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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/24/2005

File Folder SOVIET UNION: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 2/3

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 34

YARHI-MILO

3411

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11424	CABLE	CHINA/USSR D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10; D UPHELD 12/27/2012 M554/1	26	1/8/1982	B1 B3
11416	MEMO	BREZHNEV MARCH 23 SPEECH IN TASHKENT R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	ND	B1
11417	REPORT	SOVIET WEEKLY R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	3/24/1982	B1
11418	REPORT	CHINA PAR 3/28/2011 F2006-114/10	1	4/12/1982	B1 B3
11411	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE MFN STATUS RENEWAL: ROMANIA, HUNGARY, AND CHINA R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10	2	5/24/1982	B1
11412	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT RE MFN STATUS RENEWAL: ROMANIA, HUNGARY, AND CHINA R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10	2	ND	B1
11419	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO CEAUSESCU R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder SOVIET UNION: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 2/3

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 34

YARHI-MILO

3411

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11420	MEMO	STOESSEL TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE RECOMMENDATION TO CONGRESS FOR EXTENSION OF JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER AUTHORITY <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	3	5/15/1982	B1
11421	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11420 <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	3	5/15/1982	B1
11423	REPORT	SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	1	6/2/1982	B1
11413	PAPER	USSR-CHINA <i>PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10</i>	1	ND	B1 B3
11414	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE BEIJING'S REACTION TO OUR TALKS WITH MOSCOW ON AFGHANISTAN <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	1	6/23/1982	B1
11422	CABLE	210946Z JUN 82 <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	2	6/21/1982	B1
11415	REPORT	CHINA <i>D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10; D UPHELD 12/27/2012 M554/1</i>	2	7/8/1982	B1 B3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's March 23 Speech in Tashkent

Brezhnev put the best possible public relations gloss on the Soviet approach to China at a moment of strain in US-China relations but without any hints of concession on the points which bother China most. They are unlikely to respond at a policy level; indeed the most the Soviets can probably hope for is small forward movement on academic and economic exchanges which they can then tout to the world as "relaxation."

In his first major reference to the PRC since February 1981, Brezhnev put his personal imprimatur on recent Soviet efforts to improve relations. Specifically, Brezhnev called for a resumption of border talks, actions to strengthen mutual trust on the borders, and efforts to broaden other areas of contact for mutual benefit. But it is clear from his gratuitous rejection of a "two Chinas" policy that Moscow's ploy was designed to capitalize on recent strains in US-PRC relations.

Brezhnev lamented the poor state of Sino-Soviet relations which the Soviet Union stated readiness to improve. He acknowledged that the Soviet Union was critical of "many aspects" of Chinese policy, but avoided any enumeration of Chinese shortcomings. The Soviet Union, he claimed, poses no threat to China nor does it harbor territorial claims.

Brezhnev's touting of Moscow's "admirable" relations with Mongolia, Vietnam and Afghanistan (in addition to its "model" relations with India) is indicative of the flaws in Soviet efforts to woo the PRC. It is precisely Moscow's policies vis-a-vis these countries which Beijing finds so repugnant. And, there is no indication in his speech that the Soviets are prepared to rethink any of these policies. China for its part considers Moscow's presence in Afghanistan, its troops on the Chinese border, and its support for Hanoi in Indochina

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NLRR FOI-114/10 7/14/16

BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08

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as major areas which must be addressed before any improvement in relations is possible.

Moreover, Brezhnev's reiteration of last September's offer to resume border talks, which the Chinese have accepted in principle without agreeing to set dates, is devoid of any element which would satisfy the Chinese insistence that the Soviets must recognize the existence of disputed territory. Brezhnev mentioned "possible measures to strengthen mutual trust in the area of the Sino-Soviet frontier" but this alludes to the Asian CBMs which have already been scorned by both China and Japan.

One area of the speech which may find some resonance in Beijing is the reference to the desirability of taking steps to improve economic, scientific and cultural relations. Recent reporting indicates increased Chinese receptivity to such contacts (e.g., delegations of Chinese gymnasts and economists recently visited Moscow) and current talks are expected to expand the levels of Sino-Soviet trade, albeit still to rather modest levels.

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

PIPES



Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Current Analysis Series

DECLASSIFIED

March 24, 1982

NLRR F06-114/10 7/14/17

BY Cd NARADATE 1/2/08 SOVIET WEEKLY

Brezhnev Turns to Asia

Speaking in the Central Asian city of Tashkent today, Brezhnev:

- claimed that world opinion approved of his March 16 initiative on nuclear arms in Europe and said it was now up to Western governments to respond;
- held up Soviet-Indian relations as a model for Asia;
- berated foreign efforts to spoil Soviet relations with Japan. He called on the Japanese to reconsider the Soviet proposal on confidence-building measures in Asia, work on which could be started on a bilateral basis;
- lamented the poor state of Sino-Soviet relations and said the USSR was prepared to come to terms on measures to improve them.

In an apparent effort to capitalize on Sino-US frictions, Brezhnev asserted the USSR had never accepted the concept of two Chinas. The USSR accepted China as a socialist country, had no territorial claims, and posed no threat to China. (C)

Kirilenko Still Absent

Kirilenko's signature on the obituary for Marshal Chuykov confirms that he retains his position on the Politburo. But he continues to miss public events. On March 22 he was absent from the honor guard for Chuykov and was not present for Brezhnev's departure for Tashkent. (C)

Follow-Up to Brezhnev's Threat

Moscow has sought to drive home the seriousness of its opposition to GLCM and Pershing II deployments, but the follow-up has done little to clarify Brezhnev's veiled threat to deploy weapons in Cuba.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

--Gromyko, at a luncheon for Czechoslovak foreign minister Chnoupek, called on Washington and other Western capitals to "weigh again and again" the meaning of Brezhnev's warning.

--Pravda's Yuriy Zhukov rhetorically asked, "Do you really think that the USSR would sit idle...?"

--And TASS, in a retort to Secretary Weinberger's statement that the US would take every measure to prevent the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, implied that it would be legitimate for the USSR to respond in similar fashion to the threat of PIIs and GLCMs in Europe.

Soviet officials have told Western correspondents that Brezhnev indeed had in mind the stationing of missiles in Cuba. In London, however, USA Institute Director Arbatov, according to a British press report, claimed there was "no basis at all" for speculation that the USSR intended to violate the 1962 understanding on Cuba. And in Moscow, USA Institute strategic expert Trofimenko and Izvestiya commentator Matveev avoided substantive responses when pressed on the point in private conversation. (S/EXDIS)

TASS Calls CW Charges "Dirty Lies"

TASS quickly denied published US intelligence on Soviet use of CW and toxins in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. It alleged US use of CW in Indochina and provisions of toxins to "bandit units" in Afghanistan. In its effort to deflect attention from the US study, TASS also claimed the US is preparing for large-scale stockpiling of CW agents in Europe. (C)

Drafted: INR/SEE analysts:kmw
x29194

Cleared: INR/CA - Mr. Stoddard
x22402

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - APRIL 12, 1982

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1. CHINA: NO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS

A major change in the Sino-Soviet relationship is unlikely in the near future, although the Chinese are willing to increase low-level non-political exchanges. Beijing remains firm in its anti-Soviet foreign policy, however, since it is aware that the Soviets are not likely to make the concessions China is demanding as prerequisites for ending the split with Moscow. The Chinese therefore do not see Sino-Soviet rapprochement as a viable alternative to good relations with the US.

* * *

The Chinese have embarked on a policy of expanded informal relations with the Soviet Union in order to reduce tensions. A Sino-Soviet trade agreement soon to be finalized probably will increase two-way trade substantially above the 1981 level of \$200 million and possibly above the 1980 level of \$400 million. The Chinese are also attempting to improve their people-to-people and technical contacts with the Soviets.

Beijing also has begun a serious effort to establish relations with pro-Soviet Communist Parties. Chinese interest in a rapprochement with the strongly pro-Soviet French Communist Party is intended to encourage independent tendencies within it, according to a clandestine report. The Chinese may improve relations with other Communist parties as well--e.g., the East German and Dutch--to mute criticism that Beijing simply engages in polemics with Moscow. China may additionally hope to encourage a large fraternal party turnout for its upcoming party congress.

These gestures, however, do not signal any change in China's basic anti-Soviet orientation. Beijing greeted Brezhnev's Tashkent speech with caution and suspicion, and top Chinese officials echoed the Foreign Ministry statement that the process of Sino-Soviet reconciliation requires deeds by Moscow, not merely words. By deeds, the Chinese mean a change in Soviet policy in Indochina or Afghanistan, or some reduction in Soviet strength along the Chinese border. The Soviets are unlikely to do any of this, despite their stated desire to improve relations and reduce tensions.

Beijing is using a number of channels--including media articles and comments to foreign diplomats--to make clear that it has no intention of playing a "Soviet card."

FOIA(b)(1), (3)

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NLRR F06-114/10 #11418

BY RW NARA DATE 3/28/11

PRC
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 24, 1982

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ACTION

NLRR F06-114/10 # 11411

BY C11 NARA DATE 6/25/09

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Most Favored Nation (MFN) Status Renewal: Romania, Hungary and the People's Republic of China

Walter Stoessel's memorandum to the President (Tab C) recommends MFN be renewed for Romania, Hungary and the PRC. Your memorandum to the President (Tab I) endorses State's recommendations but proposes that the President a) issue a strong statement to Congress warning that if Romania's emigration procedures do not improve, its 1983 MFN status would be jeopardized (Tab A-1), and b) send a letter of concern to Romanian President Ceausescu (Tab B). The President's statement should not be released until after June 1 -- to do so would adversely affect the Buckley credit discussions in Europe. (C)

NSC (Bailey, Pipes and I) and Treasury support these proposals as:

- MFN extension to Romania has not fostered freer emigration. Since Romania had been granted MFN in 1975, Jewish emigration to Israel dropped from 4,000 to 1,000 in 1981.
- In Congress, both conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats (Tab D), have urged the President to exert strong pressure on Romania to improve its unsatisfactory emigration record.
- The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations also has urged the President to make a strong statement on Romania to Congress this year (Tab II).
- In 1981, Secretary Haig and other U.S. officials repeatedly raised our serious concerns about Romania's emigration record in discussion with President Ceausescu, Foreign Minister Andrei and the former Romanian Ambassador to the U.S., Ionescu -- all with marginal results. (C)

OMB recommends (Tab III) that MFN status be renewed with these countries. At Tab A-2 is the Presidential Determination. Speech-writers have cleared all texts. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 24, 1988.

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
 - Tab A-1 Statement to Congress with Recommendation
 - Tab A-2 Presidential Determination
 - Tab B Letter to Romanian President Ceausescu
 - Tab C Memorandum from Walter Stoessel
 - Tab D Letter from 23 Senators

- Tab II Letter from the Conference of Presidents of
 Major American Jewish Organizations

- Tab III Recommendation from OMB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Most Favored Nation (MFN) Status Renewal: Romania,
Hungary and the People's Republic of China

Issue: Should MFN status for Romania, Hungary and the PRC be extended for 1982? (C)

Facts: The Trade Act of 1974 prohibits the granting of MFN treatment to any nonmarket economy country which restricts emigration. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment authorizes you to waive these prohibitions before June 3, if you determine that a waiver will foster freer emigration and if you receive appropriate assurances from the country concerned. (C)

Discussion: MFN should be extended to Hungary and the PRC as both have established acceptable emigration practices which largely comply with the terms of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. MFN should be extended also to Romania this year since Romanian emigration to the U.S. has been satisfactory, the U.S. has benefitted from an independent Romanian foreign policy, and U.S.-Romanian relations are viewed as a litmus test of a policy of differentiation toward Eastern Europe. However, Romania has not promoted freer Jewish emigration. Since Romania had been granted MFN in 1975, Jewish emigration to Israel annually dropped from 4,000 to 1,000 in 1981. Moreover, Romania has a backlog of over 672 emigration cases. In 1981, this matter was raised repeatedly by Al Haig and other U.S. officials in discussions with Romanian President Ceausescu, Foreign Minister Andrei and the Romanian Ambassador to the U.S. -- with marginal results. (C)

The existing Congressional and American-Jewish community's mood this year is one of grave concern about Romania's emigration policies. The Conference of Presidents of the Major American Jewish Organizations urges you to encourage the Romanians "to improve their performance substantially." Twenty-three Senators sent you a letter (Tab D) indicating they are "unpersuaded that another extension of MFN for Romania will have the desired effect." (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review May 24, 1988.

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NLRR F06-114/10 # 11412

BY CN NARA DATE 6/25/09

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To meet these objectives, you should a) send a strong statement to Congress (Tab A-1, Transmittal and Recommendation for Extension of Waiver Authority) warning that if Romania's emigration procedures do not improve and the rate of Romanian Jewish emigration to Israel does not increase substantially in 1982, Romania's MFN status in 1983 would be jeopardized and b) send President Ceausescu a letter (Tab B) explaining your concerns and outlining the Congressional and public sentiment on this issue. Your statement and determination should not be released until after June 1, otherwise Buckley's credit discussions in Europe would be adversely affected. (C)

State, Treasury and OMB recommend that MFN be renewed for these countries. Walter Stoessel's memorandum to you is at Tab C; your determination is at Tab A-2. Speechwriters have cleared all texts. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

Yes No

- 1. That you execute the Determination and approve the Recommendation for Extension of Waiver Authority at Tabs A-1 and A-2 for transmittal to Congress on June 2.
- 2. That you sign the letter to President Ceausescu of Romania at Tab B.

Attachments:

- Tab A-1 Statement to Congress with Recommendation
- Tab A-2 Presidential Determination
- Tab B Letter to President Ceausescu of Romania
- Tab C Memorandum from Walter Stoessel
- Tab D Letter from 23 Senators

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

A

1

2

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In accordance with subsection 402(d)(5) of the Trade Act of 1974, I transmit herewith my recommendation for a further 12-month extension of the authority to waive subsection (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Act.

I include as part of my recommendation my determination that further extension of the waiver authority, and continuation of the waivers applicable to the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Hungarian People's Republic, and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402.

This recommendation also includes my reasons for recommending the extension of waiver authority and for my determination that continuation of the three waivers currently in effect will substantially promote the objectives of section 402. It also states my concern about Romania's emigration record this year and the need for its reexamination.

RONALD REAGAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

June , 1982

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RECOMMENDATION FOR EXTENSION OF WAIVER AUTHORITY

I recommend to the Congress that the waiver authority granted by subsection 402(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act") be further extended for twelve months. Pursuant to subsection 402(d)(5) of the Act, I have today determined that further extension of such authority, and continuation of the waivers currently applicable to the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Hungarian People's Republic, and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act. However, I am concerned about Romania's emigration record this year and suggest it be reexamined. My determination is attached to this Recommendation and is incorporated herein.

The general waiver authority conferred by section 402(c) of the Act is an important means for the strengthening of mutually beneficial relations between the United States and certain countries of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China. The waiver authority has permitted us to conclude and maintain in force bilateral trade agreements with Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China. These agreements continue to be fundamental elements in our political and economic relations with those countries, including our important productive exchanges on human rights and emigration matters. Moreover, continuation of the waiver authority might permit future expansion of our bilateral relations with other countries now subject to subsection 402(a) and (b) of the Act, should circumstances permit. I believe that these considerations clearly warrant this recommendation for renewal of the general waiver authority.

I also believe that continuing the current waivers applicable to Romania, Hungary and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act.

Romania: Emigration from Romania to the United States has increased substantially since the waiver has been in effect. In 1981, nearly 2,400 persons emigrated from Romania to the U.S. This is nearly six times the pre-MFN level of emigration and represents an optimum number of emigrants under U.S. immigration procedures in effect that year.

However, I am gravely concerned about the Romanian Government's failure to improve its repressive emigration procedures and the significant decrease in Romanian Jewish emigration to Israel, which is disturbing. This emigration has dropped from an annual rate of 4,000 prior to the 1975 extension of MFN to Romania, to the current (1981) low level of 972. Furthermore, contrary to the 1979 agreement with American Jewish leaders, Romania continues to maintain a considerable backlog of unresolved long-standing emigration cases. This backlog at present involves at least 652 cases. Also, contrary to the 1979 agreement, the

Romanian Government has not improved its emigration procedures. The process is cumbersome and plagued with obstacles for those who merely wish to obtain emigration application forms. All these factors demonstrate Romania's negativistic emigration policy which clearly contravenes the intent and purpose of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

In waiving the prohibition of MFN renewal for Romania this year, I have weighed the above factors within the context of the satisfactory state of overall U.S.-Romanian relations. However, I intend to inform the Romanian Government that unless a noticeable improvement in its emigration procedures takes place and the rate of Jewish emigration to Israel increases significantly, Romania's MFN renewal for 1983 will be in serious jeopardy.

Hungary: Hungary's performance during the past year has continued to reflect a positive approach to emigration cases. The majority of Hungarians seeking to emigrate receive permission to do so without great difficulty. Few problem cases arise and these can be discussed constructively with the Hungarian Government. Most difficult cases ultimately are favorably resolved. The relatively liberal Hungarian domestic situation seems to defuse any pent-up demand to emigrate and the actual number of citizens who apply to leave Hungary is apparently small.

People's Republic of China: During the past year, China has continued its commitment to open emigration, exemplified by its undertaking in the September 1980 U.S.-China Consular Convention to facilitate family reunification. The Convention was approved by the Senate on December 17, 1981. The instruments of ratification were exchanged on January 19, 1982. U.S. Foreign Service posts in China issued over 6,920 immigrant visas in FY-1980, and over 15,293 nonimmigrant visas for business, study, and family visits. The comparable figures for 1980 were 3,400 and 15,893, respectively. More than 8,000 Chinese are now in the United States for long-term study and research (approximately half of this number is privately sponsored). As has been the case for the past several years, the numerical limits imposed on entry to the U.S. by our immigration law continue to be a more significant impediment to immigration from China than Chinese Government exit controls. The Chinese Government is aware of our interest in open emigration, and extension of the waiver will encourage the Chinese to maintain liberal travel and emigration policies.

In light of these considerations, I have determined that continuation of the waivers applicable to Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act.

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT:

Determination under Subsection 402(d)
(5) and (d)(5)(C) of the Trade Act of
1974 -- Continuation of Waiver Authority

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Trade Act of 1974, (Public Law 93-618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978) (hereinafter "the Act"), I determine, pursuant to Subsection 402(d)(5) and (d)(5)(C) of the Act, that the further extension of the waiver authority granted by Subsection 402(c) of the Act will substantially promote the objectives of Section 402 of the Act. I further determine the continuation of the waivers applicable to the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Hungarian People's Republic and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of Section 402 of the Act.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

B

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

As you are aware, Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status renewal for Romania will soon be considered by the U.S. Congress. I am required by law to provide Congress with a determination whether such status is to be renewed. After carefully reviewing this issue, I have decided to recommend MFN renewal for Romania in 1982. My decision is predicated on the level of Romanian emigration to the United States in 1981, on the good political relations and mutually beneficial economic intercourse between our countries, and my deep respect for Romania's pursuit of an independent foreign policy.

Despite these positive developments, however, I am gravely concerned about a constant irritant in U.S.-Romanian relations -- Romania's policy on Jewish emigration to Israel. Since Romania had been extended MFN status in 1975, the level of Jewish emigration to Israel has declined by some 75 percent. Furthermore, notwithstanding the 1979 agreement between American Jewish leaders and the Romanian Government, a considerable backlog of long-standing cases has been left unresolved. Contrary to this agreement, Romanian emigration authorities continue to pose numerous obstacles to those Jews desiring to emigrate to Israel.

These facts have engendered a strong public reaction in the United States. I have received letters of concern from American-Jewish leaders and from a large number of prominent members of Congress such as Senators Moynihan, Helms and Jepsen, and Congressmen Solarz and Dornan. Given the existing public

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BY CN NARADATE 1/2/08

sentiment, I expect that, unless there is a marked improvement in Romanian emigration policies for those desiring to go to Israel, MFN renewal for Romania in 1983 is likely to provoke an even sharper debate. Your personal intervention on this matter, I am confident, would have a favorable impact and preclude such an unfortunate development.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Nicolae Ceausescu
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Bucharest

C

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NLRR Feb-114/10 #11470

BY C.S. NARADATE 1/2/08THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1982

82 MAY 15 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting

SUBJECT: Recommendation to Congress for Extension
of Jackson-Vanik Waiver Authority

The Jackson-Vanik waivers for Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China, and the three related trade agreements establishing nondiscriminatory ("MFN") trade treatment, are important elements in our overall relations towards Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China. Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 prohibits the granting of most favored nation treatment, or of government financing or credits, or the conclusion of trade agreements, with any nonmarket economy country which imposes restrictions on emigration.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment authorizes the President to waive these prohibitions if he determines that waivers will promote the objective of freer emigration from the country concerned and if he receives appropriate assurances from that country. The Trade Act requires that you recommend to Congress each year that this waiver authority be continued.

Section 402 (d) (5) of the Trade Act of 1974 requires that you recommend extension of your waiver authority to Congress by June 3. If you do not, the existing waivers for Romania, Hungary and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and your authority to extend MFN to those countries will lapse and our trade agreements will have to be suspended.

MFN treatment and bilateral trade agreements are very important components of our overall bilateral relationships with all three countries. A termination of MFN eligibility would seriously set back our relations without any corresponding benefits for us. It would give all three countries, in their separate ways, reason to consider reversing efforts of past years to reduce their dependence on the USSR. Failure to renew MFN would deprive us of an effective instrument which we have used to promote freer emigration. It would also hurt our efforts to ensure equitable treatment for U.S. companies in these markets and protect our firms' industrial property rights. Loss of MFN would lead to a very significant drop in our levels of bilateral trade and would result in these countries treating U.S. firms as suppliers of last resort with significant damage to our export sales.

CONFIDENTIAL
(GDS 4/11/88)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A majority vote by either House of Congress may override your recommendation to extend either your general waiver authority or any of the individual waivers. Our consultation with Congress indicates there is little opposition to renewal of waivers for any of the three countries. Of the three, Romania is most likely to cause difficulties. Romanian emigration policies, though improved, continue to attract criticism from some quarters and there has been concern from certain U.S. church groups over alleged Romanian harassment of individuals engaged in the distribution of Bibles.

As required by the Trade Act, the attached draft recommendation to Congress explains the value of the Jackson-Vanik waiver authority in our economic and political relations with Eastern Europe and the PRC. It also explains the reasons for determining that continuation of the three existing waivers will promote the objective of freer emigration from Romania, Hungary and the PRC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you execute the attached Determination, approve the attached Recommendation for Extension of Waiver Authority, and transmit both documents to Congress before June 3.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Transmittal Message
- Tab 2 - Recommendation for Extension
- Tab 3 - Presidential Determination

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Drafted by: EB/TDC/EWT - DBKursch ~~OK~~
Clearances: EB/TDC - DLamb
STR - MOrr
Commerce - JBurgess
EUR/EE - RBecker ~~OK~~
MPatterson
EA/C - RMueller
L/EB - RElliot

D

5/24/82

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN
NEW YORK

49

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We want to share with you our concern about the severe oppression suffered by Christian groups in Romania, the tremendous decline in Romanian Jewish emigration in recent years, and the major cultural and social deprivation experienced by the Hungarian minority in Romania.

You will soon be making a recommendation to the Congress on the renewal of Most Favored Nation trading status for Romania. We urge that before you make the recommendation U.S. officials engage in serious and intensive discussions with the Romanian Government, making clear that your Administration shares the Congressional view of the need for Romania to humanize its treatment of religious and cultural minorities, and to raise the rate of Jewish emigration to the level of the years prior to the granting of MFN to Romania.

Documents and other information reaching the Helsinki Commission, private organizations such as Amnesty International and Radio Free Europe, demonstrate beyond doubt the seriousness of a situation previously underestimated in official quarters in Washington. They indicate ample use of prisons, labor camps and psychiatric facilities by the Romanian authorities in the apparently deliberate harassment of Baptists, Pentecostals, Orthodox and other religious groups, the exclusion of believers from educational institutions and jobs; forced assimilation of two and a half million Hungarians and the remorseless diminution of their educational and cultural facilities; extraordinary obstacles placed in the way of would-be emigrants, including job dismissals and demotions, intimidation, military conscription, and the lengthy separation of families and affianced couples. In a region of the world noted for the general deprivation of human rights and civil liberties, Romania has distinguished itself by enforcing the separation of more affianced couples than in all of the rest of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, put together.

Though section 402 of the 1974 Trade Reform Act relates expressly to emigration, we believe emigration performance has a broader significance as a visible measure of a government's commitment to other basic human rights. We have therefore been alarmed by the precipitous drop in Romanian emigration to Israel from an annual rate of three to four thousand in the years before the 1975 awarding of MFN status to Romania to barely one thousand in recent years. The first three months of 1982, moreover, show a monthly average of only 54, compared with 250 to 350 just a few years ago.

The monthly rate of Romanian emigration to the U.S. during 1980 and 81 was over 200; Israel, with a far larger Romanian family base than the U.S., should not have less.

Accordingly, we would urge the Administration to note the Recommendations of the Senate Finance Committee in the Fall of 1979 following the hearings of its International trade Subcommittee:

to initiate discussions with Romania intended to lead to more specific assurances regarding emigration, such as those which preceded the granting of MFN to Hungary The Committee understands the difficulty of such an undertaking but nevertheless believes a renewed, more aggressive effort must be made.


We would also draw your attention to Senator Henry Jackson's 1981 message to the International Trade Subcommittee, with which the rest of us wholeheartedly agree:


It is necessary for the Romanian (authorities) to do much better with regard to emigration to Israel They should more than double the annual number they are approving for emigration to Israel.

Finally, we remind you that there are a number of instances of Romanians who have been trying to emigrate to join family members in the West for as long as a dozen years. These long unresolved cases simply must be resolved if Romania is to continue to enjoy Most Favored Nation trading status.


MFN was granted to Romania in 1975 in hopes it would encourage freer emigration and greater freedom at home. Since then, however, emigration has fallen off and repression at home has continued unabated. We hope that your Administration will be able to report to Congress greater progress on these issues than we are currently aware has been made. At this point, we are unpersuaded that another extension of MFN for Romania will have the desired effect.

Sincerely,


William L. Armstrong


Daniel Patrick Moynihan


George J. Mitchell


Jesse Helms

Jim McClure
James A. McClure

J. James Exon
J. James Exon

Carl Levin
Carl Levin

John P. East
John P. East

Charles E. Grassley
Charles E. Grassley

Claiborne Pell
Claiborne Pell

Christopher J. Dodd
Christopher J. Dodd

William S. Cohen
William S. Cohen

Mack Mattingly
Mack Mattingly

Edward Zorinsky
Edward Zorinsky

Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
Robert W. Kasten, Jr.

Patrick J. Leahy
Patrick J. Leahy

H. John Heinz, III
H. John Heinz, III

Steven D. Symms
Steven D. Symms

Roger W. Jepsen
Roger W. Jepsen

Rudy Boschwitz
Rudy Boschwitz

Dennis DeConcini
Dennis DeConcini

Alfonse M. D'Amato
Alfonse M. D'Amato

Howard M. Metzenbaum
Howard M. Metzenbaum

** This letter is still being circulated in the Senate for further signatures. The above reflects all the signatures as of May 24, 1982.

II

Memorandum

TO: Dr. Richard Pipes, National Security Council

FROM: Howard Squadron, Chairman, Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organizations

DATE: May 19, 1982

Since Congress first approved MFN for Romania in 1975, Jewish emigration has steadily declined and now seems frozen at just under 1,000 persons a year.

Although that decline can be partially explained by the shrinking pool of would-be emigrants, an additional reason for the decline is the Romanian government's policy of active discouragement of all emigration, taking the form of harrassment and even intimidation of applicants.

Emigration to Israel has dropped from 2,372 in 1975, to 1,982 in 1976, 1,347 in 1977, 1,141 in 1978, to 991 in 1979. It rose slightly in 1980, to 1,043, but dropped again last year to 973. The number of persons leaving this year does not provide much encouragement.

In 1979, the Conference of Presidents reached an agreement with the Romanian government which the Conference hoped and expected would facilitate emigration. That agreement created a mechanism by which the Presidents Conference would, on a regular basis, receive lists of Jews seeking to emigrate, which could then be brought to the attention of Romanian authorities for favorable action. However, there continues to be large backlogs of cases, some of them going back as far as 1978 and 1979. This year the backlog is 652 names, but since the President's Conference has not received any lists since last October, it may be that the backlog is actually larger.

The 1979 agreement also carried the understanding that there would be no official obstacles to Jews seeking to leave or to obtaining application forms in the first place. Our experience since that time, however, suggests that would-be Jewish emigrants continue to face impediments.

We believe that MFN has been a useful tool for the United States to encourage Romania to continue its relatively independent foreign policy. We also believe that MFN is useful as leverage to induce the Romanians to relax their emigration policies. However, we do not believe that this leverage has been used as effectively as it might be.

We would hope that the President's message to Congress on Romanian MFN will reflect our concerns with Romania's performance. We would also hope that what the President will say will encourage the Romanians to improve their performance substantially between now and the deadline for Congressional approval of another renewal. We believe that this is the optimum time for the Romanians to make that improvement, before the pressures of the Congressional hearings on MFN are brought to bear.

HS/bas





EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

3396

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MAY 20 1982

MEMORANDUM TO: MICHAEL O. WHEELER
FROM: Philip A. DuSault
SUBJECT: Extension of Jackson-Vanik Waiver Authority

This responds to your request of May 17 for OMB comments on a proposal by the Department of State that the President waive the prohibitions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for Hungary, Romania, and the People's Republic of China. This would extend MFN tariff treatment to these countries for an additional year.

OMB supports the State analysis of the importance of extension of MFN treatment to the U.S. trade relationship with these countries. As to whether the extension of the Jackson-Vanik waiver will encourage emigration from Eastern Europe and promote East-West policy objectives of the United States, we defer to the National Security Council.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1982

82 MAY 15 4 41 22

NLRR FOI-114/10 #11421
 BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting

SUBJECT: Recommendation to Congress for Extension
 of Jackson-Vanik Waiver Authority

The Jackson-Vanik waivers for Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China, and the three related trade agreements establishing nondiscriminatory ("MFN") trade treatment, are important elements in our overall relations towards Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China. Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 prohibits the granting of most favored nation treatment, or of government financing or credits, or the conclusion of trade agreements, with any nonmarket economy country which imposes restrictions on emigration.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment authorizes the President to waive these prohibitions if he determines that waivers will promote the objective of freer emigration from the country concerned and if he receives appropriate assurances from that country. The Trade Act requires that you recommend to Congress each year that this waiver authority be continued.

Section 402 (d) (5) of the Trade Act of 1974 requires that you recommend extension of your waiver authority to Congress by June 3. If you do not, the existing waivers for Romania, Hungary and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and your authority to extend MFN to those countries will lapse and our trade agreements will have to be suspended.

MFN treatment and bilateral trade agreements are very important components of our overall bilateral relationships with all three countries. A termination of MFN eligibility would seriously set back our relations without any corresponding benefits for us. It would give all three countries, in their separate ways, reason to consider reversing efforts of past years to reduce their dependence on the USSR. Failure to renew MFN would deprive us of an effective instrument which we have used to promote freer emigration. It would also hurt our efforts to ensure equitable treatment for U.S. companies in these markets and protect our firms' industrial property rights. Loss of MFN would lead to a very significant drop in our levels of bilateral trade and would result in these countries treating U.S. firms as suppliers of last resort with significant damage to our export sales.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 (GDS 4/11/88)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A majority vote by either House of Congress may override your recommendation to extend either your general waiver authority or any of the individual waivers. Our consultation with Congress indicates there is little opposition to renewal of waivers for any of the three countries. Of the three, Romania is most likely to cause difficulties. Romanian emigration policies, though improved, continue to attract criticism from some quarters and there has been concern from certain U.S. church groups over alleged Romanian harassment of individuals engaged in the distribution of Bibles.

No issue - Romania is problematic

As required by the Trade Act, the attached draft recommendation to Congress explains the value of the Jackson-Vanik waiver authority in our economic and political relations with Eastern Europe and the PRC. It also explains the reasons for determining that continuation of the three existing waivers will promote the objective of freer emigration from Romania, Hungary and the PRC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you execute the attached Determination, approve the attached Recommendation for Extension of Waiver Authority, and transmit both documents to Congress before June 3.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Transmittal Message
- Tab 2 - Recommendation for Extension
- Tab 3 - Presidential Determination

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Drafted by: EB/TDC/EWT - DBKursch ~~OK~~
Clearances: EB/TDC - DLamb
STR - MOrr
Commerce - JBurgess
EUR/EE - RBecker ~~OK~~
MPatterson
EA/C - RMueller
L/EB - RElliot

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In accordance with subsection 402(d)(5) of the Trade Act of 1974, I transmit herewith my recommendation for a further 12-month extension of the authority to waive subsection (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Act.

I include as part of my recommendation my determination that further extension of the waiver authority, and continuation of the waivers applicable to the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Hungarian People's Republic, and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402.

This recommendation also includes my reasons for recommending the extension of waiver authority and for my determination that continuation of the three waivers currently in effect will substantially promote the objectives of section 402.

RONALD REAGAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

June , 1982

RECOMMENDATION FOR EXTENSION OF WAIVER AUTHORITY

I recommend to the Congress that the waiver authority granted by subsection 402(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act") be further extended for twelve months. Pursuant to subsection 402(d)(5) of the Act, I have today determined that further extension of such authority, and continuation of the waivers currently applicable to the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Hungarian People's Republic, and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act. My determination is attached to this Recommendation and is incorporated herein.

The general waiver authority conferred by section 402(c) of the Act is an important means for the strengthening of mutually beneficial relations between the United States and certain countries of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China. The waiver authority has permitted us to conclude and maintain in force bilateral trade agreements with Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China. These agreements continue to be fundamental elements in our political and economic relations with those countries, including our important productive exchanges on human rights and emigration matters. Moreover, continuation of the waiver authority might permit future expansion of our bilateral relations with other countries now subject to subsection 402(a) and (b) of the Act, should circumstances permit. I believe that these considerations clearly warrant this recommendation for renewal of the general waiver authority.

I also believe that continuing the current waivers applicable to Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act.

Romania - Emigration from Romania to the United States has increased substantially since the waiver has been in effect. In 1981, nearly 2,400 persons emigrated from Romania to the United States. This is nearly six times the pre-MFN level of emigration and represents an optimum number of emigrants under U.S. immigration procedures in effect in that year. Continuation of the waiver will also contribute to maintaining a framework for dialogue with the Romanian Government on emigration procedures, emigration to Israel, binational marriages, and other humanitarian problems.

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Hungary - Hungary's performance during the past year has continued to reflect a positive approach to emigration cases. The majority of Hungarians seeking to emigrate receive permission to do so without great difficulty. Few problem cases arise and these can be discussed constructively with the Hungarian Government. Most difficult cases ultimately are favorably resolved. The relatively liberal Hungarian domestic situation seems to defuse any pent-up demand to emigrate and the actual number of citizens who apply to leave Hungary is apparently small.

People's Republic of China - During the past year, China has continued its commitment to open emigration, exemplified by its undertaking in the September 1980 U.S.-China Consular Convention to facilitate family reunification. The Convention was approved by the Senate on December 17, 1981. Instruments of ratification were exchanged on January 19, 1982. U.S. Foreign Service posts in China issued over 6,920 immigrant visas in FY-1980, and over 15,293 nonimmigrant visas for business, study, and family visits. The comparable figures for 1980 were 3,400 and 15,893 respectively. More than 8,000 Chinese are now in the United States for long term study and research (approximately half of this number is privately sponsored). As has been the case for the past several years, the numerical limits imposed on entry to the U.S. by our immigration law continue to be a more significant impediment to immigration from China than Chinese Government exit controls. The Chinese Government is aware of our interest in open emigration, and extension of the waiver will encourage the Chinese to maintain liberal travel and emigration policies.

In light of these considerations, I have determined that continuation of the waivers applicable to Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act.

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT:

Determination under Subsection 402(d)
(5) and (d)(5)(C) of the Trade Act of
1974 -- Continuation of Waiver Authority

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Trade Act of 1974, (Public Law 93-618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978) (hereinafter "the Act"), I determine, pursuant to Subsection 402(d)(5) and (d)(5)(C) of the Act, that the further extension of the waiver authority granted by Subsection 402(c) of the Act will substantially promote the objectives of Section 402 of the Act. I further determine the continuation of the waivers applicable to the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Hungarian People's Republic and the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of Section 402 of the Act.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

CHINA 63
6/2/82

2. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: AUTHORITATIVE MOSCOW COMMENTARY HINTS AT NEW PATHS

The authoritative Aleksandrov commentary (Pravda May 20) on Sino-Soviet relations confirms and expands upon Brezhnev's Tashkent line of last March. Moscow appears to be signalling to Beijing an interest in discussing ways to reduce the Sino-Soviet military confrontation in Asia.

* * *

The article appeared simultaneously with the announcement that the Kremlin's ranking China expert, Mikhail Kapitsa, had arrived in Beijing a week earlier for his annual visit. Aleksandrov expounded at length on past Soviet efforts to improve relations with the PRC. He regretted that China had been unresponsive thus far to Soviet overtures. Nonetheless, Aleksandrov underscored Moscow's willingness to continue its efforts on a step-by-step basis, if that was what Beijing preferred.

Aleksandrov's reiteration of Brezhnev's earlier proposals for confidence-building measures (CBMs) applicable to the Sino-Soviet border area and a resumption of Sino-Soviet border talks reflects Moscow's preferred course. The USSR seems to have concluded that this approach is not hopeless. The Chinese have issued scathing commentaries about Asian CBMs, but they have not rejected them outright. The Soviets may be calculating that Beijing can eventually be persuaded to consider CBMs in the context of border talks. The Chinese have agreed in principle to resume border talks. Thus far, however, they have been unwilling to schedule them.

Aleksandrov's juxtaposition of these two issues suggests that Moscow envisions some possibility of building on the various bilateral contacts of recent months. The article alludes to one concrete incentive for both sides in this regard--the economic costs of military confrontation. Brezhnev's Komsomol Congress speech, delivered just after Kapitsa's arrival in Beijing, signalled another, namely, that the USSR was prepared to negotiate limitations and reductions of missiles deployed in the Eastern USSR. The Soviets apparently hope that the PRC, if faced with the prospect of serious INF and START talks between Moscow and the West, will recognize the need to consider the consequences of these negotiations on its own security interests in the Asian theater.

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NLRR F06-114/10 74/11423

BY CA NARA DATE 1/2/08

64

USSR-CHINA: NO EARLY BREAKTHROUGH, BUT SOVIETS HAVE HOPES

(b) (1)
(b) (3)

Recent Soviet statements indicate no expectation of an early improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, Soviet observers are now putting a more positive gloss on Chinese internal developments than was the case in the past. Many even profess to see reason to hope that Beijing will eventually adopt a foreign policy more favorable to the USSR.

* * *

The most pessimistic of the recent rash of assessments appeared in the current issue of the Soviet party journal, Kommunist

The article harshly denounced Beijing's "direct collusion with imperialist reactionaries" and claimed the "heritage of Maoism" continues to dominate Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Although the writer contends that Sino-Soviet relations are unlikely to improve any time soon, he does point out the possibility of future Sino-American differences and he notes Brezhnev's observation at the April Party Congress that domestic changes underway in China might lead in time to a less antagonistic Chinese posture toward the Soviet Union.

Other Soviet comments echo condemnation of China's present course, but several are more optimistic about the future:

--Mikhail Kapitsa,

[redacted] expected Beijing eventually to adopt a "multi-polar" foreign policy, perhaps after China gets what it wants from the west.

--[redacted] Kapitsa's visit to China in April was more successful than his trip last year; although there was no substantive progress, the atmosphere was more positive. The Soviet diplomat also claimed he saw evidence in the Chinese press of an ongoing debate over Sino-Soviet relations. This debate suggested to him that Beijing was reconsidering its hostile stance toward the USSR.

--Alexander Bovin, senior Izvestiya political commentator, told Japanese journalists in late April that he expected Sino-Soviet relations to be "normalized" by the late 1980's. He claimed that domestic changes in China reflected a "return to good sense" and that these changes would be reflected in Chinese foreign policy.

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NLS F06-114/10 #114/3

By ADJ, NARA, Date 7/18/08

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

June 23, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT:

Beijing's Reaction to our Talks with Moscow
on Afghanistan

The attached dispatch from our Embassy in Beijing (Tab I) indicates that China is puzzled and worried about our "expert" level talks with Moscow concerning Afghanistan. I fully share Mr. Chen Songlu's misgivings. ~~(S)~~

Attachment:

Tab I Beijing's cable 4123, dated 21 June

SECRETDerivative from State
Review June 23, 2002.

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NLRR F06-114/10 #11414BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 6/22/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, AF, CH
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ALLIES ON U. S. -SOVIET DIALOGUE
ON AFGHANISTAN-CHINA

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HAVING REQUESTED APPOINTMENT ON JUNE 17, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAS GIVEN MORNING APPOINTMENT ON JUNE 19 WITH CHEN SONGLU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE SECOND ASIAN DIVISION. AFTER POLITICAL COUNSELOR HAD PRESENTED THE POINTS IN REFTEL, CHEN REPLIED THAT THE PROPOSED U. S. -SOVIET EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN WAS A NEW DEVELOPMENT AND WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED BY THE CHINESE SIDE. PROVIDING SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS, HOWEVER, CHEN EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE TALKS WOULD EXERT ANY NEW EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND MIGHT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE INDIRECT TALKS IN GENEVA, CHEN SAID THE U. S. -SOVIET TALKS ON THE SUBJECT MIGHT WELL BE MISCONSTRUED.

3. CHEN SAID THAT THE CHINESE SIDE FULLY APPRECIATED THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE U. S. IS TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS CONSISTENT WITH THE FOUR PRINCIPLES. BUT HE SUSPECTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO TALKS BECAUSE THEY WOULD BELIEVE IT WOULD BE TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. HE WONDERED IF WORD OF THE TALKS SHOULD LEAK OUT, WHAT EFFECT THIS MIGHT HAVE ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN IN ITS FORTHCOMING SESSION. CHEN STRESSED THAT BEIJING BELIEVES ISOLATION OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS ISSUE IN THE UN AND ELSEWHERE SHOULD BE THE MAIN POLITICAL GOAL IN OPPOSING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. CHEN ASKED WHAT HAD PERSUADED THE DEPARTMENT TO PROPOSE SUCH TALKS AT THIS TIME.

4. THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR REITERATED THAT WE HAD NO ILLUSIONS OR HIGH EXPECTATIONS ABOUT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. OUR PURPOSE WOULD BE TO DRIVE HOME TO THE SOVIETS THAT WITHOUT MOVEMENT ON THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM, U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS COULD NOT FUNDAMENTALLY IMPROVE. THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUGGESTED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION THE KABUL GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE HAPPY WITH THE U. S. -SOVIET TALKS AND SHOULD WORD LEAK OUT, IT WOULD ONLY UNDERSCORE THE KEY SOVIET ROLE ON THE

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BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIJING 8091

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AFGHANISTAN ISSUE. HUMMEL
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