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JET 5/24/2005

File Folder USSR - STRATEGIC CAPABILITY (ARMAMENT)

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 36

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3604

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11583	CABLE	010630Z DEC 81 PAR 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	12/1/1981	B2 B3
11584	REPORT	SOVIET SS-16 D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11	1	4/6/1982	B1 B3
11587	REPORT	REPORT RE SOVIET CAPABILITIES D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11	81	3/6/1984	B1 B3
11585	REPORT	USSR: LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11	1	3/10/1982	B1 B3
11586	CABLE	262206Z JUL 82 PAR 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	7/26/1982	B2 B3

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
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(AS OF: 1958 EST 30 NOV 81)

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

USSR: MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS. (U)

FOIA(b)(2)

1. ~~(TS [REDACTED] NOFORN)~~ A NEW SS-20 MOBILE IRBM BASE WAS IDENTIFIED UNDER CONSTRUCTION ON SATELLITE IMAGERY OF 25 NOVEMBER. THE NEW BASE, KIVERTSY MOBILE IRBM BASE 2 [REDACTED] IS IN WESTERN USSR IN THE LUTSK STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES (SRF) DIVISION. THE NEW BASE IS BEING BUILT AT A FORMER SS-4 LAUNCH SITE. TWO OTHER SS-20 BASES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THIS DIVISION -- KIVERTSY MOBILE IRBM BASE 1 [REDACTED] AND LUTSK MOBILE IRBM BASE 1 [REDACTED] -- BOTH ARE STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

2. ~~(TS [REDACTED] NOFORN)~~ VERKHNYAYA SALDA MOBILE IRBM BASE 5 (BE 0156CA0166) IS NOW ASSESSED AS BEING OPERATIONAL. WITH THE COMPLETION OF THIS FIFTH BASE, SS-20 DEPLOYMENT IN THE VERKHNYAYA SALDA SRF DIVISION APPEARS TO BE COMPLETE.

3. ~~(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN)~~ TO DATE 38 SS-20 BASES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. THIRTY BASES WITH FACILITIES FOR 270 LAUNCHERS ARE OPERATIONAL. ANOTHER 8 BASES WITH FACILITIES FOR AN ADDITIONAL 72 LAUNCHERS ARE BEING BUILT.

4. ~~(TS [REDACTED] NOFORN)~~ BASED ON OBSERVED SS-20 DEPLOYMENT, EACH SS-20 DIVISION PROBABLY WILL HAVE A MAXIMUM OF FIVE REGIMENTAL BASES. OF THE SRF DIVISIONS WHERE SS-20 DEPLOYMENT APPEARS TO BE COMPLETE OR NEARING COMPLETION, FIVE DIVISIONS HAVE FIVE SS-20 BASES AND ONE HAS FOUR BASES. CURRENTLY, THERE ARE 11 SRF DIVISIONS THAT HAVE SS-20'S DEPLOYED. IT IS PROJECTED THAT TOTAL SS-20 DEPLOYMENT WILL BE ON THE ORDER OF 50 BASES WITH 450 LAUNCHERS. FORTY OF THESE BASES (360 LAUNCHERS) ARE ESTIMATED TO BE DEPLOYED WITHIN RANGE OF WESTERN EUROPE.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
(REVW 30 NOV 11)

FOIA(b)(2)

FOIA(b)(3)

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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TO DIACURINTEL

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(AS OF: 1335 EDT 26 JUL 82)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
USSR: NUCLEAR WARFARE. (U)

FOIA(b)(2)

1. ~~(C)~~ THE OPERATIONS OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR MINE WERE TAUGHT TO SOLDIERS IN A HIGH-LEVEL WARSAW PACT FORCES ENGINEER UNIT, [REDACTED] THIS INFORMATION TENDS TO CONFIRM THE CURRENT ASSESSMENTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NUCLEAR MINES AND THAT THEY MAINTAIN PLANS FOR THEIR USE IN COMBAT.

2. ~~(C)~~ THE MINE WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING OF METAL CONSTRUCTION AND HAVING A BARREL-SHAPE WITH A DIAMETER OF ABOUT 40 CM AND A HEIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY 1 METER. IT REPORTEDLY CONSISTED OF THREE BASIC COMPONENTS: A RADIO-DIRECTED DETONATOR MECHANISM, A CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE (TNT) DETONATOR CHARGE, AND A NUCLEAR CHARGE. ITS COLOR WAS A FLAT MILITARY-TYPE GREENISH KHAKI AND IT HAD NO OBSERVABLE MARKINGS. THE LESSONS WERE TAUGHT WITH CHARTS, AND A MOCKUP OF THE DEVICE WAS AVAILABLE. CLASSES WERE CONDUCTED BY AN ENGINEER COMPANY COMMANDER AND A HIGHER ECHELON ARMAMENTS CHIEF.

3. ~~(C)~~ THE MINE REPORTEDLY COULD BE DETONATED BY SEISMIC VIBRATIONS, SUCH AS THOSE CAUSED BY HEAVY VEHICLES AND BY TIME-DELAY AS WELL AS DIRECTLY. IT WAS CONTROLLED BY A BOX-SHAPED BATTERY-POWERED TRANSMITTER 12 CM WIDE, 16 TO 17 CM LONG, AND 8 CM DEEP, WITH A SINGLE ANTENNA, AND BUTTONS FOR ARMING AND DISARMING, DIRECT DETONATION, AND ACTIVATION OF BOTH TIME-DELAY AND SEISMIC-DETONATION CAPABILITIES. THE TRANSMITTER'S RANGE WAS UNDISCLOSED. ASSOCIATED TRAINING INCLUDED EXPLOSIVES EFFECTS, FALLOUT PREDICTION, AND DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS. STUDENTS WERE TOLD THAT THE MINE WOULD NOT BE USED WITHOUT APPROVAL OF A HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. THE NAME OF THE HEADQUARTERS WAS NOT DISCLOSED, HOWEVER.

4. ~~(C)~~ THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION DID NOT KNOW IF THE UNIT ACTUALLY POSSESSED ANY OF THE LIVE NUCLEAR MINES AND COULD NOT FURTHER DESCRIBE THE DEVICE. THE STATEMENTS PROVIDED BY THE SOURCE APPEAR PLAUSIBLE AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING SOVIET UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR MUNITIONS CAPABILITIES.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
(REVW 18 JUN 01)

BT

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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