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JET 5/24/2005

File Folder USSR- START 1/2

FOIA

F06-114/11

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|-----------------|--|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 11554 | MEMO | PIPES TO ROSTOW RE PRELIMINARY START DISCUSSIONS R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 1 | 7/29/1981 | B1 |
| 11555 | FAX COVER SHEET | LEHMAN RE SALT IG | 1 | 12/4/1981 | B1 |
| 11557 | MEMO | LEHMAN RE START WORKING GROUP MEETING | 1 | 12/4/1981 | B1 |
| 11560 | PAPER | START/INF INTER-RELATIONSHIPS R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 5 | ND | B1 |
| 11558 | MEMO | KRAEMER TO NANCE RE ACDA PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO START R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 1 | 12/30/1981 | B1 |
| 11559 | MEMO | NANCE TO ROSTOW RE ACDA PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO START R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 11561 | LETTER | ROSTOW TO ALLEN RE START R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 1 | 11/24/1981 | B1 |
| 11562 | PAPER | ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO START R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 12 | ND | B1 |
| 11563 | CABLE | 091107Z JAN 82 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 3 | 1/9/1982 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 11570 | CABLE | 160623Z MAR 82 D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11 | 1 | 3/16/1982 | B1 B3 |
| 11564 | CABLE | 121107Z MAY 82 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 4 | 5/12/1982 | B1 |
| 11565 | CABLE | 031636Z JUN 82 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 2 | 6/3/1982 | B1 |
| 11566 | CABLE | 042315Z JUN 82 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 1 | 6/4/1982 | B1 |
| 11567 | CABLE | 041248Z JUN 82 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11 | 4 | 6/4/1982 | B1 |
| 11568 | PAPER | THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN START AND INF D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11 | 1 | 6/24/1982 | B1 B3 |
| 11569 | PAPER | START D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11 | 1 | 6/22/1982 | B1 B3 |

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 29, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR EUGENE ROSTOW
Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

THROUGH: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *rl*

SUBJECT: Preliminary START Discussions

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 #11554

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

In accord with your wishes, here is a brief statement of my views on a possible opening phase of START consultations with the Russians, preceding the initiation of formal negotiations on arms reductions. (S)

SALT was a sort of bastard child of our short-lived love affair with the Soviet Union. One of its basic faults was that the theoretical premises of limiting nuclear arms were never analyzed: we simply adopted the MAD doctrine, assumed the Russians shared it too, and proceeded to negotiate caps on launchers and ABM. This hasty approach proved to have been most unfortunate. This time we may want to precede actual bean-counting exercises -- which, according to your own testimony, may be months off -- with semi-formal discussions with the Russians concerning some fundamentals, to wit:

- Strategic doctrine.
- Units of measurement of arms control.
- The data base and exchange of data information.
- Verification.
- Means to improve prevention of accidental war. (S)

The advantages of this kind of exchanges, which could begin on short notice, would be twofold:

- One might learn something useful.
- We would seize the initiative in arms control talks and deflect some of the heat from us (especially if Moscow should refuse to participate in such an exchange of views). (S)

My notion is that these talks would lead to no agreement: they would be meant to clarify our mutual approaches to issues that are indeed fundamental to effective arms control. Participants should include high arms control representatives from both sides (but not the eventual negotiators) and have a set agenda lasting, say, something on the order of three to four weeks. (S)

cl

Carnes Lord concurs; Robert Schweitzer will comment separately.

~~SECRET~~

Review July 29, 1987.

~~SECRET~~START/INF INTER-RELATIONSHIPS

IV.B.1.(b)

The relationship between talks on INF and on START central systems touches on procedural (the relationship between the two sets of negotiations and between agreements reached in them) as well as on substantive questions (systems to be included in the talks, units of limitation and verification measures). The paper will point out a number of areas where we need to consider the implications of the START/INF relationship. The treatment of issues is not meant to be exhaustive. As our START and INF policy reviews progress further it is possible that other issues with a bearing on the START/INF inter-relationship will arise.

Relationship Between the Negotiations

The INF and START negotiations, at least in their initial phases, will be conducted through separate delegations. This arrangement requires careful coordination during planning stages to ensure consistency in both sets of talks. As they reach critical decision points, both the INF and the START IG will need to consider the implications of these decisions for the other talks.

The relationship will involve a number of potential pitfalls for the U.S., including Soviet opportunities to achieve substantive concessions by exploiting negotiating linkages and to create precedents in one negotiation that strengthen Soviet positions in the other. At the same time, of course, the relationship also opens up potential opportunities for the U.S. And while we will need to be conscious of the potential pitfalls in developing our approaches to the two negotiations, we would also look for ways to take advantage of the START/INF relationship.

Relationship Between Agreements

As the talks progress, and especially if we move close to an agreement in one or other areas, the question of a relationship between the agreements will become crucial. There would appear to be three broad alternative approaches:

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

1. At an appropriate point we could join the INF talks into START, merging the delegations and subsuming the INF package into the START package. It would allow us to present one agreement, presumably with one period of validity to the public and to the Senate for ratification. This approach could cause progress in one area to be held hostage to progress in another, and could increase pressures on us to make concessions in one area in order to gain agreement on the overall package. Additionally, it could allow SALT negotiations to become intertwined in Alliance politics.
2. Pursue separate negotiations until signature of separate agreements but make entry into force of one agreement contingent on entry into force of the other: This would allow us to pursue talks on INF and on START central systems on separate tracks until their logical conclusion. As in Approach 1 above, it could cause entry into force of one agreement to be delayed by lack of progress in the other, with consequent possibility of pressure on us to make concessions. There would be a danger that an agreement already reached in one set of talks could come unraveled if the conclusion of the other was long delayed.
3. Pursue separate negotiations and sign separate, free-standing agreements: This approach would attempt to prevent problems in one set of talks from spilling over into the other. It would demonstrate that we are sincerely interested in concluding balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements in one area, even if difficulties in the other were to prevent conclusion of an agreement. It would reduce the chances of START negotiations becoming intertwined in Alliance politics. On the other hand, signature of separate INF and START agreements might appear to contradict our position that INF should be pursued in the START framework. It could arouse European objections on the score of "decoupling." Signature of one agreement before the other had been concluded might reduce our negotiating leverage in the second agreement. It would permit us to bring into force an agreement we considered advantageous without allowing it to be delayed by the other talks. Agreement in only one area could, however, increase the possibility of circumvention through deployment in the other unconstrained area.

Systems to be Limited

Most nuclear systems to be addressed in START and INF fall relatively clearly into one or the other of the two

talks. Some systems, however, either because of their capabilities or their apparent missions might be addressed either in START or INF.

Backfire: The U.S. sought to include Backfire in the SALT II SNDV aggregate but eventually settled for a Soviet statement that Backfire is a medium-range bomber, that they did not intend to give Backfire the capability of operating at intercontinental distances or increase its radius of action to enable it to strike the U.S., and that Backfire production rates would not exceed 30 per year. It is clear that we will have to seek limits on Backfire in future talks, both for military and for political reasons, but we have not yet decided whether to deal with it in the START or the INF context or both. We have, however, decided not to include aircraft in the first phase of INF talks. Although there is uncertainty about Backfire's range/payload, there is agreement that under some mission profiles the Backfire has the capability to reach the U.S. in an intercontinental bombing role. The Soviets appear to have deployed approximately half of their Backfire force to LRA bases and half to SNA bases. Such deployment does not, of course, alter its inherent capabilities.

Limiting Backfire in START would correct what was perceived to be one of the most significant failures of SALT II; an achievement which would significantly increase the prospects for ratification of any future START treaty. Inclusion of Backfire would require the Soviets to take larger cuts in other systems and/or prevent further expansion of the Backfire force. It would also be consistent with our position that the initial focus of INF talks should be on missiles. It would not preclude the option of seeking to limit Backfire in INF talks at a later time, should we decide Backfire could be more effectively addressed there.

At the first round of preliminary exchanges on INF the Soviets included Backfire as an example of the kinds of systems which should be addressed in INF. Addressing Backfire in the INF context (second phase) would allow us to seek direct limits on what presently appears to be the Backfire's primary missions, i.e., peripheral attack and anti-shipping. On the other hand, raising Backfire in INF would make it more difficult to avoid negotiating limits on U.S. aircraft, particularly the F-111. Moreover, even if we decide to include aircraft in the second phase of INF, the fact that the Backfire has greater range than U.S. theater-based aircraft, make it probable to take a position that Backfire should be addressed in START. Including Backfire only in INF would concede the Soviets' point that Backfire is not a strategic bomber. Including Backfire in any way in INF could also be construed as conceding the point.

SLCMs: SLCMs may prove to be one of the thorniest problems we will have to deal with in future arms limitation talks. The U.S. decision to deploy several hundred nuclear SLCMs gives the Soviets a strong incentive to limit SLCMs in some fashion. The U.S., however, has decided not to limit sea-based systems in the first phase of INF talks and has not decided if SLCMs should be limited in START or indeed whether they should be limited at all. The U.S. has announced that nuclear armed SLCMs will be deployed as a strategic reserve force. However, the nuclear SLCM also has potential for augmenting our carrier-based INF in regional nuclear contingencies, particularly outside of Europe. SLCM also has significant non-nuclear applications.

Limits on SLCM in any forum would raise major verification problems because of the difficulty in ensuring that they have not been covertly deployed, and could constrain U.S. plans to deploy conventional land-attack SLCMs on surface ships because of the difficulty of distinguishing conventional from nuclear SLCMs. For this reason the U.S. may wish to take the position that SLCMs should not be limited at all. We could leave ourselves the option of agreeing (in return for suitable Soviet concessions and assuming the formidable verifiability and distinguishability problems can be solved) to consider equal limits on SLCMs in an appropriate forum.

Should we decide to limit SLCM, there are sound political arguments for keeping it out of INF. We want to avoid establishing any connection between SLCMs and GLCMs, which might encourage Europeans to hope that SLCMs could be deployed instead of GLCMs. This was one of the primary reasons for the initial association of SLCM with the strategic reserve mission. On the other hand, there are also drawbacks to treating SLCM in START. It could, for example, facilitate Soviet efforts -- which we must resist -- to resurrect the SALT II Protocol.

One possible approach to this dilemma might be to place SLCMs in a separate category outside both the START and the INF context. This approach could be justified on grounds of the unique verification problems presented by SLCM. It would reduce the chances that difficulties over negotiating limits to SLCMs could delay either START or INF. This approach could, however, raise additional coordination problems, and it is not clear what form such a separate agreement would take. If we agree to limit SLCMs, we may wish to consider lower-range limits, in order to restrict both long- and short-range Soviet SLCMs.

In any case, it is clear that the question of possible limits on SLCMs will be one of the most difficult we face and will require considerable further study.

FBS The Soviets have taken the position the U.S. systems, which they term "FBS," must be limited in INF. The U.S., on the other hand, rejects the Soviet concept of "FBS" and seeks to limit land-based missiles as a first step, but may indicate a willingness in principle to discuss other systems in a subsequent phase. It is possible that the Soviets will seek to limit in START those U.S. "FBS" systems which they failed to limit in INF. In addition, should the U.S. seek START limits on Soviet heavy missiles, it is possible that the Soviets will reintroduce "FBS" in START on grounds that they agreed at Vladivostok to drop "FBS" in return for the U.S. dropping its efforts to force reductions in Soviet heavy missiles. We should resist such a Soviet effort.

Units of Limitation: The START IG is considering a wide range of units of limitation for possible use in a future START agreement, including numerical limitations on launchers, missiles, warheads, or other indicators such as throw weight, yield, or EMT. There is general agreement within the INF IG on selection of warheads on launchers as the unit of limitation in the context of a ban on refire missiles, at least for the first phase of talks, which would address INF missiles.

There appears to be no intrinsic reason for units of limitation to be identical in START and INF, as long as the systems subject to different units of limitation are clearly distinguishable. However, we must carefully consider the implications of positions taken in one set of talks for our position in the other, since agreeing to units in one forum could set a precedent for the other.

The issue of refire missiles in INF could have implications for START. We must ensure that the treatment of refires in INF does not lock us into a similar approach in START. We will probably want to address in START the Soviet ability to reconstitute their ICBM force, but have not yet decided on the best approach for doing so. Limiting refires from fixed land-based silos could require different measures than would be required to limit refires on mobile IRBMs or ICBMs.

Verification: It is likely that verification of the emerging U.S. INF package will require measures that go beyond the traditional START reliance on NTM, and in fact our INF

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

December 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT: ACDA Paper on Alternative Approaches to
START

On November 24, Eugene Rostow forwarded to Richard Allen an ACDA discussion paper on alternative approaches to START (Tab B). Dr. Rostow requested views by mid-December.

Under the co-chairmanship of Richard Perle and Richard Burt, the START IG is currently undertaking detailed analyses of alternative negotiating packages. Thus, it would be inappropriate for us to comment in detail on the particular approaches outlined in the ACDA paper. Rather, as indicated in the attached response to Dr. Rostow prepared for your signature at Tab A, we should describe it as an important contribution to the START IG's analytical effort.

Richard *P*Pipes concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Eugene Rostow at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Nance Memo to Eugene Rostow
- Tab B Rostow Letter to Richard Allen

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
NLRR ~~F06-114/11~~ # 11558

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Review on December 30, 1981

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE EUGENE ROSTOW
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: ACDA Paper on Alternative Approaches to
START

In a letter of November 24 to Richard Allen, you requested our preliminary views on a paper prepared by ACDA on alternative approaches to START. We agree with the paper's enumeration of objectives which should be met by the START arms control approach finally adopted by the Administration. Constraints on destructive potential (e.g., throw weight), verifiability, and protection and flexibility of sufficient U.S. deterrent forces, appear to us to be particularly important objectives. Option 3 would be a good beginning in this regard. The ACDA paper is an important contribution to the analytical work on negotiating packages being undertaken by the START Interagency Group.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

James W. Nance
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Review December 30, 1987

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NLRR FOI-114/11 #11559

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

81 NOV 27 P 3: 18

November 24, 1981

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

Dear Dick:

As part of our preparations for the Strategic Arms Reductions negotiations, which will begin next spring, ACDA is studying a number of possible approaches the US could adopt. The attached paper describes a broad spectrum of possibilities that we are considering.

In the coming weeks ACDA will be formulating its recommendations for a US negotiating position. We will have to choose from the many possible approaches the one that best serves the interests of the US. The criteria we are using to analyze these approaches include simplicity, enhancement of deterrence and stability, the achievement of an equitable balance, support for our strategic modernization program, and verification considerations.

I would like very much to have your views on the attached paper and the issues it raises. Since preliminary decisions on our position will have to be made in the coming weeks, your response by mid-December would be most helpful.

Sincerely,

Attachment
a/s

Honorable Richard V. Allen
Asst. to the President
for National Security
Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

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NLRR E06-114/A #11561

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

Class by: J P TIMBIE
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(✓) Review for declas on: 11-24-89
Extended by: _____
Reason: _____

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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO START

This paper outlines several different ways to construct an agreement to limit strategic offensive forces. All of the approaches are designed to achieve several common objectives:

- substantial reductions in Soviet forces, especially Soviet ICBM forces;
- allow the US to take necessary unilateral steps to increase the effectiveness and reduce the vulnerability of its deterrent forces;
- preserve flexible response capabilities;
- enhance crisis stability.

There are, however, substantial differences in the approaches, including the extent to which they build on the SALT II framework, the units of account used to limit forces, and the way bombers are treated. The approaches described here span a broad spectrum, and many variations are also possible.

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NLRR F06-114/11 # 11562

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

1. Reductions in the SALT II Categories

The SALT II Treaty was based on a ceiling on the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers, with several subceilings on specific categories of weapons. The START agreement could adopt this framework, and substantially reduce all the levels, while retaining limits on fractionation.

Description

- ceiling of 1600 ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers (this ceiling and the others below represent a 30% reduction from the SALT II levels);
- 925 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers with long-range ALCMs;
- 850 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs;
- 550 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs;
- 200 launchers of heavy ICBMs;
- no more than 10 RVs per ICBM, 14 RVs per SLBM, and 28 ALCMs per heavy bomber.

Rationale

This approach would build upon SALT II. It would carry over the same basic framework, and add reductions by substantially reducing each of the ceilings. By adopting the previously agreed framework, attention would be focused primarily on substantial reductions, without the distraction that introduction of other major new elements would cause. Since the Soviets are familiar with this framework, this could be a practical way to achieve substantial reductions.

The key ceiling is the 925 limit, since in the future most ballistic missiles will carry MIRVs and most (or all) bombers will be equipped for long-range ALCMs.

Both sides would have to reduce modern as well as older systems to meet the ceilings. The US would dismantle some MM-III and Poseidon missiles and B-52s. The Soviets would dismantle SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, and older missiles and bombers. The US B-1, M-X, Trident, new bomber, and ALCM programs could all go forward, but their total number would be well below current plans.

Such an agreement would meet some of the objections to SALT II. It would result in real reductions in military capability rather than a buildup, would reduce the asymmetry in ICBM throw weight and in heavy missiles, and give the US equal rights to heavy ICBMs.

Disadvantages

Basing the limits on launchers would encourage large, highly fractionated missiles, and tend to concentrate strategic forces into a smaller number of aimpoints. This approach would also rule out the possibility of small, single-RV missiles deployed in large numbers.

2. Multiple Counting

This approach would also preserve the SALT II framework and impose substantial reductions in the ceilings, but would attempt to eliminate the inequity of considering the SS-18 the same as the MM-III by double-counting the SS-18s. It would also skew the limits to discourage ICBM MIRVs.

Description

- ceiling of 1600 on ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers (30% below SALT II levels);
- 925 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers with long-range ALCMs;
- 850 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs;
- 425 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs (no more than half the MIRV missiles could be ICBMs);
- each heavy ICBM counts as two in all of the ceilings;
- no more than 10 RVs per ICBM, 14 RVs per SLBM, 28 long-range ALCMs per heavy bomber.

Rationale

This approach retains the advantage of familiarity, and would focus on the reductions. The double-counting of the SS-18s reflects the fact that its throw weight is double that permitted light ICBMs (and SLBMs). Again, the key ceiling is the 925 limit, since in the future most ballistic missiles will carry MIRVs and most (or all) bombers will be equipped for long-range ALCMs.

The US force under this approach would be the same as for the previous approach. The Soviet force would be substantially smaller than in the previous approach because the ICBM MIRV ceiling is lower and the SS-18s are double-counted.

Such an agreement would meet some of the objections to SALT II. It would result in real reductions in military capability, rough equality in throw weight, and equal rights. The Soviets could argue that since the SS-18s are double-counted, they should be allowed to carry 20 RVs. This would not seriously undermine the approach.

Disadvantages

The tendency to concentrate larger missiles into fewer aimpoints noted for the previous approach would apply to this one as well, as would the prohibition on proliferation of smaller missiles.

3. Reductions in Missile Throw Weight

This approach would constrain the total throw weight of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Description

-- ceiling of 2.3 million kilograms of ICBM and SLBM throw weight.

Rationale

This would be a relatively simple agreement which would sharply reduce the Soviet forces which most concern us -- their large ICBMs. The ceiling is less than half the current Soviet level, and would force substantial reductions in their large ICBMs, and in SLBMs as well.

The ceiling is somewhat above the current US level, and would not interfere with deployment of Trident and M-X. The US modernization program could continue as planned.

The asymmetric impact of the equal ceiling simply reflects the fact that the Soviets have deployed more and larger missiles, so they must come down to reach equality in throw weight -- a measure of potential capability of missiles. The omission of limits on bombers would be justified on the basis that defenses against bombers remain unconstrained.

Disadvantages

Although in the near term this option would force a major contraction in Soviet missile forces, in the longer run the Soviets could develop new, more efficient missiles with large numbers of lighter warheads. The number of Soviet warheads could exceed the level of the other options despite the low limit on throw weight.

4. Reductions in Weapons and Throw Weight of Missiles and Bombers

This approach would seek to constrain the destructive potential of strategic forces by limiting the number and size of warheads on each side. Equal reduced ceilings would be placed on the total number of weapons and total force throw weight on each side, with subceilings on ICBM warheads and throw weight.

Description

- ceiling of 7000 weapons on missiles and bombers (down 30% from the present US level);
- 4.3 million kilograms throw weight of missiles and bombers (down 30% from the present Soviet level);
- subceilings limiting ICBM warheads and throw weight to no more than half the above totals.

Rationale

This approach would set equal limits on the total number of weapons on both sides. To take into account differences in the size of weapons, there would also be a ceiling on throw weight. Together, these limits would constrain the destructive potential of the forces on both sides. The sublimits on ICBMs would ensure that a substantial portion of the reductions is taken in ICBMs.

There would be a discount for bomber weapons and bomber throw weight to take into account their characteristics (limited first-strike potential and substantial retaliatory capability) and unconstrained air-defenses. For example, each B-52 could be attributed 8 weapons and 4000 kg. throw weight rather than the larger actual loadings. There would be no special limits on ALCM carriers.

Under this approach the Soviets would have to dismantle SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s as well as older missiles and bombers. The US would reduce some Minuteman and Poseidon missiles and B-52s. The M-X, B-1, Trident, new bomber, and ALCM programs could go forward, but in reduced numbers.

This approach would limit directly those aspects of Soviet forces of greatest concern -- the number and size of Soviet warheads, particularly ICBM warheads. It would not involve surrogates such as launcher numbers, which are not important.

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Disadvantages

This is a completely different approach from SALT II, and would require introduction of new concepts.

This approach requires negotiation of bomber equivalents for warheads and throw weight, a difficult task because bombers and missiles are very different systems. Determination of an appropriate way to account for bomber weapons and throw weight is arbitrary and subjective, and would be very complex to work.

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5. Reductions in Weapons of Missiles and Bombers

A variation on the preceding approach would be to base the limit on total weapons, and use multiple and fractional counting to take into account the differences between large and small warheads, and the differences between missile warheads and bomber weapons.

Description

- ceiling of 7000 on total weapons on missiles and bombers;
- subceiling limiting ICBM warheads to no more than half the permitted total;
- multiple count missile warheads with a weight over 500 kg (e.g. an RV with a weight of 500-1000 kg counts 2, 1000-1500 kg counts 3, etc.);
- count each bomber weapon as one-half.

Rationale

This approach would limit total destructive potential by limiting the total number of warheads. The differences in destructive capability of warheads of different size would be taken into account by multiple counting large warheads. The differences between missile warheads and bomber weapons (the bombers do not pose a first-strike threat, and face unconstrained defenses) are taken into account by counting each bomber weapon as one-half in the total. This approach has the same basic objective as the previous one, and would lead to similar results, but would be somewhat simpler to define and verify.

Under this approach the Soviets would reduce SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s, and older missiles and bombers. The US would reduce Minuteman and Poseidon missiles and B-52s. The M-X, B-1, Trident, new bomber, and ALCM programs could go forward, but in reduced numbers.

Disadvantages

This is a completely different approach from SALT II, and would require introduction of new concepts. The weight factors are somewhat arbitrary and would be complex to work out.

6. Reductions in Missile Warheads and Throw Weight, Separate Limits on Bombers

This approach would limit missile warheads and throw weight as in the previous case, but break out bombers into separate limits because they are so different from missiles.

Description

- ceiling of 7000 ICBM and SLBM warheads (about 30% of the current US total);
- 2.7 million kilograms of missile throw weight (about half the current Soviet total);
- subceiling limiting ICBM warheads to no more than half the above total;
- separate ceiling on bomber weapons.

Rationale

The principal differences from the approach (4) is the separation of the bomber limits from the missile limits. This would recognize the important differences between the characteristics of bombers and those of missiles (in particular, the absence of a first-strike threat) and the unconstrained defenses bombers face.

Separating missiles from bombers obviates the necessity to agree on bomber equivalents.

Without bomber weapons in the missile ceilings, the impact of the reductions on US ICBMs and SLBMs is substantially reduced. All current US ICBMs and most US SLBMs can be retained within the ceilings. The Soviets would have to reduce their SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s and older missiles as in the previous approach. In the separate agreement, US bombers would be limited together with the Soviet Backfire and other bombers.

Disadvantages

With separate limits on missiles and bombers, we would not have the future flexibility to reduce our missile forces and increase our bomber forces, or vice versa, as the strategic situation evolves. Such freedom-to-mix is a desirable aspect of a long-duration agreement.

Other Issues

This paper focuses on the question of what measures of capability a START agreement should limit. There are many other issues that will have to be addressed before decisions can be made on our position:

Magnitude of reductions. This paper uses 30% as a baseline. Larger and smaller reductions should also be explored.

ICBM vulnerability. Probably no agreement can solve this problem, but an agreement can reduce Soviet capabilities and can make certain solutions more attractive. An agreement can also reduce the Soviet forces remaining after a counterforce strike.

Refire missiles. Reload potential will have to be dealt with.

SLCMs. Further study will be required to determine whether they should be covered in START or in INF, and to resolve difficult problems of counting and verification.

Backfire. This aircraft should be dealt with in START or TNF or both.

Data. All approaches would incorporate an extensive data exchange.

Verification and cooperative measures. All approaches will require verification measures going beyond NTM.

Duration. Since lead times for strategic forces are long, a START agreement should have a long duration to significantly affect the forces of the two sides.

Other provisions. Many supplementary provisions (e.g. definitions) will have to be worked out. Some can be adopted from SALT II.

START

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TABLE 1
BASIC ELEMENTS OF PACKAGES FOR ANALYSIS

| | LAUNCHERS | THROW-WEIGHT | WEAPONS + THROW-WEIGHT | WEAPONS + LAUNCHERS ** | THROW-WEIGHT + LAUNCHERS | WEAPONS + LAUNCHERS + THROW-WEIGHT |
|-----------------------------|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| BOMBERS IN AGGREGATE | (1) Ceilings and limits along the line of SALT II but with "significant" reductions (as baseline) | (2) Ceiling on total tw. (equiv. bomber tw.) Subceiling on ICBM tw. | (4) Ceiling on weapons (bombers discounted) Ceiling on total tw. (equiv. bomber tw.) Ceiling on ICBM warheads and tw. | (6) Ceiling on weapons (bombers discounted) Ceiling on launchers Subceiling on ICBM warheads | (8) Ceiling on launchers Ceiling on total tw. (equiv. bomber tw.) Subceiling on ICBM tw. | (10) Ceiling on Launchers Limit on missile warheads Limit on missile tw. Ceiling on max. bomber loading Limits on ICBM warheads and tw. to 1/2 missile antelates |
| SEPARATE BOMBER LIMIT | | (3) Ceiling on missile tw. Subceiling on ICBM tw. Limit on number of heavy bombers | (5) Ceiling on missile warheads Ceiling on missile tw. Limit on number of heavy bombers Limit on ICBM warheads and tw. to 1/2 missile totals | (7) Ceiling on missile weapons Ceiling on launchers (including heavy bombers) Subceiling on ICBM warheads Ceiling on max. bomber loadings | (9) Ceiling on number of missiles Ceiling on missile tw. Limit on number of heavy bombers Limit on ICBM tw. to 1/2 total missile tw. | |

tw. - throw weight

** Both options in this category have bombers counted in the launcher aggregate. A variation of option (7) would be to have a separate limit on total number of bombers. This would affect freedom to mix.

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UNIT UNITS OF LIMITATION BY OPTION

| OPTION NO. | HEAVY | HEAVY | AGGREGATE | MISSILE | ICBM | AGGREGATE | MISSILE | ICBM |
|------------|-----------|-------|-----------|---------|------|-----------|---------|------|
| | LAUNCHERS | ICBMS | BOMERS | WH | WH | TW | TW | TW |
| X | X | | | | | X | | X |
| | | | X | | X | | X | X |
| | | | | X | X | | | X |
| X | | | | | X | | | X |
| X | | | | | X | | | X |
| X | | | | | X | X | | X |
| X | | | | | X | | | X |
| X | | | | | X | | | X |
| X | | | | | X | | | X |

(missiles only)
X

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00275

USSTART
USINF
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/8/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: START -- PRAVDA ON STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES
REF: 81 MOSCOW 2549

1. (C) SUMMARY: PRAVDA HAS OPENED THE SOVIET PRE-START PROPAGANDA EFFORT BY CRITICIZING THE U.S. STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM. A JANUARY 7 ARTICLE CHARGES THE U.S. WITH IGNORING "UNDERSTANDINGS AND ACCEPTED OBLIGATIONS" IN MOVING TO DEPLOY LONG-RANGE GLCMS AND SLCMS. PRAVDA ALSO ASSERTS THAT CRUISE MISSILE PROVISIONS OF THE SALT-II PROTOCOL, AND THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN THE SOVIETS AGREED IN SALT-II TO CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES. A LEADING SOVIET STRATEGIC ANALYST, GENRIKH TROFIMENKO, CLAIMS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPECTED THAT IF SALT-II HAD BEEN RATIFIED ON SCHEDULE, THERE WOULD BY NOW HAVE BEEN AN "UNDERSTANDING" TO LIMIT STRATEGIC GLCMS AND SLCMS. WE SUSPECT THE SOVIETS WILL PLAY THIS THEME IN THEIR PROPAGANDA ON THE START TALKS IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSISTENT U.S. POSITION THAT THE PROTOCOL WILL NOT SERVE AS A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE BY REITERATING PUBLICLY OUR POSITION. END SUMMARY.
PRAVDA

2. (LOU) PRAVDA JANUARY 7 CARRIES A LONG ARTICLE ENTITLED "CRUISE MISSILES AND ARMS CONTROL." THE PSEUDONYMOUS AUTHOR, N. FEDEROV, FIRST SETS FORTH VARIOUS "FACTS" ABOUT THE U.S. STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM: THE U.S. PLANS TO DEPLOY ABOUT 4,000 ALCMS ON B-52S AND B-1S IN THE NEAR FUTURE, 7,000 BY THE 1990S; THE U.S. NAVY INTENDS TO PUT 1,000 SLCMS ON SUBMARINES; WARHEAD YIELDS ARE 150-200 KILOTONS WITH RANGES UP TO 3,000 KILOMETERS; AND EVENTUAL PRODUCTION WILL BE 13,000 CRUISE MISSILES. THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO ASSERT THAT THE U.S. IS EMPHASIZING CRUISE MISSILES BECAUSE THEY ARE FREE OF ARMS CONTROL RESTRAINTS.

3. (LOU) PRAVDA REVIEWS THE SALT-II PROVISIONS ON ALCMS AND THE PROTOCOL LIMITATIONS ON GLCMS AND SLCMS. PRAVDA POINTS OUT THAT THE "JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES" ON SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS EXPRESSED "THE AGREEMENT OF THE TWO SIDES TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTION OF SLCMS AND GLCMS IN ORDER TO REACH A FINAL RESOLUTION (OF THE PROBLEM)."

4. (LOU) PRAVDA FAILS TO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT PLEDGES THE PARTIES TO SEEK RESOLUTION OF PROTOCOL ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPLEMENTING THE OTHER AGREED JOINT PRINCIPLES. MORE IMPORTANT THAN THIS OMISSION, HOWEVER, IS PRAVDA'S ASSERTION THAT:

- THESE UNDERSTANDINGS (READ: PROTOCOL AND JOINT STATEMENT) WERE CONSIDERED AS INTEGRAL TO THE TREATY
- AND WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN CEILINGS ON
- STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS WERE AGREED TO.

PRAVDA CHARGES THAT THE U.S. "HAVING REFUSED TO RATIFY SALT-II, AND IGNORING OTHER UNDERSTANDINGS AND ACCEPTED OBLIGATIONS," HAS MOVED TO DEPLOY LONG-RANGE SLCMS AND GLCMS.

5. (LOU) PRAVDA ALSO ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF ALLIED WORK ON CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, WEST GERMAN AND AMERICAN FIRMS ARE WORKING ON A JOINT PROJECT ON ALCMS AND GLCMS. IN ENGLAND AND BT

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FRANCE INDEPENDENT WORK IS TAKING PLACE ON SIMILAR SYSTEMS. PRAVDA ASSERTS THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF CAMOUFLAGING, STOCKPILING, AND USING CRUISE MISSILES TOGETHER WITH STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS, ICBMS AND SLBMS, MAKES CRUISE MISSILES A "DANGEROUS MEANS OF DESTABILIZING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION."

6. (LOU) PRAVDA ALSO REPEATS A NUMBER OF PROPAGANDISTIC THEMES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A BAN ON CRUISE MISSILES.

TROFIMENKO

7. (C) IN JANUARY 7 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, USA INSTITUTE FOREIGN POLICY CHIEF GENRIKH TROFIMENKO REITERATED THE PRAVDA THEMES. HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING ELABORATION:

- BECAUSE OF U.S. FAILURE TO RATIFY SALT-II, WE HAVE LOST TWO YEARS NOW IN THE DIALOGUE ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL.
- WHEN THE USSR AGREED IN SALT-II TO CEILINGS ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND TO THE PROTOCOL WHICH EXPIRED DECEMBER 31, THE SOVIETS THOUGHT THAT BY NOW WE WOULD HAVE REACHED AN "UNDERSTANDING" ON STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING GLCMS AND SLCMS. ALSO, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN FEWER SS-20S DEPLOYED WHEN THE TALKS WOULD HAVE BEGUN.

-- "NOW THE PROTOCOL HAS EXPIRED, BUT THE BACKFIRE STATEMENT IS INDEFINITE. THUS YOU HAVE THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS."

-- WE KNOW HOW TO COUNT ALCMS, AND IT IS "PROBABLY POSSIBLE" TO COUNT GLCMS AND SLCMS DEPLOYED ON SURFACE COMBATANTS. "BUT HOW CAN WE COUNT SLCMS ON SUBMARINES? COUNTING ALL SUBMARINES AS SLCM LAUNCHERS IS NOT ARMS CONTROL."

8. (C) NOTING PRAVDA'S AND TROFIMENKO'S ASSERTION THAT THE SOVIETS TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE PROTOCOL AND JOINT STATEMENT WHEN AGREEING TO SALT-II CEILINGS ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND TROFIMENKO'S PREDICTION THAT BY NOW SOME "UNDERSTANDING" MIGHT HAVE BEEN REACHED ON GLCMS AND SLCMS, EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. POSITION ALL ALONG HAS BEEN THAT THE PROTOCOL WILL NOT SERVE AS A PRECEDENT FOR LIMITATIONS ON LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES IN FUTURE STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. TROFIMENKO REPLIED THAT "WE UNDERSTAND THE AMERICAN INTENT IS NOT TO CONTINUE THE PROTOCOL."

9. (C) COMMENT: WHEN IT COMES TO PROPAGANDA ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL, THE SOVIETS SEE THEMSELVES IN A STRONG POSITION. THEY BELIEVE THAT U.S. FAILURE TO RATIFY SALT-II IS ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE PROPAGANDA THEMES THEY HAVE. AS PUBLIC ATTENTION FOCUSES ON THE HAIG-GROMYKO MEETING LATER THIS MONTH, AND THE PROSPECT OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF START TALKS, THE SOVIETS WILL INTENSIFY THEIR PROPAGANDA ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND THE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

10. (C) THE PRAVDA COMMENTARY ON STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES IS SIGNIFICANT FOR THREE REASONS:

- IT LAUNCHES A PROBABLE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN ON THESE THEMES.
- IT IS THE FIRST MAJOR SOVIET PUBLIC COMMENTARY ON THE SLCM COMPONENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.
- IT SUGGESTS THAT SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS ARE LIKELY BT

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- TO DISTORT THE SALT-II NEGOTIATING RECORD, AND
- TO SEEK TO CONFUSE PUBLICS ABOUT STATED U. S.
- POSITIONS, BY ASSERTING NON-EXISTENT "UNDERSTANDINGS"
- REGARDING STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES.

THE USG SHOULD MOVE TO ANTICIPATE THIS LATTER SOVIET
TACTIC BY REITERATING PUBLICLY OUR CLEAR AND CONSISTENT
POSITION ON THE PROTOCOL. HARTMAN
BT

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POLITICAL ANALYST, IN ANOTHER COMMENTARY, SCORES THE US FOR PROPOSING "UNEQUAL CUTS." TO THE EXTENT THE US CAN MAKE A CONVINCING PUBLIC CASE THAT AT LEAST THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD INVOLVE "EQUAL CUTS" IN THE TOTAL OF ICBM AND SLBM WARHEADS (EACH SIDE HAS ABOUT 7,500 ACCORDING TO "SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS"), WE CAN FRUSTRATE THE LIKELY SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE THAT THE US IS INSINCERE IN PROPOSING "UNEQUAL CUTS." END SUMMARY.

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- CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY
- CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
- CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

2. (U) IN A NOVOSTI APN COMMENTARY TELEXED TO SELECTED NEWS ORGANIZATIONS IN MOSCOW ON MAY 11 (REF A), USA INSTITUTE STRATEGIC ANALYST COLONEL (RET) LEV SEMEYKO "ANALYZED" THE PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- THE US PROPOSAL SEEKS UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THE US, WHICH WILL RETAIN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS DELIVERED BY BOMBERS. ACCORDING TO US OFFICIAL ESTIMATES, US BOMBERS ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING MORE WARHEADS THAN THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS. US BOMBERS CONSTITUTE 42 PERCENT OF US THROWWEIGHT.

-- WASHINGTON WANTS TO GAIN BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE ASYMMETRY IN THE COMPOSITION OF US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES. THREE-QUARTERS OF SOVIET "STRATEGIC MIGHT" IS ON ICBMS, VERSUS ONE-QUARTER FOR THE US. (COMMENT: SEMEYKO DOES NOT SAY WHETHER THESE FIGURES EXCLUDE BOMBERS, BUT PRESUMABLY THEY DO.)

-- THEREFORE THE US WOULD NOT CHANGE ANYTHING IN THE STRUCTURE OF ITS MILITARY MIGHT, WHILE THE USSR WOULD RADICALLY REFASHION ITS STRATEGIC MIGHT BY REDUCING CONSIDERABLY THE NUMBER OF ITS ICBMS. THE US PROPOSAL IS AIMED AT ENSURING A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF US MISSILES WHILE ALLOWING THE US TO RETAIN SUPREMECY IN BOMBER THROWWEIGHT.

-- PRESIDENT REAGAN THUS WANTS ONLY TO CREATE A SEMBLANCE OF READINESS FOR "STRATEGIC ARMS

BT

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E.O. 12065: GDS 5/12/88 (MCCALL, SHERRON) OR-P
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: START -- SOVIET REACTIONS
REFS: (A) COURTNEY-MCLEAN TELCON MAY 11, (B) MOSCOW 5743
- (C) USINFO 4952, (D) MOSCOW 5281 (NOTAL)

1. (C) SUMMARY: NO OFFICIAL PUBLIC SOVIET REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL HAS YET EMERGED. THE USA INSTITUTE'S COLONEL SEMEYKO HAS RELEASED AN UNOFFICIAL "ANALYSIS" OF THE PROPOSAL. ITS MAIN POINTS ARE: 1) THE US SEEKS UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, FOR IT WILL RETAIN WARHEAD SUPERIORITY ON BOMBERS; 2) WASHINGTON WANTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FORCE ASYMMETRIES, REQUIRING THE USSR TO REDUCE CONSIDERABLY ITS ICBMS WHILE THE US ONLY SYMBOLICALLY REDUCES ITS MISSILES, AND 3) THE USSR STANDS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION ONLY ON THE BASIS OF "EQUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY." A NOVOSTI

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REDUCTIONS." THE USSR WOULD ALMOST UNILATERALLY
REDUCE THE BACKBONE OF ITS STRATEGIC MIGHT WHILE
THAT OF THE US WOULD BE AFFECTED JUST INSIGNIFICANTLY.
THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THREE STEPS, THE US ONE.
(COMMENT: SEMEYKO APPEARS TO HAVE INTENDED THIS
FIGURATIVELY RATHER THAN LITERALLY.)
-- THE USSR STANDS FOR THE LIMITATION AND
REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF
"EQUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY."

3. (U) TWO SOVIET COMMENTARIES DEALING WITH OTHER
ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH REFER ALSO TO
THE START PROPOSAL.

4. (U) A MAY 11 TASS DISPATCH FROM WASHINGTON, READ
ON SOVIET TELEVISION NEWS LAST EVENING AND PRINTED
IN PRAVDA TODAY, SARCASTICALLY CHARGES THAT THE
PRESIDENT SOUGHT TO PRESENT IN A "SHOWY WAY AS A
'CONSTRUCTIVE STEP'" THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE US,

AFTER 18 MONTHS OF DELAY (SIC), "FINALLY DECIDED"
TO BEGIN TALKS ON STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS. ACCORDING
TO TASS, THE "LENGTHY EXPLANATIONS" BY WHICH THE
PRESIDENT ACCOMPANIED HIS ANNOUNCEMENT SHOW THAT
NO CONSTRUCTIVENESS IS BEING EVEN THOUGHT OF IN
WASHINGTON. THE US IS DRIVEN BY THE IDEA OF ACHIEVING
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES AND OF DAMAGING THE SECURITY OF
THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. TASS CLAIMS THE
PRESIDENT'S "OSTENTATIOUSLY PEACEFUL RHETORIC" IS A
"FORCED CONCESSION" TO PUBLIC OPINION. HE IS
ALLEGEDLY "TRYING" TO ABATE THE WAVE OF ANTI-WAR
DEMONSTRATIONS" IN THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE PRIOR
TO THE NATO SUMMIT, AND TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE NATO
ALLIES.

5. (U) IN A MAY 10 APN COMMENTARY, NOVOSTI POLITICAL
ANALYST GERASIMOV REMARKS THAT:
---- THE VERY FACT OF AMERICAN READINESS TO COME
BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE CAN BE WELCOMED, FOR
IT IS BETTER LATE THAN NEVER. AS FOR THE SOVIET
SIDE, IT IS ALWAYS READY FOR TALKS.
-- BUT ACCORDING TO THE "ALARMING" US ANALYSIS,
THE MAIN THREAT TO PEACE IN THE SPHERE OF NUCLEAR
ARMAMENTS SUPPOSEDLY EMANATES FROM THE GROWING
INSTABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR BALANCE AS A RESULT OF
A SOVIET ADVANTAGE. HENCE, FOLLOWING THIS LOGIC
THE PROPOSED CUTS MUST BY UNEVEN.
-- THE USSR AND COMPETENT WESTERN QUARTERS
BELIEVE THERE EXISTS APPROXIMATE MILITARY-STRATEGIC
PARITY.
-- UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, UNEVEN CUTS WOULD
VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF "EQUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY."
-- THE GOAL OF THE SPEECH IS TO DRESS PRESIDENT
REAGAN IN THE ATTIRE OF A PEACEMAKER BEFORE HE GOES
TO EUROPE.
COMMENT
BT

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6. (C) NO OFFICIAL PUBLIC SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL HAS EMERGED. WE DO NOT ATTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS OFFICIAL SILENCE. THE SOVIETS TAKE TIME TO RESPOND TO SERIOUS AMERICAN PROPOSALS. THE POLITBURO NORMALLY MEETS ON THURSDAYS, SO AN OFFICIAL PUBLIC REACTION MAY NOT COME BEFORE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY.

7. (C) THE "UNOFFICIAL" SOVIET COMMENTS TO DATE -- BY SEMEYKO AND GERASIMOV AND IN THE TASS DISPATCHES -- INDICATE SEVERAL LINES OF REASONING THAT ARE LIKELY TO SURFACE IN OFFICIAL REACTIONS:
-- THE US START PROPOSAL SEEKS UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ASYMMETRIES IN STRATEGIC FORCES, SUCH AS SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN MISSILE THROWWEIGHT AND INFERIORITY IN BOMBERS.
-- THE US PROPOSAL WOULD INVOLVE UNEQUAL CUTS,

AND ESPECIALLY A WEAKENING OF THE STRONGEST LEG OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES -- ICBMS.

-- STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS MUST BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND "UNDIMINISHED" OR "EQUAL" SECURITY.

-- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ACCUSATIONS" IN HIS EUREKA SPEECH ABOUT SOVIET BEHAVIOR RAISE DOUBTS ABOUT THE SINCERITY OF HIS PROPOSAL FOR STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS.

8. (C) "SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS" QUOTED IN THE MAY 9 BACKGROUNDER (REF C) SAID THAT THE US AND THE USSR EACH CURRENTLY FIELD ABOUT 7,500 WARHEADS ON ICBMS AND SLBMS. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN MAKE A CONVINCING PUBLIC CASE THAT AT LEAST THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD INVOLVE EQUAL CUTS FROM EQUAL LEVELS TO EQUAL CEILINGS, WE CAN FRUSTRATE THE LIKELY SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE THAT THE US IS INSINCERE IN PROPOSING "UNEQUAL CUTS."

9. (C) IN THREE ITEMS OF INF-RELATED PROPAGANDA SINCE BREZHNEV'S TRADE UNION CONGRESS SPEECH ON MARCH 16 THE PHRASE "EQUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY" HAS SURFACED. NOW WE SEE THE PHRASE USED TWICE (BY SEMEYKO AND GERASIMOV) IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS. THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE REALIZED THAT THEIR NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE STANDARD SOVIET PHRASE "EQUAL SECURITY" -- AS REQUIRING EXPLICIT COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES -- IS A NONSTARTER. WHAT THIS PORTENDS FOR POSSIBLE SOVIET CLAIMS THAT BRITISH, FRENCH, AND CHINESE STRATEGIC FORCES NEED TO BE "TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT" IN START REMAINS, HOWEVER, UNCLEAR.

10. (C) JUDGING FROM THE SOVIET COMMENTARIES SUMMARIZED ABOVE, SOVIET PROPAGANDA RESPONSES TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL MIGHT NOT REJECT THE US CRITERION THAT STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL MUST DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM BT

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OF ICBM VULNERABILITY. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER RECENT INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEGUN TO VIEW ICBM VULNERABILITY AS AN INCREASING PROBLEM FOR ITS OWN STRATEGIC FORCES PLANNING (REF D).
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LIMDIS
USSTART
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/3/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: START -- PRIVATE COMMENTS BY AMBASSADOR KARPOV
- AND GENRIKH TROFIMENKO; ARBATOV CHASTENED
REF: MOSCOW 6736 (NOTAL)

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON THE FRINGES OF SENATOR PRESSLER'S MEETINGS WITH SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATOR KARPOV (REFTEL), KARPOV HAS CONTENDED TO US THAT THE PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL IS ONE-SIDED BECAUSE THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO CUT SHARPLY ITS ICBM WARHEADS WHILE THE U.S. WOULD RETIRE ONLY OLDER SLBM WARHEADS. KARPOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL THE USSR WOULD BUILD UP ITS SSBN WARHEADS, BUT HE POINTED TO THE ASW THREAT. KARPOV ACKNOWLEDGED NEVERTHELESS THAT ICBM VULNERABILITY IS A "REAL PROBLEM" FOR THE USSR. REGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, KARPOV SAID THE ALLOCATION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES BETWEEN THE INF AND START CONTEXTS WAS A QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION. USA INSTITUTE EXPERT TROFIMENKO, COMMENTING ON THE PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL, SAID "WARHEADS ARE NOT A BAD UNIT OF LIMITATION," ALTHOUGH SALT II COUNTING RULES AND LIMITATIONS ACCOMPLISHED MUCH THE SAME PURPOSE AS COUNTING WARHEADS DIRECTLY. A PALME COMMISSION OFFICIAL HAS CHASTENED GEORGIY ARBATOV FOR PREMATURELY DIVULGING CONCLUSIONS IN THE COMMISSION'S REPORT. END SUMMARY.
KARPOV

3. IN A CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF AT A JUNE 1 DINNER FOR SENATOR LARRY PRESSLER, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE VIKTOR KARPOV, THE NEW SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATOR, MADE SEVERAL POINTS OF INTEREST ON STRATEGIC ARMS ISSUES.

4. KARPOV COMPLAINED THAT THE "SECOND PART" OF THE PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL WAS A PROBLEM. IT WAS ONE-SIDED BECAUSE THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO RETIRE TWO-THIRDS OF ITS ICBM WARHEADS TO GET BELOW 2,500 WARHEADS. THE U.S. WOULD RETIRE ONLY OLDER SLBM WARHEADS TO REACH ITS CEILINGS, AND THE U.S. COULD EVEN DEPLOY THE MX. THE USSR COULD INCREASE ITS SLBM WARHEADS, KARPOV ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT ACCESS PROBLEMS FOR SSBNS ARE A PROBLEM, ONE RECOGNIZED IN THE DIFFERENTIAL LIMITATIONS FOR SSBNS IN SALT I. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) DEVICES CAN BE PLACED IN ACCESS ROUTES, AND MILITARY PEOPLE SAY IT IS DANGEROUS TO DEPLOY SUBMARINES IN CONFINED AREAS (READ BARENTS AND OKHOTSK SEAS, FOR EXAMPLE). IN RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S QUESTION ABOUT HOW KARPOV SAW ICBM VULNERABILITY AS A CONCERN FOR THE USSR, KARPOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS A "REAL PROBLEM."

5. EMBOFF NOTED THAT BREZHNEV AND OTHERS HAD CITED THE "PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY" IN THE CONTEXTS OF BOTH INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS. KARPOV ASKED RHETORICALLY, "IN WHICH NEGOTIATION WOULD YOU PREFER THAT WE PUT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS?" KARPOV SAID THIS WAS A QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION, AND "THEN WE'LL SEE WHAT HAPPENS." HE SAID FURTHER THAT THE ANSWER WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT HAPPENS TO BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES, AND TO THE U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONSHIP.

6. EMBOFF ASKED WHETHER THE USSR PLANNED TO SET FORTH A CONCRETE START PROPOSAL AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD

DONE. KARPOV SAID DISCUSSIONS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. "LET'S WAIT AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE TALKS COMMENCE."
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ARBATOV RECEIVED A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALL FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE PALME COMMISSION. THE OFFICIAL APPARENTLY DRESSED DOWN ARBATOV FOR HAVING PREMATURELY DIVULGED CONCLUSIONS IN THE PALME COMMISSION REPORT AT HIS MAY 27 PRESS CONFERENCE. ARBATOV PROTESTED, MISLEADINGLY, THAT HE HAD MENTIONED ONLY A FEW ITEMS. THE TASS REPORT OF THE NEWS CONFERENCE, OF COURSE, EMPHASIZED ARBATOV'S PALME COMMISSION COMMENTS.
ZIMMERMANN
BT

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LIMDIS
USSTART
TROFIMENKO

7. AT A MAY 28 SOCIAL FUNCTION GENRIKH TROFIMENKO, THE CHIEF OF THE USA INSTITUTE'S FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT, COMMENTED TO EMBOFF ON TWO ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL. TROFIMENKO SAID "WARHEADS ARE NOT A BAD UNIT OF LIMITATION." HE CONTENDED THAT THE LAUNCHER COUNTING RULE IN SALT II, COMBINED WITH VARIOUS MIRVING SUB-LIMITS, ACCOMPLISHED MUCH THE SAME PURPOSE AS COUNTING WARHEADS DIRECTLY. (COMMENT: TO DATE NONE OF THE PRIVATE OR PUBLIC SOVIET COMMENTARY WE HAVE SEEN HAS TAKEN STRONG EXCEPTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO MAKE WARHEADS THE UNIT OF LIMITATION.)

8. ACCORDING TO TROFIMENKO THE U.S. CLAIM THAT EACH SIDE HAS APPROXIMATELY 7,500 WARHEADS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES IS A "THEORETICAL CALCULATION," BASED ON MAXIMUM MIRVING UNDER SALT II LIMITATIONS. TROFIMENKO, PROBABLY PICKING UP ON WESTERN NEWS REPORTS, SAID USG PUBLIC ESTIMATES OF SOVIET WARHEADS HAD JUMPED OVERNIGHT FROM AROUND 6000 TO 7500. EMBOFF ASSURED TROFIMENKO THAT THE U.S. FIGURE OF APPROXIMATELY 7,500 SOVIET WARHEADS REFERRED TO EFFECTIVELY DEPLOYED WARHEADS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND WAS NOT AN ARTIFICIALLY INFLATED OR THEORETICAL NUMBER.
ARBATOV AND THE PALME COMMISSION

9. FRG AMBASSADOR MEYER-LANDRUT HAPPENED TO BE IN USA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV'S OFFICE RECENTLY WHEN

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STATEMENT THAT "NOTHING IS EXCLUDED" FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND OTHER USG STATEMENTS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO LIMIT STRATEGIC BOMBERS IN AN EQUITABLE FASHION.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EUR/HOLØES. ACTING AND PM/HOWE
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/4/88 (BLACKWILL, ROBERT)
TAGS: PARM, START, SOPN, UR, US
SUBJECT: TASS COMMENTARY ON PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL
- - - (INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, SS8215723)

1. *f* - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE JUNE 3 TASS COMMENTARY IS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND AUTHORITATIVE CRITIQUE OF OUR START PROPOSAL SO FAR TO APPEAR IN THE SOVIET MEDIA. AS IN INF, MOSCOW EVIDENTLY BELIEVES IT CAN UNDERMINE DOMESTIC AND EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. PROPOSAL BY PROVING THAT IT IS DELIBERATELY ONE-SIDED, AND THEREBY PRESSURE US TO FALL OFF OUR POSITION ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY. FOLLOWING THE INF PRECEDENT, THE SOVIETS ARE USING SPECIFIC DATA ON U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES TO MAKE THEIR CASE.

3. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, IN CRITICIZING OUR PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT REJECTED THE IDEA OF DEEP REDUCTIONS OR THE USE OF WARHEADS AS UNIT OF ACCOUNT. THEIR EMPHASIS IS ON THE NEED FOR RESTRAINTS ON HEAVY BOMBERS AND, PARTICULARLY, CRUISE MISSILES COMPARABLE TO THOSE ON BALLISTIC MISSILES.

4. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TASS CRITIQUE COVERS FAMILIAR GROUND, ALTHOUGH FOR THE FIRST TIME SOVIET READERS ARE GIVEN THE SPECIFIC NUMERICAL CEILINGS PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT. TASS ADMITS THAT THE DEEP CUTS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS ENVISAGED UNDER OUR PROPOSAL MIGHT SOUND "OUTWARDLY" ATTRACTIVE, BUT ARGUES THAT THE REAL EFFECT OF THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE TO SLASH SOVIET ICBM CAPABILITIES AND FORCE A DRASTIC RESTRUCTURING OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE. THE U.S., BY CONTRAST, WOULD BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE ITS OWN ICBM POTENTIAL, AND ITS BOMBER AND CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNCONSTRAINED. U.S. REDUCTIONS, ACCORDING TO TASS, WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY PHASING OUT A FEW "OUTDATED" SUBMARINES. AS IN PREVIOUS SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARIES, TASS IGNORES THE PRESIDENT'S

5. THE COMMENTARY ARGUES THAT BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERING STRUCTURES OF U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD LEAVE THE USSR WITH A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POTENTIAL THREE TIMES SMALLER THAN THAT OF THE U.S., AS MEASURED BY THE OVERALL NUMBER OF WARHEADS (BASED ON THE APPARENT ASSUMPTION THAT WE WILL DEPLOY UPWARDS OF TEN THOUSAND ALCMS AND SLCMS). THE COMMENTARY CONCLUDES THAT, IN ADVANCING SUCH AN UNBALANCED PROPOSAL, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BETRAYED THE FACT THAT IT ONLY WANTS TO "TALK ABOUT TALKS, RATHER THAN TO WORK OUT A BASIS FOR ACCORD." TAKEN TOGETHER WITH OUR PLANNED INF DEPLOYMENTS THE U.S. INTENTION, ACCORDING TO TASS, IS TO ACHIEVE "UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES AND INFLICT CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THE DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF THE USSR" AND WARSAW PACT.

6. THE TASS COMMENTARY ALSO ATTEMPTS TO REFUTE U.S. ARGUMENTS THAT LAND-BASED ICBMS ARE MORE DESTABILIZING THAN OTHER STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. TASS NOTES THAT THE TRIDENT 2 SLBM WILL HAVE ACCURACY COMPARABLE TO ICBMS, AND THAT U.S. BOMBERS WITH CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE ABLE TO ATTACK HARDENED TARGETS IN THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT PENETRATING SOVIET AIR DEFENSES. IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY, ACCORDING TO TASS, TO EXAMINE ALL COMPONENTS OF THE TWO SIDES' STRATEGIC FORCES "IN THEIR ENTIRETY," RATHER THAN DISRUPTING THE EXISTING PARITY THROUGH "SELECTIVE CONSIDERATION" OF THOSE ARMS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE PLACED GREATER RELIANCE.

7. THE COMMENTARY CONCLUDES WITH A PITCH FOR BREZHNEV'S STRATEGIC FREEZE PROPOSAL, ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD

ENSURE AGAINST A CONTINUED NUCLEAR BUILD-UP DURING THE LONG PERIOD OF TIME REQUIRED TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT. ELABORATING ON THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL, THE COMMENTARY PROPOSES THAT NEITHER SIDE "UNDERTAKE ANY ACTIONS CAPABLE OF UPSETTING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION DURING THE PERIOD OF THE TALKS". STOESSEL
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR

Ms. Nancy Bearg-Dyke
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United Nations
Representative to the United Nations

Mr. L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Colonel Charles F. Stebbins
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Meehan
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. Joseph Presel
Executive Assistant
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Mr. William Schneider
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Ambassador Edward Rowny
Chief Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Ms. Teresa Collins
Chief, Executive Secretariat Staff
International Communication Agency

SUBJECT: Fact Sheets on START

The attached fact sheets on the U.S. proposal, and proposed reductions, in START are approved for use by agencies.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachments as Noted

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) -- PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

On May 9, the President announced a bold, new proposal to reduce significantly the risks posed by large nuclear arsenals. He has proposed a phased approach to reductions focused on the most destabilizing elements of nuclear forces. The initial phase would reduce the total number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 5,000, would limit the number of warheads carried on ICBMs to one-half that number, and would cut the total number of ballistic missiles to an equal level about one-half of the current US level. In a second phase, we would seek further reductions in the overall destructive power of each side's arsenal to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw weight below the current US level. We will also treat bombers and other strategic systems in an equitable manner. The proposed reductions, coupled with effective verification, will substantially reduce the nuclear threat and will make a major contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance.

The significant reductions proposed by President Reagan are shown in the following comparison:

FIRST PHASE

| | <u>Approximate Current Levels</u> | |
|--|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| | <u>US</u> | <u>USSR</u> |
| Ballistic Missile Warheads (Land-Based and Sea-Based) | | |
| o Proposed ceiling of 5,000 | 7,200 | 7,500 |
| Land-Based Ballistic Missile Warheads | | |
| o Proposed ceiling of 2,500 | 2,150 | 5,900 |
| Ballistic Missiles (Land-Based and Sea-Based) | | |
| o Proposed ceiling of 850, approximately one-half current U.S. levels | 1,600 | 2,350 |

SECOND PHASE

Missile Throw Weight

- | | | |
|---|-------|-------|
| o Proposed ceiling below current U.S. levels | 2 MKG | 5 MKG |
|---|-------|-------|

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) -- THE US PROPOSAL

The President has opened the door to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union based upon the principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint.

Arms control is an important instrument for securing such restraint. Equitable and verifiable agreements, when combined with sound foreign and defense policies, can play a critical role in enhancing deterrence and ensuring a stable military balance.

The President has outlined the objectives of U.S. arms control policy:

- Significant Reductions: We seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.
- Equality: Americans will accept nothing less. We want agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces.
- Verifiability: We will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that both sides comply. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence needed to accept the deep reductions that we seek.

On May 9, the President announced a bold and realistic two-phased U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) aimed at these objectives.

- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We will also seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level, about one-half of the current U.S. level.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenals to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current U.S. level.

The President's proposal attempts to reduce the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and securing a stable nuclear balance. The main threat to the strategic balance has been the massive

Soviet buildup of ballistic missile forces. Because of their large size, increasing accuracy, and short flight times, these missiles (and particularly land-based ICBMs) pose a significant threat to U.S. deterrent forces.

- To enhance deterrence and ensure a stable nuclear balance, the President's proposal focuses, in the first phase, on significant reductions on ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles themselves. This would halt and reverse the destabilizing trend that would have been permitted under the unratified SALT II Treaty.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions to equal ceilings on other elements of strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is an important measure of the size and destructive potential of ballistic missiles. First phase reductions will reduce the current disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight, and lay the groundwork for the second-phase reductions to achieve an equal throw-weight ceiling below current U.S. levels.

The President's approach is reasonable and equitable. It would lead to significant reductions on both sides and a stable nuclear balance, which should be in the interest not only of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but of the entire world. The President has emphasized our intention to negotiate in good faith and to consider all serious proposals from the Soviets.

The debate on nuclear weapons issues has focused public attention on a matter of crucial importance. It is now time to demonstrate support for the ambitious, yet realistic, approach to strategic arms control embodied in the U.S. START proposal. The START negotiations will begin on June 29.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER^{SK}/ROBERT LINHARD^{RSC}

SUBJECT: Fact Sheets on START

Attached for your signature and transmittal are two fact sheets on START approved earlier today by Bud McFarlane and John Poindexter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab A.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A Memo to Agencies, with Attachments

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START
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BEEN GENERATING SINCE THE EUREKA SPEECH: THAT THE U.S. PROPOSALS ARE LOPSIDED, SELECTIVE, AND UNFAIR TO THE USSR, AND THAT THE U.S. IS STILL SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY. THE ARTICLE RESTATES THEMES FROM BREZHNEV'S KOMSOMOL SPEECH, QUOTES BREZHNEV AS SAYING "RECENTLY" THE USSR HAS BEEN OBSERVING SALT II, CALLS FOR QUALITATIVE AS WELL AS QUANTITATIVE STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL, REPEATS THE CALL FOR A FREEZE, AND HIGHLIGHTS THE DANGERS OF CRUISE MISSILES; BUT IT ADVANCES NO SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSAL FOR THE START TALKS. THE SOPHISTICATED, RATHER THAN BOMBASTIC, TONE OF THE PIECE SUGGESTS THE SOVIETS ARE TAKING THEIR CASE TO THE BETTER-INFORMED SEGMENTS OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. ALONG WITH BREZHNEV'S KOMSOMOL SPEECH AND LAST SATURDAY'S PETROV COMMENTARY, THIS MAJOR PRAVDA PIECE IS INTENDED TO COUNTER THE POSITIVE INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S EUREKA SPEECH. END SUMMARY.

3. WASHINGTON READERS WILL FIND THE PRAVDA PIECE IN ENGLISH ON THE FBIS WIRE. IN BRIEF, THE ARTICLE:
-- REPEATS THE CHARGE THAT U.S. START PROPOSALS ARE PROPAGANDA, NOT REALISTIC: THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION "SEEMS TO FAVOR ARMS REDUCTION" BUT ITS "POLICY LINE AND PRACTICAL ACTIONS DO NOT CONFIRM THIS."
-- CHARGES THAT IN HIS EUREKA SPEECH, REAGAN CALLED FOR "CONFRONTATION WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" AND "REARMAMENT" WITH A VIEW TO OBTAINING "MILITARY SUPERIORITY."
-- NOTES THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE HIS "CONSENT" TO THE "SOVIET UNION'S PROPOSAL" TO RESUME STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS--A "STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION" AS BREZHNEV CALLED IT; BUT
-- QUESTIONS WHETHER THE REAGAN START PROPOSALS ARE REALISTIC "IN ESSENCE" RATHER THAN ONLY IN "OUTWARD APPEARANCE."

4. THE SOVIET STATEMENT MARSHALS THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENTS AGAINST PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS:
-- THE PROPOSALS ARE "LOP-SIDED" AND CONTRADICT THE "PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY" BECAUSE THEY EMPHASIZE LAND-BASED ICBMS.

BT

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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/4/88 (PASCOE, B. LYNN) OR-P
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET STATEMENT ON US START PROPOSALS

REFS: A) MOSCOW 6603, B) MOSCOW 6816 (NOTAL)
- C) MOSCOW 6533 (NOTAL)

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS TODAY MADE A GRAB FOR THE INTERNATIONAL HEADLINES BY PUBLISHING A LONG, AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT PORTRAYING THE U.S. START PROPOSAL AS "UNBALANCED" AND UNFAIR. DESIGNED IN PART TO COMPLICATE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EUROPEAN TRIP AND TO GAIN AN ADVANTAGE AT THE SSOD, THE UNSIGNED PRAVDA ARTICLE (JUNE 4) DEVELOPED IN A REASONED AND NON-POLEMICAL TONE THE ARGUMENTS THE SOVIETS HAVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/11 # 11567

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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-- THIS IS UNFAIR BECAUSE 70 PERCENT OF SOVIET WARHEADS ARE ON LAND-BASED ICBMS, WHEREAS ONLY ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF AMERICAN WARHEADS ARE LAND-BASED; MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF AMERICAN WARHEADS ARE ON SSBNS OR HEAVY BOMBERS.

-- DESPITE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES, THE STRATEGIC POTENTIALS OF THE TWO SIDES ARE "BALANCED;" AN "APPROXIMATELY EQUILIBRIUM" EXISTS.

-- UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, U.S. ARMS WOULD BE AFFECTED TO A "CONSIDERABLY SMALLER EXTENT" THAN SOVIET FORCES: WHEREAS THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ICBM WARHEADS BY 50-60 PERCENT, THE U.S. WOULD LOSE ONLY A "CERTAIN NUMBER" OF WARHEADS ON "OUTDATED SUBMARINES" AND WOULD RETAIN THE OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE LAND-BASED WARHEADS BY DEPLOYING "THE MOST ADVANCED MISSILES." THE PROPOSED CUTS WOULD "NOT AFFECT AT ALL" THE "HUGE ARSENAL OF WARHEADS MOUNTED ON AMERICAN HEAVY BOMBERS."

.. UNDER THE U.S. PLAN, THE SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POTENTIAL (IN NUMBER OF WARHEADS) WOULD END UP "THREE TIMES SMALLER" THAN THAT OF THE U.S.

.. IN ADDITION, "SEVERAL THOUSAND" CRUISE MISSILES (SEA AND LAND-BASED) PLANNED BY THE U.S. NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

.. IN SUM, THE USSR WOULD BE FORCED NOT ONLY TO "REDUCE SHARPLY" ITS STRATEGIC POTENTIAL, BUT TO "DRASTICALLY RESTRUCTURE" ITS FORCES, WHILE THE U.S. COULD "BEEF UP WITHOUT HINDRANCE" ITS STRATEGIC FORCES, BY DEPLOYING MXS, TRIDENT-1S AND 2S, B-1B STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES.

.. U.S. EMPHASIS ON ICBMS REJECTED, INTERPRETED

5. PRAVDA REJECTS THE PRESIDENT'S EMPHASIS ON LAND-BASED ICBMS AS THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS, CLAIMING THIS IS "INACCURATE" AND CONTRADICTS THE "REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS." PRAVDA SAYS THAT SLBMS AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS ARE "ATTAINING THE LEVEL OF LAND-BASED SYSTEMS BY RANGE, YIELD OF NUCLEAR CHARGES AND ACCURACY," AND "MAY EVEN SURPASS THEM" IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PRAVDA USES THE TRIDENT-2 AND B-1B BOMBER TO ILLUSTRATE THIS CONTENTION. THE FAILURE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF CRUISE MISSILES, AND THE DESIRE TO LEAVE STRATEGIC AVIATION TO A "SECOND STAGE," PRAVDA CLAIMS, SHOWS "ANYTHING BUT A BUSINESS-LIKE, RESPONSIBLE APPROACH" TO STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. IN SHORT, THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT FOR THE U.S., THE "MAIN THING IS TO TALK ABOUT TALKS RATHER THAN TO WORK OUT A BASIS FOR AN ACCORD."

.. SOVIETS STAKE OUT HIGH GROUND

6. TURNING TO THE SOVIET POSITION, PRAVDA SEES "MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF ATTEMPTS TO GAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY" AS A PRECONDITION FOR STOPPING THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION. UNLESS THE PRINCIPLE OF "EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY" BT

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IS OBSERVED, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL BE DOOMED TO "YEARS OF FRUITLESS ANTAGONISM, THE SQUANDERING OF IMMENSE RESOURCES, AND INCREASINGLY GREATER RISKS AND DANGERS," ACCORDING TO PRAVDA. THE TASK OF THE TALKS, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, SHOULD BE TO FIND "IN SPITE OF DIFFERENT STRUCTURES OF THE STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS OF THE SIDES, SUCH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS WITH DUE ACCOUNT FOR POLITICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER FACTORS, WHICH WOULD CONSIDERABLY REDUCE THE LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT DAMAGING THEIR SECURITY."

CALL FOR COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

7. PRAVDA SAYS IT IS NECESSARY, "AS THE UNITED STATES ITSELF EARLIER PROPOSED," TO "EXAMINE ALL THE COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC POTENTIAL IN THEIR ENTIRETY," RATHER THAN

TO TAKE A "SELECTIVE" APPROACH, WHICH WOULD "INEVITABLY RESULT IN A SHARP DISRUPTION OF THE EXISTING BALANCE" AND "DAMAGE THE SECURITY INTERESTS" OF ONE OF THE SIDES.

EMPHASIS ON CRUISE MISSILES

8. THE SOVIET UNION, PRAVDA SAYS, FAVORS QUALITATIVE AS WELL AS QUANTITATIVE LIMITS. THUS CRUISE MISSILES, HOWEVER BASED, SHOULD BE "BANNED OR RESTRICTED TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE." LEAVING CRUISE MISSILES OUT OF AN AGREEMENT MAKES ATTAINMENT OF A "MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORD" "ALTOGETHER PROBLEMATIC."

PARITY, SOVIET OBSERVANCE OF SALT II AFFIRMED

9. THE ARTICLE CITES THE DATA EXCHANGED IN VIENNA AT THE TIME OF THE SALT-II SIGNING AS "CONFIRMING" THAT THE "STRATEGIC POTENTIALS" WERE BALANCED AT THAT TIME. IT GOES ON TO STATE THAT BREZHNEV "RECENTLY DECLARED" THAT THE SOVIET UNION "HAS DONE NOTHING IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS SINCE THE SIGNING IN 1979 OF THE SALT-II TREATY WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A CHANGE OF THAT APPROXIMATE PARITY WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED."

CALL FOR A FREEZE REPEATED

10. PRAVDA RENEWS THE CALL FOR A FREEZE DURING THE TALKS, FOR WHICH "MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED." PRAVDA FURTHER PROPOSES THAT "NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE USSR UNDERTAKE ANY ACTIONS CAPABLE OF UPSETTING THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION" DURING THE TALKS.

11. THE ARTICLE REPEATS BREZHNEV'S CONDITION THAT

"ALL POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS" MADE EARLIER IN SALT BE RETAINED "TO AVOID AN UNJUSTIFIED LOSS OF TIME."

12. COMMENT: BREZHNEV (IN HIS KOMSOMOL SPEECH) AMBASSADOR KARPOV AND OTHER SOVIET ARMS EXPERTS HAVE ALREADY VOICED MOST, IF NOT ALL OF THE SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S START PROPOSALS ELABORATED HERE (REFTELS). WHAT IS NEW AND CHALLENGING TO THE U.S. IS THE SOVIETS' RESORT TO A MORE SOPHISTICATED AND THOROUGH METHOD OF PUBLIC ARGUMENTATION, CLEARLY DESIGNED TO REACH WELL-INFORMED WESTERN PUBLICS AND OPINION-MAKERS WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE ISSUES. INSTEAD OF BT

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REJECTING THE U. S. PROPOSALS OUT OF HAND, AS THEY DID
SECRETARY VANCE'S "DEEP CUTS" PROPOSALS OF MARCH, 1977,
THE SOVIETS HAVE ADOPTED A MORE REASONED, FACTUAL
APPROACH BETTER TAILORED TO THE DEMANDS OF TODAY'S
DEBATE. BY "RESPONDING" TO THE U. S. PROPOSALS, THE
SOVIETS HOPE TO PUT THE PROPAGANDA BALL BACK IN OUR
COURT. END COMMENT. ZIMMERMANN
BT

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