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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES			Withdrawer		
			JET	5/24/2005	
File Folder	SOVIET REACTION TO US ACTIONS IN LIBYA		FOIA	A	
			F06-	114/10	
Box Number	35		YARHI-MILO		
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions	
		Pages			
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11515 MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT	1	4/15/1986	BI	
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11516 MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN	1	ND	B1	
	RE MEMO FROM GEORGE SHULTZ ON	-	1,2		
	THE SOVIET REACTION TO OUR ACTIONS IN LIBYA				
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11520 REPORT	PAGE A	1	ND	B1	
	[4 -4]				
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11518 MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE	1	4/15/1986	B1	
	SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA				
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	R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10				

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Memorandum for the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a memorandum from Secretary Shultz on the Soviet reaction to our actions in Libya. In addition to saying that the Shevardnadze visit is "not possible at this time," the Soviets suggested to Art Hartman that they may undertake further unspecified measures.

I agree with State's assessment that the Soviet decision is a low cost means of responding to the situation and suggests that the Soviets are not seriously attracted to the idea of a July summit, but are aiming for the end of the year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I, unless he has already been informed.

Approve

Disapprove y.

Jour Just the

Attachments:

Memorandum to the President

Memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President

NLRR <u>F06-114/10</u> # 11515 BY <u>CH</u> NARA DATE <u>L/25/09</u>

Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

Memorandum from George Shultz on the Soviet

Reaction to Our Actions in Libya

Issue

Soviet protest of our actions in Libya.

Facts

The Soviet Foreign Ministry protested to Art Hartman on the 15th. The Soviets said Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to the U.S. is "not possible at this time" and implied that they might undertake further unspecified actions.

Discussion

The Soviet decision appears to be a low cost means of responding to the situation and suggests that they are not seriously attracted to the idea of a July summit, but are aiming for the end of the year.

Recommendation

 $\frac{OK}{}$ $\frac{No}{}$ That you review the attached memorandum from George Shultz.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from George Shultz

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR FOB-114/10 #11514

W NARA DATE 6/25/09

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM II

86 APR 15 P 2: 53 SECRET

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90301

	ACTION OFFICER: DUE: 15 APRIL 1986				
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to					
PHONE* to action office	ratext. 5112 -				
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☐ ☐ Menges	□ □ Steiner				
☐ ☐ Miller	☐ ☐ Tahir-Kheli				
□ □ North	☐ ☐ Teicher				
☐ ☐ Platt	☐ ☐ Thompson				
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

George P. Shultz 48

SUBJECT:

Soviet Reaction to U.S. Actions in Libya

Art Hartman was called to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Tuesday afternoon by the head of their U.S.A. Department. Soviets told Art that because of U.S. actions in Libya the meeting between Shevardnadze and me, scheduled for May 14-16, was "not possible at this time," and that the U.S. was responsible for this turn of events. The Soviets will be making an announcement this evening and they suggested that they may undertake further measures. Art was also told that Soviet planes and ships have been operating, and will continue to operate in the Mediterranean. The Soviets said the U.S. should not seek to interfere with their air and naval activities.

Art Hartman believes that since the Soviets are engaging us publicly on this question, we should be prepared to respond. Art found the White House background materials very useful and believes in particular that when the Soviets raise the question of loss of life resulting from our operations that we respond with chapter and verse on our casualties from acknowledged Libyan terrorist activities. I agree. We will be working with the NSC to ensure that our response is coordinated and effective.

It is not clear at this point whether the Soviets are actually cancelling, postponing, or calling into question the scheduled meeting. At this point, however, we have to assume the meeting will not occur as scheduled. This will of course make it more difficult to organize a July summit. For the Soviets, who appeared in any case to be planning on December, cancelling the meeting is a low cost means of responding not only to the Libya situation, but to such previous slights as our move against their UN mission.

> SECRET/SENSITIVE DECL: OADR