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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/24/2005

File Folder SOVIET UNION: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 3/3

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 34

YARHI-MILO

3412

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11434	CABLE	270311Z JUL 82 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	7/27/1982	B1
11435	CABLE	270621Z JUL 82 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	7/27/1982	B1
11425	CABLE	140020Z AUG 82 PAR 3/28/2011 F2006-114/10	1	8/14/1982	B2 B3
11436	CABLE	300946Z AUG 82 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	7	8/30/1982	B1
11426	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER COUNSELOR OF PRC EMBASSY (SAME AS 18809)	1	9/28/1982	B1
11427	PAPER	USSR-CHINA R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	ND	B1
11437	CABLE	270940Z OCT 82 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	10/27/1982	B1
11438	REPORT	SINO-SOVIET TALKS R 12/22/2015 M554/1	3	11/6/1982	B1
11428	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	11/9/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11429	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11428 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	11/9/1982	B1
11430	REPORT	CHINA-USSR R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	ND	B1
11431	REPORT	CHINA; JAPAN	1	11/21/1982	B1
11439	REPORT	CHINA: DENG R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	11/21/1982	B1
11448	CABLE	CHINA/USSR D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10; D UPHELD 12/27/2012 M554/1	4	11/23/1982	B1 B3
11440	PAPER	SINO-SOVIET TALKS R 12/22/2015 M554/1	15	11/24/1982	B1
11449	CABLE	080113Z DEC 82 D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10; D UPHELD 12/27/2012 M554/1	1	12/8/1982	B1 B3
11432	REPORT	SINO-SOVIET	1	4/2/1983	B1 B3
11441	PAPER	CHINESE ROLE IN STRATEGI TRIANGLE R 12/22/2015 M554/1	3	6/30/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11433	REPORT	IRAN/IRAQ; LIBYA/TUNISIA; SOUTH KOREA; SINO-SOVIET; TURKEY; SOUTH AFRICA; UK	2	8/11/1983	B1
11442	CABLE	292249Z NOV 83 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	4	11/29/1983	B1
11447	PAPER	SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	7	1/4/1984	B1
11443	REPORT	SINO-SOVIET TALKS R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	2/21/1984	B1
11444	PAPER	CHINA'S VIEW OF THE US AND THE USSR R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	3	3/27/1984	B1
11445	PAPER	USSR: NUANCES IN CHINA POLICY R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	4	4/16/1984	B1
11446	PAPER	USSR-PRC R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	5/8/1984	B1

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China

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3064

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 207977

EXDIS
E. O. 12065: RDS 1
TAGS: PDIP CH
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER FRASER

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AUSTRALIAN EMBOFF (STRICTLY PROTECT) PASSED US THE
SUBSTANCE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER FRASER
AND PRC AMBASSADOR IN CANBERRA DURING THE COURSE OF A
DINNER PREPARATORY TO FRASER'S TRIP TO BEIJING.
SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION FOLLOWS.

3. FOLLOWING THE DINNER, AMBASSADOR LIN AND FRASER
TALKED ABOUT TAIWAN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER STRESSING
THAT IN TIME THE ISSUE WAS LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED IN
CHINA'S FAVOR. HE NOTED THAT MANY POSITIONS HAD BEEN
TAKEN IN PUBLIC BUT IN FACT, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
HAD SOLD LESS WEAPONS TO TAIWAN THAN ITS PREDECESSOR.
FRASER URGED THE CHINESE TO MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR THE
PRESIDENT'S PRE-ELECTION POSITIONS AND TO TAKE THE LONG
VIEW OF THE OVERALL U. S. COMMITMENT TO A FIRM STANCE
TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION AND BUILDING UP U. S. DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES.

4. LIN APPARENTLY THEN REFERRED TO A "CAMPAIGN OF RIGHT-
WING ELEMENTS" OCCASIONED BY SECRETARY HAIG'S
RESIGNATION AND THE PRIME MINISTER URGED THAT THE
CHINESE DISREGARD THE PUBLIC COMMENTARY AND CONCENTRATE
ON RESULTS. HE REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT WHAT THE U. S.
WAS DOING NOW WAS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER WHAT THE PREVIOUS
ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN DOING AS FAR AS CHINESE
INTERESTS WERE CONCERNED.

5. THE PRECEDING INFORMATION SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE
SHARED WITH OTHERS, INCLUDING THE AUSTRALIANS. STOESEL
BT

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NLRR f06-114/10 ¹⁴11434

BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

*Sino-Soviet
releas*

PAGE 01 BELGRA 05900 01 OF 02 270850Z
ACTION EUR-00

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NSC-01 NSAE-00 PH-03 PA-01 SMS-01 SP-02 SPRS-01
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P R 270621Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 5900

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-1,2 7/26/02 (CLUNAN, J.L.) - OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, CH, UR, YO, PGOV, KN
SUBJECT: (C) RUMORED SINO-SOVIET HIGH LEVEL CONTACT AT
YUGOSLAV PARTY CONGRESS IN LATE JUNE

1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. THE COMPOSITION OF THE CCP AND
CPSU DELEGATIONS TO THE XII LCY CONGRESS (JUNE 26-29) RAISES
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SIGNIFICANT SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS
OCCURRED. (BOTH DELEGATIONS CONTAINED SENIOR OFFICIALS WITH
EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS.)
A RELIABLE YUGOSLAV SOURCE CLAIMED EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS DID
TAKE PLACE "AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL" BUT CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE
OF RESULTS. PRC DCM MAINTAINED ONLY ONE SUPERFICIAL
SOCIAL CONTACT OCCURRED AND TOOK PAINS TO CHARGE SOVIETS
WITH PRODUCING SUCH RUMORS TO FURTHER MOSCOW'S INTERESTS.
WE BELIEVE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY SERIOUS CONTACTS
TOOK PLACE. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

2. (C) CPSU AND CCP DELEGATION COMPOSITION. WE ARE
STRUCK BY THE INCLUSION IN THE CCP AND CPSU DELEGATIONS
TO THE XII CONGRESS OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS
OF YUGOSLAVIA (JUNE 26-29) OF SENIOR OFFICIALS WITH
CONSIDERABLE BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE IN SINO-SOVIET
AFFAIRS.

3. (U) SOVIET DELEGATION LEADER, V.V. KUZNETSOV,
SERVED AS SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE PRC, ACCOMPANIED KHRUSHCHEV
TO CHINA IN 1958 AND LED THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE
1969-70 BORDER TALKS IN BEIJING. KUZNETSOV'S DEPUTY, OLEG
RAKHMANNIN LIKEWISE HAS SERVED IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY
IN BEIJING; SINCE 1967 HE HAS SERVED IN THE CPSU CC DE-
PARTMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH CP'S OF "SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES." FINALLY, SINCE 1972 HE HAS BEEN DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE FREINDSHIP SOCIETY.

4. (U) THE CHINESE SENT SIMILAR EXPERTISE. CCP DELEGATION
LEADER PENG ZHEN (A FULL MEMBER OF THE CCP POLITBURO)
EXCHANGED BITTER INSULTS WITH KHRUSHCHEV AT A ROMANIAN
PARTY CONGRESS IN 1960 (BRINGING THE SINO-SOVIET
DISPUTE OUT INTO THE OPEN FOR THE FIRST TIME), ATTENDED
THE XXII CPSU CONGRESS IN 1961 AND PARTICIPATED IN THE
LAST KNOWN HIGH LEVEL CCP-CPSU DISCUSSIONS IN 1963.
ANOTHER DELEGATION MEMBER, WU XIUQUAN, HAS SERVED AS
DIRECTOR OF THE MFA DEPARTMENT ON THE USSR AND EE, WAS
IN MOSCOW FOR THE SIGNING OF THE 1950 SINO-SOVIET TREATY
AND FOR STALIN'S FUNERAL IN 1953, AND LIKEWISE PARTICIPATED
IN THE 1963 INTER-PARTY DISCUSSIONS. WU HAS WORKED

FOR MANY YEARS IN THE CCP CC DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
LIAISON. FINALLY, THE CURRENT PRC EMBASSY DCM IS AN
EXPERIENCED SOVIET HAND, HAVING SERVED AS POLITICAL COUNSELOR
IN MOSCOW FROM 1976 TO 1981.

5. (C) THE YUGOSLAV ASSESSMENT. A SENIOR GOY OFFICIAL,
WHO HAS EXCELLENT ACCESS AND HAS A SOLID RECORD OF PROVIDING
RELIABLE INFORMATION, TOLD US THAT "EXTENSIVE CONTACT"
BETWEEN THE CCP AND CPSU DELEGATIONS OCCURRED "AT THE
TECHNICAL LEVEL." BECAUSE OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE
DELEGATIONS, HE SAID THAT "IT WAS EXPECTED" THAT SERIOUS
CONTACTS WOULD TAKE PLACE--AND THEY DID. CONTINUING, HE
ASSERTED THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATIONS WAS
ITSELF A "SIGNAL" OF THEIR MUTUAL INTEREST IN TALKING AND
THAT BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THAT BELGRADE WOULD BE A "GOOD
PLACE" AND THE LCY CONGRESS A GOOD VENUE
FOR QUIET CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THEIR SPECIALISTS. THIS SOURCE
ALSO STATED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS READ THE "SIGNAL"
AND, AT THE LAST MINUTE, BEEFED UP THEIR DELEGATION,
INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND VERY SENIOR MFA
OFFICIALS, TO BETTER MONITOR ANY CCP-CPSU TALKS HERE.
THE YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
RESULTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS.

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China -
Moscow
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SECRET NOFORN

DIADIN 225-4A (AS OF: 1600 EDT 13 AUG 82)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
)
CHINA: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. (U)
)

1. (S/NOFORN) CHIEF OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT YU HONGLIANG FLEW TO MOSCOW ON 8 AUGUST FOR AN 8-DAY VISIT, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN BEIJING.
2. (S/NOFORN) WHILE IN MOSCOW, YU IS TO BE THE GUEST OF THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, BUT HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DEVOTE PART OF HIS VISIT TO MEETING SOVIET OFFICIALS. HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART, MIKHAIL KAPITSA, HAS PAID SIMILAR UNOFFICIAL VISITS TO BEIJING ON AN ANNUAL BASIS OVER THE PAST 3 YEARS AS "GUEST" OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. ACCORDING TO AN EAST GERMAN SOURCE, YU'S VISIT IS DESIGNED TO ADD A "POLITICAL COLORATION" TO A SERIES OF NONPOLITICAL SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS SINCE EARLY SPRING BETWEEN ATHLETES, SCIENTISTS, ECONOMISTS, AND SCHOLARS. THE LAST VISIT TO MOSCOW BY A HIGH-RANKING CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WAS IN OCTOBER 1979, WHEN A VICE FOREIGN MINISTER PARTICIPATED IN NORMALIZATION TALKS.
3. (S/NOFORN) THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE FOR THIS PARTICULAR VISIT IS UNDETERMINED, BUT IT LIKELY INVOLVES SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIVE THAN THE MERE ADDITION OF A POLITICAL DIMENSION TO THE MUSHROOMING NUMBER OF SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS. THERE ARE AMPLE INDICATIONS THAT BEIJING IS ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF TENSION WITH MOSCOW, WITHOUT COMPROMISING ON POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OR POINTS OF MAJOR DISAGREEMENT. THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY ELEMENTS WITHIN CHINA'S LEADERSHIP WHO BELIEVE BEIJING HAS PLACED ITSELF AT A POLITICAL DISADVANTAGE BY TILTING TOO FAR IN FAVOR OF MAJOR FREE WORLD NATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE US AND JAPAN. EVEN THE PRIME ADVOCATES OF FREE WORLD TIES MAY NOW BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS, FEARING THAT CHINA HAS CAST ASIDE TOO MANY POLITICAL OPTIONS AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, IS NOW BEING "TAKEN FOR GRANTED" BY ITS NEW FRIENDS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BEIJING IS PROBABLY ATTEMPTING TO ADOPT A MORE INDEPENDENT, NONALIGNED POSTURE IN WORLD AFFAIRS WITH A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON NATIONAL PRIDE AND SOVEREIGNTY.

(DECL OADR)
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BY RW NARA DATE 3/28/11

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CHINA

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PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIJING (MSG 1709 DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010809
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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3846
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1146
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0080

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 11709

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CH, US, PEPR
SUBJ: AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE AFTERMATH: CHINESE FOREIGN
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
REF: BEIJING 11609

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

-

THE CHINESE HAVE SIGNALLED THAT, WHILE THE SINO-AMERICAN "CRISIS" IS PAST, MAJOR NEW STEPS IN BILATERAL OR STRATEGIC COOPERATION WILL BE POSTPOHNNWGPWXTAEMYRSH) 9; SOME OPPORTUNITY TO SEE HOW THE AUGUST 17 JOINT COMMUNIQUE IS IMPLEMENTED IN PRACTICE. PRIVATELY, AS REPORTED REFTEL, CHINESE OFFICIALS ARE UPBEAT ON PROSPECTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP. PROVIDED NO SUBSTANTIAL DISPUTE OVER ARMS SALES ERUPTS IN THE NEXT MONTH OR SO, AND ASSUMING THE DENGISTS FURTHER CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION AT THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS, THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP IS LIKELY TO SUPPORT A REVIVAL OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS INCLUDING IN THE MILITARY REALM. THE NEW PHASE IN RELATIONS, HOWEVER, IS NOT LIKELY TO USHER IN A NEW HONEYMOON IN SINO-AMERICAN TIES.

3. THE AUGUST 17 SINO-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE PROVIDES THE CHINESE WITH NEW DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERABILITY WHICH BEIJING HAS ALREADY STARTED TO EXPLOIT. THE BREAKTHROUGH WITH THE AMERICANS HAS PROBABLY REINFORCED BEIJING'S INCLINATION TO INSIST ON MORE JAPANESE CONCESSIONS ON THE TEXTBOOK ISSUE. THE COMMUNIQUE GIVES THE CHINESE A STRONGER HAND IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH CHINA WILL BE VERY CAREFUL TO AVOID ANYTHING THAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE PLAYING THE SOVIETS OFF AGAINST THE AMERICANS. YU HONGLIANG'S VISIT TO MOSCOW SUGGESTS MAINTENANCE IF NOT GROWTH IN THE LIMITED, SELECTIVE, NON-POLITICAL SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS UNDERWAY SINCE LAST SPRING. YU REPORTEDLY TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT CHINA WOULD PROVIDE AN EARLY RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET UNION'S

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PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIJING MSG 1709 DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010809

FEBRUARY 3 NOTE ON RESUMPTION OF BORDER TALKS. THE CHINESE ARE ALSO MOVING TO RESUME MOMENTUM IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. IN ANY FUTURE HIGH-LEVEL SINO-AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS, THE CHINESE MAY WISH TO RESUME EXCHANGES ON STRATEGIC ISSUES, POSSIBLY INCLUDING RELAXATION OF TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER RESISTANCE. END SUMMARY. CHINA'S RHETORICAL POSTURE

4. CHINESE PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE WAKE OF THE AUGUST 17 SINO-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE DO NOT REVEAL INDICATIONS OF ANY BASIC SHIFT IN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY POSTURE. NOR DO WE EXPECT ANY SIGNIFICANT ALTERATION IN THE NEAR TERM, ALTHOUGH THE PERIOD AFTER THE UPCOMING 12TH PARTY CONGRESS COULD WITNESS IMPORTANT CHANGES IN NUANCE. ALL HIGH LEVEL CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING THOSE OF DENG XIAOPING AND HUANG HUA TO VISITING UNSG PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND THE BARBADOS FOREIGN MINISTER, POINT TO A CONTINUATION OF RHETORICAL FOREIGN POLICY THEMES WHICH HAVE EVOLVED OVER THE PAST YEAR:

(A) RENEWED EMPHASIS ON CHINA'S INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY STANCE AND HER IDENTIFICATION WITH THE THIRD WORLD; (B) CRITICISM OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FOR THEIR "HEGEMONIC" ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE THIRD WORLD, WITH THE USSR SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL ABUSE; AND

(C) UNYIELDING OPPOSITION TO SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN AND MOSCOW'S SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION IN KAMPUCHEA, ACCOMPANIED BY A SLOW, SELECTIVE, AND LIMITED EASING OF SOME BILATERAL TENSIONS WITH MOSCOW.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

5. AS REPORTED REFTEL, WHILE CHINESE OFFICIALS IN PRIVATE ARE SOMEWHAT UPBEAT IN THEIR COMMENTS ON FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, CHINESE STATEMENTS SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE GENERALLY SUGGEST THAT BEIJING IS WAITING TO SEE HOW THE ACCORD IS IMPLEMENTED IN PRACTICE BEFORE TAKING MAJOR STEPS TO REVIVE THE RELATIONSHIP. BARRING MAJOR CONTRATEMPS ON OUR ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN OVER THE NEXT MONTH OR SO, IT IS LIKELY THAT A NEW PHASE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL BE
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 BEIJING 11709

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USHERED IN. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT EVEN IN THE BEST CONDITIONS THE ATMOSPHERE WILL BE AS WARM AS DURING THE POST-NORMALIZATION HONEYMOON IN 1979, BUT NEITHER WILL IT BE AS TENSE POLITICALLY AS IN RECENT MONTHS (BUT WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT EVEN DURING THIS TENSE POLITICAL PERIOD, MOST BILATERAL PROGRAMS -- ECONOMIC, TRADE, AND EXCHANGES -- HAVE CONTINUED LARGELY UNIMPAIRED). A FAVORABLE TREND WOULD BE REINFORCED IF DENG EMERGES FROM THE UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESS IN A STRENGTHENED POSITION, THE DIFFERENCES OVER THE JAPANESE TEXTBOOK ISSUE ARE RESOLVED, AND CHINA'S OPENING TO THE WEST IS CONTINUED, IF NOT BROADENED. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS WILL REMAIN THE PRINCIPAL UNDERPINNING OF THE RELATIONSHIP. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAN XU'S RECENT COMMENTS TO VISITING MIT PROFESSOR WILLIAM GRIFFITH UNDERSCORED THIS POINT. HAN READ OFF A STATEMENT STRESSING THE GENERAL THEME OF SOVIET HEGEMONISM. HE SAID THAT, WHILE CHINA AND THE U. S. DIFFER ON SOME THIRD WORLD ISSUES, THEY HAVE SIMILAR VIEWS ON DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS IN THIRD WORLD AREAS. HE CITED OUR PARALLEL POLICIES ON AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA TO SUPPORT HIS POINT.
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

6. WHILE CHINA HAS INDICATED ITS INTENTION TO "WAIT AND WATCH" U. S. ACTIONS ON COMMUNIQUE IMPLEMENTATION, WE WOULD EXPECT BEIJING TO MOVE SOON TO EXPLOIT THE NEW DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERABILITY IT HAS GAINED BY THE BREAKTHROUGH IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THE MOST IMMEDIATE EFFECT COULD BE FELT IN SINO-JAPANESE AFFAIRS. WITH THE SINO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT IN ITS POCKET, BEIJING MAY HOPE THAT THE JAPANESE ARE ANXIOUS TO MAKE AMENDS SO AS NOT TO BE LEFT BEHIND. THUS, AS SUGGESTED BY THE NEGATIVE CHINESE REACTION TO THE AUGUST 26 JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR COMPROMISING THE TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY, WE WOULD EXPECT THE CHINESE TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON TOKYO AND EVEN TO ACCELERATE IT, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF WRINGING A MORE FAVORABLE MODUS VIVENDI OUT OF THE JAPANESE BEFORE THE SUZUKI VISIT (9/26-10/1) TAKES PLACE. MOREOVER, WE CAN SPECULATE THAT THE TOUGH PRC POSITION ON JAPAN IS AT LEAST IN PART MOTIVATED BY A

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NEED OF PRC LEADERS TO SHOW THEIR OWN COLLEAGUES THAT THEY CAN BE TOUGH ON ONE ISSUE OF FOREIGN POLICY, SO AS TO DAMP DOWN CRITICISM THAT THEY HAVE BEEN TOO SOFT IN THEIR COMPROMISE WITH THE U. S. IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON TAIWAN.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

7. SINO-SOVIET AFFAIRS IS ANOTHER AREA WHICH COULD WITNESS SOME NEW CHINESE MOVEMENT, EVEN THOUGH IT WILL LIKELY AMOUNT MORE TO ADJUSTING SOME OF THE OUTER FRINGES OF BILATERAL TIES RATHER THAN ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONSHIP. WHILE THE SINO-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE ALSO GIVES THE CHINESE A STRONGER HAND IN DEALING WITH MOSCOW, THE CHINESE WILL BE VERY CAREFUL TO AVOID ANYTHING THAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE PLAYING THE SOVIETS OFF AGAINST THE AMERICANS. FURTHER, THE CHINESE WILL BE WARY OF PROJECTING THE IMPRESSION OF LOWERING THE GLOBAL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS, SINCE THIS COULD INVITE OTHERS TO TAKE SIMILAR STEPS -- THE U. S. AND WESTERN EUROPE ON THE WESTERN FRONT, JAPAN ON THE USSR'S EASTERN FLANK, PAKISTAN VIS-A-VIS AFGHANISTAN, AND THE ASEAN STATES WITH VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE THIRD WORLD DIPLOMATIC SOURCE HERE, WHOSE COMMENTS WERE BASED ON CONVERSATIONS BY SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS WITH HIS EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, IN THEIR RECENT MOSCOW TALKS WITH VISITING CHINESE MFA SOVIET SPECIALIST YU HONGLIANG, SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS KAPITSA AND ILICHEV URGED THAT CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION IGNORE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND CONCENTRATE THEIR ENERGIES ON REMOVING OBSTACLES IN SIN -SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. YU RESPONDED BY REPEATING THE STANDARD CHINESE POSITION ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: NO IMPROVEMENT IS POSSIBLE UNLESS THE SOVIETS ABANDON THEIR POLICY OF HEGEMONISM GENERALLY, AND, SPECIFICALLY, PULL OUT OF AFGHANISTAN, CEASE ASSISTING VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AND SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN MONGOLIA.

8. BEIJING'S CONTINUING ANTI-SOVIET POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING AROUND THE WORLD AND ONGOING PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST MOSCOW DO NOT, HOWEVER, RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER, CAUTIOUS WIDENING OF NON-POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND AT SOME POINT THIS YEAR OR NEXT, ACQUIESCENCE IN SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR RESUMED BILATERAL BORDER TALKS. THESE STEPS, WHILE MINOR IN RELATION TO THE ENORMOUS DIFFER-

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ENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNIST GIANTS, WOULD REINFORCE CHINA'S MANEUVERABILITY BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, MAGNIFY HER SELF-GENERATED IMAGE AS AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR ON THE WORLD STAGE, LESSEN THE IMMEDIATE MILITARY THREAT TO CHINA FROM THE NORTH, AND PERMIT MORE CONCENTRATION ON CHINA'S PRIORITY LONG-TERM GOAL OF ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION. WE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER EXPECT THE CHINESE TO GO BEYOND THESE LIMITED STEPS OVER THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (I.E. THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO RESUMPTION OF NORMALIZATION TALKS) UNLESS MOSCOW DECIDED TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION OR UNDERTOOK A MAJOR POLICY CHANGE IN AN AREA OF VITAL CONCERN TO CHINA, SUCH AS THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN MONGOLIA, INDOCHINA, AND AFGHANISTAN.

EXDIS
9. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, YU HONGLIANG DEBATED THESE ISSUES AT LENGTH IN HIS MOSCOW TALKS WITH ILICHEV AND KAPITSA (THE SECOND SESSION WITH KAPITSA REPORTEDLY LASTED THREE AND A HALF HOURS). THE SOVIET PRESSED FOR A CHINESE ANSWER TO MOSCOW'S FEBRUARY 3 NOTE ANNOUNCING SOVIET READINESS FOR BORDER TALKS AND CALLED FOR STEPPED-UP SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS. YU POINTED TO THE EXCHANGES OF VISITS BY SCHOLARS AND TECHNICIANS ALREADY AGREED TO, INCLUDING SOME SOVIET PHYSICISTS ATTENDING A PHYSICS CONFERENCE IN CHINA AND A CHINESE METALLURGICAL TEAM GOING TO THE USSR. HE REMARKED THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SUCH CONTACTS. HE ALSO TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR FEBRUARY 3 NOTE WAS RECEIVING HIGH LEVEL CHINESE ATTENTION AND THAT BEIJING WOULD SOON RESPOND TO IT.
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

EXDIS
10. WHILE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE COMMUNIQUE, THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS THAT THE CHINESE IN RECENT DAYS HAVE MOVED TO RESTORE MOMENTUM IN THE SINO-INDIAN NORMALIZATION PROCESS. AN INDIAN EMBASSY SOURCE HERE (STRICTLY PROTECT) TOLD US THAT EARLY LAST WEEK THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN DELHI FORMALLY PROPOSED TO THE INDIAN MFA THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF SINO-INDIAN TALKS TAKE PLACE IN BEIJING IN DECEMBER. OUR SOURCE STATED THAT, IF THE

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TALKS GO WELL, THERE WOULD BE A GOOD CHANCE FOR A "HIGH LEVEL VISIT" (PRESUMABLY MRS. GANDHI OR A SENIOR CHINESE LEADER) TAKING PLACE NEXT YEAR.

EXDIS

11. ONGOING CHINESE EFFORTS TO ATTRACT THE DALAI LAMA BACK TO TIBET IS ALSO PARTLY AIMED AT EASING THE STRAINS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. THE SAME INDIAN SOURCE SAID THAT AN OFFICIAL FROM YANG JINGREN'S CPC UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT TRAVELLED SECRETLY TO NEW DELHI LAST MONTH TO HOLD TALKS WITH THURTEN NAMGYAL JURCHEN, THE CHIEF SPOKESMAN FOR THE TIBETAN NEGOTIATING TEAM IN THEIR TALKS WITH YANG IN BEIJING EARLIER THIS YEAR. THE EMISSARY CARRIED A LETTER FROM CPC CHAIRMAN HU YAOBANG INVITING THE DALAI LAMA TO RETURN AND CONFIRMING THAT ALL SECULAR TITLES HE PREVIOUSLY POSSESSED WOULD BE RESTORED. DURING THE DALAI LAMA'S RECENT VISIT TO MALAYSIA, THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN KUALA LUMPUR HELD FURTHER TALKS WITH A MEMBER OF THE DALAI LAMA'S STAFF. WHILE NEITHER WE NOR OUR INDIAN SOURCE ARE AWARE OF THE OUTCOME OF THESE EXCHANGES, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT CONTINUING CHINESE OVERTURES COULD EVENTUALLY BEAR FRUIT, POSSIBLY LEADING TO A VISIT TO TIBET BY THE DALAI LAMA THIS YEAR OR NEXT TO TEST THE WATERS REGARDING A RETURN TO RESIDE ON A MORE PERMANENT BASIS.
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

EXDIS

12. THE AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE STRENGTHENS THE BASIS FOR CHINA'S POLICY OF SEEKING COMMON GROUND AND NARROWING DIFFERENCES WITH ASEAN. THE COMMUNIQUE RESTORES THE U. S. POSITION OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH BEIJING AND ASEAN CAPITALS, AND ENHANCES THE POSSIBILITY OF SINO-AMERICAN-ASEAN COOPERATION AGAINST HANOI'S OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA. BEIJING NO DOUBT SEES BETTER PROSPECTS FOR MAXIMIZING SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK AND THE DKCG AT THE UPCOMING UNGA SESSION. IT MAY USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ENCOURAGE OTHERS, INCLUDING THE U. S., TO GIVE MORE

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ASSISTANCE TO THE KAMPUCHEAN RESISTANCE. ANOTHER AREA FOR POSSIBLE CHINESE MOVEMENT IS KOREA, A SUBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN ON THE BACK BURNER AS SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS HAVE BECOME TENSE OVER THE PAST YEAR OR SO. STEPS THE U. S. AND CHINA COULD TAKE TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA WAS A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION DURING ZHANG WENJIN'S STRATEGIC TALKS IN WASHINGTON IN 1980. BEIJING MAY BE PREPARED FOR RENEWED EXCHANGES IN THIS AREA DURING ANY
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SECRET SECTION 04 OF 04 BEIJING 11709

EXDIS
HIGH-LEVEL SINO-AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS THAT MAY TAKE PLACE. FOR THEIR PART, WE CAN EXPECT THE CHINESE TO FOLLOW-UP THE COMMUNIQUE BY USING OUR CONSULTATIONS TO PRESS THE U. S. TO GIVE MORE ATTENTION TO THIRD WORLD CONCERNS, TO APPLY MORE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA IN PROMOTING SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN AND NAMIBIAN PROBLEMS, TO AVOID "OVER-REACTING" TO CUBAN AND SOVIET PROVOCATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, AND TO SUPPORT GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. HUMMEL
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3. USSR-CHINA: NO EARLY BREAKTHROUGH, BUT SOVIETS HAVE HOPES

Recent Soviet statements indicate no expectation of an early improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, Soviet observers are now putting a more positive gloss on Chinese internal developments than was the case in the past. Many even profess to see reason to hope that Beijing will eventually adopt a foreign policy more favorable to the USSR.

* * *

The most pessimistic of the recent rash of assessments appeared in the current issue of the Soviet party journal Kommunist under a pseudonym for the party's top China expert. The article harshly denounced Beijing's "direct collusion with imperialist reactionaries" and claimed the "heritage of Maoism" continues to dominate Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Although the writer contends that Sino-Soviet relations are unlikely to improve any time soon, he does point out the possibility of future Sino-American differences and he notes Brezhnev's observation at the April Party Congress that domestic changes underway in China might lead in time to a less antagonistic Chinese posture toward the Soviet Union.

Other Soviet comments echo condemnation of China's present course, but several are more optimistic about the future:

- Mikhail Kapitsa, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's foremost expert on China, told Indian and Canadian diplomats in April that he expected Beijing eventually to adopt a "multi-polar" foreign policy, perhaps after China gets what it wants from the West.
- The Soviet DCM in Beijing told US diplomats that Kapitsa's visit to China in April was more successful than his trip last year; although there was no substantive progress, the atmosphere was more positive. The Soviet diplomat also claimed he saw evidence in the Chinese press of an ongoing debate over Sino-Soviet relations. This debate suggested to him that Beijing was reconsidering its hostile stance toward the USSR.
- Alexander Bovin, senior Izvestiya political commentator, told Japanese journalists in late April that he expected Sino-Soviet relations to be "normalized" by the late 1980's. He claimed that domestic changes in China reflected a "return to good sense" and that these changes would be reflected in Chinese foreign policy.

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TAGS: UR, CH, PEPR, PBOB
SUBJECT: SINO-SOVIET TALKS CONTINUE.
REF: BEIJING 14566 (COTAL)

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A RELIABLE THIRD WORLD SOURCE WHOSE COUNTRY HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT -- CONTRARY TO EARLIER INDICATIONS -- THE SINO-SOVIET TALKS ARE CONTINUING HERE. THE TALKS WERE BROKEN OFF OCTOBER 20 AFTER APPARENTLY HITTING AN IMPASSE (REFTEL) WITH THE SOVIETS, AS IN THE 1979 OCTOBER-NOVEMBER MOSCOW NORMALIZATION TALKS, PRESSING FOR NEGOTIATION OF A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES BEFORE ADDRESSING SPECIFICS AND THE CHINESE INSISTING ON GOING DIRECTLY TO THE CONCRETE ISSUES. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, QIAN QICHEN AND IL'ICHEV CONTINUED INFORMAL EXCHANGES DURING THE OCTOBER 22-24 EXCURSION TO XI'AN. THE TALKS HAVE RESUMED FOLLOWING THEIR RETURN TO BEIJING AND THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS EXPECTED TO DEPART ON OCTOBER 29. OUR SOURCE SPECULATED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET TALKS WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR IN MOSCOW.

3. OUR SOURCE CITED A ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT AS TELLING HIM THAT THE CHINESE HAVE TOLD THE ROMANIANS THEY HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE OFFERING SOME SORT OF PROPOSAL ON TROOP REDUCTIONS ALONG SINO-MONGOLIAN OR SINO-SOVIET BORDER AREAS. THE ROMANIAN QUOTED THE CHINESE AS COMMENTING THAT CHINA DOES NOT EXCLUDE RECEIVING SOME POSITIVE RESULTS IN THIS AREA, AND KNOWS THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT FOR MOVEMENT ON THE AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEAN ISSUES.

4. THE ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT'S COMMENTS COINCIDE WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY DENG XIAOPING IN HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS ON THE SINO-SOVIET TALKS WITH FRG PRESIDENT CARSTENS. ACCORDING TO FRG EMBASSY NOTES RECORDED DURING THE SESSION, DENG STATED THAT, "THE AIM OF THE CHINESE SIDE IS TO REDUCE THE THREAT TO CHINA." DENG THEN WENT ON TO REMARK THAT, "IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SOLVE ALL OF OUR PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT PROGRESS ON ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE BASIC ISSUES IS A PRECONDITION FOR CONTINUING THE TALKS."

5. ACCORDING TO THE ROMANIAN, DURING AN EXCHANGE ON INDOCHINA, QIAN ASKED THAT THE SOVIETS INTERVENE WITH VIETNAM AND REQUEST HANOI TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA. QIAN STATED THAT THIS STEP WOULD PROVE ADVANTAGEOUS TO BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE VIETNAMESE. IL'ICHEV RESPONDED BY RESTATING THE STANDARD SOVIET POSITION ON KAMPUCHEA.

6. COMMENT. THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS AFTER THE EXCURSION TO XI'AN IS INTRIGUING. PAST PRACTICE HERE, FOR INSTANCE DURING THE BORDER TALKS IN BEIJING IN 1977 AND 1978, INCLUDED AN EXCURSION ONLY AFTER THE ROUND OF TALKS WAS COMPLETED. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD THEN FLY BACK TO MOSCOW. WE WOULD ADD, HOWEVER, THAT ONE YUGOSLAV DIPLOMAT HAD TOLD US DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE CURRENT TALKS THAT THEY WOULD LAST UNTIL NOVEMBER 6. HUMMEL
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NLRR Feb 11/10 #11437

BY AL NARA DATE 1/2/08

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~~Sino-Sov.~~
China 11/6/82

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - NOVEMBER 6, 1982

14

1. SINO-SOVIET TALKS: BEIJING'S PERSPECTIVE

In its approach to the October Sino-Soviet talks, China has sought to keep the process alive, prod the Soviets to make concessions, and reassure other governments as well as China's domestic audience that no fundamental change is imminent.

* * *

Chinese leaders have expressed approval of the first round of talks. While demonstrating flexibility, they have also stressed that major improvements are contingent on a reversal of what they view as a Soviet strategy of weakening China.

Deng Xiaoping told a Japanese visitor that the distance between the parties was "beyond measure," but the talks were worthwhile and that China would agree to "100 meetings" if necessary. Deng's comments indicate that China, for the first time, will accept movement on one or two of the major issues rather than demanding full-scale resolution. The primary Chinese aim reportedly is to lessen Soviet support for Vietnam. They have told Thai officials that they proposed linking staged Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea with steps to normalize both Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Believing that Moscow primarily wants the appearance of improved relations, the Chinese have withheld highly visible improvements, in the hope of gaining Soviet concessions with respect to "containment" policies on China's periphery. For example, Beijing has stressed that these talks, unlike those held in 1979, are "private consultations," not formal negotiations to improve relations. Despite China's evident interest in upgrading cultural and economic contacts, Beijing has not yet entered into any new agreements. Indeed, it seems to have dismissed Moscow's revival of earlier Soviet offers for a general statement of mutual peaceful intentions as mere rhetoric.

It appears that the next round will address cosmetic "gestures" underscoring mutual peaceful intentions. The Chinese apparently were disarmed by the Soviet willingness to discuss a mutual pullback of forces along the border. Such an agreement would appear to meet past Chinese demands that both sides withdraw from "disputed" territories. But Beijing would want to portray a pullback as an admission by Moscow that the Soviet Union has illegally occupied Chinese territory rather than as "proof" that the Soviets do not pose a threat to China.

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2. SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZATION: MOSCOW WEIGHS THE OPTIONS

Moscow would prefer to improve Sino-Soviet relationships by expanding bilateral ties, while relegating basic differences to the background. Chinese resistance, however, and Moscow's interest in directing its resources against the US, may prompt the Soviets to be more accommodating. The least costly step might be to relax tensions along the Sino-Soviet border.

* * *

Brezhnev's endorsement last September of a "gradual" improvement of relations on the basis of "common sense, mutual respect, and mutual advantage" has set the tone for the Soviet negotiating position during the first round of normalization talks. The pragmatic tenor no doubt reflects Moscow's view that its more comprehensive approaches in 1979 had stymied normalization efforts. In any event, the Soviet delegation reportedly came to Beijing with a memorandum containing a number of proposals for economic and cultural cooperation.

Chinese sources state that the Soviets also resurrected their earlier proposal for an agreement on principles to guide Sino-Soviet relations. Moscow presumably raised this issue as a counter to China's call for a major shift in Soviet policies toward Vietnam and Afghanistan and for a reduction of Soviet military forces in Mongolia and Siberia. The Soviets, however, apparently do not expect the Chinese to accept the proposal.

Nonetheless, recent Soviet commentary aimed at domestic audiences pointed out the need for flexibility toward China. This suggests that Moscow may be looking for a way to accommodate Beijing's major concerns. Measures to reduce friction along the Sino-Soviet border would seem to offer the best prospect for forward movement.

Moscow reportedly agreed to discuss mutual troop reductions during the Beijing consultations (last March Brezhnev proposed resumption of border talks and agreement on bilateral confidence-building measures). One possible compromise might well be a formal demilitarization of the disputed islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers. If accomplished under the rubric of confidence-building measures, such a step would also breathe some life into the moribund multilateral Asian confidence-building measures scheme proposed by Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress in March 1981.

3. SINO-SOVIET TALKS: EFFECT ON MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS

Substantial military reductions along the Soviet-Chinese border are unlikely now, even if Moscow and Beijing agree on other measures to improve relations. Soviet deployments in the Far East are directed against perceived US and Japanese threats as well as against China. Moscow may agree to a pullback once a new rail link to the Far East is completed, but such an accord would not affect the overall size of Soviet forces in the Far East.

* * *

The Soviets have been augmenting their forces in the Far East since the mid-1960s. The buildup was motivated initially by the emergence of China as a major rival and later by Moscow's fear that China's rapprochement with the US and Japan might result in a US-Chinese-Japanese alliance. Meanwhile, the Chinese have made only limited improvements to their forces.

As a consequence, the USSR now has a clear superiority over China along the border. Moscow has about 435,000 troops in the Far East, and it could call on another 75,000 KGB border guards for operations in the area. Beijing has about 1.7 million troops opposite the USSR and Mongolia, but these forces have much less firepower and only limited offensive capabilities.

Beijing has demanded that Moscow discuss a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the border and a pullout of Soviet forces from Mongolia. Because the large Soviet presence along the border is needed to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway, neither of these issues is likely to be resolved soon. The Soviets, however, may agree to a cosmetic reduction in the disputed border areas (see map). By the late 1980s, when the Soviets complete the Baikal-Amur Mainline railway, Moscow will have a new rail link to the Far East that is farther from the border. The Soviets may then be more disposed to pull back some forces.

We doubt that a Chinese pullback of forces from the border would be an important Soviet objective. China's main force units are already 100-200 miles away from the frontier in strong defensive positions. Instead, the Soviets hope to limit Chinese military modernization by discouraging the export of Western technology to Beijing.

Better relations between Moscow and Beijing may reduce the Soviet buildup, but Moscow will continue to add more modern ships and Backfire bombers to the Pacific Fleet to counter a perceived threat from the US. Moscow will also continue to improve its ground forces to enhance Soviet territorial security and to prevent China from taking advantage of any Soviet involvement in a war with NATO.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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November 9, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Relations

I am struck by the extraordinarily warm telegram of greetings sent by the Chinese leadership to Moscow on the anniversary of the revolution. It reads:

"On behalf of the Chinese people, we send the Soviet people warm congratulations and the best wishes on the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. A lengthy friendship exists between the peoples of China and the USSR. Relations between China and the USSR were friendly for a long period of time. The Chinese side is genuinely striving to remove all obstacles which stand in the way of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations and is striving to put relations between the two countries onto the path of healthy development. This is in the basic interests of the peoples of China and the USSR, and in the interests of peace in Asia and in the whole world. We wish the Soviet people happiness."

[Emphasis added.]

I believe nothing so conciliatory in tone has been sent by Beijing to Moscow since the 1960s: it may indicate that China is more eager for a rapprochement than its leaders tell us.

cc: Gaston Sigur

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NLRR Feb-114/10 # 11428

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**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 700

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Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>		<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

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COMMENTS

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November 9, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Relations

I am struck by the extraordinarily warm telegram of greetings sent by the Chinese leadership to Moscow on the anniversary of the revolution. It reads:

"On behalf of the Chinese people, we send the Soviet people warm congratulations and the best wishes on the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. A lengthy friendship exists between the peoples of China and the USSR. Relations between China and the USSR were friendly for a long period of time. The Chinese side is genuinely striving to remove all obstacles which stand in the way of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations and is striving to put relations between the two countries onto the path of healthy development. This is in the basic interests of the peoples of China and the USSR, and in the interests of peace in Asia and in the whole world. We wish the Soviet people happiness."

[Emphasis added.]

I believe nothing so conciliatory in tone has been sent by Beijing to Moscow since the 1960s: it may indicate that China is more eager for a rapprochement than its leaders tell us.

cc: Gaston Sigur

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NLRR 606-114/10 #11428

BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

PAGE 3

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CELEBRATION OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, CHINA HAS MADE SEVERAL GESTURES WHICH MAY SIGNAL A RESPONSIVENESS TO ONGOING SOVIET OVERTURES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. FIRST, RADIO PEKING IN RUSSIAN BROADCAST THE TEXT OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WHICH IS REPORTED BY AFP TO HAVE APPEARED IN YESTERDAY'S PRAVDA. THE TELEGRAM IS ESPECIALLY WARM IN TONE. AS REPORTED BY RADIO PEKING, IT READS: "ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE, WE SENT THE SOVIET PEOPLE WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND THE BEST WISHES ON THE 65TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION. A LENGTHY FRIENDSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE USSR. RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR WERE FRIENDLY FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THE CHINESE SIDE IS GENUINELY STRIVING TO REMOVE ALL OBSTACLES WHICH STAND IN THE WAY OF NORMALIZING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND IS STRIVING TO PUT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ONTO THE PATH OF HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THIS IS IN THE BASIC INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE USSR, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE IN ASIA AND IN THE WHOLE WORLD. WE WISH THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAPPINESS."

YET ANOTHER GESTURE BY PEKING TOWARD MOSCOW IS TO BE SEEN IN THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, YANG SHOUZHENG, IS REPORTED BY UPI TO HAVE ATTENDED THE REVOLUTION DAY PARADE IN RED SQUARE "FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT MEMORY." FURTHER, AS MONITORED IN MUNICH, CHINESE RADIO BROADCASTS TO THE SOVIET UNION ON NOVEMBER 7 CARRIED AT LEAST TWO ACCOUNTS OF HOW WARMLY RECENT CHINESE VISITORS TO THE USSR HAVE BEEN TREATED. THESE BROADCASTS ALSO INCLUDED A LENGTHY SPEECH BY

A CHINESE OFFICIAL FROM THE SOCIETY OF SINO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP IN PEKING FULL OF RATHER EFFUSIVE PRAISE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE USSR SINCE THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION. WITH EFFORT, THE OFFICIAL SAYS, FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES "WILL STRENGTHEN AND DEVELOP."

END MSG-F

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 NLRR 106-114/10 #11430
 BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - NOVEMBER 21, 1982

1. CHINA: DENG MOVING ON MILITARY AND PROVINCIAL REORGANIZATION

Since the 12th Party Congress last September, the Dengist leadership has quickened the pace of reformist appointments to key military and provincial positions. Opposition to reform policies in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) appears to have weakened, and efforts to streamline provincial bureaucracies have begun. The reformists are taking advantage of the favorable political climate to pursue their personnel changes.

* * *

The initial results of the 12th Party Congress suggested that Deng made only limited progress in purging the military opposition to his reformist policies. It now appears, however, that Deng may have strengthened his control over key parts of the PLA. The Congress named a close associate of Deng's as Executive Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. Three more Deng supporters have assumed positions as Deputy Secretaries-General of the Commission.

These changes, combined with the recent replacement of conservative Wei Guoqing as head of the PLA's General Political Department, have allowed Deng to begin his military reorganization. Moreover, in view of the accession of Zhang Aiping to the Defense Ministry, Deng also may be able to accelerate modernization of the PLA. In late October and early November, four new commanders and four new political commissars were announced for eight of China's 11 military regions, and other changes are expected to follow.

A similar reshuffling has been underway at the provincial level. Two provinces have received new governors and another is reportedly slated to change. In addition, the replacement of First Party Secretaries in at least seven of the 29 provinces and municipalities is expected soon. Several new provincial appointees are personal associates of Hu Yaobang, Deng's designated heir, who is displaying more confidence and authority. Finally, Deng is making progress in streamlining provincial bureaucracies by reducing staff and appointing younger, better trained officers to key jobs. Media commentary is emphasizing that opponents of current policies and officials guilty of corruption must be removed, and trials of "Gang of Four" followers have resumed.

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CHINA

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(U) SINO-SOVIET TALKS: SETTING AND CHRONOLOGY

Note: This paper repeats the full text of INR Report 502-CA and appends a limited-distribution chronology for the period February 1981-September 1982.

(C/NF) Summary

Moscow and Beijing over the past several months have been exploring the possibilities for limited accommodation. Agreement was reached in early September to begin "exploratory" talks in Beijing on October 5. The first round was concluded on October 21, and a second will be held in Moscow early next year.

Moscow's willingness to resume talks reflected its hope of capitalizing on Sino-US differences. Beijing's interest stemmed, in part, from its uncertainty regarding Sino-US relations and from a desire for more flexibility in dealing with Washington. But Beijing responded positively to Soviet overtures only after the signing of the Sino-US communique had eased the crisis over arms sales to Taiwan.

The difficulties that Moscow and Beijing have experienced in their relations with the West, combined with pressing domestic problems, provide a confluence of interest in exploring ways to regularize the relationship and open the door to gradual improvement. As the talks began, the Chinese were looking for signs of change in Soviet Asian policies, especially with respect to Vietnam. The Soviets hope to reduce tensions but are not prepared to sacrifice major interests in South and Southeast Asia and in Mongolia. Although both sides have seemed pessimistic about the chances for rapid progress, more regular contact between officials and expanded cultural and economic ties seem likely.

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Report 503-CA
November 24, 1982

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NLR # M554 # 1144D
BY RWJ NARA DATE 12/22/15

(C/NF) Barriers to Improvement of Relations

There are major constraints on the ability of both China and the USSR to make even minor concessions, e.g., a Chinese reduction or deferral of longstanding demands for changes in Soviet policy on China's periphery or Soviet adjustment of the disposition of border troops. Constraints center on wide-ranging conflicts of interest in third-party relations. These are compounded by the lack of trust developed over the years and the problems of building a domestic consensus behind efforts to improve relations.

For Moscow, even limited gestures toward China have costs. Hanoi has been disturbed by the shift in the tenor of Soviet treatment of China. The Soviets also appear concerned that better ties with the PRC might increase Beijing's influence with East European and other communist and socialist parties.

Beijing will be trying to gain flexibility vis-a-vis both superpowers while minimizing their ability to use China as a pawn. Chinese leaders, Deng Xiaoping in particular, will be most concerned about managing the impact of Sino-Soviet contacts on relations with the West. These relations continue to have high priority for China's security and development and for eventually regaining Taiwan and Hong Kong. Beijing's caution has been evident in its efforts to play down contacts with the Soviets; officials stress that the current talks are a notch below the formal negotiations of 1979.

Nevertheless, in moving toward talks with Moscow, Deng has given ground to other Chinese officials, including some of his own reformers, who favor a less strident anti-Soviet stance. These leaders doubt US strength and reliability as a strategic and economic partner. In the past, Deng has countered such opposition with the argument that Moscow would never ease its pressure against China and would interpret a conciliatory approach as a sign of weakness, and that a strong Western connection was not only possible but China's only long-term guarantee. So far, he could claim that events (particularly Afghanistan) have tended to support him.

(C/NF) What Does Moscow Want?

By pressing on with the current talks, the USSR is primarily interested in exploiting strains in Sino-US relations to discourage

political and military cooperation between China and the US. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy have emphasized Sino-US differences and, by recalling common Sino-Soviet socialist tradition, have sought to play to elements in China that oppose Deng's opening to the West.

Moscow's decision to give greater prominence to its China policy was manifested in Brezhnev's speeches in Tashkent last March, in Baku in September, and to a Kremlin meeting of senior military officers on October 27. His comments reflected an anticipation of increased Chinese receptivity, based in part on internal Chinese developments, and also placed Soviet overtures toward China in the context of worsening USSR-US relations.

The Soviets are likely to counter Chinese demands for major changes in Soviet foreign policy by pressing for high-profile statements of mutual intent. They will in particular try to bring about new formal exchange agreements. Moscow believes that such contacts would give it leverage with the West and would seem to testify to its benign intentions toward China without changing anything in the strategic-military balance, which weighs heavily in Moscow's favor. (Indeed, the Soviets have continued the steady upgrading of their forces facing China.) If these tactics do not maintain the momentum, Moscow might also consider a token gesture regarding troops on the Sino-Soviet border.

(C/NF) What Does Beijing Want?

Beijing's decision to talk with Moscow reflects Chinese uneasiness about the future of Sino-US cooperation and its implications for China's strategic situation. But it is also part of a larger effort, first evident in 1979, to stabilize relations with all states on China's periphery. This effort is likely to characterize the coming period of succession politics.

As General Secretary Hu Yaobang indicated at the 12th Party Congress, China wants to encourage Soviet willingness to reduce the military threats along its border and in Mongolia and Afghanistan, as well as reduce Soviet support of Hanoi. Beijing has not been able to narrow the gap between its military capabilities and those of Moscow, although improvements in China's international position and its caution in dealing with Moscow have made justification of the direct use of force more difficult for the Soviets.

Beijing's offer to resume talks does not seem to reflect a change in China's assessment of the Soviet threat. Beijing probably is reopening communications as one more in a series of steps,

characteristic of Chinese foreign policy under Zhou Enlai, to "buy time" to build a stronger domestic and international position from which to deal with Moscow and its allies. As such, the offer to talk appears to stem from a renewed Chinese appreciation of the difficulties--including problems in Sino-US relations--in reaching that goal, as well as the risks of Deng's more confrontationalist policy.

The current approach to Moscow is consistent with past patterns. From 1969 (after the Sino-Soviet border clashes) to 1978, Beijing used annual border talks with Moscow to keep relations stable while Sino-US detente proceeded. In 1975, Beijing's release of a captured Soviet helicopter crew removed an important irritant at a time of stalemate in Sino-US relations and domestic crisis in China. In 1979, after Sino-US normalization and China's attack on Vietnam, Beijing broke off the cycle of border talks but offered wide-ranging political discussions with both Moscow and Hanoi to ease tension. (Beijing put these off indefinitely after the Afghanistan invasion, however.)

Beijing has laid even more careful groundwork for its current move. It has allowed nonpolitical contacts to increase for the past year or so, especially since early 1982 when Beijing's public rhetoric also began to reflect greater balance in its treatment of the US and USSR.

Even if little progress is made, talks could serve China's objective of undermining Hanoi's confidence in Moscow's support and thus induce Vietnamese caution in the region. China also may hope that talks will provide it more flexibility in dealing with the US. They serve as a reminder of China's geopolitical importance and also suggest that Beijing can handle its problems with or without Washington. A more balanced approach to the superpowers strengthens China's socialist and Third World credentials by providing evidence of its independence of Washington.

Prepared by Carol Hamrin; Frank Crump
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Chronology of Sino-Soviet Relations:
February 1981-September 1982

1981

February 23. (LOU) In his report to the 26th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev spoke positively of "changes taking place in China's domestic policies" but saw no improvement in foreign policies. He said the USSR wanted ties with China on a "good neighborly basis" and repeated earlier Soviet proposals aimed at normalizing relations. His language was considerably more positive than that used at the 25th Congress in 1976.

March. (U) The Soviet Embassy in Beijing presented Brezhnev's proposal for Far East confidence-building measures (CBMs) to the Chinese Foreign Ministry (according to Moscow radio, March 2, 1982).

April. (C) The first authoritative exposition of Soviet views of China in more than a year, under the pseudonym O. Borisov, appeared in Kommunist. The author was the first deputy chief of the Central Committee Department of Liaison with Foreign Communist Parties, Oleg Rakhmanin. The article expressed concern over increasing US-Chinese military cooperation and China's internal developments.

April 17-24 (approx.) (C) Mikhail Kapitsa, chief of the Second Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, visited Beijing. He described his reception as slightly warmer than in 1980. Kapitsa proposed, inter alia, resumption of Sino-Soviet normalization talks, which the Chinese rejected; and he discussed Brezhnev's CBM proposals, on which the Chinese remained noncommittal.

April 20-28. (C) The Soviet-Chinese Bilateral Border Railway Commission met (according to Soviet sources, for the first time in 10 years) in Khabarovsk and signed a protocol; details unspecified.

June 14-16. (U) US Secretary of State Haig visited Beijing. Soviet reporting emphasized threat of Sino-American military cooperation.

June 16. (C) Moscow and Beijing signed 1981 bilateral trade agreement. The anticipated combined trade total of just over 400 million Swiss francs was the lowest in several years. Chinese

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1981 (cont'd)

sources claimed that economic priorities reduced the demand for Soviet machinery and that Moscow was unwilling to provide raw materials in desired quantities.

June 16. (C) President Reagan reaffirmed US commitments to Taiwan. Chinese report summing up the Haig visit indirectly criticized the President's remarks.

June 17. (C) Comprehensive and authoritative review of China's position on outstanding border issues published in Renmin Rebao--the first such detailed discussion to appear in official Chinese party organs. The article, by the deputy to the 1979 political talks, Li Huichuan, reiterated basic Chinese conditions for settlement of the problem.

Late June. (LOU) The 6th Chinese Communist Party Plenum reaffirmed the important role of Mao's thought and the correctness of his foreign policies (i.e., a continuing anti-Soviet focus and opening to the West). But it was ambiguous with regard to the rationale for the Sino-Soviet split and made no reference to Soviet revisionism.

June 27 and July 1. (LOU) Two authoritative Soviet articles under the Aleksandrov pseudonym strongly condemned Maoism and US-Chinese military cooperation, but omitted criticism of PRC leaders by name and reiterated interest in normalizing relations.

July 22. (U) Beijing protested a June Soviet-Afghan border treaty covering the Pamirs area, over which Beijing asserts historic claims.

August. (S) Moscow initiated a series of demarches in Western and other capitals against Sino-US military cooperation.

August. (LOU) Kommunist carried an authoritative article under the O. Vladimov pseudonym, charging that the 6th Plenum had codified Maoist elements of anti-Soviet and great-power hegemonism. The article described Haig's visit to China as a "qualitative change" in the international situation.

August 10. (U) Soviets delivered a letter in Beijing following up on Brezhnev's proposal for discussions of CBMs in the Far East, according to a March 1982 Soviet broadcast in Mandarin. Beijing reportedly criticized the proposal and said that the Chinese would not meet with a Soviet representative to discuss it.

- III -

1981 (cont'd)

August 11. (C) Moscow rejected the Chinese protest concerning the USSR-Afghanistan border treaty.

Early Autumn. (S/NF/NC/OC) Delegation of Chinese Central Committee officials visited Berlin as guests of the Chinese Ambassador; held discussions with their counterparts in the Socialist Unity Party (SED).

September 17. (U) Moscow's Chinese-language service reported a gala in Moscow commemorating the centenary of Chinese writer Lu Xun; the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR attended. A book exhibit devoted to Lu Xun also opened in Moscow.

September 18. (U) Internal Chinese media reported the Lu Xun evening party, noting the attendance of their Ambassador and quoting Soviet orientalist Fedorenko's positive comments on Lu Xun's anti-imperialist views.

September 18. (LOU) The Soviet journal International Life responded authoritatively to the June 17 Li Huichuan article on border issues. The Soviet response, like the Chinese statement, was a reiteration of previously held positions.

September 25. (S/NF/NC/OC) The USSR formally proposed a resumption of talks on border and political issues and invited Yu Hongliang, chief of the Soviet and East European Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, to Moscow. He declined but invited Kapitsa to come to Beijing again.

September 30. (LOU) The Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia attended a Chinese embassy reception in Prague for the first time since the Afghanistan invasion.

September 30. (LOU) Official Soviet greetings on China's national day showed no abatement of hostility.

October 10. (U) Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, in a speech for the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, enunciated China's "independent" foreign policy for the first time, projecting a more balanced approach to both superpowers.

October 20. (C) The Soviet proposal for resumption of border talks was leaked to the foreign press (probably initially by Moscow).

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1981 (cont'd)

October 20. (U) "Senior members" of the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies gave an interview to the Guardian expressing optimism that China would move toward an equidistant position between the US and the USSR and professing to see positive signs in Chinese developments and Sino-Soviet relations.

October 28-31. (LOU) PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited the US. Chinese press accounts emphasized discussion of problems in bilateral relations.

November 6. (U) PRC message on Soviet national day stressed desire for friendship, but with no change in basic position.

November 20. (LOU) Chinese gymnasts, the first team to go to the USSR for a world championship meet since the Olympic boycott over Afghanistan, were given an unprecedented reception hosted by Sergey Tikhvinskiy, vice chairman of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. Moscow's Mandarin service and Chinese domestic media reported the event.

December 3. (S/NF/NC/OC) At the fourth session of the fifth National People's Congress, Vice Premier Ji Pengfei reiterated Chinese common strategic interests with the US, which he described as the weaker of the two hegemonists. He said China was trying to conduct some business and increase people-to-people exchanges with Moscow, but believed a policy of maintaining equal distance between the US and the USSR would be dangerous. He enunciated a more independent line on Third World issues along with criticism of US policy on Taiwan, which he described as intolerable.

December 16. (U) The Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed resumption of contacts with China for scientific and technical cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of experts in several areas.

December 26. (S/NF/NC/OC) Beijing responded to Moscow's September 25 call for border talks, stating that the time was not ripe.

1982

January 8. (LOU) Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman Li Xiannian, in an interview with the Italian Communist Party newspaper Unita: recalled early Soviet assistance to China, said Sino-Soviet rift was over state issues rather than ideology,

1982 (cont'd)

disavowed any preconditions for border discussions with the USSR, but stated Afghanistan and Vietnam would be discussed. He denied close relations between the US and China, because the US was still an imperialist country.

January 14-30. (LOU) Senior Soviet China expert and head of USSR Diplomatic Academy Sergey Tikhvinskiy visited Beijing as a guest of the Soviet Ambassador.

January 25. (U) Li Xiannian, speaking at Spring Festival rally, defined hegemonism to include the US as well as the USSR; indirectly warned the US on Taiwan.

January 28. (U) Moscow reported the death of Mikhail Suslov, Politburo member with oversight over Central Committee Department for liaison with ruling communist parties.

Early February. (C) Moscow replied to Beijing's December 26 note on border talks, stating it had completed its preparations and was ready to negotiate.

February 6. (LOU) Radio Moscow Mandarin broadcast described Beijing's foreign policy as anti-socialist and reiterated Lenin's dicta on relationship between foreign and domestic policies, implying China might not be a "genuine" socialist country.

February 6. (C) Beijing and Moscow signed an agreement on container transit via railway, under negotiation for year and a half. Moscow agreed to lower freight rates by 15 percent. Agreement focused primarily on Chinese shipments westward but also provided framework for eventual Soviet use of Chinese facilities for eastward shipment.

February 9. (LOU) The Soviet Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education proposed an exchange with Beijing of college students and teachers, especially in language.

February 12. (S/NF/NC/OC) In response to questions from Japanese journalists, Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman Tikhonov called for concrete reciprocal steps toward better relations but said the process could not be one-sided. The Soviet version, but not the Japanese, denounced the Chinese leadership for consistent animosity toward the USSR. The Chinese dismissed Tikhonov's comments as nothing new.

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1982 (cont'd)

February 14-15. (U) Politburo member Chernenko, in an interview with Le Monde, said Moscow wanted to develop relations with China in a spirit of good neighborliness and on the basis of principles of peaceful coexistence.

February 18-April 3. (C) China and Mongolia agreed on meticulous "joint inspection of their boundary," the first to be conducted under their 1964 protocol although the protocol called for such review every five years if necessary.

February-March. (S/NF/NC/OC) Delegation from international relations department of the German Democratic Republic's ruling party visited China as guests of the GDR Ambassador; claimed achievement of aims of maintaining momentum of contacts between parties and exploring areas of future cooperation.

March. (S/NF/NC/OC) A French Communist Party delegation visited Beijing; visit by party leader George Marchais to China planned for autumn 1982.

March. (S/NF) Jop Wolff, Politburo member of Dutch Communist Party, visited Beijing; Dutch-Chinese parties agreed to reestablish relations this summer.

March (approx.) (S/NF/NC/OC) Hungarian Communist Party rejected high-level contacts with Beijing to avoid offending the USSR but agreed to middle and lower level exchanges.

March 1. (LOU) Three Chinese economists arrived in Moscow as guests of the Chinese Ambassador, to study planning and other aspects of the Soviet economy.

March 16. (U) An increased level of amicability in annual bilateral negotiations on border navigation was implied by press statements of both sides.

March 23. (LOU) A delegation of Chinese gymnasts visited the USSR, participated (in Riga) in the first purely bilateral athletic competition in decades.

March 24. (LOU) Brezhnev in speech at Tashkent stressed China's status as a socialist country and recalled earlier cooperative relationship with USSR; reiterated proposals for bilateral CBMs and border talks in most positive Soviet overture toward China in many years.

1982 (cont'd)

March 30. (C) A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman responded negatively to Brezhnev's March 24 overture, rejecting his attacks on China and calling for deeds, not words. Chinese leaders spoke to foreign visitors about Soviet intervention in parts of the world and said China could not place faith in Brezhnev's offer while the USSR maintained more than 1 million troops on the Sino-Soviet border and until the Soviet "communist party" modified its behavior. (These comments were not reported in Chinese media.)

March 30. (C) A Chinese UN delegation accorded equal treatment to US and Soviet colleagues at reception in New York.

April. (S/NF/NC/OC) Mikhail Leontiyevich Titarenko, adviser on China to the CPSU Central Committee, visited China.

Early April. (S/NF/NC/OC) Beijing made known its intention to send small groups of specialists--especially in economic, commercial, scientific, and technical fields--to the USSR on a regular and selective basis to exchange views.

April 2. (U) Soviet foreign media reported that a Chinese historian was in Dushanbe for an international scholars meeting.

April 15. (C) Pravda, in first objective report on Chinese subjects in long while, ran article on Beijing opera.

Mid-April. (U) Chinese leaders' comments to foreign visitors, as reported in the Chinese press, began to treat both superpowers more equally as "hegemonist" and to stress China's alignment with the Third World.

April 16. (S/NF/NC/OC) Sino-Soviet trade and payments agreement for 1982 signed, providing for reopening border trade (no details) and an increase in combined trade of nearly 200 million Swiss francs over 1981 (but still below 1980 level). Large increases in Chinese trade with some East European states also reported to be pending; the trade increase with Poland (30 percent) was reported to be an expression of Chinese solidarity with Jaruzelski's regime.

April 16. (C) Soviet sources reported an exchange of notes with China on reestablishment of border trade in the Far East and reopening of two border points in Xinjiang Province (closed since the late 1960s).

1982 (cont'd)

April 17. (C) As evidence of improved Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow's Ambassador in Beijing referred to increased publication in both countries of each other's literature (e.g., the complete works of Gorkiy and Lu Xun) and to talks between tourist officials on exchanges of tourists next year.

April 17-19. (C) The PRC-controlled press in Hong Kong juxtaposed positive accounts of developments in Sino-Soviet relations with problems in Sino-American relations, implying linkage while ostensibly denying it.

May. (S/NF/NC/OC) PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested strengthened research on USSR. Increasing support among working-level officials for more balanced approach toward the USSR was reported.

May 7-9. (LOU) US Vice President Bush visited China. Moscow commentary on visit focused on Chinese-American differences over Taiwan by omitting references to strategic cooperation, in contrast with treatment of June 1981 Haig visit and earlier high-level visits.

May 13-21. (LOU) Kapitsa visited Beijing; given higher level of protocol attention than in 1981.

May 15. (U) Chinese press announced that Soviet athletes, among others, would participate in invitational track meet in China in June.

Mid-May. (C) Chinese Minister of National Defense told an American visitor that China saw US and USSR as about equal in strength. He said border dispute with USSR was serious but problem was not the limited territory involved; rather, it was the borderline itself, which China considers center of river channel.

May 18. (U) Brezhnev speech to Soviet Komsomol Congress alluded to possibility of Sino-Soviet negotiations on nuclear missile reductions.

May 20. (LOU) Authoritative Alexandrov article in Pravda reaffirmed policy line toward China enunciated by Brezhnev in March.

May 21. (U) Chinese friendship associations held a commemoration meeting for two Russian painters. Reported in Chinese domestic media.

1982 (cont'd)

May 31. (LOU) Premier Zhao Ziyang, in an interview upon departure for Tokyo, said China's relations with USSR would remain unchanged no matter what happened in Sino-US relations. He spoke of "Soviet hegemonism" as the source of "major differences of principle" between the USSR and China, but said China advocated resolution through negotiation.

Late May. (S/NF/NC/OC) Chinese characterized May 20 Pravda article as containing no evidence of change in Soviet policy and said China continued to demand deeds, not words, from the Soviets.

Early June. (U) Chinese trade promotion group departed Moscow after first visit there in decade. Meetings were held at vice-ministerial level and reportedly reciprocated 1979 Soviet visit.

Early June. (S/NF) Faculty members at university-level institutions in Guangdong Province reportedly were told to encourage students to study Russian, a directive they regarded as signaling a change in central leadership attitudes toward the USSR.

June 11. (LOU) Huang Hua criticized the USSR indirectly and did not tag Moscow as the most dangerous source of a new world war, thus reverting to practice of the early 1970s which treated the superpowers more equally.

June 15. (LOU) Beijing used the centenary of the birth of Comintern leader Dimitrov to support its efforts to expand Chinese influence in the communist movement at the expense of Moscow. It stressed independence from the CPSU and from the Soviet path to socialism.

June 18-20. (U) Four Soviet Olympic gold medalists participated in Beijing track meet, reportedly the first sports delegation to visit China in 16 years. Soviet internal media covered the event; Moscow television carried clips showing Soviet and other participants.

June 29. (U) Zhou Peiyuan, China's most notable scientist and vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, said PRC hoped for expanded cultural, scientific, and sports ties with USSR but that Soviet Government was hampering such exchanges, according to Japanese press source.

June 29. (U) Evening event commemorating 55th anniversary of the Canton (now Guangshou) Commune was held in Moscow, with

1982 (cont'd)

Chinese Embassy officials in attendance, according to a Soviet Chinese-language broadcast.

Early July. (U) Two articles in People's Daily spoke of China's need and desire to work for stable borders and good relations with all its neighbors.

July 8. (U) Chinese Sports Daily announced that three Soviet athletes would participate in Beijing Marathon in September.

July 10. (C) Chinese Ministry of Health delegation visited the GDR for 14 days to study organization and efficiency of health and social delivery systems. Chinese Embassy officials in Berlin described visit as continuation of usual exchanges in health matters but noted some improvement in recent relations and PRC interest in further improvement.

July 13. (U) Commemoration in Moscow of the 55th anniversary of Nanchang uprising (Canton Commune) was attended by the Chinese Ambassador. Chinese internal and Soviet external media reported the event.

July 27. (C) Soviet diplomat reported that China would send delegation of fish specialists to USSR and USSR would send delegation interested in silk textile manufacture to PRC; said to be response to Soviet December 16 proposal for exchange of scientific delegations.

August 8. (S) Chief of Soviet and East European Department of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hu Hongliang, in Moscow as guest of Chinese Ambassador.

Mid-August. (S) A three-man delegation from the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Soviet Affairs reported to be in Moscow.

August 17. (U) Sino-American communique on Taiwan issued.

Early September. (C) Preparation to recommence student exchange with USSR and Eastern Europe indicated by a Beijing University Graduate School announcement, which stated that results of its entrance examinations would be used to qualify applicants for scholarships in these countries.

September 4. (U) Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang's report to the 12th Congress stressed both the threat to China by Soviet

1982 (cont'd)

containment policies and China's desire to resume friendship between the two peoples. A lengthy account based on official Chinese press releases was reproduced in Soviet newspapers without comment.

September 14. (U) Agreement on delivery of printed matter signed in Beijing. The Soviets simultaneously opened an exhibition of Soviet books in the Chinese capitol.

September 26. (U) Brezhnev in a speech in Baku stressed the importance of achieving normalization of relations with China and the contribution such a change would make to strengthening peace and stability in Asia and worldwide.

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(U) THE CHINESE ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

(C) Summary

China over the past two years has reoriented its foreign policy. It has stressed its independence of both the US and the USSR and has emphasized its Third World credentials. Beijing has stated its belief, moreover, that the 1980s will witness the continued decline of the influence of the US and the USSR over their allies and clients. It has launched a foreign policy that is intended to take advantage of this perceived weakening of both superpowers in order to gain some freedom of maneuver between the US and the USSR.

As part of this new foreign policy, Beijing has resumed talks with the Soviets and has cooled relations with the US. At the same time, however, it has not sought equidistance between the two superpowers because it has concluded that China's interests are best served by continued close association with the West. Despite its deep dissatisfaction with certain US policies, therefore, China has elected to limit its freedom of maneuver.

* * * * *

(C) China could revert to hostility toward both the US and the USSR, although thus far it has shown no inclination to do so. It is difficult to see how the Chinese could move closer to the Soviets under present circumstances; even Soviet compromises on security issues would only ease, not overcome, Beijing's suspicions of the USSR. Beijing's current problems with Moscow as well as its perception of the political ramifications of the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) underscore Beijing's dilemma within the triangle.

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June 30, 1983



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(C) The Soviet Problem

China's main objectives in entering into talks with the USSR have been to ease tensions, expand trade and exchanges, and probe for Soviet willingness to compromise on the basic issues dividing the two countries. Both its independent foreign policy and its contacts with the Soviets are intended to gain China greater leverage in the US-USSR-China triangle. But leverage is only one means of serving China's broader interests and is not an end in itself. Thus, Beijing has been unwilling to make unreciprocated concessions to Moscow on basic issues or to give the false impression that the talks are making progress just to gain leverage with the US. Apart from fearing that such dissembling might gain Moscow more leverage with the US, China sees that its broader interests could be undermined.

This view results from the seriousness with which China regards its Soviet problem. China remains deeply suspicious of Soviet motives and regards the USSR as the major threat to its security. But this threat is seen by Beijing as primarily political--i.e., China believes that the Soviets hope to use their military and political presence along its periphery to intimidate it and to deny China its rightful role in Asian affairs. Thus, only if Moscow ceases such efforts at intimidation will Beijing find it possible to improve relations. In short, leverage within the triangle, from the Chinese perspective, must be tied to Beijing's broader security concerns and should not be pursued in a way that redounds to Moscow's advantage.

Managing the Problem

(C) Beijing believes that the USSR is currently constrained by problems at home and abroad and is unlikely in the near future to mount a direct military threat to China. Thus, China has entered into talks with the Soviets to ameliorate tensions and in the long term to attempt to improve relations. But Beijing's primary purpose has not been to gain leverage within the triangle or to discomfit the US. Rather, its broader intention is to secure China's interests within the triangle by easing the Soviet threat.

(S/NF/NC/OC) Nevertheless, China continues to be highly skeptical of Soviet good faith in undertaking talks; in recent weeks the Chinese have been increasingly outspoken about their differences with the USSR. Premier Zhao Ziyang told a foreign leader in April that it would be meaningless to continue the dialogue with the Soviets without a solution to the major issues. General Secretary Hu Yaobang claimed in a recent interview that some 200 Soviet spies had been arrested last year and that the two

countries could conceivably go to war over Indochina. Such statements reflect the depth of Beijing's concern over Soviet behavior and are particularly striking in that they tend to deny China the leverage that it could gain from the appearance of successful talks with the USSR.

(C) Arms Control Talks

Soviet-US arms talks also demonstrate Beijing's difficulty in maneuvering between the superpowers. China is not a participant in these talks and in the past has depicted them as a sham and a plot by the superpowers to assure their domination over the rest of the world. But China realizes that its interests can be directly affected by the outcome of such talks. Long fearful that the US and the USSR would conclude arms control agreements that disregarded its interests, China currently is concerned over the prospects for an INF agreement that would allow the USSR to move SS-20s freely to Asia.

Because China already faces an overwhelming Soviet nuclear force, the military implications of such an agreement are not its main concern. Rather, it fears that the world would see the agreement as having been concluded without regard for China's interests, thus further demonstrating Beijing's political weakness within the triangle. Clearly hoping to block an INF agreement of this nature, China has joined Japan in voicing concern that the current talks in Geneva could lead, in the words of a recent Chinese commentary, to "selling out the security interests of a third country."

(C) Pursuit of Independence

Despite Beijing's rhetoric, China's foreign policy will be based on a pragmatic judgment that Chinese interests are best served by resisting Soviet threats, maintaining regional stability, and modernizing through association with the West. Thus, while Beijing has adopted policies to enhance China's independence within the triangle, this independence is restricted by Beijing's own choices and by its definition of Chinese national interests. While highly abrasive to the US at times, China's foreign policy will continue on balance to be favorable to US interests.

Prepared by John P. Sontag
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Approved by Wever Gim
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EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL CH UR
SUBJECT: CHINESE EMBASSY ON 3RD ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET
NORMALIZATION TALKS

REF: BEIJING 18036

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. IN "PERSONAL, UNOFFICIAL BRIEFING" NOVEMBER 22, PRC EMBASSY SOVIET SPECIALIST-RAN THROUGH RESULTS OF OCTOBER ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZATION TALKS. ON BILATERAL ISSUES, CHINESE ACCEPTED-SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF TIES IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WITH IMPLEMENTATION GENERALLY DEPENDENT ON SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES. ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, CHINESE PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, FORMALLY FOR FIRST TIME IN THESE TALKS, ON AFGHANISTAN, KAMPUCHEA AND MILITARY FORCES ON CHINESE BORDERS WITH USSR AND MONGOLIA. SOVIETS-GENERALLY REFUSED TO DISCUSS "THREE OBSTACLES" SERIOUSLY, BUT SOVIET NEGOTIATOR IL'ICHEV DID PROPOSE ESTABLISHING GROUP TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES ON BORDER ISSUES; CHINESE TURNED IT DOWN, BUT PROPOSALS REMAIN ON TABLE FOR NEXT ROUND IN MARCH 1984. DEPTOFF NOTED H SOME CHINESE PROPOSALS, INCLUDING ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN BORDER REGIONS WHICH IN CHINESE VIEW INCLUDES SS-20'S, CALL FORMALLY FOR RECIPROCAL ACTION AND THUS POINT TOWARD NEGOTIATION. PRC EMBOFF SAID CHINESE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THESE "CONSULTATIONS" AND NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL DECISION IF SOVIETS ACCEPTED DISCUSSION OF CHINESE PROPOSALS. DEPTOFF ALSO POINTED OUT THAT UNLIKE U. S. CHINESE ACCEPT CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL ISSUES WHERE PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE EVEN WITHOUT PROGRESS ON "THREE OBSTACLES." PRC EMBOFF ACCEPTED DISTINCTION BUT SAID IT HAD LITTLE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SINCE PROGRESS ON BILATERAL ISSUES WILL IN FACT BE LIMITED UNLESS THERE IS PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

3. PRC EMBASSY SOVIET SPECIALIST 1ST SECRETARY HOU

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ZHITONG CALLED NOVEMBER 22 AT HIS REQUEST ON EUR/SOV DIRECTOR SIMONS TO PROVIDE "PERSONAL, UNOFFICIAL" READOUT ON 3RD ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZATION TALKS IN OCTOBER. BRIEFING MAY PROVIDE USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO PREVIOUS REPORTING, BUT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY HELD IN VIEW OF HOU'S INSISTENCE ON UNOFFICIAL CHARACTER, TO PROTECT HIM.

4. HOU CHARACTERIZED THE DISCUSSIONS AS CALM AND FRANK, BUT SAID THE RESULTS HAD BEEN DIFFERENT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND BILTERAL ISSUES.

5. ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES THERE HAD BEEN ALMOST NO PROGRESS. IN THIS AREA THERE WERE A NUMBER OF SOVIET PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. FOR INSTANCE, THE SOVIETS HAD PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED PUBLICLY-ANNOUNCED BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON U.S.-KOREAN EXERCISES IN SOUTH KOREA AND ON THE DANGERS OF JAPANESE MILITARISM. IN EARLY JULY GROMYKO HAD SENT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BEIJING IN TO PROPOSE THAT CHINA JOIN OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN A PUBLIC APPEAL CONCERNING THE DANGERS OF IMPERILISM. THE CHINESE HAD REPLIED JULY 26 IN BEIJING THAT THEY ALREADY APPRECIATED THESE DANGERS; THAT THE BASIC DANGER WAS THE HEGEMONISM OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO COMMON STRUGGLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION SO LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF THREATENED CHINA; AND THAT CHINA ALWAYS FIGHTS IMPERIALISM ANYWAY.

6. IN THE THIRD ROUND IN OCTOBER THE SOVIETS HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE THREE OBSTACLES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY AFFECTED THIRD COUNTRIES, AND DEPUTY MINISTER CHEN HAD TOLD THEM THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO IF THEY WISHED SUBSTANTIAL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

7. IN THE BILATERAL AREA, THERE HAD BEEN EXCHANGES ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

-- (1) THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED TO DOUBLE BILATERAL TRADE. THE CHINESE HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE, WITH IMPLEMENTATION CONTINGENT ON AGREEMENT CONCERNING SPECIFIC PRODUCTS.

-- (2) THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED PUTTING TRADE ON A LONG-TERM CONTRACTUAL BASIS, I. E. A LONG-TERM TRADE AGREEMENT. THE CHINESE HAD TURNED THIS DOWN.

-- (3) THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED A LONG-TERM AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, AND PROPOSED TO SEND ARKHIPOV TO BEIJING TO BEGIN NEGOTIATING IT. THE CHINESE HAD NOT ACCEPTED.

-- (4) DURING KAPITSA'S VISIT IN SEPTEMBER, THE SOVTETS HAD PROPOSED TO REEQUIP OLD FACTORIES THAT THEY HAD BUILT. THE CHINESE HAD AGREED IN OCTOBER TO EXPERTMENT WITH REEQUIPMENT OF TWO SUCH FACTORIES, TO SEE HOW IT MIGHT WORK.

-- (5) THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED TO INCREASE EXCHANGES IN TEN AREAS, INCLUDING CULTURE, SPORT, TECHNOLOGY AND CIVIL AVIATION. THE CHINESE HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IN SUCH AREAS, BUT NOT TO ANY CONCRETE MEASURES. THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED, LAST MARCH, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS STUDYING IN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND THAT NUMBER HAD INCREASED SLIGHTLY SINCE THEN.

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8. IN THE INTERNATIONAL AREA, THE CHINESE HAD MADE THREE PROPOSALS. SOME ELEMENTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AND EVEN PUBLICIZED BEFORE; FOR INSTANCE, MAO ZSEDONG HAD VOICED THE CHINESE DEMAND THAT SOVIET TROOPS OPPOSITE CHINA BE REDUCED TO 1964 LEVELS. BUT AS CHINESE PROPOSALS IN THIS FORUM THEY WERE NEW. THEY WERE:

-- (1) FOUR POINTS ON AFGHANISTAN, BASED ON THE UN RESOLUTION. THE FIRST THREE COVERED SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. IF THE SOVIETS BEGAN FULFILLMENT OF THESE THREE, THE CHINESE WOULD CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL

GUARANTEES.

-- (2) ON KAMPUCHEA, THE CHINESE DEMANDED AGREEMENT TO THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS, AND, SPECIFICALLY, VIETNAMESE COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. IF VIETNAM COMMITTED ITSELF TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND ACTUALLY BEGAN WITHDRAWING ITS MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE CHINESE WOULD AGREE TO JOIN TALKS AMONG THE DIRECTLY INTERESTED PARTIES ON A FINAL, COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

-- (3) ON THE BORDER, THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED A NUMBER OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, AND THE CHINESE HAD PROPOSED A LESSENING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BY:

--- A) WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES FROM MONGOLIA;

--- B) NO MILITARY EXERCISES IN THE BORDER REGIONS (NOT GEOGRAPHICALLY DEFINED);

--- C) REDUCTION IN SOVIET TROOP LEVELS TO THOSE OF 1964, BEFORE BREZHNEV;

--- D) NO OFFENSIVE FORCES PERMANENTLY IN THE BORDER REGIONS; AND

--- E) ELIMINATION AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BORDER REGIONS. SS-20S WERE NOT SPECIFIED, BUT FROM THE CHINESE POINT OF VIEW ARE CLEARLY INCLUDED.

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9. SOVIET DELEGATION CHIEF IL'ICHEV (WHOM HOU CHARACTERIZED AS "VERY CLEVER AND CUNNING" ON THE BASIS OF HIS OWN LONG SERVICE ON THE BORDER TALKS) HAD IN TURN PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY GROUP TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES. THE CHINESE HAD REFUSED. DESPITE THIS TURNDOWN, THE PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES REMAIN ON THE TABLE.

10. DURING HIS SEPTEMBER VISIT, KAPITSA HAD INVITED CHEN TO VISIT MOSCOW FOR DISCUSSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, AND CHEN HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT NO DATE HAD BEEN SET. DURING THE OCTOBER 3RD ROUND, IL'ICHEV HAD PROPOSED THAT THE FOURTH ROUND CONVENE IN MARCH IN MOSCOW, AND THIS THE CHINESE HAD ACCEPTED.

11. SIMONS THANKED HOU FOR THE BRIEFING, AND COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE BORDER WERE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO HIM. DURING LAST MONTH'S TALKS IN BEIJING (REFTEL), THE U.S. GROUP HAD ASKED HOW THE CHINESE PLANNED TO HANDLE THE SS-20 ISSUE WITHIN

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THE STRUCTURE OF THEIR NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. THE REPLY HAD BEEN THAT THE CHINESE HAD ADDED THE SS-20'S UNDER THE RUBRIC OF THE OBSTACLE CONCERNING THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND IN MONGOLIA. CONSEQUENTLY, SIMONS SAID, HE HAD BEEN PROCEEDING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS MEANT THE CHINESE DID NOT CONSIDER THE SS-20'S AS A TOPIC FOR BILATERAL NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT RATHER IN THE CATEGORY OF THINGS THE SOVIETS HAD TO DO IF THERE WAS TO BE FULL OR SUBSTANTIAL NORMALIZATION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. IF HE UNDERSTOOD HOU'S PRESENTATION CORRECTLY, HOWEVER, THE FIVE CHINESE PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE BORDER INCLUDED TWO ITEMS REQUIRING UNILATERAL SOVIET ACTION (WITHDRAWAL FROM MONGOLIA AND REDUCTION OF TROOP LEVELS TO 1964 LEVELS) AND THREE THAT CALLED FOR ACTION BY BOTH SIDES, AT LEAST FORMALLY (NO EXERCISES, NO OFFENSIVE FORCES PERMANENTLY, AND ELIMINATION AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS). HOU HAD SAID THAT IN THE CHINESE VIEW THE LATTER INCLUDED THE SS-20'S. HE ASKED HOU'S VIEWS ON WHAT THE CHINESE WOULD DO IF THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THIS CHINESE PROPOSAL. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT CHINA MIGHT FIND ITSELF IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON SS-20'S, OR VERY CLOSE TO IT.

1. HOU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE QUESTION, BUT HAD TWO COMMENTS. FIRST, THE RECIPROCAL CHARACTER OF THIS PROPOSAL WAS IN FACT "ONLY" FORMAL. SECOND, THE CHINESE MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS. THESE TALKS ARE CONSULTATIONS. IF THE SOVIETS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ONE OR MORE OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS, THERE WOULD BE A SUBSEQUENT-POLITICAL DECISION AS TO WHETHER TO ENTER INTO ACTUAL NEGOTIATION CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION. BUT, HE ADMITTED, THE LINE BETWEEN CONSULTATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT BE THAT CLEAR TO OUTSIDERS.

13. SIMONS ALSO NOTED THAT THE CHINESE AND U. S. APPROACHES HAVE MUCH IN COMMON, BUT DIFFER IN ONE RESPECT CONCEPTUALLY: CHINA MAKES A RADICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN BILATERAL ISSUES AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN TERMS OF VALUE AND WEIGHT, WHEREAS THE U. S. DOES NOT. FOR THE U. S., CONCERNS ON ALL ISSUES ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT AS INDICATIONS OF OUR GENERAL PROBLEM

IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, WHEREAS THE CHINESE ADMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON BILATERAL ISSUES EVEN WITHOUT PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. HOU SAID THE DISTINCTION WAS VALID, BUT NOT TERRIBLY SIGNIFICANT IN PRACTICAL TERMS, SINCE ABSENT PROGRESS ON THE THREE OBSTACLES THERE WILL IN FACT BE ONLY LIMITED PROGRESS ON BILATERAL ISSUES AS WELL. SHULTZ
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(U) SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA^{1/}

Summary

Soviet scholarly writings on contemporary China have been largely neglected in the West. But recent research on this material not only has cast new light on Soviet perceptions of China but also has exposed differing views about socialism in general among groups of academic specialists in the USSR.

A survey of available Soviet academic output over the last 14 years (1968-82) reveals diverse views on Chinese developments grouped around orthodox and pragmatic interpretations of socialism. Part of this dichotomy in the outlook on China may be due to the organizational structure of the Soviet community of China watchers.

Orthodox viewers were dominant throughout the period; but dissenters never fell silent, though their opposition always was muted. Moreover, the two camps existed rather isolated from each other, published their findings separately, and rarely referred to each other's output.

The issue which seems to have agitated both groups most is what went wrong with Chinese socialism. It is here where possible allusions to the

^{1/} The principal findings in this paper are based on a monograph of the same title by Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University. Rozman's work was commissioned by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, which is supported by funds from the Departments of Defense and State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the US Government.

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Report 750-AR
January 4, 1984

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BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08

Soviet experience loom largest. The mainstream Soviet experts seem to strive to divert any comparison between de-Stalinization and de-Maoization by placing all blame for the deformation of Chinese socialism on the resurgence of rightist tendencies. In contrast, the pragmatic scholars see the greatest danger in the drive for recentralization of control in the state rather than in the burgeoning power of such social and political forces as peasants, intellectuals, and traditional associations.

What, if any, influence these differing expert views on China have on Soviet decisionmakers is less clear. Given the normally tight rein on Soviet academic research, however, this prolonged scholarly dispute concerning Chinese contemporary developments suggests a link with possible disagreement among Soviet leaders on that issue as well as on broader questions affecting the future of socialism. There is good reason, therefore, for continued monitoring of this literature for clues about Soviet elite thinking on China and socialism in general.

* * * * *

Organizational Structure

Soviet specialists' differing interpretations of China need to be seen in the context of the actual course of Sino-Soviet relations. For the bulk of the more than two decades since the onset of the Sino-Soviet discord, hardliners have dominated Soviet China watchers. When the short-lived Institute of Chinese Studies closed its doors in the early 1960s, there followed a hiatus of 5-6 years during which Soviet leaders seem to have debated what to do with the field of Chinese studies. Contemporary work on China lagged as some scholars concentrated on working on pre-revolutionary China and others moved to institutes where China was of peripheral interest. Nevertheless, these individuals did not abandon Chinese studies altogether and seem to have provided the impetus later for a more pragmatic approach to Chinese politics.

The main strain of China watchers came into existence in the late 1960s. This group was composed largely of newly trained people affiliated with the Institute of the Far East directed by M. I. Sladkovski. But in the allocation of responsibilities, leadership in the China field was largely in the hands of O. B. Rakhmanin, S. L. Tikhvinsky, and M. S. Kapitsa. This powerful trio helped set the hardline orientation for Chinese studies which has remained dominant to this day.

Work from this group soon began to appear in authoritative newspapers and journals. In the early 1970s, the Institute of the Far East began to publish a yearbook on China and a journal titled Far Eastern Affairs. Later the Institute, tightly controlled by these three men, also trained and graduated about 10 specialists annually in Chinese studies. These scholars were expected to carry on a hardline orientation emphasizing the negative in Chinese affairs, regardless of developments in China.

Against this chorus of criticism of China, a more nuanced analysis of Chinese politics was barely audible through the 1970s. It gained greater strength after Mao's death and again in the wake of the partial rapprochement between the two communist giants in 1981-82. This view on China, however, came from institutes not specifically devoted to Chinese studies. Notable have been the Institute of Oriental Studies where L. P. Deliusin is chief of Chinese studies; the Institute of the International Workers' Movement--V. G. Gel'bras, section chief; the Moscow State Institute of

International Relations--A. V. Meliksetov, head of Chinese studies; and the Institute of the USA and Canada--V. P. Lukin, section chief. Outside academia, such well-known political observers as Alexander Bovin and F. M. Burlatsky also have promoted a new look at China.

Muted Dissent

Established Soviet practice emphasizes unity of views, and efforts are constantly being made to mute differences in the field of Chinese studies. The fact that dissenters from the hardline view are scattered in many institutes, however, not only affords them protection but also avoids the impression of a concerted attack on what is still the dominant orientation.

Still, the question remains how these mavericks have managed to operate when their powerful opponents obviously would have liked to silence them. One can only speculate as to who supports them further up the line, but it would appear that they enjoy some protection from their respective institutes, the Academy of Science Administrators, and other high officials. In some instances specific linkages can be established; e. g., Gel'bras and A. M. Rumiantsev, a member of the Academy of Sciences; and Burlatsky and G. A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada.

The head of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Deliusin, was associated with Andropov before the latter became head of the KGB. Whether this connection offered Deliusin a protective mantle cannot be stated with certainty. However, he has come to be regarded as one of the foremost China experts and his annual conferences on China have attracted large contingents of experts from all over the world. What is more, Deliusin's personal ties to a number of the more pragmatic scholars on China have made him the unofficial spokesman of an academic camp known for its nuanced interpretation of contemporary Chinese developments.

Socialism Under Scrutiny

One of the key issues threading itself through the work of many Soviet China watchers is the nature of the class struggle and its effect on the deformation of Chinese socialism; here can be found the most visible clues in the approach of the pragmatic group regarding possible similarities between Stalinism and Maoism. While there is never any direct reference to deviations from socialism in the Soviet Union similar to Mao's, the careful reader clearly is made aware of them.

The conservative school of thought, on the other hand, stresses dissimilarities. The Chinese, though fulfilling many of

the requisite conditions for a transition to socialism in 1949, forfeited their opportunity principally because of the wrongheaded leadership of the Communist Party. Failure to understand Marxism-Leninism, lack of background and experience, and insufficient control over bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influences caused the Chinese leaders to adopt incorrect policies. In short, insufficient ideological education and political control were decisive in dooming the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party.

In spite of this emphasis on the dissimilar, Soviet conservative writers also condemn the Chinese system for excesses reminiscent of the Stalinist era. The brutal nature of collectivization is cited, as is the lack of consumer goods and housing construction, the tragic consequences of the personality cult, and the existence of forced labor. Lest the comparison become too inescapable, these writers take refuge in Lenin as the proper point of reference and suggest that Chinese transgressions were considerably worse than those under Stalin even though the latter are not acknowledged specifically.

Consistent with their depreciation of Chinese developments in the post-Mao period, the hardliners argue that Maoism continues in China without Mao. They see rightist tendencies and anarchy and depict China as constantly moving further from socialism.

A rather different tack is taken by the more pragmatic Soviet writers. Obviously, their way of drawing parallels between deformities in China under Mao and in the Soviet system is indirect and found only in widely scattered publications. The shift in emphasis, however, is unmistakable. While the conservatives attribute the failures of the Mao leadership to its inability to overcome the influence of Chinese history and culture, the pragmatists see insufficient awareness of that past as a major stumbling bloc in developing a proper socialist China. This context provides the background for sharply opposed conclusions regarding the primary source of the serious problems plaguing today's China.

China Really Means the Soviet Union

Four key issues affecting contemporary China, but not it alone, provide the basis for these contrasting assessments: the place of expert knowledge in society, the extent of popular participation in decisionmaking, the importance of material well-being of the population, and the extent of legal checks on the power of officials.

Regarding experts--i.e., intellectuals--Soviet pragmatists argue that their abuse harmed the building of Chinese socialism. By defending the need for critical and independent judgment in the policy process, the pragmatists seem to enshrine the primacy of

expertness over ideological orthodoxy. Soviet hardliners, however, oppose such championing of intellectuals and warn of the group's continued bourgeois influence. Rather than trusting intellectuals, they see in the failure to reeducate them after the revolution both the error of Mao's way and a continuing threat to the future of Chinese socialism.

This reaffirmation by Soviet hardliners of the commanding role of politics emerges most strongly in their appreciation of the role of officials and the party in China. China's problems, they aver, can be met best by centralization and discipline. A more tightly run Communist Party and the elimination of the last vestiges of influence of the national bourgeoisie seem necessary elements for redressing China's flawed socialism. Opponents of the hardliners, on the other hand, speak of the need for eradicating the privileged position of the ruling stratum as essential for the de-Maoization of Chinese society. Such criticism is advanced with caution, but is reflected in the call for a new breed of officials, better educated and more accessible to experts as well as more humane in methods of governance.

This recognition of the value of intellectuals also extends to other social classes in China. It entrusts older, qualified, and experienced workers and peasants with greater responsibility and sides with experts in the perennial debate between "red" and "expert." A corollary of this view is the acceptance of greater worker participation in the decisionmaking process and awareness of the need for more effective representation of worker interests. The implicit accession to the demand for a certain diffusion of power also clashes with the hardline perspective of continued centralization and tighter discipline.

Soviet scholars disagree on the importance of the question of improving the material well-being of the Chinese population. For the pragmatists the system's success is most likely to be effected by encouraging production through material incentives. Moreover, peasants who prosper as the result of hard work deserve praise, suggesting the virtue of a concessionary attitude on the part of the regime toward the people's desire for an expanded private sector. In contrast, the conservative Soviet view is guarded about the advantage of emphasizing material awards, seeing in it a threat to central planning and party control over the economy which ultimately would turn China to the right.

In the area of legal procedures, Soviet analysts again occupy contrasting positions in their evaluations of individual rights and obligations to the state. Although neither group is optimistic about early positive changes in the post-Mao period, the pragmatists derive some hope from the ostensibly more relaxed current official position toward intellectuals and the recognition of the

need for material incentives. The conservatives, not surprisingly, see danger in bourgeois forms of reward and deem improvement possible only by a redirection of Chinese foreign policy and greater reliance on control emanating from the Chinese Communist Party. Their view of progress in China seems almost to boil down to a formula which tends to equate the health of China's society with the extent of its fealty to the Soviet Union.

Sectarians Versus Pragmatists: The Old Debate

However indirect, the essential concern reflected in these views is the impact of certain institutional processes on the socialist systems in both the Soviet Union and China. In this general sense, the debate keeps alive the longtime argument between Soviet conservatives and pragmatists. The former always see the threat to the system as coming from internal and external bourgeois influence, which must be combatted by strengthened controls and greater discipline. The pragmatists regard the stifling role of the state as the principal obstacle to the survival of socialism which can be overcome only by relaxed controls and greater involvement of the individual in the decisionmaking process.

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SINO-SOVIET

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2. MOSCOW CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SINO-SOVIET TALKS

Moscow appears to be encouraged by the relatively favorable atmosphere surrounding the scheduled resumption of Sino-Soviet consultations in early March in Moscow. Although the Soviets recognize the limits to rapprochement created by Beijing's "three obstacles" to normalization, they are aiming at a long-term process of engaging Beijing in a range of consultations and agreements.

* * *

The March round will take place against the background of progress in trade negotiations and Beijing's gesture of sending a senior associate of Deng Xiaoping, Vice Premier Wan Li, to Andropov's funeral. Beijing has also agreed to invite Deputy Premier Arkhipov, an economic specialist with diplomatic experience in China, to Beijing for economic discussions, probably in May.

Soviet officials have expressed satisfaction that Zhao Ziyang resisted alleged pressure during his US visit to join in a "strategic relationship" with the US, but the Soviet press has complained that Zhao proposed closer Sino-US cooperation in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The Soviets are, no doubt concerned that President Reagan's trip to China, coming after the Moscow talks, will again highlight these aspects of Chinese foreign policy. But above all, the Soviets understand that major progress at the Sino-Soviet talks is unlikely because of Beijing's long-standing insistence on at least a partial resolution of the "three obstacles" (Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and border issues).

Although Moscow has refused to discuss matters pertaining to "third countries," Soviet officials have implied that military dispositions near the China border might be negotiable, if approached by Beijing on a "reciprocal" basis. Moscow insists that Mongolian aspects of the border be discussed with Mongolia, but says it would not object to tripartite discussions. The Chinese, for their part, have been playing up to the Mongolians, in effect suggesting that they do not need Soviet troops on their soil.

Even if the consultations fail to deal with China's security concerns, Moscow is likely again to raise proposals similar to those it has now tabled at the CDE in Stockholm. These include military confidence-building measures of a kind that Beijing has previously rejected as inadequate. Moscow probably hopes that atmospheric improvements and possible agreements on minor issues will eventually persuade Beijing to agree on a declaratory instrument, such as the nonaggression pact that the Soviets have unsuccessfully advocated for over a decade.



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(U) CHINA'S VIEW OF THE US AND THE USSR

Summary

China has adjusted its posture in the US-USSR-China triangle over the past three years, disclaiming a community of strategic interests with the US. Most recently, China has declared that Soviet power and US power are now more or less in balance, and Beijing has substantially improved its own nonpolitical ties with Moscow. Despite these changes, China's world view appears basically unaltered, and what has emerged in Chinese-US-Soviet relations is by no means an equilateral triangle.

China wants the benefits without the appearance of a close relationship with the US. In return, the Chinese are prepared to affirm by word and deed a relationship that is friendly but nonallied. Such a relationship in Chinese eyes has to include a workable understanding on the issue of Taiwan. Notably, in contrast to "the three issues"^{1/} dividing Beijing and Moscow, the Chinese portray Taiwan as a problem on which a Sino-American modus vivendi already has been reached; the question in their view is whether the US will fulfill its commitment.

China also accepts that the relationship will include sharp disagreement over some international issues of importance to the US and avoidance of the appearance of joining forces to oppose the Soviets. In short, China will seek a high degree of cooperation with the US but also will want respect as an autarkic, socialist, and developing world power. As this sort of relationship develops, the contradiction between China's rhetoric and its Realpolitik policies will continue and perhaps even increase.

* * * * *

^{1/} The three issues are the Soviet military posture along the Soviet-Chinese border and Soviet involvement in Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

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Report 807-AR
March 27, 1984

View of the USSR

Although less fearful of an immediate Soviet attack, Beijing is quite aware of the continuing growth of Soviet forces around China's periphery. This growth probably has been a major factor in moving China to reduce tensions with the Soviets and to adjust its public position in triangular politics; but it also has confirmed China's longstanding strategic perceptions as well as the current value it places on consolidating relations with the US.

China's fundamental differences with the USSR, however, do not appear to have diminished, and they are no less severe, although less numerous, than US-Soviet conflicts of interest. China in effect has established a normal adversarial relationship with the USSR that is somewhat similar to the mix of confrontation, negotiation, trade, and contact that characterizes US-Soviet relations.

View of the US

Thus, even though China deliberately has separated itself from identification with the US, strategic compatibility between the two countries has not actually diminished. In fact, because of the continued growth of the long-term Soviet threat, it probably has increased. The Chinese seem to recognize, now even more than they did in 1980, that Western economic and technological help is essential for their modernization.

At the same time, the gap between Chinese rhetoric and actual strategic views and interests has widened. This gap had closed in 1979-81 when Beijing began to talk openly of a united front with the US against Soviet hegemonism. Since 1981, the Chinese have distanced themselves from the US, stressed their independent foreign policy, and resumed their propaganda posture of attacking both superpowers' "struggle for hegemony."

This shift resulted from a number of factors, but perhaps most important were suspicion of the Reagan administration's intentions regarding Taiwan and the perceived need by Beijing to demonstrate both that it was not dependent on its proto-alliance with the US and that it had a viable alternative to the united-front strategy. Criticism of Deng's tilt toward the US began with conservative elders in Beijing in 1981, but a consensus likely was growing throughout the country: A more independent posture would increase China's leverage with both superpowers; open and close

identity with the US was no longer necessary or desirable; and China's diplomatic effectiveness was being eroded by the perception of an extreme anti-Sovietism in Chinese policy. The Reagan administration's tough stand against the Soviets and its hard line on some Third World issues also argued for putting more apparent distance between China and the US.

Some New Shifts

President Reagan's scheduled April trip that will complete this year's exchange of high-level state visits, China's strong desire to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement and other agreements with the US, and willingness at least to give the impression of a budding military relationship with Washington suggest that Chinese leaders have concluded that they, for the time being, have burnished their independent image and maximized their leverage in the strategic triangle. These developments also suggest that a consensus in long-term US-Chinese security concerns persists. Parallel US-Chinese interests and cooperation in such vital areas as Korea, Indochina, and Afghanistan also reflect a continuing Sino-American understanding about Asia, the main element of which remains the maintenance of national stability and the containment of Soviet power and influence.

The US decision to remove discriminatory restrictions on technology transfers to China was a major factor in the improvement of bilateral ties over the past year, convincing the Chinese that the Reagan administration seeks a durable and long-term relationship. But two other Chinese calculations were equally or more important. First, Beijing apparently has concluded that the August 17, 1982, communique gives it the means to restrain US arms sales to Taiwan by increasing the US stake in good bilateral relations with China. Second, Chinese officials keep hinting that they do not expect that future talks with the Soviets will lessen basic differences. Given the continuing Soviet buildup in the region and the muted but ongoing potential for Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea, the Chinese well may believe that relations with the Soviets could worsen over the next few years.

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(U) USSR: NUANCES IN CHINA POLICY



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Summary

The continuity of Soviet China policy through two recent successions points to a consensus concerning China among Soviet leaders, who would like to reduce tensions and improve relations to the extent possible without major concessions to Beijing. Soviet officials differ, however, on the prospects of Sino-Soviet relations and on such questions as whether Deng Xiaoping is moving China toward socialism or away from it.

As the current Sino-Soviet consultations proceed and trade and other contacts expand, these differences could translate into disputes about policy, especially about the wisdom of offering more significant concessions to China than those offered so far. One such potentially controversial move would be the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Mongolia.

* * * * *

Orthodoxy of the "Old China Hands"

China specialists in the CPSU Central Committee agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Institute of the Far East--the major specialized academic organization--have been described as the orthodox wing of Soviet China watchers. This group includes veterans of the Sino-Soviet split who have become bureaucratically cautious and who view China as intrinsically anti-Soviet. They typically refer to the Deng Xiaoping post-Mao reform program as "Maoism without Mao."

Some US observers have discerned within this group two subgroups: one of "pragmatists," principally in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the

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Declassify: OADR (Mautner, M.)

Report 820-AR
April 16, 1984

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NRR 606-114/10 #11445
BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08

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other of ultra-orthodox specialists principally in party organizations. The Foreign Ministry pragmatists include Deputy Foreign Ministers Mikhail Kapitsa and Leonid Ilichev, as well as China specialist Sergey Tikhvinskiy (now rector of the Diplomatic Academy), all of whom have played key roles in the Sino-Soviet consultations and tend to emphasize the progress made in the last two years in such practical areas as trade, technical assistance, and exchanges.

The subgroup of party specialists, on the other hand, tends to be more pessimistic. It includes such men as Oleg Rakhmanin, deputy chief of the department responsible for liaison with ruling communist parties, who has been a prolific writer about China under various pseudonyms (e.g., Pravda's "I. Aleksandrov"), and Ivan Kovalenko, a deputy chief of the party's International Department responsible for Japan who also has an interest in China. The subgroup of party specialists generally emphasizes that no basic improvement in relations with China is possible as long as Beijing persists in its "three demands": that Moscow withdraw its military presence from Afghanistan and Mongolia and the Vietnamese do the same in Kampuchea.^{1/}

The views of the two subgroups are variously reflected in policy statements. Gromyko's election address on February 27, 1984, for example, followed the cautiously optimistic Chinese Foreign Ministry line. The address cited progress in Sino-Soviet consultations with no mention of the "obstacles" raised by Beijing. Four days later Chernenko stressed that the USSR would not negotiate concerning the interests of third countries, a reference to Beijing's three demands that presumably reflected the position of the more conservative subgroup. In any case, the difference is one of nuance and timing, and both views are encompassed within Moscow's negotiating strategy.

Soviet military officials undoubtedly must be included among the most orthodox of the establishment China watchers, although their views are much less accessible to Western observers. The Soviet Armed Forces for more than a decade have been engaged in augmenting and modernizing border defenses near China--an operation which by now has acquired bureaucratic momentum and created vested interests that will be difficult to budge. Furthermore, the Soviet military is accustomed to working with worst-case scenarios: It will continue to regard China and China's potential allies, the US and Japan, as the putative enemy, regardless of diplomatic considerations.

^{1/} See also INR Report 750-AR, "Soviet Perceptions of Contemporary China," January 4, 1984, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE, Decontrol: 3/31/84.

Impact of Less Orthodox Observers

The Soviet Union also has less orthodox China watchers, however, whose views may in fact become more significant as relations with Beijing develop. Some of these individuals are academicians, such as political scientist Fedor Burlatskiy, who are not primarily China specialists but have developed an interest in China for various reasons. Some are China scholars, such as L. P. Deliusin from the Institute of Oriental Studies, which generally specializes in more conventional Sinology and avoids contemporary China issues. The less orthodox commentators on China also include such figures as the popular and influential newspaper and television personality Aleksandr Bovin.

These observers have taken a particular interest in Deng Xiaoping's post-Mao reform program, perhaps in some cases because of the relevance of aspects of that program to the post-Stalin Soviet Union. The academicians in this group have long argued that Soviet Sinology itself needs reform, to get out of its ideological rut. The group tends to take a more optimistic view of China, interpreting Dengism as a return to socialism rather than a deviation and therefore arguing that China eventually will return to the Soviet model. Bovin has suggested in a television commentary that in the current Sino-Soviet consultations, even some of China's conditions--e.g., the question of military deployment near the border--might be negotiable if approached on a "reciprocal" basis.

All of the viewpoints described--except possibly that Deng's reforms might have applicability in the USSR--are part of Soviet establishment thinking. Among the China watchers mentioned, Burlatskiy has come the closest to stating that the problems of ineffectiveness and demoralization that Deng Xiaoping is addressing are actually generic to autocratic societies; but even Burlatskiy maintains a degree of ambiguity that prevents his writing from expressing overt dissidence. It thus has been possible for formulations developed by the less orthodox China watchers to be used by Soviet leaders, as Brezhnev did in Tashkent in 1979 when he offered an olive branch to Beijing in the form of calling China a "socialist" country. This has since become standard Soviet nomenclature, bringing to an end a period of several years during which China's "socialism" was debated by Soviet academics but avoided by Soviet leaders.

Degrees of Influence in Policy

The not-surprising fact that there are nuances in Soviet thinking about China does not affect present policy but may become more significant if the trend toward Sino-Soviet rapprochement continues. Eventually Moscow may work out a negotiating strategy that will try to accommodate Beijing's three "obstacles" without

compromising overriding Soviet interests. In the same way, Beijing may accept interpretations that amount to less than its full bill of demands. Without some mutual accommodation, there can be only a very limited rapprochement. But at the time of accommodation, factionalism and policy differences could prove a seriously disruptive factor in Moscow as well as in Beijing.

It is conceivable that the Kremlin leadership at some point in the process of consultation with Beijing will consider a dramatic gesture designed to elicit or respond to a corresponding Chinese move. The Soviets could, for example, agree to move a division from Mongolia back to the USSR without significantly degrading Soviet border defenses. Remaining in Mongolia would be four divisions as well as Mongolian forces that have been modernized in recent years. Moreover, the division that would be withdrawn could be reintroduced into Mongolia at any time. In any case, Mongolia constitutes a significant buffer against Chinese attack; it is virtually the only border area where the Soviets could conduct a defense in depth. Kremlin consideration of a token withdrawal from Mongolia nonetheless could become very controversial.

Such action would be supported by the less orthodox China specialists who would see it as useful encouragement of China's post-Mao effort to strengthen socialism through reform. The proposal might also be supported by Foreign Ministry pragmatists as a constructive diplomatic move to encourage a meaningful response from Beijing. But the orthodox China specialists are likely to be bitterly opposed, arguing that such a gesture would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and likely would only encourage Beijing in its intrinsically anti-Soviet orientation. The most adamant opposition might come from the military with its predilection for worst-case scenarios. Clearly only a decisive Soviet leadership could push such a proposal through its own policymaking apparatus.

Soviet moves regarding the consultations with Beijing so far have been well within the scope of the consensus among various groups of China specialists, however, and seem not yet to have been controversial. Differences in formulations, expressions of optimism or pessimism by various officials, and varying degrees of observance of the moratorium on polemics still reflect tactical moves rather than factionalism. But the potential for controversy well may be one of the ingredients that have kept the Soviet stance toward China relatively static, changing even less over time than the Chinese position toward the USSR.

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BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MAY 8, 1984

1. USSR-PRC: ECONOMIC PROGRESS DESPITE POLITICAL DEADLOCK

Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov will visit China for ten days beginning May 10, leading the highest-level Soviet economic delegation to visit the PRC since the 1950s. Progress is expected on trade and other economic issues, but deadlocked political issues will only be discussed in other forums during the coming months.

* * *

The visit is purposely reminiscent of the 1950s, when Arkhipov managed Soviet aid from its embassy in Beijing and became the friend of PRC elder statesmen. It is expected that discussions will be held on a long-term trade agreement and establishment of a joint economic committee--measures that the PRC has resisted in the past. Agreement may also be reached on a previous Soviet offer to renovate three or four of the major plants constructed with Soviet aid in the 1950s.

For Moscow, improvements in economic relations are seen as steps toward the eventual improvement of overall relations. Nevertheless, Moscow recognizes that it cannot match the West in volume of trade and technology transfer. For Beijing, the visit is an opportunity to gain more support for modernization, since Soviet technology may be cheaper and more adaptable than the state-of-the-art technology that Beijing is discussing with Western suppliers. Arkhipov's visit will also allow the PRC to receive a high-level Soviet delegation shortly after President Reagan's departure, thus demonstrating the efficacy of its "independent" foreign policy.

The political atmosphere for the visit is less than optimal. Moscow has criticized as inadequate Beijing's efforts during President Reagan's visit to maintain some distance from US positions on strategic issues. It is concerned about Chinese military action near the Vietnam border. And on the eve of Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow it is trying to extract an advantage from various issues relating to Korea. For Beijing, there is also the constant irritant of Moscow's refusal to negotiate the major strategic problems cited by Beijing as barriers to better relations.

The Arkhipov visit is not likely to lead to a dramatic breakthrough but will mark a continuing growth in Sino-Soviet economic relations. Political issues will not be deferred for long, however. PRC Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen is reportedly going to Moscow toward the end of the month to resume his talks with Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Kapitsa; regular Sino-Soviet political consultations will resume in October; and the two foreign ministers are scheduled to meet at the UNGA in New York this fall, if not earlier.