monitor the activities of employees of the US Embassy in Moscow. The substances in question, which have been applied indirectly to Embassy personnel, leave deposits on the person or possessions of Soviet citizens with whom they have had contact.

The most extensively used of such tracking agents, NPPD*, has been determined through biological screening tests to be a mutagen. Mutagens can be, but are not always, carcinogens in human beings. Extensive testing will be necessary to determine whether NPPD and other compounds used by the Soviets pose a threat to health, as well as to determine the extent of the Embassy community's exposure to these chemicals. Preliminary indications suggest that the levels of NPPD and other substances to which individuals may have been exposed is very low. There is no evidence to date that any Embassy personnel have suffered ill effects due to exposure to tracking agents.

Embassy Moscow's staff was briefed earlier this morning on what is currently known of the health implications of the Soviet Union's use of tracking agents. Unofficial Americans resident in the USSR, as well as other Embassies which may have been targeted, are also being informed. A special task force under the leadership of the National Institute of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency has been established to conduct a thorough investigation into the long-term impact of exposure to NPPD and other tracking agents.

The United States deplores the Soviet Union's use of chemical substances against its diplomatic representatives in the USSR. We have protested the practice in strongest terms and demanded that it be terminated immediately. The United States will take every possible measure to ensure the safety and well-being of all American citizens in the Soviet Union and to determine the full implications of the risks to which they have been exposed.

*5-(4-Nitro Phenyl)-2, 4-Pentadien-1-AL

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CWS NARA, Date 8/7/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Chargé Briefing in Embassy Moscow on the KGB Use
of Potentially Harmful Chemical Tracking Substance

FOIA(b) (3) [REDACTED] -- I have called you together today to give you some information we have obtained that potentially could affect the health of our people serving in Moscow. I have with me Dr. Charles Brodine of the Department's Medical office along with Mary Ryan to answer as many of your questions as we can.

-- I was just informed of this problem over the weekend. Once Washington was confident of their information, they set in motion the necessary effort to pressure the Soviets to change their procedures and to provide you with a full briefing.

-- You should know that Acting Secretary Whitehead made a strong protest to the Soviet embassy in Washington Monday afternoon and I made a similar one here to the Soviet Foreign Ministry Tuesday morning. We scheduled the embassy briefing today so we could have experts here from Washington.

-- Now to tell you what we know.

-- Over a period of several years, the KGB has occasionally used some chemical substances on various members of our staff here in Moscow and elsewhere to track them and the people with whom they have come into contact. They used chemicals that do not appear in nature and therefore can be traced effectively. The substances in question, which have been applied indirectly to Embassy personnel, leave deposits on the person or possessions of Soviet citizens with whom they have had contact.

-- For the most part, this has been viewed as a nuisance. In the past, the practice seemed sufficiently erratic and infrequent that it did not appear to cause a health hazard to our personnel. However, we recently developed evidence that the KGB program is more widespread than we had thought. Similarly, the Soviet use of chemical substances increased significantly this spring and summer.

-- We felt that our first duty -- once we were fairly certain of the scientific evidence -- was to inform our personnel here candidly and as accurately as we could of what we know. All of us recognize that life in Moscow is difficult enough without having to contend with rumors and half-truths about health hazards.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/11 #11648

BY RW NARA DATE 1-6-10

-- The most frequently used of these tracking chemicals that we have found is a synthetic chemical called NPPD. Testing of the substance in Washington has confirmed that it is potentially -- I emphasize potentially -- harmful to people. A biological screening test called the Ames Test has shown NPPD to be a mutagen. Mutagens can be, but are not always carcinogens in human beings. Intensive and lengthy tests conducted in several species of animals will be required to see if NPPD is really a carcinogenic substance.

-- NPPD is a chemical that does not occur naturally nor is it commonly manufactured. It is a white to yellow colored powder which is not volatile, i.e. it does not evaporate or form vapors. The laboratory instrument used to identify NPPD is the mass spectograph. This instrument is capable of detecting NPPD at levels of 100 nanograms (a nanogram is 1/one billion gram).

-- The possible routes of exposure to NPPD are by ingestion, inhalation and skin penetration. Ingestion would be by hand to mouth activity and would probably be in nanogram quantities and unlikely to be a significant exposure risk. Washing with soap and water is likely to remove this risk.

-- Inhalation is possible only if the powder becomes suspended in the air. Heavy applications of powder which are visible might become suspended in the air if disturbed. It is unlikely, however, that quantities that are not visible would present a risk of inhalation exposure. Skin penetration is the most likely potential route of exposure. Planned studies will seek to determine the extent to which NPPD can penetrate the skin.

-- I know the first question will be how dangerous the chemical really is. We want to be absolutely honest with you and say we do not know. Our preliminary assessment is that any dangers from the chemical, or others like it, is far from proved. For example, the chemical appears in testing to have relatively low toxicity, i.e. it is very unlikely it would cause any serious illness. We have, however, set up a group under the leadership of the NIH to study all aspects of this use of chemical tracking substances on our personnel. The group has been asked for a preliminary assessment of the risk to people in our embassy here by January 1.

-- There will, of course, need to be further and lengthy studies in animals before we can speak confidently about whether NPPD and other compounds used by the Soviets pose a threat to health, but our hope is to get some sense of how concerned we should be, what counter-measures are needed, and how widespread the problem is through this study.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

-- At this point, we can only say that preliminary indications suggest that the levels of mutagenic substance to which individuals may have been exposed is very low. There is no evidence to date that any Embassy personnel have suffered ill effects due to exposure to tracking agents. There is certainly no immediate cause for alarm.

-- We will now take your questions.

Drafted:EUR/SOV:BLPascoe/M/Med:CBrodine
#4178M 8/19/85
Cleared:EUR/SOV:MRParris
EUR:RLRidgway
NBC:JNatlock
CIA: [REDACTED]
P:MARBSCOT

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE

KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING SUBSTANCE

Q: Can you confirm that the KGB has been using a cancer-causing agent to track our embassy personnel and their contacts around in Moscow?

A: -- THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN USING POWDERY CHEMICALS FOR SEVERAL YEARS TO TRACE SOME OF OUR CONTACTS WITH SOVIET CITIZENS. OUR TESTS OF ONE OF THE CHEMICALS USED CONFIRMS THAT IT IS POTENTIALLY -- I EMPHASIZE POTENTIALLY -- HARMFUL TO PEOPLE. RESULTS OF BIOLOGICAL SCREENING TESTS INDICATE THAT THE CHEMICAL MAY BE CARCINOGENIC. FURTHER AND LENGTHY STUDIES IN ANIMALS WILL BE REQUIRED TO CONFIRM THIS POSSIBILITY.

Q: How long have we known about this?

A: -- "TRACKING" CHEMICALS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN ON OCCASION EMPLOYED BY THE KGB FOR SEVERAL YEARS. ONLY LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, DID LABORATORY TESTS REVEAL THAT THE SUBSTANCES USED MIGHT BE HARMFUL. AT THAT TIME, IT WAS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE USE OF THE SUBSTANCES WAS SUFFICIENTLY SYSTEMATIC OR FREQUENT TO POSE A HEALTH HAZARD TO U.S. PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, WE NOW HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THE KGB PROGRAM IS MORE WIDESPREAD THAN HAD BEEN THOUGHT. THE USE OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES WAS STEPPED UP SIGNIFICANTLY THIS SPRING AND SUMMER.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CIS

NARA, Date 8/7/12

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL:GADR

64

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Q: Have you protested to the Soviets and demanded that they stop?

A: -- YES. WE HAVE PROTESTED STRONGLY AND DEMANDED THAT THEY STOP USING CHEMICALS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY.

Q: Why are you making this public now?

A: -- ONCE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND INFORMED OF THE WEIGHT OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, WE FELT DUTY-BOUND TO INFORM OUR PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW OF THE FINDINGS OPENLY AND ACCURATELY. THE DIPLOMATIC LIFE IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF UNFOUNDED MEDICAL RUMORS. WE, THEREFORE, HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO BE AS CANDID AS POSSIBLE WITH OUR PEOPLE ON THE RISKS INVOLVED WHEREVER AND WHATEVER THEY MAY BE.

Q: Why didn't you follow up with further testing to determine potential harmfulness to humans immediately after initial laboratory tests revealed it might be?

A: IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE USE OF THE CHEMICALS WAS INFREQUENT AND THE QUANTITIES INVOLVED WERE SUFFICIENTLY MINUTE TO REDUCE THE EFFECT OF ANY PAST EXPOSURE.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Q: Are the Soviets giving our people cancer on purpose? Isn't this chemical warfare against civilians?:

A: -- WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT TEST THESE CHEMICALS THOROUGHLY BEFORE USING THEM. CERTAINLY, THEY MUST NOT HAVE PUT THEM THROUGH THE AMES TEST. THIS, OF COURSE, DOES NOT IN ANY WAY ABSOLVE THEM OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR USING CHEMICALS OF ANY KIND AGAINST OUR PEOPLE. THIS IS A TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ACTION BY THE KGB. WE HAVE DEMANDED THEY STOP IMMEDIATELY.

Q: Did this affect everyone at the embassy, or was this only games between spies?

A: -- WE ARE NOT AS YET CERTAIN OF THE EXTENT OF THE USE OF THESE CHEMICALS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE. WE ARE SENDING A TEAM TO MOSCOW TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION.

Q: Will this affect the Shevardnadze meetings here or the meeting between the President and Gromyko in Geneva in November?

A: -- WE HAVE RAISED BEFORE AND WILL NO DOUBT AGAIN DISCUSS THE SERIOUS DANGERS TO THE RELATIONSHIP CAUSED BY ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES WHICH SEEM TO ACT AS IF THEY ARE UNDER NO CONTROL BY THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER AND WE WILL TREAT IT AS SUCH IN OUR MEETINGS.

66

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 4 -

Q: Can you give us some more details on what the Soviets were doing with the powder?

A: -- I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER FOR YOU ON THIS AT THIS TIME.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

B3

Drafted: EUR/SOV: BLPascoe

04165M 8/19/85

Cleared: EUR/SOV: MRParrie

EUR: RLRidgway

NSC: JMatlock

CIA: 

P: MArmacost

DECLASSIFIED IN PART / RELOADED
NLRR F06-114/11 # 11649
BY CII NARA DATE 7/15/88

~~SECRET~~

Official Draft Statement

The U.S. government has recently determined that Soviet authorities over a period of several years have used chemical substances to monitor the activities of employees of the US Embassy in Moscow. The substances in question, which have been applied indirectly to Embassy personnel, leave deposits on the person or possessions of Soviet citizens with whom they have had contact.

The most extensively used of such tracking agents, NPPD*, has been determined through biological screening tests to be a mutagen. Mutagens can be, but are not always, carcinogens in human beings. Extensive testing will be necessary to determine whether NPPD and other compounds used by the Soviets pose a threat to health, as well as to determine the extent of the Embassy community's exposure to these chemicals. Preliminary indications suggest that the levels of NPPD and other substances to which individuals may have been exposed is very low. There is no evidence to date that any Embassy personnel have suffered ill effects due to exposure to tracking agents.

Embassy Moscow's staff was briefed earlier this morning on what is currently known of the health implications of the Soviet Union's use of tracking agents. Unofficial Americans resident in the USSR, as well as other Embassies which may have been targeted, are also being informed. A special task force under the leadership of the National Institute of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency has been established to conduct a thorough investigation into the long-term impact of exposure to NPPD and other tracking agents.

The United States deplores the Soviet Union's use of chemical substances against its diplomatic representatives in the USSR. We have protested the practice in strongest terms and demanded that it be terminated immediately. The United States will take every possible measure to ensure the safety and well-being of all American citizens in the Soviet Union and to determine the full implications of the risks to which they have been exposed.

*5-(4-Nitro Phenyl)-2, 4-Pentadien-1-AL

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 8/7/12

~~SECRET~~

JM: I printed it
twice

Added Zorba's name
& took out 1st PARA.

SB

ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY

I have just learned about the evidence that your security organs have for some time been engaged in the practice of contaminating U.S. officials and their dependents with chemical substances -- substances not occurring in nature, which are deliberately placed in vehicles belonging to American officials, on their clothing, and even in hotel rooms and train compartments which they utilize. Recently, American personnel serving in the Soviet Union have reported skin rashes on themselves and their children, some very young, which apparently are caused by this chemical.

Our scientists have analyzed the compound which has been used very extensively, particularly in recent months, and have found that it can cause genetic mutations, and therefore is highly suspect of being carcinogenic.

I realize that this practice may have been carried out without your knowledge. Therefore, I would request that you insist upon a full report and that you give instructions to cease this practice immediately. If the practice should be continued, it can have a seriously negative impact on our ability to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 #11657

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY

[To be delivered by Adm. Poindexter to Soviet Charge, for transmittal to Gen. Sec. Gorbachev]

I have just learned about the evidence that your security organs have for some time been engaged in the practice of contaminating U.S. officials and their dependents with chemical substances -- substances not occurring in nature, which are deliberately placed in vehicles belonging to American officials, on their clothing, and even in hotel rooms and train compartments which they utilize. Recently, American personnel serving in the Soviet Union have reported serious skin rashes on themselves and their children, some very young, which apparently are caused by this chemical.

Our scientists have analyzed the compound which has been used very extensively, particularly in recent months, and have found that it can cause genetic mutations, and therefore is highly suspect of being carcinogenic. I am genuinely shocked that any government would authorize the use of such a chemical under any circumstances.

I realize that this practice may have been carried out without your knowledge. Therefore, I would request that you insist upon a full report and that you give instructions to cease this abhorrent practice immediately. If the practice should be continued, it can have a seriously negative impact on our ability to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 #11658

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

I have just learned about the evidence that your security organs have for some time been engaged in the practice of contaminating U.S. officials and their dependents with chemical substances -- substances not occurring in nature, which are deliberately placed in vehicles belonging to American officials, on their clothing, and even in hotel rooms and train compartments which they utilize. Recently, American personnel serving in the Soviet Union have reported serious skin rashes on themselves and their children, some very young, which apparently are caused by this chemical.

Our scientists have analyzed the compound which has been used very extensively, particularly in recent months, and have found that it can cause genetic mutations, and therefore is highly suspect of being carcinogenic. I am genuinely shocked that any government would authorize the use of such a chemical under any circumstances.

I realize that this practice may have been carried out without your knowledge. Therefore, I would request that you insist upon a full report and that you give instructions to cease this abhorrent practice immediately. If the practice should be continued, it can have a seriously negative impact on our ability to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOIA-114/911 #11659

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

[To be delivered by Adm. Poindexter to Soviet Charge, for transmittal to Gen. Sec. Gorbachev]

I have just learned about the evidence that your security organs have for some time been engaged in the practice of contaminating U.S. officials and their dependents with chemical substances -- substances not occurring in nature, which are deliberately placed in vehicles belonging to American officials, on their clothing, and even in hotel rooms and train compartments which they utilize. Recently, American personnel serving in the Soviet Union have reported serious skin rashes on themselves and their children, some very young, which apparently are caused by this chemical.

Our scientists have analyzed the compound which has been used very extensively, particularly in recent months, and have found that it can cause genetic mutations, and therefore is highly suspect of being carcinogenic. I am genuinely shocked that any government would authorize the use of such a chemical under any circumstances.

I realize that this practice may have been carried out without your knowledge. Therefore, I would request that you insist upon a full report and that you give instructions to cease this abhorrent practice immediately. If the practice should be continued, it can have a seriously negative impact on our ability to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EO 6-114/11 # 11660

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY

I have just learned about the evidence that your security organs have for some time been engaged in the practice of contaminating U.S. officials and their dependents with chemical substances -- substances not occurring in nature, which are deliberately placed in vehicles belonging to American officials, on their clothing, and even in hotel rooms and train compartments which they utilize. Recently, American personnel serving in the Soviet Union have reported serious skin rashes on themselves and their children, some very young, which apparently are caused by this chemical.

Our scientists have analyzed the compound which has been used very extensively, particularly in recent months, and have found that it can cause genetic mutations, and therefore is highly suspect of being carcinogenic. ~~[I am genuinely shocked that any government would authorize the use of such a chemical under any circumstances.]~~

I realize that this practice may have been carried out without your knowledge. Therefore, I would request that you insist upon a full report and that you give instructions to cease this abhorrent practice immediately. If the practice should be continued, it can have a seriously negative impact on our ability to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/11 *11661

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11