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Withdrawer

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File Folder SOVIET COMMENTS + POSITION [JAN. 1985]

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 34

YARHI-MILO

3414

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11459	PAPER	SOVIET MOTIVATIONS FOR RESUMING ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES [1 - 13] PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	13	1/3/1985	B1 B3 B6
11460	FAX COVER SHEET	MATLOCK RE GROMYKO [14 - 14] D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	1/4/1985	B2 B3
11461	MEMO	WHAT TO EXPECT FROM GROMYKO [15 - 17] PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	3	1/4/1985	B1 B3 B6
11462	FAX COVER SHEET	MATLOCK RE SOVIET COMMENTS ON GENEVA TALKS [18 - 18] D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	1/4/1985	B2 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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[Redacted]



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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M. P. Lock

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3 January 1985

Soviet Motivations For Resuming Arms Control Discussions
With the United States

Summary

[Redacted]

The Soviets may have calculated that by resuming a dialogue they could seize the high ground in public opinion, highlight alleged differences among elements of the US administration, and exploit what they viewed as allied concerns over SDI. They apparently judged that the domestic climate in the United States and Europe in the immediate wake of the US election offered an opportune time to take the initiative on arms control. [Redacted]

The domestic dimensions of Moscow's decision to resume talks are also obscure, but signs of a more active consideration of reengagement coincided with the political and physical resurgence of General Secretary Chernenko. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

This paper was prepared by [Redacted] of the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments may be directed to Chief, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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By WJ, NARA, Date 7/18/08

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The Soviets do not now appear optimistic about achieving an arms control agreement in the near term. They nonetheless probably judge that negotiations will provide opportunities to influence Western perceptions and US policies, and to stimulate public and congressional pressure on the administration to delay, reduce, or eliminate certain US weapons programs, particularly in the fields of ballistic missile defense and space weapons, where they believe they are at long term technological disadvantage.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

In the six months before the US elections, the Soviets apparently were reconsidering the effectiveness of their refusal to engage the United States in an arms control dialogue.

[REDACTED]
changes in the tone and wording of Soviet public statements suggested a shifting policy course. Public signs of Moscow's internal deliberations on arms control appear to have included:

- The Soviet proposal of 29 June to convene negotiations on space weaponry, which contrasted sharply with Soviet intransigence on resuming US-Soviet arms control dialogue without a removal of US INF missiles from Europe and on US-Soviet relations generally.
- Chernenko's assertion in Pravda on 2 September that progress on the space weapons issue could facilitate a broader US-Soviet dialogue on "other" strategic arms issues, which reversed Moscow's earlier position that space weapons and nuclear weapons were unrelated issues.
- A noticeable muting of public demands by Soviet leaders, particularly Chernenko, that the "obstacles" created by US INF missiles be removed before negotiations could resume.
- The relatively moderate tone of Soviet official commentary on Gromyko's September meeting with President Reagan.
- Chernenko's interviews with the US media in October and November, in which he stated that Moscow desired dialogue and better relations.
- The Supreme Soviet's congratulatory message to President Reagan on the day after his reelection, proclaiming that the USSR was "prepared for joint work" to remove the threat of war and to "radically improve" the international situation. [REDACTED]

It is likely that much of Moscow's preelection posturing represented tactical probes of potential US flexibility on arms control issues as well as efforts to bring pressure on the US administration to make a concessionary "good faith" response to Soviet overtures. The Soviet posture also kept open Moscow's options for dealing with the United States after

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the election. The Soviets had positioned themselves either to continue their intransigence or to move forward, depending on their calculations of the benefits, costs, and uncertainties involved. [redacted]

Leadership

[redacted]

[redacted] The General Secretary's authority clearly has increased since his return to Moscow in September after a prolonged illness. He apparently is in a stronger position than at any previous time in his tenure to play a leading role in directing Soviet policy.¹ In a series of public statements he appeared to soften Moscow's precondition for a resumption of the arms dialogue with Washington. Moscow's agreement to the Shultz-Gromyko meeting may be part of Chernenko's overall campaign to regain the political initiative and further strengthen his authority. Gorbachev's public comments and performance in Great Britain suggest that he and Chernenko are in agreement on the need to reopen arms talks with the United States. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Motivations for Geneva Meeting

[redacted]

[redacted] We believe Soviet leaders may have concluded that their previous diplomatic hostility and refusal to negotiate was not accomplishing their political or military objectives of sowing discord in the Alliance and derailing US INF deployments. They may have judged that Washington had been successful in managing Alliance concerns on the arms control issue and in placing the onus on Moscow for walking out of the Geneva talks and for refusing to convene negotiations on space weapons. The USSR's much publicized "countermeasures" to US INF deployments also had failed to generate alarm among West European publics or to stimulate significant Allied governmental pressure on Washington to make a "concession" to get the talks going again. The West European peace movement had lost momentum and held little prospect of being revived without a renewal of public interest in the INF question.

[redacted]

The Soviets may have calculated that the post-election US domestic political climate offered an opportune time to change course and seize the initiative on arms control. [redacted]

[redacted] the Politburo may hope this approach will:

- Exploit popular expectations generated in the pre-election debate on nuclear arms and defense spending.
- Generate pressure on the President to move on arms control, which he had made a priority item on his second term agenda.
- Exploit perceived differences among elements of the administration on US arms control policy.
- Preempt any possible US initiative to restart negotiations. [redacted]

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Perceptions of US Differences. Soviet media are increasingly making explicit references to alleged differences among administration officials on arms control policy [REDACTED]

In the first editorial comment on the January meeting, a Pravda observer cited a US journal asserting that the President was receiving conflicting advice from his advisers but was "leaning" toward abandoning a "confrontational" course. [REDACTED]

Public Opinion. In agreeing to resume talks, the Soviets apparently also hoped to gain an advantage in the public arena on the arms control issue. In their public statements and in a series of demarches to US allies, they have claimed credit for proposing the talks. Moreover, they have publicly asserted that substantive progress on arms control will depend on the actions and attitudes of the United States. By claiming that the ball is now in the US court, the Soviets are trying to put domestic and international pressure on the administration as it prepares for the Geneva meeting and to lay the groundwork for blaming the United States should the January talks fail to produce results. [REDACTED]

ASAT Testing. The Soviets may have believed it was politically advantageous to resume arms control discussions with the United States before March 1985 when the Congressional prohibition on testing the US Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) against a target will expire.² Soviet officials, including Chernenko, have publicly [REDACTED] said that obtaining a freeze on the testing of ASAT weapons-- which Moscow view as an integral part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)--is a key Soviet objective in the talks. [REDACTED]

²The Defense Authorization Bill prohibits the testing of the MHV against a target until after 1 March 1985 and requires the administration to certify that it is endeavoring to negotiate ASAT limits with the USSR. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The Soviet campaign against space weapons undoubtedly is intended in part to make it more difficult for the administration to justify to Congress the need for ASAT testing while arms control discussions are under way. [REDACTED]

SALT II Expiration. The Soviets are aware that the United States will have to decide whether to continue observing SALT II limits when the seventh Ohio-class submarine becomes operational next summer, thus pushing US forces above the SALT II limits on MIRVed ballistic missiles. The Soviets may have decided to renew the arms control dialogue before that time, possibly in the hope of reaching an agreement that both sides will continue to abide by certain provisions of the SALT II Treaty while negotiations are proceeding. [REDACTED]

Western Europe. A renewed effort to provoke US-West European frictions over INF deployments probably played a significant role in Moscow's decision to resume arms control discussions. The Soviets almost certainly see continued opportunities to disrupt NATO's consensus on INF deployments by political initiatives emphasizing Moscow's readiness to seek a negotiated solution to the INF issue:

- They may have calculated that the heightened media focus on prospects for a resumption of negotiations itself would help to reinvigorate the peace movement in Western Europe and reawaken concern in NATO capitals about how to "manage" the INF issue.
- Their public [REDACTED] statements that Soviet "counterdeployments" have restored the balance in Europe and their assertions that the number of SS-20s

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targeted on Europe has not increased could set the stage for a Soviet proposal for a mutual moratorium on further US and Soviet deployments while negotiations proceed.

[redacted]

The Soviets in addition are trying to exploit Allied concerns about the SDI. [redacted]

[redacted] Moscow may hope that Allied pressure on the issue will influence Washington to moderate its position on continued ASAT testing and possibly create dissension between the United States and its NATO Allies. [redacted]

[redacted]

Longer Term Considerations

The administration's strategic modernization program, coupled with President Reagan's declared commitment to explore and develop strategic defense capabilities, has raised concerns in Moscow over the potential consequences of a high technology arms challenge from Washington. From the Soviet perspective, the US is pursuing an array of strategic programs--the Peacekeeper and Midgetman ICBMs, the Trident II SLBM, long-range cruise missiles, the Pershing II, and the B-1 and Stealth bombers--that threaten to erode the strategic gains achieved by the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The Soviets probably are particularly concerned about the hard-target capable Trident II, Peacekeeper, and Pershing II, which could threaten the survivability of their ICBM force and their command and control facilities. The proliferation of long-range cruise missiles, moreover, would vastly complicate their low-altitude air defense problems. [redacted]

[redacted]

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[REDACTED]

The Soviets may see themselves as well positioned, given their own array of ongoing programs for strategic offensive nuclear systems as well as conventional and advanced technology defensive systems, to keep pace in the near term with an accelerated US defense effort.

[REDACTED]

Various Soviet officials have asserted that the USSR is prepared to bear the economic and technological burden necessary to counter US strategic programs. The recently announced rise in the official defense budget--the first such increase since 1969--could be a signal that a decision has been made to increase the rate of spending above that of recent years.

[REDACTED]

The Soviet economy can support a sharp increase in defense spending but such a step would exact a significant price as energy, critical materials, and capacity in the machinebuilding sector were shifted to military use. As a result, the Soviet Union would have to forgo some of the civilian investment that is needed to modernize the economy.

[REDACTED]

Outlook.

The Soviets do not now appear optimistic about achieving an arms control agreement in the near term.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The Soviets nonetheless probably judge that arms control negotiations--whatever their substantive course--will provide opportunities to influence Western perceptions and US policies, and to stimulate public and congressional pressure on the administration to delay, reduce, or eliminate certain US weapons programs, particularly in the fields of ballistic missile defense and space weapons systems, where they believe they are at a long term technological disadvantage.


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
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
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By LDS, NARA, Date 7/18/08

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington D.C. 20505

4 January 1985

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: What To Expect From Gromyko

This assessment is based on what we can infer from our understanding of Soviet motivations in returning to the talks, [redacted] and Soviet public statements. [redacted]

We believe Gromyko is likely to urge that limitations on space weapons be the primary agenda item, and is almost certain to call for a ban on all space weaponry.

- He probably will seek to obtain US agreement to abide tacitly by SALT II guidelines on nuclear weapons (at least with respect to numerical limits on ballistic missile launchers and on MIRVed launchers) while future talks proceed.
- By linking progress on nuclear weapons issues with progress on space issues, he will--we believe--try to place the United States in the position of demandeur for strategic offensive nuclear weapon restraints or reductions that go beyond SALT II. [redacted]

Gromyko probably will seek reaffirmation of the US commitment to the ABM Treaty and an explicit agreement that all types of ballistic missile defense (BMD)--including systems that would be space-based or based on "other physical principles"--will be a subject for negotiation.

- He will be wary of any unilateral US assurances that BMD can be "deferred" to a future point in the negotiations.

Gromyko probably will view the US position on an ASAT testing moratorium as a near-term indication of the overall US negotiating posture and of US resolve in pursuing the SDI over the longer term.

This paper was prepared by [redacted] the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments may be directed to Chief, [redacted]

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- He probably will not insist that the United States impose a moratorium prior to the opening of formal negotiations, but he may seek a US statement that Washington would agree to it once negotiations get under way.
- We doubt that he will be willing to discuss the virtues of strategic defenses for both sides, and may respond sharply to any US approach along this line. [redacted]

Gromyko probably believes that the United States is interested in reaching an accord on offensive nuclear arms while reserving its options for continued research and development on the SDI.

- He will argue that the issues of space weapons and offensive nuclear arms are interconnected and might call for a comprehensive agreement dealing with both, along the lines of SALT I.
- He may hint that progress can be made in dealing with offensive nuclear arms if the United States is forthcoming on the space weapons issue, but he may hold off making specific proposals along these lines until he finds out more about the US attitude and approach. [redacted]

Gromyko may have considerable latitude as to the form and modalities of future negotiations. The Soviets might envisage two negotiating forums or working groups: one for space weapons and one for intercontinental and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms. Alternatively, they might seek to maintain a separate negotiating forum for INF in the belief that this would constitute a more expedient arrangement for limiting ongoing US INF deployments.

- In the latter case, the Soviets might claim it was a "new" negotiation by including SS-12 "operational-tactical" missiles deployed in Eastern Europe allegedly in response to US INF, possibly proposing to trade their removal for the removal of US INF missiles from Western Europe. [redacted]

Gromyko may call for a mutual moratorium on further deployments of INF missiles in Europe. He almost certainly will raise the issue of compensation for French and British nuclear systems but may be flexible on where and how these systems are "taken into account." [redacted]

On strategic nuclear arms, he may show some interest in the build-down concept as a way of achieving reductions, but he will insist that each side retain freedom to decide the mix of its strategic systems.

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- He is likely to hold to the principle of limits on warheads and launchers, while resisting any proposals for direct limits on throw-weight and rejecting any approach that appears to require a restructuring of Soviet strategic forces or substantial reductions in heavy ICBMs.
 - He almost certainly will press for limits on SLCMs.
 - He may suggest that agreement on some "Vladiyostok-style" guidelines is the best way to proceed on offensive nuclear arms, but he probably would make Soviet acceptance of such an approach contingent on US willingness to negotiate about space weapons and BMD. ✓
- [REDACTED]

Unless Gromyko judges that sufficient progress has been made in agreeing on a negotiating agenda and objectives, he probably will not agree to set a date for opening formal negotiations. He may propose instead an additional meeting between himself and Secretary Shultz or between other senior officials. ✓

- The Soviets might calculate that this approach would build pressure on the administration to move toward the Soviet negotiating agenda without making the USSR appear to be intransigent. The Soviets have publicly warned that new negotiations will not necessarily result from the January meeting in Geneva. Although such remarks suggest posturing for bargaining advantage, they may set the stage for a harsh public attack on the US position by Gromyko following the meeting. [REDACTED]